[Global Histories]

A student journal



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Scope and purpose
In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, 'Global Histories: A Student Journal' aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

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Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

Having examined the benefits of global history perspectives on migration in the last thematic edition of *Global Histories*, we return to the full diversity of the field in this issue. Researching questions across a wide spectrum of locations and languages, the assembled studies are the product of thorough examinations of their sources, whether based on deep engagement with specific literary or theosophical key texts, photographs, or partisan political writing, as well as administrative and state records. The contributions debate a multitude of issues, ranging from the complex and sometimes contradictory expressions of trans-cultural encounters, over the global connections of political ideologies or the dynamics of transnational *biopolitics,* through to overarching questions of 'modernization' or racism.

All six research papers that we have included in this edition pursue their questions within contexts informed by imperial or (quasi-)colonial power relations. This circumstance reflects preferences within our field as much as it mirrors the global conditions of the second half of the 19th century and the longest part of the 20th century, the time frame of this edition´s studies. The final article of the edition expands the chronology by offering a discussion on how the presentist historiographical tradition of *Zeitgeschichte* might help to move global history perspectives even closer to our current moment. However, we equally welcome future contributions that expand the chronological span by discussing *Global Histories* of earlier time periods.

In this centenary of the Russian revolution, we begin our current issue with Lilia Boliachevet´s investigation into Eurasianism. The article examines whether this conservative Russian ideology of the interwar period should be understood as a vision for a pan-continental future with the potential to unite the peoples of the former Russian empire, or instead as an expression of 'post-imperial agony' among intellectuals in exile to soothe the pain of having lost their homeland. Boliachvet´s work is based on extensive research in Russian and Czech archives and shifts the focus to 'non-Russian' Eurasianism as it was taken up and contested by representatives of the Kalmyk and Jewish exile community as well as Japanese Pan-Asianists.

Hannes Schweikardt offers a second contribution on the global history of the Russian revolution. This study analyzes how the Guyanese writer Jan Carew explored the results of Soviet modernization and the trauma caused by Stalinist terror through the eyes of exchange students from the 'Third World' during the Soviet Union´s *Thaw* period in the early 1960s. The essay argues that Carew´s writings were profoundly inspired by the style of Soviet literature at the time, and therefore reflect successful Soviet cultural diplomacy despite Carew´s dismissal of the USSR´s development as a model for the 'Third World' and his denunciation

of Soviet racism. Schweikardt thereby contributes to the study of the late Soviet Union´s global cultural influences.

In the next piece, reflecting a global intellectual history perspective, Arkamitra Ghatak has engaged with the key text *Brahmavadi Rsi o Brahmanvidya* published in 1911 by Tarakishore Choudhury, a High Court lawyer in Calcutta who would later become a famous Vaishnava saint. Ghatak´s essay highlights various nuances and contradictions of power within the intellectual universe of the colonized Bengali *intelligentsia* which was shaped by the dual forces of the British Empire´s transnational information economy as well as indigenous traditions of knowledge production. Ghatak points to the ambivalences as well as appropriations that Choudhury´s strive to reconstruct an 'Indic' identity involved in this context.

Wolfgang Thiele´s contribution is concerned with the development of Taiwanese nationalism after the end of the country´s colonization by Japan in 1945 and the establishment of the Chinese-nationalist KMT regime in 1947. Using primary sources published by Taiwanese nationalists in exile, most notably the newspaper *Taiwan Chinglian,* Thiele argues that their nationalist doctrine continued to identify domestic power relationships in Taiwan with the fates of colonized countries worldwide. The author also demonstrates how discursive nationalism was used to symbolically exclude mainland Chinese from the Taiwanese nation and he introduces the term *ad hoc colonial nationalism* to distinguish the independence movements of the 'Japanese' from the 'Chinese era'.

Hui Wang´s essay on the dynamics of the *bodyscape* in Japanese treaty ports shows how complex, multi-faceted, and contradictory the relations between Europeans, Americans and Japanese inhabitants could play out in the context of the Meiji restoration. Exploring the 'cultural performativity' of costuming and tattooing, this study shows how these expressions of cultural encounters stimulated cultural flows in multiple directions and reflected expectations of finding authenticity as well as reaching modernity through the *bodyscape*. The author concretizes these wider cultural patterns by focusing on the tourism sector of Yokohama and tracing the story of the port´s legendary tattooist Hori Chiyo.

Hatice Ayse Polat follows the spatial turn to the late Ottoman Empire through an examination of illicit migration and urban governance in *fin-de-siècle* Constantinople. Based on extensive archival research, the author traces how the emergence of a new mobile underclass, and their transformation of the urban landscape, led to the imperial state adopting modern techniques of urban governance to regulate their mass circulation. Situating her subject between transnational historiography and postcolonial theory, Polat specifically shows how colonial and imperial statesmen intervened together to control the increasingly heterogenous world of prostitutes within the context of Constantinople´s globalized sexual economy, not

only through the politics of urban governance but also in the field of international law.

The last article of this edition, a methodological intervention by Dennis Kölling, considers the potential benefits of German *Zeitgeschichte* for global history perspectives. This 'contemporary history', a presentist and politically critical historiography that often transcends regional and disciplinary boundaries, and engaging with work from the social sciences and across historical sub-disciplines, holds a prominent position in Germany's historical profession today. Dennis Kölling contends that its flexible framework can serve as a starting point for a global narrative in 'contemporary history' and reviews this assumption in his analysis of the research project *Nach dem Boom* dealing with socio-economic ruptures in 1970s Western Europe.

In the second section of this issue, members of the *Global Histories* editorial team have reviewed five recently published works in the field. The reviewed works include the methodologically oriented anthologies *The Prospect of Global History* (reviewed by Alexandra Leonzini), which offers an overview of the 'state of the art', and *Fielding Transnationalism* (by Björn Holm), which examines the use of *Bourdieusian* ideas for historical analysis. Furthermore, this section includes reviews of Susan L. Carruthers´ *The Good Occupation* (by Sébastien Tremblay), a study of U.S. occupations after the Second World War that positions itself at the interstices of *alltagsgeschichte*, military and cultural history; Angela Willey´s *Undoing Monogamy* (by Arunima Kundu), an exploration of monogamous relationships in the U.S. over the last century that challenges conventional feminist discourses; and Timothy Nunan´s *Humanitarian Invasion* (by Ryan Glauser), a multi-focal history of Afghanistan´s development within the context of the global Cold War.

We hope that you enjoy this third edition of our journal and that it offers you some insightful readings as well as stimulating perspectives. We would like to welcome you back as a reader of our autumn edition which will be published in October 2017.

Your Editorial Team

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the continued support and assistance for this project by the Freie Universität Berlin, particularly the Global History faculty and the Online Journal Systems team.

We would like to acknowledge the dedication and hard work of this edition's student team, without whom this issue would not have been possible: Brace Bargo, Maurice Boer, Violet Dove, Ryan Glauser, Björn Holm, Alexandra Holmes, Philipp Kandler, Arunima Kundu, David Lang, Alexandra Leonzini, Marvin Martin, Paul Sprute, Daria Tashkinova, and Sébastien Tremblay. Thanks go to Nils Oellerich for proofreading help as well.

We also want to thank and acknowledge the work of the authors published in this edition, with whom we have had an extensive and fruitful collaboration throughout the production of this journal: Lilia Boliachevets, Arkamitra Ghatak, Dennis Kölling, Hatice Ayse Polat, Hannes Schweikardt, Wolfgang Thiele, and Hui Wang.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to Alexandra Holmes, the journal´s founding Editor in the last two years, who has now stepped down because she finishes her degree. Still, Alex has remained involved as the most resourceful member of the editorial team and it is thanks to her effort establishing the journal that this issue´s publication process ran as smoothly as it did.

Articles

Post-Imperial Agony or Pan-Continental Future? Classical Eurasianism as a Global Ideology in the Interwar Period

LILIA BOLIACHEVETS

Lilia Boliachevets works as a research assistant at the National Research University Higher School of Economics where she has received her bachelor degree. Her research interests include political emigration from Russia and the Soviet Union, and relations between the Soviet Union and post-colonial states. She has co-authored several papers on Soviet nationality policy, economic cooperation between the USSR and Latin America, and the politics of historiography in contemporary Russia.

This article focuses on the Eurasianist movement which was first developed in the 1920s among Russian emigrants in Sofia who began to rethink the results of the Russian Revolution. These young intellectuals aspired to create a 'Third Way' of state development which would be different from European liberalism as well as Soviet socialism. In their conceptions, Eurasianists underlined the uniqueness of 'Eurasian' culture and renounced Western European influences on the Russian Empire. They furthermore focused on the 'National question', discussing the challenge of the coexistence of many nationalities within the former Empire. This preoccupation makes the Eurasianist movement comparable to the Soviet project which also aimed at appeasing nationalisms by establishing a federalized system. But unlike the Soviet project, Eurasianist ideas confined themselves to the boundaries of the former Russian Empire and Eurasianists generally remained invested in a highly imperialistic conception of the future 'Eurasian state'. Despite formally proclaiming the equality of all Eurasian cultures and peoples, Eurasianists supported the idea of the political and cultural supremacy of Russia by pointing out that only the Russian culture could truly reconcile European and Asian ways of living. These imperialistic notions prevented Eurasianism from being adopted by more than a few representatives of the former imperial periphery, most importantly the Kalmyk doctor Erenzhen Khara Davan whose vision for the Eurasianist federal state stressed the need for cultural autonomy. Leading representatives of the Eurasianist movement were neither ready to make concessions to such initiatives of Khara Davan or Iakov Bromberg, a Jewish historian, nor to cooperate with the Japanese Pan-Asianist movement which on the other hand had incorporated Eurasianist ideas. The imperialistic nature and isolationism of the mainstream Eurasianist movement shows that it remained a product of a global imperial crisis and an expression of the post-imperial agony of exile intellectuals.

Introduction

As Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier have pointed out, the first decades of the twentieth century saw the global spread of many different concepts

rethinking nation, class, law and the state.[1] The origins of this process lie in the disastrous First World War and its consequences, causing a global economic crisis as well as the rise of nationalisms as part of a widespread search for new political identities. Right-wing parties became influential throughout Europe, but also in Asia, establishing a Pan-Asianist regime in Japan and a Fascist state in Italy.

Russia also faced various serious challenges between 1914 and 1922: the continuing crisis of the Tsarist empire, revolutions, the World War as well as the Civil War, and finally the exile of almost three million people, many of whom were intellectuals, scholars, and former participants of the anti-Bolshevik movements and armies. These emigrants created highly critical, politicized diasporas with centers in Berlin, Prague, Paris, Harbin, and elsewhere. They initially refused to assimilate into the societies of their host countries as they believed the instability of the Bolshevik regime meant that their emigration would only be temporary.[2] Remaining involved in Russian political discourse, members of the diaspora published newspapers, magazines, and declarations – from liberal, to conservative, through to socialist orientations – in which they tried to reconsider past events such as the question why the Bolsheviks had prevailed over the Russian Empire. In consequence, many political concepts formulated at the time aimed at replacing Soviet Communism after its 'inevitable' fall but also avoiding the mistakes of Tsarist policies. Eurasianism was one of these alternative visions.

As contemporaries of the imperial crisis, Eurasianists – people who pertained to Eurasianist organizations or adhered to Eurasianist philosophy – tried to explain the collapse of the Russian Empire in terms of geopolitics, culture, and religion. They created a holistic ideology that suggested reconsidering Russian history from an Eastern, rather than Western, point of view and renounced Eurocentrism. Furthermore, Eurasianists intended to find a 'Third Way' of socio-economic and political state development that would differ from European liberalism and Soviet socialism but include advantages of both. Finally, they sought to solve the challenge of diverging nationalisms within the space of the former empire by unifying all Eurasian nationalities under a protectorate of the Russian nation. Eurasianism thereby continued a tradition of Russian political philosophy that had been expressed before in the ideologies of the so-called 'Slavophiles' who proclaimed the uniqueness of Russian culture in the 1840s as well as the necessity to find a uniquely 'Russian' path for its development. Eurasianist ideas were also

[1] Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, "Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s," in *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1–25.

[2] Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

influenced by the rise of interest toward the relations between Russia and Asia in the late Russian Empire, the so-called "Oriental Renaissance".[3]

However, this article moves beyond these conventional perspectives on Eurasianism and tries to relate the ideology more closely to the events of the Russian Revolution and their consequences. Based on historiographical works debating Eurasianism[4] and extensive archival research in the State Archive of the Russian Federation[5], the National Library of the Czech Republic, and the Russian State Library, this study seeks to answer the question of whether Eurasianist ideology merely was an imperialistic dream of exiled intellectuals, or could have provided a real political alternative for a pan-continental future. Firstly, it gives a brief history of the movement and outlines the main features of its ideology. Secondly, it considers the Eurasianist approach to the important question of nationalisms within a multi-ethnic space that had been at the heart of the Russian Empire's crisis, and was discussed by Eurasianists in reference to the project of Soviet federalism. A viable solution to this question seemed to be the key to reinstating control over the territories of the former empire after the many national uprisings and projects that had accompanied its collapse. Thirdly, it explores alternative projects of non-Russian participants of the Eurasianist movement, as well as the reaction of the Kalmyk[6] national diaspora toward Eurasianism and their own considerations of the 'National question'. After thereby having analyzed the 'imperial' relations within the former Russian Empire, the final part considers relations and similarities between Eurasianism and Pan-Asianism, another popular conservative ideology which flourished in interwar Japan and also sought to define its political identity by rejecting European values. This discussion of Pan-Asianism will position Eurasianism in a wider framework of profound global changes and highlight once again its imperialist and isolationist nature.

The History of Organized Eurasianism

Eurasianism as a cultural movement originated in Bulgaria's capital Sophia in the early 1920s, when the city was one of the biggest centers of post-revolutionary emigration, sheltering almost fifteen thousand migrants from the former Tsarist empire. All of the three key figures of early Eurasianism – Nikolai Trubetskoi[7],

[3] Vera Tolz, *Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[4] In the last few decades, the study of Classical Eurasianism was greatly developed by the endeavors of Sergei Glebov, Mark Bassin, Marine Laruelle, Viktor Shnirellman, and others whose works will later be cited.

[5] The State Archive of the Russian Federation will be abbreviated as GARF in the footnotes.

[6] Kalmyks are a Mongolian ethnic group living in the Volga region and in the South of European Russia.

[7] Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938) was a linguist and philosopher. As a Eurasianist, he worked on the concept of a multipolar system of international relations, the importance of Mon-

Petr Suvchinskii[8] and Georgii Florovskii[9] – were philosophers and representatives of the aristocracy, forced to emigrate soon after the beginning of the Russian Civil War.

Eurasianist ideas were first developed in a philosophy circle where the founders of the movement shared their views with visiting listeners. Eurasianists offered a cardinally new interpretation of Russian history and the origins of Russian culture: they suggested that the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan was a platform for the establishment of Russian statehood in the beginning of the 15th century and that the Russian empire should have been oriented eastward rather than to the West due to these origins. The assumed discrepancy between 'borrowed European culture' and the 'real need of the Eurasian nationalities' was perceived to lead to "historical discontinuities" such as the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War.[10] The Bolsheviks' success was explained by Eurasianists using the theory of "consequentialism", suggesting that all major political turns happen due to their historical necessity. In the view of Eurasianists, the revolution heralded a transitional period in which the Russian people needed to be guided by a strong and politically authoritative organization: the Bolshevik party. Eurasianists therefore accepted the legitimacy of the Soviet state but also believed in its imminent collapse.[11]

Eurasianist concepts were built on the core principle that the government's actions should directly represent the will of the population. In consequence, 'Russia-Eurasia' would emerge as a new type of state, based on harmony, justice, and legitimacy. Eurasianists developed three main terms to define the most important characteristics of the ideal state: *ideokratiia, garantiia,* and *demotiia.*[12] These terms can be translated as 'ideology, guarantee, and democracy' but all have specific ideological connotations. Through a unified ideology based on these conceptions, the state was supposed to control the moral frames of the citizens' behavior and the appearance of diverging ideas within society, thereby guaranteeing the stability of society. Moreover, the state should comply with its democratic obligation by answering to the peoples' demands. All of these principles would become reality with the help of a new class of working intellectuals as guarantors of the states' future.[13]

golian influences on the Russian culture, as well as the interaction between Slaves and the ancient Turanians.

[8] Petr Suvchinskii (1892-1985) was a composer and philosopher. As an early Eurasianist, Suvchinskii was responsible for organizational questions of the movement. In 1927, he initiated the 'Clamart split' which led to the division of the movement into right and left wing factions.

[9] Georgii Florovskii (1893-1979) was an Orthodox priest, philosopher and historian. He was soon disappointed with Eurasianism's development and ended his involvement in 1928.

[10] Lev Karsavin, "Osnovy Politiki," in *Rossiia Mezhdy Evropoi I Aziiei: Evraziiskii Soblazn.* (Nauka, 1993), 174–216.

[11] Ibid.

[12] GARF, f. P5783, op. 2, d. 23. ("Evraziistvo". Deklaratsiia, formulirovka, tezisy. Praga 1932)

[13] Georgii Vernadskij, *Opyt Istorii Evrazii. Zven'ia Russkoi Kul'tury.* (Moscow, 2005), 317.

Just after the foundation of the movement, Eurasianist ideology began to rapidly spread in emigrant circles. The Russian-Bulgarian Publishing House, *Russko-bolgarskoe knigoizdatel'stvo,* played an important role, allowing Eurasianists to publish their books, newspapers, and other works. In 1920, it published the first and probably the most popular work of Nikolai Trubetskoi, *Evropa i chelovechestvo* (translated as *Europe and Mankind*),[14] which was highly critical toward Europe's influence in the world. According to Trubetskoi, European thinking and politics was itself highly particularistic but nevertheless presented its 'Romano-Germanic' perspectives as universal truths. Blaming European modernity for the observed global crisis, Trubetskoi suggested refusing the European legacy and reconsidering the future politics of Eurasia in order to end the impact of "artificial European values".[15]

That idea of rejecting Eurocent was virulent at this time of political crisis. A few years earlier, Oswald Spengler had published his famous work *The Decline of the West*,[16] in which he stated that the period of the formative power of European culture was coming to an end and Eurocentrism should be rejected as an obsolete practice. Reflecting this *zeitgeist*, Trubetskoi's book gained great fame among representatives of the post-revolutionary emigration and attracted several new participants to Eurasianist circles, such as the geographer Petr Savitskii[17], the lawyer Nikolai Alekseev[18], the Kalmyk doctor Erenzhen Khara Davan[19], the historian Georgii Vernadskii[20], amongst others.

By 1925, Eurasianism had developed from a philosophically oriented circle to a well-organized politically engaged movement with main centers in Prague, led by Petr Savitskii, and Paris, led by Petr Suvchinskii. Most notably, a large number of former military officers of the Tsarist army were interested in promoting Eurasianism as a political vison for their country.[21] Both centers were closely interlinked and acted as one by organizing annual Eurasianist congresses, publishing anthologies, and sharing resources.

Ultimately however, the Eurasianist movement experienced a split into a 'right wing' and a 'left wing' faction. The background for this division was the Bolsheviks' success in organizing a stable state as well as consolidating the economy and the international relations of the Soviet Union, putting an end to the emigrants'

[14] N. S. Trubetskoi, *Evropa I Chelovechestvo* (Sofiia: Russko-bolgarskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1920).
[15] Ibid.
[16] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
[17] Petr Savitskii (1895-1968) was a Russian geographer, economist and geopolitical thinker.
[18] Nikolai Alekseev (1879-1964) was a Russian lawyer and author of Eurasianist economic concepts.
[19] Erenzhen Khara Davan (1883-1941) was a Kalmyk doctor, politician and historian, he participated in the Russian Civil War.
[20] Georgii Vernadskii (1887-1973) was a Russian-American historian.
[21] Sergei Glebov, *Evraziistvo Mezhdu Imperiei I Modernom: Istoriia v Dokumentakh* (Moscow: Novoe izdatel'stvo, 2010), 123.

dreams of a speedy return to a conservative Russian state. At the same time, the Soviet security service, Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), organized the 'Trest' operation aimed at persuading exiled former subjects of the Tsarist empire to cooperate with the Soviets. Emigrants were to be convinced of a return to the Soviet Union and of stopping any controversial activity abroad which could compromise the image of the Soviet state.[22] Faced with these initiatives, Eurasianists were divided between those who wanted to cooperate with the Bolsheviks due to their belief in the historical consequentiality and legitimacy of the Soviet state, and those who rejected any idea of cooperation.

Petr Suvchinskii and other participants of the Paris group[23] began to see the future of Eurasianism as a Soviet political laboratory that would help Bolsheviks rule the country.[24] Agents of the OGPU organized several visits to USSR for them during which some Eurasianists were convinced that there was a strong pro-Eurasianist movement within the Soviet Union looking for cooperation. On the other side, Eurasianists in Prague believed that Eurasianism should remain more of a theoretical idea without practical implementation in the USSR. The 'right wing' Prague group claimed that the 'left wing' Paris group had betrayed the original purpose of the movement by cooperating with the Soviets.[25]

The confrontation within the movement escalated in 1928-29 when Paris activists took control of the important Eurasianist newspaper *Gazeta Evrazia* and used it to propagate their aim of cooperation with the Soviets.[26] In response, Nikolai Trubetskoi, Petr Savitskii and Nikolai Alekseev published the brochure *Gazeta Evrazia - Ne Evraziiskii Organ*, translated as: "The Eurasia Gazette is not the Eurasianist voice". They stated that the 'Clamart group'[27] had crossed the line between the acceptance of the Soviets' historical legitimacy and the full acceptance of "anti-orthodox" ideas.[28] In his personal notes, Petr Savitskii pointedly criticized: "Despite transforming Communists into Eurasianists, Eurasianists transformed into Communists".[29] The 'Clamart split' would start the breakup of Eurasianism as an organized political movement. In the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s, the leading participants of the 'Clamart group'[30] moved to the USSR. There, they

[22] Glebov, *Evraziistvo Mezhdu Imperiei I Modernom*, 135.
[23] The Russian philologist Dmitrii Sviatopolk-Mirskii (1890-1939), the participant of the Civil War Petr Arapov (1897-1937), and the philosopher and historian Lev Karsavin (1882-1952) were notable members of the Paris group.
[24] Glebov, *Evraziistvo Mezhdu Imperiei I Modernom*, 32.
[25] Ibid., 134–42.
[26] GARF, f. 5783, op. 1, d. 310. (Review of the Eurasianism movement from June 1928 to January 1929, by P. Savitskii).
[27] The name owes to the suburb of Paris where the group around Suvchinskii held their meetings.
[28] Nikolai Alekseev and Petr Savitskii, *O Gazete Evrazia* (Prague, 1929).
[29] GARF, f. 5783, op. 1, d. 310. All translations from the original Russian into English are provided by the author.
[30] Petr Suvchinskii decided to stay in France, he gave up Eurasianism and worked as a composer in Paris where he died in 1985.

wanted to continue in cooperation with the Bolsheviks but Eurasianist ideas were never actually implemented. With the beginning of Stalin's Great Purges in 1937, Dimitri Sviatopolk-Mirskii and Petr Arapov, two close associates of Petr Suvchinsiki, were sent to labor camps where they both eventually died.[31]

The Prague group continued functioning for almost ten years after the split, publishing several periodicals and even establishing its own political party. The death of 'Classical' Eurasianism finally occurred in 1937 when the Eurasianist organization in Prague was dissolved in consequence of the decrease in political and intellectual activity among the post-revolutionary emigrants, which was linked to their declining hope for the Bolsheviks' fall. The mission of emigrants to preserve 'truly Russian' political and cultural identities for later use within Russia seemed progressively more futile. At the same time, the cooperation of the Paris faction with the OGPU negatively influenced the reputation of the whole movement among other emigrants who turned away from Eurasianist ideas as a result. Finally, important participants departed from Eurasianism: Trubetskoi spent almost all his time working as a linguist, Alekseev taught law in Paris, Khara Davan devoted himself to work with Kalmyks, and Cossack national diasporas were busy elaborating projects to settle in the steppes of Mexico.[32]

Against all odds, Eurasianist ideology flourished again in the 1980s due to the activity of Petr Savitskii who had continued to develop Eurasianist ideas in Prague even after its end as an organized movement. Eurasianism owes its reemergence to the Soviet historian Lev Gumilev[33] who offered a radically new interpretation of ethnogenesis which acknowledged geographical space as one of the main factors in the formation of nationalities and their characteristics.[34] Gumilev's ideas were not widely discussed in Soviet academia but gained popularity after the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, offering a new ideology with the potential to reunite the post-Soviet space. The contemporary neo-Eurasianist movement is supported by the Russian state and positions itself as a new geopolitical ideology aimed at creating a Turkic-Russian national identity and again formulates a political rationale for Russia that moves beyond Western universalist narratives.[35]

[31] Glebov, *Evraziistvo Mezhdu Imperiei I Modernom*, 36, 43.
[32] P. E. Alekseeva, ed., *Ėrenzhen Khara-Davan I Ego Nasledie: Sbornik Stateĭ I Materialov.* (Elista: Izdatel'skii dom Gerel, 2012), 17.
[33] Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) a historian, ethnologist and archeologist, was a son of the famous Russian poet Anna Akhmatova. He was twice imprisoned by the Soviet authorities and spent twelve years in labor camps. In the 1950s, he began a correspondence with Petr Savitskii and Georgii Vernadskii.
[34] Mark Bassin, *The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).
[35] Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

The Eurasianist Interpretation of Post-Imperial Soviet Federalism

The fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 was intertwined with the rise of national movements in the imperial periphery. The Tsarist state underestimated the importance of finding a viable answer to the demand for self-determination in non-Russian parts of the empire.[36] As a result, the question of how to manage ethnic diversity remained of fundamental importance for post-revolutionary politics. For the Bolsheviks, a federalist solution seemed to be the ideal way forward that would equalise the status of the different nationalities and offer the possibility to merge territories after the Civil War. On the 15th of November 1917, the new Bolshevik authorities proclaimed the *Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia* that became the basis for the federalization of the state.[37] The later constitution of 1924 confirmed the entrance of federal republics in the Soviet Union and the establishment of a single Union citizenship. From that moment on, republics could freely secede from the USSR in theory but all territorial reorganizations would need to be approved by the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[38] Besides 'solving' the national question by giving all nationalities formal rights to self-determination,[39] Soviet officials used the new federalist structure of their state to 'demonstrate' "a globally applicable model of transcultural governance".[40]

Eurasianists similarly understood federalism as a stable basis for future reconfigurations of 'Russia-Eurasia' and used it for their concepts of Eurasianism built on opposition to the West.[41] A Eurasianist Declaration of 1927 stated that 'Eurasia' should build federalism in a "Soviet, not European understanding of its meaning".[42]

But what did that mean? And how exactly did Eurasianists imagine the 'post-imperial Russia-Eurasia' they intended to create? Georgii Vernadskii saw the federal Soviet state as a "juridical facade" and pointed out that the Soviet Communist Party autocratically ruled the peoples of Eurasia. In his view, the Soviet system was built on the principle of "centralism, not federalism".[43] This understanding

[36] Andrei Shcherbak, Liliia Boliachevets, and Evgeniia Platonova, "Istoriia Sovetskoi Natsional'noi Politiki: Kolebaniia Maiatnika?," *Politicheskaia Nauka*, no. 1 (2016): 103.
[37] "Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia," November 15, 1917, accessed March 25, 2017: http://www.ctevans.net/Nvcc/HIS102/Documents/Russian.html.
[38] "The Text of the Constitution of the USSR (1924)," *Russian Constitutions*, accessed October 16, 2016, http://constitution.sokolniki.com/eng/History/RussianConstitutions/10266.aspx.
[39] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
[40] Ivan Sablin, *Governing Post-Imperial Siberia and Mongolia, 1911–1924: Buddhism, Socialism and Nationalism in State and Autonomy Building* (London: Routledge, 2016), 2.
[41] Mark Bassin, "Classical Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity," *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2003): 257–67.
[42] "Politicheskie Vzgliady (Evraziistvo, Formulirovka 1927)," *Evraziiskaia Khronika*, no. 9 (1927): 6.
[43] GARF f. 5783, op. 2, d. 6. G. (Vernandskii. Opyt Istorii Evrazii. P. 172).

helped to promote Soviet federalism among Eurasianists whose ideology included the goal to create a unified geographical and religious space in the realms of the former empire under the leadership of the Russian nation.[44] The movement's official declaration on the 'National question' accordingly stated in 1927:

> The role of the Russian nation in the construction of Russia-Eurasia goes far beyond the formal frames of national self-determination. Exactly because Russian culture includes elements of other Eurasian nations, it should become the foundation of supranational [Eurasian] culture which would serve the common demands of all Eurasian nationalities without restricting their national originalities.[45]

The later declaration of 1932 continued that idea: "Eurasianists want to reflect […] Soviet federalism and Soviet nationality policy, aimed at combining strong political control with tough forms of enforcements of power*"*.[46]

Sergei Glebov, a historian of the Eurasianist movement, notes that the Soviet Union aimed to reunite the global working class as Eurasia aimed to construct an ideological system that would be opposed to Western values and become the leader of a bloc of decolonized countries.[47] But in order to become a part of the future state, different nations would first need to accept the Eurasianist ideology, to recognize Eurasianism's "organic connection" with Eurasia and understand its role in the development of the Eurasian continent.[48] Eurasianists stated that they sought to create a society in which all cultures would coexist on equal terms, but at the same time pointed to the necessity for a dominant role of 'Great Russian' nationalism that they thought could combine Asian and European identities.[49] All Eurasian nations were supposed to be united by this supranational 'Russian-Eurasian' nationalism, and centralized Soviet federalism was understood by Eurasianists as the perfect model technique to manage national diversities.

At the same time, Eurasianist ideology did not consider the nation as the basis for federalized autonomy in the future of 'Russia-Eurasia'. Eurasianists suggested that national autonomies were extremely attractive for native peoples but incapable of developing viable regional economies, hence the future 'Russia-Eurasia' was planned to be based on geographic and economic units instead. Georgii Vernadskii proposed to destroy all national units and restructure territory according to geographic and economic regional specifics in order to create a state with well-

[44] Ch. Sangadzhiev, "Priznanie Sovetskogo Federativnogo Opyta v Russkom Zarubezh'e: Evraziiskie Razmyshleniia N. Alekseeva," *Omskii Nauchnyi Vestnik* 2, no. 54 (2007): 47–52.
[45] "Politicheskie Vzgliady (Evraziistvo, Formulirovka 1927)."
[46] GARF f. 5783, op. 2, d. 23. ("Evraziistvo". Deklaratsiia, formulirovka, tezisy. Praga, 1932).
[47] S. V. Glebov, "N. S. Trubetskoi's Europe and Mankind and Eurasianist Antievolutionism: One Unknown Source.," in *Between Europe and Asia. The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 49.
[48] GARF f. 5783. op. 1, d. 193, L. 3. (Zametki Arapova "o nacionalizme").
[49] Nikolai Alekseev, *Russkii Narod I Gosudarstvo* (Moscow: Agraf, 1998), 112.

functioning units which would avoid the rise of nationalism inasmuch as there would be no dominant nationalities in the different regions.[50]

However, the official position of the Eurasianist movement supported the project of lawyer Nikolai Alekseev who – contrary to Georgii Vernadskii – envisioned the possibility to save several national autonomies coinciding with economic boundaries.[51] With regards to the organization of the economy in these federal units, Vernadskii emphasized the importance of state leadership that should nevertheless leave room for private business activity. This 'state-private' system, heavily informed by geographic determinism, was important for Vernadskii's overall conceptualization of the new state and was supposed to serve as an alternative 'Third Way' of socio-economic development, different from both socialism and liberal capitalism but including the advantages of both. Alekseev wrote: "Spatial reorganization on the principle of economic and geographic units is the biggest problem of the Russian policy. The one who successfully solves this problem will own the destiny of the future Russia-Eurasia."[52]

Glebov has pointed out that it is hard to find a more "imperial" ideology than Eurasianism.[53] Claiming the cultural and national unity of Eurasia, Eurasianist intellectuals sought to justify the reinstatement of the Russian Empire's former borders and their further expansion to the East. Neither the Soviet nor the Eurasianist interpretation was intended to secure effective self-determination in the various parts of the country, but was instead intended to reinstate an imperialist order by using federalism as a tool to accommodate and control minority nationalisms. However, this mainstream, and indeed official, position of the organized Eurasianist movement contradicted the views of its non-Russian participants who had already experienced imperial rule and therefore instead supported solutions that stressed the importance of national autonomies.

Eurasianism in Debate with Intellectuals from the Imperial Periphery

Despite its claim to merge all Eastern nationalities and give them freedom for cultural development, Eurasianism did not gain popularity among many representatives of non-Russian diasporas. This was due to several reasons, starting with the highly nationalistic atmosphere in these communities, participants of which considered Russians as aggressive invaders of their homelands, and ending with the imperialistic emanation of Eurasianism itself. Still, there were a few representatives of non-Russian national minorities who regarded themselves as Eurasian-

[50] Alekseev, *Russkii Narod I Gosudarstvo*, 112.
[51] Nikolai Alekseev, "Sovetskii Federalizm," *Evraziiskii Vremennik* 5 (1927): 240–61.
[52] Alekseev, *Russkii Narod I Gosudarstvo*, 367. "Economic-geographic units" is used as the translation for the original Russian "Khoziaistvenno-geograficheskaia".
[53] Sergei Glebov, "A Life with Imperial Dreams: Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky, Eurasianism, and the Invention of 'Structuralist' Geography," *Ab Imperio*, no. 3 (2005): 299.

ists. The abovementioned Kalmyk doctor Erenzhen Khara Davan, the Georgian philosopher Konstantin Chkheidze and the Jewish historian Iakov Bromberg were among those who published extensively on a solution to the 'National question' within a Eurasianist polity but from a non-Russian perspective.

Khara Davan and his friend Chkheidze were both representatives of the imperial periphery that had been incorporated into Tsarist Russia in the 18th and 19th century. They both called themselves "Asiats" and frequently underlined their non-Russian origins, but welcomed Eurasianism as the only ideology able to reconnect all cultures of the former empire. Their answer to the 'National question' was to give every nationality unlimited possibilities of cultural development.[54] In the 1920s, they offered an alternative project of Eurasian statehood as a confederation of states that would each be based on the principle of nationality. Khara Davan and Chkheidze were against a centralized federation, in opposition to other participants in the movement. In their view, the Soviet system could not claim to represent the different nationalities and national minorities: "The RSFSR is no federation and the USSR is no Union of Republics".[55] Khara Davan personally supported the idea of a national confederation which would include "neighbouring nationalities, similar regarding their economic, cultural and military aims".[56] According to this plan, the Eurasian confederation would be divided in several states: Great Russia, Crimea, the Cossack Lands, and the Caucasian Federation.[57] Khara Davan criticized imperial structures in multinational states, claiming that they would destroy cultural legacies and deny national rights. The fall of several empires in consequence of the First World War and the Soviet practice of establishing convenient regimes on the territories of Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia, and the Far East only seemed to strengthen Khara Davan's argument concerning the impossibility of a voluntary coexistence within one state in the eyes of his supporters. Nevertheless, Khara Davan and Chkheidze considered themselves to be Eurasianists – their stark contrast to Vernadskii's and Alekseev's projects shows the wide spectrum of opinions within the Eurasianist movement.

However, the majority of Kalmyk emigrants did not think that Eurasianism responded to their needs due to the imperialist positions that Eurasianists like Vernadskii and Alekseev promoted with respect to national minorities. Many Kalmyk

[54] GARF, f. 5911, op. 1, d. 79, L. 6. (Perepiska Chkheidza K. s Khara-Davan Eranzhenom, doktorom meditsiny).

[55] Erenzhen Khara Davan, "Natsional'nyi Vopros v Razreshenii Russkikh Politicheskikh Partii," in *Erenzhen Khara Davan I Ego Nasledie: Sbornik Statei I Materialov*., ed. P.E. Alekseeva (Elista: Izdatel'skii dom Gerel, 2012), 236. RSFSR stands for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

[56] Erenzhen Khara-Davan, "O Nashikh Natsional'nykh Zadachakh," in *Erenzhen Khara-Davan I Ego Nasledie: Sbornik Statei I Materialov*., ed. P.E. Alekseeva (Elista: Izdatel'skii dom Gerel, 2012), 174.

[57] In his notes, Khara Davan did not provide any detailed description of how exactly "*Velikorossia*" and "*Kazakiia*" would be formed. However, he mentioned that "*Kazakiia*" would include "*Kalmykia*" and neighboring areas with Cossack populations.

emigrants gathered around their leaders, Erenzhen Khara Davan in Prague and Badma Ulanov in Belgrade, but did not support moves to reunite with Russian nationalists. The most active and strong group of Kalmyks was in Prague, where Thomas Masaryk, the president of Czechoslovakia and a former participant of the Russian Civil War organized the 'Russian Action', a work program for Russian emigrants.[58] Here, Kalmyks in exile also published their official magazine *Kovyl'nye volny*, roughly translated as "Waves of Feather Grass", in which they discussed the problems of Kalmyk emigrants but also of the Kalmyks in the USSR. In this magazine, they argued against the Eurasianists' idealization of Asia's role in Russian history, calling that approach inconvincible and "far-fetched".[59] Such positions could be explained by nationalistic attitudes within the diaspora, as Kalmyks tried to identify their nationality as independent and specifically without any connection to the Russian people. In fact, Kalmyks regarded the Russian culture as leaning towards an aggressive nationalism.[60]

Finally, the Eurasianists' rejection of Buddhism did not foster Kalmyk goodwill toward the movement. Despite formally supporting cultural diversities, Eurasianists suggested that only Orthodoxy could reunite all Eurasian nationalities as it supposedly combined Eastern and Western cultural peculiarities.[61] Moreover, the Russian Orthodox church was presented as the one continuum in Eurasian history that survived under the pressure of 'Romano-Germanic' cultural influences and had saved principles of Christian benignity and original Russianness. According to Trubetskoi, Muslim and Buddhist populations of Eurasia would have to accept the domination of Orthodoxy and understand that their own religious practices were not "organic" to the peoples of Eurasia.[62] This blunt cultural imperialism in concrete political speech was in contradiction to more theoretical Eurasianist concepts of cultural realization that stressed the importance of self-conception through national and religious experience.

Another 'peripheral' perspective on Eurasianist ideas was offered by Iakov Bromberg, a historian of Jewish origin who tried to identify the role of Jewry in the future of Eurasia. Bromberg published the book *The West, Russia and the Jewry* in which he reconsidered the 'Jewish question' with regards to the cultural and historical interrelationships of the Eurasian peoples.[63] Bromberg frequently used the concept of "place-development"[64] to explain the role of the Jewish nation in the history of Eurasia. He took this term up from the leading Eurasianist Niko-

[58] Ivan Savitskii, "Nachalo 'Russkoi Aktsii'" (Novyi zhurnal, 2008), accessed on March 21, 2017, http://magazines.russ.ru/nj/2008/251/sa11.html.
[59] Sh. Balinov, "Iz Kalmytskoi Istorii," *Kovyl'nye Volny*, no. 2 (1930): 19.
[60] S. Savel'ev, "Po Stranitsam Starykh Nomerov Zhurnala «Dni»," *Kovyl'nye Volny*, no. 2 (1930): 42.
[61] GARF, f. 5783, op. 2, d. 21. L. 53 ("Evraziistvo" (opyt sistematicheskogo izlozheniia), 1926.
[62] N. S. Trubetskoi, "Na Putiakh. Utverzhdenie Evraziitsev. Praga, 1922," *Literaturnaia Ucheba* (1991), 140.
[63] Iakov Bromberg, *Zapad, Rossiia I Evreistvo* (Berlin, 1931).
[64] The Russian original for "place-development" is "*mestorazvitie*".

lai Trubetskoi. Considering the Jews as a nation, Trubetskoi stated that all cultural stereotypes were irrelevant since behavior and culture depended on the place of settlement and its conditions.[65] Consequently, the Jewish people of Eurasia did not seem to be necessarily any different than other Eurasian nationalities. Bromberg supposed that the Jewish nation could therefore accept shared responsibility with other Eurasian peoples for the future of 'Russia-Eurasia'.

Bromberg also took up Trubetskoi's thesis about 'false' and 'true' nationalisms formulated after the collapse of the empire and claiming that the Jews, just like the Ukrainians, did not have the right to demand national autonomy. Bromberg agreed and suggested that Eastern European Jews should take an "unassuming, but deserving place" among the peoples of 'Russia-Eurasia' without claiming statehood. According to Bromberg's view, 'Russia-Eurasia' was the "New Jerusalem" which would give all Eastern European Jews the opportunity to express their interests under the auspices of "Great Russian" nationalism.[66] Despite Bromberg's claim to offer a solution for the 'Jewish question', his project did not provoke much response from other representatives of the Jewish diaspora.[67]

Eurasianism's International Potential: Pan-Asianism in Exchange with Eurasianism

Eurasianism continued the Slavophiles' intellectual current that blamed the Russian government and society for imitating European culture and not following authentic Russian patterns.[68] Criticizing Western values, Eurasianists claimed that the imperial crisis occurred precisely because of attempts to modernize and Europeanize the Tsarist Empire, and suggested instead that a future state identity should be constructed based on the proclamation of Asian supremacy. However, despite this praise for Asian influences, Eurasianism remained highly imperial and orientalist, romanticizing the image of the East without any actual intention to cooperate with representatives of Asian movements. This is proven by Eurasianist positions toward the question of 'peripheral' nationalisms in the realms of the former empire. Furthermore, Marlène Laruelle has noted how Eurasianists used the concept of the Orient to "solve the Russian identity quest by exalting the oriental alterity".[69]

Eurasianists did not only react to 'Asian' demands within the former empire but were also in exchange with Pan-Asianism, the Japanese state ideology gaining

[65] Viktor Schnirelmann, "Evraziitsy i evrei," accessed February 4, 2017, http://scepsis.net/library/id_952.html.
[66] Bromberg, *Zapad, Rossiia I Evreistvo,* 29.
[67] Viktor Schnirelmann, "Evraziitsy i evrei," accessed February 4, 2017, http://scepsis.net/library/id_952.html.
[68] Janko Lavrin, "Populists and Slavophiles," *The Russian Review* 21(3) (1962): 308.
[69] Marlène Laruelle, "The Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism," *Nationalities Papers* 32 (2004): 116.

political influence in interwar Japan. Pan-Asianists suggested the unification and integration of Asia under Japanese leadership and the project was spread to Asian countries colonized by Japan.[70]

In the late 1920s, probably on one of his journeys to Harbin, the Kalmyk Eurasianist Erenzhen Khara Davan met Shimano Saburo,[71] a Japanese translator and specialist on Russian affairs, who was a strong supporter of Pan-Asianism. It has been suggested that Saburo had already been in contact with Khara Davan when Japanese Buddhist communities donated to the Buddhist temple in Belgrade built by the Kalmyk diaspora and helped to fund a gold statue of Buddha.[72] Prior to this, Saburo and Khara Davan might even have known each other from their student years in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1907.

Saburo began to translate several Eurasianist works, such as Trubetskoi's *Europe and Mankind*, Khara Davan's book *Genghis Khan as a Military Leader, and his Legacy*, Savitskii's article *Geopolitical Notes on Russian History* and even the pamphlet *Eurasianism: Declaration, Formulation, Theses*, that gained some success in Japan.[73] As Hama Yukiko has pointed out, both movements had several common features that influenced the perception and popularity of Eurasianist ideas in Japan. Firstly, they were united by the criticism of Europe's cultural and political imperialism. Pan-Asianism used anti-Western rhetoric in order to justify aspirations to unite Asian and Japanese identities, underlining racial and cultural similarities among them.[74] The immediate context for the formulation of these ideas was the rise of the Japanese economy within the global market and the widespread desire in Japan to position the state as an equal participant in international relations. Both movements therefore aimed to reconstruct unified supranational spaces: A Eurasianist polity would have reestablished the boundaries of the former Russian Empire under the supremacy of the Russian nation, while Pan-Asianism sought to form a bloc of Asian countries led by Japan.[75] Concretely, Japanese Pan-Asianists interpreted the Eurasianists' desire to construct a state in which several nations would coexist under Russian leadership as a justification of

[70] Prasenjit Duara, "The Imperialism of 'Free Nations': Japan, Manchukuo and the History of the Present," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 211–39.

[71] P. E. Alekseeva, *Ėrenzhen Khara Davan I Ego Nasledie: Sbornik Stateĭ I Materialov.* (Elista: Izdatel'skii dom Gerel, 2012), 42.

[72] A. Iukiasu, "K Istorii Iaponskogo Perevoda Knigi E. Khara-Davana," in *Ėrenzhen Khara-Davan I Ego Nasledie: Sbornik Stateĭ I Materialov.* (Elista: Izdatel'skii dom Gerel, 2012), 41–43.

[73] Yukiko Hama, "Eurasianism Goes Japanese. Toward a Global History of a Russian Intellectual Movement," in *Between Europe and Asia. The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 155.

[74] Hama, "Eurasianism Goes Japanese. Toward a Global History of a Russian Intellectual Movement.", 153

[75] Ibid., 154.

Japanese colonial policy towards Manchukuo.[76] Shimano Saburo was nonetheless careful not to translate Eurasianist publications discussing the formal Eurasianist principle of multiculturalism that contradicted the blunt imperialist policies as pursued by Japan.

Furthermore, Saburo met Vsevolod Ivanov, a central figure of the Russian community in Harbin and supporter of Eurasianist views. In 1926, Ivanov published the book *We: Cultural-Historical Features of Russian Statehood* in which he analyzed 'Russia-Eurasia' not from a European, but an Asian perspective.[77] Ivanov considered China to have played a leading role in the formation of the Mongol Empire which he understood as the foundation of Russian statehood. He also claimed that cooperation between a Eurasianist and a pan-Asianist state would lead to the prosperity of both political spaces and establish a strong alliance that could resist Western values. However, other Eurasianists reacted negatively to Ivanov's ideas and Saburo's aspiration to spread their concepts in Japan. In a public letter, the famous Orientalist and Eurasianist Vasilii Nikitin criticized Ivanov's friendly position toward Japan as a misconception:

> Pan-Asianism appeared with the end of the rapture between the United States and Japan, and now Japan is trying to unite Asia. Japan exploits Chinese labor and floods the Chinese market with its worthless stuff. It is a very unpleasant competitor for Indian industry. Japan is Americanized.[78]

In 1932, Petr Savitskii published the article *Eurasianists Talk about the Far Eastern Question,* a direct response to Ivanov's writings in favor of Japanese Pan-Asianism in one of the Harbin newspapers.[79] Savitskii claimed that Ivanov had no connection to organized Eurasianism, the "single and unified representation of the Eurasianism movement".[80] Savitskii also blamed Japan for adopting Western colonialist and imperialist policies toward China as well as for the attempt to disguise these policies behind a 'Pan-Asian vision'. Stating that Eurasia would not deploy a colonial policy in the East, Savitskii also wrote that Eurasianists did

[76] Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and set up the formally independent vassal state of Manchukuo. According to P. Duara, Japanese policy in Manchuria represented a new type of imperialism which implied the creation of independent nation states under military control of the metropole. See: Prasenjit. Duara, "The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in comparative perspective," in *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 4 (2006).

[77] Vsevolod Ivanov, *My: Kul't.-Ist. Osnovy Rus. Gosudarstvennosti* (Harbin: Bambukovaia roshcha, 1926).

[78] Vasilii. Nikitin, "Iz Pis'ma V. Nikitina V. Ivanovu: Iz Parizha v Kharbin," *Evraziiskaia Khronika*, no. 6 (1926), 7.

[79] GARF, f. 5783, op. 2, d. 26, L. 1 (Evraziitsy o dal'nem vostoke).

[80] Ibid., L. 2.

not desire to cooperate with Asian countries, mostly because Eurasia was itself a "self-sufficient economic unit".[81]

Georgii Vernandskii further criticized Pan-Asianism, stating that Eurasianists should be cautious with regard to Japanese Pan-Asianism:

> Pan-Asianism is a concept that the Japanese press advanced to support Japanese imperialism. Asia for Asians – of course only on the assumption of Japanese superiority over Asians. In response to this slogan, we can suggest the concept 'Eurasia for Eurasians'. If the peoples of Eurasia understand their mutual connection and common historical destiny then every slogan founded on other geopolitics claims would be a weapon of foreign imperialism aimed at splitting Eurasian unity.[82]

As it has been shown above, Eurasianism was highly imperialist toward national minorities despite claiming their support for national cultures and languages. Leading Eurasianists, who criticized Ivanov's attempts to establish closer connections with Japan, were representatives of noble Russian families who had lived in the center of the former Russian Empire. These Eurasianists described the Japanese project as imperialist and oppressive toward other Asian nationalities but could not see the similarities to their own project. Both the ideologies of Eurasianism as well as Pan-Asianism were created in opposition to Western culture and positioned themselves 'between Europe and Asia', responding to profound economic and geopolitical change. However, Pan-Asianism realised the state support necessary to have real impact while Eurasianism remained an imperial dream of post-revolutionary Russian emigrants.

Conclusion

Was Eurasianism an imperial agony or did it promise a pan-continental future? Despite the fact that Eurasianism now receives support of the state elites in some post-Soviet countries, the answer to this question is not an obvious one. The ideology of Eurasianism was formed in the interwar period and presented a direct reaction to the global crisis, wars, and dissolutions of empires. Eurasianists believed in the near future collapse of the Soviet Union and later establishment of an ideal autocratic state, so-called Russia-Eurasia, which would reflect the will of the people and accommodate cultural diversity of all Eurasian nationalities. However, the political projects of Eurasianism remained highly imperialistic due to its underlying assumption of the supremacy of Russian culture and the necessarily leading role of 'Great Russian' nationalism which supposedly united both

[81] GARF, f. 5783, op. 2, d. 26, L. 2 (Evraziitsy o dal'nem vostoke).
[82] GARF, f. 5783, op. 2, d. 6. L. 25 (Vernadskii G.V. "Opyt istorii Evrazii").

Russian and Asian identities. Besides, Eurasianist ideology was fixated on Russia and therefore could not be taken up by any other state in Eurasia.

The rise of Pan-Asianism in Japan, which was also used to justify imperial aims, involved the distribution of Eurasianist ideas beyond the Russosphere through Shimano Saburo's translations of Eurasianist works. However, despite Pan-Asianism's claim of Asia's prominent role in world history as well as its criticism of Eurocentrism, Eurasianists rejected any cooperation with representatives of Pan-Asianism blaming it for conducting an imperialist policy.

The few non-Russian participants of the movement, such as Erenzhen Khara Davan and Iakov Bromberg, representatives of the Kalmyk and Jewish diaspora respectively, stood against the official Eurasianist project of centralized federalism along economic fault lines. Instead, they demanded the acknowledgment of the rights of national minorities to autonomy and the creation of a confederation on the basis of nationalisms in any future Russia-Eurasia. Yet the refusal of mainstream Eurasianism to accept these projects of national confederations led to Eurasianism's rejection by the Kalmyk and Jewish diasporas who claimed that the Eurasianist 'successors of Tsarist imperialist policy' would oppress national minorities again. These findings lead to the conclusion that Russian Eurasianism could not offer a competitive alternative to the Soviet project and therefore remaining an imperial agony of exile intellectuals.

Interpreting the 'Thaw' from the 'Third World': The Guyanese Writer Jan Carew on Modernization and Trauma in the Early 1960s Soviet Union

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This paper analyzes how the Guyanese writer Jan Carew explored the results of Soviet modernization and the trauma caused by Stalinist terror and the Gulag through the eyes of exchange students from the 'Global South' in the early 1960s. His novel *Moscow is not my Mecca* dismisses the USSR's development as a model for newly emerging post-colonial states and depicts racist attitudes in Soviet society. Thus, Carew defied Soviet propaganda conveyed through intensified cultural diplomacy towards 'Third World' intellectuals, which brought authors such as Carew and exchange students to the USSR since the mid-1950s. However, I argue that the issues Carew addresses and the aesthetic tools he uses mirror Soviet Thaw literature of the time, which intended to revive communist utopianism. The Guyanese's writings are therefore also an example of successful cultural diplomacy of the USSR, which is largely overlooked. The paper illuminates this by focusing on Carew's portrayal of Russian peasants and the USSR's peripheries on the one hand, and Soviet society's inability to cope with its traumatic past on the other. It highlights some commonalities to Ilya Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* and Vladimir Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*. The paper contributes to a new history of the Cold War, illustrating how permeable the 'Iron Curtain' could be. While most studies in this field focus on how global cultural influences shaped Soviet society, few explore the reverse effects.

Introduction[1]

In 1964, writer Jan Carew from then still colonial British-Guiana published the novel *Moscow is not my Mecca*,[2] which tells the story of disillusionment of the Guyanese exchange student Jonathan "Jojo" Robertson. The protagonist comes to the USSR to learn the skills for developing his home country after its expected independence, but has to leave without a diploma after Russian thugs called him "uncultured," a "Black monkey," and beat him up because they were envious of

[1] I would like to thank Daria Tashkinova, Violet Dove, Paul Sprute, Alexandra Holmes and Maike Lehmann for helpful commentaries and Maria Laranjeira for invaluable corrections.

[2] Jan R. Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1964).

his Russian girlfriend.[3] Therefore, 1960s Western media and more recent scholarship have a good reason to focus on Carew's book in the context of racist attitudes in the USSR that were reported by exchange students such as Carew's cousin Danny.[4] Unlike earlier foreign visitors of the 1920s and 30s (namely African-American workers who helped industrialize the country), this new generation of travelers did not praise the USSR for its unprecedented equality devoid of racism.[5] On the contrary, their accounts threatened to shatter the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) propaganda, which presented itself as a non-racist alternative to "imperialist" Western states.[6] By reporting racist violence in the USSR and openly protesting against it, exchange students from the 'Third World' widened opportunities of what could be said and done, inspiring later Soviet dissidents.[7]

However, there is much more to Jan Carew's complex assessment of Soviet society than its depiction of racist attitudes against exchange students. As Tobias Rupprecht has pointed out, Cold War perceptions of Western observers during the early 1960s obscured that Carew, in addition to other Latin American writers and exchange students, also criticized racism in Western states and their colonies at the time, as well as stressing the positive aspects of Soviet society.[8] For example, the characters in Carew's book report numerous incidences of "hospitality and

[3] "Uncultured" on Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 57; "Black monkey" on ibid., 25, 33, 185.

[4] Maxim Matusevich, "Probing the Limits of Internationalism: African Students Confront Soviet Ritual," Anthropology of East Europe Review 27, no. 2 (2009)22 on Carew, 30 on Nigerian students being called "monkeys", beaten up and even killed ; Maxim Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic: African Students as Soviet Moderns," *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2012), 338; Joy G. Carew, "Black in the USSR: African Diasporan Pilgrims, Expatriates and Students in Russia, from the 1920s to the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century," *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* 8, no. 2 (2015), 204; on Western reception see Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange Between the USSR and Latin America During the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 191-192. On 'Third World' exchange students and African-Americans in the USSR, see the bibliographical essay by Jan Carew's wife in Joy Gleason Carew, *Blacks, Reds, and Russians: Sojourners in Search of the Soviet Promise* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 257-263.

[5] See the articles of Various Authors *The Russian Review* 75, no. 3 (2016); Barbara Keys, "An African American Worker in Stalin's Soviet Union: Race and the Soviet Experiment in International Perspective," *The Historian* 71, no. 1 (2009).

[6] On the USSR's decidedly 'anti-imperialist' self-definition see Terry Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism," in *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald G. Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 80-81.; Odd A. Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 48, 67.

[7] Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 47, 1/2 (2006); Matusevich, "Probing the Limits of Internationalism", 25 f.; According to Jan Carew, his cousin played a major role in the protests described by Hessler and Matusevich, Jan R. Carew and Joy Gleason Carew, *Episodes in my Life: The Autobiography of Jan Carew* (Leeds: Peepal Tree Press, 2015), Compiled, Edited & Expanded by Joy Gleason Carew, 84.

[8] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, 92; Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 14, 25-26 , 42; Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 65, 81, 77.

solidarity towards people from Third World countries."[9] Such passages are also not mentioned by historians such as Maxim Matusevich, who only refers to Carew as an example for "[a]ccounts by African students in the Soviet Union […] replete with complaints about drab lifestyles, everyday regimentation, sub-standard dorm accommodations, and alleged spying by Soviet roommates."[10] Rupprecht, on the other hand, interviewed 15 former Latin American exchange students of different class and ideological backgrounds, concluding that "[w]hile xenophobic violence did become a huge problem from the 1980s, it was not a day-to-day issue for foreign students in the 1960s and 1970s."[11] Instead, many of them – especially those of a lower social background – at least retrospectively laud the USSR's perceived high standards of education and living, as well as the people's generosity.[12] Thus Rupprecht, one of the few authors engaging with Soviet cultural diplomacy towards the 'Third World', concludes that it was largely a 'success story' in the case of Latin America.[13]

In this paper, I would like to illustrate how both of the aforementioned positive and negative accounts of Soviet cultural diplomacy are reflected in Carew's writings. I will do this by exploring how the exchange students from the 'Third World' in his novel depict the results of Soviet modernization, and the trauma caused by Stalinist terror and the Gulag in the early 1960s. I argue that Carew's negative account of Soviet development exemplifies unintended consequences of the CPSU's efforts to gain sympathies from people in newly independent 'Third World' states during the mid-1950s and 60s. After all, like other Latin American, Asian, and African intellectuals, Carew was invited to visit the USSR's peripheries and its capital in 1961/62 to write about the impressive record of rapid industrialization and education, as well as the non-racist nature of the multi-ethnic USSR – not about racism.[14] However, his book also shows how successful the cultural exchange instigated by the CPSU's new leader Nikita Khrushchev could be: Carew applied the language, imagery and contents of critical, yet optimistic

[9] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, 192.
[10] Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic", 338.
[11] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, 217. Rupprecht does not explain the change occurring in the 1980s any further. Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic", 74-75 names two factors for growing xenophobia during the 1980s: 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost' lead to an unprecedented extent of free speech, Soviet critics used this to blame the huge sums of military and 'development' aid given to Africa as a cause of economic decline at home.
[12] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, quote on 217, 227. ibid., 188 also claims that "really negative reports" by intellectuals only started in the 1980s; Carew himself stresses that the education granted to exchange students from the 'Global South' would have been unattainable for them in their home countries, and yet they complained about its quality to him, Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 80.
[13] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, quote on 223; see also ibid., 186-190.
[14] Ibid., 162, 172; Ragna Boden, "Globalisierung sowjetisch: Der Kulturtransfer in die Dritte Welt," in *Globalisierung imperial und sozialistisch: Russland und die Sowjetunion in der Globalgeschichte 1851-1991*, ed. Martin Aust (Frankfurt am Main [u.a.]: Campus, 2013), 431.

Soviet 'Thaw' literature to deliver his own critique of Soviet society. Thus, in Carew's case, the strategy of propagating high culture such as Russian literature or ballet, which formed the second pillar of Soviet cultural diplomacy besides stressing rapid modernization,[15] seems to have been quite effective.[16]

For several reasons, exploring these connections is a fruitful contribution to the growing body of literature that is trying to write a new history of the Cold War by focusing more on culture than on military aspects, and more on 'peripheral' than on 'central' regions.[17] Firstly, the importance of Soviet Thaw literature for political, social, and cultural changes in the USSR between 1955 and the late 1960s can hardly be overstated. The fact that contemporaries as well as today's historians named this period of Soviet history after Ilya Ehrenburg's seminal novel *The Thaw* is a testament to that.[18] Yet, the international influence of Thaw literature and the discussions revolving around it have barely been researched. The few exceptions focus on its reception in Western countries or Western influences in the Soviet Union.[19] Secondly, the Cold War is increasingly being interpreted as a conflict revolving around competing concepts of 'modernity' and 'modernization,' in which the 'First' and 'Second' tried to convince the 'Third World' that their respective model was superior.[20] "Yet," as David Engerman has noted, "few pay much attention to the opponent in this battle, the USSR, and none examines in any depth Soviet activities in the Third World."[21] I understand 'modernity' as

[15] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, especially 128-230 and 190; Boden, "Globalisierung sowjetisch", 432, 436.

[16] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, especially 128-230 and 190; Boden, "Globalisierung sowjetisch", 432, 436; Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 81, recalls the "magical moments" of seeing the Kirov Ballet Company perform and visiting the Hermitage Museum.

[17] See the issues of the "Journal of Cold War Studies" of the last years; Westad, *The Global Cold War*. I am aware that 'periphery' and 'center' are critically discussed terms, because they may imply that only those in the center act, while the peripheries react. This was not always the case in the USSR, although the center of power lay in Moscow, and the peripheral states could not develop self-sufficient economic structures that would have allowed them to act more independently; Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire", 75-76.

[18] Ilja Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter," in *Über Literatur - Essays, Reden Aufsätze; Tauwetter*, ed. Ilja Ehrenburg (Berlin (Ost): Volk und Welt, 1986 [Tauwetter 1956]).

[19] Polly Jones, "The Thaw Goes International: Soviet Literature in Translation and Transit in the 1960s," in *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World*, ed. Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane Koenker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Vladislav M. Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 89-120.

[20] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 1-72.

[21] David C. Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011), 188. In this paper, I do not illuminate the USSR's activities in the 'Third World', but their consequences on a cultural level. When referring to countries in the southern hemisphere sharing a history of being colonized and a resulting higher poverty compared to countries in the northern hemisphere, I personally prefer to speak of 'Global South' rather than 'Third World', as the latter may imply a hierarchy of 'development,' in which 'Third World' means economically or culturally 'backward.' I use 'Third' or 'Second World' to hint at a perception of contemporaries of coming 'from different worlds'; Andrea Hollington et al., "Concepts of the Global South. Voices from Around

an analytical concept rather than a normative category and 'Socialist modernity' as one of its ideal type variants, which is not *per se* 'better' or 'worse' than other forms of 'modernity' found in Western countries or the 'Global South.' 'Socialist modernization' includes a bundle of processes aimed at transforming a predominantly agrarian society into an industrial one. This meant the establishment of a planned economy based on heavy industry, collectivization of farms, urbanization, bureaucratization, a general faith in 'social engineering,' and the transformation of nature through technology and science.[22] These processes were often forcefully introduced by a dictatorial regime, but also appropriated and changed by 'ordinary' citizen.[23] How people interpreted these changes and their underlying assumptions are thus a constitutive part of 'modernity' and 'modernization.'[24] This leads us to the third argument for analyzing Carew's writings: We know little about how people in the 'Global South' interpreted 'Socialist modernity' or how they appropriated Soviet cultural influences. Most scholarship focusses on how global cultural influences shaped Soviet society,[25] but few explore reverse effects. As Carew was a globally renowned activist, publicist, scholar and teacher on racism, pan-Africanism, and (post-)colonialism, his interpretation of Soviet society is one worth analyzing.[26] His novel provides interesting insights on all three of the aforementioned aspects if we analyze more closely *how* he explains racism against exchange students rather than just noting the fact *that* he does.

Such an approach also reflects the two-sided nature of Soviet 'Thaw' literature and its societal reverberations. I understand the Thaw in a twofold manner: first, as a literary-aesthetic form, which leads to the question to what extent Carew wrote *like* Thaw protagonists; second, as a historical event and period, leading to the question in what way Carew wrote *about* the Thaw. Both aspects are intertwined: by writing about certain issues in a certain manner with a specific inten-

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the World," accessed 03.14.2017, kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/6399/1/voices012015_concepts_of_the_global_south.pdf; Jürgen Dinkel, "'Dritte Welt': Geschichte und Semantiken. Version 1.0." accessed 03.14.2017, https://docupedia.de/zg/Dritte_Welt.

[22] Marie-Janine Calic, Dietmar Neutatz, and Julia Obertreis, "Introduction," in *The Crisis of Socialist Modernity: The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1970s*, ed. Dietmar Neutatz, Julia Obertreis and Marie-Janine Calic (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 9-14.

[23] Stephen Lovell, *The Soviet Union: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2009), 37-57.

[24] This approach reflects concepts such as Shmuel Eisenstadt's "multiple modernities" or Anthony Giddens' and Ulrich Beck's interpretations of a "reflexive modernity"; see Thomas Mergel, "Modernisierung," accessed 03.14.2017, http://ieg-ego.eu/de/threads/modelle-und-stereotypen/modernisierung/thomas-mergel-modernisierung.

[25] Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going after Stalin* (Bloomington [etc.]: Indiana U.P, 2009); Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic"; Rupprecht, Soviet Internationalism after Stalin, 73-126; Denis Kozlov, "Introduction," in Kozlov; Gilburd, *The Thaw*, 12-13.

[26] For a short summary of Carew's vita see Margaret Busby, "Jan Carew Obituary," *The Guardian*, 12.21.2012, accessed 01.13.2017, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/dec/21/jan-carew. For a more extensive one, including a comprehensive bibliography, see Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life.*

tion, Thaw writers influenced and initiated social, cultural, and political changes. Their works were widely, controversially, and publicly debated by Soviet citizens of all backgrounds and thereby also influenced politics under Khrushchev. Among the issues discussed were the freedoms that should be granted to cultural production and the extent to which the Gulag should be transformed into an institution preparing inmates for a return into 'normal society' by aligning living conditions in the camps to those outside of them.[27] Thaw writers wanted to create a new emotional language in order to inspire a forward-looking psychological condition and revive Communism's utopianism. Thus, Ehrenburg's metaphor turned into a "'self-fulfilling prophecy' that structured reality."[28]

I will consult three of Carew's texts: *Moscow is not my Mecca*, passages in his autobiography dealing with this book and its origins, and a New York Times article on a visit to Belorussia.[29] I will interpret the novel as it presented itself to its readers in the foreword: a work of fiction claiming to be inspired by 'real' stories of Guyanese exchange students, with the intention of raising awareness for growing racism in the USSR. The Guyanese writer from a Creole family was invited by the Union of Soviet Writers to travel the USSR twice in 1961/62.[30] At the same time, his cousin Danny studied in Moscow and Leningrad, just as Carew himself had done in 1949 in Prague.[31] During these travels, the writer met two factions of people whose influences would come to shape his book: exchange students from the 'Global South,' who told him about the racism they experienced, and intellectuals of the Soviet *intelligentsia* who seemingly conveyed the aesthetics and contents of the literature and political discourse of the Thaw to him.[32] It is crucial to critically cross-check Carew's contemporary writings with the contexts

[27] Karen Laß, *Vom Tauwetter zur Perestrojka: Kulturpolitik in der Sowjetunion*, 1953-1991 (Köln: Böhlau, 2002), 44-196; Jeffrey S. Hardy, ""The Camp Is Not a Resort": The Campaign against Privileges in the Soviet Gulag 1957-61," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 1 (2012).

[28] Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd, "The Thaw as an Event in Russian History," in Kozlov; Gilburd, *The Thaw*, 23. The Thaw can be characterized as a period of ambiguous reform processes: the Soviet Union opened up domestically and internationally, but thereby often caused unintended consequences and new tensions within society leading to a dynamic of constant rollbacks and re-introduction of reforms. Other issues than those already mentioned were breaking with the 'Stalinist' past, affordable new housing or irrigating the Kazakh steppe's 'Virgin Lands', see Polly Jones, *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006).

[29] Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*; Jan R. Carew, "Being Black in Belorussia Is Like Being from Mars," *The New York Times*, 09.19.1971.

[30] Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 71.

[31] In his autobiography, Carew barely mentions his studies in Prague and does not recall any incidents of racism there, while he stresses the racism he experienced while studying in the USA, ibid., 11-35.

[32] Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 55-87; Foreword in Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 9-10. Unfortunately, in the texts I consulted, Carew does not discuss to what extent Soviet writers influenced his work. However, considering the Thaw's omnipresence in Soviet public debate in 1961/62 as well as Carew's interest in socialism and Soviet culture, it is hard to imagine that he did not read some Soviet works and engage in a dialogue on Thaw literature's contents and aesthetics while visiting the USSR.

he retrospectively gave in his autobiography. Due to pragmatism, I will interpret only these texts, not their perception.[33] The paper will also illustrate commonalities between Carew's writings and the two most domestically and internationally influential works of Soviet Thaw literature: Ilya Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* and Vladimir Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*.[34] Further research should compare Carew to other Soviet Thaw literature, differentiate between its different periods, as well as elaborate on the changing environment of cultural policy in which Soviet authors operated, which would have been beyond the scope of this article.[35] However, this is balanced by a detailed and unprecedented focus on Carew's appropriation of Soviet influences, as well as by the consultation of secondary literature.

The Periphery in the Center: Alienation through Modernization

Descriptions of alleged 'primal' Soviet peasants form an integral part of Carew's novel. He presents these people as warm-hearted and discovers major similarities to people's mentality in the 'Global South.' However, this 'warm' nature seems to be extinguished by the processes of modernization such as urbanization, industrialization, and bureaucratization, which transform human beings into cold-hearted bureau- and technocrats. In Carew's logic, their rural origins could bring Soviet citizens and exchange students together. However, both groups in his novel distance themselves from these roots and thus foster racism: Soviet students from the peripheries feel inferior to allegedly 'cosmopolitan'[36] and self-confident exchange students, a few of whom indeed state that their Eastern counterparts were "uncultured." As a result, some Soviet students spit in front of exchange students, call them "Black monkeys," or even beat them up. It could be discussed whether what he describes as racism would not be better interpreted as cases of class-based discrimination between rural peasants and urban workers and intellectuals. However, this is of secondary importance for this paper, as I mainly analyze how Carew wrote about these issues and how he was influenced by Thaw literature. Carew's picture of alienation through modernization is related to topics and metaphors featuring prominently in Thaw discourse. He adapts these, combines it with

[33] In Western countries, the book was generally well received but reduced to its critique of the USSR. An unauthorized copy with a ranting foreword not written by Carew was also spread in the 'Global South'. In Eastern Europe and the USSR, his novel was not published, unlike his previous writings. Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 55-87; Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin,* 191-192.

[34] Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter"; Wladimir Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, Lizenausgabe für den Bertelsmann Lesering (Hamburg: Verlag der Sternbücher, 1958). As the English translations of these books were not available via interlending, I will limit the amount of direct citation to a minimum and only select passages that are easy to translate from the German versions.

[35] For such a periodization of Thaw literature see Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*.

[36] I do not refer to Soviet denunciatory language here, but try to describe that Soviet students experienced exchange students as people who had travelled to different parts of the world and were influenced by this.

19th century European critique of modernity and extends the perspective to the USSR's peripheries and the 'Global South.'

The protagonist in *Moscow is not my Mecca* discovers great potential for solidarity between the 'Second' and 'Third World' rooted in a very similar mentality, which in turn seems mainly caused by nature and space. Such a connection becomes apparent when Jojo describes the intensifying friendship to his Russian roommate Alexi:

> He was a man from the Steppes where the consciousness of space besieging the individual was so overwhelming that men were drawn closer together. And I was a son of the rain forests where the living world wore green, and giant trees, locked up in their own fastnesses, dwarfed men and inspired a brotherhood that cut across the frontiers of race, class, nationality [emphasis H.S.].[37]

Every time Carew describes such similarities, he applies an imagery of "warmth and spontaneity."[38]. This form of description is especially striking when Jojo recalls how Russian peasants offered him and Alexi shelter from the cold night, after they got lost on a skiing trip: "although it was primitive and cramped – a narrow enclosure around a huge stove – the warmth and generosity of my hosts was overwhelming. It reminded me of home, where the poorest peasants would share all they had with a stranger."[39] In this context, Jojo does not perceive it as racist when the peasants touch his hair and skin[40] – while his fellow students had described such acts as examples of Soviet racism[41]. Likewise, Jan Carew himself recalled similar experiences from a trip through the Soviet province. He lauded the hospitality and added that "the intense curiosity of the Russian peasants was without affectation or malice, and hence, gave no offence [sic]."[42] There is thus a common sense of class-based commonalities rooted in similar natural environments across peasants from all continents, which could promote international solidarity.

In this way, Carew takes on central metaphors of Thaw literature. In Ilya Ehrenburg's eponymous novel, nature and space have a profound impact on people's hearts and minds. Just like Carew, the Soviet author describes these in metaphors of warmth (meaning open, hopeful, warm-hearted) and coldness (meaning withdrawn, static, violent).[43] Both authors structure their tale along four seasons, with which the plot and its characters evolve. However, in Carew's novel, the coldness in the long run prevails, while Ehrenburg's characters, their mindset, and the nov-

[37] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 89.
[38] Ibid., 89.
[39] Ibid., 96.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid., 35.
[42] Carew, "Being Black in Belorussia Is Like Being from Mars", 66.
[43] Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", 275, 294, 315, 335; Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd, "The Thaw as an Event in Russian History," in Kozlov; Gilburd, *The Thaw*, 18-23.

el's language continuously approach the Thaw and the accompanying warmth.[44] The very title of *Mecca's* US edition, *Green Winter*, already stresses this difference to Ehrenburg's *Thaw*.[45] Thus, in the course of its plot, Jojo and his friends, as well as his fellow students, realize that there is no place for primal, warm-hearted peasants in the USSR's future. Ehrenburg's novel suggests the exact opposite: while most of its characters hide their real feelings and warm-heartedness behind a veil of 'rational' behavior and speech in the winter, they reveal their full identity and confess their love for each other as spring approaches. [46] However, while the pessimistic Carew and optimistic Ehrenburg differ on the assessment of the Soviet future, they apply the same aesthetics and metaphors introduced by the latter.

The critique of bureaucratization is another commonality between Carew, Ehrenburg, and Dudintsev. To the exchange student Ali in Carew's novel, Soviet modernization seems to be accompanied by a change that is also threatening to the 'Global South,' as the Communist state was trying to export its model of development:

> Stalin's invention, the New Soviet Man, is in danger of becoming a new kind of superman – the proletarian herrenvolk.[47] But, in addition, the Russians have created a new class – the Centurions of Communism, the technocrats; their god is an electronic computer, their Bible a technical manual, their gospel that of technology […] We have learnt that the Russian technocrat is an empiricist, impatient with the frailties of the human herd […] [b]ut our struggle is for the reassertion of an essential humanity.[48]

Comparable descriptions of the modern Soviet man can be found in other parts of the novel. For example, Jojo and his girlfriend Liza both bemoan that the Russian woman's 'rational' and the Guyanese's 'emotional' complexion are an enormous burden for their relationship.[49] The same tension figures prominently in *The Thaw* and *Not by Bread Alone*. However, it is the main female protagonists who are the 'emotionals' in these novels, and they eventually leave their husbands,

[44] Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", see e.g. 305, 369, 463.
[45] Jan R. Carew, *Green Winter* (New York: Stein and Day, 1965).
[46] Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", 275, 305, 392-393. Dudinzew also lets nature evoke certain feelings in his characters, although to a lesser degree than Ehrenburg. For example, the smell of poplar resin is associated with human qualities such as "strength," Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, 93.
[47] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 198, He seems to use the student Ali as a mouthpiece for his own views, as in the Epilogue, the author himself speaks of a racist Russian „'herrenvolk'", that only accepts „'honorary Aryans'" as equals. He therefore implicitly links Soviet mentalities to Nazism's fixed racial categories used to justify imperialist expansion, without discussing whether he expects such imperialism on a global scale from the USSR. Carew's extensive writing suggests further research on this topic, which could also include his perception of 'Western' policy towards the 'Global South'.
[48] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 113.
[49] Ibid., 162-164.

who have turned into cold-hearted party bureaucrats, and fall in love with more idealistic, emotional characters.[50] Carew denies his couple such a 'happy ending,' because unlike the aforementioned women, Liza is consistently unwilling to act on her emotions. In Carew's novel, exchange students repeatedly tie such a 'cold' and 'rational' mentality to "a bureaucracy that's eight hundred years old."[51] In Carew's autobiography, one of the few things he tells about his experiences as an exchange student in Prague in 1949 is that "[d]ealing with the bureaucracy each time was like taking a journey into Kafka's castle" – an established metaphor of an impenetrable and inhumane bureaucratic apparatus.[52] Like the exchange students in his novel, Carew also stresses how pre-revolutionary Russia lived on in the Soviet Union, most notably through its bureaucracy, when recalling his stay in Moscow in 1960.[53]

In these passages, Carew adopts motives of critique against modernity, which accompanied and influenced modernization and its conception in Europe from the very beginning.[54] In particular, the idealization of peasant culture as opposed to emotionally degenerating urban environments was a prominent critique of 19th century Russian and German intellectuals.[55] Carew's critique also closely resembles that of many Thaw authors, who identified the bureaucratization of the Soviet Union as a central aberration from Communist ideals. This critique may be illustrated best by Vladimir Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*, which revolves around the inventor Lopatkin's almost endless fight against a clique of bureaucrats who impede his new machine from being built. While they do this for selfish motives, such as preserving their high posts or getting acquainted scientists' inferior machines built, they call Lopatkin an "egoist" and "individualist" harming the collective.[56] After leaving an endless paper trail and even getting detained in a labor camp, Lopatkin's machine eventually gets built, producing much needed tubes more effectively than ever. The idealism of such individuals who do not "live by bread alone" and fight for their ideas enables Communist progress in Dudintsev's

[50] Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", 244, 245, 306; Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, 205-209.
[51] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 43, 168.
[52] Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 53. The student Malcolm also compares Russia with Kafka's castle, 43.
[53] Ibid., 57.
[54] Christof Dipper, "Moderne: Version 1.0," Docupedia Zeitgeschichte, accessed October 1, 2016, http://docupedia.de/zg/Moderne.
[55] In addition, 19th century Russian liberal intellectuals often idealized allegedly primal peasants and "savages" in the Soviet peripheries as embodiment of a truly non-Western, "Russian" identity, Susan Layton, "Nineteenth-Century Russian Mythologies of Caucasian Savagery," in *Russia's Orient :Imperial Borderlands and Peoples*, 1700-1917, ed. Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 89 ff; Bourgeouis critics in fin de siècle Germany also lamented "materialism, […], 'cold' intellect, […] division of labor and specialization, alienation and mass culture", Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (München: C. H. Beck, 2014), 45. Further research should include comparisons to non-European authors.
[56] Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, 72, 282, 432.

tale. In the novel, such idealists are the embodiment of 'real human beings.'[57] Thaw authors such as Dudintsev and Ehrenburg also bemoaned that Soviet language as applied by state officials had been stripped of any content and emotion. Thus, one of their main ambitions was to replace this 'bureaucratese' with a livelier, more 'authentic' language. Some authors also recollected an allegedly 'primal' peasants' language" rooted in rural regions, although other writers were skeptical of this orientation.[58] One of Carew's characters, Alexi, also bemoans the 'proletarianized,' post-revolutionary language. In this context, Jojo states that:

> [T]he campaigns in mass literacy had made Russian more functional, had impregnated it with the rhythms of the industrial age. The peasant used to have more time for ritual and excessive politeness, whereas the 'technical man', the product of a hasty Industrial Revolution, had to brush these aside. But the new Soviet intelligentsia, people like Alexi, were once again creating a more sophisticated language.[59]

Thus, by contrasting warm-hearted, 'natural' peasants with the cold-hearted, rational-bureaucratic new Soviet Man, Carew deploys the imagery of Thaw writers and supports their call for more "emotions" and a new language, while also referring to older literary traditions.

However, Jan Carew uses this form of critique of modernity to describe problems that extend beyond the immediate Russian and European context. In addition to the rural population in the Muscovite hinterlands, Carew's biggest interest lies in the USSR's peripheries, which he sees as colonial areas. The writer uses them as case studies: the results of Soviet modernization in Central Asia and the Caucasus seem to answer whether the USSR's model of development was appropriate for developing new post-colonial states of the 'Global South.' Such an approach was not entirely new for the 1960s. The generation of foreign visitors that came to the USSR during the late 1920s and 30s was guided by the same interest – and mostly concluded that the CPSU's record of rapid modernization was indeed unprecedented. This holds especially true for African-Americans that came as contract workers to help build a modern infrastructure and industry in the peripheries „[a]nd […] found the dramatic modernization of life for the Uzbeks and other people of color in the USSR as models for social change elsewhere."[60]

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[57] Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein* 433; Lopatkin also uses the proverb in the title (people cannot live "By Bread Alone") on page 83. Ehrenburg's characters realize that the fight for love is one that lasts throughout one's entire life but makes one who they are, see Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", 463.

[58] Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd, "The Thaw as an Event in Russian History," in Kozlov; Gilburd, *The Thaw*, 51-53.; quote "'bureaucratese'" 51.

[59] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 104-105.

[60] Carew, "Black in the USSR", 207. Carew here predominantly refers to the experiences of Homer Smith, *Black Man in Red Russia: A Memoir* (Chicago: Johnson Publ. Co., 1964) and Oliver Golden, as reported by Lily Golden, *My Long Journey Home* (Chicago: Third World Press, 2002).

Two things were new during the Thaw: those who visited the Soviet peripheries were now primarily intellectuals or students from 'Third World' countries and not workers from the USA; and they were more interested in planned economy and industrialization than Communist ideology.[61] What had also changed was the extent to which Soviet authorities spread information of modernization in the peripheries to other countries and sponsored trips for foreign visitors in an increasingly organized way. One of the main achievements they stressed besides industrialization was education, and above all, the eradication of illiteracy. In addition, Soviet propaganda also emphasized the Communist state's character as a multi-ethnic society of equals that promoted 'indigenous' languages and traditions, instead of banning them. 'Third World' intellectuals such as Carew were thus brought to Central Asia or the Caucasus to vindicate this.[62]

The Guyanese writer retrospectively claims that learning from these regions was his main motivation for visiting Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara in 1960.[63] It is likely that he had this trip in mind when analyzing the impact of Soviet modernization for Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Tajiks in the epilogue to *Moscow is not my Mecca* (which is oddly missing from the US version of the book).[64] Instead of focusing on concrete changes in their daily life, he tries to fathom how rapid change influenced these peoples' mentality and spirit. He concludes that "[the] people had to pay a high price for the swift changes, the progress, the great leap forward […] once the Uzbeks had crossed such a great distance in time so rapidly, then enormous voids are left in the spirit."[65] While Carew seemingly refers to compressed time and space here as metaphors for development, which in itself was a concept emerging in 19th century Europe, his words also apply perfectly to the consequences of collectivization. As Soviet officials and steel workers had confiscated grain to force farmers to join unproductive collective farms between 1928 and 1932, peasants suffered mass hunger and often migrated to the cities to work in a factory.[66] Stripped of the cultural and social traditions of their villages, they had to adjust to a completely different way of life. It is unclear, however, whether Carew knew this and hinted at collectivization. Nonetheless, the exchange students in his novel seem to be familiar with feelings of alienation and uprooting. Jojo il-

[61] Engerman David C., "The Second World's Third World", 21-22.; Carew, *Blacks, Reds, and Russians*, 200-211.

[62] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, 162, 172; Boden, "Globalisierung sowjetisch", 431; Comparably, Zbigniew Wojnowski, "An Unlikely Bulwark of Sovietness: Cross-Border Travel and Soviet Patriotism in Western Ukraine, 1956-1985," *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 1 (2015), 88 points out that Polish, Czech and Hungarian tourists were brought to the Western Ukraine to witness Soviet "achievements in modernizing the region".

[63] Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 60-61.

[64] Carew, *Green Winter* (New York: Stein and Day, 1965). As this version of the book was released later than the UK version, this cannot be the reason for omitting the Epilogue.

[65] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 194-195.

[66] Jeronim Perovic, "Highland Rebels: The North Caucasus During the Stalinist Collectivization Campaign," *Journal of Contemporary History* 52, no. 2 (2016), 243.

lustrates this when trying to calm down a fellow student from India, who wants to return to his wife, but is not allowed to leave the USSR:

> He was suffering from the sickness of crossing too hastily distances in time and space, from being suddenly uprooted and having no familiar spiritual humus on which his roots could feed. We all suffered from the same thing, all the students from the emergent world beyond Europe. Coming from cities, villages, mountains, plains, forests, we sometimes crossed two or three centuries in a single day by jet plane, and then we were faced with the colossal task of adjusting our emotions to the rhythms of an industrial age at a cost in anguish that is incalculable.[67]

In such notions, exchange students from the 'Global South' express thinking of their countries as 'backwards,' which they formulate in metaphors of time and space, usually associated with European chauvinism.[68] However, they implicitly counter claims that life in countries located in the 'industrial age' is necessarily better. Again, they stress a belief that a person's spirit and identity are deeply influenced by the natural environment in which one lives. In the Soviet case, this connection seems to be cut by rapid industrialization, which also makes people lose their warm-heartedness and generosity. Eventually, this process seems to destroy inter-personal relationships that could establish a "brotherhood that cut across the frontiers of race, class, nationality"– which Jojo's fellow students strive for and Soviet officials propagated. Furthermore, the ambitions of post-colonial proponents of independence – "the struggle […] for the reassertion of an essential humanity"– seem unattainable through Soviet modernization. Such a "reassertion of an essential humanity" also lies at the heart of *The Thaw* and *Not by Bread Alone*, whose characters constantly explore what the ideal Soviet citizen should be like. Ehrenburg's characters especially struggle to make sense of their feelings and irrational behavior, which they deem "humiliating" and appropriate for characters in old novels, but not for Soviet men.[69] However, they eventually accept their sentiments and act on them in public, thus finding their real identity.

The exchange students' daily experiences seem to reinforce feelings of alienation through modernization in a nut shell: in Carew's novel, racist insults, spitting in front of the students, and physical attacks are rooted in the very factories and industrial centers which embody 'Socialist modernity.' The clever part in *Mecca's* plot is that the racist thugs in the cities could be the sons of the warm-hearted peasants that saved Alexi and Jojo from dying in that cold night in rural Russia.

[67] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 61-62.
[68] See also footnote 55; comparable notions can be found in Carew, "Being Black in Belorussia Is Like Being from Mars", 69, where he speaks of the „temper of a people who had learnt their lessons in time and motion in backward villages where cruel winters and a wild countryside had imposed slow, secret rhythms upon their lives."
[69] Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", 276.

Alexi is convinced that these thugs are ashamed of their origins, which they try to cover by distancing themselves aggressively from their home:

> [T]he memory of their izbas (village huts) has left a stench that they would like to banish … you will hear them talking about their fellow peasants as 'dirty brutes', 'uncultured animals', but this is just a reflection of their closeness to the very people they are denouncing.[70]

Indeed, as a result of rural exodus following collectivization, peasants came to form a larger part of the Soviet cities' demographic.[71] Afraid of 'peasantization,' Stalinist propaganda tried to teach them how to become "cultured" with lists and illustrations of appropriate behavior.[72] Especially the younger generation tried to adapt to a new 'modern' urban lifestyle. For example, Stepan Podlubnyi's diary illustrates how this young Ukrainian actively tried to become the 'New Soviet Man' of official propaganda to overcome his origins as a peasants' son.[73] Alexi's description of these people comes to mind when Podlubnyi speaks about people of a peasant background "from a backward, extremely low milieu […] [whose] thoughts and manners are just animal like," claiming that "it is very difficult, if not impossible, to put on their feet, and lead to the path of truth, the path of a cultured person."[74] In Carew's novel, the presence of 'strangers' from the 'Third World,' according to Alexi, galvanizes an inferiority complex resulting from such processes:

> [W]e have been told again and again that your people are hungry and illiterate, victims of imperialist greed and oppression … we were never told that some of you had travelled to New York, Rome, London, Paris, and that we would envy you your clothes, your way of talking freely about things we don't dare to mention.[75]

Indeed, Jojo's fellow students repeatedly speak with arrogance regarding their "backwards," "uncivilized" or "uncultured" fellow students from the Soviet countryside.[76] Ironically, they apply the same categories as the Soviet thugs, who, according to Alexi, denounce Soviet peasants, such as their own parents, as "uncultured animals" to reassure themselves that they are "cultured." The new,

[70] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 90.
[71] Perovic, "Highland Rebels", 43; Vadim Volkov, "The Concept of Kul'turnost': Notes on the Stalinist Civilizing Process," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism*, 212-213.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Jochen Hellbeck, "Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 1931-9," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism*; see also Michael Kaznelson, "Remembering the Soviet State: Kulak Children and Dekulakisation," *Europe-Asia Studies* 59, no. 7 (2007).
[74] Cited in Jochen Hellbeck, "Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 1931-9," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism*, 92-93.
[75] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 90.
[76] Ibid., 71, 90; 92.

seemingly 'cosmopolitan' and self-confident exchange students who challenge their Soviet fellow students' views and behavior seem to deeply unsettle them in their self-conception. As a result, some of them insult the newcomers as "Black monkeys" to reassure themselves of their 'culturedness' and superiority. Because most exchange students do not interact with their Soviet peers, they miss the opportunity to identify common rural origins as the basis for practiced international solidarity, which Jojo had discovered when befriending Alexi. We can therefore conclude that racism in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s as depicted by Carew is a result of young people from the 'Third' and 'Second World' distancing themselves from their traditional, rural cultures in order to appear 'modern', thus hiding their 'warm-heartedness' and feeding mistrust.[77] Such an explanation implicitly validates one of Jojo's convictions regarding how the people in 'Third World' countries could become free and independent. According to him, this cannot be achieved by imitating the "white man" to gain his respect, but by developing an identity of one's own and shaping society based on one's own means and ends.[78] It is this new, self-conscious spirit of self-determination reflecting the emergence of post-colonial states that also differentiates exchange students from the "Global South" in the Soviet Union during the Thaw from earlier foreign visitors.[79]

These explanations for racism are also a comment on class-based discrimination rooted in the self-conception of the Russian *intelligentsia*, which Carew met. Its members were the main driver behind socio-cultural debates and changes during the Thaw. These potentials are illustrated when Carew's characters use the binary of "cultured" and "uncultured" (or "*nekulturny*"),[80] because certain rules of 'cultured' conduct and speech lie at the heart of this *intelligentsia's* identity.[81] Besides the obvious attacks already described, such mechanisms seem to also be at work in a more subtle way. When Jojo visits Liza's apartment for the first time, he describes it as typical for the "cultured" Soviet elite, and admits that he feels intimidated and inferior when facing the vast collection of books and the Swedish furniture.[82] However, such a discriminatory potential of 'culturedness' does not seem inevitable. For example, Liza shames the police men who do not want to investigate the attack on Jojo as 'uncultured,' and thereby forces them not to give

[77] This should not detract from the fact that it is only the Soviet students who attack exchange students, and are thus the perpetrators. However, as Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, 192, has pointed out, Carew also describes racist discrimination between and among the different communities of exchange students.

[78] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 52.

[79] Matusevich, "Probing the Limits of Internationalism", 22-24; Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow", 35.

[80] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 57. The narrator here explains "nekulturny" as implying "a kind of mild hooliganism, a breach of manners, morals, etiquette."

[81] Denis Kozlov, "Introduction," in Kozlov; Gilburd, *The Thaw*, 15. It should be noted that distinguishing between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' groups is not an exclusively Russian, but a traditionally European trope that justified colonialism and racism.

[82] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 132-133.

up the case.[83] She thereby demonstrates that this essentially discriminatory categorization can also prohibit certain kinds of discrimination, depending on how it is applied.

Alexi hints that the *intelligentsia* was changing from when Khrushchev rose to the helm of the CPSU. He sees the career of this Ukrainian "who doesn't speak the most elegant Russian […] [but] embodies all the dark cunning of the peasant and the empiricism of the scientist,"[84] and his own vita as indication that people from rural regions could soon form the new elite. This re-alignment of the "head" and the "heart" without the exclusion of one at the expense of the other is a central call expressed in Dudintsev's and Ehrenburg's novels.[85] In the case of Carew's novel, the main driver of discrimination – distancing oneself from rural origins – could soon vanish due to such a change. In this regard, Carew's characters express another tendency of Thaw literature and policies: a revaluation of peasants' culture and interests. Writers now tried to let their characters speak like country folk, the Soviet state was re-branded as an "all-people's state" instead of "dictatorship of the proletariat," and collective farmers henceforth received wages.[86] Peasants had figured prominently as revolutionary subjects in Marxism-Leninism before, but only if 'proletarianized.' Their cultural traditions were seen as obstacles on the way to Communism (especially when rejecting collectivization) or as causes of urban crime.[87] Carew hints at an intersection of positive and negative discrimination based on class and ethnicity, which is also discussed in historiography on processes associated with what I referred to as 'Socialist modernity.'[88] While I cannot discuss this aspect in detail here, it is noteworthy that non-Slavic and non-Christian Soviet citizens from the rural peripheries were among the main groups of victims and beneficiaries of the regime's modernization plans, which is reflected in Carew's writings: he hints at the massive promotion especially of Central Asian students and scientists during the Thaw, but also at the alienation following 'proletarization' and 'collectivization' of peasants during the 1920s and 30s, which hit people from the peripheries disproportionately hard.[89] Overall, it

[83] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 182.
[84] Ibid., 128. Note the positive, essentialist discrimination of peasants' nature, which is not further qualified.
[85] Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, 51: "You need to have a head on the shoulders to think – and a heart in the chest. Then, you can also hope!", repeated on 53; Engineer Korotejew is praised as the kind of new Soviet man needed for the future, combining rationalism and romanticism in Ehrenburg, "Tauwetter", 342; Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 152, for additional comparable statements.
[86] Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd, "The Thaw as an Event in Russian History," in Kozlov; Gilburd, *The Thaw*, 35.
[87] Vadim Volkov, "The Concept of Kul'turnost': Notes on the Stalinist Civilizing Process," in Fitzpatrick, *Stalinism*, 214-215; Perovic, "Highland Rebels", 234.
[88] Foundational is Stephen Kotkin, "1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks," *The Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 2 (1998), 405-413.
[89] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 61, 94; Carew and Carew, *Episodes in my Life*, 194; Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire", 68, 78, 81; Perovic, "Highland Rebels", 435-36; Kate

appears that Carew emphasizes 'class' over 'ethnicity' as the ultimate explanatory variable of discrimination, which he nevertheless calls "racism." Additional research should further differentiate this preliminary interpretation, applying an intersectional framework. The novel's protagonist Jojo emphasizes Soviet society is essentially different from its Western counterparts, because "there is no national tradition of racial discrimination against negroes as in England or America […] the conditions for its spreading do not exist."[90] This seems plausible in the novel's context, because racist attacks indeed result from integral parts of Soviet modernization, but are perpetrated by a violent minority and condemned by the majority of citizens. Thus, Carew's conclusion is that they are avoidable, but take place because the tolerant and mostly anti-racist *intelligentsia* remains silent, and political authorities try to arbitrarily cover them up. This, in turn, is a result of the trauma resulting from the "Great Terror," the Gulag, and collectivization.

The Past in the Present: Paralysis through Terror and Trauma

Like Soviet authors of the Thaw, Jojo for the larger part of Carew's novel assessed the USSR's future optimistically. This is the case even two thirds through the book. The most outspoken reference to the Thaw throughout the whole novel is placed right after Jojo has started a relationship with Liza and further tightens his friendship with Alexi:

> The in-between month of March when the frost and the thaw fought for supremacy echoed the rhythms of life in all Russia in the 'sixties'. It was inevitable that the thaw would triumph, but the frost was ancient, malignant and cunning, a creature of the long nights always waiting in ambush, only willing to give in after a long struggle[91] [emphasis H.S.].

The reader is thus led to expect a development similar to Ehrenburg's story, meaning that the characters confess their love for each other and thereby revitalize Communist idealism. However, Carew subsequently introduces a topic that has so far barely been present, which is absent from Ehrenburg's and mostly also from Dudintsev's novel: the "Great Terror" and the labor camp system of the Gulag, which, besides bureaucracy, signify the "frost [that] was ancient, malignant and cunning."[92]

The lack of reconciliation with the Soviet Union's traumatic past increasingly becomes the novel's focus. This shift in topic alters Jojo's careful optimism about

Brown, *A Biography of no Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), 148.

[90] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 175-176.

[91] Ibid., 139.

[92] Ibid.

the Thaw's prospects, and is subtly replaced by pessimism. With this new focus, Carew picked up the most present, but also most controversial topic of Thaw literature, discourse and policy during the early 1960s. However, unlike even the most critical Soviet authors such as Vldimir Maksimov or Iurii Trifonov, he denies the reader a hopeful 'happy ending,' which Thaw literature applied to present the processing of a traumatic past as an ultimately productive force to begin a new future.[93] It is this resilient, psychological winter that keeps Carew's characters from openly acting on their true emotions and dropping their façade, like Ehrenburg's characters had done after the inevitable, meteorological thaw had ended the winter.

Several characters describe a continuity of the Gulag. For example, the protagonist meets Jonathan, a black representative of the first generation of migrants, who came as technical workers to industrialize the USSR during the 1920s and 30s. Jonathan assures that "nothing could be worse than those seven years in a Labour Camp" that he spent there, adding that "the camps are still there."[94] He stresses that he himself did not encounter racism in the Gulag,[95] but explains that the xenophobia of the 1960s is a consequence of those experiences, because "we are all tired after the terror and the purges and the War, and we don't want to make any great effort to adjust to new faces."[96]

On the other hand, Liza, at first glance, represents a diametrically opposed position. She is convinced that Soviet society has already changed quite drastically since Stalin's death in 1953, because Soviet officials and citizens allegedly learned from the past.[97] Furthermore, she claims to understand that Jonathan constantly feels tracked and observed by the secret police, but this anxiety, to her, is unfounded: "[w]e would need millions of Security Police to keep all the former inmates of Labour Camps under surveillance."[98] However, she thus implicitly recognizes that a major part of people in society were in those camps and therefore this is a reasonable anxiety.

The reactions following the racist attack on Jojo eventually prove that a combination of widespread anxiety and apathy hinder a successful investigation of the attack. Out of such fears, even Liza eventually signs an officially organized cover-up claiming that it was a "car accident," thereby helping to disguise racism in the USSR. Yet, it is Alexi who condemns Jojo's decision not to sign the cover-up and

[93] One of the few remarks on Lopatkin's detention in a labor camp is that he is grateful for the experience, because it gave him time to rethink his life and his approach of how to get his machine built, see Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, 363-364. On Trifonov, Maksimov and others, see Polly Jones, "Memories of Terror or Terrorizing Memories? Terror, Trauma and Survival in Soviet Culture of the Thaw," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86, no. 2 (2008), 367-371.
[94] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 147.
[95] Ibid., 145.
[96] Ibid., 146.
[97] Ibid., 167.
[98] Ibid., 165.

instead openly criticize the attacks on him and the official reactions: "Your reckless way of dealing with problems, Jojo, might be all right in your country. But here, our Don Quixotes find themselves inside barbed wire enclosures, or instead of tilting at windmills, facing a firing squad."[99] Thus, it is Jojo's best friend, who he idealized as a warm-hearted peasant, who agrees with Jonathan's claim that the Gulag system and the methods of terror are still quite alive. Furthermore, Jojo finds out that Alexi spied on him and informed the secret police, which seems to justify Jonathan's paranoia. This was indeed a practice that all of the exchange students, which Tobias Rupprecht interviewed, confirm, although unlike in Carew's book, they do not bemoan this fact.[100]

As I have demonstrated, Carew draws a disillusioned picture of the Thaw, in which Soviet society seems far from coping with the trauma resulting from the 'Great Terror' and the Gulag. Liza and Alexi condemn Stalinism and its methods, and they hope for an opening of Soviet society due to lessons drawn from the past.[101] At the same time, both representations of a newer generation of Soviet *intelligentsia* are not willing to stand up to their convictions – unlike Jojo, who represents a self-conscious 'Third Worldist' stance in the face of violence and intimidation by the Soviet state. Jojo is thus comparable to inventor Lopatkin, who keeps fighting the windmills of bureaucracy despite literally being told not to,[102] but there is no comparable Soviet character in Carew's novel. By failing the plot's moral test, the Soviet *intelligentsia* impedes a clear break with the Stalinist past, which was the key demand of the Thaw project to revive Communist utopianism. Rather, the still prevalent methods of spying and denunciations, as well as anxiety, apathy, and imprisonment in labor camps make it impossible to openly call attention to racism and to fight it.

Conclusion

When Carew published his book in 1964, the Cold War was a powerful reality. That year, the US and UK administrations ousted British-Guiana's socialist-leaning Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan to prevent "another Cuba" and postponed independence until 1966.[103] The novel's ultimate conclusion is that self-confident 'Third Worldists' fighting for their right of self-determination should not hope for foreign support. Certainly, they should not resort to Soviet help, because this

[99] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 192.
[100] Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, 220-229.
[101] Carew, *Moscow Is Not My Mecca*, 128-129, 166.
[102] Dudinzew, *Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein*, 279.
[103] Cary Fraser, "The 'New Frontier' of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1961-1964," *The International History Review* 22, no. 3 (2000); Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels, "The World's Longest General Strike: The AFL-CIO, the CIA, and British Guiana," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 2 (2005). Jan Carew had served as director of culture for Jagan's administration in 1962, when he was still writing *Moscow is not my Mecca*, see Busby, "Jan Carew Obituary".

country's track record of development is a daunting example. Soviet society seems unable to reform itself, the Thaw will not triumph. However, the book also demonstrates that the early 1960s were a time for unprecedented global cultural exchange, illustrating that there was more than military confrontation, and thus transgressing our perceptions of an 'Iron Curtain.'

The Guyanese writer used the imagery and structure of Soviet Thaw authors to critically assess Soviet modernization. His conclusion seems to rule out a 'happy ending' for Soviet society's future and its relationship to the 'Global South.' Jojo's contacts with rural citizens illustrate that the Soviet Union itself was in many regions still a 'developing country'. where the warm-hearted mentality of the peasants could form the basis of international solidarity. The protagonist's contacts with the new generation of Soviet *intelligentsia* also suggest that they welcomed 'foreign' influences and condemn racism as 'uncultured'. However, they were not willing to defend their ideals, because they feared repression and impediments to their careers – thus, revealing that the shadows of the terror and the Gulag still loomed large over the early 1960s. A fundamental revival of socialism therefore seems impossible. Thus, people in the 'Third World' should resort to their own means and ideas if they wanted to have a better future for their newly emerging states. Soviet modernization only led to an alienation from one's origins, turned good people into cold bureaucrats and produced racism.

Jan Carew adapted aesthetics, contents, and controversies of the Soviet Thaw, expanded them to the relationship between the 'Second' and 'Third World' and turned the utopian aspirations, that even the most critical Soviet writers had, into a dystopian tale of his own. With his negative description of the Soviet *intelligentsia*, he seems to attack the Thaw's agents, which he met on his own travels to the country through an invitation from the Soviet Writer's Union. Thus, Carew's voice is one to take into account when idealizing Thaw writers as proponents of the dissident movement emerging in the 1970s and 80s. However, this should not detract from the fact that Carew found the language and framework for criticizing Soviet society of the 1960s in the literature produced by these very people. Therefore, it would also be short-sighted to only credit exchange students and their protests as the origin of Soviet dissidence. Rather, Carew's writings are an example of a complex appropriation of Soviet culture by a 'Third World' writer, encouraging us to look at how influences travelled both ways.

Bharatbhoomi Punyabhoomi: In Search of a Global Theosophical India in Tarakishore Choudhury's Writings

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This article deals with a particular text, *Brahmavadi Rsi o Brahmanvidya* written by Tarakishore Choudhury, an illustrious High Court lawyer in twentieth century colonial Calcutta who later became the famous Vaishnava saint Swami Santadas Kathiya Baba. The essay aims to highlight the various nuances, contradictions and inflections of power within the intellectual universe of the colonized Western-educated Bengali intelligentsia in order to locate multiple "global" moments within the text. It inspects how the intellectual and theosophical shifts experienced by the author were shaped by the dual forces of a transnational information circuit sustained by a print economy underscored by the contours of the British empire as well as extra-rational indigenous traditions of knowledge-production. It also dissects how the comparativist framework within which ideas, societies and political economies produced in the 'West' and in India are juxtaposed by Choudhury. His aim was to discursively assert the spiritual and material glory of ancient India and construct a notion of a hyperreal India about to emerge on a global theosophical career both appropriating and subverting the intellectually dominant metanarratives of the 'hyperreal West' and colonial rule. The final section of the article focuses on the ambivalence and implicit assertions of autonomy by this intellectual actor in constructing what constitutes the 'Indic' and determining the terms through which Western discourses, if at all, were to be appropriated and reconstituted in the process.

Introduction

Andrew Sartori and Samuel Moyn attribute the emergence of the "global" as a spatial reference within the discipline of intellectual history, to its inception within the journal of Modern Intellectual History in 2004, which was primarily conceived as a "forum for scholarship on intellectual and cultural history from the mid-seventeenth century to the present, with primary attention to Europe and the Americas and to transnational developments that encompass the non-West."[1]

[1] Cited in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Global Intellectual History Beyond Hegel and Marx" in *History and Theory*, 54, 1 (2015):128. DOI: 10.1111/hith.10746

Such a proclamation is problematic because not only does it produce "Europe and the Americas" as privileged spatial circuits of ideas as Sanjay Subrahmanyam points out, but also forwards the construct of the "non-West" as a unitary spatial entity that is an "other" to the "West" which renders the "provincializing" of the West within the discussion difficult. In an issue of the journal focusing on South Asia, the editors admit that the journal had so far concentrated on "intellectual history that was essentially Western in orientation" even though, in the South Asian context, the methodological concern was described as "adapting the various languages of Western intellectual history to the circumstances of a colonial world"[2]. The critical appraisals suggested by Samuel Moyn and Sartori include investigation of the "global as a meta-analytical category of the historian" most evident in Hegelian universalist and comparative histories, "intermediating agents or modes of circulation" and the "conceptions of the global scale."[3] However, such approaches obstruct the possibilities of recovering alternative polemical engagements with the "global" generated within and by the "colonial worlds".

In this article I will focus on the Bengali treatise *Brahmanvadi Rsi o Brahmanvidya* (The Sages with Knowledge of *Brahman* and the Theosophy of *Brahman),*[4] first published in 1911*,* in which Tarakishore Choudhury, an illustrious lawyer at the High Court in early twentieth century colonial Calcutta who later renounced his profession and family to become the Vaishnava saint *Swami 108 Santadas Kathiya Baba*, claims to provide an introduction to the philosophy of *Brahman* as delineated by the ancient Aryan sages through the *Darshanic* corpus.[5] By doing so, I will locate multiple manifestations of what can be perceived as "global" in an intellectual discourse produced within "a colonial world" for a colonized yet elite Bengali readership with a Western education provided by a colonial regime.

[2] Charles Capper, Anthony La Vopa and Nicholas Phillipson, "A Message from the Editors" in *Modern Intellectual History*, 4, 1(2007): 1. DOI: 10.1017/S1479244306001107.

[3] Samuel Moyn & Andrew Sartori, "Approaches to Global Intellectual History" In *Global Intellectual History*, ed. Samuel Moyn & Andrew Sartori (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

[4] This is my translation. The term *Brahman* (not to be confused with Brahmin) has been used in the Vedas in multiple senses but this essay uses the term in the form Tarakishore Choudhury uses it, following the Upanishadic usage of the term to mean "one single, primary reality" to which "the world of multiplicity is, in fact, reducible". It is derived from the Sanskrit root *"brh"* which means, "to grow".

[S]. Radhakishnan, "Introduction", in *The Principle Upanisads* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953), 52.

[5] As Wilhelm Halbfass has shown, the term *Darśana* by the 8th century had become a commonplace term in Indian doxographic literature, referring to the "main schools or systems of what is commonly called 'Indian philosophy'." Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990), 264. Andrew Nicholson argues, contradicting both the polarizing historiographical discourses of 'Hindu unity' being either a "timeless truth" or a colonial "invented tradition", that by the late medieval period, the scholars of the "six systems" (*saddarśana*) namely Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsha and Vedanta, had come to be considered part of a single philosophical theistic tradition (*astika) as* opposed to atheistic traditions (*Nastika*) like Buddhism and Jainism. Andrew J. Nicholson, *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 2-3.

A study of "global" tendencies within a singular text meant for limited regional readership, whether in the employment of scientific rationalism and Western scientific theories as hermeneutic key to the Sastras[6] or in the frequent conjuring of Western societies as a comparative framework , reveals the peculiarities of the colonial moment underscored by "the synergy produced by the fecund coexistence of different spatial scales"[7] where the idea of a "hyperreal" West[8] dominates the intellectual universe of the colonized elite, whose agency in mediating, translating and constituting the contours of such a conjecture, nevertheless, is no less significant. However, this article shows how in this process, India emerges as a hyperreality in itself - about to embark on a global career through the theosophy of *Brahmanvidya* (knowledge of the *Brahman*).

The first section of this article situates the shift in the intellectual orientation of Choudhury from an ardent advocate of reason to an apologist for the axiomatic quality of the *Sastric* word within a 'global' framework of knowledge production through the newspaper economy crisscrossing the British Empire. These hermeneutic shifts are crucial for historically grasping the agenda and the clusters of readership he explicitly targets in the introduction to the text under discussion. The second section looks deeper into the complex intellectual exercise that led to the production of certain discourses within the text, meant to restore the faith of the colonized Bengali intelligentsia, on the *Sastras* and the glorious material and spiritual past of ancient *Bharat*.[9] Finally, the third section explores Choudhury's authorial agency and agenda which informed selective intertextualities and translatory enterprises. Methodologically, this work, in aspiring to interrogate the historical intricacies and ambivalences that underpinned the appropriation and reconstitution of categories produced in and by the 'West' to articulate concepts considered 'Indic', reflects on the 'global' in terms of modes of conceptual flows

[6] *Sastra* is a Sanskrit term meaning treatise on a particular field. In this essay, *Sastras* have been used to mean *Srutis* (the 4 Vedas including the Upanishads, considered as the revealed word of God), and *Smritis* which include *Dharmasastras* (ethical codes) propounded by Manu, and *Dharmasutras* or commentaries on the Vedic scriptures by later scholars and the Puranas and epics (Ramayana and Mahabharata). These are the texts which Choudhury primarily refers to by the term '*Sastra,*' which he identifies as the sources of *Brahmanvidya*.

[7] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Global Intellectual History Beyond Hegel and Marx" in *History and Theory*, 54, 1(2015):137. DOI: 10.1111/hith.10746.

[8] The concept of 'hyperreality' was developed by Jean Baudrillard in "Simulacra and Simulation" whereby he asserts that simulation generates "models of a real without origin or reality" which he refers to as "hyperreality". Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans. Sheila Glaser (N/a: University of Michigan Press, 1994). By the term "hyperreal West", I am referring to Dipesh Chakrabarty's conceptualization of "Europe" and "India" as "figures of imagination whose geographical referents remain somewhat indeterminate" and his identification of "Europe" as a "reified category" celebrated within "relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern". Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 27.

[9] I prefer to translate 'Bharat' as South Asia in Choudhury's case rather than India since Choudhury's Bharat is not limited to the post-partition cartographic expanse connoted by the latter. To him *Bharatbhoomi* was a sacred land, where the eternal *sanatana dharma* and knowledge of Brahman had revealed themselves to the Aryan sages and had flourished.

and agents who intellectually inhabit and negotiate spatial scales, following Moyn and Sartori. At the same time, it brings the very mode of universalist and comparative historiography, also evident in Choudhury's writings under historical dissection.

The Author: Intellectual Shift, 'Global' Contours and 'Global Readership(?)'

Born to a Brahmin family in Sylhet district of present-day Bangladesh in 1859, Tarakishore Choudhury, while studying F.A. from Presidency College, lost faith in Brahminical norms under the ideological influence of the nationalist leader Surendranath Banerjee[10] and the Brahmo leader Sibnath Sastri, and as a result discarded the Brahminical austerities, which he had been performing devoutly from his childhood. Initially an agnostic, he was gradually inclined towards Monotheism and joined the *Brahmo Samaj*[11] in 1877-78. However, as evident from Bipin Chandra Pal's Memoirs, Choudhury became a member of the *Sadharan Brahmo Samaj*, the clique which, under Shibnath Sastri, broke away from Keshav Chandra Sen's *Bharatvarshiya Brahmo Samaj* in 1878, in opposition to his decision to marry his fourteen year-old daughter to the Hindu Raja of Coochbihar.[12] He self-tutored himself on History and Political Economy and Hamilton's Lectures, Fowlers' Inductive Logic which were part of the B.A. syllabi for Philosophy, and also J.S.Mill's Inductive Logic.[13] Later, he joined a *Jogisampradaya* cult while remaining a part of the *Brahmo Samaj* and was followed by Bijoy Krishna Goswami[14], then a fellow Brahmo leader and a family friend, who also passed the B.L.

[10] Surendranath Banerjee was a moderate nationalist leader who was the founder of the Indian National Conference and later a senior leader of the Indian National Congress, the bastion of associational politics of prayer and petition. Later he gave leadership to the Swadeshi anti-partition movement in response to the British government's partition of Bengal in 1905.

[11] The Brahmo Samaj had been formed by Rammohan Roy in 1828 as a religious movement which sought to focus on the worship of *Nirakar*(formless) *Brahman* as delineated in the Upanishads by purifying Hinduism of elements like priestcraft and idolatry. Choudhury joined the *Bharatiya Brahmo Samaj* under Keshab Chandra Sen, which had split from the *Adi Brahmo Samaj* presided over by Debendranath Tagore. It is noteworthy that under Keshab Sen, the Samaj had grown increasingly theistic with the introduction of devotional elements from the Bhakti tradition in Bengal like Kirtans, besides concerning itself with female emancipation and abolition of caste discrimination. The Brahmo Samaj split again when Sen was perceived by the Sibnath Sastri faction as violating the Indian Marriage Act of 1872. "History of the Brahmo Samaj", www.thebrahmosamaj.net, accessed February 12, 2017, http://www.thebrahmosamaj.net/history/history.html.

[12] Bipin Chandra Pal, *Memories of my Life and Times*, 317-318, cited in *Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit*, 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 10.

[13] Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj*, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit*, 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 9-14.

[14] Bijoy Krishna Goswami was also a Brahmo leader who later emerged as a famous saint of the neo-Gaudiya Vaishnavite tradition that adhered to the theosophical position of *Achintyabhedabhed* (inconceivable difference and non-difference), a form of what Andrew Sartori calls immanent monism that critiques Advaita Vedanta's notion of abstract monism ("phe-

Examination in 1884[15]. Meanwhile, he was gradually losing interest in the *Brahmo Samaj*, evident from a letter he wrote to the *Tattva Koumudi Patrika*, where he stated that the *Samaj* has failed to transcend materiality and become the fount which can quench the spiritual quest of people and "instill the belief among outsiders that one can attain *darshan* (used here in the sense of spiritual realization rather than in terms of the conventional connotation of visual engagement with a deity) of the true Being, bathe in the light of truth, purity and love and become free from the bondage of desires (*moha-pash*) by becoming a part of the Samaj"[16]. That Choudhury was iterating a feeling that had resonances among other Brahmos as well is evident from Amiya Sen's contention:

> [t]hat Brahmodharma was increasingly becoming a dull, uninspiring faith, with no basis in popular perceptions is a complaint that latter day Brahmos were often heard to make…highly revisionist Brahmos like Bipin Pal were subsequently to become one of the important spokesmen of Bengal Vaishnavism[17].

According to Bipin Chandra Pal, by the 1890s he "was recognized as one of the very best lawyers in the profession, taking his place in the estimates of many of those who worked with him, only next to that of Sir Rashbehari Ghosh [...]"[18]. On the religious front, he was realizing that despite having attained certain yogic abilities through the *Sampradaya* cult[19], it could not satisfy his spiritual enquiry and he was growing desperate for a *sadguru* who was *Brahmagya* (one who had acquired cognizance of *Brahman*). In 1894, he and his wife were initiated under *108 Ramdas Kathiya Baba* of *Vrindavan*, who was then the *Mahant* of the 4 primary Vaishnav sects. Soon after, he started mastering the *Sastras* and his faith in

nomena are illusory and reality is transcendent"). His disciples included prominent Swadeshi activists and nationalist leaders like Bipinchandra Pal (also a former Brahmo and friend of Choudhury). Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 148.

[15] Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj, *SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* , 28-34.

[16] Tarakishore Choudhury, *"Srijukto Babaji Maharaj kortrik likhito sadharon Brahmo Samajer 'Tattvakoumudi' Patrikar 1804 soker poila ashin sonkhyay prokashito potro"* in Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj*, "Porishishto" in SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 281.

[17] Amiya P. Sen, *Hindu Revivalism in Bengal 1872-1905: some essays in Interpretation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 34.

[18] Bipin Chandra Pal, *Memories of My life and Times*, 321 cited in Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj*, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit*, 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 66.

[19] The cult Choudhury had joined comprised of congregational practice of yoga (certain pranayams) to control one's breath and open the 6 energy layers (*śatchakra)* within the body through transmission of cosmic energy from the guru and co-practitioners to one another. Choudhury and his guru realized that he had mastered his breath and his chakras within a very short time and with little practice. Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj*, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit*, 27.

the *Sastric* word was fully restored. Pal recollects: "From an aggressive and radical *brahmo*, Tarakishore became in later life a sincere Hindu, strictly following all the disciplines, physical and psychological as well as social and ethical, enjoined upon every devout Brahmin by ancient Hindu law and scripture."[20] Finally he took *Sanyas* (renunciation) a few years after his guru's death and was eventually elected as the *Mahant* of the *Nimbarka* sect as well as other saints in *Vrindavan* and was renamed *108 Swami Santadas Kāthiya Bābā.* It is noteworthy that these marked tremendous intellectual shifts in Tarakishore, since prior to joining the Yogic cult, he had, while engaging in debates with a renowned Bengali Pundit at Kasi in 1880, refused to accept the *Sastric* word as axiomatic without any logical explanation.[21]Amiya Sen's declaration that "A fellow-student of [Bipin Chandra] Pal, Tarakishore Choudhury, who was once an active member of the Brahmo Samaj later renounced it to obtain the status of a great Vaishnav saint", however, fails to take into account the historical intricacies involved in such a transformation.[22] Choudhury himself attributes his gradual tilt towards *gurubad* (doctrine of the necessity of an enlightened guru for spiritual advancement) to a particular article from the *Australian Times* published in *The Statesman* about the owner of the Chiarini Circus who had managed to calm down and control his tigers, distraught by sea-voyage by maintaining a firm gaze and eye-contact. On reflecting, he ascertained that the owner "had transmitted his intrinsic hypnotic abilities through his gaze thereby subduing the animal instincts of the tigers."[23] With this realization, he admits that he underwent a series of intellectual shifts:

> I felt that the prevalent tradition of taking refuge in a powerful guru whereby the bestial inclinations within the disciple are purified through the Guru's powers, which I have so far considered as fraudulent and ill-founded, might not be unscientific…and with these strands of thought, whatever I had read on physics and psychology came to my mind. I realized that the human body was a machine run by the internal electrical energy of the individual and current particular to an individual's personality is always being emitted from his body to his external surroundings. With the enhancement of will-power he can transmit such electricity towards a person to a greater extent at will. The fingers in our body resemble a Point in an electrical device through which the internal current is conducted from the body into

[20] Bipin Chandra Pal, *Memories of My life and Times*, 320-321 cited in *Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar,* 2008), 77.

[21] Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj*, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit*, 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 19.

[22] Amiya P. Sen, *Hindu Revivalism in Bengal 1872-1905: some essays in Interpretation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 34.

[23] Translation mine. Tarakishore Choudhury cited in *Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 24.

> other bodies. I felt that presumably due to this reason, the Rsis have described the effects of touch by the fingers (Sparsha) in the Sastras. Probably the distinctions of caste (Jatibhed) have also been premised upon individual traits. Within a few hours, all these epiphanies transformed me into a new individual…the more I reflected, the more my faith on the codes of conduct mentioned in the Hindu sastras increased.[24]

Later in the text under consideration, he engages with these concepts with intertextual allusions to certain pseudoscientific texts, which will be discussed shortly. Nevertheless, what is evident from the above autobiographical passage is that news of an event from across the globe, circulated through an interconnected web of newspaper economy spread throughout the British colonial Empire, played a decisive role in triggering a cascade of hermeneutic exercises involving the interpretation of Hindu *Sastras* through Western scientific categories, a methodology which he applies in our text as well.

Nevertheless, Choudhury is certainly not an isolated example among the colonial Bengali elite of nineteenth century Bengal. As Tapan Roychoudhury has pointed out, even while the "weak and dependent intelligentsia"'s ideological attraction to selective intellectual strands from the "master race" were underpinned by an ambivalent admiration yet revulsion for the imperial project, the appropriation from what comprised a wide "stratum" was also informed by "the specific experience of encounter with the alien civilization".[25] Thus, even while post-Enlightenment rationalism, the basis of Western education provided by the colonial curriculum, emerged as the key hermeneutic tool for the Bengal intelligentsia, the gradual strengthening of the national ethos and critiques of colonialism required that forms of cultural servility came to be disapproved, especially in what Partha Chatterjee calls "the so-called spiritual domain of culture", the 'inner' space for articulation of "sovereignty" and colonial difference.[26] Bolstered by a national pride and self-respect reinforced by the sympathetic assertions of Colonel Olcott and the Theosophical Society, as well as Max Müller's discourses on Indo-European racio-linguistic commonality, there were several attempts to assert that Hindu practices "were based on higher reasoning", as exemplified in figures like *Sasadhar Tadkachudamani*.[27] One can trace here the reconfiguration of an Indian hieropraxy in terms of reason, an universalized Indic spirituality shorn of the so-called allegations of superstition which could stand at par with Christianity (for, as Chakrabarty points out, "reason…was grounded in a Christian conception of

[24] Tarakishore Choudhury cited in *Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 23-25.

[25] Tapan Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 4-5.

[26] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 26.

[27] Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered*, 34.

God"[28]) and the construction of a 'hyperreal' rationalist India which could be shown to inhabit a position on par with Europe, which in colonial metanarratives, represented the apex of the rationalist scale of progress. Thus, the very project of constructing a hyperreal India, with due respect to its indigenous creative flows, was conditioned by the presence of 'Europe' or the 'West', which in its 'hyperreal form', came to stand for reason, progress and modernity.

Just as Rammohan and his contemporaries derived their Sastric sources from an "indigenous tradition of Sansritic scholarship" rather than "Western Orientology"[29], so too did Tarakishore. According to Ashutosh Bhattacharya, a relative of Choudhury, he mastered the *Mugdhabodh Vyakaran* from a Pundit in Calcutta and subsequently completed the *Nyaysastra, Purnachandra Vedanta-chanchu's* exegesis on the *Patanjal* and *Sankhya* doctrines, Upanishads and Puranas by himself in 1890s.[30] However, despite his auto didactical engagement with the doxographies on the *Sastras* made possible albeit by the thriving culture of print capitalism in colonial Calcutta, in the prefatory part of the first volume of the Darshanic Brahmavidya series, he confesses that instead of following the existent exegesis on *Sankhya,* he would proceed to interpret the *Sutras,* as he understood them by his Guru's grace.[31] It is worth remarking that even while the *Sastras* were to be interpreted individually by exercising the faculties of logic and reason, the very process was perceived as inspired and facilitated by the divine intervention of the Guru. It is here, that we can perceive a break from both precolonial Sanskritic scholarship and other colonial literati; if the rationale of the *Sastras* were to be grasped, the engagement with the *Sastric* text was to be direct and individual, without the didactic mediation of a Pundit and bypassing layers of existent exegetical corpus, except in infrequent allusions to register similarity or difference of opinion. However, unlike Rammohan and the Brahmo principles, for Choudhury such a theosophic enterprise could not succeed without the extra-rational intuition provided by the intervention of the *sadguru*, of whose mediating powers he had no doubt left.

As mentioned by Tarakishore Choudhury himself, the book *Brahmavadi Rsi o Brahmanvidya* was conceptualized while he was teaching the *Yogasutras* composed by *Patanjali* to Asutosh Bhattacharya and later he expanded it into a book including other *Darshanic* traditions, considering the significance of the subject.[32] Bhattacharya recollects that the book, along with its three successive volumes,

[28] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 235.
[29] Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered*, 21.
[30] *Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar,* 2008), 100.
[31] Tarakishore Choudhury, "Preface", in *Darshanic Brahmanvidya*, *Vol. 1* (Sukchor: *Kathiya Baba Ashram*, 2008).
[32] Tarakishore Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya* (Kolkata: Swami Santadas Institute of Culture, 2004), 17.

"*Darshanic Brahmanvidya*"[33] which contain Bengali translations and exegesis of the *Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Purvamimangsha* and *Sankhya* schools, was published in 1911(b. 1318).[34] In fact, Chowdhury describes the former as "a prologue to the *Darshanic Brahmanvidya* series"[35] and states that his purpose would be served "if this book can generate some amount of veneration for the Aryan *Rsis*, the Dharma propounded by them and faith in the Sastric injunctions".[36]

Choudhury makes it evident that his target readership is the Western educated sections of Hindu society who had grown sceptical of *Sanatana Hindu Dharma*,[37] having judged its ineffectuality through sheer argumentation and from the supposedly contemporary pathetic social condition of Hindus.[38] Choudhury's statement affirms that a major section of Bengal intelligentsia perceived the contemporary social conditions in terms of decadence, a response to which ranged from socio-religious reform to revival of what was perceived as a pristine society modelled on Sastric prescriptions, though as Amiya Sen had suggested, the categories of reform and revival often overlapped.[39] However, the colonial elite's self-critical glance towards present society that was perceived to be steeped in idol-worship, superstition, moral corruption, etc. were structured to a great extent by colonial discourses, especially William Jones' notion of a classical Indian 'golden age' lost in distant antiquity as well as later Utilitarian claims like that of James Mill who attributed to India a "hideous state of society".[40] Such an embeddedness of the colonial elite's world-view within pedagogically communicated colonial ideologies also explains his confession about his earlier agnosticism and hesitation

[33] *Darshanic Brahmanvidya* translates roughly as the Philosophy of Brahman as delineated by the six Darshanic systems. Acknowledging that there are differences of opinion among the schools and the proponents on the nature of Brahman, in the series, he attempts to show the underlying harmony of the apparently contradictory stances of the different schools since all the proponents, occupying highest echelons of spiritual consciousness, were infallible.

[34] Ashutosh Bhattacharya quoted in Srisri 108 Swami Sri Dhananjaydas Kathiya Babaji Maharaj*, SriSri 108 Swami SriSantadash Kathiya Babaji Maharajer Jibon-chorit,* 5th Edition (Kolkata: *Kathiyababar Ashrom, Sukhchar*, 2008), 111.

[35] Tarakishore Choudhury, "*Bhumika*" in *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya* (Kolkata: Swami Santadas Institute of Culture, 2004), 12.

[36] Ibid., 12.

[37] As Wilhelm Halbfass has shown, the term *Sanatana Dharma* had, from its traditional scriptural connotation of an "unshakeable, venerable order" and particular norms of life, come to denote Hinduism as an ahistorical "eternal religion" synonymous with *Vaidikadharma* (Vedic dharma) in tracts of Neo-Hindus like Vivekananda, Reformists and their traditionalist opponents alike as a means of self-assertion and restorative discourse, while the Theosophists appropriated the expression to articulate Hinduism as a "universal religion" serving as a common denominator of all religions. Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990), 343-346. Choudhury, however, uses it in the former sense of *Vaidikadharma* prescribed by the *Sastras,* about which he claimed, the educated sections of Hindu society, had grown skeptical.

[38] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 17.

[39] Amiya P. Sen, "Introduction", in*Hindu Revivalism in Bengal 1872-1905: some essays in Interpretation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15.

[40] Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

about narrating certain miraculous experiences that had restored his faith in the supernatural powers of the *Rsis* and the effectuality of Dharma, "since it is impossible to convince those educated by the English pedagogical tradition of their veracity."[41] Such a hesitation seems to emerge from a self-conscious identification with his intended readership, trapped within what Chatterjee calls the 'unhappy consciousness' generated by the "prison house of reason".[42]"Post-enlightenment rationalism [which] was at the heart of the intellectual tradition encountered by the [contemporary] Bengali intelligentsia", according to Tapan Roychoudhury, necessitated that "efforts to restore…faith [in received tradition] had to be in terms of rational thought, not unquestioning acceptance" since "[r]eason was the foundation of scientific enquiry [and] [e]xploration of matters pertaining to human society and even the norms of personal life were within the latter's purview."[43]

If the *Ramkrishna Kathāmṛta* attempts to register the subordination of "skeptical rationalism" to Indic spiritual wisdom by appending the colloquial religious idiom of *Ramkrishna Paramhansa* - the rustic village priest and godman with Sanskrit quotations from the Upanishads and the Gita[44] - Tarakishore indulges in a paradoxical exercise of defeating reason through reason, establishing the infallibility of the scriptures through "logic and deliberation"[45]; once the axiomatic quality of the Sastric word has been scientifically established, faith in the sages and their supra-rational powers would automatically be restored; till then, delineation of extra-rational experiences could jeopardise his chances of convincing a skeptic colonial elite of the credulity of his claims.

Though the text, written in Bengali, specifically targeted the Bengali Hindu intelligentsia and the circulation of the text has so far remained restricted within this category of readership, Choudhury does address the colonial masters in the Introduction and entreats them not to treat the Indians with racial contempt since imperial glory can be achieved only by executing the welfare of subjects. He also informs them that "just as England and other Western lands have been enriched materially having acquired control of India, similarly by virtue of their inhabitation in India, the English stood to augment their spiritual knowledge as well and if they learn to display cordiality towards Indians, both would be able to reap the fruits of the happy days that [he] had heard, would arrive soon" in the form of the revelation of *Brahmanvidya.*[46] However, the expressed intent of addressing the British audience must not be overestimated, since the "Introduction" (*Bhumika*) is written in Bengali, even while throughout the text we find traces of bilinguality as he extensively quotes from Arthur Wallace and William Jones, etc. Therefore,

[41] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 18.
[42] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, 55.
[43] Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered*, 20-21.
[44] Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, 53.
[45] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 13.
[46] Ibid., 7-8.

one might infer that the address is rhetorical, iterating a rationale for colonial rule that could be fitted within Indian aspirations for a global spiritual future of India, that had been fuelled by the growing admiration for Indian spiritual wisdom in the West.

Thus, it becomes evident that the readership primarily targeted by the author was the social category of the colonized Bengali educated elite that shared the author's own intellectual space shaped by colonial pedagogy that ensured the hegemony of scientific rationalism and empiricism among their hermeneutic mechanisms over other forms of knowledge-production like supernatural experiences (which he mentions but maintains an overt silence), which Chakrabarty's postcolonial work identifies as a symbol of the persistence of post-Enlightenment 'hyperreal' Europe within the universe of the colonized intelligentsia. Moreover, his address to the colonial masters, certainly marks another "global" moment within the text, which is again, not free from inflections since there is both recognition of subordination and a tacit call for a readjustment of existing power-relations in favour of a more equitable partnership, that *Bharatbashis* (primarily indicating the inhabitants of a glorious ancient India), whose ancient spiritual and material achievements and the merits of whose social structures he would be delineating in subsequent chapters with extensive citations from the Asiatick Researches and a comparativist approach to political economies in ancient caste-based India and the contemporary capitalist Western world, deserve.

Engagements with "the West"

This brings us to where Choudhury situates his book within a global teleological framework, suggesting that he has learnt from an undisclosed source that the sacred doctrine of Indian *Brahmanvidya* will soon spread to all humanity around the globe. He incorporates the colonial circumstances within this teleology, proclaiming that a *Rsi* (whose name remains undisclosed) has stated that the British occupation of India was not coincidental but the effect of Sita's boon to *Trijata*, a relative of *Ravana*, the demon who had kidnapped her, that she would gain control of *Bharatvarsha* in Kaliyuga.[47] He further claims, "[t]he advent of the British will lead to universal good as the *Rsis* have designed the universal dissemination of *Brahmanvidya* using this pretext."[48] In order to bolster this claim, he refers to contemporary events like the heightened interest among European and American scholars about Indic knowledge-systems as well as the reception of Swami Vivekananda's delineation on the Vedanta at the Parliament of World Religions as steps towards the resurgence of *Brahmanvidya*.[49] One can trace an ambivalence here as Choudhury takes the attribution of colonial rule by a particular sage to

[47] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 3.
[48] Ibid., 4.
[49] Ibid.

the Ramayana as authoritative but refrains from naming him. Instead, he hastily moves over to citing contemporary events to prove the veracity of the divine design of globally disseminating *Brahmanvidya* through colonial rule.

He embeds the teleology he constructs within the general schema of the cosmic Yuga cycle. He claims that even within *Kaliyuga*, characterized by the proliferation of *Tamaguna, Brahmanvidya* can manifest itself since *Satya* and *Raja gunas* also remain enmeshed in comparatively lower proportions within it.[50] He cites an anecdote from one of the 18 Puranas that since parts of *Satyayuga* were encroached upon by *KaliyugaI,* manifest in the emergence of demons like *Hiranyakashipu,* it was compensated by being allowed to periodically encroach upon *Kaliyuga,* so that the excessive suffering of mankind under *Kali's* influence can be mitigated from time to time. He argues that the current dismal conditions of Indians as well as the Western populations' skepticism about their religious tenets due to the spread of scientific rationality signified that the spread of "Knowledge of the Brahma"[51] (*Brahmanvidya*) has become essential for mitigating the worldwide theological quest. However, since "the Indian body is most suited to receive and possess this knowledge and by divine will, Westerners have assembled here in India, Western rule in India will become a pretext for the dissemination of *Brahmanvidya* among people of other countries".[52] Romila Thapar forwarded the notion that Puranic yugas were not perceived as enclosed units and could be dialectically acted upon through human action (karma).[53] It is therefore noteworthy that Choudhury here employs a rarely cited Puranic discourse on the fragmentary and transferable quality of cosmic time to reconstitute and subvert the colonial discourse on progress along the lines of European Enlightenment. Colonial rule was, indeed, providential for Choudhury, as to quite a few colonial elites and reformers from an earlier generation in mid-nineteenth century, like Gosto Behary Mullick, secretary of a literary club in Calcutta, to whom, "the 'Joneses and Wilsons and Bethunes' had been necessary to raise India from 'the depths of ignorance and superstition'."[54] However, in Choudhury's discourse, colonial rule was an occasion for India not merely to recover its ancient glories but also to become the agent of a global moral and spiritual progress brought about by the worldwide spread of the Indic knowledge of *Brahman.* Thus, *Brahmanvidya* which com-

[50] Puranic time comprises of infinite cycles of the 4 Yugas or cosmic periods, namely Satya, Treta, Dwapar and Kali which are usually characterized by gradual decline in moral, social and religious life. The condition characterizing the yugas are perceived in terms of the three gunas or dispensations: Satya (propensity to dharma), Raja (propensity to action) and Tama (propensity for vices). Romila Thapar forwarded the notion that Puranic yugas were not enclosed units and capable of being dialectically acted upon through human action (karma).

[51] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 6-8.

[52] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 8.

[53] Romila Thapar, *Time as a Metaphor of History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.

[54] Gyan Prakash, "Civil Society, Community, and the Nation in Colonial India", *Etnográphica*, VI, 1 (2002), 32.

prised of scattered strands within the mystical traditions of the Upanishads, is universalized in the process of imagining a global career for a regenerated Bharat, that does not quite fall short of spiritual hegemony.

It is evident that Choudhury sees his work as inaugurating if not facilitating the moment of global diffusion of Indic spiritual knowledge, the occasion for which has been provided by European and American Orientalist and Theosophical enterprises. One can be tempted to read in this diffusionist discourse with India as the epicenter, an echo of Vivekananda's identification of his times as opportune for "the spiritual oneness of the whole universe"[55]. Although Choudhury identifies the enthusiastic reception of Vivekananda's Vedantic discourse at Chicago as symptomatic of the phenomenon, there are differences in their conception of the nature of cross-cultural encounter.[56] Even as Tarakishore interwove *Brahmanvidya* from the various *darśanas* in contrast to Vivekananda's sole reliance on the Vedanta, he shares the latter's stress on the bilaterality of the encounter.[57]

Realizing that he was writing at a time when extremist nationalist politics as well as the anti-partition agitation was at its height in Bengal during the first decade of the twentieth century , he was aware that his contention that the British advent had made a positive impact on India required more qualification. Thus in the footnotes, he argues, "It is true that some people feel that the advent of the British has been disadvantageous for India, but those deliberating carefully will find that a powerful foreign rule has brought all the sects of India to a common state of colonial dependence which is educating them to move beyond mutual prejudices and due to greater disciplining of lifestyle, there has arisen opportunities for social reform. Engagement with foreign histories has enhanced the consciousness of Indians, they are showing interest in worldly affairs inspired by the Western sciences and aspiring to forge a national unity in wake of the nationalism exhibited by the foreigners. The efforts of the Western Theosophists and scholars like Max Müller have reminded the Indians of the glory of their ancient knowledges so that the word *Aryan* is resonating with happiness among many educated individuals. However, there is no entity in this world that has unlimited advantages. One must admit that foreign rule has also occasioned a lot of unfortunate consequences as well."[58]

Choudhury doubted that, considering the moral degeneration of Indians and public recalcitrance towards independence in comparison to European nations, political independence would be successful in effecting welfare and emancipation of the nation, and urged the youth of India to give up political agitation in

[55] Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990), 231.
[56] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 5.
[57] Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990), 231-233.
[58] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 3.

favour of the *Dharmic* code prescribed by the Sastras which would ensure moral refinement of the Hindu nation and earn them the favour of Divinity.[59] He writes, "it is worth remembering that the path which yields success in one country need not prove fruitful in another and *Dharmic* conduct being the characteristic trait of Indians, whoever has accomplished a great deed since the earliest times, has managed to do so by force of Dharma".[60] Having provided the instances of Arjun and Rama defeating their adversaries after acquiring divine favour through penance, he infers, "[t]he effect of this is that despite accomplishing a great task, one remains devoid of pride and executes Karma in social life without pride; this is the genuine Aryan and *Sura* (divine) quality, the Indian idealism. One who discards this quality will never be able to attain the best for this country through *Asuric* (demonic) attitudes" (by which refers to the excesses of political agitation)."[61] In the conclusion to his book, he reiterates that instead of mimicry of foreign attitudes, the revitalization of Dharmic attitudes would automatically bring about social and political regeneration, a process which would be universally beneficial since *Bharatbashis* have always been the spiritual preceptor of the world.[62]

Indeed Choudhury's view resonates the opinion of several literatis before him, like Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (a conservative Brahman and a colonial bureaucrat), Nabagopal Mitra (a Brahmo founding member of the Hindu Mela in the 1860s emphasizing cultural nationhood rather than the associational politics of the Indian National Congress), Krishnakumar Mitra (editor of a journal *Sadharani*) and most notably Bankimchandra Chatterjee (a prominent litterateur of the Bengal renaissance and one of the key progenitors of Hindu nationalist thought and composer of the hymn *Vande Mataram* and the novel *Anandamath*, which became key components of a surging Hindu nationalism in the early twentieth century) who, as Swarupa Gupta points out, "considered society [*samaj*] rather than the state to be the proper arena for national regeneration" by restoring the "ideological centrality of *dharma* in *samaj*".[63] However, it is to be remembered that Choudhury wrote three to four decades after them, in the agitated political circumstances of early twentieth century when animosity against the colonial state apparatus had reached a height and Hindu religious symbolism, revivalist discourses and notions of Dharma came to be articulated and appropriated by a flourishing militant Hindu nationalism against the colonial regime, most notably under the extremist nationalist leader Aurobindo Ghose.

If Choudhury's polemic on Dharma shifts emphasis from contemporary political economy to the realm of the theological and moral unlike those like Ghose,

[59] Choudhury, "*Bhumika*", 15.
[60] Ibid., 15-16.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Tarakishore Choudhury, "*Uposomhar*" in *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya* (Kolkata: Swami Santadas Institute of Culture, 2004), 321.
[63] Swarupa Gupta, *Notions of Nationhood in Bengal: Perspectives on Samaj, c1867-1905* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009), 62.

it seems to come close to Bankimchandra Chatterjee's constructs of Hinduism. However, Choudhury primarily talks of Dharma as *tapasya* along Sastric lines which stands at a *difference* from Bankim's notion of *Anusilan* or "holistic self-cultivation" and "desireless" karma (*Niskama Karma*) which entertains "neither ritual nor worship" and leads to "union with god that at the same time involves the expansion of human powers in this world "[64], Choudhury talks of a theopractical exercise that leads to negation of individual and national agency into Divine Providence, so that individual and national will are subsumed within divine will. He is overtly critical of what he sees as the Western liberal socio-political ideology of equality of all labour-producing selves (*adhikargoto somotwo*): "This world has been created through diversity in manifestation of energy (sakti) […] hence owing to the divergences in the inherent powers, differences in the quality and competence among various beings are inevitable though all are alike in respect of humanity and some other (general) characteristics […] owing to this inequality of capacities, differences in their eligibility for certain actions are unavoidable. *Adhikara* [the term has *Sastric* connotations which somewhat incommensurably can be translated as both rights to certain forms of *karma or labour* and as rights emerging from *karma or past actions*] is a product of *karma*, hence differences in it are also inevitable. Even in those nations where the socio-political ideal of equal rights and aptitudes is prevalent, this equality of capacities exists only in name; in actual practice, it is only a few powerful people who obtain high privileges, others only follow their orders."[65]

Even though he shares his friend Bipinchandra Pal's[66] aversion to "the atomizing principle of 'competition' which, "economic or otherwise, was a sin against God and man"[67], unlike Pal who sought to counter it by stressing on the Vaishnava principle of divinity of Man, Choudhury located the solution in the caste-society. Thus he writes, "the dependency of various castes, on each other for the daily necessary commodities ensured mutual co-operation and poverty, and misery had been limited to an extent. However, due to the competitiveness generated by current economic policies, grains are being exported to other countries causing depletion in the stock which, along with other reasons, have made India a land of perpetual famine. The import of daily necessities from other countries and their dissemination across the nation have caused Indian traders who deal in these com-

[64] Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History*, 120.
[65] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 80-81.
[66] Bipin Chandra Pal was a prominent Swadeshi and later extremist activist during the anti-partition agitation and thereafter.A close friend of Choudhury, he was also a Brahmo in earlier life but later became a disciple of Bijoy Krishna Goswami. While Pal saw every nation as "the manifestation and revelation of a Divine Ideal" and the highest purpose of man as realizing his essential divinity, for Choudhury, such a realization and regeneration of the Divine Ideal manifested in the nation was contingent upon return to Dharmic action. Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 149.
[67] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 80-81.

munities to have become derelict […] and most of them are now immersed in misery […] The present division of caste-system in India therefore, though unscientific, cannot be said to have produced only evil effects […]"[68]

"Therefore," the author feels, "it is the caste system of ancient India, in which the Aryan *Rsis* divided people into special categories on basis of their capacity for action and determined their Adhikaras [specific rights produced from labour] is the best means of social organization." [69]Though this is similar to Bankim's notion of caste as "a coordinated form of the division of labor, with the special activity of each caste correlating to the different classes of action that mankind undertook in society"[70], Choudhury elaborates further, with citations from *Yudhistira's* dialogue with *Nahusha* in *Banparba* (Forest episode) of the Sanskrit Mahabharata, that the four-fold division of *jati* (which Choudhury conflates with the category of *Chaturvarna* that, according to the Bhagavatgita, has divine origins) was based on *guna* (aptitude) and *karma* (types of action) so that one who does not show the behavioral characteristics of a Brahmin i.e, a greater propensity towards *Satyaguna,* must be deemed to be a Sudra. He further illustrates this position by alluding to the *Chandogya Upanishad* which mentions the ranking of *Satyakam*, unsure about his paternal identity, as a Brahman due to his truthfulness and innocence.[71] The notion of *adhikarbheda*, as Choudhury articulates it, thus, negates the notion of "generalization of 'human labour'" which comprises the very premise of the "value" of the liberal humanist self, the source of Western categories of "equality and freedom" that, according to Sartori, mediates "capitalist social relations"[72], which Choudhury brings under vehement attack. It is also noteworthy that Choudhury's connotation of *Dharma* is polysemic, drawing from a range of meanings already in circulation in neo-Hindu literature, including Bankim's *"niti"* (morality), evident from his delineation of political agitation as "*nitibiruddho*" and ethical conduct that characterizes the Aryan.[73]

This becomes the basis of his apologetic discourse on Sastric prescription of Brahmins as the ideal recipient of donation (*daan*), as he posits his rhetorical question within a global framework of comparison: "Is a person," he asks, one "who eschews wealth and savings, trade and warfare except in dire circumstances, sleeps on a grass-mat, maintains frugality in food and clothing and pursues knowledge which he disseminates among deserving disciples, not considered worthy of respect and patronage in other countries as well?"[74] Again citing the

[68] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 79-80.
[69] Ibid., 82.
[70] Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History*, 122.
[71] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 65-69.
[72] Andrew Sartori, "Global Intellectual History and the History of Political Economy" in *Global Intellectual History*, ed. Samuel Moyn & Andrew Sartori (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
[73] Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990), 334-348.
[74] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 63.

Mahabharata, he constructs a trajectory of degradation from the *Satyayuga*, when *Satyaguna* predominated and division of labour was the basis of *Jati* division, up to present *kaliyuga* where birth had become the determinant of *Jati*.[75] He inserts this trajectory of moral decline within a wider devolutionist teleology even as he uses this progressive degeneration of the caste structure to refute Darwinism as unscientific: "That with passage of time, all animals including flora become enfeebled and smaller is evident everywhere…Even in Europe, few nowadays can carry the armors used by warriors five hundred years ago… The theory of evolution that is now becoming prominent in the western world is unacceptable to our Hindu Sastras and may be termed fictitious. The same is true of the theory which states that human race has evolved from inferior creatures like the apes; there is no evidence to prove this."[76]

To sum up, this section has shown how Choudhury conceives of colonial rule as a transnational moment occasioned by cosmic design for the global dissemination of Indic theosophical knowledge and proceeds to opine that agitational politics pursued in blind imitation of foreign political practices without proper Dharmic regeneration in India, would fall short of serving the welfare of the nation and the world. Employing a comparative historicist approach, and citing the Upanishads to counter the Darwinist notion of social evolution, Choudhury establishes that though the caste system had undergone corruption from an aptitude-based system to a birth-based one, a burgeoning capitalist political economy both in the West and in colonial India had brought about ruptures and inequalities, disrupting the mutual cohesion of a caste-based political economy which, according to him, characterized pre-colonial India. It is thus evident that across the text, whether in providing the context, through colonialism, for the diffusion of Indic spiritual knowledge, or as an element of comparative engagement aimed at establishing the superiority of what was conceived as the Indian, an exercise which sometimes included the refutation of dominant Western scientific notions in terms of Indian textual evidence, the conjecture of the West or *Pashchatyo* as a hyperreal entity remains a constant presence. However, unlike Chakrabarty who suggests that postcolonial intelligentsia came to perceive Indian postcolonial trajectory in terms of a "lack" - the failure of postcolonial Indian history to traverse the scale of 'progress' and completely replicate the hyperreal universal Europe in its national life,[77] Tarakishore subverts the colonial historicist narrative of progress into an Indo-centric one, relegating Europe to the " waiting-room" within a scale of global spiritual awakening with India at its apex. Indian national life was to be reconstructed through Sastric caste-based Dharma and divine favour, not as a replica of 'Western' capitalist modernity. Again, though pitted against the notion of *Paschatyo*, the conceptualization of authentic Indian socio-moral structures

[75] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya* , 70.
[76] Ibid., 71.
[77] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 32.

in terms of scriptural authority of the Upanishads and *brahmanvidya* as a "textualist, salvationist and universalistic" theosophy, was ironically shaped by the early Orientalist discourses, which according to Richard King, located the "core of Indian religiosity in certain Sanskrit texts" in consonance with the "Protestant emphasis upon the text as the locus of religion"[78] and the Western idea of "World religion", which was underpinned by "an overraching Christian paradigm", respectively.[79] However, as the next section will show, Choudhury's intertextuality with Orientalist as well as Western scientific discourses was selective, apologetic and embelished with supplementary evidence, wherever available.

Author as the Actor

Choudhury in his quasi-nationalist discourse, accedes that "once the kings of India lost their prowess, series of alien warriors belonging to other denominations invaded India, looted her wealth, acquired control of this land and destroyed texts and achievements of Indians which was enjoined by their religious tenets, leading to steady impoverishment of India and such a fragmentation of the social fabric, that Indians today are skeptical of the fact that they had a prestigious past ever."[80] As Roychoudhury suggests, such occasional references to Muslim tyranny had become common refrain among the Hindu intelligentsia, trained in British Indo-Muslim historiography.[81] However, Tarakishore dedicates an entire chapter to assert that ancient Indians were accomplished in every sphere including science and technology, and reasons that "since, one cannot grasp knowledge of the self as long as knowledge of the world has been mastered, the author of *Sankhya* has focused on the phenomenal world in Sankhya philosophy."[82] However, for this romantic discourse, he heavily depends on intertextual references to Western Orientalist discourses, especially on William Jones' Third Anniversary Discourse published in the *Asiatik Researches* in 1788. Nevertheless, when he claims, "Western linguists who have compared every language on the earth, have reached the conclusion that Sanskrit is superior to every other language"[83], one cannot discern if he is citing Jones who considers Sanskrit to be "more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either…" because his discourse does not address the affinities Jones traces between Sanskrit, Latin and Greek.[84] Nevertheless, he does borrow from the Third Discourse, especially

[78] Richard King, *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial theory, India and 'the Mystic East'* (London: Routledge, 1999), 101.
[79] Ibid., 67.
[80] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 31.
[81] Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered*, 12.
[82] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 33.
[83] Ibid., 32.
[84] William Jones, "The Third Anniversary Discourse delivered 2 February, 1786" in *The Works of Sir William Jones: with the Life of the Author by Lord Teignmouth*, Vol III (London: T. Davison, Whitefrairs, 1807), 34.

when he refers to the festival of *Ramasitoa* celebrated by Peruvians and their claims of descent from the Sun god in order to suggest that Indians due to their superior navigation techniques had established contacts and colonized parts of South America and Southeast Asia (one must remember this was well before the members of the Greater India Society popularized this discourse of ancient India's colonial career in the 1920s). However, he refutes both the Mosaic ethnology of Jones and his contention that "South America was peopled by the same race, who imported into the farthest parts of Asia the rites and fabulous history of Rama"[85], claiming that "there is no reason to believe that Ramchandra was not born in Ayodhyapradesh in India as Dandakaranya and other areas where he left marks of his achievements can be found across India."[86] Again, it is noteworthy that even though Jones mentions Manu's views on the limited rates of legal interest except in "regard to adventures at sea" in order to argue that "Hindus were in early ages a commercial people"[87], Choudhury in the same paragraph where he discusses the Third Discourse prefers to cite the original *Manusamhita* and the precise *slokas* (806, 808-809 of the eighth chapter) which allow the king to determine the custom duties on vessels to establish the same. Moreover, when he does refer to Pliny's Natural History and Strabo in order to establish that ancient Indian ships carried merchandise to parts of Asia and Europe, he self-consciously justifies his dependence on "histories produced in other countries" on grounds of "scarcity of information in Indian texts on Indian navigation since many ancient texts do not survive" [88].

One can locate another "global" moment in the text here, as selective intertextuality with ancient Greco-Roman as well as comparatively recent Orientalist discourses become a medium for establishing the global imprint left by ancient Indian science, technology and culture though such appropriation of Western texts, sounding almost apologetic and needing to be explained by citing the lack of indigenous evidences. This can be attributed to the irony that the intent of the chapter is to establish the superiority of the ancient Indian world to that of Europe. Thus, Western scientific progress was again evoked as a comparative referent in the discussion of the *Sankhya* principle of creation. While he suggests that the *Akash-tattva* which *Kapil* (the author of Sankhya) describes as the origin of *Marut* (electrical energy) "has not yet been revealed to the Occident since it is unintelligible to the methods of Western science," Choudhury interprets the Biblical statement "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with god, and the word was God" [John 1:1] as referring to *anāhata śabda*, the pure sound that does not originate from striking any substance, is the source of the phenomenal world and has been described by the Aryan *rsis* as "*śabda-brahma*". However, the presence

[85] Jones, "The Third Anniversary Discourse delivered 2 February, 1786", 39.
[86] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 56.
[87] Jones, "The Third Anniversary Discourse delivered 2 February, 1786", 42-43.
[88] Tarakishore Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 55.

of this concept within the Bible, according to him, was either on account of the fact that "Jesus Christ had come in contact with exalted spiritual personalities and saints of India" or because "Jesus had come to know something of the knowledge of yoga from *yogis* of Asia Minor region who had been from an earlier age acquainted with *yogis* from India"[89].

Now, if failure to acknowledge the colonial context which generated the relations of power that informed the presence of England and Europe as a constant referent, leaves our scope of enquiry open to the risk of overestimating authorial intent and advocating a "mythical notion of a humanist subject who enjoys sovereign control over his own self-expressive utterances"[90], an exhaustive focus on movement and containment of ideas tends to shift focus from the agency of the author as an active determinant of the nature of discursive engagement with alien intellectual traditions. Thus, it is noteworthy that Choudhury, who heavily cites the authority of the Western Orientalists while discussing the material success of Ancient India, directly quotes from the Sanskrit texts while deliberating on questions of Indian philosophy, eschewing Orientalist discourses on the Indian philosophical traditions by those like H.T. Colebrooke, Hegel, Schopenhauer, etc. Such eschewal is perhaps better understood by the hesitation of the European academic philosophers of the post-Schopenhauer-Deussen generation towards Indian philosophy, due to the hermeneutical constraints highlighted by H.G Gadamer: "Although in the meantime the research in Eastern philosophy has made further advances, we believe today that we are further removed from its philosophical understanding…What can be considered established is only the negative insight that our own basic concepts, which were coined by the Greeks, alter the essence of what is foreign."[91]

Nevertheless, the intervention of the author in the mediation and slippages entailed in the process of translation of ideas across contexts becomes evident from the following example. Earlier it was mentioned how a piece of news from the Australian Times induced Choudhury into realizing the possibility of transmission of electrical energy from a person to external objects; this discourse is developed further in his book:

> The Western scientists have ascertained that silk and wool resist the conduction of electricity as they are non-conductors. The rsis had for this reason, recommended the use of woolen or silk clothes during meditation, for it was necessary to stop not only inflow of external energy into the body but also the outflow of tranquil energy

[89] Tarakishore Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmanvidya*, 54.
[90] Peter E.Gordon, "Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas" in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, eds. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (New York, Oxford University Press, 2014), 41.
[91] H.G.Gadamer cited in Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990), 164.

> accumulated within the body…the places or objects which have been touched by such Mahatmas have been sanctified and are capable of sanctifying others. All this is science; there is nothing superstitious about it.[92]

The complexity of this process remains somewhat unaddressed by Roychoudhury's notion of "ill-understood applications of modern physical theories" and distortion of Sastric texts.[93] It is difficult to explain away Choudhury, who had undergone formal pedagogical training in Chemistry, as mentioned earlier, in terms of conceptual error. However, in order to substantiate the fact that man can channelize his energy into objects close to them, he cites a case from Alfred Russel Wallace's "Miracles and Modern Spiritualism" which Wallace himself extracts from Baring Gould's "Curious Myths of the Middle Ages". The case alludes to Jacques Aymar, a diviner who with the aid of his divining rod, had intercepted a murderer who could not be caught otherwise and the series of tests conducted on him by a Physician from the Medical College of Montpelier which showed that he was not an imposter. Apart from the several layers through which the account is mediated before it reaches Wallace which renders the authenticity of the account problematic, Choudhury's quotation of the case is selective and partial, for he carefully ignores the part where Wallace admits, "when brought to Paris to satisfy the curiosity of the great and learned, his power left him, and he seems to have either had totally false impressions or to have told lies to conceal his want of powers."[94] Again it is noteworthy that in order to establish the scientificity of his claim, Choudhury cites a reputed Western scientist like Wallace but Wallace himself confides that "the subject of Animal Magnetism is still so much a disputed one among scientific men, and many of its alleged phenomena, so closely border on […] what is classed as supernatural."[95] Therefore, both Choudhury's attempt to fuse a *Sastric* concept of *Sparshadosha* into Mesmer's notion of Animal Magnetism as well as his choice of a discourse which was marginal and disputed among the Western scientific authorities, provide significant insights on how authorial selection and appropriation intervenes in the global movement of ideas and also negotiates the *difference*, which Dipesh Chakrabarty has identified as the product of translation[96], overlapping it through a Barthian "second-order semiological system".[97]

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[92] Choudhury, *Brahmavadi rsi o Brahmnavidya*, 51.
[93] Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered*, 34.
[94] A. R. Wallace, "Od-Force, Animal Magnetism and Clairvoyance" in *On Miracles and Modern Spiritualism: Three Essays* (London: James Burns, 1875), 59.
[95] Ibid, 59.
[96] Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Introduction", in *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 17.
[97] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, Hill and Wang (New York: N/a, 1984), 3.

Even while the immediacy of colonial experience rendered an imaginary construction of a global India without the 'West' as a comparative referent implausible, a growing sense of cultural pride engendered an intellectual confidence among the late colonial elite to implicitly claim from the Orientalists, the right to construct their nation, its past, present and future, through direct engagement with indigenous sources and determine the terms in which knowledge produced in and by the 'West', would, if at all, be employed within the discursive project.

Conclusion

As can be seen, this essay comprises of three sections. In the first section, the biography, especially the educational and changing theosophical orientation of the historical actor in question, Tarakishore Choudhury, has been charted out and situated within the historical context of late nineteenth century colonial Bengal. In fact, without examining his biography and early intellectual training, it is difficult to grasp the subtle shifts in his position from sceptic to champion of *Sastras* brought about by the dual forces of information disseminated through global networks as well as extra-rational experiences like interactions with godmen that had long been an indigenous hermeneutic and knowledge-producing device in Indian theo-spiritual engagements. Again, situating Choudhury within the social and historical context, namely, a late colonial middle-class society trying to meld Europe-derived rationalism with a national ethos cathected with received traditions, as well as his own lifestyle where he inter-traversed between the professional requirements of a lawyer at the Calcutta High Court, embedded within the rationalist framework of the colonial judiciary, and his domestic and spiritual routine shaped in rigid conformity to Sastric injunctions as well as the instructions of his guru, help us understand the ambivalences that underscore his attempts to relieve the group he self-identifies with, from the skeptical tyranny of the "prison house of reason" by instilling their faith in the *Sastras* by endowing the latter with a rational basis.

The second section focuses on the multi-textured and layered nature of Choudhury's engagement with 'the West'. While on one hand, he subverts the colonial narrative of progress, to discursively construct a parallel narrative of global spiritual progress with India as epicenter and colonial rule as instrument, embedding it within a Puranic cosmic teleology of the *Yuga* cycle and in the process transforming *brahmanvidya* from a particular strain of thought within Indian philosophical traditions to an universalized theosophy, on the other hand, he situates what he perceives to be the European capitalist political economy and India's caste-based economy within the comparative framework to establish the superiority of the latter even while he charts a devolutionist teleology of historical moral decline and corruption of the caste-system on the basis of the Mahabharata and the Upa-

nishads, using it to refute the Darwinist theory of evolution, both in its biological and social implications. If the two earlier sections reveal the dominance of 'the West', whether in terms of the supremacy of reason or as a constant referent within the intellectual universe of the late colonial elite in Bengal, the third section focuses on the creative agency of the colonial elite, in determining the terms of appropriation, translation and selective intertextual allusion to Orientalist or Western scientific and religious discourses, which reveal the subtle shades of ambivalence that characterized such 'presence of the hyperreal West', entailed by pedagogies and scholarship informed by the colonial experience.

Thus, this essay has highlighted how much Tarakishore Choudhury's text is foregrounded in the intellectual climate generated by the colonial Orientalist knowledge-production across the nineteenth century. However, within the text, one can note an ambivalence as even while frequent allusions to Europe and England as elements of reference or comparison and the substantiation of certain Sastric concepts in terms of Western scientific and quasi-scientific discourses underscore the centrality of the 'hyperreal' *Paschatyajagat* (the West) within the intellectual universe of the author and his intended audience, there is also disapproval of a "weak and dependent intelligentsia […][who] perceived [the master race] as the source of the […] models they sought to emulate"[98]. A slight discursive inversion of existing power relations can be detected in the appropriation of the West for establishing the superiority of ancient Indian material and spiritual culture and its knowledge-systems and the reduction of colonial imperial presence in India to an instrument subservient to a cosmic design for the universalist drift of an essentially Indo-centric spiritual tradition.

It is worth remarking that the globalisms identified within the intellectual discourse primarily refer to societies, scholars and ideas produced in the West which can be explained by the "modes of circulations" produced by the colonial moment. Nevertheless, it reveals the peculiarity of the ambivalent "intellectual history" of the "colonized world" with its nuances, inflections, contradictions that characterize the hybridity of the intellectual universes at the interstices of the global and the national and most importantly, recovers the intervention and agency of the colonized actor/author who (over)determines the fusions entailed by the transnational drift of ideas, to construct an indigenous 'spiritual global career of an Indic theosophy' with colonized India as epicenter that both subverts and appropriates globalist discourses produced by Western colonial rule and represents a multi-layered hermeneutic engagement of Sastric texts, Orientalist discourses and Western scientific reason, so that the omnipresent 'hyperreal' West becomes instrumental in cathecting a 'hyperreal' theosophical India (*Bharatbhoomi Punyabhoomi*).

[98] Roychoudhury, *Europe Reconsidered*, 22.

Decolonization and the Question of Exclusion in Taiwanese Nationalism since 1945

WOLFGANG THIELE

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Analyzing Taiwanese nationalist writing since 1945 and focusing on writing produced by exile Taiwanese in Japan, this article shows that the doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism was highly influenced by international decolonization discourses. It identifies Taiwan's fate with that of colonized countries and Taiwanese domestic power-relationships mirroring relationships between colonizers and colonized. This strengthened a discourse imagining Chinese and mainland Chinese in Taiwan as the antagonists of the Taiwanese nation, which entailed the symbolical exclusion of mainland Chinese into the Taiwanese nation until the late 1990s. The paper furthermore introduces the term ad hoc colonial nationalism in order to analytically distinguish the independence movements of 1895 and 1945 from the post-1947 movement..

Introduction

In this paper, I analyze the development of the doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism between 1945 and 2000 using primary sources published by Taiwanese nationalists in Japanese exile. Concentrating on the question of in- or exclusion of post-1945 immigrants from mainland China into Taiwanese nationalism, I argue that global decolonization discourses, for example concerning the question of Apartheid, visibly informed the imagined nation constructed by Taiwanese nationalists.[1] The paper is structured as follows: In this introduction, I will criticize Jürgen Osterhammel's and Jan Jansen's portrayal of Taiwanese history in their global history of decolonization. In the first chapter, I then discuss how Osterhammel´s and Jansen's very helpful categorizations of decolonization movements apply to the Taiwanese case and introduce the term *ad hoc colonial independence*, in order to analytically distinguish pre-1947 Taiwan independence movements and the post-1947 independence movement. In the second and third chapters, I use pri-

[1] The essay is the product of research I conducted during a stay at the University of Tokyo, 2016/17, and part of larger research project.

mary sources to analyze the question of in- and exclusion of *waishengren*[2] in the imagined Taiwanese nation, and the role of the global decolonization discourse in shaping this image.

Jürgen Osterhammel is probably Germany's most renowned author in the field of Global History. Two books that he co-authored with Jan Jansen largely inspired me to start this research; *Colonialism. History, Forms, Outcomes*[3] (German 1995[4], English 1997) and *Decolonization. The End of Empires* (German 2013[5]), which was published in an English translation this year. While these were inspiring readings, I did not agree with a number of claims made in these books regarding my field of specialization, Taiwanese history.

Osterhammel's and Jansen's categorizations of forms of colonialism and de-colonial movements – for me – shed a revealing spotlight on Taiwanese history. Using their definitions, I will discuss the Taiwanese case in this paper, even though the authors do not consider KMT[6] dictatorship on Taiwan and the anti-KMT independence movement a case of colonialism and/or decolonization movements. Their claim that Taiwan was decolonized by the end of World War Two in 1945, in my view, presents one of the major flaws of their book *Decolonization*[7]. The bibliography cited in their work reveals that they almost exclusively worked with Western literature produced by authors from Europe and North America, apparently ignoring the local or national historiographies of most formerly colonized nations they are writing about.

First, Jansen's and Osterhammel's very own definition of decolonization requires a local government in power and the entry into the U.N for the decolonized territory.[8] One can only really speak of a local government in power in Taiwan since 1992[9], and up to this day Taiwan is not member of the United Nations[10]. Second, the question whether or not Taiwan was decolonized in 1945 is one of the most controversial questions of modern Taiwanese historiography. In the introduction of his *Modern History of Taiwan*, published in Japanese in 2014 Ho I-lin[11] writes:

[2] 外省人, lit. "foreign province people", referring to post-1945 immigrants from mainland China and their descendants.
[3] This is a literal translation of the German title, the title of the published English translation of the book is *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*
[4] Jürgen Osterhammel and Jan C. Jansen. 1995. *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen.* München: C.H. Beck.
[5] Jan C. Jansen. and Jürgen Osterhammmel. 2013. *Dekolonisation: Das Ende der Imperien*. München: C.H. Beck.
[6] KMT is short for Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party.
[7] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation*, 51-52.
[8] Ibid., 7-8.
[9] Following the elections of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, more on this later.
[10] The KMT government residing in Taipei represented China in the United Nations until 1972.
[11] 何義麟 (He Yilin).

> From the very beginning, the Kuomintang regime referred to Taiwan's secession from the Japanese colonies as 'guangfu'[12]. Guangfu is a Chinese expression signifying irredentism, and – generally speaking – means 'returning to the shining age of rule by the fatherland from a dark age of foreign rule'. But, considering the post-war misgovernment, received a negative meaning as recurrence of pestilence or 'surrender' and is now used sarcastically. […] Instead of calling what Taiwan experienced in 1945 the return to the fatherland, guangfu, or post-war colonial independence, should it not be considered 'recolonization'?[13]

Using Ho's terminology, the version of Taiwanese history that Jansen and Osterhammel present is Chinese irredentist history. One would expect Osterhammel, a renowned scholar of Chinese history, to hold a rather critical opinion of Chinese nationalism, yet he presents a one-sided view of Taiwanese history that contradicts the views of the vast majority of Taiwanese history scholars. Since democratization, these local scholars have argued that the KMT regime on Taiwan was either colonial or at least had many characteristics of a colonial regime. If Jansen and Osterhammel had read any recent work by a Taiwanese author on colonialism and post-45 history, one would expect them to be aware of this highly sensitive question and mention other historical narratives than the Chinese nationalist perspective. Unfortunately, they have not cited a single Taiwanese scholar in their most recent work.

Nonetheless, *Decolonization* introduces very useful thoughts on the process of decolonization. Their generalization and categorization of anti-colonial movements and actions according to characteristics and period is indeed very fitting to the case of Taiwanese anti-Japanese and anti-KMT movements. The parallels in character and time frame of these movements are very intriguing: Connections to other movements in the decolonizing world seem likely. For instance: Was it just a coincidence that the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan unraveled almost at the same time as the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe?

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12 光復.

13 『国民政府は、最初から台湾の日本植民地からの離脱を「光復」と称した。「光復」はイレデンティズム［...］を表す中国語の表現であり、敷衍すれば、「異民族統治の暗い時代から祖国統治の明るい時代へ戻った」という意味である。しかし、戦後の悪政により、マイナス的な意味合いになる疫病の再発や同音意義の「降伏」を示すものとして、皮肉めいて使われるようになった。［...］ 一九四五年に台湾は日本の植民地支配から解放されたが、二・二八事件を経て、国民党に失望した一般住民の間には、「再び植民地支配体制下に置かれた」という意識が生まれた。特に、民主化の台湾社会において、国民党独裁政権下の恐怖政治は日本植民地支配よりひどいという言説が定着した。［...］一九四五年に台湾が経験したのは、祖国復帰の「光復」や植民地独立の「戦後」というよりも、「再植民地化」の始まりであったとは言えないだろうか。この問題こそが、戦後の台湾社会の歴史認識をめぐる対立の原点である。』, Ho I-lin. Taiwan gendaishi: Ni ni hachi jiken wo meguru rekishi no sai kioku (Modern History of Taiwan: Revisiting the History Surrounding the 228 Incident). (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2014), 10-11, Emphases by me.

Inspired by these parallels, I decided to do research on the participation of Taiwanese nationalists[14] in the global decolonization discourse after 1945 and the adaptation of a decolonization discourse into the Taiwanese *doctrine of nationalism.* In an influential work, John Breuilly has identified three approaches to the study of nationalism: the study of the doctrine, politics or sentiments of nationalism. Research on the doctrine of nationalism is concerned with ideas and those who produced these ideas,[15] in most cases intellectuals. In this paper, I look at persons writing in the pro-independence journal *Taiwan Chinglian*, most of which were academics living in exile in Japan and North America. Since Taiwanese nationalism was suppressed by the Chinese nationalist KMT regime in Taiwan, Taiwanese nationalists living in Taiwan were not able to advocate Taiwanese independence or nationalism as openly as writers in exile. Even though exiled academic writers are surely not representative for the whole community of Taiwanese nationalists, they constituted one very important and certainly the most visible part of the Taiwanese nationalist movement until the late 1980s.

Taiwan Chinglian[16] was published by *Taiwan seinensha*[17] (lit.: Association of Young Taiwanese) in 500 monthly issues from 1960 to 2002 in Japan, an organization founded by a number of Taiwanese students in Tokyo led by Ong Iok-tek[18] (1924-1985). Because these students participated in the independence movement, they were not allowed to return to Taiwan. Up until 1973, *Taiwan Chinglian* was the most important pro-independence publication among Taiwanese worldwide – it was distributed in Japan, but also in the Americas, Europe, and, illegally, in Taiwan. In one section, the editors published Chinese or Japanese translations of newspaper articles written in English, Spanish, Italian, German, French, Swedish etc., demonstrating the impressive circulation of *Taiwan Chinglian*. Later, *Taiwan seinensha* would inspire the creation of similar associations among the Taiwanese diasporas in the United States, Canada and Europe, which, in 1970, united as the *World United Formosans for Independence* (WUFI)[19] with *Taiwan Chinglian* as its central organ. Following 1973, the American and Japanese chapters of WUFI divided their publication work: The American Taiwanese would now publish a Chinese language journal, while the Japanese Taiwanese would publish a Japanese language journal. As a result, the length of the journal was cut in half from 60 to 30 pages. While most articles in *Taiwan Chinglian* were published in Japanese and Chinese, many were published in Hokkien and a few in English.

[14] In this essay, advocates of the Taiwan Independence Movement are considered Taiwanese nationalists.
[15] John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in *Mapping the Nation,* ed. Gopal Balakrishnan, (London: Verso, 1996), 146-174.
[16] 台湾青年 (chn.; *taiwan qingnian*, jpn.: *taiwan seinen*, lit.: Youth of Taiwan).
[17] 台湾青年社 (chn.: *taiwan qingnianshe*).
[18] 王育德 (Wang Yude), I decided to use the Hokkien based transliteration of Ong's name, since he himself preferred it.
[19] 臺灣獨立建國聯盟 *(Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng).*

Many of the writers mentioned in this essay later became prominent Taiwanese politicians following democratization. A deeper understanding of Taiwanese nationalism and its historical roots is important not just for historians. After the emergence of the 2014 sunflower movements and the attempt of the KMT party to introduce China-centric history curriculum reforms in 2015, a new generation of young Taiwanese nationalists appeared and quickly entered parliament, while the older Taiwanese nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won landslide victories in both the Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections of 2016.[20]

Through a reading of *Taiwan Chinglian*, I show that Taiwanese nationalists were inspired by decolonization movements in other parts of the world; they used those as a model to analyze power relationships in Taiwan. Moreover, this analysis formed the framework in which they imagined their own "nation". As John Armstrong[21] has argued, both ethnicities and nations define themselves through boundary-making, often by excluding certain groups of people. Therefore, I was especially interested in whether Chinese immigrants after 1945 and their descendants are considered part of the Taiwanese nation. My findings suggest that Taiwanese nationalism is as much a product of the global decolonization discourse as it is a product of the domestic power relationships in Taiwan.

Decolonization, Nationalisms, and Independence Movements in Taiwan since 1985 through the Lens of Osterhammel's Periodization

In this chapter, I will take a closer look at different Taiwanese anti-colonial and independence movements since the beginning of Japanese colonization in 1895, as well as their historical context and the global aspect of Taiwanese nationalist discourse. In doing so, I will rely on Osterhammel's concepts to establish a periodization of Taiwanese decolonization movements, and introduce the term *ad hoc colonial nationalism*.

Taiwan's independence and decolonization movements fit perfectly into the three types of anti-colonial resistance Osterhammel and Jansen identify: (1) primary resistance, meaning traditionalist, mostly violent resistance to protect the pre-colonial state of society; (2) resistance of a new elite inside the framework of and based on the colonial ruling system – seeking the emancipation and equal treatment inside the empire and thereby fundamentally exposing the bigotry of colonialism and threatening colonial power-relationships – and (3) nationalist independence movements.[22]

[20] Furthermore, adding urgency to this topic, US President Donald Trump has recently challenged the US One-China policy.

[21] John Armstrong, "Nations before Nationalism," in *Nationalism: Oxford Readers,* ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D.Smith, 140-146 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 140-146; originally published in John Armstrong*, Nations before Nationalism.* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

[22] Armstrong, "Nations before Nationalism," 53-55.

Based on these categories, one can chronologically divide anti-colonial resistance into four periods: (1) the period of primary resistance between 1895 and 1915, which ended with the Xilai temple incident of 1915;[23] (2) the period of autonomy movements beginning with the establishment of Taiwan's first political mass movement *taiwan dōkakai*[24] in 1914 and ending with the 2-28-incident in 1947;[25] (3) the period of the revolutionary nationalism and self-rule movements between 1947 and 1988,[26] and finally, (4) the period of democratic reform and *Taiwanization* starting in 1988. While Osterhammel and Jansen claim that Taiwan was decolonized in 1945, I would argue that their model is perfectly applicable to the Taiwan independence movement even after 1945. Furthermore, these indicated time periods roughly align with similar periods in other colonized territories[27] which generally transitioned from the first to the second period in the 1910s and from the second to the third period in the 1940s and 50s.

Osterhammel's first two categories: Primary resistance and emancipation movements

Taiwan has repeatedly been colonized by several foreign peoples, including the Dutch, Spaniards, the Ming-loyalist warlord Koxinga[28], the Qing Empire, and Japan. In the 17th century, the Dutch began to systematically populate the island with immigrants from China, a process that continued until Japanese colonization in 1895. These immigrants mainly came from the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, speaking Hokkien (nowadays often called Taiwanese) and Hakka, two Sinitic languages that are not mutually intelligible with each other or with Mandarin Chinese. Speakers of Austronesian languages, i.e. the aboriginal population of Taiwan, were assimilated or pushed into the mountainous areas in the east of the island and nowadays merely represent 2.5 percent of the population.

Following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894/95), the Qing Empire ceded Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan in 1895. Japanese troops managed to occupy the richly populated Western plains in 1895, albeit fighting with guerrilla troops lacking central organization or shared ideology continued until 1903. A

[23] 西來庵事件 (*xilai'an shijian*). I exclude the Wushe incident of 1931, although it fits the description of primary resistance. But, differently than the Xilai temple incident, it did only involve the Seediq tribe that received little appreciation by Sino-Taiwanese and other aboriginal people at the time.

[24] 台湾同化会.

[25] Although one can plausibly argue that the Free China incident of 1960 belongs to this category.

[26] The pro-communist Taiwan self-rule movement in the PRC belongs to this category, since it originally aimed at liberating Taiwan from KMT rule and establishing local self-government in a revolutionary manner, even if it did not aim at establishing a fully independent Taiwanese nation state. Although their organization still exists, it is now nothing more than a *bloc party* and not an independent political movement.

[27] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation* 2013, 28-85.

[28] 鄭成功 (Zheng Chenggong, 1624-1662).

short-lived "Republic of Taiwan"[29] was proclaimed by the local Qing governor Tang Jingsong[30], a native of Guangxi province, who declared himself president, but then fled to the Chinese mainland just a few days after the Japanese landing. Occasional uprisings by the Hakka and Hokkien population of Taiwan continued until 1915. Since the goals of this guerilla warfare and uprisings were the preservation of pre-colonial power-relationships and society, they fit into what Osterhammel and Jansen described as primary resistance.[31]

In colonizing Taiwan, the Meiji elites used the knowledge they had acquired by modernizing Japan to establish a centralized educational[32] dictatorship. Until the end of colonial rule, the majority of Taiwanese, especially young people, were able to speak, read and write Japanese while the local economy modernized to such a degree that Taiwan was considered to be the second wealthiest territory in Asia after Japan. After primary resistance against Japanese colonialism failed, Hakka and Hokkien intellectuals resisted Japanese colonialism via several non-violent movements demanding equal rights, representation in the Japanese Diet, and protection of Sino-Taiwanese culture starting in 1914 with the establishment of *taiwan dōkakai*.

Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Taiwan was occupied by the Republic of China, then ruled by the Kuomintang who were fighting a civil war with the Communist Party of China (CPC). Although originally welcomed by the Taiwanese population, the KMT government provoked an island-wide uprising in early 1947 known in historiography as the 2-28 incident. The KMT's misgovernment, corruption, violence, arrogance and discrimination were underlying this conflict. Examples of said discrimination were laws aimed at expropriating local entrepreneurs in favor of immigrants from the Chinese mainland and excluding Taiwanese from local government and administration. Another grievance concerned the attempt to introduce compulsory military service to recruit Taiwanese for the Chinese Civil War. All of these factors contributed to a collapse of the Taiwanese economy and public health within just a few months. The mostly unarmed revolt

[29] 台灣民主國 *(taiwan minzhuguo)*.
[30] **唐景崧** (1841-1903).
[31] The last uprising of this kind was the 1930/31 uprising by the Taiwanese aboriginal Seediq tribe, that was brutally crushed with the help of other aborigines. Since the Japanese colonial administration penetrated the mountainous areas where aborigines lived later and rather more cautiously than the plains inhabited by Sino-Taiwanese, aborigines lived under a very different and belated colonial regime than other Taiwanese.
[32] Youth and adult education, as well as distribution of propaganda through the education system, was one of the main concerns of Japanese colonial rule, leaving behind a highly-educated populace in 1945, which was possibly one of the reasons of the 1947 uprising. For further information see Patricia Tsurumi, 1977. *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), and Wu Zhuoliu. 1994, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot 1900-1947*, trans. Duncan B. Hunter (Dortmund: Projekt Verlag, 1994).

was crushed in March 1947 by the Chinese Army[33], and the period since then up until the lift of martial law in 1987 is known as the period of white terror in post-1987 historiography.

Although a certain anti-Chinese sentiment was visible among the Taiwanese populace before 1947,[34] the 22 demands published by Taiwanese leaders during the 2-28 incident merely demanded increased self-government of Taiwan. These demands were rejected by the Chinese authorities, who deemed the authors to be traitors.[35] Following the incident, the KMT purged the participants of the uprisings and the native Taiwanese elite, partly through public executions,[36] and later expropriated the rest of the Taiwanese elite through land reform in the 1950s.

In 1949, the KMT government of Chiang Kai-shek[37] relocated to Taipei, claiming to be the only legitimate government for all of China and preparing to reconquer the mainland. Together with the Chinese government, around two million mainland Chinese resettled in Taiwan, many of whom were conscripted soldiers. In Taiwan, these people and their descendants are commonly known as *waishengren*[38], literally translating into foreign province people, while natives of Taiwan are called *benshengren*[39], people from this province. The vast majority of *waishengren* neither spoke Japanese nor one of the local languages, and the KMT aggressively promoted what it considered to be proper Chinese culture and language. The KMT excluded *benshengren* from leading positions in almost all state-controlled and party-controlled institutions, including state companies, the military, educational, administrational and political bodies. This exacerbated the ethnic tensions still present since the bloody events of 1947. Although *benshengren* were gradually emancipated towards the end of martial law, a certain level of *waishengren* privilege existed until democratization in the 1990s.

Until the death of Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo[40], the R.O.C.[41] on Taiwan had three presidents, all of whom were born and raised on the Chinese mainland and relocated to Taiwan as refugees during the Chinese Civil War. The first president, Chiang Kai-shek, was *de facto* supreme leader of the KMT since 1926. After his death in 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded him as chairman of the Kuomintang. Between 1975 and 1978, Yen Chia-kan[42] shortly served

[33] Several accounts also speak of Chinese soldiers occasionally aiming machine gun fire at passers-by and artillery fire in urban areas, e.g. Kerr, George H. Kerr 1965, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 1965) and Wu, *The Fig Tree* 1994.
[34] Chen Fupian, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* (History of the Taiwan Independence Movement) (Taipei: Yushanshe, 2006), 66-81.
[35] Ho, *Modern History of Taiwan* 2014, 96-100.
[36] Ibid., 101-104.
[37] 蔣介石 (Jiang Jieshi, 1887-1975).
[38] 外省人.
[39] 本省人.
[40] 蔣經國 (Jiang Jingguo, 1910-1988, r. 1978-1988).
[41] Short for Republic of China 中華民國 (*zhonghua minguo*).
[42] 嚴家淦 (Yan Jiagan, 1905-1993).

as interim president. The members of the 1st National Assembly and 1st Legislative Yuan (parliament) of the R.O.C., elected in 1947 and 1948 respectively, served until Taiwan's first democratic national legislative elections in 1992, with only a minority of lawmakers representing constituencies in Taiwan.[43]

Following the relocation of Chiang Kai-shek's government, a pro-democratic clique consisting of both *waishengren* and *benshenreng* formed during the 1950s around the journal *Free China*[44], both under the leadership of Lei Chen[45], a Zhejiang native and former high ranking KMT official. This group attempted to establish an opposition party called the *Democratic Party of China*[46] taking an ambiguous stance towards the question of Taiwan independence.[47] However, Lei Chen and his followers were incarcerated by the KMT as alleged communists in 1960.[48]

Osterhammel's second type and period of anti-colonial resistance is marked by peaceful resistance led by a Western educated elite advocating emancipation within the framework of colonialism. The previously mentioned incidents, peaceful anti-Japanese resistance since 1914, the quest for autonomy during the 1947 uprising, as well as the attempt to found an opposition party by Lei Chen in the 1950s, all fit into this category. While the 1947 uprising and the Lei Chen incident both share some characteristics with Osterhammel's third category – the revolutionary struggle for national independence – they were still very moderate in comparison to later movements in and outside of Taiwan, which primarily emphasized the question of national independence and saw very little cooperation between *waishengren* and *benshengren*.

Independence movements before 1947: Introducing the term 'ad-hoc colonial nationalism'

Osterhammel's third category comprises revolutionary and nationalist independence movements which, according to him, usually began in 1940s. At a first glance, Taiwan seems to be an exception from this rule: The first attempt to establish an independent Taiwanese state took place in 1895, the second in 1945. Nevertheless, I would argue that these incidents were profoundly different from the post-1947 independence movement.

In 1895, the Chinese governor of Taiwan province, Tang Jingsong, proclaimed The Republic of Taiwan, stating in its declaration of independence that it would eternally continue being part of the Qing Empire. Is there any other example in

[43] The 1960s elections were held for the seats of those members who had died, but the number of re-elected seats was too small to give *benshengren* any significant influence on law-making.
[44] 自由中國 *(ziyou zhongguo)*.
[45] 雷震 (Lei Zhen, 1897-1979).
[46] 中國民主黨 (*zhongguo minzhu dang*).
[47] Lei Chen would later openly support Taiwanese independence in the form of reforming the R.O.C. into a state called *Chinese Democratic State of Taiwan* 中華台灣民主國 *(zhonghua taiwan minzhu guo)*.
[48] Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 107-115.

world history of a declaration of independence where the seceding state vows to remain part of the state it is seceding from? The declaration was created by people foreign to Taiwan.[49] Furthermore, according to the records of the American journalist James W. Davidson who was present at the time, it received no public support[50]. Moreover, the "President" apparently did not take his self-created office serious enough to remain on the island after the Japanese landed. These circumstances lead me to consider this short-lived creation not a product of any Taiwanese nationalist agenda. Instead, I agree with the academic consensus, which considers the declaration of independence an *ad hoc* attempt to prevent a Japanese takeover by ideologically appealing to France and the USA and thereby provoking their intervention on behalf of the Chinese.[51]

Less is certain regarding the 8-15 independence movement[52]. Following the radio broadcast of the Japanese Shōwa emperor declaring Japan's unconditional surrender to the allied forces on August 15, 1945, a number of Japanese officers were willing to continue the war. Led by Makisawa Yoshio[53], they allegedly met with a number of respected representatives of the people of Taiwan, led by Lim Hian-tong[54], a leader of the anti-colonialist Taiwan Culture Movement. They agreed to declare Taiwan independent but were stopped by the Japanese General Governor Andō Rikichi[55]. It is still being debated whether this event actually took place or was made up *post factum* to denunciate members of the Taiwanese elite as traitors. Assuming that it did happen, it is not clear whether the participants actually declared independence or merely organized a provisional administration to govern Taiwan until the Chinese authorities would arrive.[56]

If we assume that the story of the 8-15 independence movement is accurate, both independence declarations of 1895 and 1945 share characteristics with the declaration of independence by the Republic of Ezo in 1869, a short-lived "state" located in what is now known as Hokkaido, proclaimed by supporters of the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War (1868-1869).[57]

Osterhammel and Jansen group nationalist movements in the colonized world into two categories: *colonial nationalist* movements struggling for autonomy that are formed by ruling colonial elites, as it is the case for the American revolution,

[49] Tang Jingsong, as well as other bureaucrats participating in the declaration of independence, all came from other provinces. Tang himself was a native of Guangxi province.
[50] James Wheeler Davidson, *The Island of Formosa, Past and Present. History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical plants, and other Productions* (London, New York: Macmillan & co, 1903), 275-290.
[51] For further discussion of the topic, see Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 46-48.
[52] 八一五台獨 (*ba yi wu taidu*).
[53] 牧沢義夫.
[54] 林獻堂 (Lin Xiantang).
[55] 安藤利吉.
[56] Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* 2006, 67-70.
[57] Ann B. Irish. *Hokkaido: A History of Ethnic Transition and Development on Japan's Northern Island* (Jefferson, NC; McFarland & Company, 2009), 100-103.

and *anti-colonial national struggles for liberation* led by members of the colonized native population.[58]

I would slightly enlarge this framework to fit in the three aforementioned cases, categorizing them as cases of *ad hoc colonial nationalism*, as they were attempts by *foreign* elites to use the symbolism of nationalism and republicanism to secure traditional power-relationships in the face of military defeat. Unlike, for instance, the American Revolution, these struggles were not preceded by the creation of a nationalist doctrine or nationalist mobilization against the ruling state. Instead, they were created hastily by a few men at the top of colonial administration who tried to secure the colonial dependency towards the motherland.[59]

Osterhammel's third category: Anti-colonial struggle for national liberation

In character, these relatively improvisational attempts were very different from the post-1947 Taiwan Independence Movement and its nationalism, which aimed at a revolutionary overturn of power-relationships to emancipate a subaltern majority. The post-1947 Taiwanese struggle therefore squarely falls into Osterhammel and Jansen's category of the *anti-colonial struggle for liberation.*

Some members of the Taiwanese educational elite had successfully escaped Taiwan during the 1947 purge and organized under the leadership of Thomas Wen-I Liao[60] in Shanghai and Hong Kong[61], but later split among supporters and enemies of the Communist Party of China (CPC). While supporters of the CPC reorganized under the leadership of Xie Xuehong[62] and founded the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League[63], an organization that still exists in the People's Republic of China, supporters of Liao relocated to Japan and organized the *Provisional Government of the Republic of China*[64] with Liao as its president. Liao was an American-educated former professor of Zhejiang University in China and scion of a wealthy Taiwanese land-owning family with a history of anti-Japanese resistance. After initial successes, e.g. receiving an invitation to participate at the Bandung conference of 1955, Liao's strategy eventually proved unsuccessful in gathering support for Taiwanese independence, and his government in exile developed a negative reputation, partly due to infiltration by KMT spies.[65] After Liao's family came under increasing pressure from the KMT, he eventually returned to Taiwan in 1965, receiving a government post and producing anti-independence propaganda. Simultaneously, growing numbers of Taiwanese students educated

[58] Osterhammel and Jansen, *Kolonialismus*, 55-56.
[59] As another example, the pseudo-independent nation state of *Manchukuo* was a *de facto* colony of Japan.
[60] 廖文毅 (Liao Wenyi, 1910-1986).
[61] Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 168-171.
[62] 謝雪紅 (1901-1970).
[63] 臺灣民主自治同盟 (*taiwan minzhu zizhi tongmeng*).
[64] 台灣共和國臨時政府 *(taiwan gongheguo linshi zhengfu)*.
[65] Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*2006, 171-174.

in Japan, the USA, Canada and Europe, rejuvenated the Taiwan independence movement in the late 1960s. This development was spurred by intensified Taiwanese emigration, the incarceration of Prof. Peng Ming-min[66] of the National Taiwan University in 1964, who would become the most influential advocate of Taiwanese independence, and the publication of George Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed* in 1966. Advocating Taiwanese independence, this book looked back at the 2-28 incident and became popular among Taiwanese students overseas, whom it often introduced for the first time to the massacres of 1947.[67]

In 1964, Peng Ming-min, a native Taiwanese academic educated in Japan, Taiwan, Canada and Paris and the first native Taiwanese to head the Political Science Department of National Taiwan University[68], and two of his students printed pamphlets calling for a revolutionary overturn of Chiang's government and the establishment of an independent Taiwanese state. Although Peng and his associates were imprisoned just before distributing their pamphlets, a number of these somehow found their way to Japan and were published by *Taiwan Chinglian* as a "Declaration of Formosan Independence".[69] Since Peng was an internationally renowned scholar of international law at the time and had connections to influential people in the United States, Canada and Europe, his incarceration sparked an international outcry. American diplomats and journalists observed his trial closely, and although he was sentenced to eight years in prison, it was transformed into house detention following international pressure (his students were not as lucky). An English translation of his pamphlet would later be published by the New York Times. In 1969/70, Amnesty International successfully organized Peng Ming-min's escape from detention using a forged Japanese passport and brought him to Sweden, again producing international headlines.[70] He took up a post at Michigan University the same year and later headed the organization World United Formosans for Independence for a short period of time.

During the 1970s and 1980s, democratic and nationalist minded Taiwanese *(benshengren)* in Taiwan reorganized in the *Tangwai movement*[71], literally translating into "movement outside the party", organizing campaigns for its members to run as independent candidates in local elections. The movement climaxed in a

[66] 彭明敏 (born 1923).
[67] Ho, *Modern History of Taiwan*, 214-216.
[68] In 1961 Peng served as adviser to the R.O.C.´s U. N. delegation, this was the highest government position held by a native Taiwanese at the time.
[69] 台湾独立宣言 (*taiwan dokuritsu sengen*). In his memoirs, Peng claimed the original title was supposed to be "Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation" 台灣人民自救宣言 *(taiwan renmin zijiu xuanyan),* Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom; Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston: 1972), accessed January 14, 2017, http://www.romanization.com/books/peng/.
[70] The conservative Japanese government warned him that it would immediately deport him to Taiwan if he dared to set foot on Japanese soil. This exemplifies how sensitive the issue of the Taiwan Independence movement was in bilateral Japan-Taiwan relations.
[71] 黨外運動 *(dangwai yundong).*

large-scale demonstration in Kaohsiung in December 1979, which was cracked down by the police. As a response, the government incarcerated leading *Tangwai* movement members and murdered imprisoned Lin Yi-hsiung's[72] family.[73] Even though the KMT regime used cruel methods to destroy the *Tangwai* movement, the organization persisted. In 1986, under pressure from Taiwanese in exile, the *Tangwai* movement reorganized and illegally established the *Democratic Progressive Party* (DPP)[74], which openly adopted a pro-independence stance. The establishment of new political parties was legalized in the following year through the abolition of martial law.

Following Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, Lee Teng-hui[75] became the first *benshengren* to lead Taiwan as president and chairman of the KMT. Lee Teng-hui is a doctor of agriculture who has studied in Taiwan, the United States and Japan.[76] Lee successfully introduced reforms to democratize and *taiwanize*[77] the R.O.C. and its institutions. He thereby *de facto* made Taiwanese nationalism government policy and fulfilled the demands of the Taiwan independence movement, stopping just short of declaring formal independence[78] or replacing Mandarin Chinese's dominating role as the "national language"[79]. In 1996, the Republic of China/Taiwan held its first democratic presidential elections with Lee defeating Peng Ming-min of the DPP. In 2000, Lee stepped down from the presidency, enabling the first democratic transfer of power in Taiwanese history. After Kuomintang members blamed Lee for the success of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian[80] in the election of 2000,[81] he resigned as chairman of the party before being expelled from it in 2001. Since then, he is openly supporting the Taiwan independence movement and is especially popular in Japan as an advocate of increased partnership between the

[72] 林義雄 (Lin Yixiong, born 1941).
[73] This happened after his wife had contacted Amnesty International in Japan. Lin's mother and two of his daughters lost their lives; only one of his daughters survived the attack. Upon being released from prison in 1984, Lin moved to America to study at Harvard University and returned to Taiwan in 1989.
[74] 民主進步黨 *(minzhu jinbu dang)*.
[75] 李登輝 (Li Denghui, born 1923).
[76] He also served in the Japanese army in 1944/45. Even though compulsory military service was not introduced for Taiwanese before September 1944, Japanese universities heavily pressurized Taiwanese students to register for voluntary military service. Peng, according to his memoirs, successfully avoided military draft by hiding in the countryside, Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom. Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). accessed January 14, 2017, http://www.romanization.com/books/peng/.
[77] *bentuhua* 本土化 (lit.: localization).
[78] He probably avoided this due to the fact that a formal declaration of independence would likely lead to war with the People's Republic of China. Further, U.S. governments repeatedly expressed they would not support Taiwan if it provoked a war with China. Every government since democratization has exercised similar caution.
[79] *Guoyu* 國語.
[80] 陳水扁.
[81] KMT candidate Lien Chan 連戰 (Lian Zhan) came in third behind independent candidate James Soong 宋楚瑜 (Song Chuyu).

two countries. The KMT has returned to strongly opposing independence and advocating stronger ties with mainland China as well as – under certain conditions – peaceful reunification, ergo Chinese nationalism.

To this day, the antagonism between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms constitutes the main ideological divide in Taiwanese politics. The following chapters will use primary sources to discuss the nationalist discourse that developed in Taiwan after 1947 and show that it emerged in the context of a global decolonization movement.

Waishengren and the Doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism

The doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism that developed after 1947 was centered around distinguishing the Taiwanese nation from other nations. Was this nation unique through the blood-relations of members or a particular shared culture, or was it instead held together by a shared and unique (geo-)political fate? These questions were deeply linked to the question of whether immigrants from mainland China could be integrated into Taiwanese society or if they were essentially alien. In this chapter, I will explore how Taiwanese nationalists answered these questions.

Although minor political groups had demanded Taiwan independence well before 1945[82], they never developed a doctrine of nationalism.[83] Instead, the first doctrine was formulated by Thomas Wen-I Liao in his Japanese language manifesto *Formosanism*[84]. Liao argued that Chinese (Han people) and Taiwanese were two different races, Taiwan being home to a race that emerged through the mix of Indonesians[85], Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutchmen, Fujianese, Cantonese[86] and Japanese. Therefore, according to Liao, Taiwan deserved its own nation state.[87] This view is called *taiwan minzu hunxue lun*[88] in Chinese, roughly translating as "mixed blood Taiwan nation theory", and still enjoys some support. For instance, Japanese author Aoki Tatsuo[89]argued in a 1999 essay that Taiwanese, Japanese and South East Asians actually belonged to one race distinct from Han people.[90] In a general sense, the Taiwanese nationalism advocated by Liao was racist/*völkisch*,

[82] Chen *Taiwan duli yundong shi 2006, 49-65*.
[83] Ibid., 493-494.
[84] This is the English title on the book cover, but *Taiwanese Democratism* is a more literal and easily understandable translation of the Japanese title *taiwan minpon shugi*.
[85] Sic! He means Taiwanese aborigines.
[86] Sic! He means Cantonese Hakka.
[87] Thomas Wen-I Liao, *Taiwan minpon shugi* (Formosanism) (Tokyo: Taiwan minpōsha: 1956).
[88] 臺灣民族混血論.
[89] 青木達雄.
[90] Aoki Tatsuo, 1999. "Tōnan-a-jin, taiwanjin, nihonjin wa minna kyōdai: Taiwanjin wa kanminzoku dewa nai" (South East Asians, Taiwanese and Japanese are all Brothers: Taiwanese are not of Han race), *Taiwan Chinglian* 462 (1999): 27-28.

meaning that he strongly rejected including *waishengren* into the Taiwanese nation on racial grounds.

In a 1968 essay, Liau Kianlong strongly rejected the idea of defining nations only by race or language, arguing that race-based nationalism had led to the mass murder of the Nazis. Instead, he affirmed, nations and *volk* are based on communities *(gongtongxing*[91]*)* of natural (race, geography) and social character (economy, politics, language, culture) and that the shared social identity is actually more important in defining a nation. He criticized translating the Western term *nationalism* into *minzu zhuyi*[92]*,* since this concept implies a nation with shared blood-relations, as well as the use of the terms *guomin zhuyi*[93] and *guojia zhuyi*[94], to refer to state, i.e. not *volk*-centered, nationalisms. Instead, he preferred to use the English term without any translation.[95] While he did not elaborate upon whether *waishengren* are part of the Taiwanese nation in that work, in later essays he clarified his view that they are not. In a 1971 essay, he wrote that the ruling KMT regime was "the Chinese people's colonial rule of Taiwan – the inevitable outcome of which is preferred treatment of the two million Chinese in Taiwan that self-evidently exists in politics, economy and society."[96] Through statements like this, he not only constructed an ethnic/national antagonism between Taiwanese and "Chinese", i.e. *waishengren*, but also identified the fate of the Taiwanese nation as that of a colonized people.

Peng Ming-min and his students opposed this view. In the aforementioned pamphlet of 1964, they argued that *waishengren* and *benshengren* needed to work together to overthrow the Chiang regime, and that *waishengren* were victims of the dictatorship as well. They furthermore stated that the antagonism between *waishengren* and *benshengren* was constructed by the government through its *divide et impera* policy.[97] Peng later labeled this type of nationalism, which includes *waishengren* and *benshengren* equally into the Taiwanese nation, *Taiwan guomin zhuyi.*[98]

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[91] 共同性.
[92] 民族主義.
[93] 国民主義. Since all essays in *Taiwan Chinglian* were written using Japanese *shinjitai* characters, in order to keep my translations as close to the original as possible, I will use these characters when quoting from *Taiwan Chinglian.* in order to keep my translations as close to the original as possible.
[94] 国家主義.
[95] Although he still used the term *minzu zhuyi* in later writings; Liau Kianlong, "Gua-e kik-bing su-siong(4) Kuan-i NATION (bin-tsok)-e kho-tshat (tiong)" (My Revolutionary Thoughts(4) Thoughts Concerning the Nation (Part 2)),. *Taiwan Chinglian* 87 1968: 13-22, 33.
[96] 『蒋政権的此一政治体制，必然地造成対200万在台中国人優先——不論在政治上、経済上、或社会上——的結果，這就是中国人的台湾殖民地統治。』, Liau Kianlong, "Mianlin xin jumian de taiwan duli yundong" (The Taiwan Independence Movement Facing a New Situation), *Taiwan Chinglian* 130 (1971): 11-20.
[97] Peng Ming-min et al., *Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation*, trans. Li Ming-Juinn et al. (1964), accessed January 14, 2017, http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ad/peng_0707_z05.html.
[98] **台灣國民主義**； Peng Ming-min wenjiao jijinhui, (ed.), *Peng Ming-min kan taiwan* (Peng Ming-min Looking at Taiwan) (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi: 1994), 23.

Since the group's pamphlet was produced in 1964, it received wide circulation among exiled Taiwanese nationalists. However, one of its major points, the need for cooperation between *waishengren* and *benshengren*, apparently did not receive the same level of attention. In *Taiwan Chinglian*, the narrative portraying *waishengren* as antagonists and colonizers was still dominant. Nevertheless, after the foundation of World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) in New York, its first president, Chai Trong-rong[99] stated:

> The Taiwan independence and state foundation movement opposes the dictatorships of the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, it aims to build one sovereign, democratic and free state encompassing all of Taiwan's inhabitants. Each and every one endorsing Taiwan to become one free, democratic and independent state is one of our friends, and all those Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan, who join our comrades on the island fighting to resist communism and overthrow the Chiang regime, are our comrades as well.[100]

Chai positioned the movement against both the Communist regime on mainland China, while simultaneously condemning the rule of the Kuomintang on Taiwan. He further elaborated on the political goals of the movement and rights of future Taiwanese citizens:

> On the victory day of the revolution, except for those receiving punishment, all inhabitants of Taiwan regardless of place of birth, religion or gender shall equally receive the fruits of the revolution, liberation of political rights, and seek benefit for the masses. Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan and Taiwanese shall both automatically become citizens of the Republic of Taiwan in the same manner and receive the same rights and duties. Their lives, wealth and other rights shall receive protection under the law of the Republic of Taiwan.[101]

This statement might seem to include both *benshengren* and *waishengren* equally in the Taiwanese nation. Upon closer inspection, the author only acknowledges *benshengren* to be *Taiwanese (taiwanren)*[102] but uses the rather inapt term *Chinese*

[99] 蔡同榮 (Cai Tongrong, 1935-2014).

[100] 『台湾独立建国運動反対中共与国民党的独裁，為建立一個主権属於全体台湾住民的民主自由国家。凡是賛成台湾成為一個自由民主的独立国家者都是我們的朋友，那些為反共倒蔣与島内同志併肩奮闘的在台中国系住民都是我們的同志。[...] 革命成功之日，除這些人応受制裁外，其他台湾住民不分出生地，宗教，及性別，都將平等地享受革命的成果，開放政権，並為大衆謀福利。在台中国系住民応与台湾人同様地自動成為台湾共和国々民，且享受同様的権利義務。他們的生命，財産，及其他的権利将受到台湾共和国法律的保障。』, Chai Trong-rong, "Taiwan duli jianguo yu zaitai zhongguoxi zhumin" (Founding an Independent Taiwan and the Chinese Inhabitants of Taiwan), *Taiwan Chinglian* 122 (1971): 23-24.

[101] Ibid.Chai Trong-rong, "Taiwan duli jianguo yu zaitai zhongguoxi zhumin".

[102] 台湾人.

inhabitants of Taiwan (zaitai zhongguoxi zhumin)[103] instead of *waishengren*. In other words, while these inhabitants may be equal citizens of a Taiwanese nation state in the future, they are *not* part of the Taiwanese *volk*. The wording also implies that he denies that Taiwanese people are historically linked to China.

Chai's statement is ambiguous about how *waishengren* are part of the Taiwanese nation, placing them vaguely within Peng Ming-min's *guomin* nationalism category. Chen Fupian[104], citing Huang Yingzhe[105], claims in his 2006 in Chinese published work *History of the Taiwan Independence Movement*, published in Chinese in 2006, that this branch of nationalism became generally accepted by Taiwanese nationalists during the 1980s.[106] But the sources show that the nationalist discourse excluding *waishengren* actually intensified during the 1980s. For example, in 1981, Koh Se-kai argued that Taiwanese and Chinese were culturally vastly different while the Taiwanese Hokkien language lay closer to Vietnamese than Mandarin. He further asserted that the Taiwanese developed a national consciousness during the period of Japanese rule which was explicitly opposed to both the Chinese and Japanese. According to Koh Se-kai, recent Taiwanese intellectuals had been "poisoned" by *Chinese thought* (*chūka shisō*)[107] and this poisoned identity needed to be replaced by a new, distinctively non-Chinese Taiwanese national identity.[108] The same year, Japan-born Song Zhongyang[109] explicitly criticized Ming-min's idea of *guomin zhuyi*, civic nationalism, and instead advocated ethnic nationalism.[110] In a similar vein, during a speech commemorating the 2-28 incident in 1985, Lin Zhexu[111] said, "the character of the 228-incident was definitely a fight of Taiwanese against Chinese. […] Today, we Taiwanese have no other choice but to arm ourselves with Taiwanese nationalism to resist our two million Chinese overlords armed with Chinese thought.[112]" Lin used martial vocabulary highlighting the antagonism between *waishengren* and *benshengren.* As late as 1991, Ke Qihua[113] argued that political disputes in Taiwan were not based on ideological differences, but ethnicity. Taiwanese were not Han and culturally very different from Chinese.[114]

[103] 在台中国系住民.
[104] 陳佳宏 (Chen Jiahong).
[105] 黃英哲.
[106] Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 494.
[107] 中華思想.
[108] Koh Se-kai, "Motto Taiwan minzoku no riron wo" (More on the Theory of the Nation of Taiwan), *Taiwan Chinglian* 249 (1981): 9-13.
[109] 宋重陽.
[110] Song Zhongyang, "Minzokushugi to kokka" (Nationalism and State), *Taiwan Chinglian* 250 (1981): 9-18.
[111] 林哲旭.
[112] Lin Zhexu, "Taiwan minzokushugi no shita ni danketsu wo!" (Let's Unite under Taiwanese Nationalism!), *Taiwan Chinglian* 294 (1985): 4-7.
[113] 柯旗化.
[114] Ke Qihua, "Taiwan kokunai no kihonteki na tairitsu" (Taiwan's Fundamental Domestic Antagonism), *Taiwan Chinglian* 363 (1991): 18-20.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it was generally accepted that *waishengren* could become Taiwanese, albeit it was not clearly stated *how*. In a 1979 article, Wang Zufu[115] complained that the state had registered him, his Taiwanese wife (through marrying him) and his children as Zhejiangnese, as this was the province he came from, despite the fact that he had lived in Taiwan for 30 years, spoke Hokkien with his children and now fully identified as Taiwanese. He wondered how many generations it would take for the state to accept his family as Taiwanese.[116] It seems the nationalists of *Taiwan Chinglian* expected *waishengren* to fully assimilate into local Taiwanese culture, in order to become Taiwanese.

To maximize the distance between the Taiwanese and the Chinese *völker*, contributors to *Taiwan Chinglian* repeatedly argued against the idea that Taiwanese were Han people, *hanren*[117]*,* or Chinese in the sense of *zhongguoren,* a term that implies affiliation to the state of China.[118] The term *huaren*[119]*,* which implies a cultural and ancestral belonging to the Chinese people, was not even discussed. It took the development of a *New Taiwanese*[120] discourse around the presidential election in 2000 to acknowledge that *waishengren* were indeed *New Taiwanese* and not Chinese, regardless of their political affiliations or how much their everyday language, culture or thought resembled that of the "old" Taiwanese.[121]

Summing up, one can divide Taiwanese nationalist imaginations of the Taiwanese nation into two categories. On the one hand, a *völkisch* nationalism emphasized that *waishengren* were not part of the Taiwanese nation and culturally, linguistically and racially different from *waishengren.* On the other hand, a *guomin,* civic nationalism emphasized that *waishengren* would become equal citizens in a new Taiwanese nation state. Nonetheless, followers of this *guomin* nationalism apparently still considered *waishengren* not to be fully part of the Taiwanese nation or *volk* until the late 1990s. In other words, by including *waishengren* into its political project, the Taiwanese nationalism of Li Teng-hui's presidency deviated from the traditional doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism. Quite possibly, the emergence of this mainstream civic nationalism in Taiwan was the product of domestic political pragmatism rather than nationalist theory. In the following section, I will explore how Taiwanese nationalism was affected and strengthened by global decolonization.

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[115] 王祖福.

[116] Wang Zufu, 1979. "Taiwan ni sumu koto sanjūnen, watakushi mo taiwanjin desu. Aru tairiku shusshinsha no sakebi" (After Living in Taiwan for Thirty Years, I am Taiwanese, too. Call of a Person Born on the Chinese Mainland), *Taiwan Chinglian* 221 (1979): 23-24.

[117] 漢人.

[118] 中國人. This term implies that these people belong to the state of China.

[119] 華人、

[120] 新台灣人 (*xin taiwanren*).

[121] Chai Trong-rong, "Shin-taiwanjin wa chūgokujin dewa nai" (New Taiwanese are not Chinese). translated by Kang Wenhuang. *Taiwan Chinglian* 462 (1999): 25-26, originally published in *Minzhong Ribao*, March 15 1999.

The Doctrine of Taiwanese Nationalism and the Moment of Global Decolonization

In my opinion, one can assume that Taiwanese nationalists viewed their work as part of the global moment of decolonization. In a 1967 essay, Liau Kianlong came to the following conclusion as he compared the situation of Taiwan with that of Algeria under French rule:

> Our independence movement is one kind of human liberation movement. Its fundamental character is absolutely identical to the colonial liberation and nationalist movements of Asia and Africa that have been successively rising up since the end of World War II.[122]

Similar sentiments were expressed by the Japanese nationalist supporter of the Taiwan independence movement[123] Tōyama Kagehisa[124], a former communist who grew up in Taiwan during Japanese rule. In 1965, he argued in an article, he argued that the Taiwan independence movement and similar nationalist movements in the 'Third World'[125] (and Japan) were part of one large historic movement to liberate themselves from white people's rule and American economic domination:

> For centuries, the countries of Asia have been ruled by white people. If the masses struggle heroically for national liberation and to expel the white people, then let us not spare with praise, no matter if they are communists, Viet Minh or Vietcong, or liberals.[126]

Without adopting Tōyama's racialized language, Liau, in a more thought-through essay, basically agreed, arguing that the colonial powers, including Japan, USA and the Soviet Union, were responsible for Asia's *backward character*[127] and built their wealth upon exploitation of the peoples of Asia. According to Liau,

[122] 『Lan e独立運動[...]就是一種e人類解放運動。ce[...]ka第二次世界大戦後陸続興起e Asia Africa地域e植民地解放運動，民族運動在基本性質上是完全相同。』, Liau Kianlong, "Gua--e kik-bing su-siong(2) Tai-uan tok-lip un-tong si tsit-tshing-tsit-pah-ban tai-uan-lang--e bin-tsok un-tong" (My Revolutionary Thoughts(2) The Taiwan Independence Movement is the Nationalist Movement of 11 Million Taiwanese). Taiwan Chinglian 78 (1967): 6-10.

[123] At the time, Japanese conservatives, like American conservatives, largely supported the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Tōyama was an exception.

[124] 遠山景久 (1918-1999).

[125] He explicitly mentions Castro, Nasser, and the Vietnamese Vietcong and Viet Minh, despite the fact that the Viet Minh was originally founded as an anti-Japanese group.

[126] 「アジアの国々は数世紀に亘って白人に支配されてきた。民衆は，白人を追放してくれる民族解放闘争の英雄でさえあれば，それが共産主義者であろうと，ベトミン，ベトコンであろうと，自由主義者であろうと，喝采を惜しまないのである。」, Tōyama Kagehisa, "Nashonarizumu" (Nationalism), *Taiwan Chinglian* 51 (1965): 29-30.

[127] 後進性 *(houjinxing)*, the translation as "backward character" is his own.

the reason for Asia's nationalist awakening was the experience of World War II and the relatively easy defeat of the Western colonial powers by Japan, giving the peoples of Asia the necessary self-confidence to free themselves. He wrote that the reason the peoples of Asia were fighting against America was the USA's neo-colonialist behavior, which consisted of the installation of corrupt satraps and did not grant the Asian countries full independence. In this line of thought, Taiwan, like other Asian countries, was a victim of American and Chinese great power politics - China's claim to Taiwan was an imperialist one. Furthermore, according to Liau, Vietnam's fight for independence was an inspiration for many peoples of Asia.[128]

In fact, Taiwanese nationalists' deep identification with colonial liberation movements seems to be one of the reasons why they emphasized the antagonism between *benshengren* and *waishengren* so strongly, while they were unwilling to include *waishengren* in the Taiwanese nation. They considered power-relationships in Taiwan to mirror power-relationships between European immigrants and native peoples in other colonies, which were often legitimized by racism. In a 1965 essay comparing KMT rule on Taiwan to the Apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Dai Zhihai[129] for example wrote:

> Rhodesia is being attacked by the whole world for becoming a '"Second South Africa"', it is swimming in criticism calling it a '"zone of darkness"', '"gunpowder magazine"' and '"fossil of colonialism"', but while the international public opinion is raising its denouncing voice, we Taiwanese can not help but look at ourselves and sigh deeply. Where on earth is the difference between Rhodesia and Taiwan? There is no difference between Rhodesia and Taiwan! Just the opposite, the reality in Taiwan is far worse than in Rhodesia![130]

He furthermore contended that the reason why the Chiang regime was able to avoid international criticism for its colonial regime was its claim to represent all of China. Therefore, it had no incentive to declare Taiwan independent the way many Western intellectuals, diplomats, politicians and, albeit unofficially, governments demanded in order to solve the *Two-Chinas question*[131]:

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[128] Liau Kianlong, "Xin taiwan de jinlu. Xunqiu shijie ji yazhou de heping, anding ji fanrong" (An Aapproach for the New Taiwan. Seeking Peace, Stability and Prosperity for Asia and the World), *Taiwan Chinglian* 101 (1969): 2-23.

[129] 戴志海.

[130] 『ローデシアは全世界から「第二の南アフリカ」になると非難され，「暗黒地帯」「火薬庫」「植民地の化石」と批判を浴びているのだが，このような国際世論の糾弾の声が高いとき，台湾人はわが身をふりかえり深いため息をつかざるをえないのである。一体台湾はローデシアとどれだけの違いあるのであろうか。台湾とローデシアの違いは全くない。それどころか，台湾の実情はローデシアよりもさらに悪いのである。』, Dai Zhihai, "Rōdeshia to tasuu shihai no gensoku" (Rhodesia and the Principle of Majority Rule), *Taiwan Chinglian* 60 (1965): 53-59.

[131] Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* 2006, 133-166 and 423-434.

> In order to maintain refugee rule in Taiwan, a constitution for refugees is displayed and abused, proclaiming that they would conquer Mainland China and supporting the refugee government. Even if minority rule is continuing in Rhodesia for a while, it will not continue in Taiwan. When they cannot misrepresent Taiwan as '"China"' any longer, the truth about the minority refugee dictatorship in Taiwan will become clear to the whole world and the refugees will realize, that they are just refugees waiting for the day to return home.[132]

Although the claim that KMT rule in Taiwan was worse than Apartheid seems very exaggerated, Taiwanese nationalists continued to identify themselves with the fate of South Africans living under Apartheid.[133] Since the KMT strongly supported the Apartheid regime and tens of thousands of Taiwanese were living in South Africa during Apartheid[134], South African anti-Apartheid activists and Taiwanese nationalists had a common enemy. Indeed, Nelson Mandela's early policy on Taiwan suggests that the ANC supported Taiwanese independence at least until the late 1990s. Some examples illustrate said support: During his visit to Taipei in 1993, Nelson Mandela met with the DPP leadership for a long discussion, ignoring KMT diplomats' attempts to prevent a meeting.[135] Furthermore, Mandela not only invited a delegation of Li Teng-hui's government to his presidential inauguration in 1994, but also a delegation of WUFI and its chairman George Chang[136], despite the strong discontent expressed by the government of the People's Republic of China, which traditionally supported anti-Apartheid movements.[137] These incidents and the contacts between Thomas Wen-I Liao and other independence movements mentioned in Chapter 2 seem to indicate that Taiwanese activists cooperated with anti-colonial independence movements in the rest of the world. Since no work on this specific topic has been published, further research is needed

[132] 『台湾では難民の支配を維持するために難民の憲法をふりまわし，中国大陸を征服するのだと出張して，難民政権の支えにしている。ローデシアで少数者のしばらくつづくことがあっても，台湾で難民の支配がつづくことがあっても，台湾で難民の支配がつづくことはない。台湾を「中国」だとごまかすことができなくなれば，少数の難民独裁の事実は全世界に明らかとなり，難民は彼ら自身故郷に帰る日を待つだけの難民だとはっきり自覚するようになるのである。』, Dai, "Rōdeshia to tasuu shihai no gensoku".

[133] For example, in 1988, Taiwanese nationalists sent a delegation to the international Anti-Apartheid Conference at Waseda University, Tokyo. They reported on the situation in Taiwan and the 2-28 incident and claimed to have received sympathetic reactions from the African delegates, Lian Genteng, "Han aparutoheito kokusai kaigi wo sanka shite" (Participating in the International Anti-Apartheid Conference), *Taiwan Chinglian* 336 (1988): 29-31.

[134] Sven Grimm, Yejoo Kim, Ross Anthony, Robert Attwell and Xin Xiao, 2014. *South African Relations with China and Taiwan. Economic Realism and the 'One-China' doctrine* (Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, 2014), 29-31.

[135] *Taiwan Communiqué,* September 1993, 16-18.

[136] 張燦鍙 (Zhang Canhong, born 1936), later was mayor of Tainan.

[137] Song Zhongyang, "Minami afurika, taiwan konekushon: nan-a, soshite PLO mo taiwan dokuritu wo shiji" (The Connection of South Africa and Taiwan. South Africa and the PLO, too, Support Taiwan Independence). *Taiwan Chinglian* 405 (1994): 14-17.

on the relationship between the Taiwan Independence Movement and the ANC and other anti-Apartheid movements.[138]

Conclusions

In this paper, I tried to show how Osterhammel's and Jansen's categorizations of anti-colonial movements applies to the Taiwanese case and far into the post-war era, much different from these authors' assertion that Taiwan was decolonized in 1945. Morevover, I introduced a periodization of Taiwanese anti-colonial movements and the concept of *ad hoc colonial nationalism*, in order to distinguish the post-1947 Taiwan independence movement from the proclamation of the Republic of Taiwan in 1895 and the 8-15 independence movement of 1945.

I have also argued that, until the late 1990s, the doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism did not consider the Taiwanese as *Chinese* in the sense of *hanren*[139] or *huaren*[140], and especially not as *zhongguoren.*[141] Nor did it consider *waishengren* as *Taiwanese*[142], but rather as *Chinese (zhongguoren),* which in this context means foreigners, or *Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan.*[143] The Taiwanese nationalist discourse portrayed *waishengren* as antagonists until the late 1990s.

Furthermore, I have shown that this discourse of antagonism was not only fueled by a Taiwan-centered discourse but also by an outward looking discourse that identified the KMT regime with colonial regimes in Asia and Africa. This discourse viewed the power-relationships in Taiwan as colonial, mirroring those of European colonies and African Apartheid regimes. The point of these global identifications was to strengthen a discourse that identified the struggle of the Taiwan Independence Movement as one between two very different cultures, nations or even races.

Thus, Taiwanese nationalists saw their movement as part of a global moment of decolonization and the awakening of nationalism of the peoples of Asia and Africa. As indicated by the support granted to the Taiwan Independence Movement by the South African ANC, as well as the invitations Thomas Wen-I Liao received to attend the Bandung conference and the ceremony of the Malayan Declaration of Independence in 1957, this view was shared among at least some nationalist and anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa.

With regards to Jansen's and Osterhammel's *Decolonization*, I think the Taiwanese example shows what mistakes we as *global historians* can do if we are deliberately or unwillingly unaware of our own *ethnocentric* (in this case *Euro-*

[138] This also applies to the involvement of Taiwanese in South Africa in the Taiwan Independence Movement.
[139] 漢人.
[140] 華人.
[141] 中國人.
[142] 台灣人.
[143] 中國系台灣住民 *(zhongguoxi taiwan zhumin).*

centric) perceptions. In my opinion, over-relying on academic literature produced in Europe and North America and ignoring global imbalances in academic prestige and resources will throw us back into a time before Edward Said. The fact that none of *country x's* universities made it into the top 100 of THE ranking does not imply that locally produced knowledge about the history of said country is less legitimate or reliable than knowledge produced a Harvard. When we write about global affairs, it is imperative that we at least *try* to engage and consult local or national discourses of history, or else we will undoubtedly get a distorted view.

The 'Bodyscape': Performing Cultural Encounters in Costumes and Tattoos in Treaty Port Japan

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This essay explores the 'cultural performativity' of costumes and tattoos in the encounters between Europeans as well as Americans and Japanese in the treaty ports of Japan after the Meiji Restoration. The purpose is to illustrate how cultural encounters in the treaty ports, most importantly Yokohama, were performed visibly and how this performativity reflected and stimulated cultural flows in multiple directions. It generated transformations through the 'bodyscape', the use of the human body as a scene for performative actions that include cultural, aesthetical as well as identification meanings. The paper focuses on tourism in Yokohama and its commodified manifestation, namely Yokohama costume photography and the tattooing of 'Western' visitors at a time when the Meiji government discouraged traditional Japanese ways of life, including traditional clothes and prohibited Japanese to be tattooed. In particular, the story of the legendary tattooist Hori Chiyo will be traced who was patronized by the New England elite as well as European royalty. The essay thereby illustrates the sometimes contradictory dynamics of Japan´s radical transition in the late 19th century, rendering them palpable through the use of very concrete examples.

Introduction: Transcultural Performativity in Costume and Tattoos in Yokohama[1]

Firstly, 'Treaty Port Japan' refers to the treaty port system that existed in Japan between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century. This term also includes the transitional processes that occurred in Japan through the treaty ports. The consequences of the Opium Wars led to the opening of port cities in China, Japan,

[1] I would like to thank Marvin Martin, Paul Sprute and Alexandra Holmes for their patience to read through this article and their comments and advises that greatly contributed to the article´s refinement and improvement. I would also like to especially thank Professor Takagi Hiroshi of Kyoto University for his kind suggestions on the Japanese sources that have inspired this research.

Korea and Taiwan to foreign trade through a system of unequal treaties with the Western powers. These "particular transcultural contact zones [of treaty ports] became crucibles for commercial, cultural, and political experimentation."[2] This essay sets to explore the "cultural performativity"[3] in these ports from the perspective of costume and tattoos as practices directly applied onto the human body that people from different cultural environments voluntarily conducted in their encounters with other cultures. 'Cultural performativity' refers to the voluntary or involuntary performative actions of certain cultural manifestations by humans. As will be discussed below, one example is the adoption of local traditional costumes and Japanese tattoos in the treaty port of Yokohama by foreign Euro-American settlers, tourists and other types of temporary or long-term visitors. These actions contributed to the process of the formation and conceptualisation of an authentic traditional Japanese culture as well as the transformation of pre-modern folk culture and artisanship into the imported category of fine arts. Meanwhile, the actions taken by the Japanese upon their encounter with modern Western (material) culture and the emergence of professional costume photography studios and tattooists corresponded and consolidated the process of transferring ideals together with the increased amount of imported materials, and the Japanese conceptualization of the West as being advanced and pioneering. Cultural encounters in the treaty port context were performed visibly and this performativity stimulated cultural flows in multiple directions, and generated transformations within the 'bodyscape' – the usage of the human body as a stage for practices of cultural and aesthetic meaning.[4] The focus of this article is centered around, but not limited to, the late-nineteenth century Yokohama tourism industry and its commodified manifestations, in the interaction of Western globetrotters and local service providers on the one hand and between Japan in its radical transition and the vast world outside on the other hand.

Dressing-up and portraying native costumes is a long-established method for tourists to commemorate their experiences in exotic lands throughout the world. This phenomenon is not exclusive to any region: Europeans in Bedouin turbans have posed in front of the Grand Pyramids on the back of camels and Asians in dirndls are pictured with beers on the *Oktoberfest* during their tour through Europe. In the nineteenth century, international travels between Europe and the Far

[2] Harald Fuess, "Treaty Ports in East Asia: Connections, Comparisons and Contrasts" (research overview, Heidelberg University, 2016).

[3] The concept of 'cultural performativity' in this paper is derived from its original meaning in the linguistic sense proposed by Austin, Derrida, and Butler's theory on the construction of gender; John Langshaw Austin and James Opie Urmson, *How to Do Things with Words [the William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955]*, 2. ed. [repr.] (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988).

[4] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

East required more effort and devotion; the possibility itself also was available to much fewer people. Still, Western visitors during the nineteenth century who went to the newly opened land of Japan for their Oriental adventure were not different from those of today who wander around the streets of Kyoto in yukatas[5] (浴衣, a Japanese garment of casual summer wear). In the 1870s, commercial photography studios of Yokohama already kept a stock of ready-to-use costumes from which visitors could select the particular exotic identity they desired.[6] Such portraying of Westerners dressed in traditional Japanese garments, holding fans, posing for a tea ceremony with a background of tatami (畳, a type of mat used as a flooring material in traditional Japanese rooms) and painted screens deceptive enough to give the illusion that one was in a real Japanese living room, was commonly practiced among all kinds of visitors. Still, it is frequently criticised today for its 'tourist gaze', especially the notorious imperialist connotation of being able to domesticate, to appreciate, and to represent the 'timeless Orient'. The Yokohama photographers, either foreign or Japanese, were not suspicious or concerned at the time. For them, the souvenir photography industry was a straightforward business transaction through which they could profit from booming tourism driven by the growing number of expatriates, merchants, diplomats, missionaries, and so-called globetrotters. The promising commercial reward can be deducted from the high quality of the exquisitely lacquered and inlayed covers, the delicately hand-coloured finish, and the fierce competition among photographers and studios.[7] The sheer quantity of photos produced and exported also reflects the importance of this industry – according to the records of the Japanese Trade Bureau, 24 923 photographs were exported to the US and 20 242 to Europe from Japan in 1897 alone.[8]

If a costume could be considered a changeable second skin that is adopted by the body to perform and express one's inner characters, alter egos, beliefs, cultural and identity orientations, then tattoos are even more closely connected with this performativity because of their character of permanence and intimacy, which is carved on the skin and cannot not easily be altered or removed. Having been exempted from the utilitarian function of clothing, tattoos are perceived on a more

[5] Explanation on the use of Japanese/Chinese language: The Japanese words used in this article are translated into a roman pronunciation with the original Ja-panese words and meaning in English provided behind. Japanese/Chinese names follow the order of surname before given name as in their original appearance.

[6] Christine Guth, "Charles Longfellow and Okakura Kakuzo: Cultural Cross-Dressing in the Colonial Context," *East Asia Cultures Critique*, Duke University Press 8, no. 3 (2000): 605–36.

[7] Mio Wakita, "Sites of 'Disconnectedness': The Port City of Yokohama, Souvenir Photography and its Audience," *Transcultural Studies* 4, no. 2 (2013), 77-129; Luke Gartlan, "Types or Costumes? Refraining Early Yokohama Photography," *Visual Resources* 22, no. 3 (2006): 239–63.

[8] Philbert Ono, "Photo guide Japan," accessed March 27, 2017, http://photoguide.jp/txt/PhotoHistory_1868-1919#1894_.28Meiji_27.29.

metaphysical level for their spiritual and aesthetic connotation. Considering that tattooing has been practised among the ancient and aboriginal societies, prisoners, and rebels, the discourse of tattooing is accompanied by a sense of depravity, individual heroism, and a certain primitive, unbridled sexuality of peoples perceived to be barbaric.[9] In order to make a tattoo visible, the body has to be exposed. However, being naked, such as in the case of displaying a full-body tattoo, was not acceptable by the standards of most 'civilised' societies of the nineteenth century. Perhaps the playfulness of possessing a tattoo rests exactly on this space of being between the 'civilised' and the 'barbaric'. By dressing down to dress up, revealing and concealing the tattoos, one acquires control of the own body for the self-expression of identity, class-status, and individualism. Through this theatrical dramatization in the form of a pictorial narrative, it is not as crude as simply exposing the naked body, but in a more sophisticated and aesthetic way it is related to 'art'. Art, as defined by Shiner's[10] and Warhol's[11] claims, is a purely modern concept that is based on its relation to taste, aesthetics and intellectual capability, as well as wealth. It is this potential artistic quality that Western travellers sought in Japanese tattoos even before they landed on the ports. Tattooing in Yokohama was related to the concept of fine arts, and was promoted by the effect of celebrity, elaborated through the words of feverish intellectual orientalists, and spread from mouth to mouth in the transcontinental tourism business. This led to the replacement of former sailors and soldiers as clients by higher-classed leisure tourists, globetrotters, and aristocrats who enthusiastically joined the practice and became agents forming the 'bodyscape' of cultural exchange between Japan and the West.

The numerous souvenir photographs, illustrations, and textual descriptions of Japan and Japanese people circulating in Europe and America did not only contain the quiet scenery of Fuji-san and kimono girls, but also male nudes of mailers, firefighters, jinrikisha drivers, coolies, and carpenters. In the eyes of Westerners, all existing social hierarchies and structures had been eliminated in this encounter with Japan to give way to its subjective aesthetic appreciation for 'art' imposed on human bodies and the visual reproductions of them. The reception of these images does not necessarily mean that bodies of lower-class Japanese people were prominently interesting, but social status surely lost its relevance in the eyes of Western observers to give way to aesthetic judgments. In this regard, these bodies unintentionally constituted a part of the 'bodyscape' that connected Japan to the West. Although depicting anonymous lower-class labourers, these photographs

[9] Guth, "Charles Longfellow and Okakura Kakuzo"; Dag Joakim Gamborg, "Japanese Traditional Tattooing in Modern Japan" (Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2012); 宮下 規久朗 Kikurō Miyashita, *Irezumi to nūdo no bijutsushi: Edo kara kindai* e, NHK bukkusu 1109 (Tōkyō: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2008).

[10] L. E. Shiner, *The Invention of Art: A Cultural History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

[11] Andy Warhol, *The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975).

were similarly hand-painted to highlight the detailed lines and rich colours of the tattoos that covered large areas of their bodies (**Figure 1**).

FIGURE 1. Felice Beato: Tattooed Japanese Firefighters. Hand-colored photograph, ca. 1870.
Wikimedia Commons.

Before John La Farge visited Japan, he wrote that Japanese tattoos "are the most simple means of expression in art", and even connected "with the designs of Michel Angelo!"[12] La Farge's comment confirmed that the West regarded Japanese tattooing as a form of artwork that celebrated the beauty of the male body, strength and masculinity similar to Michelangelo's masterpieces of the Renaissance. Was he trying to transport the same Renaissance to Japan, by unearthing art of Western eternity to rediscover the Far East? His education as an art historian perhaps skewed his view. As has been pointed out by Guth, this Western response to Japanese tattoos and tattooed bodies also challenged the view that women were the exclusive focus of the male gaze in Japan.[13] Japanese tattooing also conveys a close connection with ukiyo-e 浮世絵, the woodblock prints of the 'floating world' which had already gained massive popularity in the Western world at the *Exposition Universelle* in Paris held in 1855.

[12] Ernest Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan: An Inner History of the Japanese Reformation* (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1983), 25.
[13] Christine Guth, *Longfellow's Tattoos: Tourism, Collecting, and Japan* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2004), 143.

Meanwhile, legends of Hori Chiyo (彫千代) of Yokohama, known as the "Emperor of tattooists", were repeated and circulated in both, the Western world and Japanese treaty ports. This name was recorded in memoirs, travelogues and guidebooks to describe the "Emperor of tattooists" as the master artist of the 'Orient' who tattooed several European aristocrats as well as members of the New England elite.[14] The business cards,[15] circulars and advertisements of Hori Chiyo described him as a hospitable professional service provider, an enthusiastic, devotional artist and shrewd businessman. These printed materials were cautiously designed to appeal to the tourists with already established knowledge of him.

At that time, costume portraits as well as tattooing became top attractions of Yokohama as part of the most popular souvenirs and recreational experiences for the fast consumption of globetrotters during their short stays, together with the jinrikisha (人力車the pulled rickshaw) rides and visits to curio shops. Through these staged illusions of feeling able to travel back through time, to escape the restlessness and noise of Western modern city life and its bourgeois materialism, Japan – on its far eastern islands with its far away legends – had enchanted the Western world with such imagination and impression, thus tempting people to moor in the Yokohama harbour. Meanwhile, the scheduled trans-Pacific steamship service became available with shortened travel distances and durations facilitated by the opening of the Suez Canal and the completion of the Trans-American railway by the end of the 1860s. This greatly stimulated the market demands from not only the diplomats, merchants or missionaries, but also leisure travelers.

However, Westerners were occasionally disappointed when they finally set foot on these Far East islands because their encounters in post-1870s Yokohama failed to meet their expectations. The Meiji Restoration had started a dramatic revolution that would change the entire appearance of Japan. Contrary to the Westerners, who went after pre-modern costumes, artifacts, and tattoos, the Japanese were forced to get rid of them. Since 1871, Japanese people were encouraged to adopt Western costume, and tattooing was banned in 1872.[16] Answering to the absence of the expected exotic spectacle, photographers and tattooists of Yokohama catered to the desire of Western visitors to perform 'authentic old Japan' by offering a temporal connectedness to the timeless Orient by means of costumed portraits and images on the skin, thereby reinventing Japanese heritage.[17] Within the same 'bodyscape', Japanese themselves were fervently learning and imitating the lives

[14] George Burchett and Peter Leighton, *Memoirs of a Tattooist: From the Notes, Diaries and Letters of the Late "King of Tattooists"* (London: Oldbourne Press, 1958).
[15] Charles M. Taylor, *Vacation Days in Hawaii and Japan* (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs & co., 1898).
[16] 山本芳美 Yamamoto Yoshimi, イレズミの世界 *Irezumi no sekai* (Tattoo: the Anthropology of Body Decoration) (東京: 河出書房新社, 2005).
[17] "Perseverance: Japanese Tattoo Tradition in a Modern World," Exhibition at the Japanese American National Museum, The Japan Foundation, last accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.janm.org/exhibits/perseverance/.

and styles of Westerners, for the purpose not to seem old and timeless, but modern and significant, reflecting goals of the Meiji government.

The Body Tattooed

> My object is not making money by the work, but I covet to spread the art [of tattoo] all over the world, and promote my reputation. All tourists who come to Japan from Europe and America are solicited to patronise my work, as it may serve as a memento of pleasant sojourn or visit to the fair land of the 'Rising Sun'. – Hori Chiyo 彫千代, 1896

Danbara Terukazu **檀原照和**, a Japanese contemporary writer, described the port, the sailors and the tattoos as a trinity. In a romanticizing fashion, he dated the tradition of tattooing to the beginning of seaports, when Western sailors and soldiers would come on shore to have themselves tattooed as a souvenir – patterned with exotic motifs and pin-up girls, and even as lucky charms for the blessing of a safe voyage – engraved on their skin during the short stays of visit.[18] With their hidden implication and connection to the spiritual power and wish for good luck, prosperity, strength, love and fortune, these ritual-like practices related with eternity, the necessity of going through pain and the satisfaction of enduring it. In the nineteenth century, there also was the high chance of getting a disease from the communally used needles, a further risk to be accepted.

At the opening of the port in Bakumatsu (**幕末**, at the end of the Tokugawa period, around 1853 to 1868), the craft of irezumi (**入れ墨**, literally translated as 'ink in-carving') had reached the highest level that the rest of the world had ever known. Although some researchers have traced the legacy of tattooing in Japan to the ancient Jomon and Yayoi periods (14 000 BC – 250 AD),[19] and the tribal culture of the Ainu (アイヌ, an indigenous people of Hokkaido, North-Eastern Honshu as well as Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and the Kamchatka), what made the Japanese irezumi spectacular was the development of the 'full-body suits' from the late eighteenth century onward. This tattoo covered the entirety or large areas of the body and allowed big-scaled pictorial designs and narrative motifs to be carved permanently on the human skin. Tattooist in Japan used the hand-carving technique known as tebori (手彫り) or wabori (和彫り, literally Japanese carving). Tebori is distinguished from Western tattooing, because tebori carves out sophisticated pictorial designs such as the scenes of ukiyo-e (woodblock prints)

[18] **檀原照和** Danbara Terukazu, レッドライト (2012), accessed March 28, 2017, http://yokohama-now.jp/home/?p=6655.

[19] Gamborg, "Japanese Traditional Tattooing"; Donald McCallum, "Historical and Cultural Dimensions of the Tattoo in Japan," in *Marks of Civilization: Artistic Transformations of the Human Body*, ed. Arnold Rubin. (Los Angeles: Museum of Cultural History, 1988); Willem R. van Gulik, *Irezumi: The Pattern of Dermatography in Japan, Mededelingen van Het Rijksmuseum Voor Volkenkunde* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982).

and other symbolic combinations. The development of irezumi paralleled that of the ukiyo-e but also of urban entertainment, theatrical performances as well as the growing number of workers in the city. Most tattooists were trained ukiyo-e designers who tattood as a side job.

The earliest tattoos in the Edo period were penal tattoos, which were engraved on the bodies and faces of criminals as a punishment similar to the cases in Ming China (1368–1644). At the beginning of his reign, the first Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328-1398) regulated corporal punishments by stating that "the corporal punishments include face tattooing, body tattooing, tendon-cutting, and finger-cutting" (肉刑有墨面文身挑筋去指, 大詰).[20] The earliest Japanese record which indicated tattooing as a punishment was found in *Nihon Shoki* 日本書紀 (Prince Toneri 舍人親王, 720), according to the Japanese writer Senoo Kappa 妹尾河童.[21] In 1720, Tokugawa Yoshimune 徳川吉宗 (1684-1751) enacted the regulation of tattoo punishment 入墨刑 which buried the negative root of irezumi that connected it to the exiles, criminals and yakuza (ヤクザ, members of the Japanese organized crime syndicates). To distinguish tattooing in general from negative connotations, the term Horiomono (literally translated as things that are carved) was also used to describe the voluntary expression of body art.[22]

One remarkable factor that deeply influenced the development of large scaled tattoos as body decoration in Japan is the Chinese novel the *Water Margin* 水滸伝 (Shi Nai'an, 1589), which tells the story of a group of 108 outlaws, former criminals and social rebels who formed an army to resist the central government and were then amnestied by the government to march against foreign invaders and other rebel forces. Since the early-eighteenth century, the *Water Margin* was introduced to the Japanese public through picture books of Utagawa Kuniyoshi 歌川国芳 (1797-1861), Katsushika Hokusai 葛飾北斎 (1760-1849) and through the novels of Takebe Ayatari 建部綾足 (1719-1774) and Kyokutei Bakin 曲亭馬琴 (1767-1848). The *Keiseisuikoden* 傾城水滸伝 (Kyokutei), published between 1825 and 1835, was illustrated by Utagawa Toyokuni 歌川豐國, Utagawa Kuniyasu 歌川国安 and Utagawa Sadahide 歌川貞秀. These illustrations were made into woodblock prints, which gained phenomenal popularity[23] In the original Chinese narrative, the outlaw protagonists have tattoos that highlight their unique character traits using fierce animal symbols like dragons, tigers, leopards and Buddhist iconography such as yakshas (a broad class of nature-spirits in Buddhism who are caretakers of the natural treasures hidden in the earth and tree roots), in

[20] 範炯 Fan Jiong, 歷史的瘋狂: 嗜血的年代 (知書房出版集團, 2002), 222.
[21] 妹尾河童 Senoo Kappa, 窺看日本 Kappa Ga Nozoita Nippon, trans. 陶振孝 (台北: 遠流出版社, 2006), 101.
[22] 妹尾河童 Senoo Kappa, 窺看日本 Kappa Ga Nozoita Nippon, 101.
[23] 曲亭馬琴 Kyokutei Bakin, 傾城水滸伝 (1825-1835); 建部綾足 Takebe Ayatari, 本朝水滸伝 (1773); 歌川国芳 Utagawa Kuniyoshi, 通俗水滸伝豪傑百八人之壱人, "Popular Suikoden 108 Heroes," (woodblock prints, 1827), accessed March 30, 2017, http://www.geocities.jp/shinzogeka/SuikodenKuniyoshi.htm.

the form of coloured engravings 花繍. Most characters only have the metal stamp 金印 — the face tattoo punishment as a marker of their identity as former criminals. However, in Kuniyoshi's depictions of the 108 popular Suikoden Heroes (通俗水滸伝豪傑百八人之壱人, 1827),[24] based on his accumulated style in the samurai designs, the tattoos of the Suikoden (which is the Japanese translation of the *Water Margin*, from the original Chinese Shuihuzhuan) characters acquired a moving posture (**Figure 2**).

The enlarged and elaborated depictions of tattoos on the exposed bodies became the most eye-catching site of these pictures. Since then, Kuniyoshi's prints were used as models for tattoos in Edo Japan. After World War II, when the ban on tattooing was repealed, the tradition of using ukiyo-e as tattooing designs has been revitalised, with the promotional appraisal of irezumi as the "living ukiyo-e".[25]

FIGURE 2. Utagawa Kuniyoshi: *Tsuzoku Suikoden goketsu hyaku-hachi-nin no hitori*. Pigments on mulberry paper, ca. 1827-30.
Baltimore, Walters Art Museum.

[24] "Popular Suikoden 108 Heroes (通俗水滸伝豪傑百八人之壱人)", accessed March 30, 2017, http://www.geocities.jp/shinzogeka/SuikodenKuniyoshi.htm.

[25] 宮下 規久朗 Kikurō Miyashita, *Irezumi to nūdo no bijutsushi: Edo kara kindai e* 刺青とヌードの美術史 江戸から近代へ, NHK bukkusu 1109 (Tōkyō: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai 日本放送出版協会, 2008), 168-178; 大 貫 菜 穂 Naho Onuki, "歌川国芳 通俗水滸伝豪傑百八人之一個 におけるほりものの分析と考察 An Analysis and Consideration of Horimono : In Relation to Tsuzoku Suikoden Goketsu Hyakuhachinin No Hitori by Utagawa Kuniyoshi" 立命館大学大学院先端総合学術研究科 *Core Ethics* コア エシックス 6 (2010).

With the connotation of *Suikoden* that was similar to the one of Robin Hood, tattooing soon became part of a subculture related with resistance to authority, social rebels and noble outlaws. Originally, tattooing might have been a way to cover the appearance of criminal marks with pictorial motifs, but over time, a tattoo evolved into a popular performance of self-expression of individual pursuits and rebellious beliefs on one's own body in Ming Chinese popular fictions. This new layer of meaning and connotation of tattoos was adopted by the Japanese translation and interpretation of own interest, and was visually refined and exaggerated. At the same time, tattoos are more casual and mobile than paintings, and more intimate and permanent than any costume. Although the choice between concealing and revealing tattoos gives their bearers enough freedom for this expression of the self-made willful person, once tattooed, the intention was to keep it forever and at all time, in both public and private spheres. This character of tattooing gained special popularity among the urban lower classes. Before people from the West discovered tattooing in Japan, it had been casually practiced among prostitutes and their clients as a pledge of love,[26] among labourers and craftsmen as declarations of their physical strength, pride of occupation and alternative aesthetic opinion, and among the organised criminals as markers of their semi-underground identity. The commitment of loyalty and faithfulness to this career and to the expression of masculinity, brought courage and belief in supernatural forces.[27] These traditions of myth have been reinvented in the present in popular narratives as part of a ritual performed by the yakuza, together with finger cutting. In any case, as Yamada has argued, tattoos in Japan acquired a sense of iki (いき, roughly translated with 'chic- or stylishness', describing a specific aesthetic ideal) that is opposed to the interest of the superior samurai class, and a spirit of competition among commoners.[28] The performativity of large scaled pictorial tattoos arose with the chōnin (町人, townsmen) culture that ripened in eighteenth century's Edo Japan. In order to understand how Japanese traditional tattooing was increasingly identified with 'fine art', it is necessary to recall briefly the influence of Western art over Japanese arts and crafts in general. The gradual import of Western artistic materials, visuals and concepts of art before the Edo period, and the radical restructuring in the Meiji period not only gave birth to Yōga 洋画 (the Japanese adaption of the Western style of painting), but also led to drastic changes in Japanese painting itself which engendered Nihonga 日本画, the so-called new Japanese style of painting, which was based on traditional painting but also

[26] Gamborg, "Japanese Tattooing", 27; M. Yamada, "Westernization and Cultural Resistance in Tattooing Practices in Contemporary Japan," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 12, no. 4 (2009): 319–38.
[27] David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, *Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
[28] M. Yamada, "Westernization", 319–38.

absorbed Western painting techniques.[29] These two schools constituted the main dichotomy in the categorization of Japanese art since the Meiji period. Irezumi was considered to be a part of the Nihonga movement, since it was closely related with the Nihonga painting, especially the ukiyo-e (woodblock prints), traditional watercolor painting and religious iconography. Irezumi acquired a more vivid visual quality through the use of new colors.[30] Additionally, because of the impact of Western paintings, photography and prints, the visual style of Irezumi acquired a more sophisticated and realistic appearance marked by enriched volumes and shadow layers.[31] By the end of the 19th century, both hori – that is carving and tattooing masters in Japan – as well as their foreign clients measured the quality of tattoos through their lifelikeness, flamboyance and dynamic motions.

Danbara has pointed out several reasons why the master Hori Chiyo became especially famous among Westerners. For example, Hori learned English, managed his business well and had a market-oriented attitude. Furthermore, he also put an effort in the adaptation of new colors and designs to appeal to the preferences of foreigners.[32]

To make the situation at this historical moment clearer, it could be concluded that, the ritual performance of tattooing, which involved souvenir collecting, spiritual divination, and the demonstration of masculinity through pain-endurance and gambling with the chance of getting a disease allured sailors and adventurers with romantic pursuits to walk into the tattoo shops of Japanese ports. On the other hand, its high pictorial quality and consensus with traditional art forms of Buddhist iconography, folklore symbols, kabuki (a Japanese traditional performing art), popular literature and ukiyo-e, made Japanese tattooing charming and comparable to any fine art in the eyes of its foreign advocators among the European or American elite,[33] who were obsessed with the fashion of *Japonisme* at the time.[34]

However, the destiny of tattooing within Japan tells another story: The connotation of tattooing as both an escapement from and protest against the social rule and the ruling power resulted in its continued rise and suppression throughout the Edo and Showa periods (1603-1989) until today. In 1872, the Meiji government enacted the Decree of Tattoo Prohibition (**文身禁止令**), which lasted until 1948 when the prohibition was lifted during the US-American occupation. As part of the 'civilisation and enlightenment' campaign which enforced the change

[29] Chelsea Foxwell, *Making Modern Japanese-Style Painting: Kano Hōgai and the Search for Images* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
[30] **檀原照和** Danbara Terukazu, **レッドライト** (2012), accessed March 30, 2017, http://yokohama-now.jp/home/?p=6655.
[31] 宮下 規久朗 Kikurō Miyashita, *Irezumi to nūdo no bijutsushi: Edo kara kindai e* 『刺青とヌードの美術史 江戸から近代へ』, NHK bukkusu 1109 (Tōkyō: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai 日本放送出版協会, 2008), 182-186.
[32] **檀原照和** Danbara Terukazu, **レッドライト**.
[33] 宮下 規久朗 Kikurō Miyashita, Irezumi to nūdo no bijutsushi.
[34] *Japonisme* is a French term coined in the late nineteenth century to describe the craze for Japanese art and design in the West.

of clothing, tattooing was banned together with public baths of men and women together, the display of full public nudity as well as exposing the body from the waist upwards. According to Yamamoto, the purpose of such prohibitions was political: [T]o avoid occupation by Western countries, Japan needed to appear 'civilised'"[35] and tattooing was understood by the Japanese government as what "foreigners would regard as backwards or barbaric".[36] Moreover, the need for the "centralisation of power from a world that was divided into feudal domains to create a civilised nation" was a primary concern of the Meiji government and "ever since the opening of Japan to the world, [the government] strengthened control over the people's appearance and customs" as one means of this mission.[37] The enforced unification of physical appearances was designed to demonstrate to Western powers that the Japanese people were under firm Japanese rule, homogenising them into the Japanese Empire. These policy and attitude changes further marginalised tattooing to an even more underground status.

The Legend of Hori Chiyo

Under these circumstances, one of the most dramatic scenes in Japanese tattoo history took place: It was the myth of the legendary tattoo master Hori Chiyo. While tattooing had been pushed to a more marginal deviant status by the Japanese government as part of its pursuit to be seen as equal among the 'civilised' nations, the underground practice of tattooing still prospered in the treaty port of Yokohama, especially among Western visitors. Despite the habitual practice of tattooing among sailors and marines, Western tourists came to Yokohama and requested service of the well-known hori masters by name. During his two trips to Japan, Charles Appleton Longfellow (1844-1893), the oldest son of the American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882), firstly had a giant carp ascending a waterfall carved on his back between 1871 and 1873 and Kannon, a Buddhist deity, seated in the mouth of a dragon on his chest in 1885.[38]

[35] 山本芳美 Yamamoto, Toshimi, "文身禁止令」の成立と終焉ーイレズミからみた日本近代史," 治大学政, 政治学研究論集, 5 (1997), 93-97; 山本芳美 Yamamoto Yoshimi, イレズミの世界 Irezumi no sekai (*Tattoo: The Anthropology of Body Decoration*) (東京: 河出書房新社, 2005), accessed March 30, 2017. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/06/08/reference/whether-covered-or-brazen-tattoos-make-a-statement/#.WNFI93eZNn4.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Guth, *Longfellow's Tattoos*, 142; Julie Joy Nootbaar, "Charles Longfellow's Twenty Months in Japan: A glimpse at the Journals, Letters, and Photographs of the Poet's son, and their Significance among other Writings in our Understanding of the Euro-American experience in Meiji Japan," 大分県立芸術文化短期大学研究紀要 第52巻, 107-121, 118-119; for images see: Christine Guth, "Charles Longfellow and Okakura Kakuzo: Cultural Cross-Dressing in the Colonial Context," *East Asia Cultures Critique*, Duke University Press 8, no. 3 (2000), 618–19.

Japanese tattoos also became popular among the European aristocrats, who gained a reputation for being interested in collecting tattoos and whose tattoos were widely imitated by other travelers.[39] In the travelogue of a royal British cruise on the H.M.S. Bacchante, it was recorded that on October 27th and 28th, 1881, during their stay in Tokyo, Prince Albert Victor and Prince George (later King George V) were tattooed by two Japanese tattoo artists in the En-riô-kwan (the official guesthouse for foreign dignitaries located in Hama Palace, Tokyo) despite the princes' awareness that tattooing had been abolished by law in Japan.[40] Among the crew was Prince Louis of Battenberg, who supposedly "sported the massive tattoo of a dragon across his chest and down his legs."[41]

In his memoirs, the British tattooist George Burchett (1872-1953) attributed the tattoos of the British princes, and other naval officers of the H.M.S. Bacchante, to a certain Hori Chiyo of Yokohama. The same Hori Chiyo was described to have decorated Charles Longfellow and Czar Nicolas II of Russia.[42] He was regarded as the emperor among the kings of tattooing.[43] An advertisement of the famous curio shop Arthur & Bond's in Yokohama further confirmed the popularity of Hori Chiyo among the Western travelers with the written announcement:

> TATTOOING. Hori Chiyo - The celebrated tattooer, patronised by T.R.H. Princes Albert Victor and George, and known all over the world for his fine and artistic work, is retained by us; and designs and samples can be seen at the Tattooing Room (Arthur & Bond's, Yokohama, 1893).[44]

Writing in 1897, Bolton made the same claim that it was Hori Chiyo who tattooed the Princes and he confirmed the artistic values of Chiyo's works. He went on to describe his experience seeing Chiyo's shop: "[A] visit to Chiyo's charming bungalow on the Esplanade at Yokohama is one of those things that most travelers to that fascinating country perform almost as soon as they land." There they were welcomed by Chiyo and his pupils in excellent English. The visitors were offered a cosy environment, luxurious cushions and even cigarettes and cooled drinks.[45]

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[39] R. J. Stephen, "Tattoed Royalty, Queer Stories of a Queer Craze," in *The Harmsworth Monthly Pictorial Magazine* (1), 1898.
[40] Prince Albert Victor et al., *The Cruise of Her Majesty's Ship 'Bacchante' 1879-1882*, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1886).
[41] Hugo Vickers, *Alice: Princess Andrew of Greece* (London: Penguin, 2001).
[42] Burchett and Leighton, *Memoirs of a Tattooist*, 100-103.
[43] Dambala Tell-Kaz, "Noble Tattooe and Forgotten Tattooist," accessed March 30, 2017, https://www.scribd.com/document/109352620/Noble-Tattooee-and-Forgotten-Tattooist.
[44] "Advertisement, Arthur & Bond, Yokohama" (1893), accessed on March 30, http://925-1000.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=24259&start=20.
[45] Gambier Bolton, "Pictures in the Human Skin," *The Strand Magazine* no. 4 (1897), accessed on March 30, 2017, http://www.vanishingtattoo.com/tattoo_museum/pictures_in_the_human_skin_bolton_1897.html.

As an image of a tattoo shop in Nagasaki in the *Illustrated London News* shows, sometimes geisha performances were offered and sake was served as well.[46]

Bolton added more details to his observation of the legendary tattooing master of Japan by stating that Chiyo lost the sight of one eye due to the constant straining stare on small works required in his work.[47] The excitement of this exotic experience was enhanced by a sense of violating the local regulation – perhaps another sort of fun derived from a colonialist attitude. Bolton described Chiyo's negotiation with the Yokohama police court and how he had to state that he never tattooed any Japanese but only did his business with "foreign noblemen and millionaires"[48] since he tattooed a dragon on the Russian heirs left arm some years before. Chiyo seems to have been aware that tattooing was known abroad as one of Japan´s fine arts and claimed that "so long as he [*Chiyo, H.W.*] does not operate upon Japanese, he commits no violation of the law."[49] The police eventually closed his business and charged him with a small fine. Bolton's story became even more legendary because of his description that Chiyo was later paid by a certain Mr. Bandel to work for three years in New York for an annual salary of 2,400 pounds of gold.[50]

Another globetrotter, Charles M. Taylor, also recorded a visit to Hori Chiyo's shop in Yokohama in 1886.[51] Taylor seems to have been well informed of Chiyo's worldwide reputation, but nevertheless spent two pages describing the business card and the circular of the tattooist, which read: "patronised by H. R. H. Albert Victor and George, and having testimony of Marquises, Counts, and other particular families." This reference was followed by Chiyo´s promotional declaration: "[M]y art of tattooing has been frequently noticed in the American and European press. I had a taste of drawing from very young age."[52] Chiyo, who claimed to be a graduate of the Tokyo Fine Arts Academy, sought according to Taylor to devise new methods and innovate fresh designs to perfect the artistic effects of tattooing, seeking to distinguish himself from other tattooists because he was "not satisfied with the common crude works of the profession."[53] However, this statement did not seem to meet the Westerner´s expectations of 'authenticity'. For them, the skills of the legendary Oriental tattoo master could not be rooted in the art academy as an imported Western institution with the potential to contaminate the 'authentic Japanese'. But he tourists and writers seem to have overcome the initial desire to find an 'authentic Japanese culture', the tourists were less adven-

[46] For the image see: John Mitchell, "Loved Abroad, Hated at Home: the Art of Japanese Tattooing," Japan Times, March 3, 2014, accessed April 7, 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2014/03/03/issues/loved-abroad-hated-at-home-the-art-of-japanese-tattooing/#.WOeK12dCTIU.
[47] Bolton, "Pictures in the Human Skin."
[48] Gambier Bolton, "Pictures in the Human Skin."
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Taylor, *Vacation Days*, 146–147.
[53] Ibid.

turous and relied much more on the known. At that time, the decreasing interest in tattooing within the Japanese society itself and the fast consuming treaty port business caused a decline in quality. Regarding the fact that this business was positioned in a semi-underground status and there was barely any regulation or authority to conduct quality control, both Japanese service providers and Western tourists had to accept that the training of the newly established Academy of Arts represented at least some guarantee against charlatanry. Thereby, the old artisan system of pre-modern Japanese visual culture was replaced by a new one based on Western conceptions of fine arts.[54] In this context of well-polished advertising, Chiyo did not only regard tattoos as art and delight that should be taken with professional care, but also emphasised the precaution he took with his needles, which he promised would not be re-used. This highlighted the professional awareness of the Yokohama tattooists to use the concept of fine art for marketing among the Western consumers as well as their adapted customer-oriented professional standards as possible advantage in the competition for customers. In order to serve the demands of Western tourists better, the tattooing masters of Yokohama quickly reinvented themselves as modern professionals according to Western criteria of aesthetics, service and hygiene. These tourists were driven by popular narratives, legends and celebrity effects to chase after special holiday experiences, but were nevertheless mass consumers in a mass business.

Despite all the legendary encounters with this Japanese 'emperor of tattooists', Danbara and Koyama have revealed that Hori Chiyo was a myth based on several different anonymous figures.[55] The non-existence of Hori Chiyo demonstrates the disparity of Western expectations for an 'authentic Japan' in the Meiji period and a reality that was largely created by tourists and utilized by Japanese tattooists. In the travelogues of the Bacchante's cruise, no specific names of tattooists were mentioned. It is highly possible that the royally praised anonymous tattooists of the Far East acquired a collective name, persona and fine art standards in later popular imagination and interpretations of the Anglo-Saxon literature. Yokohama curio shops and Japanese tattooists adopted similar standards to attract Western travelers who were well informed of the Hori Chiyo legends only then. Tattooing itself changed into a commodity, well-facilitated service and hospitality which could be packed and bought as a souvenir and almost obligatory experience of the visit to the Far East. Through this 'bodyscape', tattooists carved a new dimension of Japan on the encountered bodies but also left their mark on the transformation of Japanese culture itself. Outside Japan, represented by the name Hori Chiyo, the tattoo became a cultural brand that allured visitors with its 'mysterious primitiv-

[54] Dōshin Satō, *Modern Japanese Art and the Meiji State: The Politics of Beauty* (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2011), 66–93.

[55] **檀原照和** Danbara, レッドライト; **小山 騰** Koyama Noboru, 日本の刺青と英国王室〔明治期から第一次世界大戦まで〕*Nihon No Irezumi to Eikoku Ōshitsu: Meijiki Kara Daiichiji Sekai Taisen Made, Shohan* (Tōkyō: **藤原書店** Fujiwara Shoten, 2010).

ism and barbarism'. Interestingly, this Western myth eventually traveled back to the tattoo-banned Japan. In 1924, the writer Ikuma Arishima 有島生馬 wrote a novel *Hori Chiyo*彫千代which was published in the Japanese magazine *Women World* 婦人世界, with the illustration of Chiyo as an existing person.[56]

As noted by Guth, Japanese tattoos are polysemic:[57] The aesthetic values of the Japanese context – the connotations of daring, strength, and virility – can still be read even when they are displayed and given new meanings on American and European bodies. Through these bodies, certain aesthetic spirits travelled across national boundaries, as piece of Japan and markers of trips to the country. It was to perform these heroic fantasies that Longfellow and others adopted Japanese tattoos.[58] The motivations behind tattooing remain various and complex, no matter what the specific meanings and ideals are that have been transmitted through the 'bodyscape'. These ideals and meanings of tattooed bodies transcend different cultural contexts of various backgrounds, classes, races, and occupations.

The Body Costumed

The photography studios of nineteenth century-Yokohama were an imported business as well, started by foreign photographers who came to settle and later taken over and mastered by their Japanese apprentices. Among the many commercial photographers who came to Yokohama in search for new market appeal after the opening of the port in 1859 was Felice Beato (1832-1909) who became prominent in Yokohama. Before he came to Japan in 1863, Beato had already established a reputation as professional photographer noted for his works on Crimea, in India and China in the fields of war, portrait, architecture and landscape photography. Together with Charles Wirgman (1832-1891), the cartoonist and illustrator of *Japan Punch* and *Illustrated London News*, he formed Beato & Wirgman, Artists and Photographers in 1864.[59] This was one of the very first commercial studios in Japan, and Beato himself soon became the most renowned entrepreneur of the Yokohama souvenir photography industry. His products, which included studio-based scenes and elegantly hand-processed colors and portrayed Japanese people in their traditional costumes, were purchased and circulated around the world by naval officers, diplomats and travelers, but also by his working partners and clients in the printing industry who reproduced these motifs in their illustrations and lithographs.[60] These portraits of costumed people and genre scenes were such a popular commodity in Yokohama that Beato had a separate category of *costume*

[56] 檀原照和 Danbara, レッドライト.
[57] Guth, *Longfellow's Tattoos,* 158.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Alona C. Wilson, "Felice Beato's Japan: People – An Album by the pioneer Foreign Photographer in Yokohama." , accessed March 30, 2017, https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/beato_people/fb2_essay03.html.
[60] Gartlan, "Types or Costumes?" 239–63.

on his price-list by the mid-1860s. Beato's offer of costumes was adopted by both Western and Japanese photographers in Yokohama and costume portraits became such an attraction that advertisements of Yokohama photographers were found in many English language newspapers and guidebooks.[61] Gartlan has argued that the interest toward costume photography moved beyond mere touristic pleasure to the extent that the popularity of images of costumed local people was driven by "an amateur enthusiasm for ethnography" in an "era obsessed with the classification of humanity".[62]

Foreign visitors did not only purchase images of Japanese people in their traditional costume, they also put themselves in these costumes to cross the boundaries of "ethnographic classification".[63] As suggested by Guth, it was a common practice for Yokohama photography studios to have Japanese traditional costumes and genre background screens and scene sets for the selection by Western clients to have themselves pictured with such performed identities of their choice.[64] During his trip to Japan between 1871 and 1873, Charles Longfellow sent home a portrait of himself guised in a full-set Japanese samurai outfit, accompanied by the following message: "I send you the photo of a gentleman of Kioto, who I met several times in the streets, particularly in the evening".[65] Other souvenir photos of Yokohama trips of Western tourists in the treaty port period also include pictures of them in Japanese traditional costumes (**Figure 3**).

FIGURE 3. K. Yamamura, Cabinet card, Yokohama, ca. 1870.
Montreal: Personal Collection of John Toohey.

[61] Gartlan, "Types or Costumes?" 239–63.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Guth, "Charles Longfellow and Okakura Kakuzo," 605–36.
[65] Charles Appleton Longfellow and Christine Wallace Laidlaw, *Charles Appleton Longfellow: Twenty Months in Japan, 1871-1873* (Cambridge, Mass: Friends of the Longfellow House, 1998).

The motivation and psychology behind these performances of disguise were not only intended to commemorate a trip to the Far East, as the temporal escape from the bourgeois society at home, but also the playfulness of an outsider's pretension to be a cultural insider. The pleasure was dependent on the immediately recognizable ethnicity as well as to the items used to represent the Japanese environment. Through this staged performance, the Western stranger claimed his access and thereby his dominance over Japanese culture – a common practice in the colonial world based on asymmetries in relationship. Dressed in Japanese traditional costume made of silk and chintz, sitting in a Japanese family setting – where females, mostly missing from the public spheres, would be approachable in the tourists´ imagination of the pre-modern Eastern world – the whole scene acquired a softened female implication that was different from the male community of treaty port expatriates and business travelers. Although Japan was never de-facto colonized, the ethnical and cultural gap and hierarchy between Japanese and Europeans or Americans was pervasive due to the colonial situation in large parts of East and South Asia. This is especially true among the colonial officers and soldiers who rotated from post to post in all of East and Southeast Asia.[66] In a less critical sense, it seemed important to show the capability to afford the means required for long distance travel from Europe or North America to Japan.

In a few cases, such as Longfellow´s, the engagement with Japan through costumes was more complex than the short-term touristic visit and involved an aesthetic belief in cultural authenticity – the 'authentic and true' Japanese culture as it was perceived as not contaminated by the influence of the West. Through dressing-up in Japanese traditional costumes and being tattooed in Japanese traditional style, Longfellow recognized himself as a cultural preserver and informed expert. This sentiment and belief was shared by other intellectual figures of the same time, including Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1908)[67] and Okakura Kakuzo (岡倉覚三 1862-1913).[68] By comparing Longfellow's and Okakura's cross-dressed portraits, Guth has drawn the conclusion that they represented an alternative consumerism that sought expression of re-invented artistic alter-egos, essentially a pursuit for a "personal transformation in the form of a de-ethnicized, transcultural identity."[69] In this 'bodyscape', they became agents and practitioners of their own artistic and humanistic cultural beliefs beyond racial and national boundaries.

[66] The operating area of the China Station of the British Royal Navy included for example China, Japan, Korea, and large parts of the Northwestern Pacific coastline and Southeast Asia, see: "Map of Foreign Stations", accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-3909-04RN.htm#4.2.

[67] Ernest Fenollosa was an American collector of Japanese artefacts who participated in the establishment of the discipline of Japanese art history, altering the concept of traditional cultural objects into examples of fine art.

[68] Okakura Kakuzo was famous for his activities in the representation of Japanese and Asian art and culture in the Western world; Okakura Kakuzo, *The Book of Tea* (TRutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle, 1956).

[69] Guth, "Charles Longfellow and Okakura Kakuzo," 605–36.

This sense of cultural authenticity was also found among the mass tourists of late-nineteenth century Yokohama, who deplored the nascent institutions of industrial modern society and the mimicry of Western civilization and praised instead Japanese 'aboriginality' absent in their own society. In order to support the view that the touristic experience in Yokohama was 'missing real Japan', a Welsh tourist's travelogue may be cited:

> It seemed very strange to be suddenly surrounded by Japanese, and I could not help feeling sorry that so many had donned our ugly and unbecoming garments; but it was glorious fun being beset by real jinricksha men in real Japanese costume (little of it though there was), and being crushed upon by real jinrickshas, which looked like leggy Bath-chairs.[70]

As they were disappointed by the absence of an 'authentic' Japan that was supposed to be performed by local Japanese people, Western visitors dressed themselves up in dramatic, starched Kamishimo (裃, the set of clothes consisting of the Kataginu, the sleeveless top and Hakama, worn by Samurai and courtiers during the Edo period) and Hakama (袴, clothes similar to loose trousers, secured by straps). In doing so, they performed as the Samurai of tales which served as the source for their imagination of 'authentic' Japan.

Another type of Western 'performers' in Japanese costumes were the long-term Western settlers in the treaty ports of East Asia who distinguished themselves from the temporal visitors and tourists by calling the latter "globetrotters".[71] The assumed diminished quality of the touristic experience in 'culturally impure' treaty ports drove some long-term settlers and so-called 'experts' like Longfellow to dress themselves up in Japanese traditional garments and accessories, to participate in activities such as kabuki shows, tea ceremonies, calligraphy writing and Buddhist practices.[72]

They were obsessed with Far Eastern culture and occupied with 'more serious missions',rather than leisure seeking, and did not regard Japan as merely one of the many stops during their *grand tour* around the world.[73] These acts were meant to display an international humanistic pride, based on their closer intimacy and deeper engagement with the Japanese culture with the goal to understand the philosophy of the East and to appreciate its arts. Their dressing acts were supposed to

[70] Sydney Henry Jones-Parry, *My Journey Round the World* (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1881), accessed March 30, 2017, https://archive.org/details/myjourneyroundw01parrgoog, 280; Wakita, "Sites of Disconnectedness," 98.

[71] William Elliot Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1890), 339, accessed March 30, 2017, https://archive.org/stream/mikadosempire00grifrich#page/n5/mode/2up.

[72] For images see: Guth, "Charles Longfellow and Okakura Kakuzo," 615-16.

[73] In the case of Longfellow, for example, he was part of an exploratory expedition into the inner Japanese land organized by the American consul; and Ernest Fenollosa was invited to teach at the Imperial University of Tokyo.

express an intellectual connectedness beyond the momentary performance which money could buy. However, this idea of 'essential Japaneseness' attached to pre-modern costumes was not shared by the Japanese government and the wider public. As part of the modernisation reforms, Japanese people were required to shed their traditional clothes and change into modern Western ones. In 1871, Emperor Meiji issued a proclamation stating the adoption of European uniforms for himself and his court officials, followed by the military and the police.[74] This action was intended to transform the appearance of the country through a top-down policy, but eventually it had only a limited effect on urban port towns and uniformed professionals and elites.[75] The choice of Western costumes was related with the imported modern concepts of comfort, health, and convenience, even morality.[76] Emperor Meiji's European military uniform (**Figure 4**) represented a political intention seeking to revert the impression of a pre-modern, soft and effeminate backwardness into a modern, assertive, militant and masculine progression.[77]



FIGURE 4. Uchida Kuichi: Portrait of the Emperor Meiji. Photograph, 1873. The Cleveland Museum of Art.

[74] Toby Slade, *Japanese Fashion: A Cultural History* (New York: Berg, 2009), 54-55.
[75] Elizabeth Kramer, "'Not So Japan-Easy': The British Reception of Japanese Dress in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Textile History* 44, no. 1 (2013): 3–24.
[76] Ibid.;福沢諭吉 Fukuzawa Yukichi, "Seiyō Ishokujū 西洋衣食住," 福沢全集, 5 2 (東京: 時事新報社. 国立国会図書館, 1898), accessed March, 30 2017, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/898728/17.
[77] Elizabeth Ives, "The Body Politic: Victorian Fashions as Agents of Social and Political Change in Meiji Japan," accessed March 30, 2017, https://afashionableexcuse.wordpress.com/articles-and-papers/the-body-politic-victorian-fashions-as-agents-of-social-and-political-change-in-meiji-japan/.

After his experience of being viewed as an 'exotic spectacle' during his travels to the West as part of Japanese delegations, Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉 1835-1910) proposed wearing European-style clothing as an essential component of presenting Japan as equal to the 'civilised' nations of the West.[78] In 1867, he published a guidebook entitled Seiyo ishokuju (西洋衣食住 *Western Clothing, Food and Homes*),[79] in which he provided the Japanese public with illustrated introductions of Western costumes and accessories. Photos produced in Yokohama´s commercial studios commissioned by local Japanese clients also included Western accessories such as pocket watches – one of the most popular accessories among the Japanese in the treaty ports.[80] The pocket watch was also found in Fukuzawa's guidebook, together with a detailed explanation of the Western division of time into days, hours, minutes and its relatedness with the face of the watch. Fukuzawa commented that "in the West, they know the time not by the boom of a temple bell but by a watch they always bring with them. Recently, it is getting popular that people here wear the foreign-made watch. Sometimes they do not know how to read it."[81] It could be assumed that, instead of a practical function, pocket watches carried by Yokohama Japanese performed a cultural function as markers of their treaty port identity, their superiority and endorsement of Westernisation and modernisation. In contrast to the Westerners who walked passed them on the docks, the treaty port was not a temporary escapement for the Japanese, but a frontier to meet the world beyond their familiar islands. The port was a transitional space where Western developments could be observed that seemed to defeat the grand East. In the treaty ports, not only the fantastic instrument of the watch, the stiff uniforms and laced dresses were adopted, but also the sense of a globally uniformed measure of time as well as a uniformed space for business, trading and modern politics. New ways of life gradually replaced the past. Japanese people who lived and worked in the treaty ports became the first ones to taste the new fashions, and naturally became agents to introduce the new fashions, products, and ideals to the whole country. The treaty port itself served as a third space, a space of contact between Japan and the Western world: It was shaped by desires on both sides, as the suited Japanese saw off the kimonoed foreigners.

The Western response to this costume change in Japan, besides the disappointment of tourists, problematized the issue of 'fitness': Western media argued that Western costumes did not suit the Japanese body and mocked Japanese dressed in ill-fitting Western costumes or the failure to correctly produce these clothes. A sense of irritation and claim to one´s own authenticity was presented in these

[78] Yukichi Fukuzawa, Eiichi Kiyooka, and Carmen Blacker, *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
[79] 福沢諭吉 Fukuzawa, "Seiyō Ishokujū 西洋衣食住."
[80] Kramer, "Not So Japan-Easy," 3–24.
[81] 福沢諭吉 Fukuzawa, "Seiyō Ishokujū 西洋衣食住"; Olive Checkland, *Japan and Britain after 1859: Creating Cultural Bridges* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 11.

mockeries, which regarded the Japanese adoption as clumsy mimicry. In any case, costumes did play a central role in the performances of identity and its mutual recognition, ideological pursuit and cultural authentication.

Conclusion: the Bodyscape of Culture Flow

The costumed and tattooed bodies acquired plural meanings under the circumstances of crossing cultural boundaries. Dressing up and tattooing practiced among residents and travelers from Europe and America in Japan was an expression of various motivations and interests playing a role in cultural encounters within the 19th century treaty port system. On both, collective and individual levels it represented preferences and concepts of what was modern, suitable, authentic and beautiful. Since the beginning of the treaty port era, Japan had striven for modernisation along a Western model. Reform led to drastic changes in all aspects of daily life, the Western costume was adopted as a sign of a modern centralised state and as a civilised practice putting Japan on the same level as Western empires. This assumed imitation irritated the Western sense of authenticity and disrupted the Western ideal regarding the national and cultural identity of Japan. Such attitudes were represented in Western writings that stated the unfitness and clumsiness of Japanese in Western costumes and criticised Japan's continuous declining cultural value.[82]

At the same time, with its connotation of barbarism, individual heroism and resistance to the central ruling power, tattooing was officially prohibited by the Meiji government, but left to an underground existence through the patronage of foreign travelers in the treaty port cities. This resulted in a contradictory picture in the West where images and descriptions of Japanese costumes and tattoos in the forms of photographies, illustrations, travelogues, and works of fiction constructed a popular, but illusionary concept of 'authentic Japan'. Such impressions not only generated a fascination for Japanese culture in the Western world, but also attracted international tourists to land in Yokohama - who were then soon disappointed by the Westernised 'inauthentic' appearance of this port city.

It is improper to press the discourses of costume and tattoo into a single narrative and ignore its plural meanings for different groups and individuals, even among the Western travelers who had a multitude of different reasons for dressing up and being tattooed in traditional Japanese styles. For most temporal visitors, leisure travellers and the so-called globetrotters, the kind of service provided, in commercial photography studios, curio shops and tattoo studios in the treaty ports was a fast consumable touristic experience compensating for a missing 'old Japan', that was artificially reconstructed for the desired self-performance of a domesticated 'Orient'. The stereotyped tourist gaze was stabilised and authorised by

[82] Kramer, "Not So Japan-Easy," 3–24.

the development of mass tourism, the grown profit of the market, the publication and circulation of travelogues, guidebooks and souvenir photographs exported in large numbers as new 'documentation' and 'evidence' for ethnographic analysis.[83] In other cases, like those of Hori Chiyo, Japanese tattoos gained metaphysical relatedness with modern concepts of culture and aesthetics, as well as Japanese tattooing became a part of the world's visual art history. Still, it remains questionable if the practitioners themselves were conscious of the power asymmetry involved that was later criticised in the postcolonial framework. It seems that the Yokohama tourism industry in the 19th century, led to the adaptation of products and services by Western and local Japanese service providers according to the Western-oriented idealized imagination of Japan, appealing to the demand of the market. For the cases of other visitors, like Charles Longfellow, Guth has pointed out that the portraits in Japanese costumes and tattoos suggested that "dressing up and down was a kind of performance through which [they] sought to negotiate [their] masculine identity."[84] Such individual aesthetic value was out of the framework of colonialism, but suggests that travelling (to Japan) in the 1870s could have been tied to a new culture of individualism and hedonistic adventure. Dressed in kabuki costumes and carved with Japanese tattoos, Longfellow also intend to display a deeper understanding and closer intimacy with this culture beyond a superficial tourist gaze.

The treaty port era was also the period when a certain idea of Japanese cultural authenticity was being established within and outside Japan. Through the described 'bodyscape', dressing-up, costumed photographs and tattoos Westerners performed a 'Japaneseness' that shaped components and representations of modern Japanese culture and its conceptualization of the past. On the other side, the Japanese took the human body as one of the frontiers to strive for modernization and global civilization. The two conflicting flows encountered and coexisted in the nineteenth century Treaty Port and formed its unique scenery, from where the 'ancient Orient' started its journey into the age of modernization and globalization, marked by the struggles over a binary understanding of the West and the East, modernity and tradition, looking for a distinctive path into the future.

[83] Gartlan, "Types or Costumes?," 239–63.
[84] Guth, *Longfellow's Tattoos*, 158.

Contending Sovereigns, Contentious Spaces: Illicit Migration and Urban Governance in the Late Ottoman Empire

HATICE AYSE POLAT

Ayse Polat is a first year PhD student at the History Faculty at the University of Cambridge. She holds a BA in Political Science and Sociology (Double Major) from the University of Bogazici in Istanbul. Her dissertation inquires into the networks of illicit migration - i.e. 'people smuggling', 'white slave trade', 'human trafficking' - engendered by non-elite migration into and through Beirut and Alexandria in late 19th century. She intends to account for the transformation of labour regimes - in domestic, manual, and sex work – in fin de siècle Eastern Mediterranean, within which both the middlemen and the migrants were embedded.

The spatial turn in social sciences have aptly demonstrated that the economic globalisation of the 19th century and the global spread of modern statecraft had happened through, rather than to the people who had begun to move *en masse*. With an epochal rise in the circulation of people, objects and practices during the late 19th century, the imperial powers that inhabited the eastern Mediterranean would begin to deploy a variety of spatial techniques on vagabonds, prostitutes, and orphans at the face of their penetration into the city. The new underclass of les *Échelles du Levant* had transformed their adopted cities, for having provoked the imperial statesmen to adopt modern techniques of urban governance in regulating their circulation within and without the Ottoman Empire. In this research paper, I will present the Ottoman Empire's interventions into the global economy of sex work, of which *fin-de-siècle* Istanbul had become a nodal city. The administrative practices surrounding the - categorically migrant - body of the prostitute went into circulation after and owing to the way their trans-regional migration and trans-local connections transformed the urban landscape. I shall try to demonstrate how the imperial state tried to intervene and control their illicit circulation on two levels, within the spatial politics of urban governance (1) and through the imperial contestations in the field of international law (2). Corroborating the heterogeneity of the coloniser and the colonised, there is an evident affinity between the scope of such transnational historiography and the aspirations of postcolonial theory. I aim to situate my subject of research accordingly, to show how the colonial and imperial statesmen cohered together at the face of an increasingly mobile and heterogeneous world of women.

Introduction

An official decree in the year of 1789, proclaimed in the name of Abdulhamit I, had addressed the occasion in which a couple of marines[1], were caught in their

[1] Their position in the chain of command was of the lowest order similar to that of a Private (Pvt). They were called *Kalyoncu* – the main corps of Galleon ships that comprised the Ottoman fleet before the advent of the steam ship.

lodgings with prostitutes. They were inhabiting the 'bachelor's inns' along the *Balaban* port of Constantinople, which was to act as a public provision for single men (predominantly migrants and singularly lower-class) who were carrying a travelling permit for *tezkire*[2], but were not deemed trustworthy enough to inhabit the same spaces as those of respectable residents of *mahalles*.[3] Such quarters were deemed to be disreputable spaces by the Sublime Porte[4], as the breeding ground of "vices" and "delinquency" threatening the public order and the respectable and/or long-term residents of the capital.[5] A dalliance with the prostitutes was then considered as an "act of indecency" meriting the Porte's punishment - that of the immediate installation of the marines to their assigned barracks.[6]

The edict that ruled for the spatial re-arrangement of the marines reflected two concerns: about where does illicit sex take place, and with whom. The very location of the "indecent act", the bachelors' quarters, were by their nature the domain of the sovereign, as they did not have the same respectability and protection ascribed to that of the patriarchal space of *maḥrem* (i.e. the familial, intimate space). What went on in their quarters was a matter of *public* indecency, and as such comprised an urban frontier where the police could regularly, and arbitrarily, evict and punish the residents.[7] While the vagabonds and prostitutes of Constantinople were routinely subjected to exile during that pivotal year of 1789[8], the *re*-location of the marines to their barracks reflected the difference of their relation to the seat of the sovereign. With the military reformation of the Ottoman Empire on the horizon, the sexual health and productivity of the ordinary soldier and sailor was becoming a central concern for all the governors and bureaucrats of the Empire.[9]

Throughout the following century, the Sublime Porte would continue to employ a variety of spatial practices in re-settling the vagabonds, prostitutes, and orphans as they "invaded" the Ottoman capital. With an exceptional rise in the circulation of people during the late 19th century, the Porte could no longer simply exile or deny entrance to migrants coming from the east or west of Constantinople. The new underclass of *les Échelles du Levant*[10] were to transform their adopted cities,

[2] Internal passports.
[3] Smallest administrative/residential unit in the imperial capital by the turn of 19th century; was organized on the basis of a network crosscutting sectarian and professional differences.
[4] The seat of the Sovereign, and the center of Ottoman government – the usage is similar to that of *Westminster* to denote the British government.
[5] Isil Cokugras, "Osmanlı İstanbul'unda Bekâr Odaları," *Mimarist* 47 (2013), 29-35.
[6] BOA, HAT, 19/911, 1203/Z/29.
[7] Nicholas K Blomley, *Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property* (New York: Routledge. 2004).
[8] BOA, HAT, 11/431, 29/Z/1202; BOA, HAT, 189/9014, 29/Z/1203.
[9] On the historical connections between the army and state-making in 19th century Ottoman Middle East, see Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), 78-90.
[10] The ports of call across the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the early Modern period, the Ottoman Empire had granted certain juridical and economic entitlements - capitulations – to first the French and then nearly all European subjects. For the transformation of Ottoman capitulary privileges into tools of imperial expansion and financial gain, see Turan Kayaoğlu,

by provoking the Sublime Porte to adopt modern techniques of governance to regulate their circulation within and without the Empire.[11] The migration which could not be prevented was to be monopolized.

In the following paper, I will present the Porte's attempts at monopolizing the global economy of sex work with a specific focus on fin de siècle Istanbul. I will make my arguments based on the juxtaposition of two documents; an imperial decree of Abdulhamit II justifying his policing of (non-Muslim) women, to a petition sent to the Ministry of Police asking for the re-patriation of a Muslim prostitute. I will demonstrate how the imperial state tried to control and intervene into the illicit circulation of women, within the jurisdictional domain of urban governance vis-à-vis that of nascent domain of international law[12], as its territorial claims to national jurisdiction was challenged by the increasing number of migrant subjects.[13] I will also attempt to explain how the recognition of Ottoman Sovereignty during the 19th century was affected and shaped by the cultural and legal confrontations that took place through its migrant subjects.

Historiography of Migration and the Empire

Within the legal framework of the *tanẓimāt* reforms, the Ottoman Empire had to assert its rule over its trespassing subjects – in the making of a liberal-imperial

Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

[11] Regarding the structural changes to predominant social and political institutions, I use the concept of modernization in a Weberian sense, as denoting the twin processes of rationalization and differentiation in social organizations. Modernization of the Ottoman state as such entails the reformation of governmental structures, and the rationalization of legal and administrative institutions. Regarding the micro-practices adopted by the Empire, I ascribe the adjective "modern" to any administrative practices or policies that operate on the basis of what Foucault calls the principles of normalization; to individualize, categorize, and discipline the subject (Rabinow, 18-20). Both Weberian and Foucauldian analyses of modernity have in common a shared concern for the role of "modern rationality", on the formation of *social organizations* and *subjectivity* (Rabinow, 27). As such, I consider Weber the authority on the analyses of the former, and Foucault of the latter, see: Paul Rabinow, "Introduction" in *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, ed. by Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 1991)

[12] Taking after Benton (2002), I define the field of international law as operating on the basis of (1) mutual recognition among states of one other's sovereignty, through which (2)law and legality helped to "tie disparate parts of empires and to lay the basis for exchanges… between politically and culturally separate imperial and colonial powers"(2). I have to add that Benton's definition of what constitutes political recognition and cultural exchange is of much wider in scope. For the purposes of this research, I will focus on the recognition of "sovereign will" as the basis on which the tradition of "positivist jurisprudence…reconstructed international law" in the 19th century, see: Anton Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 33.

[13] Nora Lafi, "Mediterranean Connections: The Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices at the Time of the Ottoman Reforms, c. 1830-1910." in *Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000*, ed. P. Saunier (Luxemburg: Springer. 2007).

state.[14] I intend look at the adoption of legal-administrative techniques targeting the illicit migration of women into the imperial capital and within the imperial frontier.[15] Through the exploration of the gendered practices shaping the history of modern human trafficking, I will demonstrate how the economic globalization of the 19th century and the universalization of international law[16] occurred *through* -rather than *to*- the people who had begun to move *en masse* across the globe.[17]

I will be relying on Torpey's recent uptake on the definition of a modern state, as having a "monopoly over the legitimate means of movement".[18] The processes of state making in the Ottoman Empire were contingent on the challenge posed by unprecedented levels of migration into the peripheries of the European capitalist system, which had vitalized the port cities of Levant and turned them into sites of encounters and contestations between a number of imperial contenders.[19] Using the perspective of the "diasporic" experiences of 19th century globalization[20] offers much to understand the workings and emergence of both spatial and discursive governance on a global scale. It helps us to capture the travails and tactics[21] of the migrants that began populating the Ottoman cities, and to see how the contentious politics of urban space could cause imperial contestations in the international arena.

[14] Ruth Austin Miller, *Legislating Authority: Sin and Crime in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

[15] I rely on Blomley's (2003) conception of the term 'frontier', who's figurative, temporal or spatial inscription is essential to the constitution of modern law. Frontier is to denote a space where "law's violence" is distinguished from the "violent world of non-law" (124), see: Nicholas Blomley, "Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 93 (1) (2003): 121–41.

[16] Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and International Law*, 32.

[17] Michael Samers, "The Socio-Territoriality of Cities: A Framework for Understanding the Incorporation of Migrants in Urban Labor Markets," in *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants*, ed. Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Simsek-Caglar. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 7.

[18] John Torpey, "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate 'Means of Movement'," *Sociological Theory* 16 (3) (1998), doi:10.1111/0735-2751.00055, 239-40.

[19] Melanie Fessel, "The Extraterritoriality Nexus: Manifestation of Extraterritoriality as Natural Phenomenon in Urban Context." *Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development* 9 (2012), 123–31; Malte Fuhrmann, "'I Would Rather Be in the Orient': European Lower Class Immigrants into the Ottoman Lands," in *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, ed. Ulrike Freitag and Malte Fuhrmann (London: Routledge, 2011), 228-241.

[20] Andrew Arsan at al. "Editorial Foreword: On Forgotten Shores: Migration in Middle Eastern Studies, and Middle East in Migration Studies", *Mashriq & Mahjar: Journal of Middle East Migration Studies,* 1 (2013), 1-7, 5.

[21] Grallert, "To Whom Belong the Streets," 328. Grallert relies on a distinction made by Lefebvre (1974), between the *strategies* of the ruling strata that produce urban space and that of the *tactics* of subaltern classes to reclaim their own place within the city. Grallert places contention and confrontation at the heart of the modern Ottoman city, and I aim to show both the global and local scope of these confrontations.

On the one hand, the rationale of urban governance oversaw the objectification of the *fāḥişe*[22] discursively (1) as belonging to a distinct profession, and spatially (2) by her social exclusion in the state controlled brothel, hospital and even within the factory.[23] A *fāḥişe* was to be distinct from the domestic slave, the entertainer, or the chanteuse.[24] The discursive differentiation of sex work resulted in estrangement: segregation of the said women from the variety of urban spaces they had hitherto inhabited. The circulation of the Napoleonic registration system, the "normalization" of the brothel as the only site for sexual transactions and the state monopolization of sex workers had all shaped the spatial and gendered regulation of sex work in the global cities of 19th century.[25] However, the very heterogeneity of sex workers – in terms of their ethnic, religious or geographic belongings – politicized the criminalization of sex workers within the port cities of the Ottoman Empire. That was where a number of sovereign states could stake their claim on the said women, based on the extraterritorial privileges accorded to each imperial power. As subjects of international private law, they became a point of contention between contesting imperial sovereigns.

On the other hand, the imperial politics of state making oversaw the *subjectification* of women, whose moral standing and free will had become a cause for diplomatic controversy as well as a conduit for identity-making.[26] In what comprised the urban frontiers of the Ottoman state, a sex worker was on par with the vagabond and the orphan as a threat to public order and morality, *regardless* of whether she freely chose to sell her body or not. On the other hand, this prostitute/slave now comprised the ever-expanding imperial frontier from the Americas to India as a potential protégée of the state.[27] Whether or not the sex worker "will-

[22] A female sex worker. The term used in the legal documents to denote women engaged in illegal sexual intercourse, *fuḥş,* regardless of whether it is in exchange of money, goods, of favors. I use the term interchangeably with the English term, *Prostitute*, as they are both charged with moral and legal connotations.

[23] Yavuz Selim Karakisla, "Arşivden Bir Belge(49): Yoksulluktan Fuhuş Yapanların Islahı (1910): Askeri Dikimevlerinde İşeAlınan Müslüman Fahişeler," in *Toplumsal Tarih* 10 (2003): 98-101, 98-101.

[24] Gail Hershatter, *Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Shanghai* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 116.

[25] Laura Briggs, *Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); on how such "forms of institutionalization" work to objectify the subject see: Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8 (4) (1982): 777–95, 792.

[26] Ibid., 780-1. Foucault analyses the processes of subjectification through how the subject is made to speak, to affirm, and acknowledge the "law of truth" that is imposed upon her. What I mean by the subjectification of a Prostitute is how she is made to conform to the moral limitations of a legal, individualistic discourse within which she can only 'speak' as a victim, or as a delinquent. With regards to how her labour is disciplined and her body objectified by the (1) institutionalization of the brothel, (2) medical knowledge and regulations produced on venereal diseases, I rely on Foucault's analyses of modern techniques of governance, more specifically that of spatial containment and scientific knowledge.

[27] Regarding the scope of these illicit networks, I have relied on the archives of the Ministry of Public Order (Zabtiye Nazareti) and Interior Affairs (Dahiliye Nazareti). On the North Af-

ingly" sold her body could mark the extent to which she was objectified by the juridical-medical policies of her country of reception[28], and whether she would be subjectified as a protégée and representative of her country of origin.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction, initially a tool of extending imperial influence[29], also gave leverage to the migrant women of the Mediterranean to help them navigate their way in and out of their illicit networks. In inhabiting these "jurisdictional borderlands" – i.e. the port cities of Ottoman Empire -, urban migrants were uniquely situated as "legal chameleons" who could profit from the legal and moral contentions existing within a system of legal pluralism.[30] They could claim subjecthood and protection from more than one entity – e.g. the British, the French, or the Ottoman Empire itself. The prostitute could -ideally- navigate her way in and out of her trade, by engaging with the moral and legal discourses that either saw her as an "innocent victim" or a "dangerous dreg".[31] Her success depended on whether or how well she played the imperial hierarchies and moral contentions between her country of origin and reception.[32]

The history of the global economy of sex work is important to account for the transformation of gendered forms of labour throughout the period of state-making and of imperial expansion at the turn of the century. Governmental practices such as the registration system for prostitutes, normalization of the brothel, and the concurrent "war on pimps" had perfected the art of "colonial regulation of sex", whose global spread was instigated by the British Empire and the desire of imperial expansion.[33] The women of the Ottoman world experienced the implementation of such colonial practices in the anxieties surrounding willing or forced sex work. The actions taken against the illicit migration of women – as slaves, concubines, or as prostitutes and entertainers - essentially brought about the "international traffic in prostitution policy", which had effectively become a lesson in

rican – South Asian connections, see: BOA, ZB. 603/84, 1325/H/3. On the Latin American connection, see: BOA, ZB. 407/84, 1318/Ke/1, BOA, DH.MKT, 831/45, 1322/M/1.

[28] Ziad Fahmy, "Jurisdictional Borderlands: Extraterritoriality and 'Legal Chameleons' in Precolonial Alexandria, 1840–1870," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 55 (2) (2013), doi: 10.1017/S0010417513000042, 77-80.

[29] Turan Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[30] Sakis Gekas, "Colonial Migrants and the Making of a British Mediterranean," *European Review of History* 19 (2012), doi:10.1080/13507486.2012.643611, 305-7.

[31] Malte Fuhrmann, "'Western Perversions' at the Threshold of Felicity: The European Prostitutes of Galata-Pera (1870–1915)," *History and Anthropology* 21 (2) (2010), doi: 10.1080/02757201003796617, 159-172. Francesca Biancani, "International Migration and Sex Work in Early Twentieth Century Cairo," in *A Global Middle East: Mobility, Materiality and Culture in the Modern Age, 1880-1940*, ed. by Liat Kozma, Cyrus Schayegh, and Avner Wishnitzer (London: Tauris, 2015): 109–33; Patricia O'Brian, "Michel Foucault's History of Culture." in *The New Cultural History: Essays*, ed. Aletta Biersack and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 111.

[32] Fuhrmann, "I Would Rather Be in the Orient."

[33] Briggs, *Reproducing Empire,* 23; Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

"running a modern empire"[34]. I aspire to show that this was a reciprocal learning process, where the colonial agents of Britain or France were peers and partners with the Ottoman statesmen.

Contentious Spaces: Policing the Urban Front

In the urban frontiers of early modern Constantinople; the bachelors' inns, the coffeehouses, and spaces of public entertainment comprised an urban frontier which was routinely encroached upon by the local authorities to reinstate order and protect the honour of the capital's citizens. What was at stake was the prevention of their intrusion into the *mahalles*, of urban networks comprising the established and respectable inhabitants of Constantinople.[35] The denizens of the imperial capital, on the other hand, could easily be subjected to the punishment of exile lest they were found without a *tezkire*, or were found to be disrupting the order, as in causing havoc or dallying with a prostitute in public. The differentiation of migration within and without the capital was thus gendered and class-based[36], as the ideological stance of the Empire was based on a particular conception of justice in maintaining order and protecting the sexual honour of its deserving subjects.[37] As denoting illicit, unlawful intercourse, *fuḥş,* was thus a trope in maintaining the public order, generally punished along the lines of exile on the part of the *customer*. The disciplinary practices regarding this old *fuḥş* was thus a far cry from its subsequently feminized and spatialized form.

As the state began its project of reforming its governing structures and modernizing its administrative practices[38], the Porte's disregard for the urban underclass was to change. The demographics of urban migration had overwhelmed the capi-

[34] Briggs, *Reproducing Empire,* 22.

[35] I rely on a description made by Cem Behar in a podcast interview from the Ottoman History Podcast collective (2014), and conceptualize *mahalle* as a social network, whose form is that of a self-regulating, relatively self-sufficient residential community. It is important to note that 19th century *mahalle* was the embodiment of a respectable, urban community – which policed its own residents, rather than relying on the state to enforce order and security. Police intrusion and interference on the lives of *mahalle* residents was few and far in between, and was contingent on the demand of the *mahalle* preacher or chief – i.e. the *imām* and the *muḫtar*, see: Cem Behar, *Bir İstanbul Mahallesinin Doğumu ve Ölümü (1494-2008)* (Georgetown University: Ottoman History Podcast, 2014), 167, accessed November 26, 2016, http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2014/07/bir-mahallenin-dogumu-ve-olumu-1494.html.

[36] Christoph Herzog, "Migration and the State: On Ottoman Regulations Concerning Migration since the Age of Mahmut II," in *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, ed. Ulrike Freitag (London: Routledge 2011), 119. Nazan Maksudyan, "Introduction," in *Women in the City: A Gendered Perspective on Ottoman Urban History*, ed. Nazan Maksudyan (Oxford: Berghahn, 2014), 4.

[37] Başak Tuğ, "Gendered Subjects in Ottoman Constitutional Agreements, ca. 1740-1860," *European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey* 18 (2014), 119.

[38] Broadly, I take the reformation and rationalization of administrative practices towards (itinerant) populations and (common) property, intensification of codification movements, and bureaucratization of governmental offices that took place during the *Tanzimat* period to comprise the modernization of the Ottoman imperial state.

tal as the new cosmopolitan frontier of the imperial capital, Beyoğlu, had become a notorious site of human trafficking of women.[39] The capitalist expansion into the Mediterranean as well as proxy wars around Europe's periphery had engendered two distinct waves of illicit migration into and through the Ottoman Empire.[40] Sources mainly indicate that the first "feminized" wave of migration began after the Crimean war and vitalized trade in -non Muslim- prostitutes and -Muslim- slaves.[41] The second were to occur during the late colonial period as both the Eastern Europe and Southern Anatolia began to witness ethnic and religious strife, the former reputedly affecting Jews[42], the latter the Armenians.[43]

Eldem argues that such non-elite migration into the Empire had created a culture of cosmopolitanism, especially concentrated in the district of Beyoğlu, as a distinctly subaltern form of urbanity that in no way corresponded to the "impressioned visions of the cosmopolitan city.[44] In its essence cosmopolitanism was a frontier phenomena - not characterizing the whole of a city stuck between "east and the west"[45], but rather straddling the boundary of respective urbanities.[46] It was this cosmopolitan frontier, Beyoğlu that was to become a site of governmental experimentation in late 1850s and exhibit the clearest expression of Ottoman municipal reforms in the second half of 19th century.[47]

As the practice of exile became demographically untenable in the second half of 19th century, locating and governing the bodies of sex workers became a matter of public order[48], social hygiene[49] and later, I argue, of self-representation.[50]

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[39] Rifat Bali, *The Jews and Prostitution in Constantinople, 1854-1922*. (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2010)

[40] Nora Lafi, "The Ottoman Urban Governance of Migrations and the Stakes of Modernity," in *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, ed. Ulrike Freitag (London: Routledge, 2011), 6.

[41] Hasan Kanbolat and Erol Taymaz, "Kafkas-Osmanli Iliskileri ve Kole Ticareti," *Tarih ve Toplum* XIV (79) (n.d.): 35-44.

[42] Bali, *Jews and Prostitution in Constantinopl*e.

[43] Florian Riedler, "Armenian Labor Migration to Istanbul and the Migration Crisis of the 1890s," in *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, ed. Ulrike Freitag and Malte Fuhrmann, (London: Routledge, 2011), 170-174.

[44] Edhem Eldem, "Ottoman Galata and Pera between Myth and Reality," in *The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul*, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[45] Ibid.

[46] Edhem Eldem, "The Undesirables of Smyrna, 1926," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24 (2) (2009), doi: 10.1080/09518960903562545, 223-227.

[47] Lafi, *Mediterranean Connections*.

[48] Jens Hanssen, "Public Morality and Marginality in Fin de Siècle Beirut," in *Outside in: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, ed. Eugene L. Rogan (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 183-190.

[49] Khaled Fahmy, "Prostitution in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century," in *Outside in: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, ed. Eugene L. Rogan (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 77-78.

[50] Abdulhamit II would, more often than not, inquire into the miserable conditions that Ottoman migrants faced on their way *out* through the ports of Marseilles or Barcelona, to the cities of North America. His consular inquiries and political interventions is generally seen as expressing a concern over the representation of the Ottoman Empire, about whether the

Inquiring into the history of Municipal Regulations, it is possible to trace gradual adoption of spatial and scientific practices through the gendering of syphilis epidemics, up until Smyrna in 1889 to Constantinople in 1894[51] The registration and identification of women suspected of carrying venereal diseases, compulsory medical examinations in lock hospitals, and sanitary inspection of the brothels[52] all came together to create a self-contained and self-sufficient institutional infrastructure for commercial sex.[53]

In order to achieve that, the first challenge to the Beyoğlu municipality was to make sex work that occurred in public subject to policing and medical regulation. As the Municipal police tried to conduct routine medical controls and began to register the prostitute into the *vesika* system[54], clandestine, *invisible* sex work became a matter of anxiety for the municipal authorities. In *Cerrahpaşa* 1898(1316), a *mahalle* resident himself complained of a *Diyarbekirli İbrahim* and police sergeant *Hakkı Efendiler*, because they had intruded upon his home and took his son away in searching for a prostitute, *without* the presence of prominent *mahalle* members i.e. the *imām* and the muḫtar.[55] By 1903, the municipal police had had the government-sanctioned means of intruding upon *anywhere* suspect of "a dalliance with prostitutes" and to keep those men, who have conducted this transaction in private, jailed from 24 hours to a month.[56] Before this slow intrusion of the modern state, it had been the prerogative of *mahalle* residents to voice their complaints against local delinquents, whereas by turn of the century the police had appropriated the right to encroach upon this previously un-penetrable communal space, without the consent or the consensus of the urban networks comprising the city.

The objectification of the prostitute as a 'toxic asset' precluded her violent extraction from the urban spaces that she had hitherto inhabited. When taken into the domain of state sovereignty, she became subjected to a perpetual state of exile or "monetary retribution"[57] up until she took residence within a brothel. With

misery and delinquency associated with the Ottoman migrants would perpetuate the idea that the Ottoman Empire was now in decay. For more on this subject, see: Andrew Arsan, *Ottoman Migrants from the Eastern Mediterranean* (Georgetown University: Ottoman History Podcast 2012), 52, accessed November 26, 2016, http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2012/04/ottoman-migrations-from-eastern.html.

[51] BOA, DH.MKT.1689/118, 1307/CA/22.

[52] Nazam Maksudyan, "Foster-Daughter or Servant, Charity or Abuse: Beslemes in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 21 (4) (2008), doi:10.1111/j.1467-6443.2008.00347, x, 488-9; Müge Özbek, "The Regulation of Prostitution in Beyoğlu (1875–1915)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46 (4) (2010), doi:10.1080/00263206.2010.492991, 555-568.

[53] BOA, A.} MKT.MHM., 502/23, 1308/Z/26.

[54] Regarding the crooks and nooks of the *vesika* system, see Zafer Toprak, "Istanbul'da Fuhuş ve Zührevi Hastalıklar 1914-1933," in *Tarih ve toplum: aylık ansiklopedik dergi* (1987), 31–40.

[55] The preacher and the local administrator, respectively. BOA, DH.MKT., 2147/106, 1316/B/29.

[56] BOA, DH. MKT, 749/4, 1321/CA/14.

[57] BOA, ZB, 478/65, 1323/A/28.

the professionalization of prostitution, the very location of the brothels was now subject to a series of negotiations between urban residents and the municipality. In 1907, Galata residents in Beyoğlu had complained of an increase in sexual assaults and unlawful intrusions by foreign soldiers, and demanded the closure of all brothels whose very existence had been to blame for the assaults.[58] Another complaint that came from Galata's *Galavani Street* three years later had provoked the Beyoğlu police to demand a venue from the *Şehremāneti*, which would be used to bring together the existing brothels and contain the illicit circulation of women.[59] Their wish was granted soon enough, which enabled the municipal police to expand their domain of intervention, beginning in the *istibdād*[60] era and lasting to the very end of the second constitutional regime.[61]

Just as the search for an appropriate location for the state-brothels had begun, the 'informalized' brothels were subject to relocation and/or eviction by the police based on any complaint of their impingement on and threat to public hygiene and morality. Beyoğlu continued to be a site for spatial contention, as a petition to the municipality in early 1914(1332) demanded the closure of the brothels near *Mekteb-i sultânî*[62], out of concern for the local students' moral well-being.[63] The venues of symbolic importance had provoked another mechanism of social exclusion as separate from that of the *mahalle*, as the school, the mosque and even the cemetery needed to be separated from the "moral degradation" implied by the existence of the brothel.[64] While witnessing the spatial differentiation of the urban landscape, the brothels had acquired a symbolic status in line with being a physical threat to the society. Eventually, even being in the close quarters of a cemetery could justify closure and relocation.[65]

Spatial exclusion of prostitutes occurred not just at the level of the city, but also within the very disciplinary institutions that had developed to provide welfare and order in Constantinople. A separate hospital for venereal diseases had already overseen the gendering of the disease – whose cause was to be the sex worker but never the men soliciting them. As such, the public health policies targeted and aimed to register the prostitute, rather than regular customers. However, soon enough there were attempts to open a hospital specifically catering to the prosti-

[58] BOA, ZB, 389/163, 1322/SU/15.
[59] BOA, DH.EUM.THR., 46/25, 1328/S/10.
[60] The dictatorial one-man regime that characterized the rule of Abdulhamit II between 1876 and 1908.
[61] Noémi Lévy-Aksu, "19. Yuzyilda Osmanli'da Kamu Duzeni Konusunda Calismak: Bibliografya Uzerine Bir Degerlendirme," in *Jandarma ve Polis: Franzıs ve Osmanlı Tarihçiliğine Çapraz Bakışlar*, ed. Noémi Lévy-Aksu, Nadir Özbek, and Alexandre Toumarkine, 1. ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1987), 63.
[62] Today's *Galatasaray* High School, standing at the heart of Beyoglu, Istanbul.
[63] BOA, DH.EUM.MTK., 77/25, 1332/B/08. For an earlier case in Sisli; BOA, DH. ID., 65/33, 1331/CA/22.
[64] BOA, DH.EUM.AYS., 42/4, 1338/L/04.
[65] BOA, DH.ID., 65/23, 1330/L/18.

tute. The homeless and sick prostitutes that were found on the streets in 1910 had not been allowed in to the *Dârü'l-aceze*[66], even when they were not afflicted with a venereal disease, and whose only other option was to be jailed in a women's *tevḳif-ḫāne*.[67] In Smyrna, the need to ensure the perfect enclosure of the prostitutes had created a self-enclosed and self-sufficient institutional infrastructure, as it was decreed by the Ministry of Interior Affairs that the spending of the hospitals were to be provided by the money coming from the brothels themselves.[68] Even within the already miserable conditions and limited resources of the Ottoman prisons, the prostitute was treated as a separate category to be spatially excluded from the other criminals.[69]

As women entered the "field of visibility" and circulated within domain of self-representation in the public space[70], prostitutes comprised a "stain" on the Porte's reputation and self-image, not just as a problem of public hygiene but also of public image. Their presence implied public debauchery and degeneration of the imperial capital. It was no longer just a question of to whom did her body belong, but also whom she represented. Concerns over self-image and representation also shaped the criteria on which a sex worker may claim Ottoman subjecthood and protection. This symbolic importance caused the ethic, religious and political belongings of the prostitute to become subject to scrutiny and categorization. During the rule of Abdulhamit II, it was the geographical and religious belongings that formed the two basis of Ottoman subjecthood, with the latter becoming increasingly more politicized. There was already a legal precedent to the policization of the prostitute's religious belongings. Unlike that of non-Muslim women, Muslim women's entrance into the trade was *de jure* prohibited.

A score of previous records do show a number of cases involving specifically *Muslim* prostitutes, but mostly taking place across a variety of urban spaces not exclusive to commercial sex. The rational, that is, strictly-business organization of the brothel was a far cry from the previous loci of the trade - taverns and coffeehouses - in which the rules of conduct were ambiguous and the contracting parties unknown.[71] The adoption of modern administrative practices aimed to create the state-run brothel as a site of economic transaction, rather than a space of sociability. What it created was a work space in which each employee was regis-

[66] It refers to the welfare and healthcare complex, inaugurated by Abdulhamit II in Okmeydani, Istanbul, in 1895.
[67] 19th century Ottoman Turkish term for Jail. BOA, DH.MKT, 2695/3, 1326/Z/05.
[68] BOA, A.} MKT.MHM., 502/23, 1308/Z/26.
[69] Kent F. Schull, *Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 125-126.
[70] Maksudyan, *Women and the City*, 6.
[71] I underline the rational organization of the brothel as well as its spatial differentiation, to denote its emergence as a modern form of organizing sex work. Thus, it is not the 'commercial', but the strictly sexual and spatially differentiated form is modern. Ideally, state run brothels in Turkey -until today- work to make sure that brothels are not turned into spaces of sociability.

tered, monitored, and physically contained. The spatial differentiation of the city had limited the options of a woman aiming to enter into a sexual transaction. As prostitution *came into* the public space as a threat to be contained in the name of public health and morality, the Muslim prostitute posed a problem of (self) representation for the Ottoman state, which dealt with the problem on two accounts: first by subjecting the Muslim women to the "protection" of patriarchal family; and then, by "protecting" the Muslim family from physical and moral contamination that might come from non-Muslim women.

The response of the municipal governments across the Empire was to 'send them back' to the domain of their fathers - their *mahrem* - and take them out of this field of visibility. *Seen as* an act of philanthropy, the stakes of representation was enough to send *Jeddahian Ayse,* who had been practicing prostitution in Constantinople, back to her parents in the Arab provinces.[72] Following her repatriation, three Muslim girls caught 'dallying' with a soldier in *Sirkeci* were all delivered to their parents instead of taken to a hospital for a medical check, or registration.[73] The relegation of responsibility to the family was thus one way in which Muslim women were immediately taken out of their trade, in the name of preventing their circulation and visibility in public.

The circulation of non-Muslim women within the *private* sphere was another source of anxiety, as they could be potential non-registered sex workers conducting their trade under the guise of a variety of other professions. Just as taverns had previously been ambiguous spaces of sociability, prostitution had not been a distinct profession that warranted specialization.[74] With its intimate link to the entertainment industry, it was thus not a surprise when the Edirne police had confronted a number of foreign *chanteuses* and charged them with prostitution. What is remarkable, however, is that the police refused to let them enter their *private* property, and kept them in the streets for days on an end, rather than keeping them out of sight in jail.[75] This reflects a concern to draw a distinction between *spaces* as well as the *subjects* that were to be seen and scrutinized by the police, the protectors of public order.

An imperial decree proclaimed by Abdulhamit II in 1901 on the issue of foreign governesses and servants took on a much more complex and insidious character, as he posits the figure of the prostitute not only between professions but also between spaces, sexes, and "civilizations".[76] Proclaimed by the sultan's seat in Yildiz

[72] BOA, DH.EUM.THR., 50/61,1328/N/17.
[73] BOA, DH.EUM.KDL., 20/16,1329/M/13.
[74] Hershatter, *Dangerous Pleasures*, 116.
[75] BOA, DH.EUM. THR., 33/41, 1328/CA/07.
[76] I am not referring to a certain definition of civilization, but the very discourses on civilization that posited a difference through the binaries of Modern/Tradition, or West/East, which was shared and appropriated by the Ottoman Elites and bureaucrats themselves. I engaged less with what the concept actually *meant* to the Ottoman Elite than I did with what the concept of civilizational difference *did* by positing such binaries. I think such fundamental difference

Palace, the decree is a tacit intervention into the international trade in women that had flourished in Constantinople through service agencies claiming to procure western chefs and drivers on one hand, and governesses, servants, and nannies on the other.[77] While the subject matter of the decree is the urban governance of non-Ottoman subjects, it is a text produced by diplomatic concerns addressing the "western" gaze, while the person of Abdulhamit II presents his authoritarian state in all its moral righteousness regarding the harsh policing of such "dangerous women". Legitimizing the intrusions made upon the lives and property of the non-Ottoman subjects, Abdulhamit II denotes the corrupting influence of a *western* underclass that threatens the moral purity and physical well-being of his caliphate.[78] It is Abdhulhamit's use of the concept of civilization that warrants our attention. In his discourse, the difference in "Ottoman" and "Western" civilizations is that of different moralities. Using the prostitute/governess as the single point of reference, the decree effectively posits a distinction between the two civilizations while placing the Ottoman Empire on par with the "highest democracy" of the Western Civilization, the USA, to justify protecting the religious freedom and purity of Ottoman Subjects – that is, the Muslim ones. While the circulation of prostitutes under the guise of governesses, and their influence over the general Muslim population is debatable, Abdulhamit II had effectively normalized the cosmopolitan nature of sex work.

Neither the ego of Abdulhamit II nor the cunning and creativity of the western subaltern[79] explains why the migrant sex worker became such a pervasive and powerful figure in fin-de-siècle Ottoman Empire. An aversion to diplomatic crises had already affected the legal and administrative treatment of non-Muslim women as potential causes for diplomatic intervention.[80] Their very request for Ottoman subjecthood was met with an adverse reaction. The harsh stance of the state regarding the problem of subjecthood was evidenced by the case of Rabbi Arslan, who had helped to procure citizenship in the name of a "brothel asset" by the name of Mirilam.[81] His was neither the first nor the only case of an official aiding a foreign woman in the quest for Ottoman subjecthood, as fake or de jure marriage was to become a common trope in the acquisition of the rights and privileges given to Ottoman subjects. Within the incipient politics of citizenship,

posited through a civilizational discourse adds a global dimension to the regulation of sex work in Ottoman Empire..

[77] Yavuz Selim Karakışla, *Eski Hayatlar Eski Hatıralar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Belgelerle Gündelik Hayat (1760-1923)* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2015), 351.

[78] BOA, Y. MTV., 48/48, 1308/B/14.

[79] Fuhrmann, "Western Perversions", 160-1. By the western subaltern, I mean the migrant sex workers of European origin that formed an active and widespread network of sex trafficking and white slave trade (or Mädchenhandel) that extended from within Eastern Europe and converged in fin de siècle Istanbul.

[80] Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5, 111.

[81] BOA, DH.MKT., 818/62, 1321/ZA/20.

the non-Muslim prostitute was kept in the urban frontier of the imperial capital as forever subjected to policing and eviction threats, while being denied the rights and privileges accorded to Ottoman subjects.[82]

Contending Sovereigns: Claiming the Imperial Front

Aside from intervening into the international circulation of women within its borders and policing the foreign subjects that lived and worked in Constantinople, the reign of Abdulhamit II oversaw attempts to extend the state's protection and influence over its subjects far into the imperial frontiers of capitalist expansion. Constituting a contested domain of influence, the Ottoman subjects that were dispersed across the world could gain a symbolic importance as a mean of asserting Ottoman sovereignty in the international arena, and as a potential means of expanding its influence across the known world. The political scope of Ottoman imperialism was thus overlapped with the geographical range of illicit networks crisscrossing the Mediterranean, from Egypt, to Sudan, to even Chile.

Scholarly debates of imperialism and Ottoman imperialism in particular, seem to converge on the problem of *non-invasive* colonialism. The question is whether the existence of an imperialist discourse reflected a desire to conquer and dominate the lands, races, and the women of the "other".[83] Alison Johnson has shown that the maritime policies of the Habsburg Empire during early 19th century could be considered as constituting imperialism without territorial expansion.[84]

In addition, recent scholarship also provides a line of inquiry into modern state building as *internal* colonialism, showing how the very process of state building had engendered a need to encroach upon the lands, trades and lives that were ruled, yet not adequately governed by the state. More contemporary studies on urban governance also show that the use of colonial techniques of governance is intrinsic to the workings of the modern state even today.[85] I thus situate Ottoman imperialism, as having existed and adopted colonial policies without -achieving- territorial expansion.

For the purposes of my subject at hand, international sex work, I would like to return to the most "succinct" definition of imperialism as described by Selim De-

[82] Giorgio Agamben, *Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Homo Sacer* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 6-9.
[83] Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
[84] Alison Frank, "The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review* 117 (2) (2012), doi:10.1086/ahr.117.2.410, 410-444.
[85] Oren Yiftachel, "Critical Theory and 'Gray Space': Mobilisation of the Colonised," in *Cities for People, not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City*, ed. Neil Brenner, Peter Marcuse, and Margit Mayer (London: Routledge, 2012), 121.

ringil, the "monopoly stage of capitalism".[86] It is in the monopoly stage of capitalism where control over the circulation of commodities matters as much as of ideas and people. As such, imperialism is a mechanism of expansion *within* and/or *without* a given territory, through the extension of state sovereignty *over* or *through* its subjects. Going back to Torpey's definition of the state as having monopoly over the means of movement, I would like to argue that an incipient politics of national citizenship was written into the *tezkire*, to *vesika*, and to the passport[87], as they reflected the legal status of a sex worker – and became the means of controlling and regulating her movements.

The symbolic status of the prostitute emerged at the convergence between the urban and the imperial frontier, where the assertion of sovereignty in the international arena corresponded to its extension into the lives and activities of women in the imperial capital. She had become a boundary marker signifying and gendering the power relations among the cohort of empires. In this global, legal *space* structured by British hegemony, the destitute prostitute was either a matter of humanitarian efforts for the abolition of sexual "slavery"[88], or of colonial domination through regulationist policies targeting "sex work".[89]

Having taken its place in this international cohort of sovereign states thanks to the Treaty of Paris in 1856 -if not before-, the nascent field of international law had given the Ottoman empire a space for visibility and assertion of its "sovereign will" by participating in the legal debates and institutions aiming to "reconstruct…international law".[90] However, visibility did not necessarily confer respect or power, as the imperial bureaucrats and Ottoman intellectuals were to find

[86] Yiftachel, "Critical Theory and 'Gray Space'", 312; Vladimir Il′ich Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism; a Popular Outline* (New York: International Publishers, 1939 [1917]).

[87] Christoph Herzog, "Migration and the State: On Ottoman Regulations Concerning Migration since the Age of Mahmut II," in *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, ed. by Ulrike Freitag, (London: Routledge, 2011), 119; Andrew Kerim Arsan, "Failing to Stem the Tide: Lebanese Migration to French West Africa and the Competing Prerogatives of the Imperial State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 53 (3) (2011), doi:10.1017/S0010417511000211, 469-478.

[88] For the British efforts against and condemning concubinage within the Ottoman Empire, see Diane Liga Robinson-Dunn, *The Harem, Slavery and British Imperial Culture: Anglo-Muslim Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century. Studies in Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).

[89] Ehud R. Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2007).

[90] Anghie, *Imperialism, Hegemony, and International Law*, 33-4; also, regarding the diplomatic and legal implications of the Treaty of Paris, see Mustafa Serdar Palabiyik. "The Emergence of the Idea of 'International Law' in the Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Paris (1856)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50 (2) (2014), doi:10.1080/00263206.2013.870890, 233-51.The Treaty took place after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, with Russia having to give concessions to the Ottoman Empire along with other European signatory states. Generally, the 1856 Treaty is considered to be the first international convention to which Ottoman Empire was a party. There are yet disagreements about whether this participation constituted a recognition of its sovereignty or not. However, based on recent research on the diplomatic history of Ottoman Empire, I shall take it for granted here that the Empire had become sub-

out. The meetings and debates on international law were sites of contention that positioned this "eastern" Empire within a hierarchy dominated by its "western" peers.[91] Throughout its engagement with the debates surrounding international private or criminal law, there were constant implications of a "defective rationality" in the Ottoman legal system, denoting its technical and moral inferiority at the face of European legal imperialism.[92] Capitulations, which had already been intrinsic to the legal culture of pluralism in the Ottoman Empire[93], now had become tools of imperial expansion and financial gain. Extraterritorial jurisdiction emerged at the physical loci of these moral and legal contestations, the port cities of Ottoman Empire. In any conflict that emerged from the extant system of legal pluralism, it was now the *free,* liberal subject of modern law that set the stakes.

Any political intervention into the international trade in sex was thus made on the basis of a woman's *free will*. The discourses on sex trafficking vis-à-vis that of Ottoman slave trade attributed the sex worker a priori existence of free will. That created a contradiction between the regulationist policies targeting sex trafficking and the abolitionist efforts of both British and French authorities against the slave trade networks of the late 19th century. For example, French abolitionists had denounced the *manumission* and registration of African slaves, by justifying their action on the sanctity of free will. They had argued that manumission practically meant *forced* conversion to Ottoman subjecthood against the will of the slaves in question.[94] This humanitarian mentality underlying the legal difference between the victim and the delinquent was very much adopted by the Ottoman statesmen. The consular correspondence in the Ottoman archives show that the British and French were very much concerned with the enslavement of Ottoman - predominantly Muslim - subjects from across Alexandria, to the Americas[95], or to South Asia.[96]

Arguing the depravity of the Ottoman subject's condition was also about presenting an indirect attack on Ottoman sovereignty, the self- proclaimed protector of the "realm of Islam". That seems to be the cleavage that had provoked a cunning *Mehmet Rasid Efendi*, a true Occidental drifter and an ex-conscript to the French Army, to bring to his highness Abdulhamit II's attention the public

ject to the "European system of international law" and a "member of the concert of Europe" thus effectively constituting a fully recognized (if slightly disrespected) sovereign state.

[91] Nir Shafir, "The International Congress as Scientific and Diplomatic Technology: Global Intellectual Exchange in the International Prison Congress, 1860–90," *Journal of Global History* 9 (1) (2014), 76 doi: 10.1017/S1740022813000508.

[92] Ibid.; Umut Ozsu, "The Ottoman Empire, the Origins of Extraterritoriality, and International Legal Theory," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, ed. Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann, and Martin Clark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)

[93] Eldem Edhem, "Foreigners at the Threshold of Felicity: The Reception of Foreigners in Ottoman Istanbul," in *Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Robert Muchembled and E. William Monter, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[94] BOA, HR. HMS. ISO., 44/21, 1327/T/21.

[95] BOA, DH.MKT., 831/45, 1322/M/1.

[96] BOA, DH.MYI., 81/35, 1328/RA/25.

degradation of a Turkish prostitute in the Chilean Republic.[97] She had been the victim of sex trafficking through an infamous procurer by the name of *Lazatrona*, who had moved in and out of the imperial capital in search for assets, inveigling the Bulgarian, Armenian and Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire way into the farthest corner of Latin America, to the port city of Valparaiso. The unnamed prostitute had provoked the mercy and compassion of Abdulhamit II, and as such was to be delivered to the Sublime Porte via the American consulate at Washington D.C., instead of accompanying *Mehmet Efendi* via the French consuls in Chile. While the Muslim prostitute at the imperial frontier was paraded around the new world in the name of moral righteousness, her non-Muslim peers were restrained in their circulation within the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

This is not to say that a singular, *religiously* minded project of imperialism characterized the Ottoman State within the international field of law, as the spatial and legal transgressions of migrants provided the occasion to interact and compete with other imperial states. Imperial politics were based on ambiguous and contradictory identities and ideas[98], and more often than not took advantage of that ambiguity. Competing imaginaries and a number of communitarian belongings existed within the Ottoman imperial project. The cultural codes denoting ethnicity, religion, and gender all served to make and unmake this project at each critical moment, from Abdulhamit II's *Istibdat* to the CUP[99] regime to follow.

On the eve of twentieth century, situating the prostitute at crossroads of civilizations and religions was a political choice, as much as it was a symbolic act. It allowed for the intrusion of the state upon the bodies and souls of itinerant women. The same legal and administrative practices that took hold of the Armenian, Jewish, or Arab prostitute served a number of political ends that were neither incongruent to nor inextricable from one another.

The international system of states that was consolidated after the Great War thus was not an antithesis to the system of imperial states whose form was consolidated during the long 19th century[100], but rather the nation-states that emerged throughout Middle East in the 20th century were *enabled* by the transformations that took place during the zenith of 19th century imperialism.[101] The core transfor-

[97] Karakisla, *Eski Hayatlar*, 329.
[98] Caglar Keyder, "Port Cities in the Belle Epoque," in *Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day*, ed. Biray Kolluoğlu and Meltem Toksöz. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 18.
[99] Committee of Union and Progress, the party of the Ottoman intellectuals sent to exile by Abdulhamit II. It was formed in 1889, and came to power through the Young Turk revolution of 1908.
[100] On the sociological formations and trajectories of Modern Empires, see George Steinmetz, "Major Contributions to Sociological Theory and Research on Empire, 1830-Present," in *Sociology and Empire*, ed. George Steinmetz (Durham. Duke University Press, 1-50).
[101] George Steinmetz and Julia P. Adams, "Sovereignty and Sociology: From State Theory to Theories of Empire," in *Patrimonial Capitalism and Empire*, ed. Mounira Maya Charrad and Julia P. Adams (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2015), 270.

mation was that of the changing relationship of the state to the body of the individual, in the making of modern state and its liberal subject of law.

Conclusion

In his autobiographical inquiry into the history of prostitution in fin de siècle Istanbul, Ahmet Rasim had reflected the sentiments of his peers by condemning the degeneration of war-torn Istanbul and the diffusion of prostitution from the taverns of *Pera* into the domain of respectability and of family.[102] Fully attuned to the gendered constitution of the public/private divide, Rasim firmly believed that the circulation of women within each domain - private/public - corresponded to the integrity of the family and the state, respectively. Women's circulation *in-between*, ergo, had meant the degeneration and impotence of both.

This "debauchery" and "deprivation" left at the wake of Great War did not just concern the statesmen of the new Republic of Turkey. Post-war population management was also a core concern for the Mandate authorities in the Middle East. Making humanitarian interventions into human trafficking was one of the aims of the newly formed League of Nations[103], while its travelling commissions documented and penetrated into this illicit trade for the purposes of its termination.[104] Abolitionist movements were to do away with regulationist policies towards "sex- and child-trafficking" in the Mandate period.

Taking its place within the international state system, the newly formed Turkish Republic began a violent process of nationalizing its citizenship, that had evolved into a social engineering project centred around the spaces and places that women inhabited. As the nation-states have achieved a global monopoly over the legitimate means of circulation, and the legions of migrants that had inhabited the Ottoman Empire either integrated or disappeared into the social fabric - either way, at a great human cost. The purity of the family and the integrity of the state had been reinstated in the Turkish Republic, through the administrative practices of the new ruling elite.

However, there was an ironic - and tragic - consequence to the migration crises of 19th century globalization as experienced in the Ottoman Empire. As the Turkish Republic took on the task of nationalizing the economy as part of their CUP heritage, they also reversed the process of de-nationalizing sex work that had begun during the *Istibdat* regime. The secularist republicans did indeed aspire to dismantle the whole economy of sex in Istanbul, with their moralism in contrast to the pragmatist and stance of the late Ottoman Empire. While they were ambitious

[102] Ahmet, Rasim, *Fuhş-i Atîk (Eski Fuhuş Hayatı)* (İstanbul: Iskit, 1958[1340/1924]), vi.
[103] Nessim Znaien, "La prostitution à Beyrouth sous le mandat français (1920-1943)," *Genre & Histoire* no. 11 (2013), http://genrehistoire.revues.org/1781.
[104] Liat Kozma, *Global Women, Colonial Ports: Prostitution in the Interwar Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016), 4-7.

enough to engineer a whole society from scratch, they were not capable of realizing their vision. Their efforts at eliminating prostitution, while escalating into an all-out urban warfare[105] against women during the twenties, failed.[106] Rather unwillingly and unwittingly, the Republican elite had to contend with the fact that a total command over the circulation of sex workers and penetrating into the spaces they could inhabit was impossible. As a result of the new regulation on 'Prostitution and Venereal Diseases' in 1933, brothels were reopened, and prostitution was legalized under the full control of the state.

[105] By urban warfare, I aim to denote the violent and intrusive practices of policing women not only within the public spaces but also within their *mahrem,* their familial space; as single or non-married women were forcefully taken from their homes during police crackdowns, registered, and disciplined; disregarding and violating their right to privacy and secure space.

[106] Zafer Toprak, "Istanbul'da Fuhuş ve Zührevi Hastalıklar 1914-1933," *Tarih ve toplum: aylık ansiklopedik dergi* (1987), 31–40, 39-40. Demographic and administrative problems regarding an abundance of "destitute" women and lack of a strong police presence led to the failure of abolitionist policies targeting sex work. In the 1930s, prostitution was again legalized.

Towards a Global Perspective on Contemporary History. A Critical Literature Review of Recent German *Zeitgeschichte*

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Contemporary history, subsumed under the term *Zeitgeschichte*, holds a prominent position in Germany's historical profession today. Practitioners in Zeitgeschichte often work in a network that transcends regional and disciplinary boundaries, engaging with work from social sciences and across historical sub-disciplines. The paper presents a meditation on recent literature in Zeitgeschichte and argues that its flexible framework can serve as a starting point for a global narrative in contemporary history. The paper primarily examines the research project *Nach dem Boom* dealing with economic and social ruptures in Western Europe around the 1970s as an example for the methodological framework Zeitgeschichte offers for Global Historians.

Contemporary history, subsumed under the term *Zeitgeschichte,* holds a prominent position in Germany's historical profession today. The German terminology relates to the word *Zeitgenossen*, people who were alive at the time of an analyzed event.[1] Accordingly, the periodization of *Zeitgeschichte* goes as far back as the oldest generation of *Zeitgenossen* still alive. Today, this strand of history primarily deals with the time after World War II. While the (West) German discourse of *Zeitgeschichte* has traditionally focused on a national approach to history writing, recent scholars have emphasized a broader look on (West) European topics and even sporadic case studies on global entanglements.

What distinguishes the German *Zeitgeschichte* approach from other historiographical traditions of contemporary history is its inherently critical political and presentist character, meaning that practitioners in this realm have interacted with recent history as a continuous stream flowing into the present and shaping present processes still underway. While contemporary history in the US predominantly follows narrative and historical analysis, recent *Zeitgeschichte* openly deals with contemporary problems through an interdisciplinary analysis of the past. Accord-

[1] Unless otherwise noted, all following translations or descriptions of German terms are my own.

ingly, practitioners of *Zeitgeschichte* have often worked on the border between political and social science, emphasizing interdisciplinary approaches.

Due to its reliance on secondary sources from the social sciences, and its focus on unfinished historical processes, contemporary history is often criticized for straying too far from classical historical modes of analysis. While source base and temporal frame do certainly constrain historical methodology, contemporary history and its German offspring *Zeitgeschichte* provide trained historians with a venue to criticize and complicate narratives of the present, which deserves further engagement transcending the national frameworks that have dominated this strand of scholarship in recent decades. To acknowledge this, I engage in detail with practitioners from the German field of *Zeitgeschichte* in this essay, as the field has traditionally generated wide interest beyond the academic community due to institutional links to civic education in post-war Germany. *Zeitgeschichte* therefore fosters an active public engagement of historians as recently envisioned by global historians Jo Guldi and David Armitage in their *History Manifesto*.[2] This literature review therefore examines the school of "structural rupture" as a notable example of recent German *Zeitgeschichte* and argues that in its methodological framework, a first approach towards a globalization of contemporary history can be found.

The term *Zeitgeschichte* was popularized by the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* (Institute for Contemporary History), which was founded as the *German Institute of the History of the National Socialist Era* in Munich in 1947 and renamed in 1952. Established as part of the Allied Forces' denazification effort, the Institute had a political agenda from the very beginning. Its journal *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (Contemporary History Quarterly), published since 1953, became a main organ for this new strand of historic writing. In 2016, the Institute published collected translations of journal articles into English for the first time, to reach a wider international audience and encourage transnational engagement with the topics presented.[3]

Notable among the more recent publications on *Zeitgeschichte* is the journal *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Of Politics and Contemporary History) published on a regular basis by the *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung* (Federal Agency for Civic Education/BPB) since 2000. The journal has become highly influential among academics and practitioners in the field of civic education alike. The

[2] Jo Guldi and David Armitage. *The History Manifesto*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Note that Guldi's and Armitage's main claim is about a return to the *longue durée,* which is still absent from most of contemporary history, with notable exceptions such as for example Pankaj Mishra, *Age of Anger: A History of the Present* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017).

[3] The first volume of the German Yearbook of Contemporary History contains recent essays from *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* on the topic of "Holocaust and Memory in Europe". See Thomas Schlemmer and Alan E. Steinweis, eds., *Holocaust and Memory in Europe*, German Yearbook of Contemporary History, Vol. 1 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016).

publication efforts of the BPB therefore underline the significance of integrating *Zeitgeschichte* into a civic discourse in Germany.

The perspective of *Zeitgeschichte* can serve historians as a model for a more presentist, political take on contemporary history engaging in public discussions and historically nuancing academic interpretations of the present. In times of growing discontent and a rise of populism in the "Western" world and beyond, historians need not shy away from engaging in public discourse and political discussions to contextualize and problematize currents of explanation for today's world. The interdisciplinary practice of *Zeitgeschichte* and its institutional links to venues of public discourse provides historians with a toolset to work together with social scientists across disciplinary boundaries to establish more nuanced models for explaining current problems and challenging populist grand narratives.

The following part of this essay will examine a recent strand of *Zeitgeschichte* historiography in Germany by looking at the research cluster *Nach dem Boom* ("After the Boom") as a growing body of literature providing methodology for the interdisciplinary integration of economics, politics, sociology, and cultural studies under a contemporary historical narrative. This recent project looks at structural transformations coinciding with the change from Keynesian economics to a neoliberal model of politics in Western Europe in the 1970s and beyond. I argue that the project presents a prime example of how *Zeitgeschichte* can serve as an integratory dialogue between history and a wider social science discourse, and that it represents the challenges and opportunities of an inherently presentist history writing. Following that, I explain why the project *Nach dem Boom* presents an ideal starting point for the venture of a global contemporary history. Building upon the methodological framework of the research project, I finally argue that *Zeitgeschichte* needs to take the current global turn in historiography seriously and engage with a more globally integrated contemporary history in order to nuance discourse about the roots of the present as parts of global systems of entanglements.

Nach dem Boom: Structural Contemporary History in Western Europe after 1970

The research cluster *Nach dem Boom* is a joint project of the seminar for *Zeitgeschichte* at the University of Tübingen and the Department of Contemporary History at the University of Trier. It is headed by the German historians Anselm Doering-Manteuffel (University of Tübingen) and Lutz Raphael (University of Trier). The research cluster builds on Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael's eponymous book, which proposed a new perspective for Western European history from 1970 on. Both historians call for the re-evaluation of the period in a framework of interdisciplinary analysis and propose a historical caesura for the 1970s. Their

research cluster is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) since 2009 and has produced a wide array of scholarship since its inception.

The work of the research cluster is based on the publication of *Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (After the Boom. Perspectives on *Zeitgeschichte* since 1970) by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael in 2008.[4] In this extended essay, the authors propose their new take on contemporary German history, partitioning it into an era of the boom following World War II and a time after the boom, beginning as a culmination of ruptures in the 1970s.[5] Their take on history is superficially speaking materialistic, since they focus mostly on economic structures and events. However, in resemblance of Bloch and Braudel, they aim at a perspective on history close to a *histoire totale*, which acknowledges the entanglements between cultural, economic, political, and social factors. While this all-encompassing structural take on history only becomes visible to a limited degree in their publication, it is mostly due to the methodological character of the essay. For heuristic reasons, Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael predominantly use economic history to illustrate their methodology. The authors however encourage an engagement across historical sub-disciplines with the framework of *Nach dem Boom*, and their methodological work provides historians with a toolset for further analysis beyond the materialistic approach presented in the essay.

Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael do not use the term "boom" exclusively to address the German *Wirtschaftswunder* of the post-war years, to which it is commonly ascribed. Instead they rather define it as a general era of economic and political well-being marked by the strong presence of the state ranging from the 1950s to the early 1970s.[6] The authors characterize the time of the boom in Germany, as well as in other West European countries (most notably France and Great Britain) as a period of strong economic growth, governed by the principles of Keynesian economics, aimed at a 'liberal consensus' between labor, state, and capital. These premises, however, fall apart in the 1970s, and give rise to the new ideology of neoliberalism and ultimately the system of digital finance capitalism still in place today. Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael propose that the ruptures of the 1970s and 1980s mark the beginning of the 'Prehistory of the Present'.[7]

Their work becomes especially interesting for academics on a conceptual level: they introduce two concepts, which are central to the scholarship that followed.

[4] Lutz Raphael and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012).

[5] Raphael and Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom*, 13.

[6] For related descriptions of the 'boom' era see for example Peter Mair, *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy* (London; New York: Verso, 2013) for the European context and Jefferson Cowie, *The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016) for the American context.

[7] 'Prehistory of the Present' is the title of their most recent edited collection - Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and Thomas Schlemmer, *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom*, 1st ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016). They use variations of the term already in *Nach dem Boom.*

First, they define the time between the 1970s and the 1980s as a caesura, which they refer to as a 'structural rupture.'[8] This rupture is qualified by the second concept they introduce, a 'social change of revolutionary quality.'[9] Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael identify several of these social changes of revolutionary quality, which build the foundation of their proposed structural rupture in the 1970s. However, they caution the reader that the semantic singular of structural rupture does not mean they are advocating a linear, homogenous transformation process in historical development. Rather, they chose to bundle a wide variety of ruptures they identified across different timeframes and spatial dimensions under the category of structural rupture.[10] They justify this culmination of ruptures for heuristic reasons as follows: "Our thesis of the structural rupture (in the singular) stands in close relation to our lead hypothesis, that the various forms of ruptures all contributed to fostering the new constellation of financial market capitalism."[11]

Among the 'social changes of revolutionary quality' they identify in their book are the drastic rise in female employment rates, the expansion of the education sector, the digitalization of work processes and private life, as well as the decline of industrial labor in favor of the service economy, and the rise of individualism in management discourse but also in sports and body perception. These changes are obviously of different quality, pace, and range, and Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael acknowledge that throughout their work. They reiterate that the culmination of individual and diverse ruptures formed the structural rupture that paved the way for the structures we experience today. In fact, multi-temporality of ruptures and the paradoxical parallel of continuity and discontinuities are central to their argument: They illustrate this in the example of how despite the paradigm shift to market based neoliberalism in the 1970s, states like West Germany still widely expanded their social welfare programs. In an almost Foucauldian argument, Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael address these continuities and discontinuities by arguing that processes of the decay of one historical epoch and the rise of another happen at the same time, and do not necessarily negate the argument for a structural rupture but are rather part of a nuanced description avoiding teleology.

Methodologically, *Nach dem Boom* is a formidable demonstration of how historians can deconstruct historical processes that are so close to the present, where their impact is still feasible today. The book sparked a wide discussion in German academia, inspiring wide use of the concepts of structural rupture and social change of a revolutionary quality in a number of case studies, many of them coming from the research cluster *Nach dem Boom,* headed by Doering-Manteuffel and

[8] 'Strukturbruch' in the German original text. Following, I will translate important concepts in the text and name the original in the footnotes. See Raphael and Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom*.
[9] 'Sozialer Wandel revolutionärer Qualität'.
[10] Raphael and Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom*, 13.
[11] Raphael and Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom*, 13.

Raphael. Beyond the use of concepts, *Nach dem Boom* also called for a re-evaluation of the presentist mission of *Zeitgeschichte*; in resemblance of the German historian Hans Günter Hockerts, the authors explicitly call for seeing *Zeitgeschichte* as a problematized history (*Problemgeschichte*) of the present. By leaving behind traditional periodization in decades or political events, and declaring the timeframe from 1970 until today as one era after the boom, they want to encourage a historical discourse that integrates "national, European, [and] international" narratives to historicize the "challenges of the present."[12]

Extending the Historiography Nach dem Boom

A first interim balance of the results of the research conducted in the cluster following *Nach dem Boom,* was presented in the publication *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart. Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom* (The Beginnings of the Present. Ruptures in Western Europe after the Boom) edited by Morten Reitmayer and Thomas Schlemmer. The 2013 book features a collection of essays that present case studies, which used the concepts introduced by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael in their earlier publication. The various essays demonstrate how historians can use the presentist and structuralist approach advocated in *Nach dem Boom* for more narrative historical analysis, while still reflecting on the problematization of the present that Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael called for.[13]

The collection is a valuable indicator of how strong the scholarship coming out of the original project has grown over time. It furthermore provides a re-evaluation of the concepts that Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael introduced in their earlier publication, after they have been *road-tested* in a number of case studies. The variety of essays in the collection furthermore provides readers with a sense of the diversity of application for the framework of structural rupture. While a number of essays deal with classical topics from labor history such as Lutz Raphael's take on deindustrialization, a variety of authors historicize research from the social sciences, exemplified for example by Tobias Dietrich's treatment of running as a popular sport and Hannah Jonas' critique of the narrative of declining attendance figures in soccer stadiums coinciding with the rise of televised sport events.

Methodologically noticeable are two essays by the editors: In the opening essay of the collection, Thomas Schlemmer presents a reflection on the concept of structural rupture. He focusses on describing cultural phenomena as symptoms of a growing sense of uncertainty and loss in Western Europe and the United States in the 1970s. Schlemmer then argues that these sentiments widely contradict the ongoing growth of prosperity and freedom for individual expression central to economic and sociological accounts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This para-

[12] Raphael and Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom*, 25–26.
[13] Morten Reitmayer and Thomas Schlemmer, eds., *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart: Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom* (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2013).

dox, he explains, reiterates the necessity to acknowledge continuities and discontinuities in the narration of *Zeitgeschichte.* His colleague Morten Reitmayer supports this notion in the second introductory essay, when he shows how events with a distinct caesura character are hard to pinpoint in a structurally integrated – across disciplinary boundaries – history of mass cultural phenomena.[14]

In a concluding essay, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel reflects on the reactions and challenges of the concepts of *Nach dem Boom* five years after its first publication. He proclaims that the independent case studies presented in the volume exemplify a set of "deep drillings" into the terrain of the era after the boom, which helped establish *Zeitgeschichte* as a problematization of the present. However, the case studies also serve as an example of the plurality of currents in the era under consideration. Following Schlemmer's introductory remarks, Doering-Manteuffel reiterates the need to consider continuities and discontinuities in the writing of *Zeitgeschichte* in order to challenge teleological frameworks.[15]

The essays in the 2013 collection show the broad variety of areas in which the concepts of Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael can be used to complicate teleological narratives. Most of them furthermore interact with research from the social sciences, historicizing political and sociological data to provide a more nuanced picture.[16] Notably absent from the collection, however, is a detailed engagement with the global turn in historiography. Most of the essays presented have a quite narrow spatial focus and rarely engage with transnational entanglements in their historical reasoning. While the collected volume demonstrates the diverse possibilities of applying Doering-Manteuffel's and Raphael's conceptual framework to different topical areas, a further engagement over extended spatial areas is still missing. Since a majority of the essays in the collection are part of larger dissertation projects, it is safe to assume that the scholarship on these topics making extensive use of the terminology, periodization, and conceptual framework of *Nach dem Boom* will continue to grow in the near future.

[14] See Thomas Schlemmer, "Der diskrete Charme der Unsicherheit. Einleitende Bemerkungen," in *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart: Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom*, ed. Morten Reitmayer and Thomas Schlemmer (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2013). 8–10. Morten Reitmayer, "Nach dem Boom – eine neue Belle Époque? Versuch einer vorläufigen Synthese," in *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart: Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom*, eds. Morten Reitmayer and Thomas Schlemmer (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2013), 21.

[15] Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "Die Vielfalt der Strukturbrüche und die Dynamik des Wandels in der Epoche nach dem Boom," in *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart: Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom*, ed. Morten Reitmayer and Thomas Schlemmer (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2013), 135–45.

[16] See also Alexander Gallus' essay "On the Relation Between History and Political Science", where he names the research on *Nach dem Boom* as a prime example on how social and political sciences can serve as "suppliers of social data" for an integrated version of structural history. Alexander Gallus, "Über das Verhältnis von Geschichts- und Politikwissenschaft," *Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte* 62. Jahrgang, no. 1–3/2012 (January 2, 2012), 39–45.

In a recent book entitled *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart. Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom* (Prehistory of the Present. Dimensions of Structural Rupture After the Boom), editors Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael provide an extensive update on the current state of research on the era after the boom and also explicitly acknowledge the need to globalize scholarship on a structurally integrated history of the present. The edited volume contains twenty essays by authors from different sub-disciplines of *Zeitgeschichte* and from the social sciences. Given the scope of this essay, I will not describe the details of each article but rather group them in various areas of research.[17]

Among the authors are contributors from the earlier collection *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart,* who basically provide updates on their respective research projects, introduced earlier. The collection is furthermore structured into four distinct parts introducing various areas of scholarship where the framework of *Nach dem Boom* can be applied: The first part mainly deals with describing structural ruptures and formal transformations in the history of labor. Reoccurring themes in these essays are uncertainty and precarity, the transformation from industrial labor to an information society (*Informationsgesellschaft*), the rise of female labor and its implications in a changing work environment, and the revitalization of former industrial cities as 'creative cities'.[18]

The second part of the collection focusses on economic and social policy in between the dynamics of continuity and transformation within contemporary history. Key ideas of this part are the changing conceptions of an anti-inflationary monetary policy, the restructuring of multinational companies in response to challenges and opportunities of a rising global digital finance capitalism, the paradox of continuity and discontinuity in the evolution of the German social welfare state, and the fragile relationship between capital (in the form of interest groups), labor (in the form of unions), and the state. In this chapter, Maria Dörnemann's essay on the relation between supranational development politics and modernization theory takes a notable first step in the direction of applying the methodology of *Nach dem Boom* on a transnational or even global level beyond the Eurocentric realm.[19]

The essays in part three of the collection aim at historicizing the rise of contemporary consumer society and its implications for individualization processes advocated in the 2008 publication. Authors in this part present topics ranging from the rise of consumerism in general to a more genealogical analysis of trends like fast food and health food booms, the commercialization of sport events, and also

[17] Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and Thomas Schlemmer, *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom*, 1st ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016).
[18] Doering-Manteuffel, Raphael, and Schlemmer, *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 37–170.
[19] Ibid., 173–290.

the changing perceptions of sports as an individual practice influenced by changing perceptions of gender and body.[20]

The final part of the collection examines the different perceptions and intellectual debates surrounding temporality in the era after the boom. The essays in this part elaborate on dimensions of time and space in the history of ideas of sixties radical movements and the emergence of poststructuralism as a paradigm in the humanities and social sciences, the shift in mentalities and upcoming post-historical sentiments, transforming horizons of expectations coinciding with changing labor markets, and the semantics of elitism within a new global class of leaders in the financial sector.[21]

In a lengthy opening essay to the collection, Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael also reflect in more detail than in *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart* on the impact and current state of research of their project *Nach dem Boom.* They proclaim that since the inception of the project, the discourse of *Zeitgeschichte* "has left the accustomed paths of tenacious advancement through the decades."[22] Engagement with source material and data from across academic disciplines has ended the constraints of archival blocking periods. They furthermore reiterate that *Zeitgeschichte* has begun to "become a problematized history (*Problemgeschichte*) of the present."[23] The project and publications following its methodological approach have served to strengthen the empirical foundation of research on a presentist contemporary history in Germany and across Europe.

However, eight years after the original publication of *Nach dem Boom*, the authors also see room for improvement in certain fields. In resemblance of Doering-Manteuffel's closing reflections in *Die Anfänge der Gegenwart,* they call for a more productive engagement with the plurality of temporalities emerging from the assessment of diverse ruptures in different sub-disciplines under the umbrella-concept of a singular structural rupture qualifying the epochal change.[24] They furthermore argue for a stronger engagement of the history of science and technologies with the rise of digitalization in the 1990s, which was central to the original thesis of a rise of digital finance capitalism, and which the authors now see as possibly revolutionary enough to justify another internal caesura (*Binnenzäsur*).[25] Finally, Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael hope for a further engagement of historians and social scientists focused on the development of democratic systems with the loss of state sovereignty implicit in the emergence of supranational digital finance capitalism central in *Nach dem Boom.*[26]

[20] Doering-Manteuffel, Raphael, and Schlemmer, *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 293–370.
[21] Ibid., 373–495.
[22] Ibid., 9.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 11–12.
[25] Ibid., 29.
[26] Ibid., 30.

Looking back on projects employing the framework of *Nach dem Boom,* they however also mention a number of historiographical trends in *Zeitgeschichte* outside of the direct vicinity of their research cluster. The authors proclaim that their project inspired a wider use of social sciences data in historical work, but that this entanglement between the disciplines also proved reciprocal: they see the formation of a "counterweight against the trend in social sciences to keep a distance from historical explanatory approaches and detailed critique."[27] They acknowledge a general resurgence of economic history as a response to the global turn, and they laud the establishment of new research centers for a global history of labor in Germany and the Netherlands.[28]

While the reception of the work in academic circles is hard to deny, it is important to acknowledge how the conceptual work of *Nach dem Boom* is also present in discourses that are aimed at a broader audience in the context of civic education. In a recent issue of *Aus Politik and Zeitgeschichte* on the 1980s, various essays take up the approach advocated by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael: Angela Siebold examines the history of the 1980s as an "area of tension between old and new."[29] Detlef Siegfried elaborates on the plurality of contrary processes emerging from similar structural changes, coinciding with the rise of right-wing rock music in his assessment of a new leftist understanding of popular music culture in West-Germany.[30] And finally Lutz Raphael reexamines the concept of the era after the boom in the same publication, arguing against what he calls a "fetish of decades" (*Dekadenkultur)* in *Zeitgeschichte,* which forestalls a nuanced periodization of contemporary narratives.[31]

The wide variety of scholarship stemming from the project *Nach dem Boom* not only underlines its significance with recent German historiography, it also demonstrates how the research cluster serves as a prime example for the German practice of *Zeitgeschichte.* In addition to that, the reception of the project beyond traditional academic circles exemplifies how *Zeitgeschichte* interacts with the public sphere and practitioners across disciplines.

While it successfully highlights the achievements of the research cluster in the recent years, the opening reflection of Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael in *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart* should also make the reader aware of the limitations of the project: Without downplaying the academic impact the conceptual framework of *Nach dem Boom* exerts, the scholarship making use of it is still quite confined

[27] Doering-Manteuffel, Raphael, and Schlemmer, *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 12.
[28] Ibid., 13 and 20. They are referring to the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam and the re:work cluster at Humboldt University of Berlin.
[29] Angela Siebold, "So nah und doch so fern? Die 1980er Jahre historisch erforschen," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 65. Jahrgang, no. 46/2015 (November 9, 2015), 3–8.
[30] Detlef Siegfried, "Die Subversive retten. Eine Denkfigur der 1980er Jahre" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 65. Jahrgang, no. 46/2015 (November 9, 2015), 13–19.
[31] Lutz Raphael, "1980er: Typische Jahre 'nach dem Boom,'" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 65. Jahrgang, no. 46/2015 (November 9, 2015), 8–13.

to a circle of mostly German academics. None of the major publications I have discussed have been translated into English. Only individual members of the research cluster have published occasional articles in English journals. It is time to take the authors' call for a transnational or even global turn in the historiography *Nach dem Boom* seriously and integrate their conceptual framework into global narratives. While the approach pursued by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael is decidedly aimed at explaining Western European history, the framework they use is not limited to European application. Central to their take on *Zeitgeschichte* is a narrative evolving around structural ruptures and the fragile transition from Keynesian models of governance to neoliberalism. The processes underlying these larger trends coincided with phenomena of globalization and global historians should aim at expanding Doering-Manteuffel's and Raphael's concepts as a perspective for entanglements of a global spatial reach. *Nach dem Boom* is integrated across historical sub-disciplines and makes extensive use of scholarship from outside the historic discipline, however, there is still a need to integrate the idea of revolutionary structural change in a global history of the present. As much as *Nach dem Boom* presented a historiographical experiment by transcending (sub-)disciplinary boundaries, global historians may benefit from approaching contemporary history from a broad 'universal' perspective, looking at cultural, social, economic, and political processes as one structurally integrated narrative to overcome challenges of different temporalities in a global spatial arena and identify structural ruptures on a global level.

The research cluster *Nach dem Boom* serves as a prime example for a progressive approach to the German practice of *Zeitgeschichte,* and I argue that academics following a global perspective can benefit widely from building on this approach. In the latter part of this essay I present a number of examples in which transnational or global historians have interacted with structural ruptures similar to those of Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael. Finally, I argue that the conceptual framework of *Nach dem Boom* is compatible and useful for examining contemporary history from a global perspective. Historiographically, a number of authors in world history have attempted to pursue a structurally integrated global narrative of the recent past. Most notably among these is Eric Hobsbawm in his work *Age of Extremes,* in which he follows the history of the 20th century from a universal perspective in the sense of earlier universal histories such as Arnold J. Toynbee's *A Study of History.* While Hobsbawm's treatment of recent history does not live up to the methodology of global history defining the field today, he can be seen as a predecessor to integrating entangled narratives into his mostly teleological framework of universal world history. Since Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael cite Hobsbawm multiple times in *Nach dem Boom*, the following part of my essay will briefly introduce his work.

Towards a Global Contemporary History

"The History of the twenty years after 1973 is that of a world which lost its bearings and slid into instability and crisis. And yet, until the 1980s it was not clear how irretrievably the foundations of the Golden Age had crumbled."[32] With these words, the great Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm made the transition into the 1970s in his major work on the 20th century, *The Age of Extremes.* Hobsbawm's passionate account of a troubled century is a universal history with a startling geographical and conceptual range, encompassing all corners of the earth and acknowledging currents across historical sub-disciplines.

It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Hobsbawm's unique take on history in detail, however there are a few details striking about his work that deserve mention in the context of a global perspective on *Zeitgeschichte*: First, *The Age of Extremes* is quoted and referred to by various writers within in the research cluster *Nach dem Boom,* including Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael. Second, its presentist, political approach to history bears resemblance to the framework advocated by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael (even though *Nach dem Boom* can hardly be considered a Marxist work). Genealogically, it is easy to trace back rough schemes for ideas elaborated by them, to the work of Hobsbawm. His chapter on "The Crisis Decades" widely examines the rise of neoliberalism and the demise of Keynesian economics in the "Western" world in the 1970s and 1980s. He suggests a similar periodization as *Nach dem Boom*, when he sets the recession and oil price crisis of 1973 as a rupture from the "golden age" and as the brink of troubled decades to follow. Hobsbawm furthermore identifies deindustrialization as the main cause of a shifting labor market across the globe. In regard to "Western" industrial societies he even acknowledges that the "rising unemployment of these decades was not merely cyclical but *structural.*"[33]

Even though *The Age of Extremes* might look like an early globally integrated predecessor to the narrative of *Nach dem Boom*, Hobsbawm misses a structural analysis in the sense of Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael in many ways: Hobsbawm's explanations, despite their insightfulness, are to a large degree teleological. He fails to account for the plurality of processes of continuity and discontinuity so central in the later German scholarship. It is because of that that he misses the contradictory developments of market capitalism and social welfare state in Sweden when he declares that "[a]t the end of the Short Twentieth Century the 'Swedish Model' [meaning Keynesian policy *par excellence*] was in retreat even in its own country", a prognosis that has been shown wrong by the absence

[32] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995). 403. I am citing from the first American edition published by Pantheon Books 1995, the book was originally published in Great Britain by Michael Joseph and Pelham Books, 1994.

[33] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, 413. Emphasis added.

of the decay of the Swedish welfare state.[34] Furthermore, while treating inequality in the different industrial societies in quite some detail, Hobsbawm sees the decades of crisis as a rather homogenous period, not acknowledging different temporalities of decay and response in diverse spatial contexts. Finally, he widely underestimates the growing discourse of neoliberalism and its influence on the rise of digital finance capitalism in the 1990s, when he asserts that "neo-liberal triumphalism did not survive the world economic setbacks of the early 1990s."[35] To be fair, it was hard for him to see these developments in hindsight, since his book was published in 1994, only shortly after the internet became publicly accessible and only on the verge of contemporary digitalization processes.

Outside of history departments, a number of mostly leftist sociologists and economists have developed notable treatments on the transformation of global capitalism and its dynamics in recent years. Among the most prominent works in this field are Luc Boltanski's and Eve Chiapello's *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (1999), which explores the influence of 1968 counterculture language on management texts, and proposes a rise of individualism in the rhetoric of financial culture beginning in the 1970s, Wolfgang Streeck's books *Re-Forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy* (2009) and the more radical *Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus.* (Purchased Time. The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism)*,* in which Streeck traces back the transformation of capitalism in Germany (and in the latter book also in the US and Japan) to the end of consensual politics in the 1970s, and to a degree the recent best-seller *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* by Thomas Piketty, who has a far wider timeframe of transformation, yet still does not contradict the findings of Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael.[36]

All these social science accounts have in common that they treat the economic and social phenomena described by Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael from a transnational if not even global perspective. As is common for work in these disciplines, all these accounts are furthermore fairly presentist, analyzing problems of the present by looking at the near past. However, a global historical account with strong presentist notion and an integration of a structural approach ranging across disciplines is still missing. Practitioners of global history aimed at informing about the present have mostly been confined to narratives of decolonization, the global Cold War, or generalized histories of globalization, which mostly fall

[34] For further assessment of Sweden's crisis decades in the 1970s and 1980s within the conceptual framework of *Nach dem Boom* see Lars Magnusson, "Do the Nordic Lights Shine Bright Again? Sweden's Response to the 1970s and 1980s Crisis," *Journal of Modern European History* Vol. 9, no. 2 (2011), 195–214.

[35] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes,* 412.

[36] Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, *Le nouvel ésprit du capitalisme.* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1999). Wolfgang Streeck, *Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Wolfgang Streeck, *Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus.* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013). Thomas Piketty, *Le capital au XXIe siècle* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2013).

short of reaching into the present moment, explaining processes that are still underway.[37]

Global historians should consider engaging with the practice of a presentist, political *Zeitgeschichte* as presented in this essay – the flexible toolbox provided by the methodology of *Nach dem Boom* which provides them with a starting point. In fact, a lot of the groundwork of the original study already bears the premises for a further global perspective on the topic: the pillars of Doering-Manteuffel's and Raphael's periodization lie in the recession connected to the oil price crisis in 1973. The oil price hike in itself presents a global moment that was only possible due to a globally integrated financial market. If we accept Sebastian Conrad's idea of global history as a historical perspective that acknowledges the integration of actors in a global network and then examines causation on a global level, the framework of *Nach dem Boom* presents us with a degree of approachable starting points.[38]

Many of the dynamics described in the case studies that followed the initial publication furthermore show regional or local aspects of transformation processes that took causation from larger integrated networks. This emphasis on locality only underlines the fact that the nation-state is not the appropriate container for the study of the presented ruptures anymore. It is up to global historians to uncover the entanglements between the diverse local narratives and larger supranational networks of causation, and weave them into an encompassing global narrative. In a 2012 article the global historian Andreas Eckert argued that the comprising transnational and regional literature on development policies had the potential to become "a building block among many, upon which in a few years eventually a global history of the 20th century à la Osterhammel might be written."[39] I argue that the conceptual framework of *Nach dem Boom,* indeed should become such a building block for global contemporary history.

[37] See for example: Dietmar Rothermund, *Memories of Post-Imperial Nations: The Aftermath of Decolonization, 1945–2013* (Daryaganj, Delhi, India: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung: Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen*, 5th ed. (München: C.H.Beck, 2007).

[38] Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?* (Princeton: Princeton Univers. Press, 2016).

[39] Andreas Eckert, "Globalgeschichte Und Zeitgeschichte," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 62. Jahrgang, no. 1–3/2012 (January 2, 2012), 28–32. He is referring to Jürgen Osterhammel's monumental account of the 19th century, see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung Der Welt. Eine Geschichte Des 19. Jahrhunderts.* (München: Beck, 2009).

Book Reviews

The Prospect of Global History

Edited by James Belich, John Darwin, Margret Frenz, and Chris Wickham, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 222, Hardback £35.00, ISBN: 978-0-198-73225-9

REVIEWED BY ALEXANDRA LEONZINI

The Prospect of Global History, edited by James Belich, John Darwin, Margret Frenz, and Chris Wickham, is a compelling anthology and the first book of a planned series to be produced by the Oxford Centre of Global History. Expressing an intention to "show how global history can be applied instead of advocated", the book is divided into three parts - Conceptual Considerations, Global Circulations, and Global Networks - and seeks to highlight the geographical and chronological range of global history studies today. The result is nuanced, informative, and, while not 'perfect', certainly promising.

The introductory essay written by Belich, Darwin and Wickman situates the book within the field and identifies three promising approaches to the writing of global history; globalization, comparison and connectedness. It is an interesting read, drenched in historical detail, which highlights global networks from the Romans to the present day, and argues that the global can be found further back in time than most historians have previously theorized. This argument, which is very much at the core of Peter Frankopan's recent publication *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World* (2015) is elaborated upon by Robert I. Moore in his chapter, 'A Global Middle Ages?', which challenges the convictions of historians like Christopher Bayly and Jürgen Osterhammel who, in their books *The Birth of the Modern World: Global Connections and Comparisons, 1780-1914* (2004) and *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (2014) respectively, have argued that global connectedness is a modern phenomenon. Moore instead argues that 500-1500 CE was an 'Age of Global Intensification' characterized by a sustained agricultural development in Eurasia which withstood the disastrous spread of plague in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and enabled the development of urban centers. As such, it is his suggestion that global historians turn to the history of the 'middle ages' to better understand the development of the modern world.

The first chapter of the anthology, Jürgen Osterhammel's 'Global History and Historical Sociology' is a fascinating piece and should be read by all students of history due to its strong emphasis on the benefits that interdisciplinary exchange has on scholarship. It is Osterhammel's contention that global history is not a self-contained field, but one in need of theoretical and terminological support from various parts of the systematic social sciences, particularly Historical Sociology, stating that, in the case of global history, "a lack of discursive autarchy and a shallow rootedness in mainstream historiography turn an interdisciplinary orientation

into a daily necessity" (p.24). Arguing that "historians are very rarely ambitious and competent originators of big ideas" (p.25), he states that it is in the best interests of historians to be "rational and discriminating shoppers at the marketplace of theory," for the discipline "suffers when it is chained to theoretical orthodoxy" (p.27). After highlighting the many methodological interests shared by global history and historical sociology, including the rejection of Eurocentrism and a focus on long-distance connectivity across national and cultural boundaries, Osterhammel discusses six types of global history and how their specific needs for theory can be met using sociological considerations and categories. His explanation of the differences between the Comprehensive, Universal, Movement, Competition, Network, and Connection histories produced by global historians today is illuminating, demonstrating a thorough and profound understanding of the current state of the art, and his predictions of decline should global historians continue to uncritically adopt and adapt key concepts from other fields offer much food for thought.

Belich's 'The Black Death and the Spread of Europe', Antony G. Hopkins' 'The Real American Empire', and Linda Colley's 'Writing Constitutions and Writing World History' also provide the reader with much to consider. An entertaining read, Belich's chapter discusses the positive impact that plague had on living standards and per capita trade in Europe from the mid-fourteenth century. It is his contention that the sudden depopulation of formerly overcrowded European centers triggered significant technological advancement and led to a restructuring of politics and socio-economy which facilitated later European expansion. Particularly fascinating is Belich's throwaway discussion on the relationship between disease and expansion in non-European centers by non-European actors, which really was worthy of greater attention.

Hopkins' 'The Real American Empire', discusses the territorial empire of the United States, issuing a call to historians of the US to resurrect and research this "real American Empire," which he argues was formally decolonized by 1959. The success of Hopkins' argument is reliant on a definition of 'empire' that is limited to territorial considerations, precluding culture, economy, and other spheres of influence. He rallies against what he perceives to be the anachronistic labelling of the United States as an empire in the second half of the twentieth century with little discussion as to why it has been perceived as such. In doing so, he ignores completely the relationship between culture and imperialism so eloquently outlined by Edward Said in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), and the effect America has had on the world since the decline of their territorial empire. Rather, this is examined by Linda Colley in 'Writing Constitutions and Writing World History', which is a wide-reaching study highlighting what historians can learn about empire, war, and gender in the long nineteenth century by examining the proliferation of written constitutions, like that of the US, in a global perspective.

It is important to emphasize that as a total package *The Prospect of Global History* is not prescriptive: it does not provide a blue print for the construction of a 'perfect' global history. Instead, Belich, Darwin, Frenz and Wickman have collected nine essays with diverging perspectives regarding how to best approach the writing of global history. These approaches will not strike any reader already familiar with global historiography as particularly new or innovative - globalization theory, comparative studies, and network theory are 'old hat' by now, but are important to recapitulate nonetheless. The volume's use of multiple approaches in the writing of global history, however, means that authors tend to contradict each other as to how to best approach scale and scope when writing global histories. The role of microhistory in a global framework is particularly contested, with Nicholas Purcell, in his essay 'Unnecessary Dependences: Illustrating Circulation in Pre-modern Large-scale History', stating that global history needs microhistory on a purely practical level as it is unrealistic to expect global historians to do and know everything, while Mather W. Mosca in 'The Qing Empire in the Fabric of Global History' is more circumspect, arguing that it can be difficult to 'scale up' from the micro and ensure that what is observable on a local scale is representative of larger 'macro' historical dynamics. Belich's argument that "a global approach need not be universal" (p.93) is emphasized in such disagreements and highlights the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of this developing field.

The nine essays collected within this anthology address many of the considerations and concerns historians have had when approaching history from a global perspective. Unintentionally, however, they also highlight some of the more troubling structural inequalities within the field today. For example, of the nine authors featured, all but one are male; with the exception of Osterhammel, all contributors are Anglo-American; only Purcell provides an in-depth analysis of non-English language materials, and even then, works with English translations of Arabic sources rather than the originals; and, Africa and Latin America are peripheral figures at best, while the bulk of the book is dedicated to Eurasia and the ever popular 'East vs West' divergence debate. While Darwin argues in the anthology's afterword that the appeal and values of global history "lie in the multiple vistas it opens up, in the connections it suggests, in the questions it asks" (p.183), it would be encouraging to see more diverse vistas 'opened up' and these questions asked by more diverse historians as the series continues. Despite these concerns, however, *The Prospect of Global History* has much to offer those in the field, and I have no doubt that Osterhammel's chapter alone will be mandatory for all students of global history to read in years to come.

Fielding Transnationalism

Edited by Julian Go and Monika Krause, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016. Pp. 242, Paperback $34.95, ISBN: 978-1-1192-3787-7

REVIEWED BY BJÖRN HOLM

Recent years have seen an upsurge in academic interest for using the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu to conduct historical analysis.[1] *Fielding Transnationalism,* the result of a workshop held in 2014 at Boston University, is the latest fruit of this trend, an attempt to demonstrate how the Bourdieusian concept of *fields* can be fruitfully put to use to analyze border-crossing historical phenomena. Contributions span from theory-laden discussions of Bourdieu to heavily empirical works where theory plays a minuscule role in the background. The actual "fielding", it seems, is quite a variable affair.

In a way, this variation can be seen as the natural outcome of the book's argument. In the introduction, Julian Go and Monika Krause convincingly argue that Bourdieu's theory is pliable enough to be helpful in a wide range of circumstances, and especially in cases where other frameworks prove to be too crude or dogmatic. This centerpiece is brimful of analytical inspiration and does a good job of explaining what Bourdieusian field theory is in a straightforward way – no small feat, considering the notorious academic verbiage produced by the theorist himself. Historians looking to expand their conceptual toolbox will be well-served to read it closely.

The theory under survey is markedly open-ended. Throughout his career, Bourdieu always underscored the importance of paying close empirical attention to circumstance. For him, a field denotes a hierarchically ordered set of *relations* with struggles ruled by specific "rules of the game", which render the field distinguishable from other modes of organization. These rules also outline the constellation of different kinds of capitals (e.g. cultural, social, and material) relevant to the field and their internal exchange rates for symbolic capital (legitimacy), as well as the field's relationship to other fields. The actors competing over positions in the field can be either people or organizations, so that the company of Volvo can be conceptualized as a field, but also as an actor in the field of car manufacturing.

There is no universal blueprint. The task to empirically determine the variables relevant in a particular field and fill the concepts with concrete meaning is left to the individual researcher. While Bourdieu's research traditionally focused on national cases, his theory is profoundly *relational,* knowing of no borders, and the authors insist that fields come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. In other

[1] E.g. Philip S. Gorski (ed.), *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

words, there is nothing inherent to the model that precludes it from being applied to transnational relations. Field theory is proposed as a non-teleological, highly empirical, and scalable alternative to other frameworks that have been used for the study of global events, many of which tend to postulate *a priori* logics of causality and focus on specific scales of analysis.

Unavoidably, the individual articles of the volume can only hint at the versatility of this transnationally extended theory. Three of them touch upon how new global arenas are formed or relate to the national. In a theoretical text, Larissa Buchholz posits that new fields can emerge not only by defining a practice autonomous from other fields, but also by defining a new *level* upon which struggles take place. She exemplifies this process with her own research on the international art scene. Her addition of *relative vertical autonomy* to the Bourdieusian dictionary seems necessary if we want to understand the various ways in which national fields relate to their global counterparts, how their logics clash or overlap, under what circumstances ideas transfer between levels, and how these transfers change them.

The study by Shai M. Dromi is another good example of how field theory elucidates the national-global complex, focusing on the budding years of the Red Cross movement in the 1800s. Somewhat paradoxically, the organization made use of nationalist rhetorics and imagery to establish itself in accordance with the local norms in different nations, while at the same time drawing upon its transnationality as an important source of legitimacy. This article is a challenge to the idea of blind transfers of ideas between levels and the assumption that humanitarian organizations are dichotomously counterposed to nationalism.

Nicholas Hoover Wilson looks at a struggle between two East India Company administrators in the 18th century with regard to corruption and the proper role of the state, tracing in it the transition to modern British imperialism. He uses Bourdieusian theory to understand the emergence of an "interest in disinterest" as the ruling idea on this field, but leaves the causal analysis of change to other theorists within the sociology of organizations. Whereas the theme is transnational, his use of Bourdieu is not, leaving the chapter more in line with traditional tendencies to cherry-pick among the frenchman's concepts.

Three other contributions consider how logics spread through field connections and struggles. In a thoroughly theorized and detailed version of Christopher Bayly's homogenization of forms, Martin Petzke makes use of Bourdieu's full range of concepts to show how campaigns of the international Christian missionary field prompted the emergence of a more formalized Hinduism.[2] The proselytizing efforts of Christians altered the rules of the game in the Indian religious field by quantifying the number of followers, which led to competition between the different religions of the area. Through a discussion of how Muslims and Hindus

[2] Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

gradually adapted to this new logic, the article makes a good case for using field analysis to pinpoint the spread of globalization.

Exploring a more contemporary theme, Lisa Stampnitzky shows how the US decision to publicly defend its use of torture during and after the Iraq War is best understood as a conscious strategy to respond to the emergence and strength of a transnational human rights infrastructure. Empirically-based, transnational Bourdieusian field theory here turns out to be better equipped than traditional theories on the spread of human rights, which tend to postulate that states will increasingly adhere to human rights norms in rhetorics, if not in practice.

Stephanie L. Mudge and Antoine Vauchez try to explain the European Central Bank's somewhat unexpectedly wide-ranging investment in science as a *field effect* of the interconnections of the organization with the financial world, politics, and academia. The article argues that enquiring into the multiple interconnections of an organization facilitates our understanding of the particularities and "accidents" ruling it.

Two of the essays focus on the field of sociology itself. George Steinmetz explains the dynamics of the French sociological field in the 20th century and how it related to colonial settings. His essay also outlines some of the potential advantages of seeing empires as networks of fields. He asserts that field theory enables the researcher to conceive of subalterns and elites as actors within the same interconnected framework without making Eurocentric assumptions as to the logic ruling each constituent part. Needless to say, these circumstantial analyses can also take into account power disparities and differences between metropole and different colonies, as well as between individual colonies. In Steinmetz' words, they "[refuse] to separate colonizer and colonized, metropole and colony, culture and economics, but [see] these as inextricably linked elements of an extremely complex figurational and relational whole" (p.99).

Monika Krause discusses how "model systems" express power disparities within academia. With the help of field theory, she argues, we can dissect hierarchies in global fields and start thinking about how to deal with them constructively. Given the enormous gulf still separating canonical history accounts and narratives of events seen as "peripheral", this theme holds special relevance in global history. As an example, she touches upon the question of the English language as an academic capital, which has leading journals soliciting the opinions of relatively inexperienced native English speakers over far more merited professors abroad.

Last but not least, Angéle Christin's ethnographical study of e-newsrooms in France and the US makes it clear that some border-crossing relationships are too unbalanced to be described as fields. Nevertheless, her essay illustrates that the search for fields leads to meaningful insights about the nature of global interactions. A basic survey of the autonomy of different logics or spheres of practice, whether in form or level, allows us to map different *types* of interconnectivity. Here, the field concept fruitfully serves as a frame of reference.

Such specific uses are important to underline, because they point towards the rewards of taking the time to familiarize oneself with the language of Bourdieu. While the present volume's theme holds significant interdisciplinary potential, all of the contributors are trained sociologists. Without clear-cut and easy-to-understand examples of the usefulness of the theory, it will be difficult to proselytize the use of Bourdieu beyond these disciplinary borders. In most countries, the discipline of "historical sociology" does not even exist. Many historians still have deep-seated misgivings about theorizing their narratives at all, instead relying on commonsensical language completely devoid of mumbo-jumbo. Conversely, Bourdieu argued that a complicated language was important for sociology, as it granted the discipline academic capital.[3] This difference in pedagogical perspective has perhaps always been there, albeit the introduction to the volume at hand competently manifests that the lines are blurry at best.

Indeed, nowadays, many historians navigate tricky theories with almost the same ease as political scientists. Most would agree, however, that the theorizing has to add significant value to the narrative for it to be worthwhile. In this respect, the pliability of Bourdieusian field theory in all its might is not just its greatest asset, but also its Achilles' heel. Bourdieu's more well-known and broadly used concept of *habitus,* for instance, has the advantage of constituting just a single word to explain. A theory should never be an end in itself, and most theories that require the historian to do as much explaining as Bourdieu does instead gather some of their academic value from favoring certain outcomes. In the introduction, Julian Go and Monika Krause argue that Foucauldian governmentality's vision of an ever-expanding discursive power or World System Theory's economic bipolarity where the core dominates the periphery, to name but two examples, contribute very significantly to any research endeavor by introducing pre-ordained, far-reaching causal implications. Undoubtedly, field theory's open empirical approach is both harder to explain and harder to adapt as an academic *agenda*. For many historians, I am sure, Bourdieu's concepts might really seem like gobbledygook, devoid of any obvious analytical trade-off.

Yet with patience, field theory can give the historian a means of narrating with great detail without losing track of the bigger picture. Take, for instance, the term "entanglement", so over-used in global history as a shortcut for denoting complex relations. Identifying the structures in Bourdieusian terms could help us specify exactly what we mean with such terms in concrete situations, a fact amply illustrated by George Steinmetz', Christin's, and Petzke's articles in the volume, among others. Barring a few exceptions, however, the articles at hand seldom discuss global-scale structures in great detail. To a large extent, this is an effect of the article format and the focus on the theory itself.

[3] E.g. Pierre Bourdieu, *Sociology in Question* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1993).

Arguably, however, transnational field theory would be better suited for so-called grand narratives than many other models, not least because it forces the analyst to take both cultural and economic capitals into account without presuming *a priori* the dominance of one or the other. The system's scalability enables the historian to zoom in and out among linked analytical levels. Its empiricism allows us to unite causal processes of different kinds into the same framework. In an earlier work, for instance, Julian Go has revealed how the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic capital helps in explaining the development in colonial policy from direct to indirect rule over the centuries as a result of changes in exchange rates for different kinds of capitals in the international arena.[4] Sadly, the concept of capital is barely touched upon in the contributions to this volume, excepting the introduction. Instead, most essays are more interested in the spread of field logics than the actual struggles contained in them. But what would a large-scale Bourdieusian analysis of the Great Divergence look like? Or one of the spread of civil rights and state revolutions starting in the 18th century? If and when more such grandiose questions are asked, which hopefully is just a matter of time, *Fielding Transnationalism* will be an excellent starting point for theoretical inspiration.

[4] Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: the British and American Empires, 1688 to Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace

By Susan L. Carruthers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. Pp. 400, Hardback $29.95, ISBN: 978-0-674-54570-0

REVIEWED BY SÉBASTIEN TREMBLAY

From the first lines of her well researched study on the U.S. American long postwar occupation in both the European and Pacific theaters, Susan L. Carruthers, professor of history at Rutgers University-Newark sets the tone for a political narrative, connecting the long years of military government to the failed contemporary occupation in the Middle East. Nevertheless, *The Good Occupation* is much more than a pamphlet on the caveats of military imperialism. It is a thorough inquiry and a magnificent example of methodical archival research.

Decentralizing the history of the U.S. presence in not only Japan and Germany but also in the first steps of the liberation of Sicily and Algeria from German occupation, Carruthers manages to dig up enough personal GI correspondence to draw a complete and far reaching tableau of the soldiers' everyday life. Indeed, halfway between cultural history, military history, and *alltagsgeschichte*, her investigation of countless ego documents, written by officers and by simple low-ranked soldiers, offers a new perspective on the less glossy events of the long postwar period in both Europe and Asia. In her own words, Carruthers aims to challenge a more prominent master narrative of the Axis' demise and the Allies' golden Liberation. In so doing, she intends to influence present day tendencies to appeal to the turbulent postwar era as an example of a 'good war' or a 'good occupation'. Only by exposing the thoughts of soldiers, she argues, it is possible to reveal the lesser-known aspects of the U.S. overseas regimes. Nevertheless, one of the core and most impressive aspects of the book is the shift between soldiers' ego documents and Carruthers' interest for both the occupiers and the occupied. Her phenomenal deconstruction of her source material, her reading both with and against the grain, and her brilliant analysis of the power structures at play, offer the reader an almost complete picture of both the dominant and the subaltern voices.

By starting her book on the home front and before the early days of Liberation, Carruthers manages to open her book with a condensed version of her research, namely the dissident voices in both Congress and the civilian population and the ongoing debates on isolationism during the first half of the twentieth century in the United States of America. However, although the first chapter presents the reader an overview of the U.S. efforts of preparation, the real *pièce de résistance* of Carruthers' *tour de force* starts with the second chapter onward, a thematic analysis of the occupations on both continents. More than a comparative study of military decisions and decrees in Germany and Japan, Carruthers offers a global

moment, a contextualized still frame of the United States' imperial expansion beyond the Western hemisphere. By mixing the GIs' reactions in Okinawa and the German (and Austrian) U.S. occupation zones, Carruthers puts forward a decentralized history of race relations, of gender and of the body. Each chapter of her superb exploration of the GIs' thoughts and deeds challenges preconceived ideas of a national grand narrative, without falling in usual traps in which less experienced historians could have fallen.

For instance, her chapter on the relationships between GIs, and German as well as Japanese women, rape, the failed fraternization, and the regulation of sexuality goes beyond the usual 'American soldiers also raped women' political undertone, and exposes not only the fact that officers knew what was going on, but that the intersection of race and gender played an important role. Furthermore, her examination of non-consensual and consensual relationships, based on the aforementioned ego documents, exposes multiple reactions, from women reading the letters of their husbands, to the sexual bragging of young GIs, and finally to campaigns in the press both at home and abroad. Moreover, Carruthers pairs this history of gender (of masculinities and female survival tactics to sexual violence) to a broader history of the body. It is fascinating to see the parallels between the self-proclaimed 'civilizing mission' of the military government and the constant fixation of GIs and what they consider filthy and subhuman. Carruthers analysis of the soldiers' disgust and their portrayal of natives in both Europe and Asia recall the work of Ann Stoler (e.g. *Race and the Education of Desire*)[1], as it clearly identifies the colonial subtext of the Liberation.

Nowhere is this discourse more present than in Carruthers' chapter about displaced persons during the early years of the postwar era. By exposing the soldiers disdain for the 'filth' of Holocaust survivors, their condemnation of 'looting and chaos' and the incendiary and anti-Semitic remarks from generals (Patton is one notable example) to the simplest of GIs, Carruthers once more sheds light on a less prestigious aspect of the "good occupation", of the victory of 'democracy' over the Axis. Nonetheless, Carruthers' endeavor seems at times unpolished. For example, her exhaustive research and inspection of the GIs' race relations, of segregation within the U.S. army and its hypocritical discourse on freedom and liberty might be excellent, but it lacks broader context. By exposing the U.S. American racism in Europe and Asia without paralleling it with the racism in post-fascist societies like Germany and Japan, Carruthers might raise some eyebrows by offering only one side of the picture. The same can be said about her tendency to present Germans and Japanese as suffering under the yoke of occupation. This is not to say that her book is to be classified in the dubious array of revisionist studies. Her research is well documented and necessary in order to broaden the

[1] Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

discussion on the topic, but it could have benefited of a more subtle approach to the dichotomy of perpetrators and victims, a subtlety that might have been lost in her eagerness to dispute a narrative popular amongst certain sections of the Left in countries like Germany and Austria, in which the benevolent Yankee brought freedom and chocolate bars.

The last part of the book, an interesting day-to-day analysis of the *alltage-schichte* of boredom, the black-market and the so-called 'domestification' of occupation is where Carruthers is at her brightest. By opposing the official discourse to the reality as the GIs and their families perceived it, she manages to entangle the various aspects of her previous chapters. Bored, frustrated and unsure of their own position in both Asia and Europe, the GIs were implicated in cases of petty theft (excused by their status as occupiers), cases of murder (excused by racial power structures), and cases of violence against their own and against women (excused by a so-called degeneration of their morals). By emphasizing on the desire of soldiers to go home, on the officers' efforts to cover things up, and on the resistance and revolts of some GIs, Carruthers finishes to paint a grandiose portrait of the situation behind the military walled communities and the relations between GIs, their families and the occupied.

Yet, Carruthers seems to lose her breath in her conclusion. The final pages of her book seem rushed in a mere repetition of her thesis and do not do justice to an overall outstanding and brilliant research. The same can be said about the lack of theoretical analysis of her source material. Throughout her book, she pairs her original findings, the ego documents, with newspaper articles and press clips from well-established magazines. It seems, at times, that she puts these journalistic accounts on the same level as the previously mentioned diaries and letters, and the reader is left to believe that she does not differentiate the two. In spite of that, the genius of her case study is such, that one is forced to forgive these small mishaps for the benefit of a groundbreaking study of the time period.

Undoing Monogamy: The Politics of Science and Possibilities of Biology

By Angela Willey, Durham: Duke University Press, 2016. Pp. 195, Paperback $23.95, ISBN: 978-0-822-36159-6

REVIEWED BY ARUNIMA KUNDU

Angela Willey's *Undoing Monogamy* is an interdisciplinary exploration of the concept of monogamy within the cultural context of the United States of America in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. She seeks to undermine the assumptions about human nature and biology underlying previous feminist discourses that seek to challenge monogamy's compulsory status while ultimately reinforcing it. She also seeks to challenge contemporary feminist claims that the only alternative to monogamy is non-monogamy and/or polyamory. She argues that attempts "to imagine human nature as non-monogamous, however marginalized, often reproduce the logics underlying monogamy's naturalization" (p.2). The book borrows from the following disciplines and methodological frameworks: feminist and queer theory, the natural sciences, philosophy, anthropology of science, critical science studies, history, literary and cultural studies. By looking at monogamy in a variety of contexts; as a "bioscientific object" (p.2); ethnographic fieldwork in a neuroscience laboratory; and critical readings of documents from genomics to comics, Willey aims to challenge the lens through which human nature is seen as monogamous or non-monogamous, and by doing so, seeks to show us how this forces us to "reconsider our investments in coupling and in disciplinary notions of biological bodies" (p.5). However, this book concerns itself only with methodology: it is more about how to "undo" monogamy, rather than a narration of an undoing of monogamy. The author does not deconstruct monogamy per se; rather, she describes a method to deconstruct it.

Willey writes that feminist critiques of monogamy have challenged the naturalization of monogamy and discourses about what she calls "compulsory monogamy" (p.4), but (as she shows later in the book) have naturalized non-monogamy in the process. In these discourses, monogamy is seen as a central feature of femininity and female sexuality. She adds a queer feminist dimension to this critique by challenging the use of the heteronormative, dyadic structure to define homosexual relationships, and also the assumptions about the monogamous and non-monogamous nature of homosexual and bisexual relationships respectively. She also shows how "compulsory monogamy" was central to the colonial project of nation-building of the nineteenth and the twentieth century and contains significant racial undertones. This project was accompanied by the development of a scientific discourse that asserted the naturalness of monogamy, while simultaneously gendering the concept. Monogamy, writes Willey, is an a priori assumption informing scientific research even today. Scientific naturalization genders mo-

nogamy by assuming the naturalness of monogamy in females, while producing a variety of theories of male monogamy in different situations.

Feminist critiques have done their best to maintain the nature-culture binary while talking about monogamy. They have always looked for cultural explanations of monogamy and rejected biological ones because science, according to feminist critique, is a 'social construction'. Willey argues for a "naturecultural" world (p.17), beyond the nature-culture binary because what we know as "nature" and "culture" have coevolved together- and here lies her methodological intervention. She argues that feminist engagements with monogamy would benefit greatly from knowledge of "the body" and the material world. She claims that feminists are unable to "productively engage with data" until they take into account what she calls "politics of science"[1] (p.21). She further argues that nuanced and careful narratives about relationships between feminism, science, and the body enable the work of producing "newly accountable knowledges about the materiality of the naturecultural world" (p.22). Her aim is to approach monogamy as a "naturecultural object" with its own histories and "embodied realities" (p.22). Therefore, the central argument of the book may be roughly summarized as follows: "[…] monogamy and non-monogamy are not biologically distinct conceptual or behavioral phenomena and that a naturecultural approach to their embodied reality opens space for new imaginings that non-monogamy's naturalization does not" (p.75).

The main body of the book is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is a genealogy of monogamy as an object of sexual scientific knowledge. Willey reads the discourses of monogamy in the major works of two sexologists – Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis – to locate monogamy within the historiography of sexual science and to reveal the racial underpinnings of monogamy's nature. Chapter two challenges the a priori assumption of the naturalness of monogamy in scientific research. Willey does this using the reports from the genomic research conducted by a laboratory headed by Dr. Larry Young at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center in Atlanta, involving a special type of rodents called prairie voles that are assumed to be monogamous. She shows us how sexuality is assumed to be the basis for bonding behavior and that this is the root cause behind the assumption that monogamy is natural. The third chapter addresses her central argument and discusses how feminist critiques of monogamy have viewed non-monogamy or polyamory as its only alternative and have also in turn naturalized these concepts in an attempt to denaturalize monogamy. The fourth chapter deals with Willey's methodological innovation that she calls "Dyke Ethics of 'Antimonogamy'" and is arguably the most interesting part of the book. Here she challenges the centrality of sexuality in the concepts of monogamy and polyamory

[1] By this, she refers to the fact that scientific research is never free from the biases of the scientist and one cannot dissociate politics from science; in explaining this, she draws on feminist science studies and shows how science (used of political gains) has contributed to the naturalization of gender norms and therefore, the gendered understanding of monogamy.

and argues that other forms of bonding behavior like friendship and community feeling should be taken into consideration and this would enable us to visualize many other forms of human relationship outside the heteronormative sexual dyad. She bases her arguments on Alison Bechdel's comic series *The Essential Dykes to Watch Out For*. In the final chapter, she looks at monogamy as a "bioscientific object" and underlines the "possibilities of biology"; and in doing so, shows us how "antimonogamy" can benefit from scientific data.

Undoing Monogamy is a fascinating book that offers a very innovative methodological intervention. Willey's interdisciplinary approach makes it all the more engaging. However, the book would have benefitted from a global approach to the concept of monogamy. Although Willey does not claim to be writing a global history of monogamy, her first chapter promises a transnational approach that very quickly disappears by the beginning of chapter two. In her first chapter, through considering narratives about "monogamy in canonical sexological texts produced in a world made global by colonial and imperial projects" (p.27), she refers to certain transnational discourses about monogamy that were responsible for its naturalized, compulsory status. She also links larger colonial narratives of race, sexuality, gender and nation-building to the discourses of compulsory monogamy. However, the second chapter abruptly takes us to twenty-first century USA and its contemporary genomic research projects. The rest of the book is situated firmly and entirely within the cultural context of the United States. Willey could have, for example, situated the contemporary US feminist critiques in a global context. Moreover, her use of a variety of conceptual paradigms initially makes the central argument very complicated and difficult to comprehend, especially for a reader who is not well-versed in feminist or queer theory and associated discourses. Some terms also seem to be synonymously used (for example, her use of "nonmonogamy" and "polyamory" interchangeably), making it difficult to know whether one needs to differentiate between the concepts.

Nevertheless, the book is a very interesting read and Angela Willey creates a methodological innovation through it that will be useful to the present and future scholars of feminist and queer studies. The most important contribution of the book is that it makes us rethink human relationships and opens our minds to various possibilities of relationships – be it sexual or otherwise – between one or more individuals. It also helps us think beyond the nature-culture binary and imagine a world where nature and culture have coevolved. *Undoing Monogamy* is definitely a significant addition to the scholarship on history of sexuality, queer history, feminist and gender studies.

Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan

By Timothy Nunan, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. 336, Hardback £64.99, ISBN: 978-1107112070

REVIEWED BY RYAN GLAUSER[1]

Historians have typically opened discussions about Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and occupation with a narrative about the flight into Kabul. Nunan opens his book in a similar fashion, except he tells of the arrival of a Soviet journalist, a plane full of Soviet party workers and development experts, and their ambitions for the future of Afghanistan. This opening narrative is used to frame the discussion around neither the political and diplomatic intricacies of the war, nor the story of the *mujahidin* and their efforts. Instead, the book focuses on a handful of themes – such as development, humanitarian and international actors and their ideas and images of Afghanistan, communism in Afghanistan, gender and feminism, sovereignty, and borders – by examining the relationships between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, NGOs, and the international scene. By approaching Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion from a development framework and historiography, Nunan attempts to demonstrate the immense influence both the Soviet Union and NGOs had within the nation; as well as the lack of control of the outcome these same institutions had in implementing their ideas and programs. Effectively, he challenges the idea that Afghanistan was a graveyard for empires; rather, it was a graveyard for the 'Third World'.

The book is broken into seven sections. Nunan begins with the historiographical traditions and problems that have plagued historical narratives of Afghanistan and Central Asia during the Cold War. The second section discusses Soviet, West German, and American development projects. Differences between the three projects not only demonstrate the diversity and plethora of ideas that entered Afghanistan in the 1950s, but also the eerily similar methods used to justify 'Western' and 'Eastern development'. The third section introduces the conflict between Soviet attempts at societal transformation through education and humanitarian efforts. Nunan suggests that the "Soviet global project destroyed states within borders; humanitarian actors crossed borders in order to challenge illiberal state functions." (p.120) He attempts to further this discussion by including the difficulties faced by Komsomol programs due to a lack of interest in local issues by Komsomol and Soviets experts and the steady alienation of religious and local leaders. Eventually, this general discussion about the conflict between two images of the

[1] Currently, Ryan Glauser is studying in the Global History M.A. program at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, where Timothy Nunan is a lecturer and researcher.

world comes to a head in the fifth section with an examination of the debate on women's rights and feminism. Here, Nunan argues that "the insistence on politics at the cost of morality turned Afghan women into a male factory worker; the insistence on morality at the cost of politics turned her into a victim." (p.206) Thus, Nunan demonstrates that, within the Cold War context, Afghan women were used as tools to further both socialist development and humanitarian interventions, depending on the goals of local political actors. However, as he convincingly shows, this does not mean that one can ignore the local issues that these women were advocating.

These arguments and ideas are brought together in the final two sections which discuss the lack of borders, or**,** in some cases, the extreme rigidity caused by fluctuating borders. This discussion begins with the deployment of Soviet Border Forces within Afghanistan and the problems facing local Afghans, Soviet soldiers, humanitarian NGOs, and the *mujahidin* that encountered a fluid border situation inside Afghanistan. Instead of confronting the reality of a 'leaky' border, both the Soviets and NGOs entered into a state of denial by relying on their ideas of nation-states; thus causing their missions and ideas to fail in the face of war and local Afghan interpretations. These failures and the inability to cope with them caused the international community to define Afghanistan as a 'failed state'. Nunan demonstrates these failures by examining the fall of Soviet control in Qandahar and the jading of NGO missions in conjunction with the ideas in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. In his final remarks, history is extended to the present, to the American involvement within Afghanistan after 9/11 and the American idea that 'failed states' are the greatest security threat to the 'free world.' Nunan does not end on that note, since most of his book revolves around Soviet and humanitarian NGO interventions into Afghanistan. He concludes by stating that "the dreams of development, humanitarianism, and Russian power in the world together form an indelible part of Afghanistan's past, but they have become our shared future." (p.285) Thus, for Nunan, the developmental history of Afghanistan and the appeared failures of the developmental approach remain vital in any present-day discussion surrounding Afghanistan.

These conclusions are based on extensive archival research, oral histories with former Soviet experts and leaders, and former NGO professionals, and bounds of non-Anglophone secondary sources. With Nunan's first-hand experience in Central Asia, the locale is not excluded. He attempts to conquer his biases and approach the local on their own terms by narrating their daily experiences. Nevertheless, local Afghan accounts are sparse. With only a handful of local testimonies, the book reads, at times, like a Western attempt to delegitimize the Soviet ideas and schemes for development and the 'Third World.' However, in Nunan's defense, he states that "security conditions and politics of memory in Afghanistan make sustained in-country research challenging." (p.14) Although that caveat

does not exonerate the lack of Afghan testimonies, the current political status of Afghanistan opens future opportunities to fill the oral testimonial hole within Nunan's book.

Simultaneously, Nunan unexpectedly presents the political and present-day issues with researching history in both a global and development context. Due to the history of development and the Cold War, 'failed states' and 'unfriendly regimes' create situations in which historians must decide how to advance their research. In Nunan's case, he continued his work and visited Central Asian, Russian, and Indian archives, in addition to interviewing local people while he was in-country. By not allowing 'failed state' diplomacy and politics to hinder academic research, he manages to bring a nuanced approach to the historiography of development and Afghanistan. Rather than a graveyard for empires, Afghanistan was a laboratory where Soviet, humanitarian, and Western world views were challenged and permanently reshaped. Afghanistan influenced the world in which we live in today in more ways than 'producing' terrorism and the concept of a 'failed state'.