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Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut
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Scope and purpose
In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, 'Global Histories: a Student Journal' aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

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Copyright and publication dates

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Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

Thank you for your interest in this fourth edition of *Global Histories: A Student Journal*. In this year's autumn edition, we have again assembled an impressive array of research articles that together give an insight into the manifold opportunities connected to global history as a historical approach pursued from a student perspective.

The eight research articles in this edition cover an wide scope of locations and languages, and we are especially grateful for the opportunity to explore the benefits of global history approaches across different temporalities. This is exemplified by contributions drawing attention to unexpected agents shaping early modern globality but equally by several studies that transcend the focus on specific time periods by stressing the long-lasting continuities of certain cultural preconceptions or discursive patterns. The articles in question point out how references to the imagined pasts of (national) communities develop in the public sphere as political arguments as they are used for purposes of identification and delineation.

In the editorial team, we have also always been interested in interdisciplinary approaches to our field and are happy to include several contributions that widen our understanding of the possibilities of global history if it comes together with methodologies, concerns, or points of view that historians do not usually consider.

This edition again includes several book reviews surveying the latest research in a variety of global historical fields as well as the process of writing history. The issue is completed by six conference and summer school reports intended to encourage fellow students to use the chances of participating in or organizing such events.

The first research article of this volume is Vita Unwin's *Facilitating Early Modern Globality: Uncovering the Role and Status of the Remadores on the Gold Coast,* investigating the crucial but long overlooked importance that the canoemen of the region have had over centuries in making the cross-Atlantic trade economy possible. Vita Unwin points to the complexity of relations underlying this nodal point of early globalization.

In continuation of a focus in our last edition, this issue again includes research on the global history of the Russian Revolution through investigations into the fractured histories of Russian émigré communities. Katya Knyazeva's *High and Low: The Material Culture of the Russian Diaspora in Shanghai, 1920s–1940s* gives an intriguing insight into the *Alltagsgeschichte* of a post-revolutionary Russian bourgeoisie in China whose diaspora was shaped by the revolution that they defied.

Immanuel Harisch's article, *Bartering Coffee, Cocoa and W50 Trucks: The Trade Relationships of Angola, São Tomé and the GDR in a Comparative Per-*

spective, examines the economic connections between socialist regimes in Africa and Germany shedding light on the material realities of late global socialism and how the commitment to 'international solidarity' was strategically deployed by socialist-leaning states in Africa to advance their political goals.

Julien Hoffmann´s study, *"We Have No Right to Force our Religion on others": Civilization, Modernity and the Discourse on Religious Tolerance in 19th Century Great Britain*, is concerned with the question of how the concept of tolerance was deployed as a marker of progress and civilizational superiority in British press coverage. Religious fervor, particularly that connected to Islam, served as the negative image of backwardness to this projection of British modernity.

Dimitrios Chaidas' article analyzes the prevalence of certain representations of Greece in today's British press. The title of his article, "*Are Greeks Desperate for Heroes?" A Corpus-based Investigation of Colonial Discourses*, refers to his demonstration of the possibilities of the digital humanities for examining predominant discursive patterns. Chaidas shows how the British public refer to the past and mythology of Ancient Greece to make sense of the modern state's crisis. While they can easily stand alone, it is intriguing to relate Hoffmann's and Chaidas' contributions to each other.

Monica Palmeri's article, *The Time of the Myth: Situating Representations of the Roman Empire within Italian Colonialism, 1911–1940* is likewise concerned with the image of the nation rooted in an idealized past. The study examines how the modern Italian imperialist state creatively produced an argument for Italian colonialism in images, restorations of archeological remains, and exhibitions. The fascist regime legitimized its expansionist foreign policy in these displays by claiming heritage to the Roman Empire as a colonizing and civilizing force.

Disha Karnad Jani explores how the anti-colonial activist intellectual M.N. Roy employed the accusation of Fascism against the mainstream of Indian anti-colonialists in her illuminating study, *The Concept of Fascism in Colonial India: M.N. Roy and The Problem of Freedom*. The author explores how the concept of fascism itself evolves through its use in a non-European setting and thereby contributes to research decentring conceptual history.

Finally, Rowan Holmes' intriguing contribution, *Microhistory Interrogates a Mystery: On Some Possible New Relations in the 'Somerton Man' or 'Tamám Shud' Case*, investigates the purpose of history itself. It is an inspired piece of writing, which implicitly reflects on the role of historians by literally turning them into detectives trying to build their case. It also raises questions about how history can be presented through its narrative style, and in this way points beyond the described case.

In addition to the research articles, members of the editorial team have reviewed recently published books that are of interest to (global) history students. David Lang revisits another mystery in his review of a collected volume, edited by Ray

mond Clemens, on *The Voynich Manuscript*, an obscure medieval document that has never been decoded. Dennis Kölling reviews *The Autonomous City: A History of Urban Squatting* by Alexander Vasudevan, which explores the issue of squatting as a transnational practice but remains confined to the Atlantic. Ryan Glauser contributes a review on *The Spread of Modern Industry to the Periphery since 1871*, a volume edited by Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson. The review points out that the editors question concepts such as modernity and peripheriality but ultimately struggle to overcome diffusionist perspectives. Lastly, Alexandra Holmes reviews *Essaying the Past*, a guide to the most important occupation of any aspiring historian—the sometimes-arduous writing process.

We close this autumn edition with reports from several conferences and summer schools that have taken place over the 'long summer.' Kathleen Burke opens this section with her review of the third instalment of our sister project, the *Global History Student Conference*, that took place in Berlin this May. In the same month, students at King's College in London have hosted their own *World History Student Conference*, attended for us by Dennis Kölling who reviews it here. Sébastien Tremblay reports back from a conference on Conceptual History in Helsinki that was held August, followed by Philipp Kandler's review of the *18th AHILA Congress*, held in September in Valencia; both authors are pursuing their doctorates in graduate schools of our own Freie Universität. Lastly, Nils Oellerich and Hauke Jacobs provide an exemplary report on two summer schools from the *"Go East" program* of the German Academic Exchange Service, which facilitates several dozens of these schools each year.

From a practical standpoint, it was extremely gratifying to receive more submissions for this edition than ever before, although it necessarily led to some hard editorial choices. Equally, our editorial team for this edition was the most experienced so far, with many members having already worked on the previous two or three editions, although we were still glad to welcome a number of new members, who played a vital role in the successful production of this edition. Three of the articles published in this edition are based on conference presentations at this year's Berlin conference, and one on a presentation at King's College, proving to us how valuable it is to give students such opportunities to develop their research in collaboration with others over the long term.

As the days in Berlin get shorter, we hope to offer you good reads and trust that the published articles hold some insight for you. Furthermore, we would like this edition to make the potential of global history as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach a bit clearer to you—through, rather than despite, the diversity that our articles represent.

Your Editorial team

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the work and interest of all students who submitted an article during the last call for papers and are especially grateful to the authors published in this edition with whom we have had an extensive and fruitful collaboration throughout the production of this journal:

Dimitrios Chaidas, Immanuel Harisch, Julien Hoffmann, Rowan Holmes, Disha Karnad Jani, Katya Knyazeva, Monica Palmeri, and Vita Unwin.

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Special thanks go to Kathleen Burke, Hauke Jacobs, Nils Oellerich, and Sébastien Tremblay for contributing conference reviews to this edition.

Articles

Facilitating Early Modern Globality: Uncovering the Role and Status of the *Remadores* on the Gold Coast

VITA UNWIN

Vita Unwin completed her M.A. at Universiteit Leiden in 2017, and was awarded a First Class honours from the University of Bristol in 2016. Her primary research focus is on West African port cities, and she admires in particular the work of historian Holger Weiss. She is hoping to commence a Ph.D. in 2018, having taken a year out to work for a coffee trading platform—enabling her to visit some of the West African regions which captivate her.

This article uncovers the crucial role played by the remadores, or canoemen, of the Gold Coast in the making of global trading networks which converged and steadily expanded on the West African coast in the early modern era. Their inimitable skill and the footloose nature of their daily work afforded them a unique status as African workers, and special bargaining power with the various European and African polities which competed for influence in the region. Remadores were logistical agents in the making of local, inter-polity and global trade networks, and this paper examines their role on a local, regional and global scale in turn. As this research demonstrates, their navigational skill was a lynchpin, without which in the burgeoning trade of ivory, gold and slaves would have been completely undermined.

Introduction

> Those canoes, laden with goods and men, are conveyed by the Mina Blacks over the worst and most dreadful beating seas all along the coast...where no manner of trade could be carried out without that help.[1]

For as long as humans have carried out commercial exchanges, they have confronted and overcome boundaries. These boundaries might be religious, linguistic, political, cultural or geographical. To the European traders who arrived on the Gold Coast in the early modern era, there was an immediate physical boundary impeding their access to lucrative trade for the West African commodities of ivory, slaves and gold: powerful surf, unruly currents and a total absence of natural harbours.[2] However, long before the first Portuguese explorers arrived on the coast, skilled African canoemen mastered the punishing surf to catch fish and

[1] Paul E. H. Hair, ed., *Barbot on Guinea: The Writings of Jean Barbot of Guinea on West Africa, 1678–1712* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1992), 341.

[2] Peter Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast (Ghana): A Survey and an Exploration in Precolonial African Labour History," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 29 (1989): 342–343.

carry out trade of their own centred on the Niger River.[3] By enlisting the labour of these canoemen, the shoreline—while tricky—became a passable barrier; granting European access to a region of great commercial potential. Larger European ships could anchor offshore, allowing for commodities and people to be ferried in specially designed canoes across the surf and onto the mainland. This study interprets these Gold Coast canoemen, henceforth *remadores*,[4] as logistical agents in the formation of local, inter-polity and global trading networks converging on the West African coast in the early modern era.

First initiated by Portuguese explorers, the tactic of enlisting the labour of *remadores* to grant commercial access to the Gold Coast was employed by Europeans well into the twentieth century—testament to the effectiveness of the labour provided, and the enduring logistical challenge posed by the coastline.[5] This highly skilled African workforce was sometimes purchased as slaves by European polities, but more often hired on a contractual basis, receiving half their pay in advance and the other half upon completion of their contract. The aim of this paper is to interrogate the status of this numerically small yet indispensable workforce on the Gold Coast and elsewhere in West Africa, and qualify their role in the formation of trading networks.

It is important to recognise that substantial inland trade networks and economic systems existed in the region long before the arrival of Europeans. To quote historian Eric R. Wolf, the earliest European explorers landed on a Gold Coast already dense with towns and settlements, and caught up in networks of exchange that "far transcended the narrow enclaves of the European emporia on the coast."[6] However, contact with European trade sparked the reorientation of this network away from the Niger River and towards the shoreline, triggering a violent transformation of scale.[7] Using *remadores* as a lens, this paper uncovers the exceptionally high density of relations and interactions across formal boundaries on the Gold Coast, which by the early modern era was a region dense with both European and African polities who sought to claim a stake in the gold, slave and ivory trade.

[3] Harvey Feinberg, "Africans and Europeans in West Africa: Elminans and Dutchmen on the Gold Coast during the Eighteenth Century," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 79 (1989), 41–42.

[4] In the primary sources encountered in this research, many terms were used to refer to the canoemen of the Gold Coast. However, the most common was *remador*—from the Portuguese word for oarsmen. For the sake of uniformity, *remador* has been used throughout this study, but when citing sources the term is reproduced in its original form.

[5] According to the research of historian Peter Gutkind, between 1911 and 1921, 602 trucks, 169 trailers and 219 cars were loaded onto ships lying in the roads off Elmina by lashing two large canoe-boats together. Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast (Ghana)," 353.

[6] Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), cited in Ray Kea, *A Cultural and Social History of Ghana from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century: The Gold Coast in the Age of the Transatlantic Slave Trade,* vol.1 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2012), i.

[7] Kea, *A Cultural and Social History of Ghana*, 2.

Although focusing on a particular geographical region, the framework this study adopts emphasises entanglement within this space. The role of *remadores* as network facilitators is assessed on a global, local and finally inter-polity scale. This does not serve to impose rigid spatial distinctions, but the opposite. The *remadores* act as a human thread connecting local, regional, and global networks. It will also be pointed out that their actions at any one of these given levels often had important ramifications at the other levels. This approach is one influenced by the writings of historian Holger Weiss, who has made it his agenda at times to examine the local articulations of global interconnections, especially in an African context.[8] This is a means of breaking free from what he refers to as the "straightjacket of national narratives."[9] Historian Peter Gutkind produced the first and only study (1989) to deal exclusively with *remadores* within the framework of African labour history. In his own words, he was "primarily interested in the evolution of the working class on that continent [Africa] as well as its contemporary structure, consciousness and activism."[10] This paper treads very different ground, exploring the entanglement of space which *remadores* facilitated, and how their daily work on a local level facilitated early modern globality.

This study makes use of primary evidence amassed by Europeans pertaining to the daily administration of Gold Coast forts on a local and regional level, correspondence between those stationed at the forts and respective trading companies or European associates, and personal journals and travel accounts. These sources provide an insight into the role and status or *remadores*. Due to language constraints, Ole Justesen's *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana* and Robin Law's *English in West Africa* form the basis of this research.[11] Malyn Newitt's *The Portuguese in West Africa 1415–1670* was also consulted.[12] These collections of European-produced administrative sources were complemented by travel accounts of European explorers and traders such as Pieter de Marees (1602),[13] Jean

[8] Holger Weiss, *Portals of Globalization, Places of Creolisation: Nordic Possessions in the Atlantic World During the Era of the Slave Trade* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2015), 28–30.

[9] Holger Weiss, "Entangled Spaces—Global Connections and Local Articulations: Portals of Early Modern Globalization and Creolization During the Era of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade," *Connections: A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists* 12 (2015), 2.

[10] Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast (Ghana)", 339.

[11] Ole Justesen, ed., *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana 1657–1754*, vol.1–2 (Copenhagen: Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selska, 2005); Robin Law, *The English in West Africa: Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company in England 1681–1699*, vol.1–3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[12] Malyn Newitt, ed., *The Portuguese in West Africa 1415–1670: A Documentary History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[13] Pieter de Marees was a Dutch traveller and explorer who undertook a voyage to the Gold Coast in 1600. After returning in 1602, he wrote an extensive narrative about his voyage and daily life on the Gold Coast. A century passed before another account was to surpass it in terms of scope and originality. It was translated into German, English and Latin. Pieter de Marees, *Description and Historical Account of the Gold Kingdom of Guinea (1602)*, ed. and trans. Albert van Dantzig and Adam Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Barbot (1678–1712)[14] and Willem Bosman (1721).[15] In addition, this study makes use of translated primary material cited by historians whose work has touched upon *remadores*, despite the fact that very few historians have foregrounded the *remador* in their studies of the Gold Coast, and none within the frameworks I propose. Close analysis of these sources can shed light on the operation of the *remador* from a European perspective. However, the potential plurality of the role assumed by *remadores* who, for example, also engaged in illicit trade must be acknowledged—although it cannot here be quantified. It is certain that *remadores* did carry out trade independent of European jurisdiction in the form of interloper or contraband trade, in spite of repressive efforts throughout the early modern era. Owing to a relative paucity of available sources, it has been necessary to adopt a broad time span in this work. Although change over time is acknowledged in a broad sense, it is inevitable that some potential particularities in the role and status of the *remador* have been levelled.

The most fundamental difficulty encountered in this research has been the lack of a paper trail left by the *remadores* themselves. As a result (and due to language constraints) it has only been possible to gain an insight through examination of European-produced sources and the limitations this poses must not be underestimated. It is therefore hard to quantify the extent of the *remadores*' role in illicit trade, although European sources clearly indicate that this was taking place. It has also been difficult to discern how the *remadores* viewed themselves as skilled African workers, and this must be inferred through their actions and the reading of European sources against the grain. Historian Ray Kea stresses the obligation of historians of the Gold Coast to recognise the extreme limitations of archival analysis in giving voice to Africans' explanations of themselves in their own terms.[16] Bearing this in mind, it is my contention that the role assumed by small-scale logistical go-betweens should not be overlooked given the limited sources available for historians. This would lead to historical underestimation of the diversity of agents who facilitated trans-Atlantic trade in the early modern era, and the extent to which it was facilitated by local actors.

[14] Hair, *Barbot on Guinea*. Jean Barbot, served as a commercial agent on French slave-trading voyages to West Africa in 1678–9 and 1681–2. In 1683 he began an account of the Guinea coast, based partly on his voyage journals (only one of which is extant) and partly on previously printed sources.

[15] Willem Bosman was a Dutch merchant in the service of the Dutch East India Company who progressed to become the chief agent of the company. His study was written in 1702 when European popular interest in the Gold Coast reached a zenith. His account was read avidly, not only because he provided a first-hand account of the Komenda Wars (1694–1700) which were fought against the British but also because the book was printed in English as early as 1705. Willem Bosman, *A New and Accurate Description of the Gold Coast of Guinea, Divided into the Gold, the Slave and the Ivory Coast's* (London: James Knapton & Dan Midwinter, 1705).

[16] Kea, *A Cultural and Social History of Ghana*.

This study responds to a trend in more recent historiography on the trans-Atlantic trade that challenges traditional scholarship focused on the relationship between 'core and periphery' in relation to trading companies or empires.[17] This core-periphery model has been called into question by historians such as John Thornton who have stressed the agency of African innovation, foodstuffs and diaspora in forging trans-Atlantic networks.[18] Foregrounding *remadores* in this study underscores the agency of a skilled African workforce in the formation of global trading networks, and active participation of African societies in the shaping of the Atlantic world.

Remadores resist easy categorisation as a workforce. A combination of the footloose nature of their work set against the backdrop of dense European interpolity rivalry on the Gold Coast from the seventeenth century onwards and an awareness of the crucial nature of the role they performed afforded free *remadores* exceptional bargaining power as a skilled African workforce. They operated outside of the norms of regular logistical service, and were situated somewhere between cultural broker, skilled employee, and go-between. Strikingly, these free *remadores* (hired on a contractual basis by European merchants or polities) often worked alongside slave *remadores* whose status was, of course, entirely different—a paradox which is addressed later in this study. Whether slave or free, their physical labour acted as a lynchpin in the entanglement resulting from the contact of Europeans with the Gold Coast, and yet their role has been greatly overlooked by historians. This research offers a perspective which represents—in the words of Robin Law—"if not quite a view from below, nevertheless a perspective that was, in political terms, from the periphery rather than the centre."[19]

Remadores as Network Facilitators on a Global Scale

In his 1602 description and historical account of the 'Gold Kingdom,' Dutch trader and explorer Pieter de Marees admitted:

> Since we Netherlanders are not as experienced in this as they [the Africans, the *remadores*] are, if we want to sail in them, not being able to adjust ourselves as well and steer them properly, the result is that the canoes capsize immediately and we fall into the water.[20]

[17] For recent examples of traditional scholarship, see: David Armitage and Michael K. Braddick, ed., *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009[2]).

[18] John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World 1400–1680* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.

[19] Robin Law, *Ouidah: the Social History of a West African Slaving 'Port' 1727–1892* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 3.

[20] De Marees, *Description and Historical Account of the Gold Kingdom,* 117.

Throughout the early modern era Europeans were rarely able to master the skill of canoe navigation, obliging them to enlist the services of *remadores* at considerable expense. A letter from the Governor of the Danish fort of Christiansborg to the directors of the Danish West India and Guinea Company in 1736 indicates that the *remadores* were aware of the special bargaining power this afforded them, and sometimes exploited it to their advantage. In response to pressure to limit monthly expenses from financiers in Denmark, the monthly expenditure was disclosed:

The King's dues, monthly	32 rdl
The Caboceers in *Orsue*	5 rdl[21]
The Company's messengers	4 rdl
Company *rimadores*	66¾ rdl[22]

The governor goes on to justify the exceedingly high proportion of fort funds spent on *remadores*, of which there were 12, arguing that this "indispensable category" when "well maintained" and given the same as they would receive in ports under the govenance of rival European powers, are "more alert and enterprising" and less likely to defect.[23] By nature of their trade, *remadores* were footloose workers, and the readiness of the governor to defend their salary indicates that he was aware of the capacity of *remadores*, through defection, to sever the global and local commercial networks that the forts depended on for their survival and all forms of commercial profit.

The *remadores* were responsible for transporting commodities to and from the larger vessels which arrived at the Gold Coast, and their barks were perfectly designed for this. The canoes were generally 16 feet in length, and manufactured in forested regions near to the coast such as Axim, Ackuon, Boutrou, Tackary and Comendo.[24] The canoes were designed to withstand the event of capsizing in the surf with as little loss of merchandise as possible, with goods bound to cross-bars on the boats. Smaller canoes were used to transport lighter loads, passengers, and to take messages and could be manned by a single *remador*. However, larger boats could also be purchased at Juda and Offra to ferry large groups of slaves, oxen and commodities weighing up to ten tons.[25] These larger canoes were manned by up to 20 oarsmen and usually rented out on a temporary basis; and could be sent

[21] The word *Caboceer* is derived from the Portuguese word *cabociero*, meaning headman or official. *Caboceers* were the directly-appointed agents of coastal West African chiefs responsible for the procurement of slaves from the interior.

[22] The monetary system in the Danish West Indies was complicated because the currencies of many countries were used concurrently. One of the currencies used was the Danish *Rigsdaler* (Rix-dollars) abbreviated to 'rdl.' Information cited in Niklas Jensen, *For the Health of the Enslaved: Slaves, Medicine and Power in the Danish West Indies, 1803–1848* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2012), 60.

[23] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, vol. 2, 512.

[24] See, for example: de Marees, *Description and Historical Account of the Gold Kingdom*, 118; Hair, *Barbot on Guinea,* vol.1, 346.

[25] Gutkind, "Canoemen of the Gold Coast," 342–343.

to the Gulf of Guinea and beyond that to Angola.[26] The use of the larger canoes increased after the end of the seventeenth century, when the region was roughly delineated by Europeans not only as a principle source of gold, but also grain, ivory, and increasingly slaves.[27] The canoes were necessary for importing and exporting, and were also exchanged as commodities and offered as gifts to local African rulers.[28] These skilled canoemen were the means via which Atlantic goods and material culture were introduced to the continent; and their labour was fundamental in the export of African goods, slaves and culture to other parts of the continent, Europe and beyond.

One major shortcoming in historiography on Atlantic trade, according to Holger Weiss, has been the lack of scholarly attention directed towards the entanglement of African port cities with one another (although much has been said about the entanglement between Atlantic and African ports, or Atlantic ports with one another).[29] *Remadores* offer an unusual perspective through which to explore inter-African port entanglement, as their labour connected the commodities available at the Slave Coast and Ivory Coast with the European bases on the Gold Coast. According to Robin Law, the indigenous population at Ouidah had no tradition of navigation of the sea, therefore it was necessary for traders to hire Gold Coast *remadores* in order to land goods and embark slaves.[30] To take one example, according to translated records preserved in a journal at the Danish fort Christiansborg, the largest ship of the Danish navy *Christianus Quintus* arrived at Christiansborg on 12th of April 1703, at which point a nine-man canoe was dispatched under the command of the merchant Hans Pedersen to the Slave Coast to trade for slaves.[31] Just two days later, the *remadores* returned with merchandise and slaves to load onto *Christianus Quintus*. Between the 18th and the 24th of April the nine-man *remador* canoe ferried goods between the Slave Coast and the ship *Christianus Quintus* docked on the Gold Coast five times, finally returning on the 25th April accompanied by a second five-man canoe loaded with merchandise, after which the *Christianus Quintus* set sail to the West Indies. Slaves sourced in other African ports were also sold on to African merchants in return for gold on the Gold Coast.[32]

[26] Hair, *Barbot on Guinea,* 545.
[27] Kwame Daaku, *Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600–1729: A Study of the African Reaction to European Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) 21.
[28] There is evidence of the import, for example, of fabric from Northern Africa which was in high demand on the west coast of Africa in the early modern era.
[29] Holger Weiss, "The Entangled Spaces of Oddena, Oguaa and Osu: A Survey of Three Early Modern African Atlantic Towns, ca. 1650–1850," in *Portals of Globalization, Places of Creolisation: Nordic Possessions in the Atlantic World during the Era of the Slave Trade*, ed. Holger Weiss (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2015), 26–27.
[30] Law, *Ouidah*, 29.
[31] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* vol.1, 129–130.
[32] Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast," 341.

Remadores acted as a human bridge between the coastal communities of the Gold Coast, and other important coastal localities in West Africa where they migrated (voluntarily and coercively) to capitalise on their skills. This paper directs attention towards the demographic globalisation which occurred as *remadores* of the Gold Coast moved to other African coastal areas to hire out their skills, which facilitated material and cultural exchange on a larger scale through the export and import of commodities of ivory, gold, fabrics, weapons and slaves in their canoes.

Remadores took on a great strategic importance for European traders aiming to gain possession of the Gold Coast as they were a lynchpin in the global trading network of ivory, slaves and other West African commodities. The importance of *remadores* is made plain in a letter to the Royal African Company from John Thorne, an English representative posted at a factory in Ouidah:

> Wee have great occasion for a canoe or two, and some paddles...a 7 hand canoe which was here was broken adrift in a turnadoe, soe that at present wee have a great want of canoes, and you had as good send me noe ships as noe canoes, for without them nothing can be done.[33]

In the Danish sources the importance of the *remadores* can be inferred from the competitive wages free *remadores* received and also from the lengths Danish officials went to recapture *remadores* who ran away. At Fort Christiansborg, a policy was enforced that if any slave *remador* escaped, the other hired *remadores* would be forced to pay a debt of 72rdl.[34] Defecting or escaping *remadores* not only threatened to sever Atlantic trading networks, but also potentially strengthened rival European forts along the coast. This policy is insightful as it gives historians a clue as to why some European polities kept both slave and free *remadores*. In the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, it is perhaps surprising that workers so crucial to trade and daily life on the Gold Coast were not all enslaved to minimise cost and risk for European merchants. However, one explanation lies in the footloose nature of their work. On a daily basis, *remadores* transgressed boundaries and travelled to places where nobody without their skills could reach. It was therefore incumbent on traders to keep at least a small base of loyal free *remadores* (whom they attracted with wages and material rewards) to prevent the slave *remadores* from paddling away with precious goods, defecting, or simply fleeing. This hypothesis is supported by the policy outlined above, although this research has unearthed no explicit explanation for the slave/free *remador* paradox from early modern contemporaries.

[33] John Thorne, *Ophra in Arda*, August 19, 1681 (*Letter from English Factories in Ouidah to Royal African Company Officials, Requesting Remadores*) in *The English in West Africa,* ed. Robin Law, vol.1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 222.
[34] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* vol.2, 589.

Historian of the Gold Coast Ray Kea makes an important point when he notes that "texts cannot be regarded as ahistorical abstractions or as ephemera; they were grounded in real historical events or relationships."[35] The texts encountered in this study are embedded with contemporary ideas and prejudices: they were written to justify, to entertain, and to record for posterity as much as they served everyday administrative purposes. Since this study is dependent on European-produced sources, they can never fully show the role of the *remador* in contraband trade. At all European forts along the Gold Coast in the early modern era, *remadores* were forbidden to contact the vessels lying in 'the roads' until the captain had announced his arrival, and needed permission before approaching any vessel which arrived to the port.[36] The *remadores* were ostensibly operating within the global trading networks which primarily amassed European commercial profit. However, in spite of formal condemnation, piracy and interloper trade also flourished in the early modern era—although without records the scale of this is impossible to quantify. The account of Dutch merchant Willem Bosman (1705) hints that there was an independent community of *remadores* settled at the port of Ouidah who traded directly with larger European merchants for African cloth: "The Blacks come with canoes there to trade in them [North African cloth], and carry them off almost immediately."[37]

This is supported by the near-contemporary account of Frenchman Jean Barbot, who claimed to illegally purchase gold from *remadores* at Tebbo.[38] Therefore, although most of the sources encountered indicate that the *remadores* operated within European-controlled trading networks, they may just have often forged networks of their own for personal profit.

When read against the grain, restrictive measures intended to curb the ability of *remadores* to carry out their own trade might indicate the extent to which they were engaged in this activity, thereby undermining European trade networks. For example, on 28th June 1514, King Manuel I of Portugal issued the *Ordenações Manuelinas,* imposing a bureaucratic system on virtually all aspects of Portuguese overseas trade. Under these regulations, any *remador* contacting Portuguese ships before they reached the fort of Elmina was to be "whipped and have his ears cut off on the first offence, and to be hanged for a second offence."[39] The stringency of the punishment indicates the damage caused by independent *remador* trade. Additionally, strict control over the *remadores* was a means by which King Manuel sought to monitor trade on the Gold Coast more broadly, and potentially starve out his rivals. The global trading network could thus be controlled via strict regulation

[35] Kea, *Cultural and Social History of Ghana,* 127.
[36] Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast," 348.
[37] Bosman, *A New and Accurate Description of the Gold Coast of Guinea*, 337.
[38] Hair, *Barbot on Guinea*, 351.
[39] Texeira de Mota, *Some Aspects of Portuguese Colonisation and Sea Trade in West Africa in the 15th and 16th Centuries* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1978), 10–11, cited in Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast," 343–344.

of the *remadores* along the Gold Coast. And yet, *remadores* also wielded a dangerous ability to forge trading networks of their own, and sabotage the burgeoning European trans-Atlantic trade of Gold Coast commodities. English official John Thorne stationed at "Ophra in Arda" wrote an intriguing letter to the Royal African Company officials on 4th of December 1681 seemingly complaining about a *remador* strike:

> For canoemen I have 13 here, and if you send downe anymore pray lett them be pawnes, for those which came with Captain Lowe proved rogues. For the last three dayes when there was occasion for them moste, we could not get them to carry off the slaves, to Captain Lowe's great damage, but was forced to hyre others...[40]

This source is further evidence of the precarious stake claimed by European polities on the Gold Coast, and their dependence on *remadores* who were a crucial link in the chain of the global trade networks which converged in the region in the early modern era.

Remadores as Network Facilitators on a Local Scale

Most European trading companies vying for a stake in commercial trade with the Gold Coast established multiple forts along the coast to secure access to commercial and subsistence goods and to shelter the communities which they established there. The Danish possessions on the Gold Coast, for example, consisted of the main Fort Christiansborg (founded in 1658);[41] and four smaller forts which were ceded to the British in 1850. *Remadores* were important not only in facilitating trans-Atlantic and intra-continental trade by ferrying goods to and from the shoreline, but also in communicating *between* European forts, carrying messages or sourcing and distributing local supplies.

In 1717, the Dutch governors at Elmina were placed under pressure to justify the financial burden of maintaining fifteen forts along the Gold Coast.[42] The directors argued that the maintenance of a high number of forts was crucial to the defence of the interests of the Dutch West India Company for the following reasons:

- To stave off attacks from the African population living around or near a fort.
- To guarantee the security of sea communication by small boat; if there were fewer forts, greater distances would exist between them, and sea travel would become more hazardous, making contact with the outforts more difficult if not impossible.

[40] Law, *The English in West Africa,* vol.1, 222.
[41] The fort was occupied by the Portuguese between 1680–82.
[42] Harvey Feinberg, "Africans and Europeans in West Africa," 41.

- To preserve alternative places to attract African traders in case the roads to a particular fort were impassable.[43]

Clearly the directors saw advantages that were strategic, commercial and defensive, and the possession of multiple forts necessitated the employment of *remadores* to distribute supplies, convey messages and people between them.

The sources analysed pertaining to both Danish and English coastal enclaves illustrate the dependence on *remadores* to source and distribute essential supplies for the maintenance of the fort network. On 3rd of May 1738 Governor Boris at Fort Christianborg penned a letter to the Directors of the Danish West Indies and Guinea Company urgently requesting more sloops, since the local *Fantes* had retained and panyarred all of the Danish-owned canoes "because of some fabricated palaver either with the *remidors* or with our Negroes."[44] He notes, "at the fort we are desperate" since without canoes the basic supply of *millie* could not attained.[45] The heavy dependence of Europeans on the local transport services of the *remadores* illustrates the vulnerability of the Danish trading posts on the Gold Coast—irrespective of the influence their trading companies might wield commercially on a global level.

Other evidence can be found in the account of the Portuguese royal chronicler Rui de Pina. De Pina was appointed royal chronicler in 1490, and penned an extensive account of Portuguese enterprise in Africa, at a time when the King had previously ordered the establishment of the fort of Elmina and intended to make the gold trade an exclusive monopoly. The account, therefore, was likely a propaganda exercise to expound the benevolence of King Dom João III's intentions and legitimise his actions. Nevertheless, the chronicle includes a letter addressed to Alfonso de Albuquerque, chastising him for his harsh treatment of the local populations in the town of Mina. The letter reads:

> In our name, they [local population at Mina] serve us in everything required of them, and with their canoes and their servants they bring wood to the captains of our ships. Many of them make large purchases from our factory and most of them are accustomed to buy the odd cloth which they sell from their canoes.[46]

The conciliatory tone adopted by the King to safeguard the *remadores* from Albaquerque's violence is indicative of the vital role played by *remadores* in equip-

[43] Feinberg, "Africans and Europeans in West Africa," 26.

[44] *Fantes* refers to people residing in the south-western region of the Gold Coast. *Panyarred* means the practice of seizing and holding persons until the repayment of debt or resolution of a dispute which became a common activity along the Atlantic coast of Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries. Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, vol.2, 462.

[45] *Millie* refers to millet. Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, vol.2, 462.

[46] Letter from Dom Joao III to Alfonso de Abluquerque, governor of Sao Jorge da Mina, Tomar (October 13, 1523), translated from the chronicle of Rui de Pina published in: António Brásio, ed., *Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 1471–1531*, vol.1 (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1952), 451–2; accessed in Newitt, *The Portuguese in West Africa,* 96.

ping the fortress at Elmina with crucial supplies, and in purchasing spoiled goods from the cloth factories which might otherwise have gone to waste.

As well as distributing supplies, *remadores* were also required to convey messages and letters between forts via the rivers and sea. Without the aid of *remadores*, communication was hampered, leaving outposts in vulnerable isolation. Since communication was necessary, some forts without *remadores* were obliged to rent *remador* services from other European powers, at considerable expense. A letter to the main English fort from a factory outpost in Sekondi written by Mark Bedford Whiting on the 20th of June 1683 reads: "I would wright your Worship oftener only I am in want of a canoe and to hyre a canoe every time is chargeable, the Dutch have them here for that purpose."[47]

The sources also document instances of *remadores* communicating between fort governors and the slaves captured and held on the ships. In a letter to the directors of the West India and Guinea Company (1705), Governor Lygaard reports the death of over twenty slaves, as they were held aboard a ship before it sailed, due to exposure to the elements, cramped conditions ("stinking air"), and the "cuts and blows" inflicted on them. He alludes to the *remadores* operating as intermediaries between the slaves below deck and the Governor himself: "It is said that they [slaves being held below deck] were very ill treated with cuts and blows and also suffered from hunger and thirst. They themselves often complained to me [Lygaard] through the *remidors*."[48]

The interference of the Danish governors at Fort Christiansborg in African cultural practices to ensure the compliance of the *remadores* is another illustration of the power wielded by *remadores* as logistical agents. To the great annoyance of the chaplain, the governors at Fort Christiansborg continued the practice of "eating *fetish*" (the local means of oath-swearing) as a way of securing a promise well into the eighteenth century. An entry in the diary kept at Christiansborg on the 3rd of February 1744 records an incident when the Company *remadores* sent down to Ningo with goods in the large canoe negligently left the canoe on the beach at night, and it was swept against rocks and destroyed. The next morning the *remadores* sent word back that "they would not come here to the fort before the governor had sent the Company's Messenger, Soya, to them to eat fetish that they would not be punished."[49]

The journal recounts that "the governor, *nolens volens,* had to do what they asked, so they would not run away altogether".[50] This illustrates three points: the degree of bargaining power afforded to the *remadores* because of the footloose nature of their trade; the dependency of the Danish forts on the local and global

[47] Law, *The English in West Africa*, vol.1, 4.
[48] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, vol.1, 199.
[49] Ibid., vol.2, 654.
[50] Ibid.

networks facilitated by the *remadores*; and how an awareness of this forced the Danish to adhere to indigenous cultural practices in this instance.

Remadores as Network Facilitators on an Inter-polity Scale

After the advent of European trade heralded by the arrival of Portuguese merchants on the Gold Coast in 1471, the commodities of gold, ivory and various agricultural products such as pepper, dyewoods and gum arabic were predominantly traded in exchange for European (or European-acquired) products. However, by the end of the seventeenth century, the focus of the export trade had turned to slaves. The first European settlement on the Gold Coast, São Jorge da Mina, was established by the Portuguese in 1482. Over the course of the next century, the Portuguese used force in an attempt to monopolise all European trade in the region and stave off English, French and Dutch merchants. However, these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, especially since accounts such as that of Pieter de Marees heightened European interest in the Gold Coast region. Already by 1720, the Gold Coast can be described as a 'colonial fossil':[51]Merchants and representatives of a plethora of European trading companies (later colonial powers) had established communities and commercial forts along the coast which featured alongside the pre-existent African polities and communities. *Remadores* offer a fascinating lens through which historians can explore inter-polity rivalry and competition along the bustling coast. All European polities were bound by a common dependence on the services of *remadores*, which paradoxically fostered competition to secure their services and at times cooperation in securing the return of those who had defected.

Due to the footloose nature of their work, traders were obliged to offer a competitive wage to *remadores* to prevent them from taking their services elsewhere. Rival European forts in the region were consequently locked in competition with one another to secure the labour of *remadores*.[52] Danish sources indicate that slave *remadores* did at times escape or defect. For example, in a letter to the directors of the West India and Guinea Company, Governor Syndemann complains:

> A man slave, who had been made the company's remedor on the Upper Coast ran away from us when he was sent up in the time of the previous Governor with the company's canoe to take water out of our recently arrived ship. We have never since been able to catch him.[53]

[51] Daaku, *Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast,* xiii.

[52] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, vol.2, 512. Here, we find evidence of competition among European polities for *remador* services (see previous example cited in fn.23 of this study).

[53] Governor Syndermann et. al., Christiansborg, to the Directors of the West India and Guinea Company, Copenhagen. General Letter (March 21, 1724), accessed in: Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* vol 1*,* 316.

The very fact that officers at Fort Christiansborg saw fit to introduce a policy of holding free *remadores* accountable for escaping slave *remadores* with a heavy fine indicates that the *remadores* did escape or defect from time to time.[54]

As well as a mutual dependence on *remador* services, rival European forts were also reliant on one another to ensure the return of *remadores* who had escaped or defected. At times of war, refusal to return escaping *remadores* to their 'original' fort was also a sign of inter-polity aggression. In 1730, at the time of the Danish-Dutch conflict on the Gold Coast, in the minutes of a 'secret council,' it is recorded: "We have not yet got back either our remedors or Company slaves who had run away and been taken to the Dutch town."[55]

It is unclear from this extract whether the *remadores* actively defected to the Dutch side, or simply fled and were captured by the Dutch. However, the fact that they were not returned is a sign of tense relations between the polities. When relations were amicable, some European stations also loaned out the services of *remadores* employed at different forts, for a fee.[56] At times of peace and war, then, *remadores* transgressed European polity boundaries—sometimes working on commission and sometimes through defection.

Since *remadores* were a prerequisite to trans-Atlantic trade on the Gold Coast, securing their services (or depriving rivals of their *remadores*) was inherently political. Depriving a rival of these commercial linchpins was a harsh and effective means of sabotaging their activity. Danish sources indicate that this tactic was pursued at the time of the Danish/Dutch conflict in the early seventeenth century, and most likely elsewhere. It is crucial to note that *remador* hostage-taking was not just a European tactic, but one also pursued by African leaders. For example, it is recorded in a Danish letter to the directors of the West India Company (1731) that:

> Immediately after the Aquambue prince who had been detained in the Dutch fort had been killed, the King of Aquambue started a dispute against the Dutch factor, and immediately withdrew a number of the remidors and fishermen who lived in the Negro towns by the forts and took them up the coast.[57]

[54] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* vol. 1, 589. Here, we see a policy outlined for punishing free *remadores* when slave *remadores* escaped or defected, by way of a heavy fine (see previous example cited in fn.34 of this study).

[55] Governor Waeroe et al. Christianborg, to the Ship's Council on the Habet Galley (Copy of Secret Council minutes) (November 18, 1730), accessed in: Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, vol 1*,* 426.

[56] Law, *The English in West Africa*, vol.1, 4. Here, we find evidence of one European polity loaning the services of their *remadores* to another European polity for a sum of money (see previous example cited in fn.47 of this study).

[57] A. Willemsen, Copenhagen, to the Directors of the West India and Guinea Company, Copenhagen (July 11, 1731), accessed in Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana* vol 1, 442.

Remadores were not only used as pawns in conflicts, but sometimes actively participated in acts of sabotage and warfare too. On 9th December 1730, it was reported to the directors of the Danish West Indies and Guinea Company that the rival "Dutch Negroes along with [Danish] Company slave *remadores*" hatched a plan in order to successfully defect to the Dutch town. The plan, apparently, was to distract the attention of the Danish officials by setting fire to a sloop giving the rest of the slave and free *remadores* the opportunity to escape unnoticed.[58] At night, two of the company *remadores* set light to the sails of a sloop which had pulled into the Danish Fort, and "tried to burn up the sails," but their plan was thwarted when a female slave raised the alarm. Again, Jean Barbot also details an instance of *remadores* embroiled in inter-polity rivalry. At the time when relations were tense between Danish and Dutch forts, Dutch *remadores* supposedly attempted to execute the Danish Governor when transporting him in their canoes. The account reads:

> When they were going ashore again the Dutch remidors toppled and capsized the canoe outside the breakers, whereby the governor almost lost his life. For five of the remidors hung on to him to keep him under the water and drown him. He is still spitting blood from this, and has much pain in his chest.[59]

This account may have been exaggerated for dramatic effect for European readers, and hanging on to one another may have been more of a survival technique than assassination attempt, yet, if we choose to accept this story (despite the very reasonable criticism against it) we can learn something of the involvement of *remadores* in political conflict. In this passage *remadores* were at least portrayed to be deeply involved in inter-polity rivalries both actively and passively. What we do not know definitively is the extent to which *remadores* were coercively embroiled in these conflicts, or whether they felt a genuine sense of duty and loyalty towards those for whom their worked.

In conclusion, historian Jeppe Mulich assesses inter-polity connections as reactions to "shared internal and external threats to security and social order posed by slave uprisings, revolutions, and inter-imperial war, alongside local inter-polity rivalries."[60] In this case an alternative shared threat to security has been examined, namely the vulnerability of the forts without the services of *remadores*. This sometimes fostered amicable inter-polity connections in the form of loaning the

[58] Governor Waeroe et al. Christiansborg, to the Directors of The West Indies and Guinea Company, Copenhagen, General Letter (December 28, 1730), accessed in: Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* vol.1, 436–7.

[59] Governor Waeroe et al. Christiansborg, to the Directors of The West India and Guinea Company, Copenhagen (March 22, 1732), accessed in: Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana* vol 1, 453.

[60] Jeppe Mulich, "Microregionalism and Intercolonial Relations: The Case of the Danish West Indies 1730–1830," *Journal of Global History* 8, no.1 (2013), 74.

services of slave *remadores* to other European communities at a cost, and returning those who escaped to their 'original' forts. However, in times of conflict, *remadores* were also embroiled in inter-polity rivalry. Sometimes they were taken as hostage to sever rivals from the commercial trading network and access to essential supplies, and at other times it seems they were even involved in the fighting directly.

Conclusions

In her study *Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil 1500–1600*, historian Alida Metcalf identifies three main categories of go-betweens who facilitated transatlantic interaction: the physical go-between, the transactional go-between, and the representational go-between.[61] Metcalf's categorisations are set out in relation to the *remadores* of the Gold Coast and the role they performed on a global, local scale and inter-polity scale. This underscores the importance of *remadores* as facilitators of trans-Atlantic interaction on the Gold Coast and the shortcoming of Metcalf's three categorizations in quantifying their role.

Metcalf defines the physical go-between as the "men, women, and children who crossed the Atlantic Ocean, thereby linking not only Europe and America, but Europe and Africa, and Africa and Asia."[62] These forced and free migrants carried their own representational practices to new destinations and also acted as biological go-betweens transferring disease, flora, fauna and domesticated animals from place to place. The *remador* might be considered a physical go-between within continental Africa owing to their (sometimes forced) migration to non-native ports and coastal enclaves to capitalise on their skills, also transferring 'representational practices' to new places by spreading their knowledge about surf and tide navigation. Additionally, *remadores* facilitated trans-Atlantic human traffic in their work ferrying travellers, traders and slaves between ships and the Gold Coast hinterland.

Transactional go-betweens, according to Metcalf, are the "translators, negotiators, and cultural brokers."[63] This group closely resembles the 'trading diasporas' defined by Philip Curtin, who acted as brokers across vast cultural divides, facilitating the entanglement of markets and commodities around the world in the pre-industrial era.[64] It is challenging to assess the role of the *remador* as a transactional go-between since their role altered over time, and they left no paper trail themselves to gain a more holistic understanding of their activities.

[61] Alida Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil 1500–1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005) 9.
[62] Ibid., 9.
[63] Ibid., 10.
[64] Philip Curtin, *Trade Diasporas and Cross-Cultural Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1–2.

Before colonial forts were established on the Gold Coast, *remadores* assumed a more active role as transactional go-betweens, bringing goods from the hinterland to the traders directly without Europeans having contact with the African vendors beforehand. Pieter de Marees (1602) narrates an instance of three Dutch trading ships pulling into the bay simultaneously.[65] The traders were forced to offer a competitive 'Dache' or tip to the *remadores* to secure their access to the best of the Gold Coast commodities. He concludes the anecdote with the remark that 'striving with one another, they [Dutch ships] diminished each other's gain.'[66] However, the agency of the *remadores* as transactional go-betweens diminished as forts were established which dissolved the need for *remadores* to act as a point of contact between Europeans and the African traders. In more informal circumstances *remadores* did mediate across hierarchies of power at a later date. A previous example has been cited of *remadores* relating information between African slaves and European governors.[67] It is certain that some *remadores* undertook a more active role as transactional go-betweens when engaging in contraband trade directly with European and African ships. When employed by European trading companies their role was predominantly, but not exclusively, confined to physical labour.

However, none of Metcalf's definitions qualify the important role *remadores* assumed as logistical go-betweens, bridging the physical spaces between European forts, between the ship and the shore, and in facilitating networks of a local, global scale and inter-regional scale. Their daily work as go-betweens, ferrying goods to and from European ships, was of fundamental importance in the maintenance of trading networks and European coastal enclaves in West Africa. This study has now established the crucial role played by *remadores* in breaching natural barriers to trade as well as in the formation of interlocking trade networks on a local, inter-regional and trans-Atlantic scale.

In this narrative, *remadores* have been given a central place in the consideration of interlocking networks which converged and steadily expanded in the region in the aftermath of inter-continental contact. This was not done to offer a maverick or unorthodox perspective, but because they rightly deserve to be placed centrally in this narrative. *Remadores* of the Gold Coast facilitated and were integral to the entanglement of African and European goods, ideas, and culture both on the Gold Coast and beyond. Uncovering the importance of the African *remador* in the formation of cross-Atlantic trading networks in the early modern era is one means of responding to John Thornton's call to recognise the active role assumed by Africans in the making of the Atlantic world.

[65] "Dash: The Gift of the West African Commercial Life: Etymology and a Brief Genealogy," Open Source Guinea, accessed August 25 2017, http://www.opensourceguinea.org/2015/08/dash.html.
[66] "Dash: The Gift of the West African Commercial Life."
[67] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* vol.1, 199.

It was through the skill, dexterity, and speed of the *remadores* that Gold Coast goods found a global market, and *remadores* also acted as portals ushering European goods, ideas and influences into Africa. Historian Holger Weiss has advocated a greater understanding of how "early modern forms of globalization intermingle with local culture"—focusing particularly on the Gold Coast in his study.[68] However, this study has demonstrated how one local culture on the Gold Coast, a culture of canoemanship passed for centuries from father to son, spurred on entanglement on a local, regional and global scale. Uncovering the importance of *remadores* as network facilitators also exposes the fragility and precariousness of the dense entanglement of commercial interests on the Gold Coast in the early modern era. Aware of the importance of their services to European interests, and due to the footloose nature of their work, *remadores* enjoyed special bargaining power as a work force.

The inadequacies of this paper in providing a holistic understanding of the role and status of the *remador* must be acknowledged. It is difficult to qualify the role they assumed when conducting contraband trade, and the personal profile of the *remador* has remained elusive since this study heavily relied on European-produced sources. Since this study has predominantly made use of Danish and English sources only in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it has not been possible to fully gauge the macro-shifts in the role and status of the Gold Coast *remador*: here, there is scope for further research. There have been obstacles to understanding the *remador* in his own terms, and yet attempts at uncovering the contribution made by this African workforce of unique status should not be abandoned entirely for such reasons. It is hoped that by uncovering their role, historians may come to a better understanding of the diversity of agents and agency involved in the tentative establishment of trans-Atlantic networks, recognising those whose intimate knowledge of their physical surroundings equipped them to overcome the many tangible and intangible barriers to trade on the Gold Coast and beyond.

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[68] Weiss, "The Entangled Spaces of Oddena, Oguaa and Osu," 22.

High and Low: The Material Culture of the Russian Diaspora in Shanghai, 1920s–1950s

KATYA KNYAZEVA

Katya Knyazeva, from Novosibirsk, Russia, has degrees in Information Systems and Digital Design, obtained from Russian and South Korean universities. During her ten-year sojourn in China she worked as a journalist, a photographer and an independent researcher with a focus on urban history and heritage preservation. She published the historical and photographic atlas Shanghai Old Town: Topography of a Phantom City (Suzhou Creek Press, 2015). Since 2016 Katya has been pursuing her second master's degree, in Global History, at the University of Bologna.

This paper examines the material culture and consumer practices of the Russian diaspora in Shanghai in the first half of the twentieth century. The article argues that the dynamic of political estrangement and mercantile licence in the international treaty port engendered consumer behavior and an economy of services uncharacteristic of Russians living in the Soviet Union. It will also suggest that the diverse enterprises and commercial street life of stateless Russian emigrants have led to permanent transformations in the urban fabric of the treaty port. By drawing on previously unexamined source material, this study addresses a problem in related scholarship that has neglected the material component of the diaspora's experience. Through the testimony of the emigrants themselves, this paper looks at how a lengthy exile in the free-trade environment facilitated the commercial deployment of service skills, and how Russian refugee enterprises produced lasting effects on the cultural life of the city. The study provides a framework for further research demonstrating how the diaspora became the conduit of European material sensibility and global modernity for local and foreign populations.

Introduction

The Russian community in Shanghai emerged in the 1920s, peaked in the late 1930s and dissolved in the 1950s. The thirty-year sojourn of thousands of predominantly middle-class and stateless refugees from the former Russian Empire created a distinctive and vibrant consumer economy in the international city. This paper examines the material culture of the diaspora through the testimony of the emigrants themselves. The focal point of the study is the Russian marketplace in the international port that serves as a backdrop for the matrix of consumer practices among the exiles and provides a framework for analyzing their impact on the city.

The Russian diaspora in Shanghai has been the subject of a number of studies. Wang Zhicheng's *Shanghai e qiao shi*[1] is a phenomenological portrait of the enclave's foreign society based on historical newspaper reports and municipal records. Wang's ethnographic approach makes no attempt to place the work within the *longue durée* and its gaze remains that of an outsider. Conversely, multiple works by Amir Khisamutdinov,[2] the leading Russian authority on Slavic migration in the Pacific region, are grounded in the Russian national perspective and draw mostly on Russian-language source materials. Marcia Ristaino's *Port of Last Resort*[3] is a parallel examination of two stateless communities—the European Jews and the ex-Russian Slavs—through a rich array of archival data, predominantly the records of the Shanghai Municipal Police. Ristaino's work is the most comprehensive survey of the subject to date. It was the first to unsettle conventional perspectives emphasizing more powerful foreign communities in Shanghai and to challenge the coherence of national identities in the complexity of Shanghai's semi-colonial history. With regards to the quotidian, however, the author provides far more character and detail on the Jewish day-to-day experience (lasting less than a decade but more extensively documented by its participants) than on that of the Russians.

Overall, non-Chinese studies addressing the diaspora are inevitably dominated by the diaspora's self-representation that foregrounded Russian culture and spirituality; they also tend to overlook material ambitions and class aspirations. Attempting to relieve the scarcity of detailed analyses of the material life of the Russian community in Shanghai, this study looks at how a lengthy exile in the free-trade environment enabled and molded the community's production, commerce and consumption practices in this city. I argue that the environment of the treaty port instilled extensive entrepreneurialism and a cosmopolitan service economy that was uncharacteristic of Russians in the Soviet Union. While Russians in the USSR were compelled to denounce merchant activity and repudiate material attachments and attainment, the Shanghai Russians were building a locally derived manufacturing base and service economy that targeted both their own community, as well as all the other nationalities in the city. The Russian business and consumer initiatives that were ubiquitous in Shanghai from the 1930s to the 1940s had disappeared from Soviet Russia in the late 1920s with the termination of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

The most thorough representation of the material culture of Shanghai Russians are their own oral and written accounts, filled with the itemization of prices,

[1] Wang Zhicheng, *Shanghai e qiao shi* (Shanghai: Sanlian chubanshe, 1993).
[2] Amir Khisamutdinov, *Russkie v Kitae: Istoricheskii obzor* (Shanghai: Koordinatsionnyi sovet sootechestvennikov v Kitae, 2010); *Russkoe slovo v strane ieroglifov* (Vladivostok: Far Eastern University, 2006); *Rossiyskaya emigratsiya v Asiatsko-Tihookeanskom regione I Yuzhnoy Amerike* (Vladivostok: Far Eastern University, 2000).
[3] Marcia Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001).

salaries, rents, descriptions of clothing, food and interiors. This was the prevailing vocabulary through which the community described their experience of exile in Shanghai. These material portraits reveal a web of interconnections between domestic environment, commercial enterprise, consumer behavior and national identity. As a forum for transformation and negotiation, the commercial and consumer practices of the diaspora presented a counter-dynamic to the Russians' political life in China, in which the refugees had no access or agency due to their stateless condition.

The Emergence of the Russian Community in Shanghai

Christina Malygina was a volunteer nurse in the Russo-Japanese War. She arrived in Shanghai in 1904 on the damaged cruiser Askold which docked in Shanghai to undergo repairs, after escaping from pursuing Japanese warships. Malygina, who suffered from tuberculosis, was hospitalized as soon as she disembarked. On June 15, 1905, she died. Her belongings were sent to a judge in Saint Petersburg who was charged with forwarding them to Malygina's hometown in Siberia (Biysk), where she had left her young son and mother before going to the war. At the time of her death, her possessions consisted only of a cotton handkerchief, a coat, an officer's uniform, a muff, a hat, five Christian crosses, an ostrich egg, a turtle-shell vial, a Singer sewing machine and one hundred rubles in bonds of the Russo-Chinese Bank in Port Arthur—roughly the equivalent of five months' rent for an apartment in her hometown.[4]

Malygina had been supplementing her nurse's salary by working as a tailor, and planned to do the same in Shanghai. She was one of several thousand demobilized Russians from the Russo-Japanese War that passed through the port. The wounded were treated in local hospitals, while the dead were buried at the Bubbling Well Road Cemetery. Most eventually moved on, but some stayed, creating a resident community of 354 persons.[5] This was the first wave of Russian immigration to Shanghai, and the size of this community remained stable for more than a decade.

After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the ensuing civil war, Russians fled to Shanghai in greater numbers. At the end of 1922, several hundred White Army officers and their families sailed from Vladivostok. The refugees initially settled in the vicinity of the port and depended on the charity of the authorities. The strike of 1925 and subsequent suppression of Chinese labor unions created employment opportunities for the exiles: the availability of industrial work attracted an additional 5,000 Russians from the north of China. By the end of the 1920s there were about 8,000 Russians in Shanghai.[6]

[4] Victoria Sharonova, *Nekropol russkogo Shanghaia* (Moscow: Staraya Basmannaya, 2013), 285.
[5] Zhicheng Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae* (Moscow: Russkii put, 2008), 19.
[6] Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae*, 81.

The destruction of the Shanghai port neighborhood by Japanese air strikes in 1937 sent Russians fleeing to the foreign-governed areas of Shanghai. The majority settled in the French Concession, the expansive and largely undeveloped residential area under the governance of the French Consul-General. By 1939, Shanghai was home to about 25,000 Russians who lived mostly in the areas protected by the extraterritorial status from Sino-Japanese hostilities, namely the French Concession and the International Settlement.[7] Almost all of the Russian residents were stateless since the fall of the Tsarist government, although not everyone was a deliberate exile from the Communist regime. Many had been affiliated with the East China Railway and had been living and working in Harbin at the time of the 1917 revolution.

Unlike Europeans and North Americans, Russians did not come to Shanghai to represent international enterprises or national interests, but to protect their lives and possessions. Compelled by poverty, low status and homelessness, but enabled by the booming economy and the legal ambiguity of the treaty port, Russian emigrants turned the French Concession into a European market district and created a westernized service economy. Russian entrepreneurship drove up the value of the land and made the French Concession a city-famous destination. The Russian storefront became the face of Europe for the Chinese residents, whose daily contact with other Westerners was rare or formulaic.

The Material Life of the Russian Diaspora

In the absence of any significant taxation or official procedure, starting a business in Shanghai was simple and inexpensive.[8] By the 1940s, Russians owned and operated almost all the boutiques and tailor shops in the French Concession, as well as most barbershops, bakeries, pharmacies and photo studios. A significant part of the Shanghai jewelry trade was in their hands as well. Russian-owned factories produced wood veneer, nails, paints, leather goods, shoes, cosmetics and medicines; their food processing businesses produced sausages, sweets, wines and dairy products.[9]

While many of the Russian services targeted Western and Chinese consumers, the foundation for most Russian businesses was to supply the demand of their compatriots. Russian-language periodicals of the three decades between 1920 and 1950 are filled with advertisements for pharmacies selling medicines at affordable prices, experienced beauticians and hairdressers, boutiques with men's and women's clothing, lending libraries and bookshops, retail stores offering housewares,

[7] Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 164.
[8] Valentin Fedoulenko, *Russian Emigré Life in Shanghai* (Berkeley: University of California Bancroft Libary, 1967), 82.
[9] Vladimir Zhiganov, *Russkie v Shankhaie* (Shanghai: Slovo, 1936), 154.

silverware and crockery, furniture rentals, and opticians' workshops trading in watches, reading glasses, engraved gifts and jewelry.[10]

The most successful emigrants had come to Shanghai early and customized their professions—as pharmacists, wine makers, restaurateurs, architects and engineers—to Shanghai circumstances. However, large fortunes were rare. Russians were outsiders in the treaty port with no representation in the city government and few resources outside China to draw upon. The majority remained poor, and there was always a sizable portion of the community living on the verge of starvation.

For older emigrants, reminiscences of the bygone prosperity and status were their only solace in the face of displacement. Stories of lost property and nobility were told and retold with embellishments of missing luxuries: horse-driven carriages, extravagant dresses and well-furnished houses. "They can take everything from you, but they cannot take away your memories," one emigrant told her daughters who had no memories of living well in the Russian Empire.[11] Aging aristocrats and former generals often lived in denial and squalor, refusing to work for a living and wearing their uniforms and medals at home. Poverty reduced many to begging. A Cossack officer in full regalia lying drunk in a ditch was an iconic sight in Shanghai. One notorious "general with a plate" collected leftovers from the customers' tables in restaurants.[12] Suicides among emigrants were frequent, and many death notes found in the pockets of those who poisoned or hanged themselves cited poverty and the lack of prospects.[13]

The diet of the poor expatriates consisted mostly of Chinese street food, the cheapest available. Larissa Andersen, a cabaret dancer in the 1930s and 1940s, lived for weeks on cacao bought on credit from a Russian store and fried wheat flat-cakes from Chinese street stalls.[14] Georgy Yeliseev, a student of engineering, lived on baked sweet potatoes and self-made peanut paste.[15] The widow Ekaterina Voyeikova and her college-age daughter Olga usually ate one meal a day at lunch, which they often shared; for dinner they had tea and toast with butter[16]—some households even had to replace butter with margarine.[17] Although Voyeikova's family economized on food and moved to increasingly cheaper and more remote boarding houses, the mother maintained her membership in the prestigious social club, Cercle Sportif Français, to give her daughter the opportunity to swim, play tennis and socialize with Western "good girls."[18]

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[10] *Parus* (1931–1939); *Shanhaiskaia Zaria* (1925–1945); *Slovo* (1925–1941).
[11] Olga Ilyina-Lail, *Vostochnaia nit* (Saint Petersburg: Izd-vo zhurnala Zvezda, 2003), 174.
[12] Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae*, 102.
[13] Sharonova, *Nekropol russkogo Shanghaia*, 189, 217, 253, 272, 329.
[14] Larissa Andersen, *Odna na mostu* (Moscow: Russkoe zarubezhie, 2006), 264.
[15] Georgy Yeliseev, "Uzory sudby," April 2001, http://samlib.ru/g/georgij_n_e/uzory_sudby.shtml.
[16] Ilyina-Lail, *Vostochnaia nit*, 175.
[17] Olga Bahtina, "O semeistve Narbutov," *Sbornik Uralskogo genealogocheskogo obschestva*, no. 21 (2011), 63.
[18] Ilyina-Lail, *Vostochnaia nit*, 172.

Such adherence to signs of status and class position was not uncommon. Tokens of bygone privileges were hoarded as symbolic protection from the uncertainty of the future. One Westerner who grew up in Shanghai remembered an impoverished Russian countess, who taught her mother French: the lady wore a frilled lace collar every day, in all seasons, convinced that a woman with a lace jabot would never starve.[19] Disenfranchised nobles who managed to find employment were envied. French language skills allowed Prince Ukhtomsky to get a job as a doorman in the Shanghai branch of Banque de l'Indochine[20] and later a secretarial position in the French Consulate; meanwhile his wife operated a boarding house, which was highly profitable.[21]

For the majority of Russians, boarding houses served as residences, which were located in two- and three-story terraced row houses, the predominant type of housing in Shanghai. To the front of the row house, rooms would be arranged vertically, with a tiny attic room at the top. There would be a similar vertical course of three rooms in the back of the house. All the rooms were accessible by a narrow wooden staircase. The back room on the ground floor would be used as a kitchen with a coal stove for heating and cooking. A portable bucket under the staircase served as a toilet; every morning the bucket was handed to the itinerant waste collectors who transported the refuse to the fields. The bathing area in a corner would be separated by a curtain. Many houses lacked even these, so the tenants had to use public bathhouses, on average once a week.[22]

It was commonly accepted that the proprietresses of boarding houses were former nightclub hostesses and concubines. This exclusively female entertainment economy blossomed in the 1920s and was credited with the initial growth of Russian commerce in Shanghai, fueling business in clothing, fashion, jewelry, housing and restaurants.[23] Once they turned to "respectable business," landladies were not above profiteering. They would ration tap water, overcharge for meals and subdivide rooms into narrow cubicles. Tiny lightless spaces under the stairwells were also rented out as rooms.[24] Tenants economized by squeezing an entire family into one room and making temporary beds out of chairs and trunks pushed together. However basic the furnishing, no Russian room was ever without an icon in the corner and an oil lamp underneath it.[25]

According to the testimony of Valentin Fedoulenko, a former officer and an apothecary store owner in the 1920s and 1930s, one could lead a reasonably com-

[19] Harriet Sergeant, *Shanghai* (London: John Murray, 1990), 38.
[20] Viktor Smolnikov, *Zapiski shanhaiskogo vracha* (Moscow: Strategia, 2001), 10.
[21] Natalia Ilyina, *Dorogi: avtobiograficheskaia proza* (Moscow: Sovetskiy pisatel, 1983), 130; Ilyina-Lail, *Vostochnaia nit*, 174.
[22] Aleksandr Titov, "Zdravstvui, Shanghai," http://www.rusconshanghai.org.cn/useful/shanghai/titov-memory (2002).
[23] Nikolay Lidin, "Russkaia emigratsia v Shanhae," *Annales russes*, no. 2 (1937), 317.
[24] Smolnikov, *Zapiski shanhaiskogo vracha*, 270.
[25] John B. Powell, *My Twenty-five Years in China* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), 60.

fortable existence on about 120 Chinese dollars a month; Fedoulenko paid his employees 175–200 dollars. A room or a small apartment cost between 35 and 75 Chinese dollars a month; a loaf of bread cost 10–15 cents; a meal in a medium-range Russian restaurant cost 40–50 cents; a discounted ticket to a concert or an opera cost 50 cents. Fedoulenko's storefront and the living quarters above his pharmacy all together cost 55 dollars a month. In spite of their middle-class standing, the pharmacist and his wife lived frugally, working all the time and spending only 24 dollars a month on food.[26]

FIGURE 1: Fedoulenko's pharmacy on Avenue Joffre, 1930s.
Zhiganov (1936).

Russian tenancy and commerce was concentrated in the center of the French Concession, along four blocks of Avenue Joffre from Avenue du Roi Albert to Rue du Lieutenant Pétiot. The streetscape became indistinguishable from a Tsarist-era town in central Russia with rows of stores overhung by striped canopies and Cyrillic signs.[27] The signage in the windows of Piotr Grigorieff's fabric store promised moderate prices and timely arrivals of English woolens and French angora

[26] Fedoulenko, *Russian Emigré Life in Shanghai*, 67.
[27] Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae,* 93.

for tailor-made dresses and coats. Next to it, the Shanghai branch of an old established Harbin textile emporium, Petroff & Co, offered a range of "woolen, silk and cotton piece-goods," and positioned itself as "the only place to find ready-for-wear suits and dress, as well as moleskin, mink and leopard fur coats."[28] Next in line was the Avenue Joffre Flower Shop of Mrs. A. P. Medem, one of the few genealogically authentic aristocrats among the Russians. The next row of shop windows belonged to Leontiy Baranovsky's haberdashery, an old-timer in Russian Shanghai.

The Baranovskys belonged to the elite set of moneyed expatriates who purchased the same services as their European counterparts. They owned their Shanghai homes as well as summer retreats on the north coast of China. In 1935, rich Russians owned about 1,000 out of 3,942 personal vehicles registered in the French Concession.[29] Like most other successful Russian entrepreneurs, the Baranovskys were wealthy before they came in Shanghai. Upon arrival in Shanghai in 1923, Leontiy Baranovsky opened a small haberdashery near the port. By 1934, he operated a large storefront in a prime location in the French Concession with five floor-to-ceiling shop windows.[30] The haberdashery sold English wool, Chinese silk, Indian cotton and European lace sourced directly from manufacturers. Fabric was turned into coats, suits, dresses and children's garments directly on the premises. Also, sections of ready-for-wear men's clothing and accessories were available.

FIGURE 2: Baranovsky's storefront on Avenue Joffre. Zhiganov (1936).

[28] Advertisement, *Ponedelnik*, no. 1 (1930).
[29] Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae,* 94.
[30] Zhiganov, *Russkie v Shankhae*, 163.

The de-facto manager of Baranovsky's store was Madame Baranovsky, who, according to her family, always used her husband's alleged ill-health as a bargaining point in negotiations with suppliers. Born to a Roma family in Kashmir, India, she met her future husband when she was a singer and a dancer at the Roma Theater in Moscow. Having completed her transformation from a gypsy entertainer to the matriarch of a wealthy Russian Jewish family, Madam Baranovsky kept her heritage a secret and always assumed an aristocratic European identity. Not to wear perfume in public was for her "akin to appearing nude, according to the testimony of her granddaughter."[31] Madame Baranovsky ordered her outfits from Milan and Paris even after the Japanese invasion of Shanghai drove up the price of delivery from abroad.

In spite of her pathological fear of horses, Baranovsky took riding lessons, unable to "resist the class connotation of the chivalrous sport." Riding allowed her the opportunity to dress herself in the French luxury brand Hermès from head to toe, including kid gloves and leather boots. She took dressage lessons at a riding school run by the former White Russian cavalry lieutenant Godfrid Arnhold, who landed in Shanghai in 1920. Riding lessons were *de rigueur* among Shanghai gentry, and the riding instructors tended to be former White Army officers and Cossacks.[32] Russians were tutors in all the aristocratic leisure arts—ballroom dancing, instrumental music, painting, singing, French language, fencing—as well as boxing, swimming and tennis. The availability of Russian teachers' services and their low fees created a market for upper class proficiencies and pastimes that would be hard to afford for Europeans and Americans back home.



FIGURE 3: Ascot Riding School on Tunsin Road.
Zhiganov (1936).

[31] Antonia Marechek, "My First Five Years," 2010, https://myfirst5years.wordpress.com/..
[32] Patricia Chapman, *Tea on the Great Wall: An American Girl in War-torn China: a Memoir* (Hong Kong: Earnshaw Books, 2015), 153.

The Baranovskys left Shanghai for California in 1938, leaving the store in the care of their oldest daughter Sarette (Serafima). She was a capable businesswoman who owned a successful bookshop on the same block as her father's haberdashery. The Globe Bookstore carved itself an upscale niche, offering luxurious leather-bound books for purchase and lending. After the Japanese takeover of the foreign settlements in 1941, Sarette converted her father's haberdashery into a nightclub called Coconut Grove, where some Russian hostesses made themselves available after hours. These same girls sketched out the latest Japanese troop movements culled from the clients in a secret backstage room and passed that information to Soviet agents. Sarette's friendship with Japanese officers helped her business in difficult times, but after the war, her association with occupiers and her espionage for the Soviets made her ineligible for an American visa, and she could not join her family in California.[33]

Most Russians' aspirations for commercial success and a Western lifestyle remained in the realm of the imaginary. Larissa Andersen, working as a classical ballerina by day and a tap dancer by night, had to make her own stage costumes from the skirts of her old dresses; the frilled bras and panties for her stage act demanded so little material that a pair of costumes could be tailored out of one skirt. Andersen recalled that nightclub administrators often demanded a weekly rotation of routines with different outfits, which made her improvise and wrap herself in a tablecloth as a substitute gypsy shawl.[34] Though Andersen was not a professional, she was forced to support herself by dancing, because most Russian women had to work for living and were frequently sole breadwinners in their families, unlike middle-class Chinese and other foreign women in Shanghai. In the absence of any substantial blue- or white-collar job opportunities for women, they had to create their own markets, such as tutoring, tailoring, translation, editing, debt-collecting, dancing and prostitution.

Careers in the textile and fashion industry—hat making, tailoring, knitting, cleaning, mending and modeling—became the preserve of entrepreneurial and skilled women. The most successful of them operated boutiques in the central blocks of the French Concession, like Nina Gingeroff, whose Salon Des Modes was located in the high-end strip mall Grosvenor Gardens. New York's latest fashions displayed in the salon's huge vitrines received regular coverage in the English-language press.[35] Though Gingeroff's level of success was an exception among Russians in the garment trade, a fair number of women did rise to prominence. Among them were Anna Iskandrian, the owner of Scarlett Gowns in Grosvenor Gardens and the official representative of the luxury brand Elisabeth Bock, Tamara Linoff, the owner of Maison Arcus, and Eleanora Garnett who climbed out of abysmal poverty to become the darling of fashionable elites in Shanghai and

[33] Marechek, "My First Five Years."
[34] Larissa Andersen, *Odna na mostu* (Moscow: Russkoe zarubezhie, 2006), 265.
[35] *The North-China Daily News* (November 14, 1938), 3.

later New York. In order to target Western clientele, Russian businesses adopted European-sounding names, like Maison Lucile, Femina Silks, Modes Parisiennes, La Femme de Demain, La Donna, Elite Fashion, Knitkraft, Jenny, or Monique.[36] The majority of Russian tailors, however, served their compatriots, working from home and advertising their services on the gates of their residences.

The highest aspiration for a well-educated Russian woman with English-language skills was a secretarial job in a foreign firm, guaranteeing her western-level pay, company housing and medical coverage. A mastery of stenography and speed typing were essential, and the competition for such vacancies was brutal. There are accounts of fifty candidates competing in an open speed-typing race with only the winner getting the job.[37] Lidia Tsirgvava was one of the fortunate secretaries, employed by the Norwegian shipping company Mollers Limited, where she enjoyed a free two-bedroom apartment near the port, access to sports facilities, a vacation on a company ship once a year, and, most importantly, free daily meals at the prestigious Chocolate Café in downtown Shanghai.[38]

Professional entertainers among the Russian community—musicians, dancers and actors—inhabited all income strata. Classical musicians employed by the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra enjoyed housing subsidies and occasionally the services of a chauffeured car.[39] Those that played in theaters, ballrooms and hotels often found that their salaries were not enough to support their families, and moonlighted in nightclubs, restaurants and cabarets. Alexandr Vertinsky, the world-famous star of Russian chanson, literally sang for food by performing in the Russian-owned restaurant, Renaissance. After each show, he went from table to table, toasting and eating with the guests. In the mornings, he could count on a free breakfast from the restaurant.[40]

Some corners of the entertainment business offered extravagant material rewards, if only for a very few. Thirty girls competed in the 1931 beauty pageant Miss Shanghai, and the winner, Elena Slutskaya (24), took home a silver goblet 2.5 feet high and a six-seat Buick of the latest model worth 7,000 silver taels. Nina Barsamova (21), elected Miss Shanghai in 1933 out of 160 contestants, received her crown personally from Shanghai's most illustrious tycoon, Sir Victor Sassoon.[41] Barsamova was awarded a round-the-world trip and an audition at Paramount Pictures in Hollywood.[42] The beauty pageant attracted more candidates each year until the austerity of the war years confined the competition to the format of a floorshow in Arcadia, the largest Russian-run restaurant and cabaret.

[36] *The North China Desk Hong List* (1925–1941).
[37] Ilyina, *Dorogi*, 100.
[38] Lidiya Vertinskaya, *Siniaia ptitsa liubvi* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2004), 42–43.
[39] Vladimir Serebryakov, "Svoia pesnia," *Kazan*, nos. 1–4 (1997).
[40] Ilyina, *Dorogi*, 152.
[41] Zhiganov, *Russkie v Shankhae*, 239.
[42] "Rotary Around the World," *The Rotarian* 43, no. 2 (1933), 41.



FIGURE 4: "Miss Shanghai" Elena Slutskaya next to her prize Buick, 1931. Zhiganov (1936).

The restaurant scene was one of the most visible Russian influences in Shanghai. Always attached to their own cuisine, émigrés opened cafés and food stores that traded in familiar foods: dairy, bread, sweets, pastry, honey, fruit jams, smoked fish, sausages, hams and liquor. Emphasizing ethnic and regional Russian dishes, many restaurants, canteens and tearooms served classic Slavic and Caucasian staples, such as skewered meat, soups, cutlets, stews, vodka and fermented bread lemonade. People from all economic strata frequented these eateries. The poor and the middle class did this partially out of necessity since cooking facilities in rented rooms were almost universally lacking. For the well-off, the theatric and festive atmosphere of a proper restaurant with harmonica and balalaika players, gypsy dancers, real silverware, crystal glass and a familiar menu was a trusted way to satisfy their nostalgia.

Numerous Russian coffee houses modeled themselves after Parisian cafés complete with outdoor seating, which was meant to instill a European variant of cosmopolitanism into the street life of an Asian city. Since the 1920s, Chinese intellectuals were caught up in Shanghai's "coffee house craze." A literary scene played out in the multiple Russian venues in the French Concession, as testified by Zhang Ruogu: "I spent practically all my leisure time in the cafes on Avenue Joffre […] Come late afternoon, all of us would gather, at a few of our usual cafés, and as we drank the strong and fragrant coffee to enhance our fun, we would talk

our hearts out."[43] Participation in the shared cosmopolitan public spaces and the exposure to various aspects of European culture through the consumption of food, services and material goods eventually translated into the characteristic Shanghai modernism in the Chinese literature and visual arts.[44]

Although restaurateurs and entertainers were some of the more visible entrepreneurs among the diaspora, they were certainly not the most affluent due to the volatility of demand and fierce competition. The largest incomes were earned by bankers, import and export dealers, and real estate developers. Among the few Russian professionals who became as wealthy as the above groups were engineers, jewelers, architects, and doctors. In 1935, there were about fifty Russian physicians.[45] Doctors working for the Russian community earned little: competition was high, patients were poor, the currency was volatile and bills were often paid on credit. By the 1930s, when Shanghai already had several foreign-run hospitals with state-of-the-art equipment, the only Russian-run hospital consisted of ten beds in an unheated room, where the patients shivered from cold under thin blankets and complained about the hospital soup resembling liquid garbage.[46] Even this mediocre level of medical care was denied to the poorest Russians. One of Natalya Ilyina's semi-autobiographic short stories tells of a life-saving operation being delayed until the patient's wife brought cash raised from pawning her wedding ring.[47]

The most successful Russian doctors spoke European languages and had specialized skills, which allowed them to treat European patients and charge higher fees as compared to when they treated their Russian counterparts. Dr Victor Smolnikov, educated in a French Catholic university, tried running a practice for the Russian community but found himself conducting price wars with other Russian doctors. He later found prosperity as a staff physician in the British-run medical firm, Marshall & Partners. By the early 1950s, in spite of the Japanese occupation and the civil war of the preceding decade, he was living in a sprawling villa and making comfortable sea voyages. His excess furniture had to be stored in his garage, sharing space with his car and motorcycle.[48]

A doctor's reputation for exclusivity could further attract wealthy patients, who could use medical appointments as opportunities for conspicuous consumption and boasted to their friends about the high cost of their medical bills. Such patients came from a set of "merchants' wives" who distinguished themselves by status perfume—Chanel No. 5 or Shalimar—and elaborate hairstyles that proscribed wearing hats. Responding to his patients' fondness for status symbols,

[43] Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern,* 21.
[44] Lynn Pan, *Shanghai Style*, 144.
[45] Zhiganov, *Russkie v Shankhae*, 115.
[46] Vladimir Zhiganov, "Otryvki iz glavy deviatoy," *Kartiny proshlogo*, no. 14 (Jan 1975), 63.
[47] Nataliya Ilyina, "Iz posledney papki. Records from Various Years. 1957–1993," *Oktiabr*, no. 6 (2000), 33.
[48] Smolnikov, *Zapiski shankhaiskogo vracha*, 239.

Smolnikov's one time superior, Dr Arcady Lempert, designed his office to convey affluence and competence; solid wooden wall paneling, portraits of American scientists over the fireplace, piles of leather-bound medical books on a desk, large Chinese vases with white and yellow chrysanthemums, and a "colossal and outmoded broken electrocardiograph."[49] During the checkups, Lempert would casually inform his patients of his sore back, allegedly after playing golf, because "playing golf until you are sore put you on a high pedestal in the eyes of the Russian diaspora."[50]

The Japanese occupation from 1937 to 1945 disrupted production and consumption of goods and services in Shanghai. In 1943, the dissolution of the foreign settlements and the internment of thousands of Allied nationals by the Japanese military resulted in the collapse of the city's economy. Russian cafés and restaurants in the former French Concession turned into makeshift marketplaces. In popular cafés, self-proclaimed brokers walked from table to table, randomly offering goods for sale, such as soap, Camel cigarettes, women's bras, whisky, shaving razors, clocks, etc.[51] Meanwhile, some Russians profiteered on wartime inflation and speculated on gold bars.[52] Both stateless Russians and those who had received Soviet citizenship were free to move around the city, but in the face of unemployment and inflation the market for their services contracted painfully. Furthermore, there was new competition from thousands of European Jews who had sought refuge in Shanghai and also made their living from craft professions and services.

The Move to the West and the USSR

The end of the Japanese occupation in August 1945, signaled the beginning of mass departures of Russians from Shanghai to the USSR, the USA, Australia, the UK, Canada, Brazil and other countries. The Soviet Consulate reported receiving about 8,000 applications to repatriate—triple the anticipated number. The USSR government announced that it would cover the shipping costs of any personal belongings of up to 600 kilos and the waiver of custom duties.[53] However, the Chinese authorities limited the export of currency, so the emigrants were not allowed to take money with them.[54] To circumvent this rule, emigrants were known to fit golden crowns on their healthy teeth.[55] Dr Smolnikov was still in Shanghai,

[49] Smolnikov, *Zapiski shankhaiskogo vracha*, 44.
[50] Ibid., 45.
[51] Aleksandr Vertinsky, *Dorogoi dlinnoiu* (Moscow: Pravda, 1990), 378.
[52] Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae*, 95.
[53] Piotr Balakshin, *Final v Kitae: Voznikovenie, razvitie i ischeznovenie Beloj emigracii na Dalnem Vostoke* (San Francisco: Sirius, 1958), 285.
[54] Larisa Chernikova, "'Nasha zhena' Irina Kotiakova," June 2002, http://www.lundstrem-jazz.ru/press/press_28.php.
[55] Artur Heidok, *Stranitsy moei zhizni. Vospominania, rasskazy, skazki, esse* (Moscow: Biblioteka zhurnala Delphis,1989), 1929.

waiting for permission to repatriate to the USSR, when he witnessed some ingenious methods used by Russians who tried to smuggle their American dollars to the western countries they emigrated to. One patient in his clinic showed off his custom-made coat with double lining, in which he would hide wads of dollars, and asked Smolnikov to make him a realistic cast corset to hide more valuables. Smolnikov refused, but another doctor complied, and the patient was carried to the departing ship on a stretcher.[56] Sarette Baranovsky, whose US visa was denied, embarked on a circuitous voyage via Singapore, Japan, Indonesia and South America. In preparation for the trip, she filled the hollow body of her daughter's doll with diamonds; the doll underwent "surgery" whenever the need for funds arose.[57]

Readying themselves for the cold climate and the harsh Soviet discipline, the repatriates tried to acquire all the life necessities while still in Shanghai. An advertisement for L. Reznikov's tailor shop in the Epoch magazine said:

> Everything for the departure! Now taking orders for coats and suits made of the best materials. Men's and ladies' boots per order. Fur-lined leather jackets and men's and ladies' woolen stockings.[58]

Another store on Avenue Joffre announced "special discounts for those departing for the USSR" and a "large selection of autumn and winter essentials at affordable prices."[59] Following the arrival of American troops, Shanghai was flooded with American goods (sent to China as humanitarian aid); US Army equipment went on sale, illegally, in summer of 1947, and emigrants bought army coats and boots, khaki pants and rainproof fur-lined windbreakers.[60] The Soviet Consulate advised returnees to dress inconspicuously and avoid standing out in the drab and conservative USSR, but many men boarded the repatriating ships wearing American army uniforms with the "U. S. Navy" insignia stenciled on the backs,[61] while women wore pants and army boots that had no equivalent in the Soviet Union for decades to come.[62]

Oleg Shtifelman, who was a teenager at the time of his departure, recalled that his mother had purchased enough clothes to last him five years and even a pair of skis. Together with his grandmother's belongings—which included tableware and silverware—they loaded six large trunks onto the cruise ship Gogol in November

[56] Smolnikov, *Zapiski shankhaiskogo vracha,* 278.
[57] Marechek, "My First Five Years."
[58] Viacheslav Vozchikov, "Chelovek v misterii XX veka. Pamiati Gleba, syna Spasovskogo," *Noviy vzgliad. Mezhdunrodnyi nauchnyi vestnik* (2016), 42.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ilyina, *Dorogi*, 112.
[61] Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, 289.
[62] Ilyina, *Dorogi*, 112.

1947.[63] The cruise ship Ilyich, which sailed in August that year, carried 1,100 passengers to Nahodka. The luggage took three days to load, and included ten pianos.[64] Some returnees brought trunks of equipment and tools they had used in their workshops and factories in Shanghai.[65]

To equip the teenage Tankred Golenpolsky for his trip, his parents gave him several formal suits, a black leather coat lined with striped skunk fur, a pair of custom-made fur-lined leather boots and six pairs of dress shoes in three sizes. The boy packed a hunting rifle and seven sets of volleyball uniforms—he was expected to continue his practice and wanted to dress his team. To stay under the luggage quota, Golenpolsky had to make an uneasy choice between his thousand-strong collection of tin soldiers, baseball equipment and twenty albums of rare postmarks. He did not sacrifice his set of Shanghai Millionaire, the monopoly board game popular in Shanghai.[66] Preparing to depart for the USSR, the wealthy Dr Smolnikov had to get rid of possessions deemed incompatible with the Soviet way of life, such as his custom-made golden ring with a large uncut diamond and his Royal Enfield motorcycle. He also decided not to bring his English Austin 10 automobile, not because he knew there were no spare parts for it in the USSR, but because he reasoned that its motor was not suited for Russian winters.[67]

Having pledged to cover the transportation expenses, the Soviet Consulate immediately set about recouping these funds from rich repatriates. The Soviet Club organized a banquet for the 300 wealthiest holders of Soviet passports and then hectored them with speeches concerning the hardship their homeland experienced during the war. When asked to cover the cost of repatriation, many guests committed to donating large sums. For instance, the former White Guard, N. Yakovlev, pledged 300 million Shanghai dollars for the cause. Some people, though, ended up paying more than intended. A guest who pledged 50 million at the banquet was later invited to the Soviet Consulate and made to sign off 500 million.[68]

The pressure to part with money and properties continued on board the Soviet ships, since the wealth of the "Shanghainese," as they were nicknamed, appeared enormous. A group of children sent to the USSR ahead of their parents, in autumn 1947, were approached by the political propaganda commissars on the ship and defrauded of their dollars. In the Soviet port of Nahodka, customs officers declared the children's valuable belongings, such as foreign postmarks and hunting rifles, illegal for import and expropriated them.[69] When special trains carried the

[63] Oleg Shtifelman, "Kroshka iz Shankhaia," http://www.russianshanghai.com/author/shtifelman (2012).
[64] Wang, *Istoriia russkoi emigratsii v Shankhae,* 114.
[65] Shtifelman, "Kroshka iz Shankhaia."
[66] Tankred Golenpolsky, "Otiezd iz Kitaia," http://booknik.ru/library/all/otezd-iz-kitaya-na-rodinu (2007).
[67] Smolnikov, *Zapiski shankhaiskogo vracha*, 258.
[68] Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, 289.
[69] Golenpolsky, "Otiezd iz Kitaia."

returnees across Siberia, state security officers canvassed the carriages and compelled the passengers to sell their possessions for next to nothing.[70] Locals, too, haunted the stations and solicited foreign goods from the arrivals.[71]

Having acquired most of their knowledge of the USSR from propaganda films screened in the Soviet Club, many returnees humbly acknowledged that they were bourgeois elements in need of moral reform. One repatriated journalist had so much faith in the higher ethical standing of Soviet citizens that he blamed the disappearance of his suitcase from the station on a "backwards element."[72] In fact, alerted to the arrival of the "Shanghainese" trains, locals went as far as to unhinge train cars and push them off a slope, causing multiple injuries to passengers and taking advantage of the ensuing commotion to steal their luggage.[73] Those who retained some properties during the first years of their life in the USSR lived off their gradual sale through state-run second hand shops. Many of these people, however, were eventually arrested under the pretext of espionage and counter-revolutionary activity, and their remaining belongings were confiscated.[74]

For those who held out for a better resettlement opportunity than the USSR, liquidating the assets in post-war Shanghai became increasingly difficult. Many Russian entrepreneurs hoped that the American presence would continue to safeguard the free market, but the victory of Mao Zedong in the civil war and the establishment of the Communist regime, in 1949, precipitated the recall of the US troops from Shanghai. For example, the pharmacist Fedoulenko had to sell his business cheaply; after paying agents' commission and severance fees he arrived in the United States with around 4,000 US dollars to his name.

The exodus of Russians from China was accompanied by the inventory, valuation and liquidation of assets of an entire community. As businesses, estates and private possessions were traded for passage and security, the transactions reveal the relation between the individuals' economic status and the trajectory of their resettlement. In the absence of thorough documentation regarding age and wealth distribution of the refugees from China, a tentative appraisal based on the personal testimony suggests that the older and wealthier segment of the community relocated to the West, while the younger and less moneyed comprised the majority of those who traveled to the Soviet Union. Entrepreneurs would expect to find a better fit in the capitalist West than in the Soviet command economy, whereas monarchists and White sympathizers would fear repercussions in the USSR. China-born Russian youth, however, were spared the political stigma and political biases of older generations and were more amenable to Soviet propaganda. Professionals were a rarity among the repatriates to the USSR, while artisans, school- and col-

[70] Shtifelman, "Kroshka iz Shankhaia."
[71] Ilyina, *Dorogi*, 113.
[72] Ilyina, *Dorogi*, 114.
[73] Shtifelman, "Kroshka iz Shankhaia."
[74] Heidok, *Stranitsy moei zhizni*, 1930; Yeliseev, "Uzory sudby."

lege-age youth and retirees were strongly represented. At the same time, among those who left China for the Western countries, the majority were members of families of above-average means, good education and professional backgrounds, such as doctors, engineers, architects, artists, couturiers, lawyers, businessmen.[75]

The evidence of rich Russians spending large sums to improve their political standing in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suggests some complex strategic reasoning in the repatriation venture. It demonstrates the formation of a hybrid Soviet identity among some of the wealthiest representatives of the diaspora, which is remarkable insofar as it arose in the capitalist milieu of Russian-speaking Shanghai: effectively outside of the Soviet political space. The cases of wealthy emigrants —including former White officers—pledging large portions of their fortunes to reimburse the Soviet Consulate the expense of the repatriation of Shanghai Russians to the USSR is one example of this identity at work.[76]

Prior to 1949, departures from China, for whatever destination, were largely optional; however, the 1950s and 1960s saw sporadic exodus for any country that was available. At the close of 1949, the youngest, the oldest and the most vulnerable of the remaining Russians in the care of the Orthodox Church were assisted by the San Francisco Eastern Orthodox diocese to relocate to the US. For those not in the fold of the church, it became more difficult to leave as the months passed. Western countries tightened immigration quotas for stateless persons, meanwhile Chinese authorities narrowed legal channels for emigration. Applicants for exit visas remained in uncertainty for months,and sometimes years, eating through their savings and forfeiting their properties. Frequently one family member would be held hostage in China while the rest were permitted to leave, but the families were not allowed to take anything with them beyond personal items.[77] The dancer Larissa Andersen was denied her exit visa without any explanation. She was forced to sign off her villa in the western suburb of Shanghai to the authorities and move to a one–room apartment in an overcrowded building in the city. Resigned to ending her days in Shanghai, she continued to dance in the former Arcadia cabaret, which had been converted to a Chinese restaurant, one of the few remaining places of leisure in the city. Only in 1956, after hastily marrying a French trade representative, was she able to leave Shanghai.[78]

During the years in limbo, most Russians lived on 10 dollars a month sent from Hong Kong by relief organizations.[79] Having eaten through their possessions "down to the last teakettle," emaciated émigrés were seen at street markets

[75] Yeliseev, "Uzory sudby;" Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*; Fedoulenko, *Russian Emigré Life in Shanghai.*
[76] Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, 289.
[77] Vladimir Zhiganov, "Why I Call Australia Paradise," *Kartiny proshlogo*, no. 9 (Sep 1971), 32–35.
[78] Andersen, *Odna na mostu*, 318.
[79] Zhiganov, "Why I Call Australia Paradise," 92.

attempting to peddle soap, matches and thread.[80] Food rations introduced by the Communist government were meager and only after an increase in 1960 did some remaining foreigners begin to receive "5 pounds of meat, 3 pounds of fish, 3 pounds of sugar, 12 ounces of vegetable oil, 20–25 pounds of rice and two pounds of crackers." Russians were allowed to exchange their rice quota for bread. They were entitled to a pound of potatoes a week, when the designated "foreign" store had potatoes.[81]

While most stranded Russians struggled to survive in an increasingly barren and hostile city, there was also a coterie whose privileged lifestyle was insulated from the transformation of the country. The Mandrigin family had attained Soviet citizenship, but remained professionally associated with the British Consulate in Shanghai. Into the 1960s, the Mandrigins lived in a prestigious downtown apartment block, hired private tutors for their teenage children and supported expensive hobbies, such as tennis, ballet, sculpture, photography and fashion. The eighteen-year-old daughter, Marianna, recorded that her "social life is made up of dinners and cocktails, which are interesting when you are new to it, but prove to be quite boring after three years' attendance."[82] Isolated by her class, Marianna did not know any Russians—or Westerners—in her age group and called herself "the last foreign teenager in Shanghai."[83] In 1964, the whole family relocated to London, following the invitation to the younger son Mikhail to study at the Royal Academy Schools of Art. In the same year, another and much larger group of Russians of various ages and modest economic means, succeeded in moving to Australia. One of those who departed estimated that out of the tens of thousands of compatriots that once lived in Shanghai "only 19 old ladies and 11 men remained, all of whom eventually left or died."[84]

Although higher social standing vastly improved one's chances of escape from China, there were no guarantees. A handful of the commercial elite never managed to leave China, such as Anna Bouianovskaya, a widow of an Italian diplomat and formerly the owner of a hairstyling and cosmetology school and spa. After the Chinese authorities denied her an exit visa, she remained in Shanghai until her death in 1981. Managing to stay under the radar of the Communist surveillance, she became an informal custodian of the closed Italian consulate and indulged in Cuban cigars and champagne from the consulate cellars in the middle of the Cultural Revolution.[85]

[80] Guanlong Cao, *The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son* (California: University of California Press, 1999), 17.
[81] Zhiganov, "Why I Call Australia Paradise," 92.
[82] "A teenager writes from Red Shanghai," The Australian Woman's Weekly (March 1961).
[83] Ibid.
[84] Zhiganov, "Why I Call Australia Paradise," 109.
[85] Mario Filippo Pini, *Italia e Cina, 60 anni tra passato e futuro* (Roma: L'Asino d'oro edizioni, 2011), 141–142; and: "Alcune note su due diplomatici che hanno studiato il cinese e sulle loro esperienze in Cina (prima parte)," *Mondo cinese*, no. 131 (April 2007).

Another inadvertent hostage of the Communist regime, Ksenia Pavlova, was denied her exit visa after the rest of her family left China. Her relatives' attempts to return were also thwarted; thus, Pavlova spent the rest of her life in Shanghai, teaching Russian and doing secretarial work. The family mansion that had belonged to her father, a railways engineer from Harbin, was nationalized and populated with Chinese tenants, leaving Pavlova to live in a one small room. When she died of old age in 1988, the Soviet Consulate found among her scant belongings a crumpled paper with pencil notes indicating various secret areas beneath the floor and behind the walls. Having lifted floorboards and broken through hollow masonry, the stunned Soviet bureaucrats discovered 2.5 million dollars worth of gold rings, necklaces, brooches, diamonds, gold bars, old Russian coins, and piles of Republican Chinese banknotes.[86]

Conclusion

The personal histories of Russians in Shanghai, supported by statistical and administrative records, display a materialist mosaic of economic and social processes that accompanied the emergence and dissolution of the community. This portrait of the material life of the diaspora leads to a number of conclusions.

Over three decades in Shanghai, the Russian refugees lifted themselves from widespread poverty, denial and marginalization to relative well-being, integration and independence—a progression that was cut short by the Chinese civil war and the Communist takeover in 1949. The economic, social and political composition of the diaspora was not a static feature during its sojourn in Shanghai, nor was it determined by the pre-existing class structure. The Russians were in a unique position to carry on a restructuring of their community towards a market organization with the middle class driving the development. Competitive conditions in the treaty port habituated the Russian exiles to the growing agency of the entrepreneurial class and the diminishing role of the aristocracy. Economically successful members of the diaspora were able to cross ethnic boundaries and enter the ranks of the city's foreign elite. The efforts of traditionally minded members to maintain the pre-revolutionary class structure were undermined by the free market economy that rewarded entrepreneurialism. Even when Russian fortunes were not built in Shanghai, but transplanted from elsewhere, they were not heirloom properties or establishments, but new business emporiums conceived in the Russian Far East and Manchuria.

The Russian presence in the port city also brought about a qualitative change to Shanghai society through widespread economic participation of expatriate women. Russian women were instrumental in creating a host of new industries in Shanghai because they took up careers in medicine, journalism, entertainment,

[86] Amir Khisamutdinov, *Russkie v Kitae*, 497.

fashion, photography, catering, food production, vending, etc. There was a contemporaneous women's revolution taking place in the USSR, but the Soviet initiatives went along the lines of removing the private, domestic and familial from the women's sphere of competence and replacing it with communal, industrial and the anonymous.[87] In Shanghai, women's activity remained within the framework of a bourgeois society with women merely increasing their workload and performing in both the domestic and mercantile arenas.

Testimonials in Chinese-language memoirs and fiction of the 1920s and 1930s suggest a significant Russian influence on the economy and urbanity of the multinational city.[88] In the formation of a European-style street-level market economy, and in the trade of cultural skills and services, the exiled Russians became the conduit of European material sensibility and global modernity for the Shanghai Chinese. Russian spaces of consumption, cultural services and performance influenced the formation of a "modern" Chinese identity in Shanghai. Consideration of the material culture and consumer behavior of Shanghai Russians opens avenues in the examination of the mutual influence of the Chinese and Russian populations. The material residue of the Russian diaspora continues to inform urban experience in Shanghai, revealed in embedded elements of Slavic architecture, fashion, culinary customs and consumer habits that trace back to the heyday of Shanghai's "Little Russia."

[87] Victor Buchli, *An Archaeology of Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford International Publishers, 1999), 42–43.

[88] The problem of translated modernity in China is illuminated by the following works: Lynn Pan, *Shanghai Style: Art and Design between the Wars* (San Francisco: Long River Press, 2008); Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Andrew Field, *Shanghai's Dancing World: Cabaret Culture and Urban Politics, 1919–1954* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010); Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Bartering Coffee, Cocoa and W50 Trucks: The Trade Relationships of the GDR, Angola and São Tomé in a Comparative Perspective

IMMANUEL R. HARISCH

Immanuel R. Harisch received his bachelor degrees in African Studies and Development Studies from the University of Vienna, where he is currently enrolled in the consecutive master programs. His current research interests focus on the relations between the German Democratic Republic and Angola as well as on the production of historical knowledge at the University of Dar es Salaam where he studied as an exchange student.

This article offers a comparative examination of trade relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and two former Portuguese colonies—Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe respectively—within the context of the global rivalry of political systems during the Cold War. As part of the socialist bloc, the GDR gave considerable support to pro-Marxist regimes in both countries which sought to consolidate their rule after achieving independence in 1975. In both instances, the countries bilaterally agreed on direct commodity exchanges, fueled by the GDR's manifest need to retain its foreign currency reserves in the face of sky-rocketing commodity prices in the 1970s. However, as my archival research reveals, Angolan and São Toméan officials exercised significant influence in negotiations by effectively appealing to the GDR's "anti-imperialist solidarity" and successfully shaping the terms of trade in both arrangements. These agreements were accompanied by other forms of "socialist aid," like constructing industrial facilities and the work of so-called East German "Friendship Brigades." Angolan negotiators pushed for a comprehensive assistance package for the coffee harvest as well as for "Friendship Brigades" to repair the imported W50 trucks whereas the São Toméan President Manuel Pinto da Costa secured fixed prices for his country's primary export, cocoa, at a time when decrease in global demand threatened to devastate the country's economy.

Introduction

Recent studies which emphasized a "multipolar" interpretation of the "Global Cold War"[1] triggered a fresh interest in "the Second World's Third World."[2] By emphasizing the agency of Third-World-actors, these works distanced themselves from the prevailing bipolar superpower discourse and went beyond the North-

[1] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[2] David Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," *Kritika*, 12 no.1 (2011): 188–211. From a less Eurocentric perspective it would read "The Third World's Second World."

South paradigm.[3] In the context of "development" trade constituted an ideological battlefield during the era of system competition.[4] Rejecting the "imperial exploitation" of the capitalist states, the socialist states of the COMECON[5] viewed their trade relations as "mutually beneficial." Countries such as the GDR made no clear distinction between development aid and regular, bilateral trade relations.[6] This article focuses on a particular and widespread instrument of trade relations in the socialist sphere—in this case, between the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe—namely, barter agreements. The concept of barter trade, referred to by East German officials as "*Prinzip Ware-gegen-Ware*," was entangled with other forms of "socialist aid," like constructing industrial facilities, and sending East German "Friendship Brigades" ("*Brigaden der Freundschaft*")[7] to assist in coffee harvests and repair East German W50 trucks. The promotion of barter trade is inextricably linked with the GDR's political elites' re-orientation to countries of the periphery in the second half of the 1970s. Sky-rocketing prices for coffee[8] and, to a smaller extent, cocoa, seriously strained the GDR's already scarce reserves of '*Valuta*,' as hard currency was usually termed in the GDR. Barter was a crucial option to import raw materials without spending hard currency.[9]

[3] Christine Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola: South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976–1991* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); See also: Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Krushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[4] Hans-Joachim Spanger and Lothar Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt. Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR—eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland?* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), 243-44.

[5] Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

[6] Berthold Unfried, "Instrumente und Praktiken von ‚Solidarität' Ost und ‚Entwicklungshilfe' West: Blickpunkt auf das entsandte Personal," in *Die eine Welt schaffen: Praktiken von ‚Internationaler Solidarität' und ‚Internationaler Entwicklung,'* ed. Berthold Unfried and Eva Himmelstoß (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 77.

[7] The "Friendship Brigades" ("*Brigaden der Freundschaft*", also "*Freundschaftsbrigaden*"), were joined by young men and (much less) women of various occupational backgrounds, mostly between the age of 21 and 30. Founded in 1963, the brigades were sent as collectives ("*Kollektive*") into countries of the periphery to assist in different fields. The work of the 'Friendship Brigades' was usually free of charge for the recipient government that was responsible for food and accommodation. During their service, the members of the brigades received their salary at home, an allowance in local currency and a small amount of hard currency every month that was transferable to an account in the GDR. See: Eric Burton, "'Stark abhängig vom Partner:' Solidarität und ihre Grenzen bei den Brigaden der Freundschaft der FDJ," in *Globales Engagement im Kalten Krieg*, ed. Frank Bösch, Caroline Moine and Stefanie Seng: Globales Engagement im Kalten Krieg (in publication), 20–21.

[8] In view of sky-rocketing prices for raw coffee, the SED regime introduced "*Kaffee-Mix*," a soluble mixture with a significant lower amount of raw coffee. In spite of an orchestrated media campaign, "*Kaffee-Mix*" can be considered a failure since East Germans were protesting against the new brand. This put serious pressure on high-ranked officials to secure coffee imports on a barter basis. For a detailed account on the 'crisis' see: Volker Wünderich, "Die 'Kaffeekrise' von 1977," *Historische Anthropologie* 11/2 (2003): 240–261, accessed July 6, 2017, doi:10.7788/ha.2003.11.2.240.

[9] Anne Dietrich, "Zwischen solidarischem Handel und ungleichem Tausch: Zum Südhandel der DDR am Beispiel des Imports kubanischen Zuckers und äthiopischen Kaffees," *Journal*

Barter agreements were not new in the socialist world; in 1960, Cuba traded 80% of its sugar with socialist countries of the COMECON—including the GDR—for tools, industrial plants and industrial equipment.[10] Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah oscillated between East and West to secure financial means for his envisioned industrialization agenda. Nkrumah's decision to barter cocoa with the Soviet Union enabled Ghana to receive technical equipment against the backdrop of rapidly deteriorating terms of trade, since the Soviet Union offered prices 15 to 20% above the world market price in exchange for its machines.[11]

What was new, however, was that the tumultuous 1970s reshuffled the power constellation on the African continent and new trading partners for the GDR—itself only recently internationally fully recognized[12]—emerged: Ethiopia saw a Marxist-inspired revolution in 1974 and in the same year the Portuguese *Estado Novo* collapsed, after being involved in a decade-long guerilla war in its colonial territories. The leadership of the leftist liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies[13] adapted Marxist-Leninist theory to their own means and were able to secure considerable material, financial and personal support from the socialist bloc.[14]

Acknowledging the political background amid an era of a global rivalry is a necessary precondition for the analysis of the bilateral trade relationships, which were part of political and economic cooperation between these self-declared socialist one-party states. The GDR, based on its proclaimed imperative of "anti-imperialist solidarity,"[15] had supported those "progressive forces" of national libera-

für Entwicklungspolitik 30 (3/2014): 48–67. Also see: Hans-Joachim Döring, "*,Es geht um unsere Existenz:' Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien (*Berlin: Christoph Links, 2001).

[10] Dietrich, "Zwischen solidarischem Handel," 53.

[11] Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization,* 228–233.

[12] The FRG's "*Hallstein-Doktrin*" (Hallstein Doctrine), in place from 1955 to 1969, viewed the establishment of official diplomatic relations with the GDR as an "unfriendly act" and aimed to isolate the GDR internationally. Chancellor Willy Brandt's "*Ostpolitik*" led to the signing of the Basic Treaty ("*Grundlagenvertrag*") in 1972, the FRG and GDR now recognizing each other as sovereign states. See Gareth Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [1990]), 33–84.

[13] The African Lusophone colonies were comprised of present-day Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verdean archipelago close to Guinea-Bissau and the two small islands of São Tomé and Príncipe that are located in the Gulf of Guinea 250 kilometers off the coast of Gabon.

[14] For the Soviet Union and Southern Africa, see: Natalia Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961–1975" (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014); for Czechoslovakia, see: Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968 (*New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[15] The imperative to support "the struggle […] against imperialism and her colonial regime" was enshrined in the 1974 constitution of the GDR. See: Klaus P. Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität: Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR in die ‚Dritte Welt' (*Berlin: Ch. Links, 2012), 575.

tion from an early stage on,[16] hoping that once in power, they would pursue a path of "socialist orientation."[17] Thus, following formal independence, the new elites in power could point to a long and "friendly"[18] relationship with the East German "*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*" (SED), the GDR's ruling party.

Based on archival research in Berlin,[19] this contribution highlights discursive strategies and motives of Angolan and São Toméan officials, showing how they used Cold War rhetoric and ideological promises to make material claims.[20] My research will firstly demonstrate how Angola and São Tomé significantly shaped the (trade) relationship with the GDR by brokering for more "mutually beneficial" terms of trade and, secondly, how the political relationship between the East German SED and its "sister parties"[21] and other forms of "socialist aid," that accompanied the barter trades, were an important determinant and must be taken into account when evaluating the trade relationship as a whole. Interviews[22] with members of East German "Friendship Brigades" in Angola provide valuable in-

[16] According to former GDR diplomat Hans-Georg Schleicher, the SED's support for cadres of the later MPLA dates back to 1956. Throughout the 1960s, MPLA-members secured material support on their frequent visits to East Berlin. From 1967 onwards, the SED decided to supply the MPLA also with weapons. Direct party relations were established in 1971 and wounded fighters of the liberation war received treatment in East German hospitals. The MPLA's proclamation of independence on 11th November 1975 was recognized by the GDR as one of the first governments. See: Hans-Georg Schleicher, "The GDR and the National Liberation Movements," in *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents 1960–1994. 9 vols. 8: Countries and Regions outside SADC*, ed. Arnold J. Temu (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014), 503–4.

[17] Spanger and Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten*, 150–157.

[18] "Friendship" ("*Freundschaft*") conveyed an important meaning in the GDR. Consequently, Erich Honecker's visit of Libya, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola in 1979, that marked the climax in the GDR's relation with African states, was crowned with the signing of "Friendship Treaties" ("*Freundschaftsverträge*") with each country.

[19] The bulk of research was carried out in the Bundesarchiv Berlin, "S*tiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR*" (SAPMO-BArch).

[20] However, this should not disguise the existent asymmetries based on structural disparities between socialist countries in the Global North and socialist oriented countries in the Global South. See: Dietrich, "Zwischen solidarischem Handel," 62.

[21] The basic political model of most state socialist countries like the GDR, but also of many countries with "socialist orientation," was characterized by the dual structure of the communist party and the state administration, whose key positions were personally interwoven. The decision making process was highly centralized and the "mass organizations" were subjugated to the party line of the "vanguard party." The MPLA's first party congress in 1977 signaled its transformation to a "worker's party", whereas in a small Creole country like São Tomé and Príncipe on the other hand, there was little scope for the formation of a "vanguard party." Notwithstanding the different implementations and cultural peculiarities, in all three countries the government was in effect "an arm of the party." See: Patrick Chabal, "Lusophone Africa in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa,* ed. Patrick Chabal et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 52, 61, 63; as well as: Joachim Becker, "Anatomie der Sozialismen. Wirtschaft, Staat und Gesellschaft," in *Sozialismen. Entwicklungsmodelle von Lenin bis Nyerere*, ed. Joachim Becker and Rudy Weissenbacher (Wien: Promedia, 2009), 35–40.

[22] I conducted five biographical interviews, lasting two to five hours, with four mechanics and an electrical engineer. All interviewees worked during different periods as members of the "Friendship Brigades" in Angola. Two of them later returned to Angola for six months a year to work as experts in the car repair workshops.

sights into how their work as an instrument of "socialist aid" was interlocked with the coffee commodity chain and the export of the W50 trucks.

Historical Context and Comparative Perspective

On April 25 1974, Portuguese armed forces of the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA), demoralized with their seemingly pointless fighting in the colonies,[23] overturned the right-wing dictatorship in Lisbon. By 1971, Portugal had only been able to maintain its colonial wars by spending 40% of its national budget on the military,[24] while also receiving military[25] and political[26] support from other NATO members due to the strategic importance of Portugal's possessions within the Cold War order.[27] The *coup d'état* in Lisbon also marked an important watershed for the 'Second World,' because socialist countries[28] were staunchly supporting the pro-Marxist national liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola.[29]

[23] For the importance of the colonial wars as a motive for the revolting MFA, consult: A. Rodrigues, C. Borga and M. Cardoso, *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril–229 Dias para Derrubar o Fascismo* (Lisbon: Moraes, 1974), 104–109; see also: Chabal, "Lusophone Africa," 3, 15.

[24] Westad, *Global Cold War*, 218. According to Basil Davidson, Portugal committed nine tenths of all its available military resources to its colonial wars in Africa by 1972, totaling 17,000 men in the army, 18,000 in the navy and 21,000 in the air force. See: Basil Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa: With an Appendix on Equatorial Guinea," in *The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 8. From c. 1940 to c. 1975,* ed. Michael Crowder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 782.

[25] It is well documented how France and West Germany provided substantial material help for the Portuguese armed forces in Africa. See for example: A. Jose Telo and H. de la Torre Gómez, *Portugal e Espanha: nos Sistemas Internacionais Contemporâneos* (Lisbon: Edições Cosmos, 2000), 127–132 and Davdison, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," 781.

[26] Based on extensive archival research, Rui Lopes shows that despite proclamations of isolation, Portugal's right wing dictatorship in reality was still a member of a number of key multilateral institutions and "fully integrated in the Western bloc." Lopes Rui, "Accommodating and Confronting the Portuguese Dictatorship within NATO, 1970–4," *The International History Review* 38 no. 3 (2016): 506, accessed July 6, 2017, doi:10.1080/07075332.2015.1046388.

[27] Portugal's most valuable assets were the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores, providing a strategically important air base for the United States. In addition, NATO fleets used the seaports of Luanda and Lobito. See: Lopes, "Accommodating," 505; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 220.

[28] Outside the socialist bloc, independent African countries, Yugoslavia, China and the governments of Scandinavian countries, as well as the Netherlands committed themselves to support "progressive" anti-colonial movements in Southern Africa. See for example: Temu, *Southern African Liberation Struggles*.

[29] Contrary to those three countries, there had been no armed resistance on São Tomé and Príncipe (and the Cape Verde). Due to the isolation and small size of the two islands, Portuguese security forces and secret police had no difficulty in suppressing political opposition to colonial rule. Thus, the nationalist grouping operated from exile in Accra, Libreville and later Santa Isabel in Equatorial Guinea. See Gerhard Seibert: "São Tomé and Príncipe 1975–2015: Politics and Economy in a Former Plantation Colony," *Estudos Ibero-Americanos*, 42/3 (2016): 990–91, accessed July 6, 2017, doi:10.15448/1980-864X.2016.3.22842.

After independence in 1975, the leftist *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) and *Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe* (MLSTP) sought to establish their rule by leaning on mainly political and diplomatic assistance from the socialist bloc. Consequently, they established their political structures in formal accordance with the Soviet model.[30] The MLSTP succeeded relatively easily with the creation of a socialist one-party-state on the small islands São Tomé and Príncipe after formal independence. In Angola, however, the perpetuated strife for political and economic power between the competing "liberation movements"[31] MPLA, FLNA, and UNITA,[32] was fueled by a complex set of antagonistic ideological factors,[33] influenced by ethnocentrism and interests of neighboring states,[34] and at the same time firmly embedded in the "Global Cold War."[35] Consequently, with the help of Cuban troops and Soviet military assistance, the MPLA was able to keep hold of Luanda and installed itself as the ruling party amidst an invasion of South African troops, together with UNITA soldiers from the south and FLNA fighters from the north. Notwithstanding their support from the CIA, both UNITA and FLNA as well as the South African troops, finally were forced to withdraw.[36]

Aside from historical, economic, political and cultural differences, there are a number of similarities between São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola, especially regarding the relationship with the GDR and the socialist bloc, in whose view both countries pursued a "non-capitalistic path of development" ("*nicht-kapitalis-*

[30] For Angola see: Keith Somerville, *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986), 78–130; Chabal, "Lusophone Africa," 60–61, 66. For São Tomé and Príncipe consult: Gerhard Seibert, *Comrades, Clients and Cousins. Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 136–138.

[31] Unlike the MPLA, the FLNA and UNITA hardly aimed to "liberate" Angola from the Portuguese and were more engaged in fighting against MPLA troops. According to Patrick Chabal, "the FLNA never seriously engaged in armed action against the Portuguese nor did it try to establish 'liberated zones' inside the country," and would rather wait for the Portuguese to leave. Chabal, "Lusophone Africa," 7, 16. By the early 1970s, UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi was secretly negotiating with officers in the Portuguese army "over the possibility of obtaining a neocolonial settlement of the liberation stalemate." See: David Birmingham, "Angola," in *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa,* ed. Patrick Chabal et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 147.

[32] On the competing nationalist movements *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FLNA) and *União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) see for example: Chabal, "Lusophone Africa," 3–16 and Westad, *Global Cold War,* 210-11.

[33] For an in-depth analysis of ideological and ethnic antagonisms consult: Chabal, "Lusophone Africa," 3–136.

[34] The most detailed account on the Angolan liberation war is: John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962)* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969); John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962–1976)* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978). For a more personally involved and sympathetic view on the MPLA see: Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972).

[35] Westad, *Global Cold War,* 207–249.

[36] Ibid., 228–230, 236.

tischer Entwicklungsweg"), as conceptualized by Soviet and GDR theoreticians.[37] Formally non-aligned, both countries saw their "natural" (political and military) allies in the community of socialist states, although their foreign trade continued to be dominated by relations with Western capitalist countries.[38]

Both countries entered into barter agreements for their agricultural commodities, and the GDR became an important, at times leading,[39] trading partner. Whereas prices for Angolan coffee were set by the world market for most of the trading period, São Tomé and Príncipe proposed fixed prices for its cocoa as a strategy to mitigate the deteriorating terms of trade.

In both instances, prices for additional trading goods, construction facilities and other forms of assistance[40] were negotiated by the parties on a US-Dollar basis, and entailed "virtual" credit exchanges, handled by the central banks of each country.[41]

Angola and the GDR: A High Priority 'Coffee Line' and W50 Trucks for a Loyal Partner

On their travels to Angola in 1976 and 1977, East German officials praised the "anti-imperialist solidarity" and good party relations between the SED and the MPLA, based on the GDR's support during the liberation struggle and shared ideological views.[42] Angola's prime minister at that time, Lopo do Nascimento, underlined his country's will to collaborate in the sectors of agriculture, transportation and vocational training. Angola would expect "the utmost possible commitment of the socialist community to support her, fast acting of every country is

[37] Spanger and Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten,* 114–157. For a classification of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe see: 131.

[38] In both countries, the foreign trade of non-military goods with socialist countries never exceeded 20% of the overall trade volume, mostly ranging between 10 to 15%. One exception may be the year 1983, when the GDR was São Tomé and Príncipe's main trading partner due to the cocoa trade. Tony Hodges and Malyn Newitt, *São Tomé and Príncipe. From Plantation Colony to Microstate* (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 117, 123.

[39] As noted above, in the year 1983 the GDR was São Tomé and Príncipe's main trading partner. Concerning Angola, the GDR ranked 6th in 1984, serving as the major trading partner within the socialist bloc. See: SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1464, 294–95.

[40] The work of experts ("Spezialisten") in various sectors, such as engineering, motor mechanics, agriculture or education was paid by the Angolan government. The solidarity work of the "Friendship Brigades" on the other hand was paid by the GDR and the Angolan government had to provide food and accommodation. See: Bettina Husemann and Annette Neumann, "DDR–VR Angola: Fakten und Zusammenhänge zur bildungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit von 1975 bis 1989," in *Engagiert für Afrika: Die DDR und Afrika II,* ed. Ulrich van der Heyden and Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster: Lit, 1994), 169.

[41] "Virtual" means that barter trades and loans were issued without the use of hard currency on both sides, since the US-Dollar functioned as an accounting unit only for the stock list ("Warenliste") and certain other services. If the debit exceeded an agreed threshold, interest on the negative surplus had to be paid back either in additionally provided goods or in US-Dollar. In some instances, the interest rates for loans of GDR machinery had to be paid back in US-Dollar as well.

[42] SAPMO-BArch DE 1/57595, 2.

important."[43] In this quote, the prime minister approaches the socialist community with Angola's (or the MPLA's) high expectations; effectively, each state in the socialist bloc had different domains within the country, determined by national interests and capabilities.[44] The GDR itself was interested in a stable supply of raw coffee on a barter basis to avoid spending hard currency, similar to the agreement it secured with Ethiopia on June 16, 1977.[45]

A special agreement in June 1977—coinciding with the height of the East German domestic "coffee-crisis"—guaranteed the GDR 5,000 tons of Angolan raw coffee within the same year, symbolizing the 'socialist' structure of the trade relationship, as was also the case with São Tomé and Príncipe, which was handled by high-ranked political actors of the party. The foreign trade monopoly of the state enabled the initiation, regulation, and negotiation of commodity flows. In both cases, the alternating meetings within a special board, the "*Gemeinsamer Wirtschaftsausschuss*"[46] (GWA), acted as the main forum for negotiations and the coordination of the economic, technical and cultural cooperation between the representatives of the GDR, Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe respectively.[47]

In February 1978, high-ranking officials of the SED handed over tenders for export, mainly W50 trucks and agricultural machines, to Lopo do Nascimento.[48] Following a field report by the East German ministry of transport, from erstwhile 25,000 trucks before independence roughly 4,500 were countrywide operational, 450 of those belonging to the new Angolan government. The small amount of trucks would meet only 15 to 20% of the economy's capacity.[49] Having earned a reputation as an excellent off-roader with reliable technology which was easy to repair, the comparatively cheap W50 produced in the GDR seemed a good option for a post-colonial transportation sector with a shortage of skilled mechanics.[50]

[43] SAPMO-BArch DE 1/57596, 6. All translations in the quotes by the author.

[44] The Cubans, for example, were not only present with troops, but also sent thousands of teachers, medical personnel and civil engineers to Angola. The Soviet Union mainly supplied military and economic advisers, as well as the bulk of military equipment, but was also involved in fishery. Bulgaria was active in setting up agricultural state farms and Yugoslavia was responsible for construction of bridges and residential buildings. See: M.R. Bhagavan, *Angola: Prospects for Socialist Industrialisation* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980), 33.

[45] However, unlike Angola, due to high prices on the world market, Ethiopia canceled the barter with the GDR already in 1979 and decided to sell coffee for hard currency only. While coffee accounted for most hard currency earnings before Angola's independence, oil outstripped coffee from the mid-1970s onwards. See: Dietrich, "Zwischen solidarischen Handel," 56, 59–60.

[46] "Common Economic Council."

[47] Husemann and Neumann, "DDR–VR Angola," 161.

[48] SAPMO-BArch DE 1/57596, 6.

[49] SAPMO-BArch DM1/8287, np.

[50] Christian Suhr, *Laster aus Ludwigsfelde* (Reichenbach/Halle: Kraftakt, 2015), 205. Also based on an interview with a former IFA-mechanic who was in Angola from 1982 until 1989. The first two years he worked as a member of the '*Brigaden der Freundschaft'* mainly in the car workshops in Luanda, and later returned to Angola as an expert with better conditions and

After the Portuguese exodus, there was a scarcity of functioning harvest machines, means of transportation, and trained personnel. In confluence with the GDR's interests, the MPLA prioritized the construction of a "coffee line." The production level after independence significantly dropped in all sectors of the economy; coffee production fell from over 200,000 tons prior to independence to a mere 25,170 tons in 1978.[51] Unsurprisingly, the party leadership was anxious to curb this trend with a program for national reconstruction. Including social reforms and an education campaign, this program was not only supposed to lead the way to social modernization along socialist lines, but also consolidate the precarious position of power of the MPLA.[52] Thus, following the plea of the MPLA, the GDR sent four "Friendship Brigades" made up of coffee experts, master roasters, truck drivers, civil engineers, and economists—130 people in total—to assist with all parts of the commodity chain and repair the exported trucks.[53] Initially, the Angolan side requested up to 380 people.[54]

Regarding personal cooperation between Angola and Cuba in the same period, Christine Hatzky identified the characteristic mechanism as one of "demand" and "supply,"[55] a pattern which is also apparent in the relationship between Luanda and East Berlin. Lopo do Nascimento's high expectations of contributions from socialist countries and the plea of the MPLA for the "Friendship Brigades" are only two examples of how these demands were framed in an ideological rhetoric. Whereas the "coffee line" on the spot and the work of East German "Friendship Brigades" was continuously praised by Angolan officials on different levels, the following years brought about numerous failures, often caused by the inexperience and disorganization of the GDR.

First and foremost, due to a lack of coordination, customer service on the spot for the W50 trucks was insufficient in the first years, and workshop managers from the GDR frequently complained about missing spare parts in the repair garage.[56] In addition, already contractually tied amounts of raw coffee were left to rot in the seaport of Luanda. Far worse, due to its strategic importance, was that the delivered and invoiced radio network ("*Funknetz"*) for military purposes ceased to work in almost all provinces in summer 1982—a catastrophe, since the MPLA government suffered from military raids of South African troops and

payment ("*Dienstreisender*") for 6 months every year. Jens R., interview by the author, May 23, 2017.

[51] M. R. Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy, 1975–1985 (*Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986), 67.

[52] Hatzky, *Cubans,* 73.

[53] Anne Dietrich, "Kaffee in der DDR: Ein Politikum ersten Ranges," in *Kaffeewelten. Historische Perspektiven auf eine globale Ware im 20. Jahrhundert,* ed. Christiane Berth, Dorothee Wierling and Volker Wünderich (Göttingen: V&R, 2015), 230.

[54] SAPMO-BArch VD MR–845/77, np.

[55] Hatzky, *Cubans*, 152.

[56] Numerous biannual reports of the East German workshop managers from 1980 to 1986 are to be found in SAPMO-BArch DM1/12157.

UNITA rebels in the southern and eastern parts of Angola. "The patience of the Angolan partner with the GDR is remarkable,"[57] applauded a dismayed East German official. However, in March 1981, the Angolan side had committed to barter 11,000 to 15,000 tons of coffee per year[58]—equaling around 20% of the GDR's total import quota[59]—instead of selling on the world market. Wolfgang Rauchfuß, chairman of the GWA meetings, tried to reason that the Angolan decision to barter is "a political decision of the Angolan party leadership." It was stated in the negotiations "*...that coffee, oil, and quartz crystal as strategic goods are usually only sold for convertible currency.*"[60] Since strategic goods were usually not bartered with other countries, can we therefore assume a special role for SED regime of the GDR?

There are two major interconnected factors which explain the MPLA's decision to keep the barter agreement with the GDR. The first factor is the political dimension, namely the early solidarity of the SED leadership with the MPLA. The GDR supported the MPLA during the long years of struggle, even before the liberation committee of the *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) presented its views on the issue.[61] The MPLA was the first liberation movement in Southern Africa to maintain official party relations with the SED, and President Agostinho Neto alone visited East Berlin at least five times before independence.[62] The leftist leader of the Angolan delegation in the GWA and former prime minister, Lopo do Nascimento, was also a frequent visitor in the GDR, not only for negotiations. Nascimento spent his holidays in small towns in the countryside and received medical treatment in East German hospitals twice.[63]

The second factor lies in the work of the East German "Friendship Brigades," the truck specialists and other involved forms of "socialist aid" that were accompanying the barter agreements, as well as including the delivery of basic consumer goods worth several millions by the GDR's "solidarity committee" ("*Solidaritätskomitee*").[64] The MPLA leadership and province commissioners were continuously expressing their satisfaction with the "Friendship Brigades"[65], whose work encompassed a wide variety of tasks. According to one former mechanic of the brigade, he and his colleagues were responsible for disembarking

[57] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1464, 152.
[58] "Abkommen über die Lieferung von angolanischem Kaffee im Zeitraum 1981–1985."
[59] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1464*,* 99.
[60] Ibid., italicization added by the author.
[61] Bernard von Plate, "Afrika südlich der Sahara," in *Drei Jahrzehnte Außenpolitik der DDR: Bestimmungsfaktoren, Instrumente, Aktionsfelder*, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen et al. (München: Oldenbourg, 1979), 662–3.
[62] Schleicher, "The GDR," 504.
[63] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1463, 407.
[64] A detailed statistical overview on the solidarity deliveries can be found in Ilona Schleicher, "Statistische Angaben zur Solidarität für Befreiungsbewegungen und Staaten im südlichen Afrika," in *Engagiert für Afrika: Die DDR und Afrika II,* ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster: Lit, 1994), 152–157.
[65] SAPMO-BArch DE 1/57609; DY 3023/1463, 233; DY 3023/1464, 103; DY 24/20213.

the trucks from the East German ships in Angolan ports and driving them to the garage,[66] where the trucks were inspected and prepared before they were handed over to the Angolan ministries. In the workshop, Angolan workers received their vocational training from GDR specialists, and the best Angolans were offered an advanced training course in the GDR. This form of training was especially honored by the government, since skilled workers were scarce. Additionally, apart from semi-voluntary "red Saturdays" once a month, on weekends some members of the "Friendship Brigades" provided "solidarity services" on their own, such as the provision of drinking water to municipal facilities with W50 water tankers, or voluntary labor stints on agricultural cooperatives with the MPLA's youth organization JMPLA.[67] After being requested by the Angolan side, one brigadier and his colleague repaired a generator in a SWAPO[68] military camp in Southern Angola on their weekend.[69]

This was also dangerous. Ever since 1975, the presence of SWAPO camps was a pretext for the apartheid regime in Pretoria to carry out air raids and military incursions far into Angolan territory.[70] However, the devastating economic effects and human suffering that the military attacks of South African troops and their companions of UNITA (with covert US support)[71] caused in Angola's Southern and Eastern zones were not the only reasons for a decline in agricultural production. The MPLA's mismanagement of the state farms, the urban ruling elites' total neglect of the peasantry and labor shortages in all parts of the commodity chain led to a further decrease in Angola's coffee production in subsequent years. While in 1977 around 68,000 tons were harvested, the amount oscillated between lower levels in the subsequent years, amounting to only 24,000 tons in 1984.[72] Faced with further decreasing output, the state-owned marketing board *Cafeangol* decided to follow a new policy of maximizing returns in May 1984. The GDR was now requested to pay "heavily inflated prices"[73] for Angolan coffee within

[66] There were garages in Luanda, Viana, Lubango, Uíge, Huambo, Gabela, N'Dalatando, Luena, Malanje and Cabinda.

[67] Considering the "solidarity work" on the ground, one has to be cautious, since the diaries of the brigades ("*Brigadetagebücher*") were semi-official documents. and the self representations followed certain patterns and norms that are apparent in most of the diaries. See: SAPMO BArch DY 24/20213, DY 24/20214, DY 24/20215.

[68] The South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) was the liberation movement in Namibia, occupied by South Africa and basically "ruled as its fifth province." Shortly after independence, the MPLA set up camps for SWAPO soldiers and their families, where they received military training from Cuban and Soviet instructors, as well as medical treatment. See: Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom. Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 10–11.

[69] Jens R., interview by the author, May, 23, 2017.

[70] Gleijeses, *Visions*, 199, 201.

[71] Ibid., 163, 179–80.

[72] Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy,* 67; Somerville, *Angola*, 141.

[73] Original quote: "*stark überhöhten Preisen,*" the prices were up to a 150% higher than the GDR could attain with hard currency purchases from other countries outside the International

the barter agreement, although 80% of the harvest seemed to be of low quality. As *Cafeangol* argued, other buyers—such as Poland—would comply with those raised prices. Instead of the agreed 13,000 tons, the Angolans would only be able to provide 10,000 tons. If the GDR wanted this amount, it would have to accept the new prices.

Declassified archival documents reveal that GDR officials decided to accept the new conditions, taking into account Angola's "difficult economic and military situation," as well as the need to decrease Luanda's debit with the GDR.[74] Therefore, before prices were again gradually adjusted to the world market level, the GDR paid 'preferential prices' for Angolan Robusta coffee. Returning to Christine Hatzky's terminology, we can observe Angolan "demand" for higher prices and GDR officials—considering the difficult economic and military situation of their trading partner—"supplying" the demanded prices.

In view of the intensified security situation due to increased looting and killing of UNITA rebels and South African air raids, some of the "Friendship Brigades" and experts were evacuated in the mid-1980s, while others found their activities severely constrained.[75] To reduce the negative balance of several thousand East German W50 trucks and agricultural machines, the next agreement[76] included crystal quartz and Angolan raw oil in addition to 10,000 tons of raw coffee.

Due to Angola's extreme dependence on oil revenues, the steep fall in oil prices 1985/86 seriously exacerbated the mounting debt crisis. The MPLA government accepted a structural reform program, orchestrated by the IMF and World Bank, towards a more market-oriented economy.[77] However, actual implementation of "structural adjustments" was stalled by the governing elites of the MPLA, who continued to enrich themselves via the "complex triangular relationship between [the national oil company] SONANGOL, the Treasury and the central bank."[78]

The imposed means of economic liberalization further reduced the modest trade turnover with the socialist countries,[79] which experienced themselves drastic economic shortfalls and technological leeway.[80] Occupied with peace negotiations with South Africa and orienting stronger towards the capitalist states, Angola dis-

Coffee Agreement. See: SAPMO-BArch, DY 3023/1464*,* 218.

[74] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1464, 218–220.

[75] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/998, np.

[76] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1005, np.

[77] Hatzky, *Cubans*, 168.

[78] Tony Hodges, *Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism* (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 124, clarification added by the author.

[79] As mentioned earlier, in both Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe capitalist countries dominated the foreign trade turnover. In 1984, 94.4% of Angola's exports went to capitalist countries and 72.9% of imports came from there. The share of socialist states was 3% of Angola's exports and 23% of its imports. See: Gleijeses, *Visions*, 333.

[80] Already in the late 1970s the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries experienced a significant reduction of economic growth. The further decline in oil prices in the 1980s worsened the situation for the inflexible planned economies and monolithic power structures in communist one-party states. See: Westad, *Global Cold War*, 335–337.

continued the barter trade with the GDR in 1988, recording a debit balance of 113 million US-Dollar.[81] However, over the course of eleven years, the import of raw materials—such as coffee and raw oil on a barter basis, which amounted to a total of 546.8 million US-Dollar in 1987[82]—enabled the GDR to save precious hard currency, while at the same time being able to stimulate its own manufactured exports.[83] Altogether, more than 13,000 W50 trucks of various models found their way to roads from Luanda to Lubango, making Angola the leading export destination for W50s in Africa.[84]

Cocoa Exports from São Tomé and Príncipe: a São Toméan Initiative for Fixed Prices

By African standards, the two small islands of São Tomé and Príncipe experienced a comparatively long colonial domination by Portugal, which was based on plantation complexes of first sugar and then cocoa. At the end of the nineteenth century, African slave labor was substituted by "contract labor," mostly from Angolan *serviçais*, whose work kept the cocoa plantations running until the 1970s and cemented the importance of cocoa for the two islands.[85] Perceived as *the* symbol of colonial oppression, President Manuel Pinto da Costa announced the nationalization of the cocoa plantation complex only two months after independence, which effectively took place in 1978.[86] In the same year, the first 500 tons of cocoa were exported to the GDR, following a visit of an East German delegation several months before. March 1979 saw the establishment of the first trade agreement with a further 300 tons, and stipulated the construction of a brick manufacture by the GDR in exchange for future cocoa shipments. Protracted negotiations and insufficient means of carriage on both sides delayed the construction of the East German facilities. In December 1979, the GDR's debit balance amounted to 1.4 million US-Dollar. Combined with the reluctance of São Toméan

[81] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1011, np.
[82] The imports between 1977 and 1987 consisted of 1,196,200 tons of raw oil, 101,360 tons of coffee, 73,000 tons of iron ore and 750 tons of melting quartz ("*Schmelzquartz*"). See: SAPMO-Barch DY 3023/1464, 396.
[83] Apart from W50 trucks the GDR exported agricultural equipment, machines and industrial complexes as well as consumer goods.
[84] Angola was ranked as the eight export destination worldwide. The majority of W50 trucks (98,000) were exported to Hungary, followed by Iraq (72,209), China (69,337), the USSR (49,311), CSSR (27,501), Vietnam (19,202) and Bulgaria (16,660). Numbers from: Frank Rönicke, *Schrader-Typen-Chronik: IFA W50/L60, 1965–1990* (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 2013), 93.
[85] Seibert, *Comrades*, 2, 4–5, 46–48.
[86] Martina Berthet, "São Tomé e Príncipe: Teflexões sobre alguns Aspectos de sua História Agrícola no pós-Independência," *Estudos Ibero-Americanos* 42, 3 (2016): 961–986, accessed July 6, 2017, doi:10.15448/1980-864X.2016.3.23107, 970–71.

officials to transfer balance for the agreed GDR constructions, East Berlin stopped the import of cocoa in the same month.[87]

December 1979 also witnessed a turning point at the domestic level. Former Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada was expelled from the party and imprisoned for connivance of an alleged *coup d'état.* A few months earlier, in April 1979, President Pinto da Costa increased his personal power by liquidating the position of prime minister.[88] Gerhard Seibert interprets this not only as a personal struggle for power between the childhood friends Pinto da Costa and Trovoada, but also as a signal for future policies: Trovoada opposed the introduction of a planned economy and the nationalization of domestic trade. After Trovoada's imprisonment, Pinto da Costa radicalized his regime and ruled with an iron fist.[89]

Meanwhile, the short-lived boom of high cocoa prices in the late 1970s collapsed and export earnings fell by over 70% between 1979 and 1981.[90] Confronted with this sharp decline in cocoa prices from 1980 onwards, the São Toméan side approached the GDR in April 1981 to ask for support against the devastating effects of the "general economic crisis of the capitalist system."[91] The leader of the São Toméan delegation, Fausto Soares da Vera Cruz, saw the only viable solution "to guard economic independence" of his country in the expansion of relations with the socialist states. Therefore, Soares da Vera Cruz proposed fixed prices for the cocoa trade, valid for five years, to neutralize the fluctuations of the world market. Based on the average world market price of the previous year, the fixed prices would be elevated by 15%, if the world market prices would rise.[92]

This discursive strategy of the São Toméan delegate leader—insinuating "socialist solidarity" against a devastating capitalist system—must be seen against the background of rapid declining prices for cocoa, whose importance for the countries' economy was tremendous. During the 1980s, cocoa's contribution in earning hard currency always exceeded 80% of total exports.[93] In August 1981, president Manuel Pinto da Costa, who had studied economics at the Humboldt-Universität in East Berlin, personally addressed chairman of the SED, Erich Honecker. Pinto da Costa renewed the request for fixed cocoa prices, arguing that São Toméan officials had not yet acquired sufficient knowledge of socialist planning, and were thus forced to plan over a longer period of time. Besides better calculability, fixed prices and an East German government credit would be necessary to realize economic and social development.[94]

[87] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1478, 219.
[88] Seibert, *Comrades*, 145–148.
[89] Seibert, *Comrades*, 149–152.
[90] Hodges and Newitt, *São Tomé,* 135.
[91] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1478, 236.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Hodges and Newitt, *São Tomé*, 135.
[94] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/993, 226.

The president's plea had its intended effect, and in February 1982 a new agreement[95] was signed with fixed prices for cocoa and East-German consumer goods, with 1980 as the reference year. This fixed price was untouched by the fluctuations of the world market, leading to a "lagging" price, which was frozen and not directly concerned with possible crises that could occur.[96] A 15 million US-Dollar government loan with 4% interest for GDR constructions and facilities[97] accompanied the barter agreement, thus providing a comparatively huge sum for the small island economy.[98] The GDR, on its side, was able to obtain cocoa without the use of hard currency.[99] Starting with 1,250 tons in 1982 and peaking at 1,750 tons in 1984, the exported amount of cocoa decreased to only 500 tons in 1985.[100]

Due to a combination of factors, including a lack of qualified personnel and investments, mismanagement, and drought, the productivity of the state-owned farms on São Tomé and Príncipe decreased further. In addition, plantation labor was associated with the coercive labor regime of the colonial era, and from the nationalizations onwards the government failed to provide incentives for plantation workers, who were almost exclusively contract workers from Angola and Cape Verde.[101] Notwithstanding the poor performance in the cocoa production, the mechanisms for the price fixing were not altered in a new agreement, which was signed in 1985.[102] Overall, the prices São Tomé and Príncipe received for its cocoa from 1982 until 1987 were approximately 10% higher than the world market price.[103]

The example of São Tomé and Príncipe shows how high ranked political actors like the president himself considerably shaped the terms of trade for the countries' most important export commodity, cocoa. Similar to the Angolan case, the deci-

[95] "Abkommen über die Entwicklung der ökonomischen Beziehungen im Zeitraum 1982–1985."
[96] Kunibert Raffer, "Ost-Süd: Vorbild oder Abklatsch der West-Süd-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen?," *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 2/2 (1986): 9.
[97] The government loan was mainly reserved for the construction of a brickyard as well as the reconstruction of a brewery and a soft drink factory with the help of GDR specialists up to a sum of 15 million US-Dollar. The loan had to be repaid within eight years. See: SAPMO BArch DY 3023/1478, 252.
[98] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1478, 245. However, since the credit was reserved for GDR goods and services, the US-Dollar again served as an accounting unit only and it is difficult to assess how much hard currency was effectively involved.
[99] In August 1981 the secretary of economics of the central committee of the SED, Günter Mittag, stated that given a world market price of 2,400 US-Dollar per ton of cocoa, the actual price for the GDR if financed by a hard currency loan would amount to 3,456 US-Dollar. See: SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/993, 226.
[100] From 1978 to 1987 São Tomé and Príncipe exported 7,500 tons of cocoa to the GDR, amounting to 18.5 million US-Dollar. See: SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1464, 406.
[101] See Pablo B. Eyzaguirre, "The Independence of Sao Tome E Principe and Agrarian Reform," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2/4 (1989): 676–77, and Seibert, "São Tomé," 1001–2.
[102] "Abkommen über die Entwicklung der ökonomischen und wissenschaftlich-technischen Beziehungen im Zeitraum 1986–1990."
[103] SAPMO-BArch DY 3023/1464, 406.

sion to barter was a political decision, informed by the party leaderships and the presidents of both countries.

Conclusion: Discursive Strategies to Maximize "Mutual Benefit"?

By drawing on minutes of the negotiation process of the examined barter agreements, this contribution highlighted discursive strategies of Angolan and São Toméan political actors as they negotiated the terms of trade with East German officials. As we have seen, the uttered pleas for economic and political support were immersed with appeals to the socialist countries' duty to solidarity. Angolan and São Toméan politicians expressed high expectations on the abilities of the socialist states to remedy their own countries' socioeconomic state, inherited from the era of colonialism, and to guard their economic independence.

The discursive strategies of Angolan and São Toméan political actors that were portrayed here in the context of their countries' barter agreements with the GDR must be seen within the wider perspective of a global system of competition during the Cold War. They illustrate how the ideological trench warfare opened spaces and possibilities for actors in the periphery to maximize their gains. Angolan and São Toméan politicians appealed to the officially proclaimed East German "anti-imperialist" solidarity and denounced deteriorating terms of trade as the outcome of an exploitative capitalist world economy. Socialist countries were pinned down in the negotiations not to reproduce these exploitative conditions. Accompanying the trade agreements, the negotiators requested help from East German "aid instruments" like the "Friendship Brigades" and experts to remedy the colonial inheritance, asking for the construction of facilities or government loans.

Concerning the gains of the negotiating strategies, the São Toméan agreement with the GDR on fixed cocoa prices can be perceived as a form of "mutually beneficial" trade, made more evident by the accompanying government loan with favorable conditions for São Tomé. As we have seen, both measures—the treaty for fixed prices and the government loan—followed a direct request by President Manuel Pinto da Costa to the Chairman of the SED, Erich Honecker. Bartering was thus a matter of high politics, of negotiations and invocations on the highest political level. Looking at the period from 1982 to 1987, the fixed-prices clause for São Toméan cocoa secured prices which were approximately 10% higher than the world market price.

On the other hand, we have Angola's decision to maintain the trade of its coffee, and later raw oil, for East German goods, which helped the government in East Berlin a great deal to save its scarce foreign currency reserves, while additionally providing a safe market for the GDR's industrial manufactures, such as the W50 trucks. By virtue of this beneficial exchange along West-South-patterns, and in face of East German shortcomings in the past, it was the East German officials

that were repeatedly pleading with the Angolan side to retain the barter trade. Angolan motives for this "political decision" to keep the barter were based on several factors: personal political links of the party leadership, solidarity deliveries of the East German solidarity committee, as well as the continuously praised work of the East German "Friendship Brigades," that were directly linked to (Angola's) export of coffee and import of W50 trucks.

When examining the portrayed trade relations from a strictly structural point of view, there is no doubt that the pattern of raw materials for manufactured goods strongly resembles the West-South trade, despite all assertions from socialist states[104] that their trade relations were inherently different to "neocolonial" forms of trade. However, a look at the broader canvas of the trade relationship during an era of global system competition with all the interwoven measures—like the work of the "Friendship Brigades", the solidarity deliveries, preferential prices and, above all, the political and diplomatic support for the MPLA since long before independence—enables us to make a much more nuanced and multifaceted evaluation of these bilateral East-South barter agreements.

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[104] Spanger and Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten*, 244–45.

"We Have No Right to Force Our Religion on Others": Civilisation, Modernity and the Discourse on Religious Tolerance in 19th Century Great Britain

JULIEN HOFFMANN

Julien Hoffmann received his B.A. degree in History from Freie Universität Berlin and is currently enrolled in the master program Global History at Freie Universität and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. He is mainly interested in religious history, particularly the relations between Christianity and Islam, as well as in the history of imperialism and colonialism during the 'long nineteenth century.' For his master thesis, he decided to slightly shift his focus and write about the international dimension of the American eugenics movement in the interwar period.

The idea of tolerance is generally understood today as one of the key concepts of 'modern,' 'civilized' and open minded Western society. Perceived to be directly linked to the achievements of the European Enlightenment, it often implies the victory of rationalism and respectfulness over hateful bigotry and fanaticism. It is the purpose of this article to challenge this largely positive conception of tolerance by pointing out the deeply paternalistic and hierarchical underpinnings of the term. It will be argued that, as an integral part of Protestant and liberal value systems, the notion of tolerance served as a powerful tool in the framework of late nineteenth century British imperialism, being depicted as an indicator for civilization, modernity and progress that rendered Western culture and Christianity superior to other—supposedly more intolerant and fanatic—forms of religious belief. By analyzing chosen newspaper accounts from The Times and The Manchester Guardian between 1876 and 1900, the article seeks to show how this dichotomous view particularly affected the image of Islam, juxtaposing the tolerant, rational and even-tempered Briton with the bigoted and violent "Mussulman," who had yet to learn how to properly treat other religions and who had to be taught how to properly control his emotions. It is the central premise of this article that by uncovering the ways in which the invocation of Muslim intolerance and fanaticism helped to justify British imperialism and colonial rule, we also enable ourselves to perceive more clearly the paternalistic and pejorative usage of the tolerance concept in public discourse today.

Introduction

The idea of tolerance is often understood today as one of the central values in contemporary Western societies.[1] It is both a cultural virtue that liberals and dem-

[1] UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance from 1995, accessed March 2, 2016, http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/UNESCO/HRIGHTS/124-129.HTM; by using the term "western", I am largely referring to those societies in Europe, the Americas and Oceania that claim to share some form of common cultural heritage, which is generally deemed to be rooted in ancient Greco-Roman civilization and characterized by the Judeo-Christian tradition as well as by the achievements of the Enlightenment Era.

ocrats (as well as other public figures) claim for themselves when they publicly assure their own open-mindedness, multiculturalism and cosmopolitan outlook in political debates; and at the same time tolerance stands for a specific state of mind that is sometimes presumed to be absent in non-Western societies, but nevertheless is expected from migrants upon entering Western nations such as Germany, France or the UK.[2] Therefore the concept of tolerance functions not only as a tool for self-representation or identification but also as a means for indirectly labeling otherness and thus for the implicit reinforcement of cultural differences, whether they be 'real' or imagined. As such, the notion of tolerance represents a personal ethical principle as much as it stands for a wider political discourse.[3] It is especially the latter dimension that this paper seeks to further explore.

The way in which the notion of tolerance for many individuals implies a rational and modern attitude—as well as the way in which its opposite, intolerance, conversely invokes the association with irrationality and backwardness—almost inevitably links the concept to the overall context of the civilization discourse, in which conceptions of the *self* are constructed through the invocation of an inferior *other*. Jürgen Osterhammel writes that "any ideal of civilization depends on what it is not: savagery, barbarism or even a different, but deficient manner of civilization."[4] Within this wider context, the idea of tolerance, at least in its modern shape, is often perceived by society today to be very deeply connected to the era of the European Enlightenment and the way in which it supposedly enabled a more rational and open-minded conceptualization of difference.[5] Despite the fact that tolerance as a concept is far from being universally uncontested,[6] it still seems to predominantly evoke quite positive connotations; as for many people, tolerance implies the overcoming of racial hatred and bigotry with rational thinking and a general attitude of respect.[7]

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[2] Olaf Schwencke, "Das Europa der Toleranz," *Der Tagesspiegel*, January 25, 2016, accessed March 2, 2016, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/serie-kultur-und-fluechtlinge-das-europa-der-toleranz/12781916.html; Janet Daley, "Don't 'teach' British values – demand them," *The Telegraph*, June 14, 2014, accessed March 2, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10899904/Dont-teach-British-values-demand-them.html; Suzanne Daley and Alissa Rubin, "French Muslims Say Veil Bans Give Cover to Bias," *The New York Times*, May 26, 2015, accessed March 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/world/europe/muslim-frenchwomen-struggle-with-discrimination-as-bans-on-veils-expand.html?_r=0.

[3] Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 178.

[4] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Europe, the "West" and the Civilizing Mission* (London: German Historical Institute London) 2006, 7.

[5] The contemporary perception of Lessing´s *Nathan the Wise* is arguably one of the most striking examples for this linkage of the notion of tolerance with the era of Enlightenment. See: Rudolf Laufen, "Gotthold Ephraim Lessings Religionstheologie. Eine bleibende Herausforderung," *Religionsunterricht an höheren Schulen 45* (2002): 360, 362, 365.

[6] See for example Rainer Forst, *Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2–3, 10.

[7] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 181–185.

Building on this assumption, this paper tries to uncover how, in the context of late nineteenth-century British civilization discourse, the notion of tolerance could be applied to mark religious difference and to reaffirm political power hierarchies —a tendency which, positive depictions of the idea notwithstanding, still characterizes discourses on toleration as a social ideal today. Analyzing the pejorative usage of the term in nineteenth-century Great Britain will thus help us to develop a better understanding of the nuances and complexities that surround contemporary debates on issues such as inter-religious coexistence and inter-cultural dialogue. In this regard, the paper focuses less on the actual practice of tolerance towards other creeds, but rather seeks to show how the rhetorical invocation or the call for tolerance was strategically used to establish such power structures. It will be argued that, as an integral part of Protestant and liberal value systems, the notion of tolerance served as a powerful tool in the overall narrative of British imperialism—mainly because the very concept of tolerance was seen as an indicator for progressiveness, modernity, rationality and peacefulness that separated Protestant Christianity and British civilization from its opposed irrational, intolerant and fanatic other.

This paper therefore seeks to analyze the public display of this dichotomy on the basis of chosen articles from *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*—two respected and influential newspapers—in the time period between 1876 and 1900. Representing two opposing political views—a rather conservative vs. a rather liberal outlook respectively—both journals help us to understand how the notion of tolerance was used by different authors in a similar vein across the political spectrum and, more generally, how the dualistic tolerance/intolerance imagery, as part of the wider civilization narrative, aided the construction of British identity, reassuring the British public of its moral superiority vis à vis members of other religions, cultures and ethnicities. By exploring this process, this paper thus contributes to the overall academic discussion on late nineteenth and early twentieth century civilization discourse and its historical consequences for the shaping of orientalist images of other religions; especially distorted images of Islam. In this context, it seeks to show that conceptions of Christian superiority and conceptions of tolerance are crucially linked. Other scholars, such as Wendy Brown, have already contributed to a more differentiated understanding of tolerance by pointing out the paternalistic tendencies of the term to imply a superior position of the one who *tolerates* over the one who simply *is tolerated*—discernible in the latter's perceived lack of values and his presumed incapacity to somehow endorse them in the 'right' way.[8] The concept of paternalism hence is of major importance to this study. It can be understood here as a form of power relationship in which claims of authority and superiority are based on the belief to act benevolently on

[8] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 150, 186–190; for other studies see: Susan Mendus, ed., *The Politics of Toleration: Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Life* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).

behalf of persons who are deemed to be in some way incapable of properly caring for themselves and thus dependent on some form of guidance or custodianship. In the context of late nineteenth-century civilization discourse, one factor indicating such a 'superior' standing was the virtue of tolerance, ultimately rendering the very lack thereof a sign of overall backwardness and inferiority. While the tolerant Western European man thus allegorically represented the authoritative father figure, the child figure in this power relationship was the intolerant, irrational non-European, supposedly unable to control their expressions of emotions in a manner that was seen as 'childlike.'

The Rhetorical Function of Tolerance in the Discourse on Imperialism and Civilization

I want to begin the discussion of the different rhetorical contexts in which the notion of tolerance was used by first outlining some basic aspects of the overall discourse on imperialism and civilization. The first thing to consider thus is the structural shift in political and philosophical thought during the first half of the nineteenth century that Jennifer Pitts has identified as the "turn to empire" in British and French liberal ideology: Major thinkers like Jon Stuart Mill or Alexis de Tocqueville, she argues, were connected in their "increasingly secure belief that Europe´s progressive civilization granted Europeans the authority to suspend, in their relations with non-European societies, the moral and political standards they believed applied among themselves."[9] Pitts' narrative thus contrasts a rather broad minded and anti-imperial outlook in eighteenth-century political thought—that not only included a feeling of doubt about the justice of European political and social orders, but also implied a certain amount of respect or even admiration for non-European societies[10]—with a far more racist and simplistic perception of otherness in the course of nineteenth-century ideologies. One such ideology was that of imperial liberalism, which increasingly justified imperial rule and colonialism with constructed distinctions between *civilized* and *savage* peoples, with hierarchical conceptions of progress and with general notions of Western superiority.[11] This general belief in belonging to a superior British nation or race[12] was then also

[9] Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 11.

[10] For a more critical account see: Laurent Dubois, "An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic," *Social History* 31 (2006): 1-14; and Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique," *American Historical Review* 117 (2012): 999–1027.

[11] Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*, 14, 127–130, 136–137, 139–141, 160–162.

[12] To argue that public discourses in Western nations such as Britain were characterized by certain general ideas which shaped colonial and imperial policies does *not* imply, however, that there was ever something like a monolithic and homogenic imperial culture or a collective imperial identity that was uncontested and favored by the whole public. See: Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from*

essentially linked to the Protestant faith that, in combination with the perceived need to globally distribute the blessings of Western civilization (of which Protestantism was an integral part after all), helped to legitimate imperial rule as an altruistic and philanthropic mission of the British Empire.[13] This essay will largely consider the discourse on tolerance/intolerance in relation to areas outside of the British Empire, such as Algeria and the Ottoman Balkan provinces. This illustrates the larger claim of the discourse reaching beyond the limits of the British colonies, and of British superiority not only over its colonial subjects, but over the rest of the world; with Britain seen by itself as the exemplar of civilisation. References to the civilized and progressive manner of Great Britain, contrasted with the supposed intolerance and fanaticism visible in Muslim societies, hence not only allowed for a very universal affirmation of global political dominance and overall moral superiority, but it also created a theoretical rationale for exerting influence and control over non-colonial sites and regions that were not formally British dominions.

The public atmosphere in Great Britain became increasingly hostile and indifferent towards other cultures and colonial subjects during the course of the nineteenth century, mainly due to the ascending importance attached to race and the civilization discourse.[14] Yet, this did not mean that people could not also claim to be implementing a broader humanistic agenda, or as in Pitts' words a "progressivist universalism."[15] Similarly, Ronald Hyam assures that "if it was not an ethical *empire*, it was not an empire without an ethical *policy*."[16] Partially the ambiguity Hyam refers to is derived from a very specific reception of eighteenth-century thought and the era of Enlightenment. Both were perceived as fundamental forces in the overall progress of Western science, technology, philosophy, politics and religion as they lay the groundwork for further European achievements in the decades to come, and thereby for the emergence of a stronger belief in Western, and specifically British, superiority towards other, less developed nations and peoples.[17] One of the most obvious of such achievements that structurally implicated an imperial-superior standing, was arguably the abolition of slavery and Britain's leading role in its worldwide legal implementation.[18] Analogically one could argue now that the very notion of tolerance—alongside similar concepts like equality

the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), 5; Jürgen Osterhammel and Jan C. Jansen, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich: Beck, 2012[7]), 126.

[13] Barbara Schwegmann, *Die Protestantische Mission und die Ausdehnung des Britischen Empires* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1990), 151–157.

[14] Ronald Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 28–30.

[15] Pitts, *A Turn to Empire,* 21.

[16] Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire*, 31.

[17] Annette Meyer, *Die Epoche der Aufklärung* (Munich: Oldenburg Akademieverlag, 2010), 90–92; Arnold Angenendt, *Toleranz und Gewalt: Das Christentum zwischen Bibel und Schwert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2009[5]), 68–69.

[18] Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*, 16–17.

(as in the distribution of human rights) or freedom (as in the overcoming of despotism and tyranny)—was likewise seen as an essential achievement that facilitated societal progress.[19] It was through the practice of tolerance, Britons could argue, that their country was able to end fanatic persecutions of minorities, fundamentalist thinking and religious wars against people seen as "infidels." In this regard, then, tolerance constituted a framework that helped people to distinguish themselves from backwardness (that is, basically from practices no longer deemed to be socially appropriate) and hence to locate themselves in the modern world.[20]

Tolerance as a Marker for the Progressiveness of Society

That the British public predominantly saw the concept of tolerance as such an achievement—one that was understood to be particularly linked to the overall context of Western civilization—can indeed be deduced from the accounts that I am going to address here. In a short bulletin regarding the election of the new liberal mayor of London, Henry Isaacs in 1889, *The Times* depicted the positive coverage of this election in the liberal German newspaper the *Freie Neue Presse*, from which it quoted:

> Such intelligent, sober, continuous progress as Great Britain has accomplished is without any parallel in any European country and must remain a wonder to the world. The United Kingdom has attained to the apogee of tolerance and civilization, whereas on the Continent there are too many countries which show a tendency to revert to the middle ages, with their fanaticism and religious persecutions.[21]

Very clearly this account essentially links the two terms "civilization" and "tolerance," which are not only depicted and displayed here as British accomplishments but are furthermore presented as markers for a clear opposition between the tolerance of Britain and the fanaticism prevailing in the nations beyond the Channel. The reference to the "middle ages" in this context, already hints to a common motif that is reappearing in the other articles as well: that of tolerance as an implication for civilizational progress.[22] Wendy Brown has already pointed out

[19] If we thus define tolerance as a virtue that not only referred to individuals but also to the wholesome of society, then tolerance could also be linked to the concept of civility, for both terms served as indicators "by which the different stages of development could be identified." See: Margrit Pernau, "Great Britain: The Creation of an Imperial Global Order," in *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth-Century Asia and Europe*, ed. Margrit Pernau et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45.

[20] After all it is evident that already during the Enlightenment, such influential thinkers as Voltaire or Rousseau saw the concept of tolerance as a huge progress of their time. See: Rainer Forst, *Toleranz im Konflikt: Geschichte, Gehalt und Gegenwart eines umstrittenen Begriffs* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2003), 380–384.

[21] "Freie Neue Presse, Austria-Hungary," *The Times*, November 1, 1889, 5.

[22] A similar linkage of the two terms "civilization" and "tolerance" can be found in other articles as well, for example in an account of *The Times* from 1876 regarding the Ottoman

the rhetorical function of presenting tolerance as an integral part of the modern social order and, furthermore, as an essential feature of the historical progression of peoples towards an ever greater form of civilization, marked by such ideals as the proper rule of law, democracy, reason, or liberty.[23] It is this conception that also lay at the core of the discourse on tolerance in late nineteenth-century Great Britain.

Ultimately then, besides the display of one's own progressiveness, the tolerance narrative was conversely also applied to mark the backwardness of other nations or other religions. In the fall of 1887 for instance, *The Times* launched a short series called *"The Progress of Islam"* in which, over the course of a few weeks, several letters were published that dealt with general political, cultural and religious questions concerning the practices of Islam in formal and informal British colonies. The overarching premise of all these letters was that they were all (mostly critical) responses to the polarizing and contested argument of Canon Isaac Taylor, who depicted the Christian mission in Africa and India as far less successful than the prospering missionary endeavors of Islam in these world regions.[24] Of the many critical accounts, I found the one of Liberal Protestant clergyman Malcolm MacColl particularly significant for the thesis of intolerance as a marker for backwardness examined here. In a passage on the Muslim school system in India he writes:

> It is no exaggeration to say that it is for the most part a mixture of fanaticism, intolerance, and vice. […] They [the Muslim colleges] sank into those more horrible crimes against nature which Christianity has extirpated from Europe, but which lurk in every great city in India.[25]

This assertion of Muslim intolerance in the context of overall backwardness now has to be seen in MacColl's intention to refute the argument of the aforemen-

suppression of the April Uprising in Bulgaria and the general use of violence, which states that "[c]ivilization and tolerance alone can heal the wounds of the country." See: "The Times' Prussian Correspondent, Russia and the War," *The Times*, September 21, 1876, 4.

[23] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 179-180; see also: Gail Hershatter and Anna Tsing, "Civilization," in *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, ed. Tony Bennett et. al. (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 36.

[24] Isaac Taylor, "Church Reform and Church Defence," *The Times*, October 26, 1887, 4; it seems rather telling that already in their announcement of the series that followed this letter, the editors themselves attacked Taylor´s position by devaluating it as a "perversion of figures and misrepresentation of facts". Considering the "controversy" that Taylor had caused with his statements regarding the increase of Muslim converts in India, it seems likely that with this series the editors intended to prove to the world that Britain was still politically and culturally in charge in their most important colony. As 1887 furthermore marked the 30th anniversary of the Indian Mutiny, *The Times* probably also wanted to dispel British anxieties over another uprising and set the public's mind at ease by (re-)asserting Britain's cultural impact as well as its ability to maintain order and stability. See: "The Editors of The Times, Progress of Islam: Correspondence," *The Times*, October 31, 1887, 9.

[25] Malcom MacColl, "The Progress of Islam- III," *The Times*, November 07, 1887, 13.

tioned Isaac Taylor. Taylor's account of the success of Muslim missionaries is depicted as solely fixated on numbers and statistics, while MacColl highlights the importance of comparison:

> The sole test is the comparative influence of Islam and Christianity respectively on the political and social condition of mankind. How do the two religions stand in that respect? Speaking broadly, the whole fabric of modern civilization has been the creation of Christianity.[26]

And while Christianity has thus "purified and elevated" human nature, Islam "has been an unmitigated curse to the lands where it has ruled."[27] In this attempt to prove the inability of Islam to properly implement civilization, MacColl thus portrays the Muslim faith as inherently hostile and intolerant towards other religions and races, which in turn leads him to detect within Islam a general inability for creating functioning societies. MacColl goes on to write that the "barrier to the social fusion of races" is generated by "Turkish vice,"[28] conveying his argument rather clearly. But while the intolerance prevailing in Islam is hence depicted as highly perilous, the intolerance of Christianity does not seem to bother MacColl at all. Depicting Christian episodes of intolerance—apparent for example in the trials against Galileo—as blunders of the past, he assures that "no Christian of sense would now admit that any proved truth or physical science can be inimical to the creed of Christendom."[29] Ultimately, it seems that through this juxtaposition of Christianity and Islam MacColl—making use of the paternalistic narrative mentioned earlier—sought to justify British rule over its colonial as well as over non-colonial subjects and hence point out the need for Muslims more generally to be guided by morally superior Christians.

The overall narrative of assuring Islamic stagnation while simultaneously claiming Christian progressiveness in matters of tolerance was also apparent in accounts that were far less aggressive than MacColl's explanations. A letter written to the editors of *The Times* following the *"Progress of Islam"* series by a reader named Joseph Thomson focused particularly on the spread of Islam in Northern Africa and the role of Christian missionaries there. Despite sharing a rather positive view on Islam, with Thomson intending to support Taylor's argument and thus to defend Islam against baseless and simplistic accusations, his account still managed to display the Muslim faith as somehow less progressive than Christianity. He writes:

[26] MacColl, "Progress of Islam," 13.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.

> Have we not required something like 18 centuries to learn that we have no right to force our religion on others? What wonder, then, if ardent negro propagandists should seek occasionally to force the blessing of their religion on their unbelieving and stubborn brethren?[30]

We can deduce from this statement that even such a man as Thomson, who regarded Islam as a true civilizing force[31] in Africa, still found this religion to be in some way backward, at least when compared to Christianity. According to the paternalistic worldview of the author, Islam has yet to reach the superiority of Christianity because—being unable to tolerate people of other religions amongst them—it was not yet as developed. This then begs the solution of needing 'guidance' from the more advanced Christian West in order to attain the same level of civilisation. The paternalistic account of occasional outbursts of Muslim intolerance, visible in the practice of forced conversions, implies that the whole system of Islam somehow never underwent such transformative processes as the Reformation or the era of Enlightenment, in which Christendom supposedly became more rational, self-reflexive and disenchanted.[32] In turn, the narrative of intolerance could have served accordingly as an important tool for the demarcating construction of Christian identity. Bearing the dangers of a teleological distortion of the past in mind, this is strongly reminiscent of several present day attempts to deprive Islam of its belonging to a modern era; attempts that currently not only amplify constructed notions of a backward Islam but also reinforce anachronistic and idealized perceptions of the European Enlightenment as an intellectual program that solely promoted rationality and the disenchantment of the world.[33] Acknowledging this analogy, we can perhaps understand these late nineteenth century discourses in question here, as some sort of underlying precursors to present day statements on Islam. In 2002, for instance, New York Times editorialist Thomas Friedman, paraphrasing Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, wrote that "Islam had not gone through the Enlightenment or the Reformation, which separated church from state in the West and prepared it to embrace modernity, democracy and tolerance."[34]

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[30] Joseph Thomson, "Islam in Africa," *The Times*, November 14, 1887, 4.

[31] Thomson argues that where "Mahomedanism was established as the reigning religion" it has given "an impetus to the barbarous tribes which has produced the most astounding results. […] In this manner have the seeds of civilization and Islam been scattered broadcast among numerous savage tribes" see: Ibid.

[32] Angenendt, *Toleranz und Gewalt*, 68–69; Conrad, "Enlightenment," 999, 1005; Louis Dupré, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 229–268, 312–333; Francis Robinson, "Religious Change and the Self in Muslim South Asia Since 1800," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 20 (1997): 2.

[33] See: Reinhard Schulze, "Was ist die Islamische Aufklärung," *Die Welt des Islams* 36 (1996), 278–283.

[34] Thomas Friedman, "War of Ideas," *The New York Times*, June 2, 2002, accessed August 28, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/02/opinion/war-of-ideas.html.

Apart from his own perception of Islam as partially backward, Thomson's article is furthermore illuminating in the way that it paints a vivid picture of the prevailing public opinion about Islam at that time—a religion that, as he describes it, was generally seen by many as "propagated by means of fire and sword" and moreover characterized by its alleged dictum of "death or the Koran."[35] The very fact that Thomson was therefore so eager to revise this "stereotyped notion" and to prove its obvious falseness, indicates how a great deal of people in the public discourse must have seen the religion of Islam: as a fanatic and intolerant creed that brutally forced its beliefs on others and somehow inherently promoted hostility and violence.[36] In spite of the fact that this was actually the opinion Thomson argued against, he indirectly helped to shape and further enforce it, mainly by emphasizing the notion of historical stagnation and the need for Islam to somehow catch up with modern civilization and the progress of Christianity. Therefore, although Thomson took a very sympathetic stand towards Islam and tried to deny or rather excuse the violence often associated with the religion, he remained a firm supporter of Christianity stating that: "No one is a more sincere admirer of the [Christian] missionary than I," and adding that "[t]hey seem to me the best and truest heroes this nineteenth century has produced."[37] It was exactly this eventual belief in the institution of the mission (as an instrument of general uplifting and as a means for the stimulation of progress) in which the accusation of intolerance could be used to point out that Islam was not yet equal to Christianity and Western civilization.

As the next account from *The Manchester Guardian* shows, the dichotomy between the tolerant vs. the intolerant, the rational vs. the irrational and the peaceful vs. the hostile could also be very well displayed in a different genre: that of the traveling report. Published in a two part account in August 1900, the traveler Ashley Ellis depicts his journey for unknown reasons into the Maghreb region, specifically to the Moroccan cities of Fez and Meknes. Apart from general—and deeply Orientalist—representations of landscape and local architecture, a great amount of space is dedicated to the description of Berber culture and it's supposedly backwards, bigoted and intrinsic savage nature. Hence, right at the beginning, just after briefly depicting the daily routine of the bazaars, Ellis tells his audience:

[35] Thomson, "Islam in Africa," 4.

[36] To be sure, this general public opinion was of course never uncontested. Contemporaries like the journalist William Howard Russel or the historian Robert Montgomery Martin early on tried to paint a more differentiated picture of other nations and religions that also pointed out the negative aspects of British rule. As, for instance, their critical accounts of the Indian Sepoy-Rebellion of 1857 showed, people indeed set out to highlight the barbaric crimes of British colonial officials towards their innocent subjects and thus relativized stereotyped notions of Muslims as inherently flawed individuals. See: Christopher Herbert, *War of no Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 65, 164.

[37] Thomson, "Islam in Africa," 4.

> Now and again, a fierce spirit of fanaticism may arouse them [and] as the other day in Fez, a passing fit of passion may result in an attack upon the infidel interloper, or the pastime of Jew-baiting, with its accompaniment of lust and plunder [and it is here where] the innate savagery of the human is seen.[38]

Again, we encounter the motif of fanatic hostility and irrational aggression towards the infidel, which was depicted as the expression of an intrinsic savagery and thus as the complete opposite of civilization. As the "attack upon the infidel interloper" or the even more drastic term of the "pastime of Jew-baiting" implicates, this intolerant attitude of the Muslims towards other beliefs for Ellis also included active, physical violence. There was hence no question to him as to what the destiny of the Maghreb and the Berber people was going to look like:

> And the slow tide of Western progress, forcing back the prejudices and conservatism of Islam, will eventually overwhelm them; the neck of the Oriental was fated for the foot of the Western conqueror.[39]

Similar to the other accounts already examined, the supposed inbred fanaticism, intolerance and aggression was depicted as undoubtedly inferior ("prejudices") and backwards ("conservatism"), so that, in the end, Islam was believed to vanish before the tide of Western progress. But more than the other sources discussed so far, this travel report also skillfully contrasted the theme of Muslim hostility with the actual practice of a tolerant, respectful and civilized Christian behavior as a very visible display and rhetorical proof of Christianity's moral superiority. As the report progresses further, Ellis recalled an episode where he and his travel companions encountered a religious teacher and an "angry mob" blocking their way:

> A hostile teacher bars our path and, aided by the crowd, restrains our progress. 'Sancto, sancto', is all that is said, but it means that this dirty alley is forbidden to the dog of a Christian or the Jew. A little higher is a filthy little mosque in a gloomy byway, but it is a mosque by the grave of a revered teacher of Islam, and to respect the prejudices of this people, we turn aside.[40]

Being able to control one's emotions was an essential aspect during the nineteenth century of what it meant to be civilized. Individuals and societies falling prey to their animalistic and violent passions, incapable of containing their temper were understood to be inferior to those who managed to carefully monitor and reflect on their own feelings. Impulsiveness was therefore considered to be a weakness and people not in control of their behavior needed to be taught to at-

[38] Ashley Ellis, "Sketches in Barbary," *The Manchester Guardian*, August 16, 1900, 10.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.

tain a higher level of civilization through learning by example—much as a child does from their father. In a similar way, British imperialists justified their rule as paternal, and more broadly, their superiority as Christians over Muslims. The way in which members of other cultures behaved, hence represented an important criterion for determining how far progressed they were and what stage of civilization they had attained to.[41] It is this thinking that also guided Ellis in his writing: In spite of the hostility perceived towards himself, he remains calm and rational, and, most importantly, he never loses control over his passions and emotions. Tolerant as he is, Ellis even respects the "prejudices" of these inferior people, showing, in turn that he not only participates in the overall discourse on tolerance, but also that he—as an individual—cherishes and practices the toleration of beliefs he does not agree with. Here the notion of inferiority is explicitly linked to Muslim intolerance as apparent in the perpetuation of religious segregation. This directly aided the construction of a paternalistic dichotomy between Christianity and Islam, or more specifically, between the rational, controlled and tolerant Briton on the one side and the irrational, uncontrolled, intolerant Moroccan on the other.

Apart from the vague assertion that someday Western progress will force back the "conservatism of Islam," Ashley's account does not seem to include any real political implication, such as active instructions for a specific British foreign policy based on the made assumptions of the Berber people´s nature. Other articles, however, went further than solely orientalist constructions of the *other* and placed Muslim intolerance explicitly in a (geo)political context. With regards to the "serious rising of the Arab tribes of Northern Africa," the unknown author of the next article from September 1881 set out to "discuss the possibility of a general outburst of fanaticism throughout the Moslem world."[42] His enquiry needs to be seen in relation to recent developments in the region at the time: Only a few weeks earlier, the Sudan had experienced the advent of the millenarian Mahdi Uprising, which was directed against the Egyptian occupation of the region.[43] In Egypt itself the nationalistic Urabi movement, active since 1879, threatened to put an end to the European—particularly British—influence in the financial sector that resulted from the country's increasing incumbrance and the eventual bankruptcy in 1875.[44] From Britain´s point of view, the disturbances during the autumn of 1881 were alarming as they entailed the possibility of a change in the balance of power that negatively affected the Empire's economic and strategic interests in the region, especially in Egypt, which officially became a protectorate only one year lat-

[41] See: Margrit Pernau and Helge Jordheim, "Introduction," in *Civilizing Emotions*, 8–11,14–18; as well as: Margrit Pernau, *Ashraf Into Middle Classes. Muslims in Nineteenth-Century Delhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 246–265.
[42] Anonymous, "The Jehad," *The Times*, September 10, 1881, 4.
[43] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Beck, 2010[5]), 642–643.
[44] Johanna Pink, *Geschichte Ägyptens: Von der Spätantike bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 2014), 158–164.

er. It is against this backdrop that the unknown author conducted his enquiry of the Pan-Islamic movement in Africa and the possibility of a Jihad waged against Christianity and the West. Destined to deliver a thorough analysis, he considered it necessary to "go back to the origin of Islam itself and [to] trace the history of Mahomedan warfare through the different epochs until the present day."[45] One of his first appraisals was the following:

> The astounding and rapid success, both religious and military, of Mahomedanism [...], naturally encouraged the idea that a vital principle of union exists in the system of Islam itself which needs only to be called into action once again to develop the old irresistible spirit of aggression. The world might well shrink from the contemplation of a simultaneous outbreak of murderous fanaticism among millions who profess the creed of the Prophet of Arabia.[46]

Hence, he continues, "dangers do exist from Mussulman discontent or enthusiasm […]."[47] This reference to an intrinsic "system of Islam" and the "old irresistible spirit of aggression" implies once more that the perceived hostility and intolerance towards other creeds was seen as somehow built in to the religion itself and therefore very unlikely to change, as the example of the "Bedouin or the Arab" shows, who "had preserved their patriarchal simplicity of manners unchanged since the remotest times [...]."[48] Unlike the other sources, though, this particular article explicitly linked Muslim fanaticism—in the form of a probable Jihad—to an actual political threat. Regardless of the author's perception that the possibility of a war to be carried out from the Ottoman Empire or to be proclaimed by a majority of Indian Muslims was nearly nonexistent, he nevertheless expected equivalent dangers arising from Northern Africa, stating that there are several countries where:

> The proclamation of a *jehád* [sic] would probably meet with an immediate response […]. The Arabs who migrated to Africa […] have to the present day preserved their Arab customs, traditions, and genealogies more intact than any others of the race, except for those of Arabia itself.[49]

It is therefore very probable for any "powerful Moslem saint or chief – and there are many such in Morocco, Tunis, and Algiers – [to] preach the extermination of the Kafirs […]."[50] In this context then, it seems important to note that the dangers of a Jihad were not simply understood in terms of religion per se. It was

[45] Anonymous, "The Jehad," 4.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.

rather a combination of an inbuilt religious intolerance towards other creeds and a special form of aggressiveness inherent to the Arab race, suggesting that intolerance was also defined in terms of ethnicity. The author thus assured that the execution of a Jihad would probably "not be strictly a 'Pan-Islamic' movement, [...] but it would be a universal Arab movement" which would "give rise to inexpressible horrors of war and bloodshed in western Africa itself, and it would attract sufficient sympathy in other Mahomedan countries to prove a serious danger to the general peace."[51] As the Jihad therefore also indirectly affected the Western world, it was the aim of the author to justify colonialism in northern Africa as a means to compensate for the lacking sense of rationalism, peacefulness and tolerance on the side of Islam, and thus to limit the dangers arising from such a deficiency:

> France has earned the gratitude of the world by converting a nest of pirates and slavers into a peaceful and productive country, and she has, no doubt, a right to protect her Algerian frontiers.[52]

As the remark on the general uplifting of "pirates and slavers" suggests, the author—while actually speaking about French accomplishments—also established a link to the abolishment of slavery as an overall humanistic merit of Britain. Accordingly, the warning against a possible Jihad, which necessarily implied the call for religious calmness, tolerance and rationality, was then furthermore instrumentalized in the civilization discourse:

> Morocco and Tunis must also, of course, be taught that the preservation of order and the repression of bloodthirsty fanaticism are the conditions of their admission into the band of civilized nations.[53]

In this overall civilization context then, the call for tolerance and rationalism was essentially embedded in the notion of the British Empire as a global forthbringer of justice and peace. Once again, we encounter the paternalistic tendency inherent to the accusation of Muslim intolerance, indicating an urgent need for the British to "teach" these nations what they seem to be incapable of achieving on their own, namely how to properly attain some degree of civilization; a claim that would be expanded in Egypt the following year when it was declared a British protectorate.

However, besides such discussions on Pan-Islamism and the possibility of a Jihad as explicit foils for Muslim intolerance, there were of course other contexts in which the (geo)political dimension of the tolerance discourse came to light. One historical topic that undoubtedly belongs to this category was the public debate

[51] Anonymous, "The Jehad," 4..
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

on the "Eastern Question"[54]; a topic that—especially after the "Bulgarian atrocities" in 1876 and the subsequent outbreak of war in the Balkans—polarized the whole of Britain, where debates amplified the domestic conflict between Liberals and Conservatives concerning the future of the declining Ottoman Empire and general questions regarding the Nationalist movements in the Balkan region.[55] In terms of media coverage, major events like the Bulgarian April Uprising or the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were often discussed in a much broader way and therefore often rhetorically functionalized to fit specific political agendas.[56] In June 1876 for instance, after news of the Batak massacre emerged, *The Manchester Guardian* published an article by the French journalist John Lemoinne from *Journal des débats* as part of a round-up on the opinions of the foreign press on what they called the "Eastern Imbroglio."[57] Lemoinne, like many of his English Liberal contemporaries, condemned Ottoman rule over their Balkan protectorates and thus supported national independence in these regions. His argument for "progressive emancipation" in Bosnia and Herzegovina is therefore backed up and justified by the affirmation of an overall inability on the side of the Ottoman government to appropriately maintain rule and order over their foreign dominions:

> The Turks can only maintain their dominion on the condition of their remaining Turks; they must draw on their fanaticism for their vitality. They hold it a dogma that their race is superior to every other race. Their intolerance is quite different from the intolerance of other creeds; [...] such a thing as social equality between a giaour and themselves they cannot admit.[58]

Lemoinne uses this invocation of Muslim intolerance and fanaticism to convince his readers of the supposed inefficiency of Ottoman rule over its protectorates and, therefore has to back up his own thesis regarding the necessity of national emancipation; hence the clear linkage between the concept of intolerance and distinctive political implications. Theoretically-speaking, the general intention to discredit both Islam and Ottoman authority was also about the establish-

[54] Under the topic of the "Eastern Question" contemporaries discussed the diplomatic implications of the increasing economic and political instability of the Ottoman Empire between the late 18th and the early 20th century. Yet, the "Eastern Question" was not only confined to a public debate, as it also refers to a situation of actual power struggle, in which the European nations attempted to safeguard their respective strategic and economic interests in the face of Ottoman decline. See for example: Alexander Lyon Macfie, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

[55] Florian Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa? Die Balkankrise und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland, England und Irland 1876–1913* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 32–37; Michelle Tusan, "Britain and the Middle East: New Historical Perspectives on the Eastern Question," *History Compass* 8 (2010), 213.

[56] Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege*, 37.

[57] John Lemoinne, "The Eastern Imbroglio," *The Manchester Guardian*, June 7, 1876, 6.

[58] Ibid.

ment of religious hierarchies. The Christian insurrections in the context of the April Uprising were depicted as justified, while simultaneously it was assured that the only way Turkey could react to these insurrections was "by appealing to Mussulman fanaticism,"[59] which was supposed to prove the "backwardness" of Ottoman rule. In this regard then, societies viewed as suffering under the yoke of Muslim intolerance were also believed to be necessarily unjust as the already mentioned nonexistence of "social equality" between Muslims and unbelievers suggests. Lemoinne concluded this verdict with the assertion that especially in provinces "where the Christians form a majority of the population and the whole of the administration is in the hands of the Turks, neither justice, nor order, nor peace can be regarded as safe,"[60] thus merging political and religious matters into one over-encompassing narrative of Islam as generally incompatible with the idea of modern society. Lemoinne seems to suggest here that, due to their inherent "fanaticism" and "intolerance," Muslims were unable to establish a social order, similar to that prevailing in "civilized" nations, in which religious minorities were regarded as equal citizens with equal rights and duties.

To Lemoinne all these negative aspects associated with Turkish rule justified the general implementation of national independence in the Balkans. But inevitably, he also developed a clear political opinion of Turkey itself. In a very liberal manner he opposed the conservative notion of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire[61] and furthermore challenged the belief in rescuing the "sick man of Europe" by saying that "we should not entertain any illusions as to the possibility of reforms in the Turkish Government, if even the Government itself were honestly desirous to do so."[62] To demonstrate the unwillingness of the Ottoman government, Lemoinne expands the overall narrative of Muslim intolerance and fanaticism by explicitly adding questions concerning civilization:

> It is quite a mistake to form an opinion of the Turks in general from the few specimens of Turks of the modern school, who learn foreign languages, travel all over the world [and] use knife and fork […]. In the eyes of true believers these liberal Turks are regarded pretty much […] as heretics far worse than infidels.[63]

In Lemoinne´s opinion there not only was almost no civilization and progress to be found in Turkey; far worse, the few people who did belong to a "modern school"—those who could facilitate positive societal change after all—were treated as foes and outsiders. It is this intolerant treatment of both foreign and domestic Turkish subjects that leads Lemoinne to his conviction that "Turkey cannot

[59] Lemoinne, "Eastern Imbroglio," 6.
[60] Ibid.
[61] See: Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege*, 15.
[62] John Lemoinne, "The Eastern Imbroglio," 6.
[63] Ibid.

gain strength by bastard imitations of outward forms of European civilization."[64] His main concern in this regard is thus the Ottoman failure to recognize the responsibilities that arise from the civilizing task: "To draw up paper constitutions [...] is easy enough, but some attention should be paid to the country, and above all to the people that have to be dealt with."[65] According to Lemoinne, it is exactly this proper dealing with the people—at home and abroad—that Turkey (in contrast to Britain, which spread the word of Protestant Christianity and treated its colonial subjects with tolerance and respect), simply cannot guarantee. Lemoinne's ultimate conclusion thus seems to be that the Sublime Porte's apparent intolerance, fanaticism and altogether uncivilized behavior disqualifies them as imperial rulers, because they cannot provide the paternal "care" that is expected from sovereigns who want to properly govern a given populace.

So far, the political dimension of the concept of tolerance has only been discussed in terms of actors who, although contributing to ongoing debates and thus shaping the public discourse, wrote from outside the actual political sphere. As an argument, however, the rhetorical dichotomy of tolerant vs. intolerant was also used by members of Parliament. In 1878 for example, after the war between Russia and the Ottomans ended, the House of Lords discussed the question of whether it was necessary or not for Britain to militarily partition and occupy parts of Turkey to gain a strategical advantage towards Russia's growing imperial aggression. By the end of this debate (which was published by *The Times*) the Liberal Lord Northbrook shared his opinion on this specific subject, in which he opposed the idea of intervention. Unlike others, such as the Marquess of Salisbury, Robert Gascoyne, who argued "that it is rather a desirable thing; that what we have done in India could also be done in Asiatic Turkey; […] that if we did annex it, it would add to the strength of the Empire," Northbrook explicitly pointed to the "wretched state" of Turkey, which—at least at the present state—would render British rule and the implementation of progress a rather intricate undertaking.[66] Hence, not only would a British occupation be difficult, it would also pose a "serious danger" to imperial rule itself. The very "wretched state," which was supposed to prove this skeptic assertion, resulted—again—mainly from the allegedly intolerant and fanatic Muslim mindset:

> Mahomedanism is a religion which chafes under foreign rule, especially the rule of a nation whose religion is not Mahomedan. A really religious Mahomedan cannot be content with other than Mahomedan rule.[67]

[64] Lemoinne, "Eastern Imbroglio," 6.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Anonymous, "Parliamentary Intelligence," *The Times*, July 19, 1878, 6.
[67] Ibid.

What makes this statement regarding the Muslim's general inability to tolerate non-Muslim rulers so valuable to our course of inquiry is not the statement itself, but rather the whole context of its publication. It shows that the discourse displayed so far also played a part in the shaping of *actual* politics; it proves that the rhetorical focus on tolerance and intolerance constituted a tool for the hierarchical division between Britain and their Oriental counterparts that could even influence the course of international diplomacy and geopolitics on the highest levels. In other words, the dichotomy tolerant vs. intolerant, as part of the broader civilization discourse, not only helped to construct a certain way of thinking about other people, nations and religions, but also influenced the way state officials justified and enforced their political agendas.

Conclusion

Ultimately, what these separate accounts show is that towards the end of the nineteenth century the notion of tolerance was embedded into a larger conceptual network that facilitated the overall public recognition of British progress and superiority, as the notion of tolerance enabled British Protestants and Liberals to define themselves as more civilized and modern than members of other nations, religions or ethnicities. Accordingly, to the British public, represented here at different levels by people like MacColl, a member of the general public; Ellis, a commissioned travel writer; or Northbrook, an aristocratic politician; the conception of British civilization included a certain degree of rationality as indispensable for overall human interaction. Therefore civilization, for them, almost inevitably included the liberal belief that respectful tolerance towards other cultures, religions and nations was of utmost importance for the proper functioning of the progressive and modern society.[68] The development from the backwardness of Medieval Europe to the prosperity of nineteenth-century Britain, in their eyes, convincingly indicated that. Non-European societies where the evolutionary conception of civilization was not present and where overall conditions reminded these Liberals rather of the unfree European Middle Ages with their religious intolerance and fanaticism,[69] were therefore regarded as incapable to abolish such backward aspects of life and were thus seen as necessarily inferior.

This dichotomy tended to enforce a very paternalistic understanding of the term tolerance, in which the image of the benevolent father taking care of the immature child supported the construction and justification of British civilizational superiority as well as the Empire's claim to rule over foreign territories and peoples.

[68] Considering that civilization was at the turn of the century also defined by Pear´s Encyclopedia as "progress in the art of living together," there can be no longer a doubt as to the crucial part of tolerance for the British conception of civilization. See Pernau, "Great Britain," 47.

[69] I am strictly referring here to the nineteenth-century retrospective perception of medieval Europe, not an accurate historiographical representation.

Societies depicted as prone to an intolerant treatment of other religions and fanatic outbursts of violence, in the eyes of the British, could not be left to themselves as they needed to be taught a more "civilized" behavior. This paternalistic mindset presented the one who practiced tolerance (the Protestant Briton) as the superior, whereas it identified the one who just passively received the generosity of being tolerated (the Muslim Arab) with some sort of defectiveness that led to his condition of being in need to be tolerated. So, by forcefully contrasting their own tolerant world view with the intrinsic intolerance of Islam, the Liberal and Protestant actors under scrutiny here effectively reinforced a hierarchical dualism that characterized Protestant Christianity as a progressive and modern religion which (unlike Islam) underwent the process of purification from irrationality during the Enlightenment era[70] and that could hence bear the expression of tolerance towards less progressive and inferior creeds. This implicated a very clear position of strength and superiority on the side of the Protestant Britons. Accordingly, the rhetorical usage of the tolerance narrative, as part of the overall civilization discourse, inevitably shaped and accompanied various political agendas concerning colonial matters and foreign affairs: Tolerance ultimately underpinned a general "logic of rule"[71] inherent to the imperial system by justifying the legitimacy of British imperial authority over politically, culturally and religiously "inferior" subjects. Whether in the case of Egypt, India, or the Ottoman Empire—the accusation of uncontrolled intolerance and fanaticism on behalf of Muslim populations and Muslim governments enabled Britain to vindicate its imperialistic (military or diplomatic) interventions in these world regions.

In my opinion, this paternalistic tendency, in part, still shapes the way we use the notion of tolerance in public discourse today. More than ever we need to acknowledge the hierarchical implications inherent to the term and its tendency to highlight the differences it actually aims to render invisible. Studying the similarities between late nineteenth-century and today's arguments concerning Islam's alleged intolerance as opposed to the ideal of tolerance in Christian tradition shows that, if we really want to achieve mutual acceptance and the implementation of true equality, we have to essentially rethink our understanding of tolerance as a means of interaction with Islam. As long as we maintain to think of Muslim believers to be one step behind in their way of handling religious and cultural difference and as long as we, simultaneously, fail to acknowledge that the Western way of talking about and practicing tolerance implies the regulation of something that is perceived to be in some way hazardous, then we will eventually also fail to regard Islam and Middle Eastern cultures as something undoubtedly equal to Christianity and Western civilization.

[70] See: Angenendt, *Toleranz und Gewalt*, 59–78.

[71] See: Catherine Hall, ed. *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Reader* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 7.

"Are Greeks Desperate for Heroes?" A Corpus-based Investigation of Colonial Discourses

DIMITRIOS CHAIDAS

The author recently completed a master's degree (M.St.) in Modern Languages at the University of Oxford. Being a holder of a master's degree (M.Sc.) in Applied Linguistics (University of Edinburgh) and a B.A. in Greek Philology (University of Athens), he is interested in the fields of Critical Discourse Studies, Social Semiotics and Corpus Linguistics. His research so far has centred around the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods for the exploration of the ways in which power, dominance and social inequality are (re)produced, performed and disseminated through discourse.

Joining previous research on the discourses that have been produced on Greece by the Western press during recent years—particularly related to the economic crisis—the present article examines the British media narratives which covered the archaeological excavation of the mound of Kasta in Amphipolis, Greece, in order to trace any possible colonial discourses. By deploying corpus linguistics in the form of word lists and concordance tables, a total of 324 articles from 108 British publications were investigated. In this study, I argue that Michael Hertzfeld's concept of 'crypto-colonialism' is an ongoing situation that Greece finds itself in and has been greatly perpetuated due to Western colonial discourses that manifest themselves both explicitly and implicitly. These discourses present the ancient past as a kind of cultural example that modern Greeks should somehow follow. Consequently, a cycle of self-colonisation where colonial discourses abroad inform self-colonising discourses domestically emerges, highlighting the dynamic and complex character of crypto-colonialism and the power relationship between the West and Greece that still exists. Finally, I advocate the benefits of using corpus linguistics in cultural research, as a tool for wide-reaching empirical research.

Introduction

Greece, as a nation state established in the nineteenth century, was never formally colonised and thus, has rarely been part of any discussion of post-colonialism. However, this situation changed in the last few years since works in the field of comparative and critical literature have shown the potential for Greece to be situated within post-colonial studies.[1] Additionally, historians and human geographers started addressing the interface between colonialism and national-

[1] For example: Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization and the Institution of Modern Greece* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Dimitris Tziovas, "Beyond the Acropolis: Rethinking Neohellenism," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 19 (2001): 189–220; Vangelis Calotychos, *Modern Greece: A Cultural Poetics* (Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003).

ism in terms of both the role of the European powers and the nature and character of Greek nationalism in its internal colonising role.[2] Finally, the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld suggested the description of Greece as a crypto-colony. 'Crypto-colonialism' as a term is defined as

> the curious alchemy whereby certain countries, buffer zones between the colonised lands and those as yet untamed, were compelled to acquire their political independence at the expense of massive economic dependence, this relationship being articulated in the iconic guise of aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models. Such countries were and are living paradoxes: they are nominally independent, but that independence comes at the price of a sometimes humiliating form of effective dependence.[3]

As a concept, crypto-colonialism has been influential and has led to numerous studies attempting to investigate its many facets.[4] Although Greece's crypto-colonial situation involving Greek elites and the West from the late eighteenth century onwards has been discussed by modern Greek scholarship,[5] it seems that more research is needed for a better understanding of the nature of this phenomenon nowadays. A specific issue that needs to be examined is whether only the domestic political and intellectual elite are responsible for the indebtedness of modern Greeks to their ancient classical past or if the West has also an active role in this.

In this article, I argue that crypto-colonialism is an ongoing situation that Greece finds itself in and is greatly perpetuated due to Western colonial discourses that manifest themselves both explicitly and implicitly. These discourses present the ancient past as a form of cultural example that modern Greeks should somehow follow. Consequently, a cycle of self-colonisation—where colonial discourses abroad inform self-colonising discourses domestically—emerges, highlighting

[2] For example: Elisabeth K. Flemming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Shannan R. Peckham, "Internal Colonialism: Nation and Region in Nineteenth-century Greece," in *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, ed. Maria Todorova (London: NYU Press, 2004), 15–43.

[3] Michael Herzfeld, "The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101 (2002): 899–926.

[4] For example, see: Yannis Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid: The Archaeo-politics of The Crisis," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 34 (2016): 227–264. Michael Herzfeld, "The Hypocrisy of European Moralism: Greece and the Politics of Cultural Aggression—Part 1," *Anthropology Today* 32 (2016): 10–13. Similar terms that have been suggested are *surrogate colonialism* and *self-colonisation*. For more information, see: Elisabeth K. Flemming, "Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan historiography," *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 1218–1233; Calotychos, *Modern Greece*, 47–53.

[5] Yannis Hamilakis, "Decolonising Greek Archaeology: Indigenous Archaeologies, Modernist Archaeology and the Post-colonial Critique," in *A Singular Antiquity: Archaeology and Hellenic Identity in Twentieth-Century Greece*, eds. Dimitris Damaskos and Dimitris Platzos (Athens: Benaki Museum, 2008), Benaki Museum supplement 3; Dimitris Platzos, "The kouros of Keratea: Constructing Subaltern Pasts in Contemporary Greece," *Journal of Social Archaeology* 12 (2012): 220–244.

the dynamic and complex character of crypto-colonialism and the power relationship between the West and Greece that exists today.

This study examines the archaeological excavation of the mound of Kasta in Amphipolis, which provoked public discourse on both a national and international level, leading to a media frenzy. To be more specific, the article explores the media coverage of the excavation in the United Kingdom in an effort to trace the existence of possible colonial discourses produced and how they interacted with the Greek discourses. Thus, drawing on this archaeological case that triggered the publication of many articles by the British press, I investigate these narratives by formulating a corpus of 324 articles and deploying corpus linguistics as this study's research method, in order to answer the following questions:

- How was the excavation in Amphipolis presented in the British media from a discursive point of view?
- Were there any further non-archaeological references and implications? If so, what were they? Additionally, did they occupy a prominent role in the corpus?

The use of archaeology and, more generally, the Greek antiquity in Western discourses has been explored by previous research either systematically or fragmentally.[6] Moreover, Greece's perception of its history and its place in a globalised world have also long been sources of discussions in modern Greek scholarship.[7] In the case of Amphipolis, however, there has not been systematic research of the discourses produced outside Greece, and this article aims to contribute towards the filling of this gap as well.

In what follows, I begin by reviewing existing literature on the usage of antiquity in media and public discourses both internationally and in Greece and also literature which specifically addresses the Amphipolis 'saga.'[8] I then go on to discuss the methodology employed for the purposes of this study, along with a presentation of the findings (supported by a concluding appendix that includes a word list and frequencies of occurrence). Finally, a discussion and some concluding remarks complete this article.

[6] Eleana Yalouri, *The Acropolis: Global Fame, Local Claim* (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Lauren E. Talalay, "Drawing Conclusions: Greek Antiquity, The €conomic Crisis, and Political Cartoons," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 31 (2013): 249–276.

[7] For example: Patrick L. Fermor, *Roumeli: Travels in Modern Greece* (London: John Murray, 1966), 106–113; Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece* (Austin: Texas University Press, 1982); Artemis Leontis, *Topographies of Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 103-131.

[8] I distinguish media from public discourse in this study, with the latter referring mainly to political discourse, but not exclusively (e.g. institutional).

Ancient Heritage in Media and Public Discourses

Since the outbreak of the ongoing Greek financial crisis in 2008, Greece has been at the heart of the international—particularly Western—public and media discourses. Front covers, articles or debates at political and economic levels are some of the platforms where issues primarily regarding the economy have been discussed and negotiated. These public and media discourses have been quite imaginative, since they draw on the ancient Greek heritage (mythology, archaeology, culture) and have manifested using modes beyond language, particularly with images. Lauren Talalay, in her investigation on how classical references were deployed by cartoonists of the Western press for the encapsulation of the Greek financial crisis from 2010 to 2012, offers an inventory of the repetitive images and motifs: the Parthenon and ancient temples, ruins, Venus De Milo, the Discobolus, the Trojan horse, mythological heroes or deities, like Hercules, and so on. These images and motifs have functioned as a major component of Greece's 'symbolic capital' and been part of a global language and market of traded images in the international press.[9] They have been used in a way consistent with an 'imagined community,' to borrow Anderson's phrase, of the Greek heritage and ideals constructed by Western Hellenism;[10] a Hellenism that focuses on classical hallmarks, like democracy or science.[11] The use of these cartoons during, and, even before the crisis, implied that modern Greeks differ from their classical ancestors.[12] Instances of presentations of the Greeks as the unworthy descendants and the chance habitants of the ancient land, in addition to instances of presentations of the Europeans as the true descendants of the ancient past, suggest that this past is a contested site, whose rightful ownership is claimed both by Greeks and Westerners.[13] The fact that the Western press/cartoonists have portrayed Greece as rupturing its once 'glorious' heritage is of great research interest to the degree that the crystallisation of a negative view of the Western audience towards the modern Greek identity can further influence the Greeks themselves in how they situate themselves from a cultural perspective.[14] In other words, cases like the political cartoons—and any kind of similar discourse[15]—can function as powerful elements in the Greek media and public discourse, reflecting and shaping at-

[9] Pierre Bourdieu, "Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson (Greenwood, New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1986), 243–251.
[10] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2006).
[11] For example, see: Jonathan Friedman, "The Past in the Future: History and the Politics of Identity," *American Anthropologist* 94 (1992): 837–859.
[12] Yalouri, *Acropolis*, 187; Talalay, "Drawing Conclusions," 251.
[13] For example, see: Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 238.
[14] Talalay, "Drawing Conclusions," 251.
[15] I speak of discourse from a semiotic point of view across the whole article.

titudes, perceptions and stereotypes.[16] Thus, the exploration of all Western public discourses on the Greek culture and identity are of major importance for the investigation of the mechanisms that affect the formation of one's self-perception and, in this case, Greeks' self-perception. The case of Venus de Milo giving the finger on the cover of the *Focus* magazine and the public outcry this created in Greece, including plans of suing the German publication, serve as an example.[17]

Classical heritage and archaeology, however, have also dominated the Greek public discourse: political, institutional and media. Ever since the Greek independence and the formation of the Greek state in the nineteenth century, archaeology has culminated to be a major component of the public discourse in Greece. Politicians, the intellectual elite of the country, the media and every institutional agent of the state, in addition to common citizens, have all developed archaeological discourses for a variety of purposes, from addressing actual cultural issues to exploiting archaeology for a political or economic agenda. The appeal of archaeology has been of such momentum that it has been characterised as a national discipline, an arena in which national imagination is being produced and reproduced daily.[18] It constitutes a space, within which non-archaeological concerns of all kinds (e.g. economy, notions of morality and respectability) are debated and contested.[19]

The politicalisation of the past in Greece has been a product of both conservative and left-wing politicians suggesting that the association of the ancient heritage with national issues and concerns transcends political ideologies, despite possible differences in the usage ranging from simple references to cases of 'banal nationalism.'[20] Political speeches in front of the Acropolis denoting the birthplace of democracy or discussions about material or non-material cultural heritage issues are among the many instances of the use of cultural heritage in public discourse. The resurgence of the debate about the return of Parthenon marbles following Amal Alamuddin's involvement in 2014 and the archaeological finds at the hill of Kasta in Amphipolis during the same year both serve as striking examples.

[16] Yannis Hamilakis, "No Laughing Matter: Antiquity in Greek Political Cartoons," *Public Archaeology* 1 (2000): 58.
[17] "Angry Greeks to Sue German Magazine for Defamation," *Der Spiegel*, April 20, 2011, accessed December 12, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/bird-trouble-angry-greeks-to-sue-german-magazine-for-defamation-a-758326.html.
[18] Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and Its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Dimitris Damaskos and Dimitris Plantzos, *A Singular Antiquity: Archaeology and the Hellenic Identity in the Twentieth Century* (Athens: Benaki Museum, 2008).
[19] Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 241.
[20] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

The Case of Amphipolis

The archaeological excavations in Amphipolis are a fine example of the place and role of archaeology and cultural heritage in contemporary public and media discourse. Since 2014, this ancient city has suddenly found itself in the spotlight of media, even though it has been a target of investigation by scholars and antiquarians since the nineteenth century.[21] As for the mound of Kasta itself, this was known to archaeologists for decades. Their interest in the mound can be divided in two general periods, with the first phase beginning in the 1960s and lasting until the 1990s.

The second period is connected with the name of archaeologist Katerina Peristeri. In 2013—and particularly during and after 2014—a public and media frenzy emerged around new findings, and the case of Amphipolis was rendered an unprecedented archaeological phenomenon or, as Hamilakis puts it, "a social and public phenomenon enacted on an archaeological stage."[22] In early 2013, the excavators announced that the lion of Amphipolis, a statue discovered during the Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century, was originally placed on the top of the hill of Kasta, triggering a speculation about the importance of the archaeological site. It was during the summer of 2014 that the excavation at Amphipolis galvanised the attention and received great media coverage on national and international level, following the full revelation of the 497-metre circumference of the mound and the statues of two Sphinxes guarding its entrance. The visit of the Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras to the hill and his interview in front of the monument proclaiming it as "an extremely important find," which is related to the land of Macedonia and its "unique treasures" that are "part of the Greek history," sparked further increase of public interest and the dialectic regarding Amphipolis. The tomb was treated as extra evidence for the 'Greek-ness' of the Macedonian history, which is claimed by both the northern region of Greece, Macedonia, and the neighbouring state FYROM/Republic of Macedonia.[23] Politics and archaeology became inextricably interrelated in the Amphipolis case ever since. A well-controlled communication strategy implemented by the Ministry of Culture offered, on the one hand, an apparently detailed account of the progression of the excavation and, on the other hand, it fuelled public expectations on the identity of the occupant of the mound. The findings after Samaras' visit in August—namely two Caryatids, a mosaic and the skeletal remains that were fi-

[21] Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 244.
[22] Ibid., 241.
[23] Antonis Samaras, August 12, 2014, accessed 08.12.2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P5juUt6PFzg; Greece and the (Former Yugoslav) Republic of Macedonia/FYROM have been in a political dispute regarding the use of the name of Macedonia ('Macedonia naming dispute') which is also used by the northern region of Greece. No agreement has been reached between the two countries so far resulting in Greece vetoing the accession of the Republic of Macedonia/FYROM to the EU and NATO until the name issue is resolved.

nally discovered—were in the midst of a dramatised public discourse seeking to address the identity of the buried occupant and its further potential significance for the country.[24]

Academic research has attempted to shed light on the cultural, social and political dimensions of this case of cultural politics. There is general consensus over the politicalisation of the excavation and its contextualisation within the wider socio-economic framework of the Greek crisis.[25] For Dimitris Tziovas, Amphipolis is only one instance of the politicalisation of the past during the crisis, acting as a counterbalance and source of national uplifting. The prevailing media narratives in Greece during the excavation at Amphipolis have been explored by Mina Dragouni, who captured the social impact of the excavation. Her findings suggest that the unearthed tomb served as the means for the Greeks to re-establish their pride towards the 'Other,' namely the West that has been criticising modern Greeks during the crisis. Furthermore, she argues that the political agenda of the government aimed at the introduction of Amphipolis in the naming dispute with FYROM over Macedonia, in order to distract the citizens from the adverse economic situation. In other words, archaeology was seen as a way for escapism through the creation of spectacle. What is worth remembering is the production of a discourse regarding the cultural economy of Greece as opposed to the economy of financial markets; a juxtaposition that reflects a so-called cultural indebtedness towards the ancient Greeks. This notion of debt in public discourse is investigated by Hamilakis, who sees Amphipolis as a case of 'occult economy,' where the "earth itself comes to the rescue of Greeks by offering its well-hidden treasures."[26] According to him, this indebtedness is linked with the crypto-colonial constitution of Greece. Thus,

[24] A caryatid is a sculpted female figure serving as an architectural support. It is used instead of a column or a pillar supporting an entablature on her head. The Caryatid Porch of the Erechtheion temple on the rock of Acropolis in Athens is arguably the most recognisable.

[25] Mina Dragouni, "'Greek drama': The Role of Heritage in Spectacle Creation during the Greek Economic Crisis," April 26, 2016, accessed December 12, 2016, https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/greek-drama-role-heritage-spectacle-creation-during-greek-economic-crisis; Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 227–264; Dimitris Tziovas, "Pride and Prejudice: Archaeo-politics and the Iconology of the Crisis," April 28, 2016, accessed December 12, 2016, https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/pride-and-prejudice-archeopolitics-and-iconology-crisis.

[26] The term *occult economy* refers to an economy outside conventional structures, which relies on the promise of instant enrichment through alternative means, such as magic, visionary skills, dreaming and ancestral inheritance, variously conceived. For more information, see: Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 250; David Sutton, "The Concealed and the Revealed: Buried Treasures as Sense of Place in Neoliberal Greece," presented at "The Economic and the Political: Locating the Greek Crisis within History and Anthropology," Durham, UK, December 20, 2014; Leonidas Vournelis, "Alexander's Great Treasure: Wonder and Mistrust in Neoliberal Greece," *History and Anthropology* 27 (2016): 121–133. Recent anthropological writings speak of occult economy as a characteristic of the twenty-first century neoliberal capitalism. For example, see: Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony," *American Ethnologist* 26 (1999): 279–303; Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," *Public Culture* 12 (2001): 291–343.

what seems to emerge is the ongoing crypto-colonial situation of Greece considering the existence of crypto-colonial discourses. A de-colonising process might become a reality by rupturing from the teleology of ancestral indebtedness.[27] However, the question is how this process can take place. Is this ancestral indebtedness owed solely to the domestic political and intellectual elite—indicating the start of this rupture from ancestral indebtedness—or is there also a separate colonisation of the ancient past in Western civilisation, serving as its so-called originary point? This question can probably find no answer, but it highlights the complexity and the dynamic character of this situation. As Michael Herzfeld argues, Greece has played up to imported Western models since the nineteenth century, models of the period of Western colonial empires.[28] Taking this into account, one would reasonably think that a possible de-colonial process of Greece would start at a great extent—but of course, not exclusively—outside Greece in the West by changing attitudes towards ancient and modern Greek cultural identity and, especially, attitudes regarding comparisons between ancient and modern Greeks based on the criterion of greatness.

Methodology

Corpus Linguistics

In order to answer the research questions posed in the introduction, this study uses Corpus Linguistics. As a method or approach, it has been deployed in a wide range of disciplines apart from linguistics, such as social science research, media studies, literature and translation studies.[29] Corpus Linguistics relies on corpora, namely "large collections of authentic texts that have been gathered in electronic

[27] Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 227.
[28] Herzfeld, "The Absent Presence," 904.
[29] Some examples that show the potential of Corpus Linguistics in the aforementioned fields are the following studies: Amanda Potts, "The Application of Corpus Linguistics in Social Science Research: A Case Study from the Annual Reports from the 'International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,'" paper presented at "Law as Text in Context: International Case Law from a Discourse Perspective," iCourts, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, August 28, 2013); Kieran O'Halloran, "How to use Corpus Linguistics in the Study of Media Discourse," in *The Routledge Handbook of Corpus Linguistics*, ed. Anne O'Keeffe and Michael McCarthy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 563–576; Jonathan Culpeper, "Computers, Language and Characterisation: An Analysis of Six Characters in Romeo and Juliet," in *Conversation in Life and in Literature*, ed. Ulla Melander-Marttala, Carin Ostman and Merja Kyto (Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet, 2002), 11–30; Michaela Mahlberg, "Corpus Stylistics: Bridging the Gap Between Linguistic and Literary Studies," in *Text, Discourse and Corpora: Theory and Analysis*, ed. Michael Hoey, Michaela Mahlberg, Michael Stubbs and Wolfgang Teubert (London: Continuum, 2007), 219–246; Mona Baker, "Corpus-based Translation Studies: The Challenges that Lie Ahead," *Benjamins Translation Library* 18 (1996): 175–186.

form according to a specific set of criteria."[30] After these large collections of texts are built, they can be investigated and processed using computer software (for instance Wordsmith) and the tools that it offers for a text analysis, such as word lists, keywords, concordance tables, clusters and collocations.[31] The main advantage of corpus linguistics is the identification of frequent and salient linguistic patterns over large amounts of data and that is owed to the usage of computer software.[32] As a result, researchers' arguments speak to a larger scope of primary material, which can then in turn be interpreted to make broader statements about the texts and themes under analysis.

Dataset and Procedure

The corpus that was built for this study consists of 324 articles from 108 British publications. The British media was chosen for two reasons. First, it has a global prominence which indicates its level of power and influence. Thus, its potential for the formation of mentalities through discourse points to the need of the analysis of its discourses. Second, unlike other European media (e.g. German) whose discourses on Greece over the last seven years have been explored by previous research, the British media has not been adequately investigated. The articles were found on the UK database *LexisNexis*. To be more specific, after typing the keyword 'Amphipolis' into the *LexisNexis* search engine all the available articles written about the Amphipolis excavation from 2013 until 2015 were retrieved and then collected to form the corpus of this article. Table 1 shows its exact size.

Number of publications	108
Number of articles	324
Total word count of corpus	84,596

TABLE 1: Size of Corpus

The articles do not belong to publications of a specific political stance. *LexisNexis* includes articles of diverse publications, ranging from liberal papers (such as *The Guardian*) to conservative tabloids (such us *The Daily Mail*). Thus, no discrimination between the political allegiances of papers was made while building the corpus.[33]

[30] Lynne Bowker and Jennifer Pearson, *Working with Specialised Language: A Practical Guide to Using Corpora* (London: Routledge, 2002), 9.

[31] John Sinclair, *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 17.

[32] Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, Majid Khosravinik, Michał Krzynaowski, Ruth Wodak and Tony McEnery, "A Useful Methodological Synergy? Combining Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to Examine Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press," *Discourse and Society* 19 (2008): 280.

[33] This study does not examine if there are more results appearing in the conservative or the liberal publications (raw corpus), since this is beyond its scope.

With regards to the procedure that followed the formation of the corpus, all articles were processed and analysed using the corpus analysis software *AntConc 3.4.0.* The tools that were utilised are *word lists* and *concordance tables* or *concordances*. A *word list* denotes "a list of all the words that appear in a text or a corpus. It offers the frequencies of each word (or token) in the corpus. Words are usually ordered in this list in terms of frequency, either with a raw frequency count and/or the percentage that the word contributes towards the whole text."[34] The collocational relationships of the words with the highest frequency in the corpus[35] of this study were explored with *concordances*, namely tables showing all the occurrences of a word, phrase or related pair of words in the immediate context that they occur in.[36] The first one hundred words with the highest frequency of occurrence in the corpus of the 324 articles (as shown in the word list) were examined in their immediate linguistic context (with the use of concordances).[37] Each word and its linguistic environment were studied in detail and, when necessary, some words were investigated in the article from which they derive. The grammatical morphemes like "and" or "the" were excluded from the word list with the one hundred words considering their high frequency in any corpus. Thus, the focus was primarily on lexical morphemes. At the end of the procedure, an attempt of grouping the findings took place, which is presented in this study.

Results

The quantitative analysis of the corpus revealed the words with the highest frequency of occurrence (for a more detailed account, see appendix). Their investigation in their immediate linguistic environment allowed the prominent discursive strategies and their characteristics to be disclosed. These discursive attributes make up four main categories: the portrayal of the monument, discourses of hope and memory, meta-discourses and, finally, Greek voices. In the presentation of the findings that follows I quote words, pairs of words or phrases—as examples—from the corpus that was built without citing their source (i.e. the article of origin) for technical reasons.[38]

[34] Paul Baker, Andrew Hardie and Tony McEnery, *A Glossary of Corpus Linguistics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 169.
[35] These were given by the word list.
[36] Paul Baker and Erez Levon, "Picking the Right Cherries? A Comparison of Corpus-based and Qualitative Analyses of News Articles About Masculinity," *Discourse and Communication* 9 (2015): 226.
[37] As it is common in linguistic studies using tools like *word lists*, a threshold is chosen by the researcher. In the present study, I chose to investigate the first one hundred words with the highest frequency of occurrence out of all the words that a word list offers by using the *concordance tables*.
[38] No meta-linguistic information was added on the corpus (raw corpus) during its formation. At the time of the conduction of the empirical research my focus was on the corpus as a whole and the pervasive discursive strategies in it, not on the publications themselves. Hence, the quotes that follow are cited with no citation of their source (i.e. article).

Portrayal of the Monument

As expected, the mound of Kasta itself was at the heart of the corpus, since this was the main subject of all articles. The tomb and the various archaeological findings (for instance, the mosaic, grave, entrance, wall, Caryatids) were first and foremost presented and described with a focus on the size or circumference and, secondly, on the craftsmanship of the tomb. Descriptive adjectives like "enormous," "giant" or "large" and evaluative adjectives such as "remarkable," "magnificent," "rare" or "spectacular" abounded. The wealth of the burial site also stood as a major point of interest (for instance, "lavish monument," "decorative mosaic").

The media discourses closely observed the process and the stages of the excavation. The chronicle of the excavation began with the revelation of the circumference and the two sphinxes and continued with the two Caryatids, the mosaic, the final chamber and the burial site with the bones. The British media followed the paradigm of their Greek counterparts, in terms of the speculation over the identity of the tomb's occupant as the procedure of the excavations unfolded ("speculation," "mystery," "enigma"). The names of the prospective occupants occupied a high place in the word list, namely "Olympias" (mother), "Roxane" (wife), "son," "general" and, of course, "Alexander the Great."[39] Although it was only for a short while (between August and September 2014) that the name of Alexander was circulated as one possible occupant, it was his name that came first in the word list reaffirming his allure as a famous hero. The names of the other possible occupants received their significance with reference to their relationship with Alexander. It is worth mentioning that many articles included a short biography of Alexander, even if the article was not about him as a possible occupant.

Finally, the archaeological site at Vergina was repeatedly mentioned. This archaeological site, excavated in the 1970s, appeared related to Amphipolis in a significant percentage of the total number of the articles (for example: "Alexander's fellow royals were traditionally interred in a cemetery near Vergina, far to the west, where the lavishly furnished tomb of Alexander's father, Philip II, was discovered in the 1970s"). What was featured most prominently in these articles was their interrelation as ancient and royal Macedonian sites.

Discourses of Hope and Memory

A second category that emerged during data processing refers to hope. Emotional discourse in the press releases by the Greek Ministry of Culture and the

[39] The name of Hephaestion, for who the whole tumulus was built as funerary monument, according to Mrs. Peristeri, did not make it into the top positions in the word list. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that this claim was made in late 2015 and not 2014, when the speculation and the media coverage reached both their peak. For Mrs. Peristeri's claim, see: "Greek tomb was 'for Alexander the Great's friend Hephaestion,'" October 1, 2015, accessed December 15,.2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34417796.

media appeared as a vehicle to describe the mental state of the Greeks throughout the excavation. Thus, phrases like the following ones dominated:

> Greeks hope the tomb holds members of the ancient Macedonian family
>
> Greece's confidence returns
>
> Find raising Greeks' hope that the tomb will add another chapter to their tumultuous history
>
> Discovery in Amphipolis reignites the hopes of Greece

Confidence and hope are depicted as the main ways in which the mental state of the Greek people are affected by the excavation and, more specifically, for their projection into the future. According to the British press, the significance of the findings at the mound of Kasta for the Greeks lies not in the monument itself, but rather in the role(s) this excavation can play in the years to come. In addition to hope, discourses of memory also prevailed within the corpus. To be more specific, the burial site at Amphipolis is presented as a reminder of a distant past. Phrases in the form of declaratives or rhetorical questions were often used. Some instances include:

> Will this monument remind the Greeks of their glorious past?
>
> Great dig reminds Greeks of past glory
>
> Mosaic as a reminder to Greeks of past glories

What is of interest here is the presumptuous hypothesis that this past which is related to the late Classical period and the empire of Alexander has been forgotten by the Greeks, or that this past is distinguished by a glory that no longer exists in the country. It is crucial to note that this juxtaposition of the glorious past and the inglorious present was pervasive in the corpus. With regards to the terms through which this ancient 'glory' is represented (for example, cultural or political), after examining the linguistic context, in which these references were made, it becomes apparent that glory is relayed primarily in financial terms. It is the wealth of the tomb that is juxtaposed with a Greek present that faces an economic crisis or poverty. As for the ways that this was handled, the references were either explicit or implicit. The following quotations serve as examples:

> The near-intact sculptures and staggering mosaics found at Amphipolis have been a cheering reminder of past glories for a country mired in economic woes
>
> The excavation is not going to lift the fortunes of a country where over one in four is unemployed and household income has fallen by a third since the crisis began
>
> After six years of economic crisis, political tumult and a humiliating international bailout, Greeks are desperate for heroes

Here the crisis is presented as the incompatible feature of the present that lies in conflict with the wealthy and glorious past. Thus, hope, memory and economy are inextricably connected in that the last one constitutes the negative or adverse present of a country that starts to "remember" a forgotten and economically powerful past which was part of its identity:

> It [the tomb] revives Greeks' hopes that, despite their big struggle to survive, there is a holy grail that will *re*connect them to a period of glory and power. In times of crisis, people have the chance to *re*define their identity [emphasis added]
>
> The Amphipolis syndrome: the economic crisis revealed a cultural deficit

In light of these media approaches, one important question that arises is why the identity of a people is discussed from an economic perspective, rather than from a cultural point of view. Additionally, one might wonder why a potential cultural deficit is presupposed and what the reasons are for its linkage with a potential 'oblivion' of the distant past of antiquity. If the finds at Amphipolis are seen as a 'chance for Greeks to re-define their identity,' what does this tell us about the ways in which the modern Greek identity is perceived and constructed outside Greece?

Meta-discourses

The discourses that were produced and which dominated the Greek public sphere stood as an object of observation and critique by the British media. The excavation saga was seen as a 'show'—even as a 'reality show'—in which Samaras himself and the archaeologists were the main stars. The role of the Greek media was also often discussed in the British press which, in some cases, presented the former as manipulating the imaginations of citizens through the excavation:

> Although the official news release said nothing about Alexander the Great, a recent report in the Athens daily Kathimerini cited vague sources at the Culture Ministry

> saying that the female skeleton might be Olympias, Alexander's mother, who was murdered after his death

An interest in the Greek politics also emerged. More specifically, the role of archaeology as a political tool of the ruling party at the time, New Democracy, was addressed in the corpus. The financial investment in the excavation triggered the British media's interest:

> Greece invests 600,000 euros in Amphipolis

> No other similarly significant project has received this amount of money before

With regards to the motives behind this unprecedented investment, the British media speculated about a strategy to shift the attention of Greek citizens from the 'real' problems linked with the economy, to a monument projected as the 'proof' of a great Hellenistic past and its Greek origins. For instance:

> discovery to distract Greeks at a time of economic and social hardship

> find to rebut FYROM's claim that the ancient general was of Slavic rather than Greek descent

Tapping into national pride was also portrayed as serving the political survival of the New Democracy government at the time, whose precarious position was worsening:

> It is questioned whether this is an attempt to restore Greece's tarnished image and boost national pride and morale that included elements of a strategy that will see the government's popularity increase at a time when polls put ruling New Democracy 10% behind the main opposition, Syriza

Another meta-discourse focused on the enhancement of Amphipolis' local economy that this tomb could trigger. References to Greek hopes for the unearthing of hidden "treasures" and their touristic merit to drive some new revenue into the economy in a time of need were made:

> Samaras hopes that some treasures have survived

> Discovery of female sculptures gave fresh hope that some treasure may have survived

> Amphipolis for an elusive growth
>
> Greece hopes tomb discovery breathes life into economy

Greek Voices

Data processing showed that quotations occupied a significant place in the corpus from a quantitative point of view. The origins of these quotations ranged from politicians and archaeologists to the average Greek citizens. For instance, public statements of the Prime Minister Antonis Samaras hailing the tomb as "an extremely important discovery" and proclaiming Macedonia as the land that "continues to move and surprise us, revealing from deep within its unique treasures," or quotations from Peristeri's reports on the processes of excavation, reflected their protagonist role. The public speculation over the occupant of the monument, both inside and outside Greece, is indicated by the different opinions and criticisms that various experts expressed about the monument. However, what stands out is the space given to Greek citizens to voice their own views often in an anonymous way and, especially, the kind of views that were expressed. This took place structurally through either direct or indirect speech and included both eponymous and anonymous citations. Some examples include:

> This discovery proves that Alexander belongs to Greece
>
> It [the monument] shows one more time that Macedonia is here, ok? Not up there with the Slavs!
>
> You are proud of your ancestors, but are they proud of you?
>
> Extremely important monument not just for the area, but also for Greece, for history itself and archaeology

The phrases quoted indicate how the cited words of Greek people in the corpus were focused. To wit, the Greeks are presented as claiming their singular right to the Macedonian heritage as its only true heirs, unlike their neighbours from FYROM. Moreover, Greece's citizens (and the politicians) are portrayed as culturally aggressive. They project a cultural superiority in their effort to show the rest of the world the importance of their cultural heritage, part of which is the legacy of Alexander according to them. Finally, people in Greece are presented as being in a peculiar relationship with their ancient past; a relationship of concern, negotiation and effort to keep up with a 'great' legacy. Occasionally, however, this effort did not appear as successful, as the third example suggests.

Discussion

The British media followed the stages of the excavation closely, especially from August 2014 until the beginning of 2015, and joined the Greek public discourses in the game of speculation. In fact, they went as far as to reproduce the different opinions that were expressed by politicians, experts and, in general, every public figure, regarding the identity of the occupant. The interplay between visibility and invisibility that is at the heart of material heritage management in modernity as a whole, and which was so tightly manipulated in the case of Amphipolis in Greece,[40] are also apparent in the UK's media.

As a case of occult economy, Amphipolis was also depicted as such, and this fact aligns with previous research on Amphipolis,[41] whose earth promised immense and untold wealth, and was about to give birth to treasures. Thus, an oneiric cultural economy seeking roots by unearthing cultural masterpieces became in this case an 'economy of hope' for Greeks;[42] an economy that will pay dividends to the true believers in the dogmas of national destiny.

The preceding excavations at Vergina occupied a significant place in the corpus, which was the result of this 'oneiric archaeology' of Amphipolis that operates through a complicated temporality;[43] it invokes various times and recalls and cites important temporal landmarks and major moments in national archaeology. These two moments, Vergina and Amphipolis, were conjured up and placed side by side, enacting a 'polychronic temporality'.[44] In other words, 'analogic thinking'[45] or 'cultural proximity'[46] as a mode of historicisation was employed.

The analysis showed that the discourses of memory focused on a juxtaposition and implicit—even explicit at times—comparison between modern Greece and its classical antiquity. These discourses included verbs like "remind" or "reconnect" and referred to a past, whose glory and power are missing currently from Greece. Moreover, considering that the articles were written to cover a topic of cultural nature and not political, it was perhaps surprising that the 'glory' was defined

[40] Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 253; Yannis Hamilakis, *Archaeology and the Senses: Human Experience, Memory, and Affect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); for more information regarding the aforementioned interplay between visibility and invisibility in the case of Amphipolis read the papers cited on page 5.

[41] Sutton, "The Concealed and the Revealed;" Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 227–264; Vournelis, "Alexander's Great Treasure," 121–133.

[42] Vincent Crapanzano, "Reflections on Hope as a Category of Social and Psychological Analysis," *Cultural Anthropology* 18 (2003): 3–32.

[43] Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 254.

[44] Hamilakis, *Archaeology and the Senses*. Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 253.

[45] David Sutton, *Memories Cast in Stone: The Relevance of the Past in Everyday Life* (Oxford: Berg, 1998).

[46] Daniel Knight, *History, Time, and Economic Crisis in Central Greece* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

primarily in financial terms and not culturally.[47] An economically glorious past was juxtaposed with an economically inglorious present. The fact that modern Greece is struggling to overcome a deeply rooted economic crisis was presented as a break of its connection with the 'glorious' classical/Hellenistic past, an event that led to a cultural deficit for modern Greek identity. This indicates that modern Greeks are perceived as different from their antecedents of the classical past or, even maybe, not as 'glorious' as they used to be. This finding supports previous research that investigated the Western attitudes towards modern Greek identity.[48]

Furthermore, considering that this discourse of juxtaposition was deployed by the media of a Western country that continues to be one of the great powers since the nineteenth century, I would argue that this discourse signals the view that modern Greece should view its classical past as a form of cultural example.[49] Taking into account, first, that modern Greeks are urged to remember and reconnect to the classical antiquity, in order for them to surpass their "cultural deficit" that is so closely related with the economy, and, second, that this is articulated within a global cultural hierarchy, where the United Kingdom as a Western country holds a prominent position, I argue that colonial discourses are still existent in the British media. Since the inception of the Greek nation state, the great powers (Britain among those) pointed at a model of classical Attica or the classical past, in general, as Greeks' only possible source of legitimacy.[50] This coincided with the Western European Philhellenism's colonisation of classical antiquity that was a project on self-awareness, whereby affiliation led to appropriation.[51] This study's findings support Michael Herzfeld's argument:

> [T]he reality of colonialism's heritage is that the global hierarchy of cultural value it has created persists long after the demise of the political and military empires.[52]

Relevant to the aforementioned argument are the meta-discourses and the Greek voices. The results showed that the British media presented Amphipolis as an arena where politicians, experts and citizens voiced their opinion. The tomb

[47] The role of the Greek economic crisis should be acknowledged here.
[48] For example: Yalouri, *Acropolis*; Talalay, "Drawing Conclusions," 249–276.
[49] I would add various aspects of this projected supremacy of the classical past, apart from the cultural one (e.g. economic). Additionally, the UK's position as a great power nowadays was indicated by the British Pound to Euro exchange rates in 2014/2015. For example, see: Katie Allen, "Pound hits five-year high against euro and dollar," *The Guardian*, September 25, 2014, accessed December 12,2016, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/16/pound-high-five-year-dollar-euro..
[50] Herzfeld, "The Hypocrisy of European Moralism," 10.
[51] Suzanne L. Marchand, *Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Simon Goldhill, *Victorian Culture and Classical Antiquity. Art, Opera, Fiction, and the Proclamation of Modernity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 9–17; Platzos, "The kouros of Keratea," 230.
[52] Herzfeld, "The Absent Presence," 920.

was used mainly by politicians as a vehicle to stage the nation's cohesion.[53] The discourse employed mainly by Samaras was culturally aggressive. It projected the cultural leadership of Greece outside the country serving the enhancement of his political power and his agenda of political survival in that way. In addition, the Greek people are presented as if they are in a peculiar relationship with their ancient past, in that they are concerned if they actually keep up with its 'global significance.' Considering these two findings, Herzfeld's concept of crypto-colonialism is particularly pertinent. According to the scholar, crypto-colonies, although not colonies technically, are governed by elites that use world-dominating civilisational discourses, first, to enhance their power and, second, in defence of their perceived national interests and specificity (in this case, the naming dispute with FYROM).[54] Greece, as a crypto-colony, has adapted to dominant images of Hellenic cultures greatly focused on classical antiquity, confirming its cultural subordination to imported Western models. Thus, in addition to the existence of colonial discourses that I advocated earlier, I also argue that in the British media there were crypto-colonising presentations of Greece, which are an inextricable part of the former, through the meta-discourses and the Greek-voices.

The crypto-colonial presentations of Greece though quotations of Greeks themselves, in addition to a colonial discourse projecting antiquity as a model of economical glory that should be attained by modern Greece, end up playing one dual role; it affirms and enhances both the situation that the modern Greek state has found itself facing since its birth and its complex nature. As the findings of this study suggest, the modern Greek identity is, on the one hand, haunted by the ancient past and, on the other hand, it is perceived as different or less 'glorious.' I say haunted, because this illustrates a not so productive relationship that is free of comparisons on a scale of significance or status. As a crypto-colony, Greece appears to continue to struggle, burdened by its ancient past, with a future for which there is as yet no clear categorical slot.[55] The repercussions that such Western attitudes, like the ones in the British media, have for the modern Greek identity include the perpetuation of the crypto-colonial constitution of Greece, since these discourses are reproduced by the Greek media in turn. As a result, the Greek identity continues to be informed by these discourses. A possible process of decolonisation, according to Hamilakis, might start by "rupturing the temporality of ancestral debt and imagining an open past which can lead to an open future."[56] However, this issue is more complicated as the findings of this study have shown. To the degree to which Western perceptions and attitudes affect the self-aware-

[53] In Greece, this kind of concern with the territoriality or "Geo-Body" (Winichakul Thongchai, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994)) of the nation, is commonplace.
[54] Herzfeld, "The Absent Presence," 901-902.
[55] Ibid., 920.
[56] Hamilakis, "Some Debts Can Never Be Repaid," 227.

ness of modern Greeks, a possible process of decolonisation seems to be far from achievable in the imminent future. A change in the direction of the Greek politicians', institutions' and elite intellectuals' ideological regime is arguably the first step to be made.

Concluding Remarks

Joining previous research on the discourses that have been produced about Greece in the Western press over the last few years and, especially, regarding the economic crisis, the present article examined the British media narratives that were published for the coverage of the excavation at the mound of Kasta in Amphipolis. A corpus of 324 articles from 108 British publications was investigated. To answer the research questions posed at the beginning of this essay, data processing revealed that the articles were primarily concerned, first, with the material description of the monument and the speculation about the occupant's identity; second, the effects that this archaeological find generated in the mental state of Greeks (hope and memory). Finally, the discourses that were produced in Greece stood as an object of observation and critique by the British media. The findings suggest that the size and the wealth of the monument stood as a platform for the juxtaposition of a glorious classical past and an inglorious present struggling to overcome the ongoing economic crisis. Therefore, non-archaeological references and implications made their appearance and were pervasive in the corpus. After analysing the conceptualisation of the glorious past and with reference to the perception of modern Greece and its cultural identity, I have argued that colonial remnants are still present in the British media. I showed the dynamic and complicated character of the ongoing crypto-colonial constitution of Greece, a situation that is the outcome of both domestic discourses and discourses abroad. The analysis revealed a cycle of self-colonisation and a relationship of power between the UK and Greece as manifested in media discourses.

The present article employed corpus linguistics, in order to look at the British media from a macro level without focusing on a few articles or articles of a specific political ideology, a practise that is maintained in traditional cultural research and generates the question of the arguments' generalisability. Thus, a methodological contribution is also made.

As for the limitations of this study, the corpus was built with articles that were uploaded only on the website of *LexisNexis*, meaning that other databases may yield different results depending on their digital contents. Furthermore, it did not include any other discourses that could have been produced on social media, for example. My interest was rather in hegemonic discourses and that is why the press, which mediates between the public and institutions of power, was chosen

as the material of this study. Finally, considering the time constraints, I needed to limit the scope of the material I investigated.

Future studies could deploy corpus linguistics for a diachronic investigation of Western discourses and help us disclose if there are qualitative and quantitative differences in the production of colonial discourses not only in the British media, but also in any other Western country's media. This could offer insights into the possible existence of downwards or upwards trends in the development of colonial discourses across the decades, or even the last two centuries, and how this relates to the socio-political context. Moreover, a comparative study between Western countries could also be conducted with corpus linguistics by building two or more corpora, so that the exploration of similarities or differences in how colonial discourses on Greece were used in these countries is rendered possible.

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Appendix

WORD LIST AND FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCES

O/N	Word	Frequency	O/N	Word	Frequency
1.	Tomb	1209	51.	Their	123
2	Alexander	1013	52.	Egypt	122
3.	Was	925	53.	Years	122
4.	That	905	54.	Skeleton	120
5.	Greece	627	55.	Monument	119
6.	Said	549	56.	Entrance	116
7.	Great	516	57.	Era	116
8.	From	499	58.	Mother	115
9.	Ancient	486	59.	Athens	114
10.	Amphipolis	484	60.	Bones	114
11.	On	463	61.	Near	112
12.	Be	461	62.	Death	112
13.	Greek/-s	385	63.	Wall	112
14.	Archaeologists	369	64.	Unearthed	110
15.	Found	368	65.	Year	109
16.	Which	365	66.	Important	108
17.	Buried	321	67.	Uncovered	108
18.	Site	315	68.	Wife	107
19.	Were	288	69.	Most	106
20.	Ministry	277	70.	We	106
21.	But	255	71.	Philip	105
22.	Northern	244	72.	World	105
23.	Culture	240	73.	Archaeological	103
24.	Discovered	224	74.	Archaeologist	103
25.	Or	224	75.	Last	102
26.	Had	216	76.	Inside	100
27.	There	206	77.	Speculation	100
28.	Will	192	78.	New	96
29.	Burial	189	79.	Caryatids	94
30.	Peristeri	187	80.	Dig	93
31.	Excavation	185	81.	According	92
32.	Remains	184	82.	Other	91
33.	Marble	182	83.	Around	91
34.	Could	177	84.	Female	91
35.	Mosaic	177	85.	Olympias	91
36.	King	172	86.	Generals	90
37.	Experts	171	87.	Largest	90
38.	After	160	88.	Person	90
39.	Mound	159	89.	Before	89
40.	Macedonia	155	90.	Minister	88
41.	Some	139	91.	Chamber	87
42.	Built	138	92.	Where	87
43.	Died	137	93.	Woman	86
44.	More	137	94.	Samaras	84
45.	City	131	95.	Believe	84
46.	During	129	96.	Family	77
47.	Empire	128	97.	Father	75
48.	Grave	128	98.	Country	74
49.	Over	125	99.	Mystery	71
50.	Lion	124	100.	Identity	70

The Time of the Myth: Situating Representations of the Roman Empire within Italian Colonialism, 1911–1940

MONICA PALMERI

Monica Palmeri is an art historian specialized in contemporary art. She holds a master degree in Art History as well as Archaeology and is specialized in the protection of archaeological remains. She is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in History and Cultural Heritage at the Università degli Studi di Viterbo. Her research project focuses on colonial exhibitions in Italy during the Liberal and the Fascist periods. Her interests also include museology, colonial and imperial studies, as well as anthropology.

This article traces aesthetic operations of the Italian state, both in the Liberal and the Fascist Era, to spread certain representations of Italian colonialism. In particular, it highlights how a 'mythologized' idea of the Roman Empire was used to valorize the image of Italy as a colonial power to a domestic and an international public. Two case studies are presented, the Italian section at the *Exposition Coloniale Internationale* held in Paris in 1931 as well as representations of and archaeological efforts to restore the so-called Marco Aurelio's Arch in Tripoli. Their analysis points out how the Italian state propagandized its imperialist efforts by relating them to the glorious Roman past as a model for the contemporary Italian state. Both cases are interpreted as examples of ambientation, a technique to display historical remains according to the presumed taste of a distant past. The article concludes that ambientation was used as a means to turn Marco Aurelio's Arch in Tripoli's urban space and the Italian presence on the international stage of the colonialist exhibition into political symbols. They were supposed to support Italy's demands for a colonial empire as an appropriate contemporary expression of the country's assumed past.

Introduction

This paper highlights how the myth of the Roman Empire was used by Italian governments, both Fascist and Liberal, to valorise the image of Italy as a colonial power to a domestic and an international public. The period taken into consideration lasts from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1940. Thereby, this study deals with *Italia Liberale*—'Liberal Italy'—which describes the Italian state and government following the unification of Italy in 1861 in consequence of the so-called *Risorgimento* movement but still pays special attention to the period of Italian Fascism, beginning with Mussolini's take-over of power in 1922.

Throughout the period in question, the legacy of ancient Rome was continuously evoked to strengthen the national identity of Italy but also to assert Italy's position in Europe. Indeed, references to ancient Rome formed a key tenet and theme

in the creation of the unified Italian state during the *Risorgimento* period:[1] the government as well as intellectuals and artists appealed to the Roman past, appropriating it as a source of political and cultural legitimacy. An aspect of this appeal was the drive towards a renewal of the (colonial) Italian empire. Especially the strive for a colony in Libya, which began in 1911, took on symbolic importance for Italian nationalists who imagined it to be the starting point for a new dawn for Italy. After the rupture of World War I, the aspiration of Italian nationalists to turn Italy into a capable modern state and empire via a determined expansionist foreign policy intensified further. This nationalist aspiration went hand in hand with criticism of the Liberal government that was deemed incapable of providing the political leadership which the nationalists demanded. The Fascist movement had been committed to these demands since its founding days in 1919. The myth of ancient Rome was utilised by the Fascist movement to legitimise a more universal mission for Italy and their claims regarding the supremacy of Italian values.[2] The cult of Rome was not only the most effective rallying cry in the Fascist effort to popularize imperial ambitions and push for an aggressive foreign policy, but it became a fundamental part of Fascist ideology.[3] To Mussolini, the glorious Roman tradition represented a model and a source of inspiration. For the Fascists, the claim to the myth of Rome thus constituted the foundation on which to build the future: it was not seen as an abstract admiration or a nostalgic reference but rather as an important base from which to construct a dynamic Italian identity.[4]

In the present paper, it is my goal to highlight how the glorification of ancient Rome joined the political programme to promote and valorise Italian colonialism from the 1911 to 1940. To do so, I will explore two case studies: the first one is concerned with the lengthy debate about the preservation of the Marco Aurelio's Arch in Tripoli, while the second concerns the Italian sections at the *Exposition Coloniale Internationale* held in Paris in 1931. In the first case, the need to preserve and restore archaeological remains blends with processes of re-writing and re-reading the past. In the case of the Italian pavilions at the colonial exhibition in Paris, the myth of ancient Rome is considered by the Italian committee as a source from which to draw the image of a strong and powerful nation. Ultimately, a creative version of the Roman past is claimed by the regime in both cases.

The theme of ambientation connects these two cases. Ambientation refers to a specific display practice, namely the planning and organisation of displays according to a presumed view of the past, and was used for permanent or tempo-

[1] Jan Nelis, "Imperialismo e Mito della Romanità nella Terza Roma Mussoliniana," *Forum Romanum Belgicum* 2 (2012).
[2] Simonetta Falasca Zamponi, *Lo Spettacolo del Fascismo* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino Editore, 2003), 144–152.
[3] Dino Piovan, "Il Fascismo e la Storia Greca," in *Eredità Classica e Costruzione delle Identità Nazionali nel Novecento*, ed. Jacopo Bassi and Gianluca Canè, (Milano: Edizioni Unicopli, 2014), 25.
[4] Zamponi, *Spettacolo*, 144–152.

rary museum exhibitions from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1920s and 1930s. It is possible to find examples of this kind of display technique in Italy, Germany, France and in the United States.[5] The resulting displays are also known as 'period rooms.' Especially ateliers of artists were frequently recreated using this method. As a technique, ambientation had the potential to manipulate the perception of time and space for the visitor—an argument that will be developed in analysing the two case studies.[6] In Italy, ambientation as a cultural technique benefitted from the presence of a significant monumental architectural and artistic heritage within the nation, exalting the national identity as well as regional and cultural polycentric traditions of which Italians had become more aware during the *Risorgimento*. In the historicist cultural climate of the time, these 'ambientated' displays suggested the original context from which single works were drawn, thereby synthetically reconstructing an epoch and recreating an idea of its atmosphere.[7] Ambientation was therefore similar to a play: curators staged settings reproducing specific historical moments in order to entice the public, while visitors could embrace the nostalgia and marvel at the timeless reproductions.[8]

The Historical Context of Italian Colonialism

In order to adequately analyse the two case studies, it is necessary to first briefly contextualise the Italian imperialist policy of the Fascist era within the broader history of Italian colonialism. The Italian scramble for African colonies started later than in other European countries: in 1869, thanks to a deal with the Italian government, the Rubattino shipping company bought a strip of land near the Assab Bay in today's Eritrea from the Egyptian-Ottoman authorities. The transfer of this land to the Italian state in 1882 marked the beginning of state-led Italian colonialism. The Italian government sought to pursue a colonialist foreign policy in order to alleviate its domestic problems (such as government overspending or Italy's economic stagnation) and instead present the image of a strong and powerful nation to the world.

Colonial expansion continued with the conquest of the Red Sea port of Massawa in 1885 which was supposed to be the first step in the takeover of the Ethiopian inland and the creation of a protectorate over the Abyssinian Empire. However, there was considerable public opposition to Italian colonial policies, with the Italian public generally opposed to substantial financial and economic commitment

[5] Nadia Barrella, *I "Cocci" in Rolls-Royce. Carlo Giovene di Girasole e i Musei d'Ambientazione nella Napoli degli Anni Venti* (Napoli: Luciano Editore, 2015).
[6] Jeffrey T. Schnapp, *Anno X: La Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista del 1932* (Roma: Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 2003); Zamponi, *Spettacolo*, 12–31.
[7] Sandra Costa et al., *The Period Rooms: Allestimenti Storici tra Arte, Collezionismo e Museologia* (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2016).
[8] Patrizia Dragoni, *Processo al Museo: Sessant'anni di Dibattito sulla Valorizzazione Museale in Italia* (Firenze: Edifir, 2010), 19.

to colonial operations in Africa that could potentially end in failure. Indeed, the Italian forces were defeated by Abyssinian armies in Dogali (1887) and in Adwa (1896).[9] The Adwa defeat left a deep mark on Italian nationalist memory as it was the first time that a regular European army was defeated by an African one. The attempt to present Italy as a powerful European state to the international public now seemed futile. Four decades later, in 1935, when the Fascist regime decided to attack Ethiopia again, it would therefore publicly exploit its military success as evidence of Fascist strength in contrast to Liberal weakness. In contrast to its Eritrean campaigns, Italy gained control over parts of today's Somalia thanks to economic treaties in 1889 that led to the territories being officially declared an Italian colony in 1905. However, this territory proved to be as unprofitable as the Eritrean colony.[10]

In 1911, Italy finally issued an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire to obtain Libya, consisting of the two greatly different regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Libya was publicly presented as an extension of the Italian national territory due to its past as a part of the Roman Empire. This myth of the 'Fourth Shore' also pointed to Libya as a new place for Italians to settle. This possibility tapped into domestic Italian politics: the right wing used it to suggest a way to ease class conflicts that had intensified because of the country's strong industrial development during the first decade of the century. Moreover, the right wing also asked for an expansionist colonial policy in Libya as politics of prestige to uplift public opinion. The invasion of Libya in the same year represented the zenith of this strategy in which the mobilization of the press, as well as poets and writers played an important role. Newspapers sent their correspondents to Libya to write about it as a rich and prosperous country in order to manipulate public opinion at home by suggesting that the conquest would have great economic benefits and that Libya would become the ideal home for Italians settlers. Later, these themes would also be taken up by Fascist propaganda.

In spite of Libya's official annexation in 1911, the resistance of the local population was hard to break but suppressed violently by the Italian army. The Italian army never achieved full military control before Mussolini's take-over of power.[11] Local soldiers had been recruited and the army's equipment had improved already in the last months of 'Liberal Italy' but only the Fascist regime's brutal warfare between 1923 and 1925 secured uncontested rule over the colony.[12]

The Fascist regime equally sought to finally turn the Abyssinian Empire into a protectorate. However, as Ethiopia had been a member state of the League of

[9] Haggai Erlich, "Alula 'The son of Qubi': A King's Man in Ethiopia 1875–1897," *The Journal of African History* 15 no.2 (1974): 261–274.
[10] Michele Pandolfo, "La Somalia Coloniale: una Storia ai Margini della Memoria Italiana," *Diacronie Studi di Storia Contemporanea* 13 no.2 (2013): https://diacronie.revues.org/272#tocto1n2.
[11] Giorgio Rochat, *Il Colonialismo Italiano* (Torino: Loescher, 1973), 64.
[12] Rochat, *Colonialismo*, 98.

Nations since 1923, the military attack by Mussolini's forces in 1935 caused a severe diplomatic crisis. Italy was subjected to international sanctions of the League of Nations, causing an exacerbation of nationalist propaganda within Italy, but Ethiopia was still defeated. Mussolini used this victory to proclaim the birth of a 'proper' Italian Empire and King Vittorio Emanuele III received the crown of the Abyssinian Empire. This moment marked the highest watermark of Italian imperialism and the moment in which the Fascist regime enjoyed its greatest public approval ever.[13]

The First Case Study: Marco Aurelio's Arch in Tripoli

The first case study concerns an arch erected in 165 CE in Tripoli, named after the Roman emperor Marco Aurelio. As outlined above, Libya was pictured by the press and propaganda as a natural extension of the Italian territory, the so called 'Fourth Shore.' In contrast to the colonies at the Horn of Africa, Libya was in fact part of the ancient Roman Empire, the legacy of which could be demonstrated by a great number of archaeological remains. Therefore, the conquest of this territory was presented as a homecoming of the legitimate heirs to their own land. The events surrounding Marco Aurelio's Arch as a significant Roman remain in the urban context of Tripoli make clear that this idea was present constantly both during the Liberal and the Fascist periods. The importance of this idea also helps us to understand why the ancient Roman vestiges were continuously represented in works of art.

Giovanni Varvelli's painting (**Figure 1**) is an early example of a depiction of the arch from the time preceding the Italian conquest of Libya. In 1904, the engineer, who was passionate about painting,[14] made a tempera on paper in which a scene of daily life in Tripoli is portrayed. Some characters can be distinguished, namely two Arabs, a monk and a few travellers accompanied by a local guide. Yet it is only the European tourists who admire the ancient monument—the locals seem not to care at all. Thereby, Varvelli used a theme deeply embedded in orientalist paintings, according to which the indigenous populations are indifferent to the legacies of ancient times since they do not want to or cannot recognize their importance.[15] This lack of appreciation constitutes another common argument supporting the idea of the Italians' legitimate homecoming.

[13] For further contextualisation of Italian colonialism, see: Giorgio Rochat, *Il Colonialismo Italiano* (Torino: Loescher, 1973); Nicola Labanca, *Oltremare: Storia dell'Espansione Coloniale Italiana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002); Angelo Del Boca, *Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale* (Roma: Laterza, 1985).

[14] According to Marina Sorbello, Varvelli was an engineer from Rome who worked in colonial administration in Tripoli. There are no other known works by Varvelli. Marina Sorbello et al., "Biografie degli Artisti", in *Dipinti, Sculture e Grafica delle Collezioni del Museo Africano,* ed. Mariastella Margozzi (Roma: Istituto per l'Africa Orientale, 2005), 294.

[15] Marco Rinaldi, "Immagini d'Oltremare: Archeologia e Opere Pubbliche fra Retorica e Reportage," in *Dipinti, Sculture e Grafica delle Collezioni del Museo Africano,* ed. M.

FIGURE 1: Giovanni Varvelli: *Tripoli, Arco di Marco Aurelio,* 1904. Roma: Istituto per l'Africa Orientale.

The arch is also represented in an etching made by Laurenzio Laurenzi (**Figure 2**), an Italian artist who visited many Mediterranean countries and dealt with archaeological topics several times during his career.[16] In his work of 1935, the arch is represented from a low perspective and stands in the 'necessary solitude' that Mussolini demanded for Roman vestiges. One of Mussolini's motivations for his extensive modifications to the urban texture of Rome, was to provide this 'necessary solitude' to the ancient monuments and let them stand alone and loom large, without any distraction by surrounding modern architecture.[17] This architectural goal is projected in Laurenzi's etching through its transfiguration of the urban context: the buildings around the monument are removed and no people are depicted. The buildings of Tripoli, including the silhouette of the Bastioni Mosque, retreat into the background. Lastly, the artist decided to add a palm tree and greenery to the scene which are not present in period photos.

Margozzi (Roma: Istituto per l'Africa Orientale, 2005), 43.

[16] Laurenzio Laurenzi was commissioned to produce 80 etchings of ancient monuments all around the Mediterranean Sea. His journey resulted in an exhibition in Rome dedicated to this project. Agostino M. Comanducci, *Dizionario Illustrato dei Pittori, Disegnatori e Incisori Italiani Moderni e Contemporanei* (Milano: Leonilde M. Patuzzi Editore, 1972); Marco Rinaldi, "Immagini d'Oltremare," 42.

[17] Giorgio Ciucci, *Gli Architetti e il Fascismo: Architettura e Città 1922–1944* (Torino: Einaudi, 2002).



FIGURE 2: Laurenzio Laurenzi: *Tripoli, Arco di Marco Aurelio*, 1935. Roma: Istituto per l'Africa Orientale.



FIGURE 3: Raul Falangola: *Tripoli '42. Zona Arco Marco Aurelio e rovine*, 1942. Roma: Istituto per l'Africa Orientale.

A later example from 1942 is a watercolour by Raul Falangola (**Figure 3**), a soldier passionate about art, who chose to represent the ancient arch avoiding the low point of view and restoring the regular proportion between the subject and the surrounding space.[18] In this work, the arch is not alone in the centre of the scene but Falangola decided instead to place some ancient columns in the lower left corner—a stereotype indeed.[19] There is no trace of greenery nor human presence but again the urban context is evoked by the Bastioni Mosque in the background. The mosque is, however, not shown at its exact position in Tripoli's urban topography but merely as a reference, pointing out the proximity of the two monuments. The mosque is indeed present in all three pieces of art, speaking of the necessity to characterise the place in which the arch is found as "different" and "exotic."[20]

These three examples of artworks highlight how the ancient monument became a symbol of the 'Fourth Shore' in the popular imagination under the Liberal government as well as the Fascist regime. The paintings contributed to a portrayal of Libya as a territory in which the traces of ancient Rome were present despite foreign domination over millennia. They stipulated the idea that Italians would proudly rediscover these lands as legitimate heirs. In this context, the presence of the Bastioni Mosque can be interpreted as the dialectical counterpart to the Italian heritage and the symbol of foreign domination, as will be explained in the conclusion.

After the Italian conquest of Libya, the future of the arch was debated by Italian archeologists who were tasked with any potential restoration efforts. It was at this time that questions about the surrounding areas and the issue of ambientation arose. Before the restoration, the roof of the arch was covered with modern tiles, many buildings encroached upon it, and it stood three meters below the level of the surrounding buildings.

In 1912, the archaeologist Salvatore Aurigemma published an article in the literary journal *Il Marzocco*,[21] in which he followed the history of Marco Aurelio's Arch from its erection to its "extreme degradation"[22] after it had been declared alienable property by the Ottoman authorities in Libya and later acquired by a merchant from Constantinople. Commenting on this perceived neglect, Aurigemma states: "It took remedial action […] at this time that we got back on our ances-

[18] Falangola presumably was an Italian soldier and amateur painter. Ancient monuments were his favourite subject. Marina Sorbello et al., "Biografie degli Artisti," in *Dipinti, Sculture e Grafica Delle Collezioni del Museo Africano,* ed. Mariastella Margozzi (Roma: Istituto per l'Africa Orientale, 2005), 280.

[19] Rinaldi, "Immagini d'Oltremare,"46.

[20] Alida Moltedo Mapelli, ed. *Tra Oriente e Occidente Stampe Italiane della Prima Metà del Novecento* (Roma, Istituto Nazionale per la Grafica, 2006).

[21] "Il Marzocco," Enciclopedia Treccani, accessed September 18, 2017, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/il-marzocco/.

[22] Salvatore Aurigemma, "L'Arco di Marco Aurelio in Tripoli," *Il Marzocco*, June 16, 1912: 2. All following translations or descriptions of Italian terms are my own; "Estremo avvilimento."

tors' path, as Italy has embraced its weapons once again."[23] Aurigemma clearly states his perception that the monument has been irresponsibly and disrespectfully neglected in the absence of its Italian 'caretakers.' It seems necessary to him that the Italian state takes up weapons to avoid the elimination of ancient monuments metaphorically standing in for the Roman tradition. The statement of Aurigemma from 1912 therefore clearly exemplifies a continuity of ideas concerning the meaning of the legacy of ancient Rome to their 'proper heirs' from the Liberal era to the Fascist regime.

In 1915, Giacomo Boni[24] and Lucio Mariani,[25] two leading Italian archaeologists at the time, published an article in *Notiziario Archeologico del Ministero delle Colonie*, informing the public of the progress of the arch's restauration that had been started in 1912 under Aurigemma's guidance (**Figure 4**).[26] They particularly stressed the need to "set the arch free from filthy hovels"[27] surrounding it, thereby raising the question of how the urban environment should be dealt with. The authors recommended a programme of large-scale expropriation and the demolition of buildings close to the arch in order to carry out topographical studies in the area and verify the presence of further archaeological remains. The two professors particularly referred to the roof that lacked its original octagonal dome, a fact that had been discovered when the modern roofing was removed. They hoped to discover the original roof through further archaeological excavations. These suggestions implied a need for extensive changes to the urban environment without any concern for the social impacts of such efforts and displayed a disregard for local architecture.

In 1933, another article was published by architect Michele Marelli in the Colonial Ministry's magazine *Africa Italiana Rivista di Storia e d'Arte a Cura del Ministero delle Colonie*.[28] Whereas Boni and Mariani had proposed to place the arch in the centre of a square and in front of an appropriate background through demolition, Marelli had different ideas: in his opinion, the aim of the restauration of Marco Aurelio's Arch was to allow the ancient monument to "breathe" with-

[23] "Ci voleva una riparazione. […] Era tempo che noi venissimo a ritrovar le ombre dei nostri grandi, ora che la Patria […] ha imbracciato nuovamente lo scudo e impugnato sulla destra la lucida asta possente." Aurigemma, "L'Arco di Marco Aurelio," 2.

[24] Giacomo Boni (1859–1925) was an Italian archaeologist and architect. He was one of the first archaeologists to use the stratigraphic method. Eva Tea, *Giacomo Boni nella Vita del suo Tempo* (Milano: Ceschina, 1932).

[25] Lucio Mariani (1865–1924) was an Italian archaeologist, university professor and museum director. He was one of the founders of the Società Italiana di Archeologia e Storia dell'Arte. Massimiliano Munzi, *L'Epica del Ritorno: Archeologia e Politica nella Tripolitania Italiana* (Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 2001).

[26] Giacomo Boni and Lucio Mariani, "Relazione Intorno al Consolidamento ed al Ripristino dell'Arco di M. Aurelio in Tripoli," *Notiziario Archeologico del Ministero delle Colonie* 1 (1915): 15–34.

[27] "Liberazione e isolamento dell'edificio, cui si addossavano catapecchie e nel quale si annidavano luride botteghe." Boni and Mariani, "Arco in Tripoli:" 15.

[28] Ciucci, *Gli architetti.*

out destroying the surrounding buildings which he considered a "gentle frame."[29] Marelli believed that those typical buildings could provide a contrast and help highlight the arch's magnificence, provided some rearrangements were carried out. After the demolition of some nearby storehouses, the humble appearance of the neighbourhood around the arch would emphasize the monument and give it a touch of "local colour."[30] Marelli further suggested to plant oleanders trees, creeper and succulent plants all around the arch in order to isolate the archaeological remains and monuments from the contemporary buildings. Marelli's project promised to maximise the visibility of the arch as a prominent monument within the urban landscape of Tripoli, despite its position three meters below ground level, by creating a "decent and proportionate space."[31]

FIGURE 4: Arch after initial Restoration, *Bollettino d'Arte*, 1926, 555. Roma: Direzione Generale Archeologia (Authorisation No. 26754).

The quintessence of Marelli's plan was the use of local architecture as an 'exotic' element. Instead of seeing Marco Aurelio's Arch as unique in the neighbourhood's architectural context, Marelli chose to overturn the perspective and consider the ancient monument typical but all the surrounding buildings atypical or 'exotic.' Both standpoints, the suggestions of Boni and Mariani as well as that of Marelli, remained ethno-centric, supporting the assumption that Italian architects and city planners were authorised to disrupt urban topography. In this context, the

[29] "Cornice gentile," Michele Marelli, "Relazione al Progetto di Sistemazione dell'Arco di Marco Aurelio in Tripoli e di Restauro dei Fonduchi Arabi," *Africa Italiana: Rivista di Storia e d'Arte a Cura del Ministero delle Colonie* 12 (1933): 169.
[30] "Colore locale." Marelli, "Arco di Marco Aurelio," 163.
[31] "Ambiente degno e proporzionato," ibid., 166.

"filthy hovels" had to be dismantled in order restore the finest example of ancient glory and by extension the myth of Rome itself.

The final results emerging from the debate are presented in 1940 by the *Libia* magazine in 1940 published by the *Istituto Poligrafico editoriale Maggi*. The caption of the article reads: "Marco Aurelio's Arch restored and placed in its urban environment."[32] A featured photo (**Figure 5)** shows the arch as well as the surrounding area of white buildings, the Bastioni Mosque in the background and some pedestrians. In front of the arch, there is a walkway decorated with plants and archaeological remains.

The ancient monument is set apart from the surrounding area and it is clear how the photographic frame sought to exclude the neighbourhood, thereby emphasising the arch's presence. The empty roads and the meticulous care used to organise the scene reflect a will to control the urban pattern as one aspect of the more encompassing colonial project of controlling territories and the lives of the people within them. Thereby, the restoration of Marco Aurelio's Arch emerges as a project reflecting Italian colonialism more generally and the restoration should be seen as typical of an Italian colonialist logic. This logic also introduced racial laws regulating the private and sexual lives of the colonized in their relations to the colonizers, supported racialized and racist anthropological and ethnographical knowledge systems and, more concretely, attempted to reconstruct Addis Abeba as a racially segregated city.

FIGURE 5: Marco Aurelio´s Arch after Restauration, *Libia*, 1940, 45. Roma: Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale.

[32] "L'Arco di Marco Aurelio restaurato e ambientato urbanisticamente," Giacomo Caputo, "I Grandi Monumenti della Romanità Risuscitati da Balbo," *Libia: Rivista Mensile Illustrata* 4 (1940): 45.

The Second Case Study: Italy at the International Colonial Exhibition in Paris

The second case study deals with the Italian section at the *Exposition Coloniale Internationale* held in Paris in 1931. The concept of the exhibition is rooted in the colonial sections staged at universal or international exhibitions in Europe, the United States and Australia since the nineteenth century. The International Colonial Exhibition of 1931, the first to be held in Paris (although there had previously been colonial exhibitions elsewhere in France), was planned as an opportunity to demonstrate France's wealth, strengthen relations with other European empires and reaffirm the civilizing mission as the main source of legitimacy for European colonialism.[33] The exhibition was directed by Marshal Louis H. G. Lyautey, a former governor of French Morocco,[34] and strongly reflected his personal preferences as well as his views on colonialism.[35] Each country that participated in the exhibition presented itself in country pavilions. Those pavilions were arranged along an elliptical path so that each tour through the exhibition began and ended at the modern *Porte Dorée* ('Golden Porte') through which visitors were allowed entrance. The distribution of pavilions was not meant to represent a political or geographical order but was ethno-anthropological: the more 'exotic' a pavilion's architectural style was, the further from civilisation the presented colony was considered.

The Italian section at the *Exposition* comprised three pavilions of a particular architectural lexicon. The first one was a reproduction of the famous basilica at Leptis Magna, Libya, planned by Armando Brasini, an Italian architect;[36] the second was dedicated to the conquest of Rhodes and the other Aegean islands that were annexed from the Ottoman Empire in 1912. The third pavilion, called *Italia*, represented the progressive architectural style of Futurism (**Figure 6**).[37]

[33] Maddalena Carli, "Ri/produrre l'Africa Romana: I Padiglioni Italiani all'*Exhibition Coloniale Internationale*, Parigi 1931," *Memoria e Ricerca* 17 (2004): 213; Patricia A. Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000); *Guide Officiel de la Section Italienne à l'Exhibition Coloniale* (Paris: Publicité de Rosa, 1931).

[34] Bernett Singer et al., *Cultured Forces: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 181–217.

[35] Carli, "Ri/produrre l'Africa Romana," 211–17; Ettore Sessa, "L'Exhibition Coloniale Internationale de Paris 1931," in *La Città dei Prodotti. Imprenditoria, Architettura e Arte nelle Grandi Esposizioni*, ed. Eliana Mauro et al. (Palermo: Grafill, 2009), 279.

[36] Armando Brasini (1879–1965) was an architect known for his majestic buildings inspired by an eclectic lexicon. "Armando Brasini," Enciclopedia Treccani, accessed September 18, 2017, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/armando-brasini_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/; Luca Brasini, *L'Opera Architettonica e Urbanistica di Armando Brasini: dall'Urbe Massima al Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina* (Corigliano Calabro: Arti Grafiche Joniche, 1979); Paolo Portoghesi, *I Grandi Architetti del Novecento: una Nuova Storia dell'Architettura Contemporanea Attraverso le Personalità e le Opere dei Protagonisti* (Roma: Newton & Compton, 1999).

[37] *Guide Officiel de la Section Italienne*

In analysing the first pavilion planned by Armando Brasini it is necessary to introduce the model it was based on, the Leptis Magna Basilica, one of the most famous ancient monuments of Libya. The construction of the basilica began in 209 CE, commissioned by Roman emperor Septimius Severus, and was completed under his son and successor Caracalla six years later.[38] It was dedicated to Hercules and Dionysus, *dii patrii* of Leptis, but also to the emperor's ancestors.[39] The basilica consisted of three naves and a colonnaded hall with two apses. Flanking the apses were ornately sculpted pilasters depicting the life of Dionysus and the twelve Labours of Hercules.

At the Parisian exhibition of 1931, the facade of the basilica's reproduction was painted in red to evoke Libyan architectural traditions and 22 columns were painted to imitate *cipollino* marble. The interior of the basilica (**Figure 7**) was divided into three naves and two superimposed planes like the original one but it also contained a covered pool and two rooms designed in Renaissance style.[40] An exhibition of archaeological finds, raw materials and native handicrafts was shown inside the pavilion. Information panels presented the results of the Fascist 'modernisation' campaign in the Italian colonies. Copies of some of the most relevant classical artworks found in Cyrene and Leptis Magna, namely statues, epigraphs and bas-reliefs were presented in the main hall of the pavilion. Another exhibition was dedicated to the military and a more general one. This exhibition presented information about the geography and administration of the colonies, using dioramas, different kinds of models and boards. Finally, an anthropological exhibition of costumes as well as an anthropometric collection were intended to provide proof of the physiological diversity of African races.[41]

The Leptis Magna basilica was reproduced with evocative intent. The decision to use the Roman architectural lexicon enriched by Renaissance details was part of the Italian committee's program to re-write and re-interpret history. The Fascist government chose to present the African war campaign not as a conquest but as a homecoming to legitimise their imperialism by reaffirming their supposed right to recover something stolen. At the same time, the Italian section at the exhibition was supposed to claim the common origin of European imperialism in the glorious Roman past and present the Fascist Italian state as its heir, underlining its role as a legitimate European empire of the twentieth century. Reference to this programme can, for example, be found in the official guide booklet to the exhibition (quoted below).

[38] Orietta Dora Cordovana, "Between History and Myth: Septimius Severus and Leptis Magna," *Greece and Rome* 59 (2012): 56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0017383511000246.
[39] Cordovana, "Between History and Myth," 73.
[40] Bruno M. Apolloni, "Il Foro e la Basilica Severiana di Leptis Magna," *I Monumenti Italiani* no.8–9 (1936): 1–8.
[41] Carli, "Ri/produrre l'Africa Romana," 225–26.

FIGURE 6: Futurist pavilion *Italia*, *Guide Officiel de la Section Italienne*, 1931. Roma: Polo Museale del Lazio.

FIGURE 7: Replica of Leptis Magna, *Guide Officiel de la Section Italienne*, 1931. Roma: Polo Museale del Lazio.

Through the recourse to ambientation, this system of re-interpreting history goes along with its revitalisation that gave visitors of the pavilions the chance to experience manifested history themselves. The 33 million visitors[42] would have had the opportunity to recognise the majesty of a past to which the Fascist regime declared itself heir on the one hand and to retrace a bond between ancient Rome's past and the modern Fascist present on the other hand. Metaphorically, this manipulation of space and time could transform the exhibition into a majestic 'time-machine' through the representation of the perpetuity between a mythologised past and an unreal present. It is accurate to speak of the 'manipulation' of time and space coordinates rather than their 're-presentation' due to two elements: firstly, the Leptis Magna reconstruction was not conceived as an exact replica but as a highly symbolic interpretation. Italy wanted to present itself to the international audience of fellow colonising nations at the exhibition as an 'eternal' coloniser and therefore as an important colonial power to be reckoned with in the present. The official programme booklet of the Italian section reiterated this viewpoint by locating the source of the very idea of colonisation in ancient Rome and linking Rome to "universal" values and their dissemination:

> In Rome we greet not only the noble Italian country but also the universal genius thanks to which humanity has progressed after Athens. […] To Rome, we owe the concept of the protectorate which is a great lesson of tolerance, respect of local traditions and customs.[43]

Furthermore, it is possible to talk about the 'manipulation' of time and space because the arrangement of the Italian section's pavilions enabled the visitor to spontaneously move through different moments in time. Apart from the Leptis Magna basilica there were two other pavilions, one representing the Aegean islands that Italy had annexed in 1912 and one showcasing an example of Futurist architecture. The presence of this third pavilion, used mostly as a restaurant, was important because it symbolized the connection between past and present, between the Roman legacy and contemporary artistic and architectonic expressions, confirming their continuity and projecting future development. Moving through the Italian exhibition space, the visitors were supposed to return to the past, thereby disrupting the passage of time, to eventually witness the very origins of the colonising efforts in ancient Rome and to become aware of its (Fascist) trajectory.

[42] Sessa, "L'Exhibition Coloniale," 280.

[43] "En Rome, nous saluons non seulement la noble terre italienne, mais le génie universel par qui, après Athènes, la Grèce, l'Humanité a progressé. […] C'est à Rome que nous devons cette conception […] du régime du protectorat, cette grande leçon de tolerance, de respect des traditions, des coutumes…," *Guide Officiel de la Section Italienne*, 6.

Conclusion

The Italian section at the Parisian exhibition of 1931 and the restoration of Marco Aurelio's Arch should both be seen as attempts to create immersive spaces. They were a structured operation in which monuments became symbols of the relationship between 'Liberal Italy' and the Italian Fascist regime on the one hand and the nation's past on the other. As such, both cases were part of a conscious effort to reinterpret history. The cases show how the myth of ancient Rome was manipulated for imperialist purposes, highlighting striking continuities between the cultural attitudes and approaches of the Liberal and Fascist regimes.

By reproducing the Leptis Magna Basilica in Paris, the Italian committee wanted to date the starting point of Italian colonial history back to the Roman Empire, consequently creating a bond between the past and the present and increasing the prestige of the Fascist regime's policies. An international exhibition was the perfect context for this operation (and the investigation in this article) because these events were stages for all participating countries to negotiate their real existence with ideal conceptions right from the very beginning.

In the case of Marco Aurelio's Arch, these confrontations developed on a larger stage, namely the urban context of a city with existing architectural stratifications and a long history. After the conquering of Tripoli, the ambientation of the arch was focused on an affirmation of Italian power. One means to this end seemed to be the elimination of any structure limiting the arch's effect. Looking back on the works of art depicting the arch, the recurring presence of the Bastioni Mosque stands out and it becomes clear that the mosque was even shown in the wrong position in order to include it in the painting. This points to the fact that the representation of the mosque seemed vital in order to mark the 'exoticism' of the arch's place, including the mosque as a 'touch of local colour.' Other buildings around the arch did not seem to have this quality as signifiers and, as a result, they were misrepresented in the paintings and later actually demolished in order to let the arch 'breathe again.' Considering the huge impact of such manipulation of the urban landscape on the lives of Tripolitans, the ambientation of the arch can be seen as a meaningful and violent act of the Italians' seizure of Libya as a colony.[44]

In the Parisian exhibition, ambientation was supposed to display to an international audience a level of Italian imperial power that did not actually exist. Faced with the need to present itself as a colonial power, the Fascists chose to look back to the glory of ancient Rome. In the case of Marco Aurelio's Arch, ambientation was directed towards the Italian public who came across artistic representations of the arch but equally towards the actual colonizers and colonized walking down Tripoli's streets. To them, the government hoped, ancient Rome's history and its

[44] Ludovica Scarpa, "Spazi Urbani e Stati Mentali: come lo Spazio Influenza la Mente," in *Il Paesaggio nell'Era del Mutamento un Problema Deontologico*, ed. Politechnico Milano (Milano: Trasporti e Cultura, 2007), 39–45.

bond to the Fascist regime would become personal and tightly connected with their own lives.[45]

In Homer's Iliad, Ulysses does not recognize his own land when he returns to Ithaca:

> So he jumped up and looked out at his native land. He groaned aloud and struck his thighs with both his palms, then expressed his grief, saying: 'Where am I now? Whose country have I come to this time?'[46]

Seeing the "filthy hovels" of a Tripoli re-conquered or founded anew, the archaeologist Salvatore Aurigemma demanded in the magazine *Il Marzocco* that "a remedial action must be undertaken,"[47] thereby portraying Italian colonialism in terms of a righteous choice of returning to Libya in order to care for its legacy after a long absence. This is why the arch was 'ambientated' and a timeless present of the Roman Empire restored. Here, ambientation ultimately became a way to relive history while providing the Italian colonial state with the tools to reinterpret history and to give symbolic importance to the use of space, both political and urban.

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[45] Marta Nezzo, "La Tutela come Esperienza Identitaria: una Campionatura tra Otto e Novecento," in *La Cultura del Restauro. Modelli di Ricezione per la Museologia e la Storia dell'Arte,* ed. M. B. Failla et al. (Roma: Campisano Editore, 2013), 279–90.

[46] Homer, *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. Ian Johnston, vol. 13, verses 237–41, accessed September 30, 2017, https://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/homer/odyssey13.htm.

[47] Aurigemma, "L'Arco di Marco Aurelio," 2.

The Concept of Fascism in Colonial India: M.N. Roy and *The Problem of Freedom*

DISHA KARNAD JANI

Disha Karnad Jani is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Princeton University. Before her graduate work at Princeton, she received a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History and Political Economy from McGill University. She is interested in the intersecting histories of empire, the nation-state, radicalism, liberalism, political institutions, and resistance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

M.N. Roy was an Indian-born, widely-travelled activist and intellectual who moved over the course of his life from roles in anti-colonial resistance, militant organizing, Communist and Comintern circles, to what has been termed 'radical humanism.' In narratives of the same, as well as in those of the transnational 1920s and 30s and interwar cosmopolitanism, he and intellectuals like him are invoked in order to shape narratives around interconnectedness and parallel modernities that marked the twentieth century. Roy's own political thought, however, as laid out in one text in particular, lends itself to an alternate reading of his life and moment: one in which resistance is not framed against European empire and with national sovereignty in mind; rather, *The Problem Of Freedom* (1945) sets up the road ahead for India against the threat of fascism. Roy in this text uses fascism as a concept to warn of the threat to come for the post-independence nation-state. Using Reinhart Koselleck's framework for conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), this paper examines the historic, psychoanalytic, and propagandistic elements of this text in order to question some of the key assumptions for how global history and intellectual history are written.

In 1945, as the war in Europe was coming to a close, the fascist threat of the past decades appeared to be waning. M.N. Roy disagreed. At this crucial juncture for Europe—and as historians would later write, for European colonies—Roy framed the struggle for independence in India as an anti-fascist struggle. In a series of essays published at the end of that year, entitled *The Problem of Freedom*, Roy established a political trajectory for the future Indian nation-state that mirrored that of Europe, as depicted in the work of Max Weber, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer. The Enlightenment's authoritarian seeds, the psychoanalytic grip of leaders on a blinded population, and the threat to individualism posed by authoritarianism are all elements of Roy's acerbic critique of the Indian National Congress (INC) and its representatives. Roy argued that Gandhian nationalism, if realized in the nascent Indian nation-state, would amount to fascism.

An Indian-born and well-travelled activist and thinker, Roy had returned to India in 1930 after fifteen years abroad. His first foreign trip had taken him to Java to meet with German agents during the First World War as part of what would become

known as the Indo-German conspiracy. His travels took him to Mexico, China, Japan, the United States, and various European capitals, including Moscow for the Second World Congress of the Communist International, where he was the representative of the Mexican Communist Party. After a stint in jail, during which he wrote extensively, Roy continued his nationalist agitation, eventually striking out on a path divergent from the INC and its central figureheads, namely M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.[1] After his imprisonment, he aroused suspicion among Indian anti-colonial nationalists, as his allegiances were unclear,[2] although Roy numbered among the prominent young leaders of the national struggle by 1938.[3] He had been warmly welcomed back into the fray by Nehru in the presidential address at the 1936 Congress, and young intellectuals gathered for his speeches and to read his publication, *Independent India,* launched in 1937.[4] Despite the bevy of important participants in what came to be known as the freedom struggle, including the Bengali leftist Subhas Chandra Bose, in *The Problem of Freedom* it is Gandhi and Nehru who stand in for what Roy considers to be the entirety of the significant Indian nationalist movement. *The Problem of Freedom* is propagandistic in tone and aim; it was written in order to warn of the dangers Roy saw in the negotiations between the Indian National Congress and the British government in India. The particular nation-state configuration that was likely to emerge out of these negotiations was not one that would achieve 'freedom' in any real sense; according to Roy, in the absence of a truly revolutionary transition, India was in danger of succumbing to the fascist threat, just as Europe seemed poised to defeat it. Roy uses a psychoanalytic explanation to illuminate why precisely India was suited to the thrall of fascist authoritarianism, but is not particularly rigorous or precise in his use of the term "psychoanalysis" (or indeed, of the term "fascism"), conflating it with biography in one moment, and culture in another.[5] It is a repetitive and didactic text, condescending in its attitude towards the Indian public and full of entertainingly insulting sketches of Roy's political adversaries.

[1] Michael Goebel, "Geopolitics, Transnational Solidarity or Diaspora Nationalism? The Global Career of M.N. Roy, 1915–1930," *European Review of History* 21, no. 4 (2014): 487. For more on the context of this trajectory, in particular the Communist International, the Indian communist parties, and nationalism, see John Patrick Haithcox, *Communism and Nationalism in India: M..N. Roy and Comintern Policy 1920-39* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[2] Kris Manjapra, *M.N. Roy: Marxism and Colonial Cosmopolitanism* (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2010), 112.

[3] Ibid., 116.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Roy was familiar with prominent psychoanalytic texts and thinkers, including but not limited to the Freudian school and clinical psychology. On the Indian Psychoanalytic Society and the institutionalized study of psychoanalysis in colonial India, see Christine Hartnack, "Vishnu On Freud's Desk: Psychonanalysis in Colonial India," *Social Research* 57, no. 4 (1990): 921. For a theoretical and literary treatment of psychoanalysis in Europe and the colonies in the period immediately following the Second World War, see: Ranjana Khanna, *Dark Continents: Psychonalaysis and Colonialism.* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

While much of Roy's writing has been published and studied, his 1945 text has not received much attention, least of all by intellectual historians. In this text, Roy elaborates on his analysis of the concept of freedom at this turning point for India. His criticism of the Indian National Congress, Gandhi and Nehru, and the "democracy of counting heads" lends itself to a reading of fascism and the history of the modern world.[6] The German historian Reinhart Koselleck wrote in 1967 that the purpose of the famed eight-volume encyclopedia of concepts, the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,* was to examine "the dissolution of the old world and the emergence of the new in terms of the historico-conceptual comprehension of the process."[7] Using Koselleck's criteria for such concepts, we can read *The Problem of Freedom* as an attempt at such a process for the transition between British rule and Indian independence. Situated within the larger (and continued) debate around the differences or similarities between Europe and its colonies, and the need for differentiation between the emancipatory strategies of each, *The Problem of Freedom* stands as an attempt to articulate the threat of a European phenomenon —fascism —in a non-European setting, as a pitfall on the road to a universal ideal: freedom. Insofar as this is a polemic against the Indian National Congress, Gandhi, and Nehru—quite tangible adversaries—it is articulated nonetheless in conceptual terms. The *concept* of fascism is discussed theoretically and in the abstract, rather than in terms of what it looks like in action, how it acts in government, or manifests in culture.

In a way, the crucial elements of conceptual history in the German tradition (*Begriffsgeschichte*) are bound by time and place, as Koselleck himself admitted. This was not a problem for Koselleck *per se*, as in texts such as *Critique and Crisis* and *Futures Past* the influential historian sought to explain Western European conceptual change through the canonical philosophers of the German, French, and English traditions. But concepts travel. Margrit Pernau and Dominic Sachsenmaier, in their call for a global approach to conceptual history, characterize the reason behind the shift to this approach as a "growing discomfort with the mental maps which have dominated the professional field since the nineteenth century."[8] Uncomfortable at its most delicate, angry at its most acute, the reaction of scholars both inside and outside the Western academy to the particular moral and political implications of the historical tradition is not irrelevant in a discussion of this historiographical shift. Even besides this kind of impetus, it is the methodology

[6] M.N. Roy, *The Problem of Freedom* (Kolkata: Renaissance Publishers Ltd. 2000), Preface.

[7] Reinhart Koselleck, "Richtlinien für das Lexikon politisch-sozialer Begriffe der Neuzeit," *Archiv für Begriffgeschichte* vol. 11 (1967), 81, quoted in Keith Tribe's introduction to *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time,* trans. Keith Tribe. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), xiv.

[8] Margrit Pernau and Dominic Sachsenmaier, "History of Concepts and Global History," in *Global Conceptual History: A Reader*, eds. Margrit Pernau and Dominic Sachsenmaier. (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016).

of conceptual history that allows us to disentangle the complexity of periods of extraordinary global exchange.

Roy is an especially fitting test case for the commensurability of conceptual history with the wider lens called for by the authors above. The subject of a comprehensive biography by Kris Manjapra, Manabendra Nath Roy, born Narendra Nath Bhattacharya in 1887, was an active historical player on an international scale.[9] In a career spanning key epochal breaks such as the Russian Revolution, the First and Second World Wars, and Indian independence, Roy's changing viewpoints and affiliations offer an alternative to a nation-state or party-centered reading of the political history of the period. His break with the Comintern in 1929, his opposition to the Gandhian freedom struggle and the Indian National Congress, and his flirtation with the Frankfurt School and what has been termed 'radical humanism' allow his life and writings to be read creatively and from a variety of vantage points.

In perhaps his most important role as a historical actor, Roy's debate with Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 marks a key moment in the relationship between Moscow and European-held colonies on the question of their emancipation. Roy's "supplementary theses on the national and colonial question" challenged Lenin's initial suggestion that it might be prudent to ally with national bourgeois organizations in non-European countries for the purpose of creating the basis of proletarian class consciousness and the subsequent revolution in the colonies, where a working class did not yet exist.[10] This did not sit well with Roy, and his refutation of Lenin's position on the colonial situation was included in the revised theses later published as part of the Congress proceedings. If we consider the long relationship, ideationally and organizationally, between the Left and anti-colonialism, the supplementary theses of the 1920 Comintern Congress could be read as one of the first attempts by orthodox Marxism to reckon with the difference between Europe and the colonies (with Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capital* having been the attempt to read the two as structurally integrated).[11]

In an essay on the future direction of conceptual history in the Koselleckian tradition, Jan-Werner Müller argues that historians have not yet considered "what happens when concepts move between different kinds of modernities and their associated temporalities."[12] An effort to understand how concepts such as 'liberalism' or 'democracy' change as they move between places and times would

[9] Manjapra, *M.N. Roy*.

[10] "Minutes of the Second Congress of the Communist International, Fourth Session, July 25, 1920," in *Second Congress of the Communist International: Minutes of the Proceedings*, *Vol. One and Two*, Trans. R.A. Archer (London: New Park Publications, 1977), accessed June 29, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch04.htm.

[11] V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2010 [1917]).

[12] Jan-Werner Müller, "On Conceptual History," in *Rethinking European Intellectual History,* ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 88.

require a theory of conceptual change that can no longer rely on the canon of the European Enlightenment or of a series of changes to the state in Germany, France, or England. Prasenjit Duara has argued that the wave of decolonization that took place in the 1940s–1970s "turned the world into the stage of history."[13] This was a renewal of the world-historical trajectory attributed to Hegel, with a similarly ideational core; according to Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, this version of universal history "placed an extraordinary premium on the role of thought in organizing and driving forward the unfolding of a world history."[14] This widening, after decolonization and with the advent of postcolonial theory and subaltern studies, became couched in the language of liberation and the nation-state. Müller's comment on the commensurability of conceptual history and "what happens when concepts move between different kinds of modernities and their associated temporalities" takes the existence of this multiplicity as a given, and indeed, pegs the conceptual to the series of transformations that are now attributed to the 'making of the modern world.' Among historians concerned with precisely the problem Koselleck discusses most often, that is, the making of the modern, the diffusion model continues to be credible—a process by which industrialization, democracy, individualism, and the nation-state came to the non-Western world unidirectionally by way of the West. This understanding of how the world came to be recognizable to us in the present sits uncomfortably alongside the multiplicity model. The multiplicity model sees these transformations as occurring in many places with many agents and, in historical debates, has led to a discussion of the profusion of modernities and temporalities which Müller seems to take for granted. The notion of 'alternative modernities' is decades old and continues to be taken up in the still-growing (and increasingly problematized) approach of global history, which tends to emphasize connectivity and multidirectionality.[15] In an edited volume published for the new millennium, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Leo Ou-fan Lee, and Charles Taylor, among others, approach the fracturing of our understanding of the modern without completely rejecting the diffusion model of European origins:

> Born in and of the West some centuries ago under relatively specific sociohistorical conditions, modernity is now everywhere…And it continues to 'arrive and emerge,' as always in opportunistic fragments accompanied by utopian rhetorics, but no longer from the West alone, although the West remains the major clearinghouse of global modernity.[16]

[13] Prasenjit Duara, "Introduction: the Decolonization of Asia and Africa in the Twentieth Century," in *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.
[14] Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, "A Framework for Debate," in *Global Intellectual History,* ed. Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 6.
[15] Pernau and Sachsenmaier, 8.
[16] Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "Alternative Modernities," in *Alternative Modernities,* ed. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 1.

More recently, Vanessa Ogle provides an account of the process by which understandings of work, leisure and practices of time-keeping altered in the nineteenth century. These were not (mere) conceptual changes in how time was understood, but can be read through technological change and political upheaval.[17] As central as a singular, European, historically bounded Enlightenment is to a Koselleckian paradigm, Sebastian Conrad has questioned this by recasting the moment as existing both for longer than previously assumed and in many places simultaneously, as part of the Global Enlightenment of the nineteenth century.[18] It would appear then, when looking at where global history and intellectual history meet in current debates, that modernity, time, and the Enlightenment are to be understood as globally constituted and contested multiplicities.

A number of authors in recent years have made use of Koselleck in understanding difference in terms of "different kinds of modernities and their associated temporalities."[19] In particular, Koselleck's notion of "futures past" has been useful for grappling with alternative visions of anticolonial resistance and decolonization that became "foreclosed" as the middle decades of the twentieth century progressed.[20] Manu Goswami has called for a re-evaluation of the project of anticolonial internationalism that accounts for "multiple visions of a non-imperial future."[21] She argues that the thwarted expectations of colonial intellectuals—past futures—have been ignored. "The privileging of histories of experience over expectation has worked to propel studies of movements, institutions, and categories regarded as durable, prevalent, or immediately recognizable to the present."[22] Gary Wilder levies a similar critique of the centrality of the nation-state form in discussions of anticolonial resistance and, through a reading of Léopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire, re-inscribes alternative temporalities into the history of negritude and decolonization. "To presuppose that national independence is the necessary form of colonial emancipation," Wilder argues, "is to mistake a product of decolonization for an optic through which to study it."[23] The anthropologist David Scott makes use of Koselleck's distinction between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation to argue that the relation between pasts, presents, and

[17] Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformations of Time: 1870–1950* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).
[18] Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique," *American Historical Review* 117, no. 4 (2012): 999–1027.
[19] Müller, 88.
[20] Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time.* Trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts.* Trans. Todd Samuel Presner and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
[21] Manu Goswami, "Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms," *American History Review* 117, no. 5 (2012): 1461–1485.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2015), 4.

futures "is a relation constituted in narrative" as opposed to the concept *per se* and its mutations.[24] Scott believes that the future envisioned in the moment of decolonization has now been foreclosed, and that continuing to write histories of colonialism that are premised on revolution, emancipation, and national sovereignty amount to an ineffective form of both storytelling and praxis he calls "Romantic anti-colonialism." These critiques of the preoccupations of anti-colonialism and postcolonialism within the academy, whether they center the experiences of realization, the territorialized nation-state, or Romantic emancipation, all hinge on understandings of temporality, and futurity in particular, as they emerged in Koselleck's conceptual history.

Koselleck has come to be useful for parsing the temporality of the decolonizing and postcolonial world, as shown above. Looking back, the gravity of the situation at the end of the Second World War was bound up in the possibilities of the postwar (post-victory) years for the colonial world. Roy's involvement at the key junctures of the long history of anti-colonialism and decolonization offers a particularly fruitful opportunity for the application of some Koselleckian insights to his political writing. Diasporic networks of Indian nationalists had been established in the wake of the partition of Bengal and the Japanese victory in the war against Russia, both in 1905. During the First World War, the Indo-German conspiracy saw German weapons and funding handed to Indian revolutionaries as part of a shared desire to see Britain weakened on the subcontinent, and thus at large. Roy also spent time corresponding with members of the Frankfurt School and, according to Manjapra, collaborated with Max Horkheimer.[25] Roy's involvement in the Comintern, combined with these other German influences, suggests an affinity not only in terms of the practice of anticolonial agitation or the "practice of transnational and global history," but also in the intellectual history of concepts central to mid-century debates.[26]

Roy begins his analysis of the concept of freedom by way of the "colourful personalities of Indian nationalism."[27] As Roy frames it, there are two choices before India: national independence with the INC at the helm of a post-British nation-state, or the formation of some kind of 'freedom' which cannot exist under the proffered INC alternative. The machinations of personalities exist outside of the "rational," at the level of power politics; what remains "cannot be rationally explained" and so requires psychoanalysis.[28] Despite this distinction made early

[24] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment.* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 45.
[25] Manjapra, *M.N. Roy,* xiii. For more on the connections between German and Indian intellectuals, particularly as pertains to nationalism and psychoanalysis, see: Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals Across Empire.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
[26] Goebel, "Geopolitics," 486.
[27] Roy, Preface.
[28] Roy, Preface.

in the preface, later in the text Roy submits both Gandhi and Nehru to the scrutiny of psychoanalysis as he sees it. Intending this text as both analysis and warning, he writes:

> My contention is that, if a gathering of fifty thousand people could be hypnotized so as to pronounce seeing the sun rise at midnight, that could not be accepted as truth, and an entire people can be placed in a state of mass hysteria. If we do not see what is happening under our very nose, we must, in the fullness of time, thank ourselves for what is in store for us.[29]

The danger to come is named here as 'fascism,' emerging in India just as it is about to be extinguished in Europe. Roy argues that fascism arose in Europe due to its preconditions being embedded within the modern nation-state, and since the form of the bourgeois nation-state is set to be implemented in India by the transition to independence from British rule, this germ will also exist in this new society. Not only does the germ exist, he continues, it is being realized by the mass hypnosis of the Indian people by the INC and the neurosis of Gandhi himself.

Debates among Indian nationalists in 1945 were dominated by the negotiations between the Government in India and the representatives of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Roy does not himself refer to the Muslim League, or indeed, any other significant nationalist group here besides Congress, and focuses his criticism on the fact that discussions over the precise configuration of independent statehood were beside the point. He contends that this controversy over the governance of independent India "misses the point" because independence does not necessarily represent freedom for India. The terms of the anticolonial struggle are thus shifted from "a conflict between a foreign government and the people's urge for freedom" to "a conflict between urge for freedom and fear of freedom."[30] Gandhi's submission to the fear of freedom is rather archly introduced through the language of neurosis. "Gandhi need not be suspected of dishonesty. No neurotic person ever is; and neurosis is the psychological foundation of demonstrative saintliness."[31] In the mien of the non-violent freedom fighter, above sectarian conflict and acting in the sole interest of the Indian people, Gandhi has, for Roy, "confused issues." The tone here is sarcastic, and it would be unhelpful to read this as a sympathetic view of a Gandhi beset by forces beyond his control—rather, Roy uses the language of psychoanalysis metaphorically, to denote the difference between the "rational efforts made with conscious purpose" and those actions Roy disapproves of, "motivated by subconscious urges."[32]

[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 10.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Roy, Preface, 11.

Social conditions emerging from India's "medieval past" are the fertile ground in which the seed of authoritarianism will be allowed to grow, according to Roy. Europe is both the model and the warning.

> Critical historians and students of social psychology are still to teach the world to what extent the urge for freedom expressed by the Renaissance movement was counter-acted by the fear of freedom represented by the Reformation, and thus laid down the cultural foundation for the rise of authoritarianism in a subsequent epoch. When it is realized that Luther and Calvin, though revolting against the Catholic Church, laid the psychological foundation of a political authoritarianism, one should not be shocked by the discovery that Gandhi played the same reactionary role in India. And his role has been all the more reactionary because it was played in the setting of social conditions and cultural environments much more backward than those of Europe in the seventeenth century.[33]

These "social conditions and cultural environments" were ideal for the transformation of the agitation brought about by the First World War, a "degree of unsettlement in the traditional patterns of Indian society and habits." Despite this disruption, which in a society not mired in tradition could have resulted in some kind of action, the Indian masses allowed any "incipient urge for freedom" to be "overwhelmed by the fear of freedom." This fear "grows rankly in the atmosphere of a medieval culture which made no room for the concept of individual freedom."[34] This "medieval culture" was uninterrupted by a transformation akin to the Renaissance, Reformation, or Enlightenment, and was therefore allowed to remain in the grip of an unexamined, unreasoned religiosity. Roy describes "the Indian masses" as caught in a cultural trap: "the central theme of that culture was submission of man—either to the will of God or to his own *karma*."[35] It is this tendency in Hinduism, and particularly a Hinduism unchanged since the "medieval age,"[36] that predisposes the Indian people to accept the regime of a saintly leader such as Gandhi, in whom the confusion between the urge for freedom and the fear of freedom is embodied. It is this fusion of the singular leadership Roy sees in Gandhi's hands and the mechanism of religious control that is the "cultural" basis of Gandhian fascism, according to Roy.

The "social basis" for Gandhian authoritarianism was the urban middle-class, "which felt the social crisis to some extent consciously."[37] The urban middle-class was tied to the agrarian economy for its economic position but was formed in order

[33] Ibid., 12.
[34] Ibid., 14.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Despite the immense diversity in religious belief and practice covered by the term "Hinduism," Roy uses it to denote the "indigenous" religiosity he believes to be the particular yoke of the Indian people. He appears to use the term interchangeably with "religion."
[37] Roy, Preface, 14.

to "man the governmental machinery"—it was a colonial creation.[38] This urban middle-class was first unmoored from traditional agrarian forms of employment, and then from employment within the colonial administration; for when its role in the machinery of the colonial government began to stagnate at the beginning of the twentieth century, "the old tie was gone but there was no future." "Modern education and economic position at least partially outside the traditional patterns of the social organization" meant that there was a "slight advance towards the concept of individual freedom," while the prospect of the further unmooring that such freedom entailed meant that this desire sent the 'middle class' directly from comfort in tradition to comfort in authoritarianism. Gandhi emerged as the "typical member of this class, which constituted the social basis of authoritarianism."[39] Roy credits Gandhi's "lonesomeness and helplessness" during his sojourn in Britain and his legal practice in South Africa with driving him towards his faith in God, and this "lonesome individual, frightened by the specter of freedom, found refuge in submission to an authority [God]."[40] Roy thus attributes the religious character of Gandhianism to Gandhi's own turn to religion after his disillusionment with the British legal and political establishment. With an urban 'middle class' caught between tradition and the uncertainty of modern futurity and a wider public under the thrall of religion, an authoritarianism with a figurehead who embodied both these positions had emerged as the regime-in-waiting, conjured up by the Indian subconscious.

The psychoanalysis in *The Problem of Freedom* vacillates between diagnosing the leaders of the nationalist movement, and diagnosing the "masses." This dimension of fascism's appeal in India is not systematically considered separately from the cultural, social, or historical elements outlined above; rather, each of these aspects forms a part of a sociological explanation for the conditions of fascism's complete ascension, above which psychoanalysis looms as a mechanism for both how society and nationalist leadership reinforce one another, and how an observer (and Roy's reader) might understand this bond. For instance, Roy narrates the uninterrupted existence of Hindu society in India (a historical inaccuracy) until the changes of the early twentieth century, and then declares: "the religiosity of Gandhi is the psychological mainstay of authoritarianism."[41] A kind of determinism permeates this reading of the Indian political situation, in which

[38] When Roy refers to "the masses," he tends to speak in psychoanalaytic terms i.e. with reference to the psychology of the masses; otherwise he is referring to "society." This distinction between "masses" used as a class category and in the two ways stated previously becomes critical when we consider the culpability Roy affords to the "urban middle class" above; the latter is a class category, articulated in clearly material and geographic terms, and is therefore set up in an implicit contrast with the working class, agrarian class, etc. It would appear that when speaking in psychoanalytic and societal terms, "the masses" include the "urban middle class," and refers to the larger polity that Roy views as under the sway of Indian fascism.

[39] Roy, Preface, 14.

[40] Ibid., 15.

[41] Roy, Preface, 12.

subconscious desire, cultural backwardness, and a fear of uncertainty in the face of an imminent but unclear future make the rise of a fascist leader inevitable:

> The influence of any doctrine is proportionate to the degree to which it appeals to the psychic needs of those to whom it is preached. In other words, there is a large element of historical truth in the saying that a people gets the kind of leader it deserves. Only, it is not a matter of conscious desire, but of an automatic conformity with subconscious cultural urges. The personality of a leader, his conscious behavior—physical as well as mental, including emotional—is determined by the given social environment and the cultural background, which are equally operative for the entire human group of which he is an individual member. An authoritarian leadership can be established only when there is a mass psychology of predisposition towards submission.[42]

There is a great deal of contempt and pity in Roy's attitude towards the Indian population. For instance, they "could not as yet think in terms of freedom" despite the "vague feeling of revolt" that took hold at the end of the First World War.[43] The great mass of Indian society is described as overwhelmingly orthodox in its Hinduism and in its outlook, attitude, and anxieties, as demonstrated by its submission to the notion of "karma" for example, which even though it operates at the level of the individual, robs the individual of the agency required to harness real political will because the sins of a past life are thought to govern the trajectory of the present. Roy alludes to a similar effect on European society brought about by Luther and Calvin, as mentioned above, but the relative advancement of seventeenth century European society compared to twentieth century India explains, for Roy, why alternate political configurations were possible for Europe even after this submission of the individual to predestination, but the analogous open-endedness is not possible in India.

Enzo Traverso has synthesized prominent treatments of the concept of fascism by George L. Mosse, Zeev Sternhell, and Emilio Gentile into a fourfold notion. For these historians, who for Traverso hold an "outstanding place" in the interpretation of fascism in recent decades, "fascism was at the same time a revolution, an ideology, a *Weltanschauung*, and a culture."[44] The historians under Traverso's scrutiny studied European fascism as it emerged as a movement, carried out a successful revolution (evidenced by its realization as a regime), articulated an outlook, and enacted, in social and aesthetic forms, a culture of its own. Elements of their criteria for evaluating fascism are present in Roy's reading. For instance, Mosse's identification of fascism's political style with the secularization

[42] Ibid., 13.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Enzo Traverso, "Interpreting Fascism: Mosse, Sternhell and Gentile in Comparative Perspective." *Constellations* 15, no. 3 (2008): 304.

of sacredness and its new belief in the 'nation,' with its need for its own liturgy, is similar to the role that religion plays in Roy's account as the font from which Gandhian nationalism is able to access its vast, psychic hold on the public. Also resonant is Sternhell's interpretation of fascism as "a total rejection of the vision of man and society elaborated from Hobbes to Kant, from the English Revolution of the seventeenth century to the American and French Revolutions" and as "an exacerbated form of the tradition of the counter-Enlightenment."[45]

In *The Problem of Freedom*, cultural nationalism, the foundation of fascism, is a totalitarian concept because it draws culture towards a specific source and erases the individual: "Cultural values being universal, national culture is bound to be a counterfeit."[46] Subjugation by a foreign power is the most fertile condition for the growth of this notion, and here Roy draws an explicit comparison between India and Germany (subjugated by the victorious powers via the Treaty of Versailles). In a long discussion of Fichte and Schelling, he elaborates on the relationship between the elevation of one's own national character and the denigration of that of one's neighbors. The Indian analog for the origins of German Romanticism are in Hindu mythology:

> The "Ramraj" [reign of King Rama, avatar of Lord Vishnu, as told in the Sanskrit epic *Ramayana*] or the "Vikram era" of the Indian nationalist's imagination is reminiscent of the "Verlorene Heimat" (the lost home) of the German Romanticists of the early nineteenth century. Spiritual perfection and complete oneness of life was believed to have been attained by the extraordinarily gifted people who inhabited the country along the Rhine, which became the Ganges of German cultural nationalism. Myths and legends were re-written as history…Nationalism finding its crassest expression in Germany declared war on the spirit of the Enlightenment.[47]

Roy warns: "these experiences of history should dispel the illusion that Nationalism, developing in India remarkably on the classical German pattern, can lead to any different result."[48] And so the classical origins of Indian nationalism are paired with those of German Romanticism, and the trajectory to the realization of a fascist regime based on these cultural foundations is laid out for the reader.

Roy uses the term 'fascist' as a charge against Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, and as a warning against supporting the vision of the mainstream of the Indian nationalist movement. Traverso summarizes the prominent interpretations of fascism as concept with four attributes: it is anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, spiritu-

[45] Zeen Sternhell, "Le concept de fascism," in *Naissance de l'ideologie fasciste* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 28–29, and Sternhell, *Les anti-Lumières. Du XVIIIe siècle à la guerre froide* (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 578, both quoted in Traverso, "Interpreting Fascism".
[46] Roy, 76.
[47] Roy, 77–8.
[48] Ibid., 79.

alist, and communitarian.[49] Roy's Indian fascism is fascist despite being liberal (liberalism is its guise), and it is certainly anti-Marxist. Crucially, its fascist nature comes from the combination of spiritualism and communitarianism that establishes a cult of personality around the saintly figure of Gandhi and his strikingly modern deputy Nehru. It appropriates the religious culture of the Indian masses in order to keep them in thrall. It requires the submission of the individual in service of all this, in order to hold the Indian nation suspended between tradition and a truly liberated future. The charge of 'fascist' in 1945 was powerful because European fascism was on the verge of defeat, and indeed, upon publication in December, had been defeated. One way to read this accusation by Roy is to understand it as an instrumentalization of the stain of fascism against what he sees as bourgeois Indian nationalism. The latter was a movement that maintained moral superiority and public support not only by using the language of liberal democracy, but by undermining the British claim to power in the colonies through contrasting its liberatory role in occupied Europe with its domination of native peoples abroad. In this reading, *The Problem of Freedom* becomes an extended metaphor, with fascism and the language of psychoanalysis standing in for domination by Roy's political enemies, against which he hopes to galvanize his reading audience. If, however, we take seriously the charge of 'fascism' levied by Roy against Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, then the concept itself undergoes a kind of metamorphosis.

How does Roy marry what he sees as Gandhian authoritarianism with the concept of fascism? The four elements outlined by Traverso in his overview of the interpretations of fascism are helpful here, not least because they allow us to construct four zones in which fascism and anti-imperialism interacted in 1945. The relationship between anti-imperialism and anti-fascism has received considerable attention, but usually in terms of the synergy of the two movements in the interwar period among the Left in Europe, or in terms of the war effort and the allegiances that bore fruit at that time. The twinning of fascism with imperialism and anti-fascism with anti-imperialism was powerful in 1945 and remains powerful in historiographies of resistance, even as the relationship is complicated, and opposition to one or both is nuanced.[50] The one does not always go with the other, however. The European powers with colonial possessions that opposed European fascism during the war were anti-fascist imperialists, and Roy notes the tension between opposing an anti-fascist Britain in the colonies and those elements of Indian nationalism that favored Hitler's Germany before the war.

[49] Traverso, 304.

[50] For an examination of the relationship between anti-fascism and anti-imperialism in Britain and France and their colonies in the period immediately leading to this moment, see Tom Buchanan, "'The Dark Millions in the Colonies are Unavenged': Anti-Fascism and Anti-Imperialism in the 1930s." *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016).

Table 1

Anti-fascist anti-imperialists e.g. M.N. Roy	**Fascist anti-imperialists** e.g. Gandhi
Antifascist imperialists e.g Britain	**Fascist imperialists** e.g. NaziGermany

The affinity of Congress leaders with German and Italian fascism is marshaled as secondary, yet nonetheless significant, evidence of the fascist nature of Gandhian nationalism. Most of *The Problem of Freedom* is concerned with identifying the latter's fascist nature and explaining how it came to be; this occurs at the level of the concept, treating both Gandhian nationalism and fascism as ideologies. In the following instance however, it is fascism's successful revolution in Germany and Italy, and the cultural and *realpolitik* advantages that the INC saw in those regimes, that Roy uses to support his argument:

> [T]he most powerful leaders of the Congress…did not make any secret of their admiration for "great men" like Hitler and Mussolini; they also believed that India needed "national unity" (totalitarianism) on the pattern of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany…Fascism was regarded as the fullest expression of nationalism, and as such naturally captivated the imagination and commanded the sympathy of nationalists, proud of cultural traditionalism and therefore, willing victims of the authoritarian psychology. As a matter of fact, the Fascist cult of Aryanism and Hitler's denunciation of Marxist materialism were acclaimed by the average nationalist as a vindication of ancient Indian culture—as a triumph of Eastern Spiritualism over Western Materialism. It was a cherished belief among nationalists that the doctrines of Fascism were formulated by German Sanskrit scholars, who had drunk deep in the wisdom of the *Vedas*.[51]

Besides another striking articulation of the affinity of ancient Indian culture and European fascism, this is also an attempt by Roy to draw attention to the hypocrisy on the part of Congress leaders who in 1945 were trying to embody the best of liberal, bourgeois governmentality. This tension is explained not as a contradiction, but rather as an expression of the enmeshed tradition of cooperation between the two political currents.

Roy argues that the "problem of freedom" is uniquely manifested in India due to it being part of the civilized world, yet backward in certain respects. Since it participates in civilization, it is not exempt from "this conflict between the urge for freedom and the fear of freedom;" however, the "degree of the differentiation of social forces and [India's] cultural state" are such that the urge for freedom

[51] Roy, 19–20.

and the fear of freedom have become confused, creating the social conditions for authoritarianism, which is then hailed as the "champion of freedom."[52] Here Roy is alluding to the inability of the Indian masses to view the political distinction between freedom and servitude, which particularly endangers a society that is both civilized and backwards. Indian society is thus particularly susceptible to the modern authoritarian threat by way of its existence in the same time-space of 'Civilization' and yet at a different stage of progress.

How does this picture of Roy as an anti-fascist fit into how historians have recently understood him? Michael Goebel and Kris Manjapra have provided the two most prominent accounts of Roy's political career in the last decade. In these accounts, Roy serves to demonstrate the existence of transnational networks of anticolonial resistance and of India's de-territorial nationalism, respectively. *The Problem of Freedom* disrupts both narratives. Sure enough, Roy's position in Communist and nationalist circles shifted in the final decades of his life. His turn to radical humanism was a rejection of the kinds of collectivities that orthodox Marxism and nationalism presuppose. To read Roy as an anti-imperialist in 1945 one must reckon with, for instance, a declaration such as this one:

> Reactionary Nationalism in the colonial countries has of late been embellished by the pseudo-Marxist theory of anti-Imperialism. The latter theory is believed to have a social foundation: the colonial people's struggle for national freedom is an integral part of the proletarian world revolution. Experience, however, has belied the elaborately constructed theory. Triumphant or semi-successful nationalist movements in the colonial countries, or in countries which are believed to have been kept in backwardness by modern Imperialism, have invariably turned towards Fascism, instead of showing the least inclination to be honest allies of Democracy, not to mention proletarian world revolution. […] The pseudo-Marxist theory of anti-Imperialism (anything purely negative is always sterile) panders to the base sentiment of race hatred, and consequently plays into the hands of social reaction. The doctrine of a united anti-Imperialist Front divorces the political practice from the context of social conflicts, and making it an expression of racial animosity, helps the upper-class minority to use the people as a pawn in the game of power politics.[53]

It would appear that the "theory" of anti-imperialism (of any *anti-* movement!) is anathema to the kind of universalist revolutionary change Roy sees for India. But his associations with the Comintern, with both the Mexican and Indian Communist Parties, and with networks of transnational anti-imperialists are the very basis for historiographical interest in Roy in the first place. Is reading Roy as an anti-imperialist justified in political or historical terms, but simply incorrect at the

[52] Roy, 12.
[53] Roy, 84–5.

level of the concept? Or is what he did more important than what he thought and wrote?

What we are left with is an alternate reading of both anticolonial resistance and decolonization. In Roy's understanding, anticolonial resistance in India is not the struggle between the British government and Indian nationalists such as Gandhi and Nehru (and indeed, the entire slate of nationalist bourgeois leaders that they represent in this text). It is also not revolution in Marxist-Leninist terms, brought about by world revolution through class struggle and resulting in the dictatorship of the proletariat. For Roy, framing the struggle as such is an obfuscation of the *true* struggle between "the urge for freedom and the fear of freedom" as understood in psychoanalytic terms. Crucially, freedom itself is *not* self-determination, or native rule, or the overthrow of European domination, but is understood instead in terms of an opposition to fascism. The struggle against fascism in Europe is thus not only the backdrop of Roy's understanding of what it means to be free, but forms the very vocabulary in which freedom is articulated. Or, inversely, the definition of fascism that emerged from the struggle in Europe is expanded and appropriated for use in an Indian context—just as Lenin's approach to revolution is applied to the colonial situation in 1920—and the language of anti-fascist resistance mobilized for an anti-Congress polemic by a man who, in 1945, had few friends in the Comintern and fewer still in the mainstream of Indian nationalist politics.

Even more striking is the fact that this understanding of fascism, as both a phenomenon of mass psychology and having germinated in the modern nation-state before being transmitted to India, are both notions prominent in the work of German thinkers, particularly Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Roy's collaboration with the Frankfurt School has not yet been fully studied, and is only mentioned briefly in Manjapra's biography as an example of his cosmopolitanism and interstitiality.[54] What could be learned from a reading of this exchange at the level of the concept, not merely as symptom of the transnational 1920s and 1930s? If conceptual history has indeed "since its inception…contributed to destabilizing what felt like an intuitive knowledge"[55] then it is a fitting methodology with which to parse the shifting meaning and stakes of terms/concepts such as 'freedom' and 'fascism.'

To the extent that concepts such as freedom or fascism are ideas as well as empirical conditions under investigation by historians—and furthermore, represent the goals of historical actors—tracing the concept across time and place, or as in this case, in a single text, can yield insight into this three-fold role. Let us return to Koselleck and his criterion for modern concepts, which is that they mark

[54] Manjapra, xiii. On the contributions of Critical Theory to the understanding of fascism in this period, see: Stefan Breuer, "The Truth of Modern Society? Critical Theory and Fascism," *New German Critique* 44, no. 2 (2017).
[55] Pernau and Sachsenmaier, 14.

the dissolution of the old world and the emergence of the new. The architects of decolonization considered their project to be no less than such a transformation, and historians have echoed the period's sense of its own gravity in narratives of anticolonial struggle and national independence. Reading a text such as *The Problem of Freedom* with the criteria of conceptual history requires coupling the conceptual and political weight of fascism with all that is at stake in the re-making of the world. It is possible, of course, that Roy merely used the concept of fascism in order to shock his readers; what better comparison to draw with one's political adversary in 1945 when actually-existing-fascism in Europe was close to defeat, and widely acknowledged in left and liberal circles as an existential threat requiring eradication? It was, no doubt, a helpful metaphor, and close at hand in both political reality and imagination. I have here attempted to read it in another way, as Roy's sincere attempt to delineate a European concept with European origins in the Indian context, predicated on the belief that within the modern Indian nation-state, just as it was beginning to take root via negotiations between Indian nationalists and the British government, was a European transplantation containing the germ of that most European threat.

Microhistory Interrogates a Mystery: On Some Possible New Relations in the 'Somerton Man' or 'Tamám Shud' Case

ROWAN HOLMES

Rowan Holmes is an ageing amateur recluse who hides, as far as possible, in the Blue Mountains outside of Sydney, Australia. He is currently studying for a doctorate in experimental music and microhistorical studies are presently a side project. His hobby is snoozing on the couch in the company of his Siamese cats.

Microhistorical methods are used to examine evidence surrounding the 'Somerton Man' case, in which the body of a unknown man was found on a beach in Adelaide, South Australia, in December 1948. All identifying items had been removed from the man's body, including the labels on his clothing. The case is connected with a strange code inscribed in the back page of a copy of the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám which was found nearby. The man has never been identified or the code solved. The author looks into details of a series of strange deaths which occurred in Sydney, Australia, three years earlier, uncovering new material which suggests for the first time a possible connection between the two series of events. A recent identification of 'Somerton Man' as an errant Russian intelligence officer is discussed, together with the case's possible presence in the context of Cold War atomic espionage. Lacunae prevent firm conclusions being reached.

Introduction

Carlo Ginzburg dates the first formal use of the word 'microhistory' to 1959. This use was by the American historian George Stewart, in his book *Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Charge at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863*, a detailed examination of a single action by a single Confederate unit at the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863. Discussing *Pickett's Charge*, Ginzburg warns that Stewart's speculations on how the failure of this single charge might have stochastically cascaded all the way 'upwards' to macrohistorically changing the outcome of the Civil War "could wind up as a reflection upon Cleopatra's nose."[1]

Ginzburg's own work, *The Cheese and the Worms*, a study of a previously obscure victim of the Inquisition, is described by its author as "the minute analysis of a circumscribed documentation, tied to a person who was otherwise unknown."[2] He emphasises "that the obstacles interfering with research in the form of lacu-

[1] Carlo Ginzburg, "Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It," trans. John Tedesci and Anne C. Tedeschi, *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 1 (Autumn, 1993): 12.
[2] Ibid., 22.

nae or misrepresentation in the sources must become part of the account."[3] Thus, Ginzburg has unknowingly described (and circumscribed) the present document, which is a study of the microhistory around a man who was already dead and carefully denuded of an identity at the time that he came to the attention of the world. The death of 'Somerton Man' in 1948 became one of the most famous cold cases in Australian history. I became interested in the case as a consequence of postgraduate research into other matters extraneous to this study; I thought it might serve as an interesting canvas for the illustration of certain postulates within the creative arts. Investigating casually, I found that there was a great deal of ambiguity and seemingly ill-informed speculation about the case, especially on the Internet. I set out to apply historical principles, in the sense that I attempted to separate speculation from such hard facts as could be ascertained from the study of scattered and fragmentary surviving documentation, precisely as Ginzburg has said. I had no idea that what I would find would serve to deepen and broaden the mystery, and frankly I was expecting the very opposite to occur. This is what I have established so far.

Background

Tuesday, 30 November 1948 was the last day of spring in Australia. In the city of Adelaide in South Australia, the weather was unseasonably warm, reaching up to 24.6°C. Several suburbs away from the city centre, the suburb of Glenelg meets the Indian Ocean at St Vincent Gulf. A beach stretches north and south in front of an esplanade romantically entitled either 'North' or 'South Esplanade'; it has always been a popular spot for a postprandial stroll or assignation. The beach and esplanade extend southwards to the locality of Somerton Park, where the beach takes the name of the suburb. Across the esplanade from what was then the Somerton Home for Crippled Children, a large Victorian house on the corner of Bickford Terrace, a set of steps runs down to the beach over a low seawall. An evening stroller, a jeweller named John Lyons, passed that point with his wife, heading southwards along the beach to their home. The couple's attention was drawn to a well-dressed man who was lying on the sand beside the stairs, his head propped up by the seawall. The man was wearing a suit and tie and, unusually for the season, a knitted pullover. However, he was devoid of a hat, which was noteworthy in those days, particularly given his otherwise formal attire. This led the Lyons to presume that the man was drunk. As they joked about reporting him to the police, the man raised his right arm upwards until it fell flat again. The Lyons presumed that the man was hopelessly drunk and attempting to light a cigarette, and continued their stroll, after Lyons had noted the time to be 7pm.[4]

[3] Ginzburg, "Microhistory," 28.
[4] These circumstances are set out in detail in the inquest papers; see Thomas Cleland, *Inquest into the death of a body located at Somerton Beach on 1.12.48*, report, City Coroner's Office,

The same man—or presumably the same man, nobody saw the face clearly—was seen in the same place by another couple sitting on a bench on the Esplanade about half an hour later. The woman thought he might be dead; her boyfriend joked that the man would have to be dead drunk to be able to ignore the mosquitoes clustering about him. They moved on at around 8pm: the lights were already on along the Esplanade. The man was still there.

He was still there the next morning, as John Lyons discovered when he rose early for a swim prior to work. He and a friend noticed a couple of people illegally exercising horses on the beach, who were looking fixedly at the spot where Lyons had seen the man before. He went over and saw, presumably, the same man he had seen the night before in the same place. The man was dead, stiff and cold, and Lyons fetched a policeman, who found no marks of violence on the body and no signs of a struggle in the sand where it lay. An ambulance was called and the body was conveyed to the Royal Adelaide Hospital, where the death was confirmed by the doctor on duty.

After this examination, which revealed that the body had belonged to a middle-aged man perhaps around 45 years old, with hazel eyes and fair or reddish hair greying at the temples, the body was taken on to the City Mortuary, where it was prepared for storage. As part of this process the clothing was removed and searched for identification. It was here that the first of a sequence of increasingly strange enigmas was noted: despite the presence of a few quotidian items in the pockets of the dead man such as cigarettes, local bus and train tickets and a half-empty box of matches, neither wallet nor keys were found. Nor was there a ration card, then still necessary in Australia for some items. He might perhaps have been robbed as he lay dead or dying on the beach, but when his pullover and suit coat were examined further it was found that the maker's labels had also been removed.

An autopsy was then held at the Mortuary, which was inconclusive as to the cause of death; the condition of the body suggested poisoning, but on analysis of the stomach and other specimens no common poison could be found, a circumstance which astonished the doctor conducting the process. Word of the mysterious fatality spread to the Adelaide newspapers, and the first of many apparently false identifications took place as the autopsy was being conducted. In the months to come, over seventy such misidentifications would be made.

The police sent photographs and fingerprints of the dead man interstate and eventually overseas; no country would admit to possessing him. The body was embalmed in early January 1949, pending further enquiries.

On 14 January 1949, Adelaide detectives took possession of a suitcase left unclaimed at Adelaide Railway Station. It had been lodged there on 30 December and never called for. The suitcase—which had had all identifying labels removed—contained mostly clothing and work tools. Almost all the labels had been removed

Adelaide, South Australia (Spelling and punctuation as original throughout).

from the clothing as well, except for three items which were hard to treat in that way, as they each had marks bearing a variation on the name ʻT. Keane' or ʻKean.' A special brand of thread found in the suitcase matched that used in repairs to the Australian-made trousers the man had been wearing. There was nothing of a personal nature, such as photographs or identity papers or letters, other than some unused airmail envelopes and a few coins of loose change.

An unlabelled jacket found in the suitcase was confirmed from its construction as having been made in America, as was an aluminium comb found on the body. Enquiries into ʻT. Keane' led nowhere at the time. But I have found an interesting possibility which seems to have been overlooked by all previous authors on this case: in 1945 a Victorian newspaper reported on the expulsion of a railway shop steward in inner-city Melbourne from the left-leaning Australian Labor Party (ALP). The man, who had been secretary of the Newport branch of the ALP until he was expelled for alleged ʻCommunist sympathies,' was named Tom Keane.[5] Nothing further is presently known of him; perhaps the obscurity of the newspaper story and the lack of further publicity prevented this possible link from becoming more widely known until newspaper archives became searchable by computer.

In early April 1949, an inquest was announced into the death of ʻSomerton Man.' In the course of preparations for this procedure, a pathologist, John Burton Cleland, conducted a second autopsy on the body. Examining the man's clothing, Cleland discovered a small roll of paper in a fob pocket inside the waistband of the dead man's trousers. When unrolled, this contained two words in an ʻoriental' typeface: "Tamám Shud." These words were eventually discovered to be the concluding phrase in the *Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám*, a selection of Persian poetry from the 11th Century CE. This book was in wide circulation in English-speaking countries at the time, in a somewhat selective translation by Edward FitzGerald which dated from the 1850s. Superficially interpreted, at least, the roughly one hundred quatrains exhort a hedonism which mocks the pretensions of organised religion, emphasising instead the value of living in the moment, given post-mortem uncertainty. The concluding words are generally taken to mean ʻit is over' or ʻit is finished.' This discovery naturally furthered the perception of Somerton Man as a suicide who had successfully sought to conceal his identity; however Cleland, a highly experienced practitioner who was Professor of Pathology at Adelaide University at the time, was unable to identify the poison which had been used.

In early May, it was announced that the embalmed body, which was showing signs of decay, was to be buried after a plaster cast had been made of the head and torso for identification purposes.[6] The Adelaide *Advertiser* also reported on

[5] "A.L.P. Expulsions," *Williamstown Chronicle*, no. 5048, 27 July 1945, 4, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/6746572.

[6] "To Make Cast of Beach Body," *Adelaide News* 53, no. 8030, 2 May 1949, 1, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/11115264.

the discovery of the Tamám Shud slip, for what seems to have been the first time.[7] The inquest opened on 17 June, three days after the body had been secretly buried in the West Terrace Cemetery. It was adjourned indefinitely—rather than closed—on 21 June, with coroner Thomas Cleland (a cousin of the pathologist) finding that the death was not accidental and was probably caused by a glucoside poison. Whether that poison was self-administered or not Cleland refused to determine.[8]

A month after the inquest, a story was published in the Adelaide *News* which stressed that the police were still looking for a copy of the *Rubáiyát* which might have once contained the slip of paper. Despite the fact that the article itself admitted that this was "a million to one chance,"[9] a copy of the book was handed in to the Adelaide police the very next day, by a gentleman whose identity remains uncertain. He stated that the day before the body was discovered he had found the book in the back seat of his car, which was parked near Somerton Beach, and that he had forgotten about the incident until he had read the newspaper story.[10]

A torn portion in the last printed page of the book appeared to possibly match the slip in the dead man's clothes, although if the slip had come from that book it had been trimmed down. One of the police officers noticed that the unprinted end page had been entirely torn out. Examining the inside back cover of the hard-backed book revealed some lines of writing which had presumably been created by the impression of handwriting on the page which had been removed. These faint impressions were traced over, revealing still another mystery. There were five lines of text, as follow:

W R G O A B A B D
~~M L I A O I~~
W T B I M P A N E T P
M L I A B O A I A Q C
I T T M T S A M S T G A B

These enigmatic entries were immediately assumed to be a code of some description. If they were, however, the whirlwind of amateur cryptography which was triggered by the publication of a photograph of the code on 23 July signally failed to solve it. In fact, it has never been adequately solved, even today, seventy years after the event.

Along with this code, a number—or some numbers (as with almost all the primary evidence in this case, accounts differ)—was (or were) found on the tracing.

[7] "New Clues May Identify Somerton Body," *Adelaide Advertiser* 91, no. 28, 257, 3 May 1949, 1, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/36364854/2654492.
[8] Cleland, *Inquest*, 3.
[9] "Remote Book Clue in Mystery Death," *Adelaide News* 53, no. 8,100, 22 July 1949, 1, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/11111689.
[10] "Book Found: Body Clue?" *Adelaide News* 53, no. 8,101, 23 July 1949, 1, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/11111709.

It is uncontested that one of the numbers proved to be the telephone number of Jessica Ellen Harkness (1921-2007), a nurse who liked to call herself 'Jestyn,' who had been born and trained in Sydney and now worked at the Home for Crippled Children in front of which the body had been found. She lived nearby in Glenelg, and a detective called on her.

Jestyn denied all knowledge of Somerton Man, while readily agreeing that she had once owned a copy of the *Rubáiyát*. It could not, however, have been the one found in the car and from which the Tamám Shud slip had supposedly been torn, as she had given her copy to one Alfred 'Alf' Boxall, an army lieutenant, in Sydney in 1945. She was now, she said, married to someone else and had had no connection with Boxall since.

On Tuesday 26 July, Jestyn was taken to view the plaster bust of Somerton Man. Again, accounts differ significantly as to her reaction; one of the detectives working on the case, Lionel Leane, said that she nearly fainted. Everyone agrees that she denied knowing the man and insisted that, whoever it was, it was certainly not Boxall. This was confirmed the next day, when police in Sydney located Boxall, very much alive and queuing for his pay envelope in his workplace, a municipal tram depot where he was employed as a mechanic.

Boxall told a TV interviewer in 1978 that once the police established that he could not possibly be dead and in Adelaide, they lost interest in him. He was, however, pestered by reporters who accompanied the police, and he showed them Jestyn's *Rubáiyát*, complete with an inscription by her, to get rid of them. According to Boxall, Jestyn was a casual acquaintance who had given him the popular 'oriental'-themed book as a farewell present over drinks when he was being posted to the South East Asia area; she had said "you're going . . . into palm trees or words to that effect, you might as well read about 'em before you go and she gave me the book."[11] In 1949, Boxall told the reporters what he told the police; he knew nothing whatsoever about Somerton Man, and the circumstance of the repeated *Rubáiyát* he ascribed to an amazing coincidence.[12]

[11] National Archives of Australia: Australian Broadcasting Commission, Head Office—Television Features Department; C673, INSIDE STORY PART 2, 117 (Spelling and punctuation as original throughout).

[12] He neglected to mention that much of his military service had been with a reconnaissance and commando unit, the 2/1st North Australia Observer Unit, known as the 'Nackeroos.' In fact, his service record shows that he was involved in operations in the Timor Sea during the Timor Campaign of 1942, alongside the Australian author Xavier Herbert (1901–1984), already famous for his 1938 novel *Capricornia*, partly a denunciation of the treatment of indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory, and Herbert's brother David, who commanded Boxall's company. Boxall was working as an instructor in small naval craft at an Army transport unit in Mosman when he was given the book. He was kept on army service, mostly as a ship's engineer, until 1948. (National Archives of Australia: 2 Echelon, Army Headquarters; B883, *Second Australian Imperial Force Personnel Dossiers, 1939–1947*, NX83331, Boxall Alfred, Service Number – NX83331: Date of birth –16 Apr 1906: Place of birth - London England: Place of enlistment – Paddington NSW: Next of Kin – Boxall Susie.

Subsequently

This is almost the end of the conventional narrative: with Jestyn reticent, Boxall pleading total ignorance, and the 'code' apparently unsolvable despite many attempts official and otherwise, developments in the case died away to be replaced by decades of speculation. Naturally the case migrated onto the Internet, and it is still the subject of attention in the mass media. Recently, in 2013, the Australian current affairs TV program *60 Minutes* devoted a segment to an extended interview with Jestyn's surviving family members, one of whom claims that Jestyn was a Russian agent who had a child by Somerton Man. The family is divided over calls to exhume the body for DNA testing, although a recent DNA test conducted on the putative 'son' of Somerton Man by Jestyn (now deceased himself) purported to show that Somerton Man was actually of American origin.[13]

Jestyn, Boxall and other, more minor participants in the case whose stories cannot be told here are all dead now. The case, with all its engimas, lacunæ and contradictions, seems to belong to microhistory now, as firmly as that of Ginzburg's 'heretical' and combusted miller, Menocchio. And yet, the case of Somerton Man may still be capable of yielding new and perhaps useful information. My research into a series of strange deaths which occurred in Sydney in 1945, at the same time that Jestyn was giving her *Rubáiyát* to Alf Boxall and involving still another copy of that book, point towards a possible connection between the two trails of events. As yet there is nothing definite, but by referring to primary documents such as inquest and army service records, I have been able to trace out a sequence of events which possibly both deepen the mystery and extend its reach in time and space. However, much of what I have found is open to various interpretations.

Ginzburg opens *The Cheese and the Worms* with an epigraph attributed to the French author Louis-Ferdinand Céline: "Tout ce qui est intéressant se passe dans l'ombre. On ne sait rien de la véritable histoire des hommes,"[14] which roughly translates as 'everything of interest happens in the shadows. Nothing is known of the true history of humanity.' This is perhaps an instance of the conspiratorial thinking which led Céline to destroy his own literary reputation in the late 1930s through hysterical, paranoid anti-Semitism which led inexorably to charges of Nazi collaboration, post-war imprisonment and abiding disgrace. We should be careful to not follow Céline down a toxic rabbit-hole into delirium by attributing more to the scattered if suggestive events than the facts themselves permit. What we are about to learn is surely strange and shadowy enough without any attempts to 'explain' it on my part, even if I knew how to do so.

[13] See: Lisa Zyga, *After Years of Forensic Investigation, Somerton Man's Identity Remains a Mystery (Part 2: DNA, Isotopes, and Autopsy)*, Phys.org 2015, accessed 12 May 2017, https://phys.org/news/2015-06-years-forensic-somerton-identity-mystery_1.html.

[14] Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (London: Penguin, 1992), *v*.

Sydney, 1945

Monday 7 May 1945 was a momentous day world-around, being the day before the surrender of the German armed forces. Anticipatory celebrations were widespread away from the front lines, including in Sydney, the oldest and largest city in Australia. However, one Sydney resident, an old lady called Augusta 'Pakie' Macdougall, would not live to see news of the surrender the next day; at around 7pm on the wet, windy evening, she was struck by a truck coming from the Army post office, a warehouse in the suburb of Surry Hills. The truck was passing northwards along Elizabeth Street, alongside Hyde Park in the city's centre, when it struck Pakie as she was crossing the street by way of the tramlines which then ran down the middle of the broad carriageway. The driver of the truck stopped and fetched two policemen, one of whom questioned Pakie briefly before she fell into a coma from which she did not recover before she died in Sydney Hospital the next day.

Pakie Macdougall was a musician and a pioneering suffragette. She had been running a 'Bohemian' club in rooms at 219 Elizabeth Street for over fifteen years. The eponymic "Pakie's Club" was a well-known resort for leading Australian intellectuals and their crowd of hangers-on, and Pakie's kindness and tolerance were legendary among them. The club had been partly decorated by Walter Burley Griffin, American designer of the original plan for Australia's national capital Canberra, in association with his wife Marion Mahony Griffin.[15]

The inquest into her death was held in what might be considered a rather perfunctory manner at the long-since demolished City Coroner's Court at the Rocks in Sydney on 21 May 1945. Pakie's son, Robin Macdougall, gave evidence that his mother was not suicidal; he stated tersely that Pakie was not depressed and also that her hearing and vision were adequate. The driver of the lorry, Private Wilbur Judge, said that he was moving slowly and that Pakie started across the road after having stopped on the tramlines. He braked but skidded and struck her with fatal consequences. One of the attending policeman said that Judge told him at the scene that Pakie "jumped in front of"[16] the truck, and that he saw no skid marks in the road, although this may have been because it was raining and the road was wet. The other policeman stated that before she lost consciousness, Pakie had said that she did not know what had happened, and that he was unable to find any direct eyewitnesses among the onlookers. The sergeant at the police station where the driver was interviewed said that Judge had told him that Pakie

[15] After Burley Griffin's early death in India in 1937, Pakie briefly shared a house with Marion Mahony Griffin in the Griffin-planned suburb of Castlecrag in Sydney.

[16] Reginald Cookson, *Inquest No 45-611*, report, City Coroner's Court, Sydney, 14 (Spelling and punctuation as original throughout).

"suddenly continued to walk in the path"[17] of his truck, and that on inspecting the truck he could find no marks of the impact. Again, he could find no eyewitnesses.

A lawyer attending for the army managed to get the sergeant to agree that Judge had said in the station that Pakie had "jumped"[18] in front of the truck. Perhaps the intention of the army was to imply that Pakie had committed suicide rather than being the victim of negligent driving by a soldier, but this discrepancy was not pursued by the coroner. One can legitimately wonder about this, in view of the peculiar circumstance that while three other traffic accidents in Sydney on that day were reported in major Sydney newspapers, the accident resulting in Pakie's death—that of a minor local celebrity—went completely unmentioned, with the exception of later death and funeral notices placed in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, presumably by Robin Macdougall. In any case the coroner asked no further questions of anyone and reached a verdict of accidental death. Quite possibly it was, but the number of deaths which may have a bearing on our study had probably already increased by one as Coroner Cookson made his findings.

A few days after Pakie's inquest had closed, on Sunday 3 June 1945, a picnicker at the North Shore suburb of Mosman across the harbour from the central business district was looking for firewood when he made a different and highly unpleasant discovery: the severely decomposed body of a man. It was lying in bushland near the shore of Taylor's Bay, a large park across the point of Bradley's Head from Taronga Park Zoo. Police were fetched, and what was left of the body was eventually identified as having once been Joseph Haim Saul Marshall, a former citizen of Malaya who was thirty-five years old.

'George' Marshall, as he preferred to be known, was from a wealthy and prominent family (one of his brothers, David Marshall, became the first Chief Minister of the newly-independent Singapore in 1955). He had emigrated to Australia in 1939 after a quarrel with his father. His early ambition to become an author had ended in failure when his self-published book of poetry, *Just You and I*, had been badly received when it came out in 1931. In Australia, where two of his brothers were in business, Marshall had alternated between subsiding on income from property and working for the government. He had also alternated residence between Sydney and Perth on the other side of the continent. He had recently returned to Sydney and resumed residence in a flat in the inner-city suburb of Potts Point. Now he was lying dead in the bush in Mosman with a copy of the *Rubáiyát* open on his chest.

Marshall's inquest, again presided over by Cookson, opened on 18 July.[19] Marshall's brother Saul spoke of his younger brother's history of suicide attempts; he had been briefly institutionalised in Perth in January 1945 after an unsuccess-

[17] Cookson, *Inquest No 45-611*, 9.
[18] Ibid., 10.
[19] Reginald Cookson, *Inquest No. MS.45/988*, report, 1945, City Coroner's Court, Sydney (Spelling and punctuation as original throughout).

ful attempt. In the hospital he had received insulin ʻtherapy,' a now-discredited technique in which patients were placed, sometimes on a daily basis, in artificially-induced comas created by massive injections of insulin. During these comas electro-convulsive ʻshock treatment' was sometimes applied as well. Patients were then brought back to consciousness by further massive injections of glucose; sometimes they did not emerge from the coma. If they did, brain damage was not an unknown consequence of the ʻtreatment'.[20]

After an adjournment lasting some days, the police spoke of finding the body, with its head supported by a rock under which a copy of a Sydney newspaper of 20 May had been placed. A bottle of water and a tin containing a residual amount of toxic barbetuic acid were beside the body; the *Rubáiyát* was open and facing downwards on the chest, with either one or two quatrains (again, accounts differ) marked in pencil. There is no mention of a corresponding pencil having been found on the body; in fact the police said that they had only identified the body in late June after being contacted by Marshall's former landlord, as—like Somerton Man—"there was nothing amongst the apparel of the deceased to identify him by."[21]

Marshall's landlord said that he had last seen his tenant on 18 May, and had contacted the police after hearing of the discovery of an unidentified body in Mosman. A former headmaster of Marshall's, now retired in Sydney, spoke of his having stayed in touch with his pupil, who had "a first class philosophic mind,"[22] and how although Marshall had a deep interest in the *Rubáiyát*, unlike Marshall's brother Saul, the headmaster did not accept the suicide theory, believing that "the appeal would have been rather towards a living solution than towards unsolved ending."[23] The headmaster last saw Marshall late on the night of Saturday 19 May, when he seemed "full of good spirits."[24]

Next on the stand was a young woman called Gweneth Dorothy Graham. She began by falsely stating that she was living with her parents in Rockdale in southern Sydney. She said that she had been "very friendly"[25] with Marshall for several years, but had not heard much from him since he moved to Perth. In April 1945,

[20] It may be significant that Saul Marshall spoke of his brother David having received head injuries in a childhood car accident, and that his knowledge of David Marshall's 1945 suicide attempt came from a mutual friend who was alarmed to be asked by David Marshall to pass on certain papers to a third party, since he said he was going away to the country and might not return. As Cookson did not enquire further into these matters, we presently know nothing more.

[21] Cookson, *Inquest No. MS.45/988,* 7. What are we to make of this account? Did Marshall underline the book to leave a final disdainful message to the world, add a newspaper to the site to establish the exact date of death, and then—as Somerton Man may have—dispose of the documents which would serve to readily identify him before taking poison? Did Marshall wish to be identified or did he not? To whom?

[22] Ibid., 11.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Cookson, *Inquest No. MS.45/988,* 12.

Marshall had returned to Sydney and they had seen each other regularly since. On 19 May they had dined together, on which occasion Marshall had told Graham that he had sent her a cheque for £200 (about thirty times the average weekly wage) to enable her to realise her long-expressed desire to establish her own hairdressing salon. She tendered the note which eventually arrived with the cheque, and spoke of Marshall's "extremely temperamental"[26] and "domineering"[27] manner. She had not seen him since they parted in the street following their dinner, after she complained of a "head ache."[28]

Cookson asked no further questions and quickly ruled Marshall's death a suicide. This decision was reached on 13 August, four days after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. The Sydney scandal-sheet *Truth* naturally found the material irresistible, with the combination of poetry, exoticism (the 'dark' Marshall was from a Jewish family), implicit sex and suicide, and it made the events the subject of a story in its edition of Sunday 19 August. A few days later, 'Gwen' Graham was the subject of more newspaper reporting: on 26 August she joined Marshall in death.

Graham's inquest, once again presided over by Cookson, opened on 14 September, a fortnight after the official signing of Japan's surrender.[29] Her mother was the first to be called. She said that she had last seen her daughter alive on 21 August, at the hairdressing salon in Kings Cross where Graham had worked. Graham was "not happy on the day of the Inquest on Mr Marshall."[30] Contrary to her evidence at Marshall's inquest, Graham was not living with her parents but was cohabiting with a soldier called Helmut Hendon in Kings Cross, a suburb adjacent to Potts Point where Marshall had lived. Speaking of Marshall by another of his adopted names, Lorenzo, Graham's mother said that the last time she had spoken to her daughter she had been told that "Lorenzo told her to break from Hendon that he was evil,"[31]and that Graham herself "had discovered that he was both evil and ruthless too."[32]

Without asking any further questions of Graham's mother, Cookson proceeded to call Hendon to the stand. Private Helmut (or Hellmut or Hellmuth—all three variations are recorded) Hendon declared that Graham had been living in his flat since December 1944 and had known her since January that year. She stayed in the flat while he had been in the hospital and away on army business, and he lived there as well when he was on leave. She had told him in May of receiving the money from Marshall; she had sent the cheque back but when it was returned unclaimed she had paid the money into her own bank account. Hendon stated that

[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid., 13.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Reginald Cookson, *Inquest No. 45/1132*, report, 1945, Department of the Attorney General and of Justice, Sydney (Spelling and punctuation as original throughout).
[30] Ibid., 2.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 3.

"the death of Marshall seemed to upset her,"[33] but that "she said ʿShe understood that when a man had nothing to live for [he] would take his own life.'"[34]

The rest of his evidence was as straightforward as anything can be said to be in this bizarre matter: according to Hendon the landlady of the block of flats where he lived was scandalised at the couple's de facto status and on the night Graham died he had "suggested she leave the flat and go back and live at home,"[35] whereupon she went into the bathroom, ran a bath, got into it and slashed her wrists. When she did not respond to his eventual knocking at the door, he went into the room and found her "floating in the bath with her face down."[36] He removed her from the water and fetched a doctor who lived in the building.

Cookson asked Hendon no further questions, and did not call the landlady or the doctor in question. He took perfunctory evidence from the police who found no marks of violence on the body other than the cuts to the wrists, and declared that unspecified "further enquiries" established that "there are no suspicious circumstances."[37] And with that the case of the death of Gweneth Dorothy Graham was closed, as is, almost completely, the narrative portion of our present story.

Reflections; Connections?

Ginzburg says, astutely, that "any document, even the most anomalous, can be inserted into a series."[38] He also points out that "in any society the conditions of access to the production of documentation are tied to a situation of power and thus create an inherent imbalance."[39] We recall the fact that Pakie's accident and death were seemingly not reported in the prosaic way that other, similar events were on the same day, and wonder, at least mildly, about the possible relations of power and documentation in this matter.

One of the original investigating detectives into the Somerton Man case, Lionel Leane, told the same Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) TV team which interviewed Alf Boxall in 1978 that while he was investigating the discovery of the body he had found a hypodermic syringe at the scene.[40] But Leane did not mention this during his evidence to the 1949 inquest and the ABC documentary omitted this portion of his interview. Why?[41]

[33] Cookson, *Inquest No. 45/1132*, 5.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 8.
[38] Ginzburg,"Microhistory", 21.
[39] Ibid.
[40] NAA: C673, INSIDE STORY PART 2, 61.
[41] Again, it is interesting to note that Leane took pains at the 1949 inquest to state that there was no evidence to support the suicide theory (Cleland, 28), and, in view of no puncture marks having been found on the body, to emphasise that "I think it is probably quite possible

The available life story of Helmut Hendon is an enigma in its own right, above and beyond his involvement in this case. He was born Heinz Hellmut Hönig in Berlin in 1909.[42] His early life remains almost entirely opaque before his arrival in Australia as a stateless refugee in 1937, but he came from Spain, then enduring the agonies of civil war, and claimed to have been one of that nation's leading broadcasters. I have not yet been able to unearth any evidence to substantiate his claim, but nevertheless within six months of his arrival in Australia, after changing his name, he was giving lectures on international politics over ABC radio. How did he get onto the national broadcaster so quickly? Exactly what did he have to say on it? (He also lectured on international politics and radio broadcasting at Pakie's Club at least twice prior to WW2.) In 1943, he was apparently conscripted into the army, where he was placed in an 'Employment Company'—a special unarmed rear echelon unit for 'enemy aliens,' where they could be safely watched. Despite all his apparent gifts, he remained a private throughout his perhaps reluctant service, and his service record largely consists of episodes of hospitalisation for rheumatism and episodes of going absent without leave. One of these occurs from 6–7 May 1945, the morning of the day on which Pakie fatally encountered the army truck.[43]

After the death of Dorothy Graham in his flat and his discharge from the army a few months later, Hendon attempted to become an actor and writer. When these efforts came to nothing, he married and went into business with a jewellery wholesaler. By the 1950s, he was prosperous enough to buy a house in Castlecrag, the exclusive North Shore suburb planned by Burley Griffin (and once inhabited by Pakie Macdougall). I can as yet find no record of his presumed death and burial, but he disappears from the Australian electoral record in the late 1960s. Alf Boxall died in retirement in Canberra in 1995, having added nothing further to his views on the case. 'Jestyn' Harkness eventually married the car dealer she had passed off to the Adelaide police as her husband, and as mentioned she died in 2007, again without adding anything more about the case to the public record.

Pakie's Club was taken over by Robin Macdougall and continued operating until its final closure in 1966, although without ever regaining its prewar status. Hendon's name appears sporadically in its guest-book (preserved in the National Library of Australia) until the early 1960s, as do those of contemporary intellectuals such as Xavier Herbert (Alf Boxall's World War II colleague) and Miles

to inject into the finger and leave no puncture mark." (Ibid., 37) By the time of the ABC interview in 1978, however, after his retirement, he inclined to the suicide theory.

[42] See: National Archives of Australia, Department of the Interior [II], Central Office, A435, *Class 4 correspondence files relating to naturalisation*, *26 Apr 1939–31 Dec 1950*, 1944/4/2763; Hendon Hellmut Horace – born 15 December 1909 – Stateless.

[43] National Archives of Australia, 2 Echelon, Army Headquarters, B884, *Citizen Military Forces Personnel Dossiers, 1939–1947*, N463175, Hendon Hellmut Horace: Service Number – N463175: Date of birth – 15 Dec 1909: Place of birth – Berlin Germany: Place of enlistment – Paddington NSW: Next of Kin – Wagner Wolfgang.

Franklin. The names of Boxall, Graham, Harkness and Marshall have never been identified in the book, although since it was apparently only used on special occasions this does not preclude their presence there.[44] In 1947 a 'radio chess match' was held between members of the long-established chess club at Pakie's Club and players in Canada. The moves were transmitted by radio, using a special chess code called Gringmuth notation.[45] This code resembles the letter sequences found in the back of the Adelaide *Rubáiyát*; in fact, there is only one letter in the *Rubáiyát* code which does not appear in Gringmuth notation, although as a description of a chess match the *Rubáiyát* code is meaningless gibberish.

Does this have any significance? Perhaps. In fact, it might be the occasion for a certain juxtaposition of the microhistory of Somerton Man with broader global politics. One of the attendees at the chess match in Sydney in 1947 was Fyodor Nosov, the TASS correspondent in Sydney and an alleged asset of Soviet intelligence.[46] Nosov's name would later figure in the famous 'Petrov Affair,' the sensational defection of two married Russian diplomatic staff in Australia in 1954, amid allegations of widespread Russian penetration of the Australian government.

In fact, an Australian weblog maintained by former intelligence agents has recently identified the Somerton Man as Pavel Ivanovich Fedosimov, the former deputy vice-consul in New York and the alleged NKVD *rezident* (roughly intelligence station chief) there until his recall to Russia in late July 1948, after which his movements are unknown.[47] This attribution may be more convincing than others: Fedosimov had been the handler for American atomic spies until the American "Venona" program of decryption of intercepted Russian radio communications began to close in on them at this time. South Australia in 1948 was not only the centre of the incipient British missile testing system but was also reputed to be the location of rich new deposits of uranium ore.[48] (It was also claimed to be the location of a Venona intercept station.[49]) Fedosimov certainly would have had

[44] It is also perhaps notable that in explaining his movements before the death of Dorothy Graham, Hendon was careful to stipulate to the coroner, Cookson, that the day before her death he had visited "Paekies in Elizabeth Street" [*sic*], although what bearing this had on the situation he did not explain. Cookson, *Inquest No. 45/1132*, 5.

[45] "A Test Match Would Take 16 Hours," *Sydney Sun and Guardian*, no. 2305, 15 June 1947, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/24816141.

[46] His signature and that of his wife are present in the relevant (unnumbered) page of the preserved guest-book of Pakie's Club; Pakies Club (Sydney, N.S.W.) & Franklin, Miles, 1879–1954 & Keesing, Nancy, 1923–1993 & Gilmore, Mary Dame, 1865–1962 & Herbert, Xavier, 1901–1984 et al. 1928, *Records.*, accessed May 10 2017, https://www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/personal/dabbott/wiki/index.php/Primary_source_material_on_the_Taman_Shud_Case.

[47] 'Gordon332,' "Somerton Man: The Trap: Important Update: Match for SMs Teeth? Updated 22nd January 15.40," *Tamam Shud* (blog), 19 January 2017, accessed 14 May 2017, http://tamamshud.blogspot.com.au/2017/01/somerton-man-trap.html#comment-form.

[48] See, for instance: "Uranium Quest," editorial, *Adelaide Advertiser* 91, no. 28076, 1 October 1948, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/2657124.

[49] 'Gordon332,' "Somerton Man: Venona or Venom? Why Was He Killed?," *Tamam Shud* (blog), 9 August 2014, accessed 1 August 2017, http://tamamshud.blogspot.com.au/2014/07/somerton-man-venona-or-venom-why-was-he.html.

pressing reasons to be in Adelaide in late 1948, but he is also said to have subsequently served as a delegate to a Russian delegation at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the late 1950s. This is not a confirmed sighting, however, and research is proceeding.

The American source of some of the clothing and impedimenta of Somerton Man is also explained if they were being used by Fedosimov, himself recently in America, although of course this contradicts the American origin of the body alleged by DNA testing. This origin story is itself contestable, however, as it was conducted on samples from Somerton Man's alleged son by Jestyn rather than on the body of Somerton Man itself, exhumation for this purpose having been refused by the South Australian government.[50] Nevertheless, there are also problems with the conventional explanation of Fedosimov's supposed arrival in Adelaide. This assumes that he arrived undercover as a member of a Russian delegation to a United Nations economic conference which was being held outside Sydney in December 1948. According to surveillance material gathered by the embryonic Australian intelligence organisation ASIO, one man and one woman from the delegation apparently went missing during their aircraft's refueling stopover in Darwin in northern Australia the day before Somerton Man was first seen on the beach.[51] It is just conceivable that, assuming the man was actually Fedosimov and headed for Adelaide, he managed to get there overnight (a feat of considerable difficulty!) and died on the beach the next day in pursuit of some opaque goal. However, if that was the case, then Fedosimov also managed to fit in a stop at an Australian haberdashery to acquire a pair of trousers which had been made in Victoria, and also acquired some thread to mend them as well as the time and need to do so.

Clearly, all of this is very much a subject in a state of considerable flux, with various intriguing leads still remaining to be followed, but in conclusion the patient reader may be asking what there is which actually formally connects Somerton Man to Pakie's Club, Pakie's Club to the Boxall-Jestyn nexus, and any of it at all to the unfortunate Marshall?

The candid answer must be nothing—yet. At least not directly. And yet Marshall's body, complete with *Rubáiyát*, arrived in the record at about the same time and almost around the corner from the pub in Mosman where another *Rubáiyát* was exchanged between acquaintances. The Adelaide *Rubáiyát* (long since lost) is said to be such a rare edition that a precise duplicate has never been located, leading some to speculate that it was a special one-off edition used for espionage purposes. Perhaps it was, but the same claim has been made about the Marshall *Rubáiyát*, whereas I located a copy of that edition in the rare books

[50] And, obviously, Jestyn may have had a son with someone else altogether who was an American.
[51] See: National Archives of Australia, Attorney-General's Department, Central Office – Solicitor-General's Office, M1509, 1, *Subject file, alphabetical series (classified)*, Correspondence, Reports and Statements, 1948–1955, Lapstone, 28.

section of an American university library. One should not get carried away into conspiracy theories: for example, claims about the existence of 'micro-writing' in the Adelaide *Rubáiyát* code seem hard to sustain, given that they are being made on the basis of a heavily enlarged copy of a photograph of a tracing of some faint impressions made on a page which no longer exists.

Even so, it is at least a little odd that the Boxall *Rubáiyát*, which survived at least until Boxall showed it to the ABC in 1978, is a dual-language edition which was translated by a professor who is credited with having done unspecified intelligence work for the Australian army during the war.[52] The second language is that of the late George Marshall's home: Malay.

Is microhistory mocking its adherents with still another ultimately meaningless coincidence? Ginzburg says that obstacles to microhistorical research must become part of the account of that research, like lacunæ in the sources. If the purpose of history is the search for meaning in events which have already taken place, what is one to do if study suggests that the events being considered *have* no meaning? As I tried to work towards some sort of understanding of these events, the incompleteness of the record proved frustrating, but one thing seemed fairly clear; whatever was taking place could not be understood, if it was to be understood at all, outside of the larger geopolitical milieu in which it was embedded. A few general remarks on this broader context will therefore bring this text to a close, rather than a 'conclusion.'

A Dead Man on the Beach—The Dance of Politics

The story of Somerton Man took place in the context of early Cold War Australia, amidst nuclear shadow-boxing which would require a book to fully clarify. At the time at which the man was found dead on the beach, the British government had been frozen out of nuclear weapons research by the Americans, breaching a wartime agreement made between Churchill and Roosevelt (but not honoured by Truman). The Australian government had been declared a security risk by the Americans in May 1948, due to Venona intercepts revealing a high-level leak in the Australian government. The Australian government was already lending support to the British weapons testing programs with personnel and territory, particularly the Anglo-Australian Long Range Weapons Establishment, or as it eventually became known the Woomera Rocket Range in South Australia. The Australian government apparently accepted that it would be denied access to any resulting technology. A major influence on the British Labour government's decision to pursue their own nuclear capability was the wish to maintain prestige against the Americans as much as to deter the Russians. There was also a fear of a uranium

[52] "Malayan Nursery Rhymes," *The West Australian* 63, no. 19144, 22 November 1947, 5, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/3813505.

shortage at the major source for both American and British uranium ore at the time, the Shinkolobwe mine in the Congo. And, as we have seen, South Australia was something of a crossroads for all these powerful interests. It is notable that when the official enquiries into the death of Somerton Man were finally closed by the same coroner in South Australia in 1958, the second inquest document consisted almost entirely of a carbon copy of the first document with some general closing remarks being added by Cleland. Despite the finding of the Adelaide *Rubáiyát* having been made just a month after the adjournment *sine die* (to some other day) of the first inquest, despite the discovery of the code in the book and the world-around publicity given to it, despite the involvement of Jestyn Harkness and Alf Boxall in the case, however peripherally—not a single one of these matters is even mentioned in the official document which is supposed to close the official deliberations on the case, created and signed off with an open verdict by the same official who presided over the first enquiry. Does this not strike the reader as a somewhat remarkable oversight under the circumstances?

Still, the atomic connection *in toto*—like the identification of Fedosimov—remains speculative, however plausible. Other theories have been suggested; many of them, which the interested reader can easily find for him- or herself. It is often claimed that the death of George Marshall and the other events in Sydney in 1945 are not related to the main case. While it is certainly still a possibility that all of these very strange events are unrelated and the thread of the *Rubáiyát* weaving through this cavalcade of death really is, as Boxall put it, an astonishing coincidence, I would suggest that I have offered some tentative evidence to the contrary.[53]

Postscript—On (And Perhaps Somewhat Against) Method

We began this paper with some reflections on Carlo Ginzburg's warning about the futility of what one might call 'speculative microhistory,' specifically the notion expressed by the author of the microhistorical ur-text *Pickett's Charge* that the outcome of a decision to charge a single particular cavalry unit at the Battle of Gettysburg may have materially influenced the outcome of the entire American Civil War. In a very worthwhile sequence of reflections on this question, Jill Lapore points out (from an American perspective) that "there is no American school of microhistory, no mission statement ... and few if any self-professed practitioners," (this was in 2001), so that "we are left to define the genre by its examples, except that, if my suspicion is correct, no one agrees on what those ex-

[53] As an instance of one of various findings I have been forced to omit from this paper due to lack of space, why did the Sydney-based newspaper of the Communist Party of Australia, the *Tribune*, advertise the *Rubáiyát* for sale in late 1948 and early 1949 and at no other time in its decades-long history?

amples are."[54] She then points out, a little subversively, that none of the "hitherto obscure people" (a term Lapore cites from a conference's paper call) who have been the subject of microhistorical studies were actually particularly "obscure" or mundane in their own lives, including Ginzburg's Menocchio; as Lapore points out, "these stories are epics."[55] Instead, Lapore suggests, the subject of microhistory rests "not in its uniqueness, but in its exemplariness, in how that individual's life serves as an allegory for broader issues affecting the culture as a whole."[56] In his paper discussing the nature of microhistory, Ginzburg cites Tolstoy's *War and Peace* as the origin of his (and Tolstoy's) "conviction that a historical phenomenon can become comprehensible only by reconstructing the activities of *all* the persons who participated in it."[57] I believe that applying just these principles to the Somerton Man case, coupled with the acceptance of incompleteness both in the sense of unanswered (and possibly unanswerable) questions and numerous lacunæ in sources, is precisely what distinguishes this study as microhistory rather than biography or conspiracy theory.

The Somerton Man case as it appears in the light of my research is, amongst other things, a story of individuals interacting through and participating in historical currents at least partly beyond their control. I was not consciously aware of conforming to 'microhistorical' principles while I was conducting my research, but the idealistic socialism of Pakie Macdougall, the energetic ambition of the "evil and ruthless" cosmopolitan Helmut Hendon, even the recurrence of the '*ersatz*-orientalism' of the FitzGerald *Rubáiyát* itself (now so antiquated but still highly influential at that time), and especially the hints of atomic espionage which seem to be constantly at the periphery of the Adelaide part of the story all serve to illuminate, in their own small ways, the broader canvas of Australian and indeed global history at a time of deep and tumultuous transformation. Whether Somerton Man was in fact some species of 'atomic spy' or not, speculation about this possibility may help to emphasise the significance of contemporary atomic politics which, as we have seen, impelled the Australian prime minister, Ben Chifley, to give his reluctant consent to British oversight in the reform of Australian security services in 1948 to form the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). This was a decision on the part of a left-leaning Labor prime minister which puzzled contemporary observers and has only been interpreted in the context of Venona comparatively recently.[58]

In this way, 'microhistory' might perhaps be usefully thought of as a different and 'broader' kind of 'section' through the 'cone' of history. The history of the

[54] Jill Lapore, "Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography," *The Journal of American History* 88, no. 1 (June 2001): 129–144, 130.
[55] Ibid., 131.
[56] Ibid., 133.
[57] Ginzburg, "Microhistory," 24.
[58] See: Frank Cain, **"**Venona in Australia and Its Long-Term Ramifications," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (April 2000): 231–248, http://www.jstor.org/stable/261205.

'Great Men' who give the orders is a small perfect circle taken from at or near the apex; the history of the you-and-me who execute, resist and do most of the endurance of the consequences of these orders is a far broader elliptical section taken from much lower down. Both sections are useful to the description of the overall figure; neither is sufficient in itself. Is it possible that they might even be complimentary?

Acknowledgements and Dedication

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Ms Iris Jastram, Reference and Instruction Librarian at Gould Library, Carleton College, Minnesota, for her location of a copy of the 'non-existent' seventh Methuen edition of the Rubáiyát (the version found on Marshall) in the rare books section of that library. Thanks are also due to Mr Timothy Pwee, Senior Librarian, Content & Services at the National Library of Singapore, for his kindly making available a scan of Marshall's own book Just You and I for my research. The help and encouragement of my old friend Matthew Kay, a fount of knowledge on subjects relating to historical Sydney, was invaluable and is deeply appreciated. The profound usefulness of the Trove service of digitised newspapers maintained by the National Library of Australia is self-evident throughout this paper, and the cuts recently proposed to its funding would have amounted to a depressing act of national self-lobotomization. Thanks are of course also due to the staff at the Government Records Depository at Kingswood, Sydney, for their provision of the inquest records for Pakie Macdougall and Gwen Graham. Two anonymous referees provided valuable advice and input which reshaped this work for the better in revision. The patient assistance of Alexandra Holmes (no relation) of Global Histories was also greatly helpful throughout the process.

Finally, this paper is dedicated to the memory of my late brother Simon Holmes (1963–2017), who swam so uneasily in his own particular microhistorical current. May he be at peace now in whatever, if anything, lies beyond what Ambrose Bierce called "the part of immortality that we know about."[59]

[59] Ambrose Bierce, *The Enlarged Devil's Dictionary*, ed. E. J. Hopkins (Middlesex: Penguin, 1983), 227.

Book Reviews

The Voynich Manuscript

Edited by Raymond Clemens, Introduction by Deborah Harkness, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. Pp. 304, Hardback $50.00, ISBN: 978-0-300-21723-0

REVIEWED BY DAVID LANG

In 1921, renowned rare books salesman Wilfrid M. Voynich declared to the New York Times that he had in his possession proof to the world "that the black magic of the middle ages consisted in discoveries far advance of twentieth century science," which he promptly valued at over $100,000. (p.18) The proof that Voynich referred to was a medieval manuscript written in an unknown language, decorated with fantastic drawings of otherworldly plants and naked women bathing in interconnected pools of green liquid, with foldouts of intricate star maps and other miscellaneous etchings within. It was believed to be the work of Roger Bacon (1214–1292) or John Dee (1527–1608/9) by the finite number of individuals Voynich allowed to examine the manuscript; limited private access would continue after Voynich's death in 1930 until 1969, when rare books collector H.P. Kraus donated the manuscript to Yale University. Popularly known as the Voynich Manuscript after its 20th century advocate, the medieval document, with its true name and author unknown, dazzled and perplexed all who studied it, including master cryptologist William F. Friedman and semiotician Umberto Eco. To date, there have been only two compilations of scholarly articles centered around research of the medieval manuscript. The first was gathered by Yale Professor of Philosophy Robert S. Brumbaugh in 1978, entitled *The Most Mysterious Manuscript: The Voynich "Roger Bacon" Cipher Manuscript*,[1] the second being the very collection under review, compiled by curator Raymond Clemens of the Yale University Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library in 2016.

What sets Clemens' *The Voynich Manuscript* apart is that it contains, for the first time ever in a format available to the public, a physical facsimile of the enigmatic medieval manuscript itself, copied meticulously to match the actual size and scale of each delicate original calfskin page. At 246 pages long, the facsimile occupies the center of the collection, with proceeding pages vii to xi containing the "Introduction" by Deborah Harkness and the "Preface" by Raymond Clemens, followed by pages 1 to 59 containing six recently published scholarly articles on the study of the Voynich Manuscript. Clemens has decided not to paginate the facsimile with conventional numbering but opted instead to rely on the numbering of folios already present within the manuscript, which are believed to have been added in the 16th century. This means that readers must navigate the manuscript

[1] Robert S. Brumbaugh, *The Most Mysterious Manuscript: The Voynich "Roger Bacon" Cipher Manuscript* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978).

in the manner of Voynich and his successors, noting the number in the upper right hand corner of each right-side page as the folio number of the *recto* (the current page) and the *verso* (the following left-side page). Therefore, the first 'page' of the facsimile, *folio* 1 *recto*, which contains the *ex libris* of Jacobus Horčicky de Tepenec (1575–1622), pharmacist to Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (1552–1612), is followed by *folio* 1 *verso*, then *folio* 2 *recto*, *folio* 2 *verso*, and so on. Clemens' decision to leave the facsimile untampered with, only adds to the feeling of authenticity towards the copied manuscript, and invites the reader to explore and uncover the mystery as Voynich and many scholars have previously sought to do.

When one opens *The Voynich Manuscript*, they are first met with the cryptic facsimile of a letter "concerning the cipher MS", written by the late Ethel Voynich only days after her husband's death. Immediately, the reader feels as if they themselves are tasked with deciphering the riddle of the authorship and message of the manuscript by examining the primary source material, which ultimately serves as the collection's *raison d'être*. Indeed, it is the actual Voynich Manuscript in physical form that serves as Clemens' greatest contribution to the continuing saga of the mysterious manuscript, as the six scholarly articles serve almost exclusively to introduce the reader to the document and its history.

The first article, René Zandbergen's "Earliest Owners," is a well-written narrative of the earliest owners of the manuscript agreed upon by scholars, starting with the aforementioned pharmacist de Tepenec, and ending with the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680), whose 1637 letter to Jesuit Theodor Moretus (1602–1667) was re-discovered in 2008 by historian Josef Smolka and now is the earliest known reference to the Voynich Manuscript. (p.5) Smolka's recent contribution to the manuscript's history is later matched by Greg Hodgins in the third article "Physical Findings," whose radiocarbon dating of the calfskin pages of the manuscript in 2009 place the parchment's origin between 1404 and 1438 with 95 percent probability. (p.28) Besides these two notable developments, the remaining articles, Arnold Hunt's "Voynich the Buyer" and Raymond Clemens' "The World's Most Mysterious Manuscript," only delve into the document's history without proposing any new theories or approaches to uncovering the mystery, with the welcome exception of Jennifer M. Rampling's "Alchemical Traditions." In her article, Rampling proposes a comparative understanding of the pictures in the "balneology section" of the manuscript with 15th century alchemical imagery as a means of possibly uncovering meaning with the absence of philological understanding. (p.47) This approach of Rampling's is the result of nearly a century of philological and cryptological failure with regards to deciphering the manuscript, which William Sherman's article "Cryptographic Attempts" briefly covers, including the famed conclusion of cryptologist William F. Friedman that the manuscript's message remains unknown even after forty years of research, the result of "an early attempt to construct an artificial or universal language." (p.42)

As *The Voynich Manuscript* abruptly concludes with Raymond Clemens' closing article, the reader is left longing for more; the strange drawings explained, the authorship confirmed, the fantastic script translated and alphabetized, but to no avail. Rather, Raymond Clemens' *The Voynich Manuscript* best serves to introduce the reader to one of the greatest mysteries of the medieval European world by placing the very document in the hands of the reader, allowing them to take on the role of the historian and cryptologist that exists within one's self whenever curiosity is piqued by an unsolvable puzzle. Despite the disappointing nature of the articles within, which contain recent developments and new approaches countable on one hand, the quality of the facsimile provides more than enough historical value, with its otherworldly images and script that have excited and baffled scholars for centuries. It is the job of the historian to constantly pursue historical context and fact despite a myriad of seemingly indiscernible information, and indeed the Voynich Manuscript, with all its mystery, personifies this ultimate pursuit of truth, one in which the solution itself is not always as interesting as the problem itself.

The Autonomous City: A History of Urban Squatting

By Alexander Vasudevan, New York: Verso, 2017. Pp. 292, Paperback $26.95, ISBN: 978-1-78168-786-4

REVIEWED BY DENNIS KÖLLING

The recent public debates surrounding the involvement of activists from the Rote Flora in the riots surrounding the 2017 G20 summit in Hamburg, as well as the extended coverage of the Occupy movement—to name only two prominent examples—have repeatedly testified to the significance of the practice of squatting in the repertoire of urban political activists. The practice, however, has been widely neglected in the field of history so far, and it is hard to find a contemporary global historical account of squatting as a radical political practice, with the notable exception of the edited volume *The City is Ours: Squatting and Autonomous Movements in Europe From The 1970s to The Present*.[1]

Alexander Vasudevan's monograph *The Autonomous City* expands on the topics explored in the collection *The City is Ours* and weaves a number of national or local histories of urban squatting into what is claimed to be the "first popular history of squatting as practiced in Europe and North America" on the back cover of the book. Vasudevan connects the histories of local squatter movements in various cities across Western Europe and North America by dividing his book into eight topical chapters that each present a theme illustrated by the example of one or sometimes two cities.

Vasudevan's interest in squatting is twofold: on the one hand it is rather structural, or geographical, as he examines squatter groups as "movements that shared a radical geographical sensibility that operated at a critical distance from the state." (p.10) Squatting here becomes a political act, or "a place where one could (quite literally) *build* an alternative world." In addition, via the process of this world-making, Vasudevan's examination also falls back to the individual level of his actors. Imagining a new urbanism entailed the reflection on identity, "[i]t offered an opportunity to *become a squatter*, to explore new identities and different intimacies, to experience and share feelings and to organize and live collectively." (p.10)

Vasudevan's historical account then integrates these conceptual, political, and cultural questions as he follows individual squatters' movements in the larger context of emerging social movements from the 1960s on. Merging these two strings of his argument, he asserts "[a]t the heart of the book is an account of squatting as the political *other* to 'creative destruction,' such that we continue to find in the lives, spaces and practices of squatters an alternative vision of the city that grows ever more necessary and urgent in the face of capitalist urbanisation [sic]." (p.12)

[1] Bart van der Steen, Ask Katzeff, and Leendert van Hoogenhuijze, *The City is Ours: Squatting and Autonomous Movements in Europe From The 1970s to The Present* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2014).

Vasudevan presents a wide topical range in the set-up of his book. Individual chapters explore shantytowns, the practice of squatting as an anti-poverty strategy, the politics of remembering in the squatters' movements and a form of collective world-making inherent in the practice, squatting as a form of preservation and neighborhood organizing, the relation of squatters' movements to violence, makeshift urbanisms, ideas of self-determination and autonomy, the controversial relationship between settler colonialism and squatting, as well as the meaning of squatting in the contemporary neoliberal city. Vasudevan connects these historically different articulations of squatting using a red thread of commonality; all his actors saw squatting as a strategy to reassemble the social of the city, to reimagine urbanism to make it more inclusive and, in the words of Lefebvre's famous dictum, to articulate an 'alternative right to the city.'

Vasudevan's geographical diversity is as impressive as his topic range: the individual chapters in *The Autonomous City* cover squatters' movements from New York, London, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, Bologna, and Vancouver. Global Historians would surely be right to raise the critique of Euro-American-centrism at this point. However, while Vasudevan's history of urban squatting is definitely not narrated in global dimensions, he still deserves credit for his usage of a wide variety of original sources in six different languages. Most of his chapters are based on archive-heavy research, which he integrates well into his overarching narrative.

Vasudevan's source-base widely fits his argument for a "popular" history of urban squatting, while allowing him to make a concise and well-reasoned case. A great number of his sources are taken from squatters' memoirs, as well as political artifacts such as leaflets and do-it-yourself squatting handbooks. This provides a unique insight into the squatter's world, highlighting the processes of world-making and urban imagination that run parallel to political and social agendas connected to squatting. While the type of sources he engages with vary from chapter to chapter, depending on which overarching theme he is exploring, Vasudevan manages to integrate a structural, even conceptual, approach to squatting with an investigation into the lives of the actors that made use of the strategies he discusses.

Although Vasudevan manages to weave together the structural and individual levels very well in his narrative, he nevertheless neglects to point towards interconnections between the individual case studies he is concerned with. While his individual chapters are mostly coherent in their argument, Vasudevan only partially engages with possible interconnections between the actors he follows in different chapters. Some of the sources he is using, however, do hint at the fact that squatters' movements were, at least to some degree, connected across national borders, a topic which definitely deserves further historical attention. Unfortunately, Vasudevan's account falls short here as most movements he discusses

appear almost historically contingent, a feature which highlights that his overall focus is more of a geographical than historical nature. For the book to be considered a truly (global) historical account, Vasudevan would need to make more connections with the wider historical context of his narrative, which is always apparent in the background of his book but remains rather static throughout.

Nevertheless, *The Autonomous City* provides the reader with a conceptually diverse history of squatting in Europe and North America since the 1960s and engages critically with a wide variety of important questions. While his focus may stray towards the geographical, his minute treatment of varied sources serves as a great starting point for historians interested in exploring a popular history of squatters' movements. The strongest part of *The Autonomous City* is Vasudevan's approach to the topic from the bottom-up without glorifying actors and actions, and it deserves attention from an audience of historians.

The Spread of Modern Industry to the Periphery since 1871

Edited by Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke and Jeffrey Gale Williamson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 391, Hardback $82.46, ISBN: 978-0-19-875364-3

REVIEWED BY RYAN GLAUSER

Over the past decade, global history and its ideas have steadily diffused throughout academic writing. Economic history initially adopted global frameworks and ideas when discussing globalization and the spread of industrialization. Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke and Jeffery Gale Williamson continue this vein of research, but attempt to complicate it by introducing 'modernity' and 'periphery' as flexible terms, and pulling the timeframe of research backwards to include 1871. For the editors, "the periphery are *ex ante* unclear, and tend to depend in practice on the purpose at hand." (p.3) Meanwhile, their conception of 'modernity' is temporally flexible, however, 'modern' manufacturing is represented as Western European and American industrial structures of production. With these definitions, Southern, Eastern, and Southeastern European manufacturing are included within the typical periphery areas of the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. By expanding the concepts of 'periphery' and 'temporality', a general diffusion of 'modern' manufacturing can be sketched out that is simultaneously flexible and rigid.

The volume begins by tackling the issue of 'modern' manufacturing in Europe. In Chapter 3, Andrei Markevich and Steven Nafziger portray Russian manufacturing as a story of continuity from the Tsarist Empire through Stalin's industrialization policies and the later Soviet Union to Vladimir Putin's autocratic rule. The current state of the Russian economy developed as the result of heavy government involvement and direction over a century and a half that promoted heavy industries over consumer industries and desires, thus causing the Russian economy to form an oligopoly of state-run and supported firms. In Chapter 4, Alexander Klein, Max-Stephan Schulz, and Tamás Vonyó demonstrate the stratification of manufacturing within Central Europe, specifically in the former Habsburg Empire. The spread of manufacturing within the empire originated in Austria and the Czech lands, then steadily moved eastward and southward along railways to the periphery. This stratification continues to the present because of Cold War era investments which exacerbated these divisions. Chapter 5 deals with the lack of consistent manufacturing throughout Southeastern Europe despite foreign investments and apparent economic advantages, such as low labor costs and a proportionally high level of human capital. Michael Kopsidis and Martin Ivanov suggest that this failure is due to a combination of structural industrial problems, intensi-

fied international competition, and the Debt Crisis of 1979. In short, communism played a significant role, but cannot be considered the sole reason for sporadic manufacturing growth. Chapter 6 by Matteo Gomellini and Gianni Toniolo investigates the regional divide within Italian manufacturing. Their work focuses on the North-South divide within Italy and the attempt by Italian governments to close the gap through education programs and direct investments. Unlike the other chapters in this part, Gomellini and Toniolo conclude that the regional divide is due to geographical reasons and the lack of human capital, rather than numerous economic reasons. Part I concludes by touching on the Middle East and its structural problems: Ulaş Karakoc, Şevket Pamuk, and Laura Panza demonstrate how the rise and fall of Egyptian and Turkish manufacturing can be connected to protectionism and the cost of energy, specifically oil.

Part II jumps a couple thousand miles to the economies of East Asia. Chapter 8 tackles the typical 'Asian Tigers' of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Dwight H Perkins and John P Tang discuss how the growth of Japanese manufacturing cannot be used as an ideal form for East Asian manufacturing because of the change in geopolitical circumstances since World War I. Thus, the rise of Korean and Taiwanese manufacturing needs to be embedded into a Cold War and Bretton Woods framework rather than a British imperialist and free-trade approach. Perkins and Tang want to emphasize the importance of timing in the spread of manufacturing rather than the actual spread itself. Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G Rawski attempt to bring clarity to the industrialization of China by arguing for the continuity of present-day growth back to the nationalist government of Chiang Kia-Shek in Chapter 9. In their view, the miracle of Chinese growth is not solely due to the communist system of targeted investment and the ensuing liberalizing reforms of 1978 and 1995. Instead, the miracle needs to be traced back to the infrastructure and human capital investments made by Nationalist China in the 1920s because they laid the foundations for Mao Zedong and his industrial policy. Indian manufacturing and the emergence of a prominent service sector is discussed in Chapter 10 by Bishnupriya Gupta and Tirthankar Roy. The distinct structure of the Indian economy is traced back to the lack of manufacturing and economic investments outside of agriculture during the colonial period. Instead of implementing a mass industrialization program after independence in 1947, India created an autarkic industrial sector while steadily creating a profitable service sector in the 1970s. The second part closes with a quick investigation into the lagging industrial sectors of Southeast Asia by Jean-Pascal Bassino and Jeffery Gale Williamson. Chapter 11 revolves around the temporality of the manufacturing spread which can cause certain regions to lag behind others due to increases in global competition. In the case of Southeast Asia, the oil shocks of the 1970s provided the region with the opportunity to expand manufacturing, however, Chinese industrial production outpaced and surpassed Southeast Asian production by the 1980s. Thus, despite the highly

educated population, foreign investments, and apparent comparative advantages, time destroyed the "catching-up" phase for Southeast Asia. (p.281)

Part III crosses the Pacific Ocean and addresses manufacturing in Latin America. Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato and Graciela Márquez Colín show the economic influence of the United States and difficulties of market integration in rugged countries, such as Mexico and Peru, in Chapter 12. In the case of Mexico, the border with the American market encouraged economic growth and specialization within the industrial sector, but at the expense of economic stability. Meanwhile, Peru developed a more diverse industrial sector, but was hampered by its lack of local resources and access to international markets due to the rugged terrain. This trend of geography and influence of the United States continues in Chapter 13 as Xavier Duran, Aldo Musacchio, and Gerardo della Paolera discuss the emergence and stratification of the South American economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The authors state that "there is too much heterogeneity for a single theory to work," (p. 318) and that numerous local factors aided the process, but the common factor between them all was geography and the ability to access the American market, as well as the global market throughout the twentieth century, specifically from the 1970s to the 1990s.

Finally, Part IV crosses the Atlantic Ocean and ends with the "failure of Sub-Saharan African manufacturing." (p.345) Gareth Austin, Ewout Frankema, and Morten Jerven argue that Sub-Saharan Africa is considered a failure because of a misconception in the stage of development in which Sub-Saharan Africa currently exists. After independence in the 1960s, most of the continent experienced economic growth, especially in manufacturing. However, this was not part of the catching-up phase because the continent lacked necessary human capital, low labor costs, urbanization, and market access that would facilitate an economic boom. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa needs to continue its current process of creating the necessary conditions to cause an effective and permanent economic boom in the coming years.

In summary, the edited volume contains a complex and diverse set of articles that attempt to break a common historiographical conclusion around the spread of manufacturing. The diffusion of 'modern' manufacturing was a long process that can be traced to varying points for the entire world. The success and adoption of 'modern' manufacturing was also not guaranteed once the ideas and technology entered a region. These conclusions are based on statistical data and economic theory, then historical events are placed within this economic framework. This is a typical problem with econometric analyses that attempt to pull actors out of economic decisions and policies. The volume mentions local actors and decisions, but focuses on a general trend rather than explaining how and why this trend occurred. This is accomplished by using economic terminology and ideas, such as 'Dutch Disease Effects,' labor productivity, microeconomic variables, etc. By dis-

tilling the local into complex abstract terms, the volume creates an image in which the spread of 'modern' manufacturing was mainly caused by the will of the West through import-substitution programs and free trade policies, not local actors and their economic accomplishments.

Although the volume focuses on numbers and economic theory, it also emphasizes the discussion of temporality within the spread of manufacturing, which was accomplished by approaching the issue from a global perspective. This emphasis helps to demonstrate that regardless of economic policies, investments, human capital, urbanization, etc., economic growth and industrialization are affected by global circumstances and events outside the control of any single country. Therefore, future economic histories of 'modern' manufacturing, globalization, industrialization, and trade need to account for global trends, ideas, and events. These events shape the global economy indirectly and can cause certain countries to remain in the periphery, regardless of local economic decisions and circumstances.

Essaying the Past: How to Read, Write, and Think about History

By Jim Cullen, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2017. Pp. 197, Paperback £15.99, ISBN: 978-1-119-11190-0

REVIEWED BY ALEXANDRA HOLMES

Essay writing is eventually what all history comes down to, and yet many of us struggle to coherently put our thoughts down on paper in a manner that is both insightful and interesting. Cullen's *Essaying the Past* manages to encapsulate methods of achieving both, whilst retaining brevity (the slim volume only comes to 197 pages including index). Its helpful structure is designed to make sense read cover-to-cover or to allow the advanced writer to skip the unnecessary sections and find the nugget of wisdom they are seeking. This book was first published in 2009, and has been republished in its third updated edition this year. It is aimed at "high school, college, and graduate-level students," a wide range of academic levels; it is this breadth of intended readership which sets this book apart from other notable works in the field, such as Turabian's *Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, *The Craft of Research* by Wayne C. Booth et al. or *The Elements of Academic Style* by Hayot.[1] This need to be applicable to multiple levels of scholarship prevents *Essaying the Past* from becoming too prescriptive or technical, but this span also means that readers will inevitably find some parts of the book less useful than others and, despite the claim to be a "complete resource" for all levels, it is predominantly aimed at students beginning their foray into academia. However, it is this broad approach which allows Cullen to avoid becoming drearily caught up in overly rigid formulas for writing and focus instead on universally applicable aspects, including a welcome recognition of the importance of style.

Although the book is entitled "how to read, write, and think history," the main focus of the volume is on crafting essays and this is where its strength lies. The first six chapters cover the basics on reading and thinking about history, which will be useful to students starting out in the discipline but much of the content should not be news to anyone doing a degree in the subject. The second part of the book is dedicated to the topic of writing essays, which spans ten chapters. Each chapter is relatively short, giving advice on all the aspects of essay writing in bite-sized chunks. The order of the chapters mirror Cullen's proposed writing process, beginning with how to think about your essay, through to setting the crucial bare

[1] Wayne C. Booth et al., *The Craft of Research: Fourth ed. Chicago Guides to Writing, Editing, and Publishing* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016); Eric Hayot, *The Elements of Academic Style: Writing for the Humanities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Kate Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013)).

bones of question, thesis, and motive, the importance of a strong introduction, the necessity of clear signposting with concise but interesting 'topic sentences,' the key components of a convincing argument, and the importance of revision. Cullen draws on his own experience as a teacher, identifying the common pitfalls he finds in essays that have been submitted to him over the years, and he mines his past assignments for examples demonstrating his points on how to (and how not to) write. Being given the perspective of an essay marker is a helpful reminder of how others will see your work, and what they are looking for—as Cullen emphasises, knowing one's audience and tailoring one's prose to them is a critical part of writing successfully. Aside from the usual aspects of essay-writing that one expects from texts on the topic, such as structure, argument, evidence etc., Cullen also adds an imperative which appears to stem from his years in having to read student essays: don't be boring. Aside from crafting an essay which covers all the necessary academic requirements, he exhorts readers to consider their text from the perspective of drama—how to consider the rhythm of a paragraph, how to intrigue and draw your audience into the text. This is crucial advice that academics at any level of their career should consider. The final part is a series of appendices, giving a brief breakdown of the steps covered in part II as a checklist and specific issues that Cullen has found students struggle with such as bibliographic formats, proper citation, reliance on dubious websites, and how to tackle different varieties of essay including, conveniently, advice on how to structure a book review.

Cullen's real strength throughout is his obvious passion for the craft of academic writing and his enthusiasm for helping students discover the same joy. He describes writing as an "ethical act" because it forces the writer to think about someone other than themselves (both the subjects of the history under consideration and the reader). (p.151) For him the process of reading and writing history is "an intense experience that's emotional, intellectual, and even physical all at once." (p.60) This book serves not only to provide advice on how to write, but also motivation and insight into why we write, and why writing good history is an important endeavour to undertake. The frequently wry and informal tone prevents the book from becoming dry, although the pop culture references sometimes jar rather than put one at ease. Although much of the advice is aimed at US students, with specific references to US educational practices, the section dedicated to essay writing transcends his target audience. Even at a more advanced level it is useful to be reminded about best practice; his insistence on the importance of revising one's work and leaving sufficient time for all stages of essay-writing is an admonition that academics at all stages can take to heart. The explicit consideration of one's 'motive' for a piece is also a useful reminder to historians to reflect on why they are interested in a topic and to consider their personal stance towards their work. The need to explain why one's research is interesting, and placing it in a wider context is also a lesson many essays and articles would benefit from, but Cullen's repeated insistence on connecting this context to 'relevant lessons for to-

day' demonstrates the weakness of trying to appeal to too broad an audience. Cullen is not blind to the accusation of ahistoricity here, but rejoins that his aim is "to develop informed, engaged, and active citizens." (p.114) This is all very well, but signposting would be useful here to signal to his younger readers that whilst this may be acceptable in high school, it is not regarded as good academic practice.

However, *Essaying the Past* is overall a rich, informative text with advice that manages to span some, if not quite all, of the needs of students, from those just entering the field of history to those heading towards an academic career in the subject. Cullen succeeds in providing a useful and interesting writing aid for each stage of the essay process, and if at times the advice and examples appear too simplistic, it is worth remembering how many pieces of work, even published ones, could do with paying more attention to seemingly simple ideas such as clarity of prose, defining key concepts, and above all, being interesting.

Conference Reviews

Global History Student Conference
Freie Universität Berlin, May 2017

REVIEWED BY KATHLEEN BURKE

Kathleen Burke graduated with a joint M.A. in History from Humboldt-Universtität zu Berlin and King's College London, where she specialised in researching global food history of the Portuguese and Dutch empires. She is currently pursuing her Ph.D. at the University of Toronto, where she is focusing on developing further productive linkages between global history and food history.

Three years after its establishment, the annual Global History Student Conference in Berlin remains one of a kind. It is one of the few conferences open to both undergraduate and graduate students in global history, and gives them an opportunity presenting their work to an international audience of peers. At the same time, it provides the responsible student team with the chance to gain experience in holding an academic conference. The Berlin conference has inspired students to organise similar conferences in other European capitals. Spanning two days, the 2017 conference topics covered a range of temporal and geographical spaces and drew students from around 20 different countries. The generous funding offered by the Center for Global History at the Freie Universität (FU) sets it apart from the majority of other student conferences, and gives the organisers the opportunity to widen the geographical range of participants, as well as to refine their experience over the years in running a successful conference.

Three years on, the conference also provided an opportunity to reflect on the state of the art of global history research. For the first time, the conference included thematic workshops on new methodologies such visual history and digital humanities. This was a welcome addition, and future conferences could look at making the workshops even more praxis-focused. As in previous years, the conference also raised broad questions about global history. While many of these remained unanswered, the quality of the discussions around methodology has deepened over the years of the conference's existence.

The question of methodological Eurocentrism has remained a key theme over the three years. This is a complicated question that a single student conference cannot be expected to answer, but it seems like a preoccupation that will not go away. This reflects, of course, broader institutional structures and trends in which the conference is implicated, but which go far beyond it. Some student participants were critical of the fact that the majority of presenters were from European universities. Of course, a global history student conference held in New Delhi or Shanghai would look completely different, and likely reflect a different set of geographical and institutional biases. Others countered that despite students' own

position in the global hierarchy of universities, they should strive to use sources in non-European languages in their work, in order to develop new non-Eurocentric paradigms. At the same time, the discussion invariably left a few questions unresolved, particularly how the desire to transcend methodological Eurocentrism was a particularly Eurocentric concern, and how different conversations might be taking place in universities outside of the Atlantic.

There was also discussion about whether to 'mainstream' gender throughout panel discussions, or to dedicate a separate panel on gender history. While the first two Berlin conferences had separate panels on gender and sexuality, the 2017 edition tried the approach of mainstreaming gender throughout different panels. There are risks and benefits to both approaches. The compartmentalisation of gender history risks reducing it to a side-issue that some academics, for example global economic historians, do not consider relevant to their work. The tendency for some historians to dismiss gender as 'women's' history is related to this, despite the aim of gender history to investigate the production of both masculinities and femininities in a relational sense. The mainstreaming approach has the advantage of avoiding the 'siloisation' of gender, but risks trivialising it at the same time. As long as gender inequality remains within academic structures themselves, it is difficult to know which approach carries less risk, but the 2017 conference was a good opportunity to experiment with the mainstreaming approach and reflect on what kinds of messages this sends.

As in any conference, it can be hard to stimulate audience engagement, but perhaps this is especially in global history where the remit of time periods and geographical spaces is so broad. The 2017 conference tried to rectify this by circulating papers to panel members in advance, with the suggestion that speakers draw links to broader methodological themes. Not everyone took up this challenge of course, but chairs made particular efforts to draw out broader implications and link detailed work into larger theoretical debates. This helped to get all the panel members engaged and avoid a situation where only a few panel members had the opportunity to answer questions.

Building on the successful workshops, future iterations of the conference could consider how to share the knowledge acquired by students and staff at FU with a wider audience. For example, students at the FU also run a journal on global history that only accepts student submissions and is peer-reviewed by students. While the keynote lecture discussed the different target audiences of major journals in urban history, a similar kind of review of academic journals would also be useful in global history. Members of the 'Global Histories' journal team could also share some of their knowledge about the peer review process and how to get work ready for publication, as this is a mystifying process for most students. There is also considerable faculty expertise on how to position oneself for an aca-

demic career in global history, as well as the differences between the European and US systems, which might also be beneficial for students.

Overall, the 2017 conference was a testament to the hard work of the organisers and the participants. There was a palpable sense of team spirit among the organising committee, which showed through in almost all aspects of the conference. Networking—one of the key aspects of every conference—was also well facilitated, with ample opportunities to mingle over coffee or a post-conference beer. Students with an interest in global history are strongly encouraged to apply, as it gives them an opportunity to showcase their work within a more relaxed context before moving on to larger conferences in their academic career.

World History Student Conference
King's College London, May 2017

REVIEWED BY DENNIS KÖLLING

Dennis Kölling holds an undergraduate degree in North American Studies from the John-F.-Kennedy-Institute at Freie Universität Berlin and is studying in the MA program in Global History at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He just completed a year abroad at Vanderbilt University. His main research interests include the Global Cold War, (post-)modern cultural history with a focus on meanings of music, and the contemporary history of neoliberal capitalism.

While structural analysis and materialist abstractions from empirical data will "remain indispensable" for historical research, Pankaj Mishra admonishes that "our unit of analysis should also be the *irreducible human being,* his or her fears, desires and resentments."[1] Still quite fresh from the press in May 2017, the arguments of Mishra's *Age of Anger* did not only serve for a hot discussion topic at the pre- and post-conference pub-crawls, but the book's inherent dialectic between structuralism and human agency also provides a good framework for the methodological questions raised at the second World History Student Conference at King's College London. The question of positionality and the tense relationship between structure and individual were the core themes underlying the many engaging discussions among students and practitioners of global forms of history at the conference.

I was fortunate to visit the conference organized by King's College History graduate students as part of an ongoing cooperation with our own Global History Student Conference in Berlin. The tightly packed program from 9am until 6pm featured opening remarks by Rhodes Professor of Imperial History Richard Drayton, followed by three sessions of two simultaneous panels. The panels catered to a wide array of fields, namely, the History of Science, Internationalism, Social Movements and Ideology, Experiencing the Other, Urban History, and Labor History. The conference was concluded with a methodological roundtable which reflected upon the preceding panels and presented ideas and concepts to rethink how to write histories of global entanglement.

From the very beginning, the opening remarks of Professor Drayton emphasized the need to critically reflect on the methodologies of Global and World History. He cautioned that the terms "global, transnational, and intercultural" have been used inflationary in academia, and that historians should create connected narratives instead of compiling "lists of examples" which supposedly demonstrate a global reach. Global History after all should not become a federation of individ-

[1] Pankaj Mishra, *Age of Anger: A History of the Present* (London: Allen Lane, 2017). 35.

ual national histories and area studies, but should develop its own clearly articulated set of methods and frameworks. When making his case, Professor Drayton touched upon the themes of positionality, and the relationship between structure and agency: historians should stay aware of who writes historical narratives. Furthermore, they should go beyond creating structural accounts of globality and rediscover how the local, national, and regional levels have been entangled at all times. In this way, Professor Drayton also stressed the revisionist character of a global historical perspective by emphasizing the need of rethinking and realigning existing historical narratives in addition to writing "new" ones.

Many of the presentations given by students offered further food for thought that went beyond the level of case studies into the methodological conception of historical writing. This was widely reflected in the reactions from the audience: the three or four short ten-minute presentations on each panel were followed by lively discussions with attendants that often revolved around quintessential questions underlying the recent discourse on World History and Global History such as: how to differentiate between World History, Global History, and Transnational History? How does a transnational or global perspective change the narratives that historians produce? Does a global narrative automatically privilege structural analysis and how can we reintegrate individual human agency into seemingly dehumanized transnational networks? And, simply, how to overcome the language barriers that condition every global historical study?

The wide array of topics presented by the panel participants reflected the diversity of approaches to World History and served as a prime inspiration for discussions, for which the conference organizers had allotted a fair amount of time. The presentations of Wei Yi Leow and Martina Schiavon on the first panel 'the History of Science' were representative for the different levels of agency in global narratives: Presenting on "Science as an agent of coloniality" and examining a case study of rubber research in British Malaya, Leow strongly emphasized human relations underlying historical processes and 'followed' individual actors on the ground. Schiavon, on the other hand, presented a very structural approach to "Health, environmental justice, and racism" privileging international and transnational networks over individual actors. In a later panel on Social Movements and Ideology, Wolfgang Thiele combined such a structural approach and the method of following actors. In his presentation on "The discourse of Taiwanese nationalism in the era of decolonization and civil rights," he analyzed both the structural level of discourse as well as the activities of individual writers and editors of nationalist journals.

The many questions that arose in the panel discussions were then again picked up on the concluding roundtable, along with a presentation of Microhistory and Big Data analysis as new pathways for World History. This setting served for a fruitful discussion and reiterated the dialectic of structure and humanism in the

writing of global histories by juxtaposing the 'following' of individual actors in Microhistory with the anonymous mass of Big Data as a source for contemporary historians.

In a final methodological remark, the convenor of the Master's program in World History and Cultures at King's College, Dr. Christine Mathias, urged students to continue to reflect upon chances and challenges of revising traditional history writing by incorporating transnational and global perspectives. However, she also closed with some words of caution that might serve as an inspiration to global and world historians beyond the conference: instead of a fetishization of networks and movement within these transnational spaces, she wishes to see more global accounts on those actors that remain static, that do not move across the globe, and that do not form extensive networks, yet are still shaped by the forces of globalization.

The second World History Student Conference at King's College proved a success in facilitating a viable exchange between practitioners of various global historical approaches on the student level. The conference underlined the importance and fruitfulness of bringing students into discussions surrounding methods and concepts of the relatively broadly defined field of World History. Ultimately, the experience in London also emphasized the need for students to self-organize means for academic exchange in the early stages of a potential academic career and to establish connections and exchange of know-how between projects of this kind to create a platform for creative, transnational dialogue and cooperation inspiring the writing of global narratives. Following the opening remarks of Professor Drayton who stated that "conferences are among the best things in academia," I argue that students should take the organization of such opportunities increasingly into their own hands. The World History Student Conference at King's College has shown the feasibility of such endeavor and the chances arising from it.

Introduction to the History of Concepts: Annual Workshop for Graduate Students

Helsingin Yliopisto, August 2017

REVIEWED BY SÉBASTIEN TREMBLAY

Sébastien Tremblay holds a M.A. in Global History from the Freie Universität and Humboldt-Universität in Berlin and a B.A. in History and German Studies from the Université de Montréal in Canada. His master thesis explored the impact of US military occupation on ideas of masculinities and the persecution of homosexualites in the early German Federal Republic. His present dissertation project looks at the gay and lesbian transnational and transatlantic cultural communication networks from the 1970s to the 1990s and focuses on the 'Pink Triangle' as a marker of identity in LGBTQI+ activist circles.

For two full weeks in August 2017, Helsinki—one of Europe's most liveable cities and the capital of Finland—invited the world to enjoy the Baltic, the last of the summer breezes, and its annual summer school on the University of Helsinki's downtown campus, a jewel of Fin de Siècle architecture and home to one of Northern Europe's most celebrated institutions of higher education. The international board of 'Concepta,' the International Research School in Conceptual History and Political Thought, used the occasion to organize its annual workshop on conceptual history for graduate students in conjunction with the University. The lucky participants were welcomed with typical Finnish charm and sense of hospitality and encouraged to discuss their own projects and get a crash course on the work of Reinhart Koselleck, Quentin Skinner, and Kari Palonen, to name but a few.

From the beginning, the eclectic composure of the group mirrored the plurality of perspectives and the richness of the discussion that was to be expected. Political scientists, philosophers, and historians coming from the four corners of the world had the chance to exchange ideas on Intellectual History, Conceptual History, *Begriffsgechichte* and the various multidisciplinary international research projects that constitute this still relatively small but vibrant field of study.

After a reception organized by the University and a welcoming ceremony, which oscillated between the relatively awkwardness of the protocol and the welcoming smiles of the new colleagues, the workshop kicked off with some introductory theoretical remarks by Jani Marjanen. As an editor of the journal 'Contributions to the History of Concepts,' Marjanen was able to bring the heterogeneous group to a similar level with his clear and tongue-in-cheek style that would become the norm for the rest of the sojourn in Helsinki. Martin Burke from the City University of New York, Niklas Olsen from Copenhagen, Margrit Pernau from the Max Planck Institute in Berlin and Jan Iversen from Aarhus University all kept the

perfect balance between a thorough, interesting and thought-provoking stance on theory and a cheerful tone open to criticism and remarks. Whether due to the size of the field or the warmth of its core members, the Concepta research group was able to bring each and every graduate student to a new appreciation of the field while cracking a joke here and there along the way. Even the networking after the seminars became an event to look forward to with happy anticipation instead of the usual dread that accompanies the customary and typical self-indulgent spiel in international scholarly events.

The first week was full of introductory sessions, which quickly developed into advanced lectures on theory and the deconstruction of some of the master narratives in the field. Even though some of the participants were already familiar with some parts of the topic, the group as a whole was able to evolve in a quasi-simultaneous unison toward profound and surprisingly sophisticated exchanges and debates. Martin Burke gave an overview on the work of Quentin Skinner on Conceptualism à la Cambridge and Genealogy, Niklas Olsen presented a detailed biography and outline of Koselleck's work, Jan Iversen masterfully connected the history of concepts to discourse analysis and Margrit Pernau meticulously contested main narratives with her stance on translation studies and global history. It is necessary and important to mention how the emphasis was not put on the opposition of the schools from Cambridge and Bielefeld, but on the possibilities offered by both them and many others and the prospects of linking them according to one's research and interest. In that sense, Concepta brought the participants to a new place, where the sectarian arguments on whichever school is the most relevant made way for a rich new standpoint on intellectual history. This first week was also the stage for more practical discussions on the future of the field and the possibilities and practicalities for young scholars. All in all, a perfect mixture of theory and practice washed down with evenings in pubs and eating delicious Nordic fare.

If the first part of the workshop surfed on the theoretical approach to conceptual history, the second week confronted the group with clear research projects and case studies. A plurality of young or established scholars took the stage and presented their own ventures in the field, opening the floor for questions and critiques to their own endeavours. The multidisciplinary composition of the guests allowed for everyone to get something out of the series. Nevertheless, the presentations were uneven, as is always the case in such a context. The organizational committee could have favoured a more seminar-based approach during the first week, expanding the theoretical approach at the cost of a myriad of presentations, which, even if they were never boring, hung heavy on a programme already based a bit too much on lectures. Text-based discussions and group work could have benefited the graduate students present in another way, a more participative way.

One of the highlights of the second week was the attention and the light shone on people's papers and projects. Every participant who wanted to do so could circulate a paper beforehand, and the late afternoon of every day was dedicated to an informal session where each and every member of the group was able to ask questions or comment on the aforementioned papers in a friendly and constructive atmosphere. This is where the heterogeneity of the group proved to be a weakness. As in many cases of a multidisciplinary and international workshop, certain papers appeared hermetic to some. However, two if not three professors were assigned to each session in order to secure the possibility to receive enriching feedback. Apart from the usual comments-turned-into-fake-questions and mansplaining that unfortunately seems to be almost inevitable in such a context, every member of the group with the courage to present their project (draft of an article, exposé of a dissertation, etc.) received helpful and encouraging advice. Sadly, these sessions were always relegated to the end of the day and were therefore somewhat ignored by some, or met with a concert of sleepy and weary eyes. A better time-slot for these meetings would have benefited the daring presenters. Furthermore, as the papers were made available only during the first week of a workshop already packed with a long and exhaustive list of readings, many participants focussed on only one or two papers. It would possibly have been more advisable to pass on said papers one or two weeks before the opening of the workshop.

Last but not least, it is necessary to mention the extraordinary organisational skills of both Jani Marjanen and Johan Strang, who not only revealed their brilliance as scholars, but also as coordinators of the event. Accompanying the two weeks, the group was lavishly treated with dinners, picnics, and a historical tour of the city in an overall casual atmosphere favourable to such an intellectual gathering. Moreover, the connection with the Helsinki Summer School meant a possibility to take part in many social activities over the weekend (hiking in a national park, cooking lessons, etc.) and the possibility for organized housing around the city. If the 'summer camp'/'Erasmus youngsters' aspect of such a crowd was not to the taste of everyone, this has nothing to do with the organization, but probably more to do with the age gap between the participants of the usual Summer School and the graduate students of Concepta's workshop. That being said, the annual workshop is in many aspects a 'must' for everyone interested in the possibility to enjoy the last rays of the midnight sun in the northern parts of Europe and a challenging intellectual environment among new colleagues. However, the price of such a summer school makes it an almost exclusive and V.I.P event (around €700 just for the course fees), so it is unfortunate that not all interested parties would have the privilege to debate with Finns.

Congreso de la Asociación de Historiadores Latinoamericanistas Europeos
Universitat de València, September 2017

REVIEWED BY PHILIPP KANDLER

Philipp Kandler completed his B.A. in History and his M.A. in Global History at the Freie Universität Berlin. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in History and Latin American Studies at the Freie Universität with the International Research Training Group "Between Spaces," working on the reactions of the Chilean and Argentine dictatorships to human rights criticisms of the 1970s and 80s.

The Association of European Historians of Latin America (AHILA) held its 18th congress in the city of Valencia, Spain from the 5th to the 9th of September, 2017. The topic of discussion was "On the Margins of Traditional History: New Perspectives of Latin America from the 21st Century." Academics, mostly from European and Latin American universities, discussed topics from Latin American history as varied as "Times of Change: Governments and Social Transformation in Latin America During the Cold War (1945-1975)," "The Atlantic as Political Space (1780-1840)" and "Transatlantic Political Networks Between Europe and Latin America (1959-1979) across 64 panels. These panels were organized along a wide range of specific approaches, actors, source types, time frames and subregions, ranging from colonial to contemporary times. Although this made for a diverse offer of interesting presentations, the participants had to limit themselves to only a few of them due to the restricted time frame of effectively one full and two half days of actual panels. Attending the panels also meant not being able to take advantage of the cultural program that the organizers had prepared. This included guided tours by professors of the University of Valencia through the historic city centre or museums.

The congress was inaugurated by keynote speaker Prof. Jaime Rodríguez of the University of California, Irvine, in the hall of the Monastery of San Miguel de los Reyes. Unfortunately, Prof. Rodriguez's presentation limited itself to merely reviewing Spanish American independence and seemed targeted towards an audience of the general public rather than scholars specializing in Latin American history.

Concluding remarks were given by Prof. Ana Ribeiro of the Universidad Católica del Uruguay and addressed three historical events that connected the Río Plata-Basin, which is often seen as a marginal space in historiography, to global events. The first instance was the time of the first arrival of European colonists and *conquistadores* when the wide plains of South America were converted into a synonym of 'vast- and emptiness' in European discourse. The second was the time

of independence, when Latin Americans renegotiated their place in the (Atlantic) world. Thirdly, Prof. Ribeiro brought her audience up to the present day, castigating what she sees as the decisive characteristic of this era—that is, the tendency of Latin American scholars of trying to apply European models to their work, and ends with a call to arms to develop their own models. According to Prof. Ribeiro, the concept of 'global history' might prove to be either a reinforcement of European models or an opportunity to diversify historical research by including models based on different local experiences. Prof. Ribeiro's speech profited from her emphatic narrative style, which positively differed from the rather dry enumeration of events and facts of the inaugural speech.

Though the congress was about Latin American history, the individual panels all addressed more specific topics. In the panels I was able to attend, this helped the debates, which were mostly informative and concrete. However, when the panel coordinators allowed questions and comments only after a block of presentations—which was the case in two of the three panels I visited—or even only at the end of the whole panel, this led to a situation where comments and questions were focused on one or two speakers, while others were ignored. A general problem, which is unfortunately typical of bigger congresses, was the absence of a sizeable number of speakers. This made it nearly impossible to switch among panels—something visitors might have wanted to do due to the large number of panels—since the official schedule kept changing when speakers did not show up. The actual number of participants, which was still significant in size, also made it more difficult to get in contact with other scholars and led to an atomization of the congress. As the panels took place in different parts of the university with no central meeting place, this became an issue, especially for young scholars such as myself, who have yet to build up professional networks or recognition. Nevertheless, participation in one of the 'big' congresses with a broad range of topics was a valuable experience.

This was my first opportunity to present on such a big stage in front of a number of specialists, not only in Latin American history but specifically in the topic I am working on. Due to the absence of a number of speakers on this panel, the discussion was able to dig deeper into the topic—state publications as a specific source type—and I received valuable comments and recommendations for my future work with these sources.

The AHILA congresses are held every three years, the next one being scheduled for the late summer of 2020 in Paris. It is the largest congress on Latin American history in Europe and due to the variety of topics, students working on Latin American history—be it colonial, post-colonial or contemporary—will certainly find a panel where they could fit in. One potential issue for those interested are the fees, which were €100-150 for the Congress in Valencia for members of AHILA, and €200-250 for non-members, depending on the date of registration.

Ultimately, I enjoyed the congress in Valencia, which was my first time presenting in front of an audience composed of people who I did not know beforehand and also my first time as a participant in a conference of this size. Although I was unfortunately unable to make new contacts and had to spend most of my time with fellow students from Berlin, who might also have been in a similar situation, it nonetheless proved to be a valuable experience. In the response to my presentation, I was offered unique perspectives and valuable comments for my work. Receiving feedback by people who might not work on my exact topic, but are far more familiar with the national histories of the countries I am dealing with, was a crucial addition to the more methodological and conceptual comments I might get from a presentation in Berlin.

"Go East" Summer Schools of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), 2017

Each year, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) offers students in Germany the opportunity to take part in numerous summer schools in (Central and Southern) Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In 2016, the so-called "Go East" program facilitated 52 summer schools in 19 countries of the region and co-sponsored the participation of several hundred students. Although the possibilities for financial support by the DAAD are unfortunately focused on a German student clientele, the program has an impressive scope and has helped to facilitate an extensive network of summer schools in the region that are usually open to non-German participants as well. The summer schools are independently organized by universities in the region that apply annually for inclusion into the DAAD program.

The schools cover a wide range of concerns, from (petrol) economics to the environmental sciences, yet most take an interdisciplinary approach including historical, political and cultural questions; language courses form an integral part of many summer schools. In order to reflect this extensive scope, we have included reviews of two "Go East" summer schools—albeit both in Russia—that should give an impression of the breadth of possibilities within the program and the limitations that accompany them—whether they are to be found in overly broad guiding questions that remain unanswered or in mosquito attacks. Nils Oellerich reviews this year's interdisciplinary summer school in Nizhny Novgorod asking: "Does Russia have a Strategy?" whereas Hauke Jacobs reports on his summer school and waterbound expedition to a former Gulag prison camp in Stvor, near Perm, that was organized by students themselves.

"Does Russia Have a Strategy? Understanding Economic Change":
Summer School of the Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, August 2017

REVIEWED BY NILS OELLERICH

Nils Oellerich currently studies Political Science as a master student at Central European University in Budapest. He previously completed his Bachelor of Arts at the Universität Bremen and studied at Budapest's Corvinus University for two semesters. In his studies, he focusses on the former 'transition countries' in Central and Eastern Europe, on the history and nature of political parties and party systems in the region, as well as populism and Euroscepticism.

The summer school "Does Russia Have a Strategy? Understanding Economic Change," held in Nizhny Novgorod, was one of many seminars throughout Eastern Europe that were made considerably more affordable for students enrolled in

German universities by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). During the school of two (or optionally three) weeks, daily classes on the relevant topics were accompanied by an extensive cultural programme as well as Russian language courses tailored to different levels of knowledge. The school was organised by the Nizhny Novgorod branch of the Higher School of Economics (HSE), a university established in 1992 to support reforms in Russia's post-Soviet economy and the education of "a national cadre for the emerging market economy."[1] The university is well known for its excellent international links, its distinct focus on economic and social modernisation, and its remarkable contributions to Russian socioeconomic research.[2]

The Higher School of Economics applied the breadth of its expertise and the depth of its resources to the summer school. Classes delivered on the promise of the summer school's name: we were indeed taught to understand economic change in Russia. Insider perspectives from the banking sector, reports from marketing experts, as well as general observations of experts on Russia's geostrategic positioning offered insights into contemporary political problems. Such insights ranged from a general introduction to International Relations to first-hand reports from individual Russian businesses. In this regard, future perspectives and frequent obstacles for Russian businesses in the country's political and economic environment were outlined. A recurring issue was the football World Cup taking place in Russia next year: in Nizhny Novgorod, the venue of several matches, it is perceived as a unique chance for urban and business development although the sustainability of its positive impact is frequently questioned as well. This focus was complemented by an obligatory course on intercultural communication.

The chosen interdisciplinary approach of the school, which was reflected in the different backgrounds of the participating students, gave a holistic impression of the strategic position in which different disciplines, mostly political science and (business) economics, see Russia. Yet the interdisciplinary focus was rather directed towards the country's economic and political perspectives than its past. Historical issues, such as the transition towards a free-market economy after the Soviet Union's collapse, formed an important backdrop of our discussions but could have been emphasised more strongly. Furthermore, the summer school's guiding question—Does Russia Have a Strategy?—proved difficult to answer due to the varying perspectives presented. Indeed, we felt that an answer was lacking—however ambiguous it might have been—and that underlying connections between the different issues remained underexposed.

[1] Isak Froumin, "Establishing a New Research University: The Higher School of Economics, the Russian Federation," in *The Road to Academic Excellence: The Making of World-Class Research Universities*, ed. Philip G. Altbach and Jamil Salmi (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2011), 300.
[2] Ibid., 294-295.

Moreover, on some occasions one could observe a general sense of defensiveness among lecturers who made a point of reiterating the role of cultural differences and certain Russian circumstances, presumably in order to say, "We are not that bad after all." Such defensiveness unfortunately resulted in a stronger focus on questions of difference between Russia and other countries instead of pointing to commonalities. This is unfortunate as it could be argued that cultural differences become more tangible and more 'real' the more they are embraced. After all, the perception among us students was one of communality in spirit rather than one of irreconcilable differences.

Naturally, academic outcomes are not the only things that matter: Coming together with students and teachers from different backgrounds and countries is of great personal gain. Seeing Russia, its culture, and politics from a perspective off the beaten tracks, i.e. away from the overcrowded environs of Moscow and Saint Petersburg and beyond commonly expressed truisms about Russian-ness, was indeed a unique and valuable experience.

Digitizing a "Museum without a Guide": a German-Russian Summer School and Expedition to the Former Prison and Labor Camp of Stvor, August 2017

REVIEWED BY HAUKE JACOBS

Hauke Jacobs is a graduate student in the History master program at Freie Universität Berlin, and holds a bachelor degree in History and Political Science from the Universität Bremen. He has a strong interest in European history of the late 19th and 20th centuries as well as the history of Latin America and the Soviet Union. In his studies, he focuses mainly on different and conflicting cultures of remembrance (Erinnerungskulturen) concerning experiences of violent and traumatic pasts. Other research interests include questions of film and history as well as the relationship between historical science and the methods of digital humanities.

"Where is that plaque?" I ask myself. It has been almost two hours climbing up and down the steep slope and I am getting more exhausted by the minute. All I can see are plants and trees while I am getting constantly stung by mosquitos, swarms of mosquitos. The plaque we are looking for is a small rusty metal plaque like the many others that I have already taken photos of this day. They bear only two letters and two numbers, letters and numbers that stand for an individual life, or several, we do not know for sure. Archival sources about this place are rare, but we know that it is a cemetery.

We are at Stvor, site of a former Gulag prison and labor camp on the banks of the Chusovaya River near the industrial city of Perm. Stvor, which can be translated as 'strait', was opened in 1942 and the prisoners sent to the camp were supposed to build a dam at a nearby river strait. Before construction works could begin, they had to build the camp from scratch by themselves. These efforts were part of a project to construct a hydroelectric power plant to secure the power supply of the region during the 'Great Patriotic War,' as the Second World War is known in Russia. The goal was to be achieved in record time by the use of mostly manual and forced labor. Later in the war, another camp for German POWs was opened on the opposite side of the river and returning Soviet soldiers who had been imprisoned in German camps were sent to Stvor under the accusation of being enemy spies or collaborators. Although many camps all over the Soviet Union were closed and their prisoners pardoned after the death of Stalin in 1953, others remained open. The number of prisoners at Stvor dropped from some 2000 people to a minimum of 400. The project of building a dam was dismissed but prisoners still had to carry out hard physical labor, inter alia, in the production of bricks and wooden furniture, until the camp was finally closed in 1972. The site was abandoned, neglected, and nearly forgotten apart from by the local people who looted the place and took away most of the useful parts of the former camp infrastructure.

The camp cemetery was discovered by members of a Memorial youth camp some years ago while looking for firewood in the forest. Memorial, branded a 'foreign agent' in a 2014 law, is a Russian NGO that was founded in 1989 during the late stages of the Soviet Union to document cases of political repression and human rights abuses under Soviet rule to make them known to the public. Nowadays, they fight to prevent stories such as the one of Stvor from falling into oblivion.

Their local branch, Memorial Perm, is one of the partners of our summer school that was organized by two German student participants and the universities of Tomsk and Perm before its inclusion in the DAAD "Go East" program. In a group of German and Russian students of different academic backgrounds, and supported by a team of researchers from Tomsk and Perm, we spent two and a half weeks in the region. For more than half of these days, we travelled along the Chusovaya River by boat, camping overnight on its banks. Memorial has turned Stvor and many other similar places in the region into a 'museum without a guide.' They have installed small signs about the history of these places to inform the few visitors they receive, mostly rafting tourists or people on fishing and hunting trips. Participants of former summer camps collected all kinds of artefacts they found at the site—among them shoes, all kinds of different tools, lamps and pieces of barbed wire—to erect a small monument and invite visitors to think about and interact with the place themselves.

Courtesy of Hauke Jacobs

What might seem to some people as an inappropriate or unscientific approach to the place is in fact currently the only way people are trying to preserve its history at all.

After documenting the place together with the activists of Memorial this summer, it is our group's intention to transform what once began as a 'museum without guide' into a more accessible online museum.[3] This has become all the more important in recent years, given that the political climate in Russia for groups like Memorial has become ever more hostile as the Stalin cult reemerges, while time and nature are taking their toll on the few remaining traces of places like Stvor.

Back in Stvor, I am thinking about calling it a day and returning to our camp, but Wanja does not want to give up yet. Wanja—whom everybody calls by his Russian nickname instead of the more formal Ivan—is a young Memorial activist accompanying our expedition. Our plans for the upcoming days are strict since we can only stay four days at Stvor before we return to Perm to finish our project and Wanja will have to wait until next year to take up his search again. He assures me that he had found the plaque we are now looking for in the summer before and shows me his handwritten map of the place. I follow him and Julia—a German participant of our expedition—downhill when suddenly I slip. Getting up on my feet again and quickly checking my equipment, I hear Wanja shouting: he has not found the plaque we were looking for but two new ones instead. They had not been marked on his map before, he explains as he scribbles down some new letters and numbers to be included on his map.

[3] For further impressions of the summer school as well as information concerning the upcoming online museum, please see: https://stvor.hypotheses.org/.