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In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, 'Global Histories: a student journal' aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion and intellectual exchange for a new generation of

scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

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Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

The topic of migration has dominated public debate in recent years. Patterns of migration may pose challenges to national self-perception, indeed, to concepts of nationalism itself. Debates surrounding the current so-called 'crisis' of refugees in Europe also tend to overlook the trajectories of migrants from their countries of origin to a wide variety of destinations. A global history perspective allows us to critically re-examine these claims, and provides an alternative framework for contextualising migration flows as well as analysing the causes and impact of such phenomena from a historical, trans-regional perspective. In this edition, we have a diverse array of papers demonstrating the scope of migration as a field for historians. Global history has especially emphasised the importance of ensuring migration is not simply a story of 'happy connections', and that immigrants themselves are not reduced into an amorphous, agentless, mass following greater trends without input. Both of these points find themselves addressed throughout the papers of this edition, across a wide spectrum of both spatial and chronological locations.

We begin with Robin Möser's article, which brings the field of migration history up to the contemporary period. He examines the connections between xenophobic sentiment and migration patterns in post-apartheid South Africa, focussing on attitudes to immigrants from the neighbouring countries of Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Showing that migration is not only a modern phenomenon, Shweta Raghu considers the colonial implications of works by two Dutch painters in the sixteenth century, contextualising Eckhout's and Post's paintings within contemporary discourses on representation, exoticism, and consumerism, and placing their artistic representations of West Indian natives into the context of Dutch imperial ambition and practice.

Chiara Ricci studies the development of anti-immigration discourse in British newspapers from 1958 to 1985, examining how the expression of opposition to Commonwealth migration to Britain evolved from fears over the racial integrity of the nation to include fears of difference in regards to culture and religion.

Baptiste Sibiude considers twentieth century relations between the French and Gabonese in Gabon using oral histories of French expat family members to create a microhistory and then examines how the wider implications of French/Gabonese relationships through these memories, and explores the strengths and limitations of such an approach.

Jan Philipp Wilhelm, who demonstrates the strengths of a micro-historical approach to global history, tracing larger transnational migration patterns through consideration of one family in the Banat Swabian village of Sackelhausen/Săcălaz in Central Eastern Europe, and reflecting on the possible contributions that the

study of this particular group's migration history can offer for a better understanding of European migrations in the twentieth century.

Adrian Franco reviews the field of environmental migration history, and strongly argues for the importance of keeping people in the frame when using overarching narratives of migration related to climate change. He emphasises the value of using a framework which includes human rights and a micro-historical focus on individuals and their personal narratives of forced migration in order to prevent overarching macro-narratives about environmental factors reducing immigrants to a homogenous mass.

Finally, we would like to bring our latest projects to your attention. Two new student projects are in the pipeline with a multimedia focus and we encourage you to check out our article 'Future projects' for more information.

We hope you enjoy our second edition,

Your Editorial Team

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the continued support and assistance for this project by the Freie Universität Berlin, particularly the Global History faculty and the Online Journal Systems team.

We would like to acknowledge the dedication and hard work of this edition's student team, without whom this issue would not have been possible: Maurice Boer, Oscar Broughton, Violet Dove, Willem van Geel, Alexandra Holmes, Philipp Kandler, Elisabeth Köller, Dennis, David Lang, Alexandra Leonzini, Benedict Oldfield, Yorim Dominique Spoelder, Daria Tashkinova, and Barbara Uchdorf. Thanks also go to Jamie Beeching and Joel Grossman for proofreading help.

We would also like to thank and acknowledge the work of the authors published in this edition, with whom we have had an extensive and fruitful collaboration throughout the production of this journal: Adrian Franco, Robin Möser, Shweta Raghu, Chiara Ricci, Clare Richardson, Baptiste Sibieude and Jan Philipp Wilhelm.

Conference Articles

Migration Policy and Xenophobia in the New South Africa: The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiments and Apartheid's Inherited Policy Framework, 1994-2008

ROBIN EPHRAIM MÖSER

Robin Möser received a BA in African Studies (2013) and a MA in Global Studies (2015) both from the University of Leipzig, Germany. He is currently a member of the Graduate School "Global and Area Studies" at the Research Academy of the University of Leipzig and pursues his PhD Project "The termination of the South African nuclear weapons program: an analysis of the reasons for dismantling, 1985-1993". Robin Möser emphasizes the transnational entanglements of the nuclear disarmament process in South Africa and his work is based on archival research and interviews in South Africa, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria and the United States. His research interests include the global Cold War, nuclear decision-making, Apartheid, and global history.

This paper engages with transnational migration to South Africa and the immigration policies of the democratically elected ANC government. It is the aim to highlight the spill-over effects of migration policies designed during Apartheid on the anti-foreigner climate in South Africa after 1994, exemplified most obviously by the continuation of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. There is reason to believe that migration to and xenophobia in South Africa are closely intertwined phenomena which should be analyzed in tandem. Therefore, the xenophobic violence in 2008 serves as a reference point against which the policy analysis unfolds. The argument made in this paper is that the initial reluctance by the post-Apartheid government to address Apartheid's continuities in the migration legislation of the new South Africa encouraged a growing anti-foreigner sentiment that erupted in early 2008. However, this does not mean that explanations of xenophobia rest only on single factors. Instead, a comprehensive analysis must include a multitude of political and socio-economic factors, with an engagement of the continuities of Apartheid's immigration policies as one of them.

Introduction

There are quite a number of different factors that play into the decision of a group of people to begin migration, not limited to, but often reliant upon the political/economic situation in their home region. Today, there might certainly be no village, city, region or much less a state that is not witnessing aspects related to international migration, often being either a sender or a recipient of human beings. Southern Africa and South Africa in particular are no exception.[1] Since the

[1] Aurelia Segatti, "Migration to South Africa: Regional Challenges versus National Instruments and Interests," in *Contemporary Migration to South Africa: A Regional Development Issue*, ed. Loren Landau and Aurelia Segatti (Washington: World Bank 2011), 9-30.

early 1990s, South Africa has experienced, like any other African country, diverse migration configurations and serves today as a place of origin, transit, and destination for legal migrants, as well as those coming without papers or visa.[2]

In this paper, I engage with migration to South Africa in the post-Apartheid period after the piecemeal end of Apartheid. The occurrence of rising anti-foreigner sentiment within the country is likewise analyzed, because there is reason to believe that migration to and xenophobia in South Africa are closely intertwined phenomena. With regard to the period analyzed in this paper, the first democratic elections in 1994 constitute an important caesura in the recent history of the country and therefore serve as an adequate starting point. However, ten years had to pass until the first post-Apartheid Immigration Bill was implemented by the ANC government, with some scholars going as far to call this period a "lost decade" for the country with regard to immigration policy.[3]

This paper sets out to highlight the spill-over effects of immigration policies designed during Apartheid on the anti-foreigner climate in democratic South Africa after 1994, exemplified most obviously by the continuation of the Aliens Control Act. The xenophobic violence in 2008 serves as a reference point against which this analysis unfolds.

However, as some scholars argue, it is difficult to set an exact date for the end of Apartheid, therefore the latter is not interpreted as a sudden rupture but rather as an incremental transformation from the late 1980s to the elections in 1994.[4] But even this milestone does not signal the end of a process which some argue has taken much longer, especially concerning the change in people's perceptions.[5]

The focus on policies is especially interesting because, as Anderson argues, the actual level of immigration to South Africa has been lowered by laws, policies and procedures,[6] quite to the contrary of what popular media discourses proclaim with regard to the allegedly rising number of foreigners. Most prominently this refers to the political crisis within Zimbabwe in 2007/08 during which migrants crossed the border into the Republic of South Africa. The numbers of migrants became grossly exaggerated by the media which referred to a "human tsunami"

[2] Aderanti Adepoju, "Internal and international migration within Africa," in *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, ed. Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John O. Oucho and Johan van Zyl (Cape Town: HSRC Press 2006), 26-46.

[3] Jonathan Crush and Belinda Dodson, "Another Lost Decade: The Failures of South Africa's Post-Apartheid Migration Policy," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie"* 98 (2007): 437.

[4] Holly E. Reed, "Moving Across Boundaries: Migration in South Africa, 1950-2000," *Demography* 50 (2013): 74.

[5] Segatti, *Migration to South Africa*, 9-11.

[6] Barbara A. Anderson, "Migration in South Africa in comparative perspective," in *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, ed. Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John O. Oucho and Johan van Zyl (Cape Town: HSRC Press 2006), 99-105.

coming from neighboring Zimbabwe. This in turn had an impact on the anti-foreigner sentiment in South Africa which culminated a little later.[7]

In May 2008, a wave of violent attacks aimed at migrants from other African countries hit South Africa's metropolitan areas, spreading rapidly to almost every province in the country. The devastating attacks led to the death of 62 people,[8] left hundreds wounded and several thousand displaced.[9] Most of South Africa's population, along with the rest of the world, were caught by surprise when international media covered the event.[10]

In this paper an emphasis is placed on migration from within southern Africa,[11] in particular those from the neighboring countries of Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Subject of analysis are the South African national policies vis-à-vis international cross-border migration.

In order to get an idea of the significance of immigration into South Africa, and of South African attitudes in response, it is important to give "[…] reference to the migration history of the country and the Southern African region".[12] Accordingly, it is imperative to acknowledge century-old flows of human beings migrating to certain sectors of the country as well as the long tradition of return migration, especially in the first half of the twentieth century. Over time, the migrant labor system stretched across the whole region to satisfy the workforce demand of the mines and farms in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, Swaziland and Botswana, while its core had always been in South Africa.[13]

The regime change in South Africa and the first black government in power stirred the expectations in neighboring countries that the new government would facilitate easy migration from within the region, because:

[7] Jean Pierre Misago, "Disorder in a changing society: Authority and the micro politics of violence," in *Exorcising the Demons within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa*, ed. Lauren B. Landau (Johannesburg: Wits University Press 2011), 91.

[8] More than a third of the victims were South African citizens.

[9] Judith Hayem, "From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic Violence and National Subjectivity in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 39 (2013): 78.

[10] Christine Fauvelle-Aymar and Aurelia Segatti, "People, space and politics: An exploration of factors explaining the 2008 anti-foreigner violence in South Africa," in *Exorcising the Demons within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa*, ed. Lauren B. Landau (Johannesburg: Wits University Press 2011), 56.

[11] In other words, the focus lies on migration from within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which, besides South Africa, consists of the following member states: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[12] Aurelia Segatti, "Reforming South African Immigration Policy in the Postapartheid Period (1990-2010)", in *Contemporary Migration to South Africa: A Regional Development Issue*, ed. Loren Landau and Aurelia Segatti (Washington: World Bank 2011), 31.

[13] Oliver Bakewell and Hein de Haas, "African Migrations: Continuities, discontinuities and recent transformations", in *African Alternatives*, ed. Leo de Haan, Ulf Engel and Patrick Chabal (Leiden: Brill 2006), 13.

> […] countries had linked their fate to that of the blacks in South Africa, supported their liberation struggle and engaged in an armed struggle against Apartheid. It was hoped that democratic South Africa would acknowledge the contribution made by the Southern African region […].[14]

Indeed, the argument made in this paper is that the continuation of Apartheid migration policies, such as the Aliens Control Act, negatively impacted migrants entering South Africa, who expected better treatment from the new black government in power. Hostile legislation was replicated by citizens' perception of entitlement and resulted in actions against actual and perceived foreigners. This in turn led to a prevailing climate of xenophobia within the country which culminated in 2008.

By now, it is an established fact that following the end of Apartheid, South Africa has become a center for migration, both within the region and for the rest of the continent.[15] That being said, it is not clear how many people have migrated into the country since the demise of Apartheid and varying estimates of the number of migrants living in South Africa exist. Indeed, there is widespread agreement among scholars that more detailed research needs to be carried out in order to formulate more reliable data, as many believe that the numbers used by the media and in public discourses are grossly exaggerated.[16]

Taking a closer look at migration policies during the first decade following the end of minority-rule will help explain the high levels of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa. Therefore, the underlying research question for this essay is: what are the continuities and discontinuities in the migration policies of the 'new' South Africa after 1994, and how exactly are they related to xenophobia?

As suggested by most of the literature aforementioned, a profound analysis of these enduring anti-foreigner sentiments should bring in a historical dimension. Superficial explanations by the media have the tendency to exacerbate anti-foreigner sentiments, thus, creating a climate in which reproduced stereotypes are often taken for granted.[17]

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[14] Reno Modi, "Migration to Democratic South Africa," *Economic and Political Weekly* 38 (2003): 1759.

[15] Bakewell and de Haas, *African Migration*.

[16] Audie Klotz, "Migration after apartheid: Deracialising South African foreign policy," *Third World Quarterly* 21 (2010): 838; Modi, *Migration to Democratic South Africa*; John O. Oucho, "Cross-border migration and regional initiatives in managing migration in southern Africa", in *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, ed. Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John O. Oucho and Johan van Zyl (Cape Town: HSRC Press 2006), 47-70; Segatti, *Migration to South Africa*, 32.

[17] Francis B. Nyamnjoh, "*Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa*" (Dakar: Codesria Books 2006); Michael Neocosmos, "*From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners': Explaining Xenophobia in Post-apartheid South Africa*" (Oxford: Codesria 2010); Marguerite Duponchel, "Who's the alien? Xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa," *WIDER Working Paper* 003 (2013): 1-35.

Migration to South Africa since the 19th century

Most literature on migration to South Africa agrees that the country attracted significant numbers of migrants since at least the mid-19th century – before colonial borders were drawn. This history of intra-regional migration is likely the main reason for the single regional labor market that emerged during the 20th century.[18]

In addition, the discovery of gold and diamonds brought thousands of people into the country who looked for work in the newly established mining sector. Back then, the majority of migrants came from within the SADC region, notably in the 1920s from Lesotho and Swaziland. These two countries later signed bilateral labor agreements with the Apartheid-state, which included the main characteristic of the migrant labor recruiting system, namely, that foreign workers would be denied the right to permanently work or reside in South Africa.[19]

Throughout the twentieth century, male cross-border labor migration dominated and became the most prevalent form of legal migration within the Southern African region.[20] However, as indicated by Bakewell and de Haas, a number of sectors such as farming, plantation work, domestic services, transport and construction lacked sufficient labor supply which resulted in the formal system of labor migration that predominately supplied mining labor, being supplemented by a "parallel system of irregular migration".[21]

For a long time these patterns gave rise to a crisscrossing of often unskilled laborers between various sectors who were at the same time subject to an exploitative recruitment system.[22]

After the National Party came into power in 1948, serious attempts to systematically plan the source and composition of immigration into the country manifested itself in the resulting policies. The Apartheid government favored a "temporary oscillatory migrant system" that saw labor migrants return to their country of origin after their contract had expired.[23]

Increasingly since the 1950s and parallel to the temporary migration schemes for black people, the white minority government pursued a strategy that helped to attract and recruit skilled "ethnically desirable migrants". The minority government perceived the need to enforce such policies because during this time the proportion of white South Africans with regard to the overall population was shrink-

[18] Modi, *Migration to Democratic South Africa*; Jonathan Crush, Vincent Williams and Sally Peberdy, "Migration in Southern Africa" (Paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration 2005): 1.
[19] Marie Wentzel and Kholadi Tlabela, "Historical background to South African migration," in *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, ed. Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John O. Oucho and Johan van Zyl (Cape Town: HSRC Press 2006), 71-77.
[20] Crush, Williams and Peberdy, *Migration in Southern Africa*, 2.
[21] Bakewell and de Haas, *African Migration*, 14.
[22] Oucho, *Cross-border migration*; Modi, *Migration to Democratic South Africa*.
[23] Adepoju, *Internal and international migration within Africa*, 40.

ing. These policies turned out to be successful when in the late 1960s more and more immigrants from Europe and North America settled in South Africa.[24]

Throughout the twentieth century, the government actively sought white settlers but in turn rigorously limited Africans to only temporary forms of legal entry in accordance with the migrant labor system.[25] Therefore, South Africa was the only country in the region to pursue a proactive immigration policy up until the 1990s, albeit with a heavily racial undertone.[26]

Migration since the end of Apartheid

The profound economic changes and the political restructuring of South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s impacted international migration patterns to the country. South Africa rapidly became a focal point not only for African migrants but increasingly also for people coming from Asia and Eastern Europe.[27]

Following Apartheid, South Africa has seen a significant rise in the number of migrants from the SADC region, as well as other regions such as West Africa. Since the 1990s there has been a continuous southward flow of undocumented people forced to migrate due to difficult situations in their countries of origin. As a result, South Africa has become home to a growing Francophone and Nigerian community from West Africa.[28]

Indeed, entrenched patterns of migration experienced significant changes as southern Africa increasingly became a region on the move. This holds true for both legal and undocumented border crossings, and resulted in new forms of mobility.[29] Interestingly, a large number of South African nationals who had lived in exile for decades due to the white-minority rule were also among those who moved to South Africa, having finally gained the possibility of repatriation.[30]

For the majority of people in the region the political changes during this time created new opportunities for legal as well as undocumented migration into South Africa. This coincided with intensified scholarly engagement with the country. For a long time Apartheid had delayed the influx of these forms of migration while conceptual as well as analytical debates have hitherto mostly bypassed South Africa due to the country's international isolation.[31]

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[24] Anderson, *Migration in South Africa in comparative perspective*, 99-102.
[25] Klotz, *Migration after apartheid*, 831.
[26] Crush, Williams and Peberdy, *Migration in Southern Africa*, 9.
[27] Segatti, *Migration to South Africa*, 9.
[28] Crush, Williams and Peberdy, *Migration in Southern Africa*, 13.
[29] Crush, Williams and Peberdy, *Migration in Southern Africa*, 1.
[30] Oucho, *Cross-border migration*.
[31] However, outward migration from South Africa to other countries does not feature as much in the debate, except with regard to the "brain-drain"-phenomenon, which refers to the departure of skilled South Africans who leave the country for destinations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and America.

Consequently, the rising number of African migrants in the post-Apartheid period triggered harsh police reactions, and between 1990 and 2002 this led to the deportation of over 1.7 Million migrants, many of whom were of Zimbabwean and Mozambican origin and faced more than one removal, because they had returned after their first deportation.[32]

Although this paper primarily focuses on immigration into South Africa, it is of significance to mention that following the end of the Influx Control Act in 1986, an Act which aimed at restricting the number of Africans in urban areas, the country experienced a dramatic increase in domestic migration since the non-white population in South Africa was free to move and this largely influenced rural-urban migration.[33]

In the 1990s this gave rise to a situation in which two streams of domestic and international migrants were competing, both displayed similar forms of behavior and expectations, albeit enjoyed different degrees of legal protection.[34]

What was new with regard to migration in the decade following the political transition was the scale and diversity of origins of immigrants.[35] Additionally, Crush and McDonald point to the grossly exaggerated numbers of illegal immigrants in media and popular discourses, highlighting the fact that by far the majority of people from neighboring countries entered legally through the official border posts, equipped with the necessary documentation. There was absolutely no reason for government officials to speculate about the consequences of a rising number of migrants during the first decade after the end of Apartheid, as many of them preferred to go back to their country of origin after having fulfilled a work-related contract.[36]

At this point, it is helpful to keep in mind that the proportion of African immigrants to the total amount of immigrants increased from 11% in 1990 to 40% in 1999. This is no surprise, because the new ANC government after 1994 discontinued the Apartheid policy of attracting skilled white people. However, the absolute number of African immigrants was even smaller in 1999 than at the beginning of the decade.[37] Irrespective of the skin color of the people migrating into South Africa, their overall number decreased and this therefore runs counter to the stereotype of more and more people entering the country in the first decade after the end of Apartheid.

[32] Crush and Dodson, *Another Lost Decade*, 446.
[33] Bakewell/de Haas, *African Migration*, 14.
[34] Jonathan Crush and David A. McDonald, "Transnationalism and New African Immigration South Africa (Ontario: South African Migration Project/Canadian Association of African Studies 2002).
[35] Adepoju, *Migration in South Africa in comparative perspective*.
[36] Crush and McDonald, *Transnationalism and New African Immigration South Africa*.
[37] Crush and Dodson, *Another Lost Decade*, 440.

Explaining xenophobia since the end of Apartheid

South Africa has experienced flows of migration from its African neighbor-states for decades and their share of the total amount of refugees even increased in the early 1990s when the Apartheid-system came to an end.[38]

Parallel to the rising number of people coming to South Africa from the continent, domestic anti-foreigner sentiments were growing as well. Throughout the 1990s and up to the notorious violence in May 2008, people of African origin were killed in the country because of their assumed non-South African nationality and appearance.[39]

Already in December 1994, the same year in which the first democratic elections were hailed as a success and portrayed as the culmination of the transition process, youth groups violently expelled people of foreign descent from Alexandra.[40] After the end of the white minority regime, which exemplified the defeat of the common enemy of the region, the stereotype threat of outsiders had emerged again.[41]

During the years that followed a xenophobic discourse grew steadily, leading to a situation in which "South Africans […] developed a sense of legitimate entitlement linked to their national being".[42] Alarmed by high levels of physical violence against foreigners, the African Peer Review Mechanism report on South Africa in 2007 warned about prevailing xenophobia in the country against people from other parts of Africa only a year before the notorious attacks took place.[43]

Flockemann et. al. argue that over the two decades since the end of Apartheid, xenophobia became almost a banal thing that is abnormal in its normality:

> This apparent ordinariness also suggests complicity involving both those who are subjected to the situation, and those who do nothing to change it.[44]

In early 2008, foreigners were again subject to violence, with xenophobia reaching a new intensity that led to the death of thirteen people before the events

[38] Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders*.
[39] Neocosmos, *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*.
[40] Alexandra is a township in Johannesburg (Gauteng).
[41] Duponchel, *Who's the alien*, 7.
[42] Hayem, *From May 2008 to 2011*, 85.
[43] "APRM Country Review Report 2007 Republic of South Africa," last modified July 14 2014, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SAREPORT14MAY07.PDF.
[44] Miki Flockemann, Kudzayi Ngara, Wahseema Roberts and Andrea Castle, "The everyday experience of xenophobia: performing *The Crossing* from Zimbabwe to South Africa," *Critical Arts: North-South Cultural and Media Studies* 24 (2010): 249.

of May 11.[45] After the attacks intensified in May 2008, the South African army was employed in a domestic affair for the first time since the end of Apartheid.[46]

There is an abundance of explanations in the academic literature used in this essay, addressing the question as to why there are such high levels of xenophobia in South African society. Possible factors that could explain the xenophobic patterns in the post-Apartheid state range from low levels of income, unemployment, as well as the political discourse within the government.[47] Undisputed is that xenophobia is the result of a long process, not just appearing overnight.[48]

A very common explanation for xenophobia refers to the relative deprivation and poverty of the majority of South Africa's population, though, as Hayem argues, this provides no sufficient explanation for the start of the violence. Most of the underprivileged areas remained calm and at times even protected foreigners. There was absolutely no indication that the violence against actual and perceived foreigners was planned by a single group or an individual.[49]

Despite this, the phenomenon's complexity cannot be easily distinguished from the broader reality of inequality and poverty in South Africa.[50] Therefore, many scholars favor an analysis of long-term structural reasons when explaining the rise of xenophobia in general, and the outbreak in 2008 in particular. The majority of scholars agree that with the ANC leading the country since 1994, profound changes in the nationalist discourse on citizenship have taken place. They especially point to the discourses on indigeneity that have been allowed to dominate. Here the root causes for xenophobia can be found.[51]

Particularly, as Neocosmos argues, a change appeared in the meaning of citizenship, "from an inclusive understanding towards an exclusive notion of citizenship with regard to foreigners from the rest of Africa".[52] Neocosmos also suggests that xenophobia should be understood as a political discourse that is related to the manner in which the concept of citizenship has evolved during the past fifty years as exemplified by the differential treatment of foreigners.[53]

This observation is supported by what Kohnert and Kersting describe in their respective articles as a 'second' or 'new' wave of nationalism in Africa. They distinguish between a first wave of nationalism that was prevalent when states fought

[45] Duponchel, 2013.
[46] Dirk Kohnert, "Neuer Nationalismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Afrika;" *GIGA Focus Africa* 7 (2008): 2.
[47] Neocosmos *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*.
[48] Norbert Kersting, "New Nationalism and Xenophobia in Africa – a New Inclination?" *Africa Spectrum* 44 (2009): 7-18.
[49] Loren B. Landau and Jean Pierre Misago, "Who to Blame and What's to Gain? Reflections on Space, State, and Violence in Kenya and South Africa;" *Africa Spectrum* 1 (2009): 105; Hayem, *From May 2008 to 2011*, 86.
[50] Duponchel, *Who's the alien*, 8.
[51] Nyamnjoh, *Insiders and Outsiders*; Neocosmos, *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*.
[52] Neocosmos, *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*, 106.
[53] Ibid., 106.

against a colonial oppressor and a second wave since the early 1990s. The latter's defining feature is a notion of exclusiveness with regard to citizenship and it is directed at individuals from another country living within the concerned state.[54]

This new nationalism is based on the narrative of a shared history and "focuses on internal othering and excludes social groups within the society and their access to state resources",[55] thereby revealing its intrinsic xenophobic character.

Addressing the lack of empirical research that could help to explain xenophobia, Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti in their study establish correlations between the violence and socio-economic profiles of regions. The results offer no support for theories claiming that the poorer the people the higher the likelihood of xenophobic violence. Instead, they observe that municipalities with a high proportion of black males are more prone to anti-foreigner violence. The same is valid for areas with a high heterogeneity of language and income amidst the population. What seems to be a less decisive factor are the levels of unemployment and the proportion of foreigners with regard to the South African citizens. These findings challenge earlier explanations which presented poverty as the sole driver behind xenophobia.[56]

Another empirical study pursued by Misago focused on the role of local leadership. He stresses that a prevailing xenophobic climate made it easier to mobilize collective action against actual or perceived foreigners. The nature of local leadership therefore plays a decisive role in two ways. On the one hand, it may be responsible for attacks when anti-foreigner sentiments are exploited and leaders invoke anti-foreigner discourses to secure the support of the population in the next election. On the other hand, local leaders also called upon their constituency to shield foreigners from the wave of xenophobia; thus generalizations with regard to local leadership are hard to sustain.[57]

Everything considered, a narrow focus on legal and political citizenship has encouraged tendencies of scapegoating and harassing foreigners throughout the years after Apartheid, leading to seemingly omnipresent xenophobic sentiments in present-day South Africa.

Change and continuity of immigration policies since 1994

The policy developments with regard to governing migration in the post-Apartheid era did not really reflect a move away from the security-driven approach towards immigration of the undemocratic predecessor. The laws on immigration following the political transition rather replicated Apartheid policies and in gen-

[54] Kohnert, "Neuer Nationalismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Afrika"; Kersting, "New Nationalism and Xenophobia in Africa".
[55] Kersting, "New Nationalism and Xenophobia in Africa", 17.
[56] Fauvelle-Aymar/Segatti, *People, space and politics*, 75-77.
[57] Misago, *Disorder in a changing society*, 97-103.

eral remained largely detached from ongoing migration dynamics, including the actual skilled-labor demand needed in the country following the brain-drain of the mid-1990s. Quite to the disadvantage of migrants, the old systems of divide and rule continued to serve as antecedents in the new South Africa, especially with regard to the perception of outsiders, irrespective of whether they be from another part of the country or another African state.[58]

However, before a more detailed engagement with the continuities follows, it is important to also look at the changes in migration policy.

While previously non-white people were only legally allowed into the country if they had a migrant worker status, this situation changed completely following the end of Apartheid, with all people regardless of their race now able to apply for visas.[59] Additionally, there was another important break with the past: unlike the Apartheid state, its democratic successor was strongly committed to the ideals of international refugee protection, thus, the government became a signatory to the United Nations and Organization for African Unity refugee conventions in 1995. This exemplified the new government's move away from the old regime's refusal to establish a refugee policy.[60]

Ultimately, the new Immigration Act in 2002, which was amended in 2004, constituted the clearest shift away from the old legacy. The Act was a break with earlier policies insofar as it replaced, at least on paper, the anti-immigration discourse of the old government and led to a more economically-based set of policies in order to facilitate selective skills import.[61]

Nevertheless, there were also striking continuities in the immediate post-Apartheid period regarding the immigration policies of the white-minority government. Unfortunately the "two-gate-policy" of white skilled immigration and black contract labor migration remained largely in place, and while the race criterion was dropped in official policies, the exploitative character was maintained.[62] Accordingly, the post-Apartheid government had more pressing issues to confront than immigration policies and as a result no substantial shifts occurred, whereas the continuities remained inscribed in migration legislation. The protection of rights, dignity and welfare of foreigners featured very low in the government's list of political priorities, even more so in the run-up to elections in which non-South Africans cannot partake.[63]

[58] Landau and Misago, *Who to Blame and What's to Gain?*, 107; Segatti, *Reforming South African Immigration Policy*.
[59] Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, and Johan van Zyl, "Introduction", in *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, ed. Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John O. Oucho and Johan van Zyl (Cape Town: HSRC Press 2006), 1-25.
[60] Jonathan Crush and David. A. McDonald, "Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid," *AfricaToday* 48 (2001): 1-13.
[61] Crush and Dodson, *Another Lost Decade*, 441-442.
[62] Segatti, *Reforming South African Immigration Policy*.
[63] Klotz, *Migration after apartheid*; Landau and Misago, *Who to Blame and What's to Gain?*.

The similarities are even more noticeable with regard to the policing of migration which had also not changed significantly. What was introduced by policy makers did little to protect human rights and the police tactics were strongly reminiscent of those employed by the old regime's forces.[64]

All this was also reverberated in South African officials' attitudes towards migration policies at the regional level. Between 1994 and the early 2000s there were three serious attempts to institutionalize a "Schengen-style" agreement by the SADC-countries in order to regulate cross-border migration and to implement the principle of free movement across all the member countries. The response by South African officials to this effort was an immediate refusal to sign, which was echoed by the delegations of Namibia and Botswana, and resulted in the ultimate rejection. Policymakers in these three countries feared that more migrants would cross their borders to benefit from relatively smooth economic conditions and thereby competing with their citizens with regard to seeking employment.[65]

Klotz goes even further when he states that since the Union of South Africa was established in 1910 there has been a trajectory up until the early 2000s in which policies sought to limit the inflow of people while heavily encouraging enforcement measures. With regard to the "lost decade" since the demise of the old regime he argues that: "democratization of the policy-making process […] opens avenues for popular influence resulting – ironically – in the persistence of Apartheid-style immigration policy".[66] Thus, the public and most members of parliament seem to have supported harsh restrictions on immigration during this period and the legislative policies that followed fueled and reflected the popular sentiment "in a mutually reinforcing process which constitutes South African identity".[67]

The Aliens Control Act

In the last days of the white minority-regime the de Klerk government poured significant financial resources into policing migration as well as controlling the refugee influx of that time. The Aliens Control Act of 1991 constituted one of the final pieces of legislation that emerged from the Apartheid state and proved difficult to transcend in the years to come. The newly elected government had not been able to quickly shake off the institutional legacy of Apartheid, and the alienation and marginalization of foreigners was as a result reinforced through this lack of transformation.[68]

[64] Jonathan Klaaren and Jaya Ramji, "Inside Illegality: Migration Policing in South Africa after Apartheid," *Africa Today* 48 (2001): 35-47.
[65] Oucho, *Cross-border migration*; Crush and Dodson, *Another Lost Decade*, 449-450.
[66] Klotz, *Migration after apartheid*, 832.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Crush and McDonald, *Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid*; Landau and Misago, *Who to Blame and What's to Gain?*, 104.

The Act itself introduced tough measures against unauthorized migrants coming to South Africa and ascribed unprecedented powers to immigration officers and the police with regard to entry, searching and arresting of migrants. In the years following the first democratic elections in South Africa, the Act continued to be a cornerstone of the country's immigration policy.[69]

The Aliens Control Act, nicknamed "Apartheid's last act", remained in place for another decade in post-Apartheid South Africa until 2002 when it was finally reformed after being declared unconstitutional.[70] It is this legislative Act that deserves more attention, because it is such an overt result of the Apartheid-era and completely at odds with the human rights-based emphasis of the democratic successor, "that its longevity will always be something of a blot on the record of the post-Apartheid government".[71] Thus, the act serves as a sign for the continuity of Apartheid-style migration policies after 1994, having endured during the five years of Nelson Mandela's presidency and half of Thabo Mbeki's first term.

The Aliens Control Act must be seen as the culmination of a number of policies that were designed by the late Apartheid government to prevent the influx of migrants from neighboring African countries. During the 1970s and the 1980s civil wars were prevalent in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Northern Namibia, and the white South African politicians feared that these conflicts would trigger large scale flows of refugees from within the SADC region.[72]

As a result, immigration to South Africa continued to be governed by the Act throughout the 1990s[73] and was not repealed until 2002 when the new Immigration Act was passed by the government under Thabo Mbeki. However, even the new Act did not address continuities such as the contract labor migration system, and the overall objectives with regard to human rights were rather modest.[74] This perfectly shows the difficulties of transcending the Apartheid legacy that became deeply ingrained in the management of immigration under the new government.[75] The enduring characteristics of the old Act and its emphasis on control and exclusion, for which it was specifically designed, "has proven to be a blunt, ineffectual and often unconstitutional instrument for migration management in post-Apartheid South Africa".[76] While violence and discrimination against Africans before and during Apartheid stemmed from the institutionalized racism of the white-minority government, it is rather surprising that the act continued to be employed after the ANC-takeover in 1994.[77]

[69] Oucho, *Cross-border migration*.
[70] Segatti, *Reforming South African Immigration Policy*, 38-39.
[71] Crush and McDonald, *Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid*, 6.
[72] Oucho, *Cross-border migration*.
[73] Modi, *Migration to Democratic South Africa*.
[74] Crush and Dodson, *Another Lost Decade*, 446-448.
[75] Crush and McDonald, *Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid*.
[76] Crush and McDonald, *Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid*, 1.
[77] Neocosmos, *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*.

Conclusion

In the literature reviewed, there appears to be a consensus that the immigration policies of the new South African government suffered heavily from an Apartheid legacy that was deeply enshrined in the legal framework, most prominently in the Aliens Control Act of 1991. The continuity in the policies as well as the practices are strikingly similar to those employed under the old regime. The policies remained very restrictive, enforcement of them harsh and the overall sentiment towards migrants rather brutish. Most of the old Apartheid-era images and stereotypes had simply been forwarded onto African immigrants as well as refugees.[78]

Almost a decade after the formal end of Apartheid, the 2002 Immigration Act produced a policy framework that indeed constitutes a change. However, to call this a rupture from the Apartheid legacy would be an exaggeration.

Initially, immigrants nourished high hopes that the policies would change for the better and allow for easier entry into South Africa. However, the political transformation since the early 1990s did not address these concerns.[79]

Many migrants from the region may have confused the advent of a democratic South Africa with a change in the definition of core national interests.[80] The newly elected government was predominantly concerned with a nation-building process and therefore policy responses to migration had the additional function of a symbolic labelling to identify particular categories of outsiders and insiders, or in other words, immigrants vis-à-vis legitimate South Africans.

Consequently, migration policies were employed to construct the nation-state within an increasingly transnational setting.[81] Although the country no longer pursued an immigration policy based on differentiations of race, it became ever more difficult for outsiders to cross the borders. Unfortunately, in a rather cynical way, these restrictive policies reflected the hostile feelings of most of South Africa's citizens toward migrants during the first decade of democratic rule.[82]

However, despite its obvious conservative character, the migration policies should not be criticized too much for simply echoing Apartheid-era traditions, for they were undeniably the result of "the contemporary political dispensation and popular views".[83]

The efforts to de-racialize the political debate after the end of Apartheid led to a reinterpretation of South African citizen's identity vis-à-vis "the other", rather than being open to the rest of the region. The result is that since the 1990s a previ-

[78] Crush and McDonald, *Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid*.
[79] Modi, *Migration to Democratic South Africa*; Oucho, *Cross-border migration*.
[80] Segatti, *Migration to South Africa*, 40.
[81] Klotz, *Migration after apartheid*, 836.
[82] Anderson, *Migration in South Africa in comparative perspective*.
[83] Klotz, *Migration after apartheid*, 843-844.

ously covert insider-outsider dichotomy emerged which makes almost no distinctions in public discourse between the various motives of the migrants.[84]

Much more needs to be done in order to stimulate a domestic debate that can effectively reduce day-to-day practices of xenophobia toward Africans from the rest of the continent. The reoccurrence of violence in 2011 can be seen as a consequence of the government's mismanagement of the initial crisis in 2008. According to Hayem, the policies of the ANC greatly helped to transform "the national subjectivity from an inclusive participant notion of 'collectively building the nation' to a division between nationals and non-nationals".[85]

While more research in this regard should be conducted, the argument made in this paper is that the initial reluctance by the post-Apartheid government to address Apartheid's continuities in migration policies of the new South Africa encouraged a growing anti-foreigner sentiment that erupted in early 2008. However, this does not mean that explanations of xenophobia rest only on single factors. Instead, a comprehensive analysis must include a multitude of political and socio-economic factors, with an engagement of the continuities of Apartheid's immigration policies as one of them.

In addition, a more spatially-oriented analysis could help reveal the connection between claims to territory and its relation to political and economic entitlement, thus adding new insights to the debate on xenophobia in South Africa.[86]

Thinking of the horrible events in 2008 in which more than sixty people died due to xenophobic violence, the first decade after the end of Apartheid and the obvious political reluctance to address important issues of migration with an adequate policy framework, might indeed be called "a lost one".

[84] Klotz, *Migration after apartheid*, 843-844; Crush and McDonald, *Transnationalism and New African Immigration South Africa*.
[85] Hayem, *From May 2008 to 2011*, 96.
[86] Landau and Misago, *Who to Blame and What's to Gain?*, 100-101.

Dynamic Otherness: Technologies of Representation in Colonial Dutch Brazil

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The transnational turn in history has brought new scholarly interest to the visual culture of colonial Brazil. Crucial to these analyses are the paintings of Albert Eckhout and Frans Post, Dutch artists who studied the flora, fauna, and people of the new land. However, most discussions of these painters' oeuvres place their non-European subjects within bimodal notions of "self" and "other," rather than within the complex matrix of slavery, commerce, and morality that pervaded the colonial Atlantic. An analysis of migration dynamics allows us to reconceptualize the ways in which racial otherness was understood and represented by contemporary painters. This paper examines the paintings within the networks of trade, migration, and consumption that permeated the Dutch and Portuguese Atlantic. Indeed, in these paintings, race is not cast as a static accessory, but rather as a dynamic feature of identity and motion. In particular, while racial otherness previously existed in the imaginations of contemporary Europeans, transatlantic migration allowed racial otherness to be consumed by European viewers, merchants, and burghers.

Upon first glance, Albert Eckhout's *A Black Brazilian Woman and her Son* (c.1641, Copenhagen, National Museum of Denmark) (**Figure 1**) appears to mimetically illustrate a voluptuous dark-skinned woman who stands next to her lighter-skinned son while holding a basket of tropical fruits. The landscape surrounding her evokes the tropical paradise of the Dutch port at Pernambuco, a new settlement along the Brazilian coast. The verticality of the woman's form is accentuated by both the picture frame and the erect palm trees surrounding her, punctuated only by her round breasts, red sash, and wide-brimmed hat. Agricultural references to the woman's exotic location abound; as the child points an ear of corn toward the woman's groin, and holds a parrot, which, more than any other animal in early modern European art, represented the resplendence of New World fauna.[1] But Eckhout did not include a cornucopia of botanical forms to merely

[1] Irma B. Jaffe, "The Tell-Tale Tail of a Parrot: Duerer's Adam and Eve," *The Print-Collector's Newsletter,* Vol. 24, No. 2 (May-June 1993), p. 52-53. The author cites earlier scholarship by Wilma George, who in her book *Animals and Maps*, argues that many explorers, including Columbus, Vespucci, and Cabal reported sightings of colorful parrots in central and south America. See Wilma George, *Animals and Maps,* London, 1969.

Figure 1. Albert Eckhout: *A Black Brazilian Woman and her Son*. Copenhagen, National Museum of Denmark.

locate the woman within the landscape. Rather, Eckhout, along with landscape painter Frans Post, (**Figure 2**) was part of an expedition of scientists and artists who were sent to the Americas to study the flora, fauna, and indigenous people of the new territories, taxonomically arranging them within the growing Dutch world. Under the commission of Johan Maurits of Nassau-Siegen, Governor-General of colonial Dutch Brazil, these painters became best known for their visual representations of indigenous peoples and tropical flora.

Western visual culture is replete with images of nude and naked women, who most frequently occupy the tropes of the heroic Odalisque or the lascivious pin-up girl. Yet the history of black female portraiture is much more complicated, due in no small part to the ambiguous identity of the black female in Western art history. Portraits of black female subjects therefore do not purely correspond to the hetero-normative male gaze, which is often theorized to describe the positions of white women in European art. The enterprise of colonial slavery and subsequent intercontinental migration rendered the black female body simultaneously

Figure 2. Frans Post: *View of Olinda, Brazil*.
Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.

an erotic fantasy and a mercantile asset. Yet the latter position of the black female is not as frequently discussed when examining the identity of black subjects in Dutch colonial art.

Perhaps this reticence can be explained by the rich history of hyper-sexualizing black women, or by the tendency to subject images of female nudes to Lacanian gaze theory. Indeed, scholarly discussions of the painters' oeuvres, while already sparse, often isolate the artists within the tradition of ethnographic painting, eschewing comparisons with contemporary portrait, still life, and landscape imagery in the Netherlands.

The most comprehensive analyses of the visual culture of colonial Dutch Brazil were undertaken by Quentin Buvelot and Rebecca Parker Brienen in their writings on Albert Eckhout.[2] Buvelot pursues a thorough study of Eckhout's oeuvre, and attempts to draw connections between the painter's iconography and earlier European travelogues. In her essay, "Albert Eckhout's paintings of the '*wilde natien'* of Brazil and Africa" and subsequent monograph, Brienen describes the black subjects featured in four of these paintings, noting aptly that these images in particular reflect European ideas about the fecundity and sexual availability of black Africans. Drawing on earlier work by Peter Mason, Brienen details the system of racial categorization that Eckhout espouses within his series, and con-

[2] Quentin Buvelot, ed. *Albert Eckhout: A Dutch Artist in Brazil*. (Zwolle: Waanders, 2004). Rebecca Parker Brienen, *Visions of A Savage Paradise: Albert Eckhout, Painter of Colonial Dutch Brazil* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2013).

nects the classificatory imagery to contemporary tropic representations of the four known continents. But Brienen also builds upon Mason's thesis, arguing that these paintings cannot be categorized singularly as ethnographic portraits or images of slaves.[3]

Buvelot's and Brienen's discussions, however, treat Eckhout's black subjects as static and rooted within their landscapes, thereby ignoring the migration dynamics that brought them to the Brazilian coast. As a result, the discussions largely place non-European subjects within bimodal notions of "self" and "other," rather than within the complex matrix of slavery, commerce, and morality that pervaded the colonial Atlantic.

In this paper, I argue that Eckhout's paintings of nonwhite subjects must be analyzed within the networks of trade, migration, and consumption that permeated the Dutch and Portuguese Atlantic. By analyzing the migration of goods, people, and ideas across the colonial Atlantic, we can reconceptualize the ways in which racial otherness was understood and represented by contemporary painters. Indeed, in Eckhout's series, race is not cast as a static accessory, but rather as a dynamic feature of identity and motion, locating individuals both on the Brazilian coast and in their native lands. Perceptions of racial otherness brought Eckhout's subjects from their native lands to the Dutch colony, just as it justified the consumption of these individuals' labor and bodies by Europeans. In particular, while otherness previously existed as a distant form of exotica in the imaginations of many contemporary Europeans, it was only through transatlantic migration that this form of otherness could be consumed by European viewers and traders.

I. Exotic Impulses in Early Modern Holland

In the early decades of the seventeenth-century, as the Netherlands continued to fight Spain for their independence, the nation was also gripped by a thirst for the exotic. This fascination inspired the burgeoning nation to sow the seeds for a global empire - one which would surpass Spain's in scope despite its comparatively limited geographical size. While the Spanish Empire looked inward, trying to suppress numerous rebellions in its bloated Empire, the Dutch looked outward, laying the groundwork for an overseas enterprise that would span both East and West. Additionally, while the Spanish crown attempted to weave an empire with a common thread of Catholicism, Protestant ideology was only a tangential motive for Dutch merchants.

Yet as the Netherlands built a global presence, it maintained distinct notions of self and other due to the simultaneous rise of nationalism that was fueled by the war for independence, and the rise of exoticism in cosmopolitan cities like Amsterdam. The subsequent expansion was therefore not motivated by a belief in

[3] Parker Brienen, 114.

Figure 3. Pieter de Hooch: *At the Linen Closet*.
Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.

Figure 4. Gerard ter Borch: *Paternal Admonition*.
Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.

religious supremacy, but rather a desire to collect and possess objects from across the globe. As such, the Dutch mercantile empire was an intricate nexus of trade posts and shipping routes that spanned from the Americas to Japan, rather than a circuit of missionary outlets alone.

Luxury and abundance were quintessential aspirations of the Dutch Republic despite being enjoyed by only a few politicians and nobles. Officials ranging from Stadhouder Johan Maurits (1604-1679), to the lawyer-statesman Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619), who had fought alongside William of Orange, shared a fascination with foreign objects. Upon van Oldenbarnevelt's execution, an inventory of his home showed that he had amassed a large collection of foreign and exotic goods, including bed linens, lacquers, porcelains, and spices, all labeled "Indian" in the survey.[4]

Yet genre scenes by Pieter de Hooch, (**Figure 3**) and Gerard ter Borch (**Figure 4**), long hailed as meticulous and accurate depictions of Dutch interiors, hide the exotic imaginations of the new nation.[5] An analysis of Maurits' and van Oldenbarnevelt's collections would suggest that other upper-class homes mirrored the cosmopolitan nature of the Dutch Empire, since they were nexuses of exotic world culture, rather than *sancta sanctorum* of domestic values alone. Indeed, interspersed with Dutch paintings in Oldenbarnevelt's collections were maps of the Dutch territories, and a portrait of a 'Turk' clad in elaborate turban and long robes.[6]

The seventeenth-century explosion of exoticist interest also pervaded the artistic sphere. As a painter educated in the humanistic traditions of his day, Eckhout also participated in this visual turn.[7] Surviving works by contemporary major artists, including Rembrandt's *Man in Oriental Costume ("The Noble Slav")* (**Figure 5**), Vermeer's *Girl with a Pearl Earring* (**Figure 6**) and Jan Lievens' *Man in Oriental Costume ("Sultan Solimans"),* suggest that the Dutch perspective of the Orient was performative in nature, mediated by objects and props, rather than racial and cultural identities alone. Prior to Eckhout's departure for Brazil, Rembrandt and Lievens collaborated on a series of images called *Turcqs tronies*, or orientalist paintings of faces and torsos. Like Eckhout's paintings, their pieces illustrated tropes of Turks and Indians, rather than specific individual subjects. But many of these images illustrate European subjects in Eastern garb, rather than indigenous populations in other parts of the globe. Identity was therefore reduced

[4] Claudia Swan, "Lost In Translation: Exoticism in Early Modern Holland," in *Art in Iran and Europe in the 17th Century: Exchange and Reception*, edited by Axel Langer (Museum Rietberg, Zurich, CH, 2013), 100-116.104.

[5] Swan, 105. The author argues that the label of these objects as "Indian" is insignificant, as Chinese, Persian, East Indian, and Indian were mostly signified as such, and the descriptor marked otherness more than national or ethnic origin.

[6] Swan, 106. The author notes that the label 'Turk' was not limited to only those of Turkish origin, but was rather a descriptor for turbaned individuals who sported clothing often seen in the Ottoman and Saffavid Empires.

[7] J. de Sousa-Leao, "Post et Eckhout," in *l'oeuil, 43/44*, 49-52, 49.

Figure 5. Rembrandt: *The Noble Slav*.
Metropolitan Museum of Art New York.

to costume, and was signified through a series of gestures that corresponded to each cultural group.

The Orient could be imagined, performed, and enjoyed by upper-class Europeans who could themselves construct new identities through reference to these distant lands. Oriental props became convenient ways to convey distance, yet their placement on Dutch bodies conveys a sense of adoption and appropriation. Thus, costume could represent the vastness of the Dutch trade network, in which foreign wealth, objects, and people were brought closer to the center of the empire through a capitalist system of governance. Exoticism was therefore a method of hybrid constituency, wherein the Dutch subject could begin to identify with the colonies through a series of appropriative gestures.[8]

[8] Joy Kenseth, "A World of Wonders in One Closet Shut" in *The Age of the Marvelous*, Joy Kenseth, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 25. Kenseth notes that this ex-

Figure 6. Vermeer: *Girl with a Pearl Earring.* Mauritshuis, The Hague.

Orientalist accoutrements also became useful tools for Europe to define its own Christian heritage, as turbans and jewels became frequently used in history paintings of biblical scenes.[9] Artists like Rembrandt and Lievens might have believed that Eastern exotica were vestiges of the material culture of ancient times. Indeed, Rembrandt may also have believed that exotica, which he enthusiastically studied, preserved accurate costume elements from biblical times.[10] Thus, orientalist depictions of both white and nonwhite bodies became condoned within the high art traditions of Northern Europe. When such techniques were sanctioned within the highest levels of painting, they could also be adopted within mainstream visual culture.

oticist interest spans multiple media, including the visual arts, drama, literature, religion, natural sciences, and philosophy. This interest also spanned across national boundaries.

[9] Swan, 110.

[10] Swan, 114.

For other Northern European artists, such as the Flemish master Peter Paul Rubens, exoticism was itself hybrid in nature, created by combining visual tropes from several different cultures.[11] Such an "exotic effect" was created by combining German, Italian, and Burgundian habit with that of cultures of the Near East.[12] Rubens, however, observed foreign dress not through direct interaction with foreign cultures or people, but rather by sketching miniatures and curios that had come to Europe.[13] Thus Rubens' vision of the periphery was already influenced by the biases of the artists creating miniatures, and thus were not true representations of the cultures depicted. Thus, in Rubens' case, the exotic became a hybrid mélange of cultures, in which some aspects of European culture were preserved while other aspects were appropriated from abroad.

To describe this phenomenon of assuming some cultural artifacts without the rigor of scientific study or meticulous observation, Paul Vandenbroeck uses the phrase "ethnographic eclecticism." [14] This phrase describes the appropriation of American Indian cultural and artistic production, such as headdresses, and feather skirts, by non-indigenous peoples.[15] This approach may describe Eckhout's paintings as well, as cultural artifacts, such as the figures' beaded necklaces and feathers, are frequently paired with signs of European intervention, such as long linen dresses or, in the case of *A Black Brazilian Woman and her Son*, a mixed-race child.

Eckhout's and Post's depictions of Brazil, however, mark an important turn in the tradition of exoticist European painting. Because these artists migrated to the periphery as part of a colonial expedition, their paintings no longer locate exotic objects within European settings. Now, the land itself was foreign, with familiar people, objects and architecture built into it. European merchants and settlers became foreign objects in their new surroundings, so the precariousness of their control may have been all the more apparent. Eckhout and Post reflect this tension in their paintings, as they do not depict the landscapes as untouched and wild. Instead, the painters visually represent the migration of European people, customs, and goods to other lands, rather than the migration of indigenous culture into the European ethos.

But how did this translocation occur? The artists' presence in Brazil was not merely a result of one man's pioneering expedition into a "new world," but rather the culmination of an elaborate competitive strategy that brought people, goods, religions, and ideas across the Atlantic.

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[11] Swan, 114.

[12] Swan, 114 and Thomas Dacosta Kaufmann, "From Treasury to Museum: The Collections of the Austrian Habsburgs," in *The Cultures of Collecting*, Jon Elsner and Roger Cardinal, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 137. The Austrian Habsburgs were among the first Europeans to amass a collection of exotica from across the globe.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Vandenbroeck 1992, p. 395; expanded on by Mason 1998, pp. 24–25. Detailed in Swan, 116.

II. Establishing Transatlantic Migration Networks

In 1621, The Dutch established the *Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie*, or the West India Company, in order to expand their economic interests in the Americas. The company also attempted to compete with the previously established (and ultimately more successful) East India Company, or VOC, whose exploits largely supported the thriving Dutch economy. Before it was dissolved and replaced in 1674, the WIC had established ports in present-day New York (New Amsterdam), the mid-Atlantic coast, and Brazil. The WIC participated in the Dutch Revolt as well, as the company's exploits in Brazil diminished Iberian interests, as competition over sugar crop mitigated the Portuguese monopoly in the area.

In the Americas, the Dutch became very successful privateers, harnessing their naval prowess to seize ships and eventually, territory from the Portuguese.[16] At one point, the Dutch held almost half of previously Portuguese territory, although the territory was ceded back to the Portuguese less than three decades later.[17] Johan Maurits, governor of Dutch Brazil, established the capital of the colony at Marritsstad (Recife) and built a palace there.

Maurits' rule contrasted sharply with that of his Iberian counterparts, as he built a colony that was much more religiously tolerant than Portugal or Spain. Mauritsstad became a haven for ostracized European Jews, offering another effective mode of resistance to the rigid Spanish monarchy.[18] Indeed, Iberian Jews in the Americas often allied with Dutch colonists as they had a common enemy - the Spanish crown.[19]

Yet religious tolerance in the colonies did not translate into total religious and cultural acceptance. Like many other Europeans, Dutch colonists were both shocked and fascinated by the religious and cultural practices of American indigenes. Contemporary travelogues captured some of the social and sexual practices of foreign people, highlighting indigenous groups' "aberrant" sexual practices.[20] Indeed, according to Carmen Nocentelli, the "periphery" was the region in which perverse and foreign modes of sexuality prevailed to the chagrin of European colonizers.[21] These practices were often associated with the untamed wildness of the natural landscape. These sentiments were echoed in Eckhout's paintings, which simultaneously feature tropes of cannibalism, nudity, and visual splendor.

[16] Mark Meuwese**,** *Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade. Dutch – Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595–1674,* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 22-23. The author points out that Dutch merchants captured numerous Portuguese slave ships traveling from Africa and resold them to the Spanish.

[17] Meuwese, 26-7. Several Protestant moralists in the Netherlands believed that Portugal was a fair target because mercantile intervention would disrupt the Portuguese slave trade.

[18] Meuwese, 30-31.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Carmen Nocentelli, *Empires of Love*: *Europe, Asia, and the Making of Early Modern Identity,* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press),

[21] Nocentelli, 8.

Figure 7. Albert Eckhout: *Tapuya Woman.*
Nationalmuseet Copenhagen.

Indeed, in Eckhout's *Tapuya Woman* **(Figure 7)**, a nearly-naked woman carries severed human limbs while surrounded by lush tropical plants.

These cannibalistic and hypersexual depictions of indigenes in the Americas contrast with the images of domesticated and civilized natives in the images that follow. In Humboldt's coconut cup, the preliminary image of the Amerindian woman carrying a severed limb is followed by a clothed woman who carries a basket of fruit upon her head. As Virginie Spenlé argues, Eckhout uses various degrees of clothing in his cycle to illustrate the influences of Europeans upon the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies.[22] When viewing Eckhout's paintings in the order that they are presented, one can observe that subjects become increasingly clothed and Europeanized. The last image in the series, which depicts a

[22] Virginie Spenlé, ""Savagery" and "Civilization": Dutch Brazil in the Kunst- and Wunderkammer," *JHNA* 3:2 (Winter 2011).

Figure 8. Albert Eckhout: *Mameluca Woman.*
Nationalmuseet Copenhagen.

light-skinned Mameluca woman wearing a full white dress, **(Figure 8)** contrasts sharply with the earlier painting of the naked Tapuya woman.

The aberrant practices of foreign people contrast sharply with the mores of reformed Christian practice in seventeenth-century Holland. Detailed in moralist Jacob Cats' writings, *Nadere Reformatie* ideology attempted to connect Christian practice to everyday life.[23] The *Nadere Reformatie*, which roughly translates to "further Reformation," was a religious and social movement that rose from Calvinist principles.[24] Domestic life was the primary front on which these cultural

[23] Amanda Pipkin, *Rape in the Republic: 1609-1725: Formulating Dutch Identity*, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 87. Also see Jacob Cats's *Werelts bedin, midden, eynde, besloten in den trouringh, met den proefsteen van den selven*, (Dordrecht: voor Matthias Havius. Ghedr. By Hendrick van Esch, 1637).
[24] Pipkin, 87.

changes were supposed to occur.[25] As a result of these theological developments, numerous domestic conduct-books were published, all advocating a domestic social hierarchy that placed the husband-father at the head and minister of his household.[26] Thus, while travelogues offered Dutch burghers purviews into the vast world, they also filtered morally suspect practices through the sieve of European literary and scientific respectability. Eckhout's paintings may illustrate some of the "civilizing" aspirations of Dutch colonists.

But despite their negative perceptions of indigenous populations' religious and cultural practices, Dutch Protestants were appalled by Spanish colonists' brutal treatment of indigenes, which was documented in Bartolome de las Casas' popular book, *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*.[27] De las Casas' account was translated and widely distributed, and enterprising Dutch colonists used the pamphlet's notoriety to encourage Amerindians to unite against the Spanish crown.[28] As a result, Maurits and his Dutch compatriots found useful allies in several indigenous groups from the Americas.

Across the Atlantic, Dutch merchants also attempted to rally support among black Africans. Because the new Dutch Republic maintained an ambiguous relationship with slavery, supporting it in colonies while outlawing it domestically, it was able to negotiate with Akan leaders who welcomed the opportunity to trade with Europe.[29]

In summary, the migration of Dutch religion, morals, and goods helped to forge closer alliances between the Dutch Republic and indigenous populations, while the negative implications of Portuguese migration pushed some indigenous groups away from the Iberian cause. Black and indigenous populations were therefore perceived to be invaluable resources for the Dutch Republic's economic growth. The Netherlands' struggle for Brazil was a smaller manifestation of the domestic war against the Spanish, which pitted the Protestant, mercantile Dutch against the Catholic, militaristic Spain. In Brazil, the Dutch sought to wrest the territory from the hands of the Catholic Portuguese to increase their share in the sugar trade. In order to accomplish this, the Dutch sought the alliance of the Tapuya people, even though they were still perceived as morally inferior. This tension reflects the liminal hybridity of colonized populations in Dutch Brazil; even though the latter did not fully enjoy equal status in the eyes of Dutch colonists, they were useful in

[25] Pipkin, 88. The belief that the family should be transformed into a small church was echoed by several contemporary writers: William Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties,* (Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1622); Willem Teelinck, *Noodwendig Vertoog (*1627*)*

[26] Pipkin, 86-90.

[27] Bartolome de las Casas, *Brevisima Relacion de la Destruccion de las Indias*. José Miguel Martínez Torrejón, ed. Madrid: Real Academia Española. 1554 (orig.), 2013(ed.)

[28] Meuwese, 58.

[29] Meuwese, 64-71. The author notes that several Akan and Kongo leaders sought luxury goods from Europe and Asia, and as a result, welcomed the opportunity to trade slaves with the Portuguese and Dutch.

Figure 9. Pieter Aertsen: A Meat Stall with Holy Family Giving Alms. North Carolina Museum of Art.

advancing the nation's economic interests.[30] Ultimately, then, migration patterns helped to transform the distant "exotic" into a consumable and easily-monetized labor force in Europe.

III. Bringing Paradise Back: Rituals of Consumption in Early Modern Europe

Eckhout's series became immensely successful in Europe, and Johan Maurits gifted the paintings to King Frederick of Denmark in 1654. The paintings, along with other exotic objects such as shells, feathers, and silver, were understood as naturalistic and objective renderings of Dutch Brazil. Indeed, several of Eckhout's European contemporaries imitated these images in their own travel accounts.[31] Among these writers was Georg Marcgraf, who published several woodcuts imitating Eckhout's paintings in *Historia rerum naturalium Brasiliae*.[32] Therefore, not only did these propagandistic and allegorical works support colonial conquest, they also inspired migration and created a supposedly objective natural history that colored Europeans' imaginations of the Americas.

[30] Bhabha describes the liminality of hybridity in Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994.
[31] Spenle, ""Savagery" and "Civilization": Dutch Brazil in the Kunst- and Wunderkammer,".
[32] Ibid.

Eckhout and Post's paintings were not exempt from this discourse on consumption, as the images were created with a keen awareness of the European eye. Thus when discussing the themes of consumption in Eckhout and Post's paintings, one must consider the space in which the scenes are framed.

In modern discourse, the desire to demarcate the public and private spheres is prevalent, especially within the Foucaldian context of the surveillance state. The propensity to understand consumption patterns similarly raises questions of viewership, subjectivity, and display space. This section will address the differences between indoor and outdoor still-life paintings. First, because Eckhout's relationship with his subject matter is motivated by mercantile activity (and in particular, slave trade) in Brazil, comparisons with contemporary market (**Figure 9**) scenes are apt. Ultimately, Eckhout's portraits are props in the Dutch mercantile expedition- objects that "sold" the Dutch enterprise to viewers and patrons at home. Specifically, images of the New World cannot be understood only as scientific studies motivated by curiosity- they must also be interpreted as advertisements, ways to present the Dutch mercantile experience within a positive, consumable light. By showing colonial exploits, the newly independent Netherlands as a whole could be considered on par with other European courts- both as a self-governing entity and as a global colonial power.

When presented outdoors, in the vicinity of the port with ships and traders in the background, Eckhout's image of an African woman may be compared to Northern European market scenes. But as Elizabeth Honig argues, markets were not just places for showcasing wares, they were also scenes that featured (positive) judgment within the picture frame.[33] The market was a stage for the public ritual, although it evolved convergently from two different traditions. Southern Low Countries (modern-day Belgium) market scenes evolved from "high art" traditions: religious and mythological history paintings. But in the Northern Low Countries (modern-day Netherlands), market scenes arose from cityscapes at the margins of books, manuscripts, and other printed media, and were first very crudely depicted.[34] Thus, in the Low Countries, connections between market scenes and the landscape (whether urban or not) are deeply steeped in tradition. As a result, one must consider Eckhout's ethnographic paintings within the contexts of consumer choice. After all, the marketplace was one of the first social spaces in Europe where middle class burghers (as opposed to nobles or royals) could access goods from migratory networks across the globe. The market, in other words, democratized the notion of consumption, and helped to transform the Netherlands into an increasingly cosmopolitan society.

However, the placement of non-white colonial subjects within the matrix of consumer choice and middle-class consumption also highlights the ambivalent

[33] Elizabeth Honig, "Desire and Domestic Economy," The Art Bulletin, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 294-315

[34] Honig, "Desire and Domestic Economy," 300.

position of the colonial subject.[35] After all, the migration of black subjects from Africa to South America, the migration of indigenous people from inland to coastal settlements, as well as the migration of Protestant religion from the Netherlands to Brazil were motivated by mercantile interests. When located within an ordered space in which moral Protestants could acceptably consume the exotic other, colonial labor could be justified as part of capitalistic order. However, the naked "savagery" of the black subject could never be fully accepted within the European moral framework. After her physical and sexual labor was exhausted, the black female body was discardable and undesirable. In short, the need to consume the colonial subject only applied insofar as the European economic and moral hierarchy could be preserved.

Conclusion

Eckhout and Post's paintings of Dutch Brazil illustrate the influence of religious and mercantile migration networks in the colonial Atlantic. While Northern Europe maintained a long history of exoticist interest prior to and during the artists' voyage to Brazil, migration patterns allowed the exotic to be consumed by European viewers, eaters, and buyers. Religious and mercantile competition facilitated alliances as well. Insofar as the colonies and their populations could be tamed and placed within the Dutch matrix of order, hierarchy, and taxonomy, they were allowed to be consumed within the moralistic mores of the post-Reformation capitalist society. At the same time though, the liminality of the colonial subject had to be maintained, ensuring that aberrant moral practices would not infiltrate the new nation. Dutch society was therefore paradoxically open to foreignness yet hermetically sealed from its dangers as it established a condition of global hospitality that only existed as far as its violent welcome.[36] An analysis of the visual culture of colonial Brazil also allows us to reconceptualize the contemporary notions of race, which was not just interpreted as a static color that occupied the surface of the skin, but rather as a commodity that could acceptably become available for use after religious change and transatlantic trade. The materialistic motivations for migration also have implications for the modern day, as we can now rethink and begin to amend the mechanisms through which the commodification of race through trade has been painted into history.

[35] Homi K. Bhabha. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994.
[36] Here, I refer to Jacques Derrida's description of hospitality, as described in Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle's, *Of Hospitality*, Rachel Bowlby, trans. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000),

"They Might Feel Rather Swamped": The Changing in Anti-Immigration Rhetoric in 1950s–1980s Britain

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Conflicts offer privileged windows to understand social changes. This paper compares national press accounts of 1958 and 1980-1 outbursts of racial violence in Britain to show the interplay between racist narratives and anti-immigration arguments. While in 1958 the persistance of a colonial mindset led to the representation of black immigration as a threat to the racial integrity of the nation, in 1980-1 culture and particularly religion later emerged as an additional complexity. The theme of "cultural swamping", which dominated the public and political debate regarding the 1980-1 race riots, points to novel understandings of "Britishness", relying on notions of shared history and culture. Concerns about the impossibility of assimilating migrant groups due to their cultural difference date back to the late 1960s – 1970s, when male migration from the ex-colonies virtually stopped and first and second generations of post-colonial migrants decided to stay, forming black communities that were depicted as an internal danger to the unity of the nation.

Contemporary migration to Britain started symbolically in 1948, with the arrival of 492 migrant workers from Jamaica on board of the *Empire Windrush.* Since 1948, when the British Nationality Act restored the imperial concept of shared citizenship, granting the right to enter and work to all citizens of the colonies and Commonwealth,[1] there have been periodic arrivals of larger groups of new migrants. In the 1940s and 1950s, these new populations came predominantly from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent. Although some restrictions were put in place during 1960s, there were further arrivals during the 1970s, especially due to family reunifications. Since the early 1990s, international migration from a much wider range of states has occurred in London, accelerated by rising globalisation processes as is the case in many of world's cosmopolitan cities.[2] Although

[1] Kenneth Lunn, "Great Britain," in *The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe from the 17th Century to the Present,* ed. Klaus Bade et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 22.

[2] For a global history of migration to Britain, see Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Kenneth Lunn, "Great Britain," 16-26; Roger Ballard, "Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Migrants in Great Britain since 1947," in *The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe from the*

it is not possible to ascribe all the history of race and racism in Britain to the supposed "legacy of the Empire",[3] post-war migration chains have opened a new era of race relations in the United Kingdom (UK), since they marked the beginning of a significant coloured settlement in an area of the world that was previously mostly white. Looking at two key moments of violence as privileged windows to understand the social change with regard to race and migration issues, this paper aims to analyse the interplay of anti-immigration and racial discourses in British press from 1958 to 1985. This analysis will shed light on the how culturally based forms of exclusion progressively became more prominent than racist arguments centred on the notion of colour, and how blackness became connected to culture.

By 1950 about twenty thousand West Indian migrants had arrived in the UK since the end of the war;[4] the number of coloured labour migrants – tiny if compared with the much higher rates of East Europeans and especially of Irish non-restricted immigration[5] - increased steeply around 1954 and reached about 200.000 by the 1960s, due to new arrivals from the West Indies first, followed by South Asian and Africans in later years.[6] Most of them were attracted by the post-war rapid economic growth, which brought about significant labour shortages in industrial areas of the Midlands and in the textile industry in Yorkshire and Lancashire.[7] Similarly to guest workers in Western Europe, the striking majority of ex-colonial subjects that reached the country from South Asia, East Africa and the West Indian territories filled mostly unskilled jobs that allowed in turn for scarce social mobility and relegated immigrants to living in the most degraded urban areas,[8] thus creating the premises for potential social conflicts. In this context the 1958 race riots reinforced the arguments against coloured migrants from the Commonwealth and the colonies.

By looking at different perspectives on the immigration debate, taking place in August and September 1958 in *The Manchester Guardian, The Times, Daily Mail* and *Daily Express,* this paper will first follow the racialisation of the discourse

17th Century to the Present, ed. Klaus Bade et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 483-87; Myriam Cherli, "Moroccan Labour Migrants in Western, Central and Northern Europe since 1960s. The Case of Great Britain," in *The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe from the 17th Century to the Present,* ed. Klaus Bade et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 577-79; Klaus Bade, *Migration in Modern European History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Dirk Hoerder, "Migrations and Belonging," in *A World Connecting 1870-1945*, ed. Emily Rosenberg (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012); Colin Holmes, ed., vol. 1 and 2 of *Migration in European History* (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1996).

[3] Kenneth Lunn, "Immigration and Reaction in Britain, 1880-1950: Rethinking the *Legacy of the Empire,"* in *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives,* ed. Jan and Leo Lucassen (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997), 335-37.

[4] Neil MacMaster, *Racism in Europe 1870-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 177.

[5] Holmes, "Hostile Images of Immigrants," 334.

[6] Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat. The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 124-25;

[7] Ballard, "Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Migrants in Great Britain," 483-87.

[8] Lunn, "Great Britain," 23; Bade, *Migration in European History,* 217-75; Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat.* 135-36.

about immigration at the aftermath of Notting Hill riots. Newspapers depicted black immigration as a dangerous and unwholesome process due to the blackness of the immigrants. A range of different publications will be utilised to enter the historical debate. Important public affairs were mostly discussed in respectable newspapers such as *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times;* while in this period the former was closer to the Labour Governments, the latter was closer to the Conservative Governments' opinions. On the other hand, sensational newspapers such as *Daily Mirror* and *Daily Express* reflected perspectives and interests of respectively the working and the conservative middle-class. Far from being less relevant than more elite publications like *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, tabloids are helpful to understand the terms of the public debate, since as rightly noted by Martin Conboy, they have been prominent influential factors in the mediation of everyday life in the UK.[9]

The second section of the paper will focus on the period of 1960s – 1980s, by counterposing newspapers to the more emotional language and rhetorical style of prominent public figures of the Conservative landscape, as they most clearly show the rhetorical change of the anti-immigration debate in a cultural direction. Since the Conservative and the Labour discourse on migration differed significantly between 1960s and 1980s**,** and as immigration became a prominent topic in Conservatives' politics and newspapers, for that period this paper will focus on the Conservative press. By means of a discourse analysis, the newspapers accounts of the "race" riots in 1980s will make apparent the discursive shift from anti-immigration arguments, in which the notions of race and colour were central as it was the case in the press discourse in 1950s, to cultural arguments that, without replacing the racial ones, had slowly become more prominent.

"Keep Britain White": Claims of Racial Superiority in the Public Response to Notting Hill 1958 Race Riots

On the background of the contested liberal migration policy set by the 1948 British Nationality Act,[10] the 1958 riots fueled the racist construction of the argument for the introduction of a more restrictive policy targeting immigration of black migrants. The analysis of the newspapers' discourse following the Notting Hill riots, which widely agreed on condemning black immigrants for the outbreaks of racist violence, despite their role as the victims of this violence, shows how anti-black racism was powerfully embedded in language and construction of group identities.

[9] Martin Conboy, *Tabloid Britain: Constructing a Community through Language* (London: Routledge, 2006), 46-68.

[10] For a description of demographic aspects of post-colonial migration to Britain in connection to 1948 British Nationality Act, see Lunn, "Great Britain," 23-25.

Events in the London borough of Notting Hill unfolded on 23 August 1958 and went on for about two weeks, preceded by a similar violent unrest in Nottingham.[11] Tensions in the area, where during the 1950s a great number of West Indians migrants ended up living in decrepit overcrowded tenements, rose on the night of 23 August, when a group of nine white youths allegedly embarked on a "nigger hunting expedition" armed with iron bars, blocks of wood and knives, as authorities were eventually able to reconstruct.[12] The area finally exploded a week later on 29 August, ignited by a minor dispute between a black man and his white wife. A white crowd soon materialised to defend the woman, who did not want to be defended.[13] Later in the night, white mobs of several hundred people took to the streets carrying racist banners with the slogan "Keep Britain White", assaulting West Indian inhabitants and besieging their homes and clubs.[14] On 3 September *The Times* argued in a reportage from Notting Hill that there were three major allegations against coloured inhabitants of the district where riots unfolded:

> They are alleged to do no work and to collect a rich sum from the Assistance Board. They are said to be able to find housing when white residents cannot. And they are alleged of any kind of misbehaviour, especially sexual. […] Several men told to your Correspondent that their wives had been accosted by coloured men, and many told the story of a young white girl who is said to have been raped by one. Several houses in the troubled district are generally believed by local people to be brothels.[15]

Interestingly, *The Manchester Guardian* agreed with *The Times* on the interpretation of the Notting Hill events, which subtly suggested that West Indians were actually responsible for the disorders and thus partially absolved the white mobs for their violence. The fact that two newspapers that were generally politically opposed to one another gave the same interpretation of the facts shows the power of the general discourse against coloured migrants. A few days after the main outburst of violence in Notting Hill, *The Manchester Guardian* published a long article reporting on the state of the police enquiry about the Notting Hill events. While qualifying the aggression as "hooliganism", the newspaper also reported about the allegations of West Indians taking housing over as follows:

> [The officers from the welfare service admit] that there might be real grounds for resentment over housing, for there have been cases of coloured landlords attempt-

[11] MacMaster, *Racism in Europe*, 178-79.
[12] "55 Charged After Racial Disturbances", *Times,* September 2, 1958, 7.
[13] "Woman Shout a Warning", *Daily Express,* September 1, 1958, 1.
[14] "Keep Britain White Call in Notting Hill Area," *Times*, September 10, 1958, 5; "Race Riot in London," *Daily Express*, September 1, 1958, 1.
[15] "London Racial Outburst Due To Many Factors," *Times*, September 3, 1958, 7.

> ing to evict white tenants […] all with the purpose of driving the sitting [white] tenants out so that the West Indian may have enough room for his family and friends.[16]
>
> Of those three allegations newspapers particularly stressed the anxieties about the exacerbation of housing problems, which had been growing all over the country for the previous few years. [17]

As *The Times´s* reportage on "West Indians Settlers" bluntly put it as early as 1954: " ...what are likely to be the feelings of more than 50,000 would be white tenants in Birmingham, who have waited years for a decent house, when they see newcomers, no matter what their colour, taking over whole streets of properties?"[18] Due to scarce social mobility and the establishing of migration chains, settlers of the same ethnic group started to cluster in decaying suburbs in the poorest sections of London and other industrial cities,[19] suburbs previously only inhabited by members of the white working class that reluctantly accepted to share tenancies with black tenants. Thus landlordism, declining property values, spiralling rents, overcrowding, dilapidation and decay were cited as the inevitable consequences of black settlement. [20] Black people not only created "slums", it was argued,[21] but these "new Harlems"[22] had their provenance in the racial character of the inhabitants, as the persisting reference to the colour of the migrants shows. As historian of racism Neil Macmaster points out, due to the persisting of a colonial mindset

[16] "Hands of British Fascists Seen Behind Race Riots," *Manchester Guardian*, September 5, 1958, 5.

[17] "The West Indian Settlers – First Signs of a British Colour Problem," *The Times,* November 8, 1954, 7: "Let it be admitted that, once the coloured immigrants are here, there is work waiting for them […]"; "Plan to Help Immigrants – No Employment Problem," *Times,* September 6, 1955, 4: "British local authorities are worried about the exacerbation of their local housing problems, for the West Indians naturally tend to concentrate in few areas. But employment is not a problem. The immigrants never fail to get the work they have come to find, even though men who consider themselves skilled sometimes have to be content with labouring jobs."

[18] Ibid.

[19] Lunn, "Great Britain," 23; Ballard, "Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Migrants in Great Britain since 1947," 483-84.

[20] "The West Indian Settlers", 7.

[21] "Slums in the Making," *Times,* November 8, 1954, 7: "Uncontrolled West Indian immigration places upon local authorities a burden that they have no means to carry. Civic leaders must stand helplessly by while they see what are virtually new slums in the process of creation. […] Brixton becomes a sort of transit camp for immigrants for a few days after each ship has docked. Houses owned by coloured landlords or occupied by coloured tenants are filled up with immigrants […]."

[22] The term "Little Harlem" or "new Harlem" for designing areas inhabited by the West Indian migrants was commonly used, as a letter to the *Times* published on October 25, 1955 shows, while pointing that allegations of discrimination against black immigrants were false: "The publicity recently given to the departure of 250 West Indians returning to the Caribbean and to allegations that during their stay they suffered from a colour bar and confinement to cramped slums in coloured Little Harlem districts English cities draws attention to two matters of some importance."

that in many ways emphasised the superiority of the white man with regard to the colonised, white residents perceived the presence of black newcomers as a symbol of their own exclusion from society,[23] and experienced their presence as an invasion, as a taking over of "our women", "our housing", "our jobs."[24] Newspapers echoed the political discourse that legitimated those popular racist claims. However, the riots contributed to the shift in the debate to even more openly racist tones. In the aftermath of the riots, *The Times* reported that Michael Webster, the Independent candidate in the 1959 general election, stated that a multi-racial society was a "biological sacrilege" and that since 'Negroes' were on a "lower evolutionary plane", their presence was lowering the standard of the English people.[25] A month before, the Conservative Home Secretary Richard Butler had claimed that "[the] English have always been a particular human race."[26] Although both Butler and Webster were speaking in the highly emotional context of the riots, these voices reveal the survival of a colonial mindset. In contrast with what is often held, that biological arguments of racial superiority disappeared from the political language about race relations after World War II together with eugenics as a colonial science, the Conservative arguments against black immigration reveal the persistence of a language still imbued with biological arguments at the turn of 1960s.[27]

While blaming black labour migrants for problems that were very real, including scarce investments and poor housing, following the riots newspapers argued for more restrictive migration policies against West Indians. As soon as 3 September the *Daily Mirror'*s headline claimed "Black v. White. What we must do" and in a long editorial the newspaper drove a clear link between public order and black immigration control. Utilising emotional language, the editorial appealed to "every decent person" who was ashamed of outbreak of race rioting and violence, and envisaged a programme that was openly racist for the biological terms in which the discussion was set ("Black vs. Whites") and for labelling black migrant workers as "evil" in connection with their blackness:

> Every decent person in this country is ashamed of the outbreak of race rioting and hooliganism in British streets […]. Commonwealth citizens – whatever the colour of their skin- must not be allowed to come to Britain unless they have a job AND home to come. Britain is the only Commonwealth country which allows immi-

[23] MacMaster, *Racism in Europe,* 178.
[24] "London Racial Outburst Due To Many Factors," *Times*, September 3, 1958, 7.
[25] "Colour Bar As Election Issue," *Times,* September 18, 1958, 3.
[26] "Butler Speaks on Race Riots," *Daily Express,* September 17, 1958, 7.
[27] For eugenics as a colonial science used to argue a biological basis for the racial superiority of whiteness, and on its gradual abandonment as a scientific discipline after World War II, see MacMaster, *Racism in Europe,* 1-27; Richard Geulen, "The Common Grounds of Conflict: Racial Visions of the World Order, 1880-1940," in *Competing Visions of the World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 69-96.

> grants to pour in without restrictions. This policy has failed. It must be scrapped. Or the growing competition for housing and employment will spark off more trouble. […] The coloured evil men must be sent back home.[28]

That the very blackness of these migrants was the real issue is also supported by the fact that they were not the only large group of settlers in the UK, since European Jews and Irish-born citizens largely outnumbered West Indians throughout the 1940s and 1950s.[29] Yet West Indians were the only group to be stigmatised for exacerbating housing shortages in London[30], and the only group whose presence woke – as shown above – fears of racial contamination.[31] British historian of migration Colin Holmes has noted that European Jews coming from Poland under the European Volunteer Workers scheme remained almost untouched by anti-immigrants sentiments in 1950s, even though they had been persecuted for centuries for racial and religious reasons.[32] Macmaster argues that the new wave of moral condemnation in the aftermath of World War II lead to the ban of anti-Jewish racism from the "respectable" political discourse, while leaving colonial-based racism almost untouched. [33] This helps to explain the evidence that West Indians became the target of xenophobic, anti-immigrant rhetoric in the newspapers, despite the fact that they were not the only large group of immigrants in Britain at that time.

As argued above, colour-based racist claims pervaded the debate around migration issues in 1950s Britain. Due to the persisting of a colonial mindset, blackness was far more prominent than other characteristics of the immigrants. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 led to a virtual halt in primary immigration for labouring purposes, dramatically reducing the number of new arrivals.[34] However, The new legislation could not prevent family reunifications as this form of immigration was protected by international law. In this way the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act led to the opposite of the desired outcome, as its implementation accelerated family reunification and their permanent settlement in Britain, paving the way for new fears that added additional complexity to the

[28] "Black vs. White," *Daily Mirror,* September 3, 1958,1-2.
[29] Holmes, "Hostile Images of Immigrants," 333.
[30] "Butler Speaks on Race Riots," 7; "West Indian Settlers," 7.
[31] "Colour Bar As Election Issue," *Times,* September 18, 1958, 3.
[32] Holmes, "Hostile Images of Immigrants," 333-34.
[33] MacMaster, *Racism in Europe*, 171-81.
[34] Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat*, 126: 1962. Lucassen argues that the Commonwealth Immigration Act introduced a system that, by giving access to those who already had a job or specific qualifications only, made it virtually impossible for people from the West Indies and South Asia to migrate, since due to wealth disparity and racism they were unable to get jobs in advance or gain the desirable qualifications. Whereas the short-term effect of the law was a sharp increase in immigration from those who wanted to escape the ban (from 5,000 entries from West Indies in 1959 to 15,000 in 1961), thereafter immigration continued only in the reduced form of family reunion. After 1970 immigration from West Indies and South Asia came to a virtual halt.

picture.[35] While in the 1950s the anti-immigration discourse targeted the first generation of black migrants coming primarily for labouring purposes, from the late 1960s onwards it mainly targeted those who decided to stay, and by settling down in "black enclaves" inside inner cities menaced the integrity of the nation from within, as the following section shows.

1960s – 1980s: Immigrants as Enemies Within

The language of the anti-immigration discourse shifted at the end of 1960s from "colour" to "culture" so that Caribbean, African and South Asian minorities[36] were now constructed as an "alien wedge"[37] endangering the cultural, moral, linguistic integrity of Britain – thus adding a further dimension to the "racial" superiority discourse. While "race" itself was no longer directly mentioned, concerns about the cultural and religious background of the immigrants became more prominent in the political and popular discourses about immigration and race-relations, and were instrumentally used to exclude non-white minorities from the national body.

1968 marked a milestone in history of race and racism in Britain, as former Conservative MP Enoch Powell pronounced his infamous speech remembered as "Rivers of Blood" in Birmingham, a city with an industrial area that was largely populated by "black and ethnic minorities," as Jamaican, Indian and Pakistani communities were named by Birmingham local authorities.[38] Although Powell's most racist claims for repatriation of black migrants met the unanimous rejection of Tories (as well as being rejected by the Labour and the moderate sectors of the public opinion) it is useful to look at his rhetoric closely, as Powell´s language of

[35] MacMaster, *Racism in Europe,* 181-83; Bade et al., *Encyclopedia of Migration,* 21-25.

[36] In the period under examination in this section (1960s - 1980s), the Conservative public press indifferently regarded all West Indians, South Asian and African minorities as "blacks." It is worth noticing that the anti-immigrant discourse in 1950s mainly targeted West Indians instead. As a clear example of the 1980s Conservative discourse "blending" all groups of migrants together see Richard West, "The Man Who Ruined Jamaica", *The Spectator*, August 21, 1981, 8. In this article about crime and disorder in Caribbean societies (imbued with racial stereotypes), the author explicitly mentions that the public discourse does not differentiate among ethnic groups (sarcastically speaking of the the Labour Party as of the "Race Relations Industry" as they promoted an anti-discrimination legislation that had been contested by some white citizens because it eroded their privileges, but taking distance from what he calls "the xenophobic right"): "The English public, in those days, took an interest in the special characteristics and problems of West Indian islands and mainland territories […]. Nowadays all West Indians, including those of Indian or mixed race, are bundled together as 'blacks'. Even Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis and Africans from Africa are lumped with West Indians under the label of 'blacks'. This arrogant and insulting label for all people not European, conforms to the prejudice of the xenophobic right; still more to that of the left, and of the Race Relations industry."

[37] Enoch Powell, Keynote presented at the General Meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre (Birmingham, April 20, 1968). Accessed on April 30, 2016. URL: http://enochpowell.net/fr-79.html.

[38] Bernhard Perchinig, "Race-Relations" Politik in Birmingham 1945-2000," in *Zuwanderung und Segregation: Europäische Metropolen in Vergleich,* ed. Heinz Fassmann, Joseph Kohlbacher and Ursula Reeger (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2002), 87-88.

war and invasion entered into the political vocabulary of the Conservative party on migration issues. In his most famous intervention in Birmingham Powell classified black Commonwealth citizens as an "alien wedge" which threatened the notion of legality that had long informed British culture; in contrast to them he depicted the white majority as an oppressed minority:

> This does not mean that the immigrant and his descendants should be elevated into a privileged or special class or that the citizen should be denied his right to discriminate in the management of his own affairs between one fellow-citizen and another […]. The sense of being a persecuted minority which is growing among ordinary English people [...] is something that those without direct experience can hardly imagine.[39]

Powell's indignation refers to 1968 Race Relations Act. The Race Relations Act made it illegal to refuse housing, employment or public services to a person on the ground of colour, race, ethnic or national origins, thus addressing those situations of social disadvantage that had led to 1958 urban unrest. Nevertheless, it met the fierce opposition of those who, like Powell, were indignant that the new legislation attempted to erode their privilege over black immigrants in the search of jobs, homes and other goods.[40] Although stressing that the numbers of this alien wedge were important, for Powell the character and effects of the black settlement were the real core of the issue. In Powell's opinion, while a few immigrants honestly tried to integrate into Britain society, it would have been a dangerous misconception to hope that the growing majority of them was willing to. In his speech Powell forecasts instead a future of black colonisation of Britain, as "the black man will hold the whip hand over the white man."[41] This is an important point for the analysis of Powell's rhetoric, since not only in his Birmingham speech, but also in a keynote presented in November 1968 at London Rotary Club and in other interventions on immigration, the masculine black remains (either in the form of "wide-grinning piccaninnies" or "black men"), while the white is transformed into a vulnerable old lady, into a sick wife unable to obtain hospital beds,[42] into

[39] Enoch Powell, Keynote presented at the General Meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre.

[40] Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 68-82.

[41] Enoch Powell, Keynote presented to London Rotary Club (London-Eastbourne, November 16, 1968). Accessed on April 30, 2016. URL: http://enochpowell.net/fr-83.html.

[42] Powell, Keynote presented at the General Meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre: "They found themselves made strangers in their own country. They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition […]. Eight years ago in a respectable street in Wolverhampton a house was sold to a Negro. Now only one white (a woman old-age pensioner) lives there. This is her story. She lost her husband and both her sons in the war. So she turned her seventy-second house, her only asset, into a boarding house. She worked hard and did well, paid off her mortgage and began to put something by for her old age. Then the immigrants moved in. With growing fear, she saw one house after

the only white child in a class full of black children.[43] Notably, campaigners in the 1950s against black immigration had already talked about the settlement of black immigrants as a form of "colonisation" of Britain,[44] due to "uncontrolled" rates of black immigration.[45] However, here the black man does not only threaten Britain because of his very blackness, but also because he poses the threat of moral and urban decay: the old lady, as a personification of the white nation, was teased by the cry of "racialist" by the black immigrants, who also push excreta in her letter box.[46] Powell was outraged; he was "filled with foreboding." Like the ancient Roman he saw "the River Tiber foaming with much blood", forecasting a "race war like in the US."[47]

Notably the racism displayed here was concerned with mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and no longer with racial contamination as it was still the case in 1950s. Moreover, it relied on a conception of national belonging and "homogeneity", (some were "fellow citizens" while some were not) defined not only in biological terms (as he often referred to his audience as "whites"),[48] but also in cultural terms. National belonging or "Englishness" relied quite explicitly on notions of shared history, customs and kinship which excluded black minorities from the national and political body, as Powell remarked in his intervention at the Rotary Club in Eastbourne, London:

> To suppose that the habits of the great mass of immigrants, living in their own communities, speaking their own languages and maintaining their native customs, will change appreciably in the next two or three decades is a supposition so grotesque that only those could make it who are determined not to admit what they know to be true or not to see what they fear. […] The West Indian or Asian does not, by being born in England, become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or an Asian still.[49]

another taken over. The quiet street became a place of noise and confusion. Regretfully, her white tenants moved out."

[43] "I told him of a constituent whose little daughter was now the only white child in her class at school." Enoch Powell, speech presented at Walsall, February 9, 1968. Accessed on April 30, 2016. URL: http://enochpowell.net/fr-80.html.

[44] "The West Indian Settlers," 7: "West Indians colonies have sprung up during the last two years in several parts of London, in Birmingham, Nottingham, Leeds, Sheffield."

[45] Ibid.: "[in those streets that have become almost exclusively populated by West Indians] lies the core of the present social difficulties about uncontrolled West Indians immigration."

[46] Powell, Keynote presented to London Rotary Club.

[47] Powell, Keynote presented at the General Meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre.

[48] The white vulnerable lady (Powell, Keynote presented at the General Meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre), the only white child in a class full of blacks (Enoch Powell, speech presented at Walsall).

[49] Powell, Keynote presented to London Rotary Club.

Powell's greatest concern was that even the offspring of immigrants remained tied with their homeland overseas in terms of language, habits, and culture at large; the growing number of foreigners, due to their higher birth rates, had thus the power to erode English culture from within, transforming entire cities into "alien territories,"[50] contaminating the natives' culture and way of life. Rather than evoking the common past of the Empire and Commonwealth, the differences between Britons and non-white Commonwealth citizens were stressed. The first effect of Powell's rhetoric was thus to draw the frontiers of identity[51] more tightly around the British Isles, since only those raised in a supposedly immutable English culture seemed to be part of the community he referred to as "English." Culture became then connected to blackness, as the target of Powell's anti-immigrant rhetoric was, once again, not European or white immigrants from the Commonwealth and Colonies, but rather West Indians, Asians and black Africans.

Powell continually emphasised from the late 1960s to 1980s that the social and cultural fabric of British society was likely to be undermined by the massive presence of individuals from a different cultural, racial and religious background.[52] While his interventions were always and unanimously rejected as "racist", the racial discourse he gave voice to gained new respectability through the Conservatives' adoption of his language of war and invasion, which contributed to the further racialisation of the immigration debate in the 1970s and 1980s. In a much quoted television speech in February 1978 Margaret Thatcher linked herself to that discourse. Referring to trends in New Commonwealth (coded-term for "non-white") and Pakistani immigration, she said:

> That is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.[53]

[50] Powell, Keynote presented to London Rotary Club: "[If we do not stop it] The very growth in numbers [of the immigrant population] would increase the already striking fact of dense geographical concentration, so that the urban part of whole towns and cities in Yorkshire, the Midlands and the Home Counties would be preponderantly or exclusively Afro-Asian in population. There would be several Washingtons in England. From these whole areas the indigenous population, the people of England, who fondly imagine that this is their country and these are their home towns, would have been dislodged […] I do not believe it is in human nature that a country, and a country such as ours, should passively watch the transformation of whole areas which lie at the heart of it into alien territory."

[51] For an analysis of how British as a people are constantly redefined through their interactions with different "frontiers of identity", see Robin Cohen, *Frontiers of Identity: the British and the Others*. Warwick: Longman, 1994.

[52] Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 122-26.

[53] Gordon Burns, TV interview with Margaret Thatcher, broadcasted on *Granada World in Action* (January 27, 1978). Accessed on April 30, 2016. URL: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103485.

When Thatcher said that a minority could scare the majority once it became a big one, she denied that hostility towards black communities in the country was a form of racism and she gave voice to the old argument displayed since the 1958 debate about race riots: the argument that it is a natural thing that people prefer to live in a culturally homogeneous milieu, not to become a multi-racial society and not to see their neighbourhoods change character because of people with different habits. However, the most prominent theme here is not the concern with racial superiority, but with the threat posed by the immigrants to the cultural integrity of the host society. To the contemporaries, such a construction did not even have to rely on the notion of racial superiority in a narrow sense: to those who accused the Conservative party of racism, Thatcher answered that controlling the number of those who were coming in was necessary "for the sake of racial harmony."[54] While connecting her rhetoric to the "ancient traditions" of respect and safety under the law, Thatcher also expressed her concerns for those mostly black urban areas, as Notting Hill was in 1950s and Brixton and the East End had become since 1970s-1980s, in which it was seen as impossible to enforce British law and culture.[55] However, beyond the immediate reference to the security debate, the main concern was the threat posed by a multicultural society to the British way of life. A more recent version of this argument can be found in a piece that appeared in 1985 in on the conservative weekly magazine *The Spectator*, in the aftermath of the 1985 major outbreaks of violence involving black youths:

> There is no doubt that a majority of West Indians and Asians wish to be British. But not all. There are elements, like the Rastafarians, who are utterly antipathetic to British society and do not wish to be assimilated. Furthermore, Islam is alien not only to English but to Western Christian culture in such things as its treatment of women, while such matters as ritual slaughter cause grave offence to the English who, whether hypocritically or no, have a long tradition of concern for animals. Can, should, such things be tolerated, especially when the shadow of Islamic fundamentalism presents a real threat to English culture? [...] The refusal of so many immigrant groups to respect English culture and law, combined with the perverse, suicidal self- hatred of the modern English intelligentsia — which is so remote from popular feeling— makes me profoundly depressed about our future.[56]

[54] Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Conservative Party Conference at Brighton, (Brighton, 3 October 1978). Accessed on 2016, 25 June. URL: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103764.

[55] Thatcher, Speech to Conservative Party Conference at Brighton: "National uncertainty continues, and with it the continued weakening of one of our most ancient and deep-rooted traditions—respect for and safety under the law. When a rule of law breaks down, fear takes over. There is no security in the streets, families feel unsafe even in their own homes, children are at risk, criminals prosper, men of violence flourish, the nightmare world of "A Clockwork Orange" becomes a reality."

[56] Gavin Stamp, "A Culture in Crisis," *The Spectator,* October 11, 1985, 19-20.

Here the differences between white Britons and the religious and ethnic minorities present in the country are radicalised. The metaphysical notion of "English" or "Western Christian culture" no longer excludes on the basis of skin colour but more and more on the basis of a supposed immutable "cultural belonging." Religious or ethnic minorities were viewed as threatening the "English" society from within. This shift in focus – no longer on newcomers, but rather on minorities present in the country – reflects the fact that by the end of the 1970s young male migration from the Commonwealth had virtually stopped, but family reunifications had led to the formation of black communities settling down in the UK.[57] Since the beginning of the 1980s anti-immigration narratives, for example in *The Spectator,* centred on the theme of political and social alienation of black enclaves inside the inner cities, where British law and order could not be enforced:

> For the police, that arch symbol of all he [the Rastafarian man] hates most, he reserves a special repugnance, and with increasing frequency they have become the targets for his bricks and bottles and, more recently, his petrol bombs. The social workers, the Christian church and the Commission for Racial Equality he regards with contempt. They come up with all the predictable answers: unemployment; bad housing; police harassment; lack of family life; inadequate education. Correct these conditions, they say, and the Rastafarians will take their place in the mainstream of British life; the problems which they now pose will melt away. The Dreads know better. They see themselves locked in perpetual conflict with white society; they don't want to join it. They regard the struggle as a straightforward biblical confrontation between good and evil. Their aversion to White is central to their religion; they cannot abandon it and remain Rastafarian. And if they are not Rastafarians they are nothing. [58]

In the context of the quote above, the reference to the Rastafarians may be explained in the context of 1980-81 race riots, a violent outbreak that some regarded as a reaction of black youths to their exclusion from white society. Further, these riots have been linked to the emergence of transnational "black" movements such as Black Power or the Rastafarians, as the literature points out.[59] Thus according to a certain discourse it was the supposed pathological black culture of hate and crime[60] that reportedly led to the race riots in London metropolitan area of Tottenham (mostly populated by West Indians migrants and their descents) in August-

[57] Lunn, "Great Britain," 19-25.
[58] Micheal Humfrey, "A Time of Dread", *The Spectator,* July 31, 1981, 8. The Conservative public identified the Rastafarian culture with black culture at large: see West, "The Man Who Ruined Jamaica". Further, the author of "The Jamaican Problem," *The Spectator,* October 18, 1985, uses the term "Jamaican" and "West Indian" interchangeably.
[59] Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat,* 127-29.
[60] Humfrey, "A Time of Dread," 8.

October 1985.[61] Crucially, however, in Gavin Stamp's article quoted above, Islam is first mentioned too, reflecting the fact that in 1980s the "shadow of Islamic fundamentalism"[62] started to be perceived as a main political problem. The mention to Islam shows how the discursive shift that started in the late 1960s with Powell´s speeches had come to maturity. In late 1980s the religious values of the immigrants appears to have become more prominent than concerns about blackness, and to be a key notion around which exclusion and fear were constructed.

The newspaper discourse regarding the 1980s "race" riots in England largely deployed the above mentioned themes of law and order, diffuse criminality among black youth and "cultural swamping". The 1980s riots were substantially different from 1958 events, when white mobs attacked black neighbourhoods: in 1980s riots were set off most frequently by an incident in which the police arrested a black youth or used violence considered unwarranted or excessive. In reaction black youths with some white peers attacked the police with stones, bricks, iron bars and petrol bombs;[63] street fights ended in hooliganism, arson, and shop pillaging followed by major police operations and hundreds of arrests. Events unfolded first in Bristol in April 1980, but received growing attention in the press when rioting spread to London and Liverpool one year later (in April and July), with major outbreaks in Birmingham.[64] Reactions to 1981 events across the national press showed great surprise and fear. Referring to the events in the Brixton borough in London on 13 April, *The Times* printed an article titled "Running Battles in Streets",[65] and continued reporting the events as the "worst public disorder seen in mainland Britain for years". The inner parts of the cities were described as being virtually taken over by black mobs.[66] The *Daily Express's* first page was similarly titled "Britain in Turmoil" when disturbances occurred again in July, stressing the national dimension of the disturbances.[67] Sociologists' earlier predictions from other countries, notably the US, about the possibility of riots in England had been arrogantly dismissed; up to 1981 British politicians and press assumed that riots in the US were the effect of racial inequalities that had not been seen in the UK.[68] Several forms of anti-racist activism, both at the popular level (the 1964-5 Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, and Rock Against Racism in the 1970s), as well as at the institutional level (the progressive radicalisation

[61] "Merchants of Hate," *Daily Express,* October 10, 1985, 8; "The Bloody Battle of Tottenham. Policeman Murdered in Terror Riots," *Daily Express,* October 7, 1985, 1.
[62] Gavin Stamp, "A Culture in Crisis," *The Spectator,* October 11, 1985, 20.
[63] Carole F. Willis, "The Police and Race Relations in England," *Police Studies* 8.4 (2005), 227.
[64] Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat,* 127-29; Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 160-74.
[65] "Mr Whitelaw Expected To Announce Inquiry Into Brixton Riots Today," *Times,* April 13, 1981, 1.
[66] "There Must An Enquiry," *Times*, April 13, 1981, 13.
[67] "Britain in Turmoil," *Daily Express,* July 11, 1981, 1.
[68] Willis, "The Police and Race Relations in England," 227-28.

and engagement of the Race Relation Institute from 1973)[69] and the progressive implementation of anti-discrimination legal measures (1965 and 1968 Race Relation Acts)[70] informed race awareness throughout the 1960s and 1970s and significantly challenged old stereotypes and practices. Together with black youth militancy, all those forms of anti-discrimination activism and legislation helped to produce diverse and competing narratives about race relations that acknowledged the necessity to tackle economic and social inequalities to avoid similar disorders in the future. *The Times*, due to its closeness to the 1981 Conservative government, pointed to the need of a serious sociological enquiry about the causes of the rioting,[71] and to the socio-economic rather than to the racial dimension of the disturbances.[72] Yet economic inequalities persisted,[73] alongside to the ideological, systematic exclusion of black immigrants from the national body,[74] and to the *a priori* criminalisation of black youth,[75] that reached the dimension of a real "racial profiling" and led to fifteen times as many arrests among black populations as among white populations by the police.[76] In this context the *Daily Express* reportage on recent events in London borough of Brixton pointed to a link between criminal culture and blackness:

> How many riots in how many cities? […] How many weekends like the past one is the civilised country to suffer before the authority asserts itself? How much racial violence are we to put up with before the interests of the white majority are considered? […] There was neither law nor order in the streets of Toxteth and Southall. Disorder is infectious. In recent years we have seen it spreading and becoming more virulent. There are some parts of our cities in which disorder is endemic.[77]

In this article black youths are being clearly marginalised from white society, "the civilised country" that was being subjected to their racial violence. The jour-

[69] Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 140-59.
[70] Ibid., 68-81.
[71] See the *Times´* editorial on 13 April 1981 at the aftermath of the first outbreak of violence in Brixton: "There Must Be an Enquiry," *The Times,* April 13, 1981. An enquiry chaired by English judge George Scarman eventually took place; the report pointed to problems of racial disadvantage and inner city decline that created the dispositions toward violent protests (Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 114-20).
[72] See the in-depth analysis by modern historian Philip Waller about the outbreak of "racial" violence in Liverpool and London, pointing at depoliticising the racial dimension in its colour terms (it was not about a racial war of black citizens against white citizens) and calling for action against ongoing social and economic inequalities: Philip Waller, "Liverpool: Why the Clue to Violence Is Economic, Not Racial," *The Times,* July 7, 1981, 12.
[73] Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat,* 139-43.
[74] Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 122-39; Gilroy, *"There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack,"* 43-71.
[75] Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain,* 99-120; Willis, "The Police and Race Relations in England," 227-30.
[76] Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat,* 128.
[77] George Gail, "Just How Much More," *Daily Express,* July 7, 1981, 1.

nalist, claiming to speak for the white majority (depicted here as an oppressed minority), makes an appeal to the authorities for re-establishing law and order in those parts of the cities now controlled by black youths. According to him black immigrants were leading cities to urban and moral decay, not because of their blackness, but rather because they were corrupting the way of life of the English people in those areas where they tended to settle in after migrating, so that now "the English people fears disorder, suffers from crime, is hurt by violence and asks protection from mobs and thugs".[78] Similar narratives highlighted the externality of West Indians and Asians from the national body rather than the racist institutions and processes that still worked against black immigrants at several levels of society. These institutions made it impossible for immigrants to move out from ghettoes to more central, but also more expensive parts of the cities. In fact, while condemning all "teenage black, yellow and white skinhead," the journalist pointed out that "the liberal experiment of integration has failed and many are tempted into crime."[79] Crucially, only pictures depicting black youths fighting white police accompanied Gail´s reportage from Brixton, reinforcing the link between blackness and criminal culture.[80] Due to the discursive shift from colour to culture, people started connecting blackness with black culture, and black culture to drug taking and violence.[81] The Conservative newspapers' discourse, by presenting riots as a planned, military action with an anti-white, anti-English function,[82] appears thus connected to the discourse that had since the late 1960s depicted black communities as an enemy within. This enemy within was thought to be engaged in activities threatening the security of British society as well as its national unity, and relegated immigrants to an intermediate position between exclusion and inclusion in the polity.

Conclusions

Racist narratives played a major role in shaping the discourse about migration and national belonging in 1950s - 1980s Britain. Black immigration from the Commonwealth and Colonies was first portrayed as a threat to the racial integrity of the nation, yet culture and particularly religion later emerged as an additional complexity. The outbursts of racial violence at different points of time can offer windows through which we can observe the transformation of cultural perception

[78] Ibid., 1.
[79] Ibid., 2.
[80] Downing, John and Keith Butler, "Express Pictures Special", *Daily Express,* July 7, 1981, 7-9.
[81] West, "The Man Who Ruined Jamaica": "Strangest of all, when English people talk of the 'blacks' or 'black culture', they unconsciously speak of Jamaican phenomena such as the Rastafarians, 'Back to Africa', reggae music, dope taking and violence."
[82] "Terrible Outrage," *Daily Express,* August 10, 1985, 8 (editorial): "Handsworth, Brixton, and now Tottenham. There was nothing spontaneous about any of the riots. They were planned and there is evidence that Sunday's was organised on military lines."

of race and immigration, since the conflicts themselves are instrumental in gaining better understandings of social changes.

By means of a discourse analysis conducted on articles in the national press and the speeches of prominent public figures, the present discussion has shown that 1958 rioting contributed to the racialisation of anti-immigration narratives. The persisting of a colonial mindset led to the social construction of a black-immigration problem. Newspapers reflected the racialised construction of biological anti-immigration arguments, focusing on English racial superiority. All newspapers agreed on black immigrants stealing jobs, women and housing from the English, regardless of their political orientation. But newspapers also contributed to shape the immigration debate in racial terms. The *Daily Mirror's* editorial calling for immigration stop under the title "Black vs. White"[83] is a good example of the racist tone the immigration debate transversally assumed. However, the ways in which the national and racial discourse changed from the late 1960s up to the 1980s reveal an emphasis on the role of social and cultural transformation brought about by immigrants. The theme of "cultural swamping" in newspapers and political debates went hand in hand with the recourse to a notion of shared history and culture, commonly thought of as "Englishness". Although migrant-related tensions had manifested since the beginning of contemporary migration to Britain, from the end of the 1960s concerns about the impossibility of assimilating migrant groups due to their different culture became more prominent in comparison to the colour issue. Claims of superiority of one race over another did not disappear, but became more implicit, while the discourse more prominently focused on cultural difference as an internal threat to English culture, rather than using justifications based on biological arguments. Black culture and not blackness itself was thus used as a tool for discrimination against descendants of black migrants who settled in the country – as in the case of 1980s riots.

The present discussion is aimed at contributing to the understanding of race and migration issues from a historical perspective. Anxieties linked to the emergence of multi-cultural societies and fears of "cultural swamping" are not specific to post-war Britain, since similar tendencies can be observed in almost every Western society and are still happening in contemporary societies, as shown by the recent refugee crisis and the resurgence of extreme-right movements across Europe. By focusing on long-term tendencies, recurring images and themes, historians can shed light on the evolution of fears and anxieties that that have contributed to the present debate regarding migration and asylum seeking worldwide.

[83] "Black vs. White", *Daily Mirror,* September 3, 1958, 1.

The Daily Lives of Françafrique: French Expatriate Communities in Port-Gentil, Gabon, 1960-1989

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Using oral history interviews with former expatriates in Gabon, this paper seeks to look at how their community has evolved over time and more importantly what it tells us about Franco-Gabonese relations. Coming from all kind of horizons, the interviewees draw a lively picture of what it was like to live overseas in a rather separated community. Their lives and how they interacted with the larger Gabonese society – or did not – over the period at hand is key in understanding French policies towards Africa. If in the early days of independence, the boundary between the colonial and the postcolonial was rather blurred, by the late 1980's, a shift has occurred and a certain normalization of Franco-Gabonese – which is yet to be further analyzed and discussed – has happened: the "Heroic Age", as some of the former participants call the 1960's and early 70's, has given way to another era that is more difficult to characterized. Gabon and its large number of French expatriates raise questions about our common understanding of decolonization ending with independence and lead us to consider it as a much longer process encompassing not only the political realm but also the economic or interpersonal ones – just to name a few.

In September 1966, my grandparents, Blandine and Gilbert Sibieude, and their four children arrived in Port-Gentil, Gabon where they were welcomed by Gilbert's superior, Mr. Moussel, and his wife who had arrived a few months before in early 1966. My grandfather was to work as Mr. Moussel's number two in the oil company SPAFE.[1] Despite both men enjoying the social life and the advantages a life as an expatriate in tropical Africa could offer, they were both ordered back to Paris within 18 months of my grandfather's arrival. The main reason behind their early call-back concerned an internal rivalry within SPAFE between Mr. Moussel and Mr. Haym Levi, the head of exploration in Paris, who had sent my grandfather to be his henchman on the spot. This rivalry caused troublebetween SPAFE's internal intelligence and security office and the Gabonese security services to the point where Mr. Haym Levi was told that "the man who is in Port Gentil and who

[1] Created in 1949 as SPAEF, it was renamed SPAFE in 1960 when Gabon gained independence. Then, in 1968, it became Elf-Spafe until it was again renamed in 1973 as Elf-Gabon. It was owned by the French state, and was the local branch of a much larger French oil company: Elf. Cf. TOTAL GABON, "Rappel Historique.," http://www.total.ga/historique-3.accessed 28th March 2016; Douglas Andrew Yates, *The French Oil Industry and the Corps Des Mines in Africa* (Africa World Press, 2009).



Figure 1. Gabonese trainees and an expatriate engineer
Elf-Gabon, 1979

causes trouble must leave"- Gilbert thus left Gabon and Mr. Moussel followed a few months later.[2]

This anecdote from my family's past brings together different themes that will be key to this paper: how the presence of natural resources explains why Frenchmen were in Gabon at that time; how the French community was not a monolithic group but was in many ways divided by issues relating to personal beliefs and ideologies, as well as by inter-personal rivalries; and, finally, how French expatriate

[2] This little narrative is the result of several oral history interviews conducted with people involved in the process and who asked to remain anonymous. My grandmother also gave substantial details in Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Blandine (Interviewee) 1935- November 22nd, 2015*.

communities, the oil industry and the Gabonese state and society interacted with each other and how this influenced the way French expatriates were behaving and understanding the world around them.

Indeed, even though Gabon was granted independence in August 1960 it remained closely within the French sphere of influence, what De Gaulle called the "pré-carré", and became known in the 1990s as "Françafrique."[3] Because of its natural resources— timber, manganese, uranium, and most importantly, oil[4]— Gabon was deemed by French policy-makers to be of great significance.[5] However, these extractive industries required heavy machinery, substantial investments, logistical skills and a stable political environment, while at the time of independence Gabon had barely a thousand students in high school.[6] This resulted in the newly instated Gabonese authorities, just as those of other former French colonies like Senegal or Ivory Coast,[7] partnering with France to receive technical assistance. "Coopérants"[8] were sent to help the Gabonese state and expatriate workers were sent to manage the different extractive industries.[9] Expatriate communities comprised of "coopérants", expatriate workers, and "petits blancs" (petty whites or white poor) remain overlooked by standard post-colonial historical research, despite their significant role in former African colonies.[10] Moreover on the company history web page of Total Gabon no reference is made to expatriates after 1960, even though they were essential to the development of the company, especially at the beginning: when Elf-Spafe opened its refinery in 1967, the SOGARA, in Port Gentil's periphery, the vast majority of the workers, from the managers to the working staff, came from France.[11]

To study these communities is essential if one wants to understand how the post-colonial relationship evolved between Gabon and France and how these

[3] Although the term was actually coined by the Ivory Coast's first president Houphouet-Boigny with a positive connotation, it was popularized in the 1990s by activists protesting against France's policies in Africa: Stephen W Smith, "France in Africa: A New Chapter?," *Current History* 112, no. 754 (2013).

[4] The first oil deposits were discovered in 1956 by SPAEF near the colonial post of Port Gentil, the mineral wealth was discovered slightly later in the early 1960s.

[5] Richard Joseph, "The Gaullist Legacy: Patterns of French Neo-Colonialism," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 6 (1976): 4.

[6] Ministère de l'Education Nationale, "Statistiques De L'enseignement Au Gabon," (1974), Table n*34.

[7] Except for Guinea who broke away from France abruptly in 1958.

[8] Technical assistants and/or teachers in the French development lingua.

[9] Throughout this essay, the term "expatriate workers" refers to the Frenchmen sent by private companies to work for them abroad while the term "expatriate(s)" refers to the community of Frenchmen overseas at large, comprising all the different categories of Frenchmen abroad.

[10] In 1981 during a conference, Louis de Guiringaud, French foreign affairs minister in 1976-1978 estimated the number of Frenchmen in Africa to have increased by about 200.000, up from 100.000 in 1960, see in Louis De Guiringaud, "La Politique Africaine De La France," *Politique étrangère* (1982): 443; Marshall Murphree, "Whites in Black Africa: Their Status and Role," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 2 (1978): 156.

[11] Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Bernadette (Interviewee) 1945- December 17th, 2015*.

French men and women overseas fit within this framework- how they shaped this relationship and were in turn shaped by it. This paper argues that the framework, inherited from and produced by the colonial era, remained very strong amongst French expatriate communities throughout the 1960s and much of the 1970s, and that only in the mid-1970s this framework/discourse started to change. The old colonial stereotypes based on the working-place framework (see fig. 1. for a visual representation) in which "the Frenchmen expected to direct and the Gabonese to be directed"[12] were starting to fade out – although slowly and not without resistance. By the end of the 1980s, this development, which culminated in the 1990 Port-Gentil anti-French riots, meant the end of an era for French expatriate communities in Gabon.The main factor that has influenced such evolution is the generational renewal of expatriates. Starting from the 1970s, many French and Gabonese had not or had barely known the colonial era and many political and social developments which occurred in this period helped to change attitudes and discourses: the discovery of the power of the Petrodollars, the increasing level of education of the Gabonese population which, as a result, no longer fit the colonial stereotype of an uneducated, backward black population. That being said, these changes and evolutions did not happen straightforwardly, but were the result of constant interaction between different worldviews more or less prevalent depending on the particular decade studied, and other events happening at the same time in the world. As such, this paper faces "the problem on which all history of mentalities stumbles, that of the reasons for and modalities of the passage from one system to another."[13]

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Archival sources on topics related to French post-colonial relationships with its former colonies remain difficult to access,[14] and historians have not been interested so far in studying expatriate communities extensively; therefore to write this history of the French Expatriate communities and their mentalities, I had to rely heavily on oral history and the few written sources I was able to find, ranging from memoirs and blog entries to academic and generalist articles published

[12] I am here making a reference to O'Brien's statement in the context of Senegal "Frenchmen expected to direct and the Senegalese to be directed" in Rita Cruise O'Brien, *White Society in Black Africa: The French of Senegal* (Faber & Faber, 1972), 19. This way of thinking that permeated both colonizers and colonized and then post-colonizers and post-colonized groups has also been extensively studied by Frantz Fanon, *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952).

[13] Roger Chartier, "Intellectual History or Sociocultural History? The French Trajectories," *Modern European intellectual history: Reappraisals and new perspectives* 13 (1982): 13-46; Cited in Peter Burke, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities," *History of European ideas* 7, no. 5 (1986): 443.

[14] The French national archives past 1964 relating to the "Fond Foccart," the main archival depository in France related to France's African policies, are not readily accessible.

in the relevant periods (1960s to 1980s).[15] In terms of oral history, I interviewed 16 former expatriates who lived (as little as eighteen months or as long as fifteen years) in Gabon between 1967 and 1985. These individuals can be divided in three generational subgroups: each forming the basis of the three subsequent parts of this article.

This article's first section revolves around my grandparents, Blandine and Gilbert Sibieude who arrived in 1967 in Port-Gentil which was the base of operations for the oil industry. It includes the perspectives from my grandmother Blandine, my grand-aunt Bernadette Sibieude, whose husband used to work for the same company as my grandfather (but as a worker, not as a manager), Monique Chuberre, whose husband was also working for the same oil company as my grandfather, Francois Cavier, who replaced my grandfather once he left in 1968, and Alain and Elizabeth Wybo who were in Gabon because of Alain's post as Chief of Gabon's Navy as part of the cooperation agreements signed between France and Gabon in 1960.

The second network of perspectives stems from the experiences of my grand-aunt Bernadette, who returned in the mid-1970s to Gabon, and her friends there. Just like in the first section, these individuals were all more or less connected to the oil industry. Jean-Louis and Béatrice Plasse were in Port-Gentil in 1971-1972 and between 1977 and 1982, where he was the technical director of the Refinery. She was the daughter of the infamous Maurice Robert, former director of the Africa section at the DGSE and Ambassador to Gabon between 1979 and 1981. Philippe Loisel was the financial and administrative director of the refinery; he was in Gabon from 1978-1982. Finally, Jean and Rolande Gregoire are a married couple of former "Pieds-Noirs."[16] They lived in Gabon between 1970 and 1985 and were "white immigrants"[17] in the sense that they moved there independently to create their own businesses and planned to stay for a longer period in Gabon.

The third network of individuals I interviewed, is formed by five individuals who lived in either in Port-Gentil or Libreville in the 1980s: the couple Jean and Rolande Gregoire, Jean Claude Bécavin, who worked in the construction business in Libreville, and his daughter Caroline, who was in her late teens at the time, and a relatively high official of the AFD, the French agency for Economic development, based out of Libreville. By the mid-1980s they all had left Gabon.The memoirs I draw on were written by individuals working in the timber industry: Jean Lepissier and his son Patrice who were with the CFG (a processing factory in Port-Gentil) between 1961 and 1972. He was the head accountant.[18] The memoir

[15] See bibliography.
[16] Pieds-Noirs were the French settler communities that were living in Algeria and by extension Tunisia and Morocco.
[17] Murphree.
[18] Jean Lepissier, *De Paris À Port-Gentil* (Blois: Self-published, 2005); Patrice Lepissier, *Moi, L'africain ... Ou, Ma PéRiode Africaine* (Self-Published, 2016).

by Alain Thuillier, who grew up and worked between 1953 and 1971 in Gabon's rainforest as a "Forestier"[19] and can be described as a "Savage Frenchmen,"[20] was also helpful. Those working in the timber industry formed a reclusive sub-group of French people that only appeared from time to time in Port-Gentil or Libreville, the other major timber-exporting port of Gabon. I also made use of memoirs of a former aviator and business man who left Gabon shortly after Independence,[21] and of a former "coopérant" (technical adviser).[22]

These sources raise multiple questions. First of all, many of these interviewees are personally connected to me through a familial link: either directly (my grandmother or grand-aunt), or indirectly (their friends). This personal connection makes it even more difficult to balance the other issue I faced: how could I understand and explain what these communities were doing in Gabon, without judging them by a contemporary moral standard that heavily criticizes the system of relationships – of which these expatriate communities were the agents – between French and African elites known as "Françafrique"? Would I offend the Gabonese population who have different understandings and memories of what was happening at that time? The final issue these sources raise is the entangled nature of France's post-colonial relationships with its former colonies from the 1960s onwards through these individuals. Most of them grew up in the 1930s-1950s at the height of the colonial Empire and carried some of the worldviews of this era throughout their lives.

I. The 1960s: the "Heroic Time of Pioneers" or False Independence?

The 1960s in Gabon saw a major increase in the French Expatriate population from a few thousand, around 3,889 Europeans (Frenchmen), to more than 20,000 in the mid-1970s.[23] Port-Gentil's French population followed a similar pattern: from a few hundred in the 1950s to 1,200 in 1965,[24] to around 5,000 in the 1970s.[25]

To live in Port-Gentil in the 1960s was not an easy task for most of the French expatriates who were not used to living in the colonies. Indeed, some expatriates

[19] Alain Thuillier, *Vivre En Afrique 1953 1971 Du Rio Mouni Aux Monts De Cristal Broché* (L'Harmattan, 2008).
[20] Jeremy Rich, "Savage Frenchmen: Masculinity and the Timber Industry in Colonial Gabon, Ca. 1920-1960," *Afrique & histoire* 7, no. 1 (2010).
[21] Jean-Claude Brouillet, *L'avion Du Blanc* (Paris: R. Laffont, 1972).
[22] Gérard Sivilia, *Les Tribulations D'un Coopérant En Afrique Noire : Récit.* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014), 141.
[23] Jean Pouquet, *L'afrique Équatoriale Française Et Le Cameroun*, vol. 663 (Presses universitaires de France, 1954), 5; David E. Gardinier, *Historical Dictionary of Gabon*, African Historical Dictionaries ; No. 58 (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1981), 4.
[24] Jacqueline Bouquerel, "Port-Gentil, Centre Économique Du Gabon," *Les cahiers d'outremer* 20, no. 79 (1967): 265-6.
[25] Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Grégoire, Jean & Rolande (Interviewees) 1941-, 1944-, January 11th, 2016* (2016). The last statistic is a subjective estimation by my interviewees, it cannot be as accurate as proper statistics but it does show a pattern of significant increase.

or "coopérants" were residents in Gabon either as colonial officers or, to use Marshall Murphree's terminology, as "white immigrants"[26] and had decided to stay in Gabon after its independence: in the words of Blandine Sibieude, "they did not

Figure 2: Elf-Spafe Apartment complex for its expatriate workers.

drive anyone away at the time of independence."[27] As such, they were more aware of and accustomed to the different challenges of the life in Central Africa than newly arrived Frenchmen.

One theme mentioned repeatedly in the interviews and memoirs relates to the weather, which was rather hot and very humid, making it very uncomfortable.[28] Indeed, a major difference in the accounts of those who lived in Gabon in the 1960s and those who lived there ten or fifteen years later concerns access to air conditioning, which was quite limited prior to the 1970s. As a result, in Elf-Spafe's apartments or in the ones assigned to the "coopérants," only the bed rooms were air conditioned. Blandine Sibieude, recalling these living quarters (see fig. 2),[29]

[26] A white immigrant is a long term resident of an African colony-country that has emigrated there in the hope of "making it under the sun" to quote an old adage, see a more subtle definition in Murphree, 157-60.

[27] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Blandine (Interviewee) 1935- November 22nd, 2015*.

[28] See Rich for an overview of the many memoirs from French expatriates in the timber industry: Rich. and Brouillet for what it was like in a more urban environment (Libreville): Brouillet.

[29] François Cavier, *Photos Taken During His Stay in Port-Gentil* (Private Collection, c.1968-1971).

described them as being of quality but also quite austere: she compared them to council estate buildings.

Second of all, even though the period of time from the 1940s to 1970s is considered the era of the rise of modern medicine and the end of the "white man's grave," medical conditions could still be quite serious:[30] the anti-malaria pills of Novaquine were taken daily.[31] As Thuillier convincingly describes, the conditions were even more challenging in the forest for the expatriates of the timber industry.[32]

Probably for such reasons, French expatriates of later eras, who did not experience the 1960s for themselves, refer to it as "the Heroic times."[33] It is also around that time that major oil discoveries were made by Elf-Spafe, which really started the "oil adventure" in Gabon: 16 oil deposits were discovered between 1959 and 1972,[34] and major infrastructures such as off-shore platforms and the oil terminal of Cap Lopez were built. Interestingly enough, despite all these hardships, all but one of the people recalling their time in Gabon in the 1960s really loved it – we will see later on in this section what that tells us about the French expatriates and how they functioned as a group.

These "Heroic times," as Jean-Claude Bécavin referred to them, were also the setting for an unambiguous neo-colonial dominance of France and its overseas citizens over Gabon. Under the pretence that Gabon's population was lacking the experience needed to govern the imported colonial state that France would leave behind in August 1960,[35] Gabon was made to accept France's help through the Cooperation Agreements it signed just before it was granted independence. These agreements were criticized by many scholars and activists as a French imperialist attempt to retain as much influence over Gabon as possible, thus questioning the reality of Gabon's independence.[36]

Indeed, France meddled in Gabonese affairs on numerous occasions: during the 1964 failed coup d'état against M'ba,[37] in which a few hundred paratroopers landed on Libreville, just two days after M'ba was toppled, to reinstate him. After M'ba fell ill, the French intervened once more, many historians claim, to make

[30] Dozon Jean-Pierre, "D'un Tombeau À L'autre," *Cahiers d'Études africaines* (1991): 141-47.
[31] Although the brands may have changed and diversified, malaria remains a great concern for every expatriate in a tropical area such as Gabon.
[32] Rich; Thuillier.
[33] Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Bécavin, Jean-Michel (Interviewee) 1943- November 11th, 2015*.
[34] GABON, "Rappel Historique.".
[35] This bleak situation of the Gabonese workforce in 1960 was the result of a lack of investment by France in education during the colonial era.
[36] Philippe Ardant, "Le Néo-Colonialisme: Thème, Mythe Et Réalité," *Revue française de science politique* (1965).
[37] David E. Gardinier, *Historical Dictionary of Gabon*, ed. Douglas A. Yates, Historical Dictionaries of Africa ; 101 (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 68-72.

sure Bongo would succeed him.[38] What is less known, however, is the role the local French leadership played in this process. In early 1966, the directors of the main industries operating in Gabon met in the house of the French Ambassador at the time, Maurice Delaunay.[39] One of the participants recalled that meeting:[40]

> "…and so I have participated in the handpick of Bongo, I was involved because Mr. Foccart […] had asked the ambassador, Mr. Delauney to consult *les milieux français* [the French economic leaders], to know who they should pick between George Damas (president of the national assembly), Paul Marie Yembit (who was influential in the South) and Bongo. So Delauney gathered us one morning at his house, not the embassy, and we talked about those three guys. We unanimously concluded that Bongo, who at the time was 32 and had been flight sergeant in the French army, […] was probably the best choice. So when that was finished... well it was between 11:30am and 12pm, so at this point Delauney walked towards us, and I can still picture him, a chest of drawers where there was a red phone; he called Mr. Foccart and he said *"les Communautés Francaises préferrent monsieur Albert Bongo"* [the French communities prefer Mr. Albert Bongo]. Then, as soon as he put down the phone, Mrs. Delauney came in saying *"le Champagne est servi et le dejeuner juste après"* [Champaign is served and lunch shortly after]. So that's how we chose Mr. Bongo [laughter]…."

Although it is hard to establish the influence of this meeting , it is interesting to note the ambition of these French industrialists. In the rest of the interview, this individual describes how they had then to "modify the constitution" in order to create a system with a presidential ticket systemnd how they organised an election before M'ba's death with Bongo as his Vice-President, securing a smooth succession (following M'Ba's death, Bongo as Vice-President became automatically President).

This situation, in which France clearly dominated Gabon's state apparatus and economy, was seen as normal because mentalities inherited from the colonial era still permeated France: most of the officials making the policies concerning Africa had had a connection to the Empire.[41] In the case of French expatriates in Gabon, the continuity in the mentalities was strengthened by the continuity in their social and economic status, as illustrated by the African expression: "les Français étaient

[38] Jean-Pierre Bat, *Le Syndrome Foccart : La Politique Française En Afrique, De 1959 À Nos Jours* ([Paris]: Gallimard, 2012); Joseph.

[39] The Industries represented were: SANDIMIN (the syndicate regrouping the two main Mining companies: COMUF and COMILOG), Elf-Spafe, Shell-Gabon (who was operating a massive in shore oil deposit in Gamaba, in the South of Gabon), the Office des Bois (who regrouped all the major players in the timber industry and the Chambers of Commerce of both Libreville and Port Gentil.

[40] Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Anon. (Interviewee) 1929- December 18th, 2015*.

[41] The most obvious example is Pierre Messmer, French prime minister, he had had a long career in the colonial administration starting in 1946 until the end of the French empire in Africa in 1960 when all but one colony – Djibouti – gained independence.

comptés." [the French were counted].[42] The framework of interaction between whites and Blacks remained unchanged. The only sustained encounters between Frenchmen and their Gabonese counterparts were either in the work-place or in the household. As Murphree notes, "this continued occupational superordinancy



Fig. 5. — Plan de Port-Gentil.

Map 1. Port-Gentil in 1967

[42] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Bernadette (Interviewee) 1945- December 17th, 2015*. Gérard Sivilia, a Coopérant in Camroun and Tchad around the same time was saying a similar thing: "the Whites were counted." Sivilia, 141.

[…] has played a particularly inhibiting role in the adjustment of racial attitudes among whites [towards Blacks].”[43]

This situation was further strengthened by the geographical organisation of Port-Gentil that maintained “a form of spatial occupation inherited from the colonial period”.[44] The city was divided into three main zones along racial and social lines (see Map. 1).[45] The littoral zone concentrated all the administrative buildings and French expatriates’ living quarters either in small apartment buildings or in “cases” (bungalows). It was commonly referred to as “la Ville” (the city) as opposed to “le Village” (the village) which designated the African quarters. The African and European living quarters were separated by a “buffer zone”, that used to be *non-aedificandi*,[46] but was now being occupied by the rising local middle class earning more than 25,000 FCFA per month.[47]

This spatial organization was and still is to this day one of the main reasons why “their experience [of whites] with blacks [is] confined largely to contact in the work situation and structured by superordinate/subordinate dimensions”.[48] When contact happened in the home, it was usually following a similar pattern but enacted this time by wives towards their house staff. Indeed, everyone had a house cleaner or a boy-cook, even working class families, and this was the case as much in colonial times as in the 1980s.[49]

These social practices and ways of understanding the world underpinned French expatriates’ involvement in Gabon’s internal affairs, especially during this 1966 meeting regarding who should succeed M’ba. It is telling that my grand-mother in 2015 believed Gabon was not independent at the time of her sojourn there, even though it had been so for seven years. Her memory could be at fault since these events happened fifty years ago but it does indicate how persistent colonial relations between France, French expatriates and Gabon were in the 1960s.

II. The 1970s: the 1968 generation and the power of petrodollars

As the 1970s unfolded, the colonial mentality, as a dominant system of belief inherited from the colonial era and maintained during the 1960s, remained relatively untouched. Still, the first cracks and challenges were emerging at the same time: a transition had been initiated.

[43] Murphree, 163.
[44] Michel Mbadinga, “Elf Et Port-Gentil (Gabon),” (2000): 1.
[45] Bouquerel, 261.
[46] Jules Djeki, “Port-Gentil,” in *Atlas Du Gabon*, ed. Roland Pourtier (Paris: 2004), 62-63.
[47] Bouquerel, 262-64.
[48] Murphree, 163.
[49] Paul Mercier, “Le Groupement Européen De Dakar: Orientation D’une Enquête,” *Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie* (1955): 135.

Fig. 3. Club SOGARA built alongside the housing complex destined to host the Refinery's expatriate workers.

The colonial mind-set remained powerful among French expatriates well into the 1970s.[50] The process of socialization was started as soon as new expatriates would land in Port-Gentil's airport: the predecessor and/or the immediate superior of the new-comer would usually be waiting at the airport to welcome him and his family. This was standard practice in the 1960s,[51] and was still happening in the mid-1980s:[52] "thus, very quickly connections are formed […] which allow the communities to perpetuate themselves and the newcomer to find some kind of a re-creation of the French social space".[53] The effectiveness of such socialization could be seen through the astonishing stability of a whole vocabulary developed during the colonial era that had been shaping French expatriates' social and spatial understanding of their lives in Port-Gentil: "Aviation" designated the airport, the "Village" the African quarters, the "Club(s) SOGARA and/or Elf," whose original models were the colonial officers' mess and the bars reserved for Europeans during colonial times (see fig. 3.),[54] and finally the "case," which meant "bungalow" and referred to expatriates' houses, from the colonial era well into the post-colonial one.[55] This vocabulary and its capacity to remain relevant – that is, to still

[50] O'brien; Murphree.
[51] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Blandine (Interviewee) 1935- November 22nd, 2015*.
[52] *Interview with Bécavin, Jean-Michel (Interviewee) 1943- November 11th, 2015*.
[53] Michel Grossetti, "Enseignants En Coopération. Aperçus Sur Un Type Particulier De Trajectoires Sociales," *Revue française de sociologie* (1986): 142.
[54] See Brouillet's description of a meeting in the mid 1940s in a hotel bar to have an idea of the kind of atmosphere it was: Brouillet, 54-57.
[55] Throughout his book, Brouillet gives us descriptions of "cases" in urban and rural settings: ibid., 127, 50, 67.

be used by expatriates 25 or 30 years after they left Gabon – shaped how French expatriates made sense of their surroundings and in turn how they behaved.

France, despite the civil and social unrests of May 1968, remained quite conservative and in support of colonialism into the 1970s.[56] A poll conducted in 1978 by Louis Harris for the weekly *Jeune Afrique* revealed that 53% of the French population thought having colonies was a rather positive thing; and that for another 47%, colonization had been rather beneficial to African countries overall:[57] "For a majority of Frenchmen, the colonies referred to the good old days. Colonization, this was something done in the interest of the colonized, and since the French have left, it is not doing so well."[58]

However, if the 1978 poll showed that the French population was overall quite conservative and would be in favour of military action in case any civilians were in danger, it also pointed to a growing generational split: "We find throughout the opinion poll the same consistent influence of age, anti-colonialism being inversely proportional to age".[59] This poll is the logical continuation of the generational split starting in 1968. This split, not very significant at first, was to have lasting consequences on the expatriate community in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the new generation replaced a substantial portion of older colonial-minded Frenchmen overseas. Philippe Loisel, when he recalled his first year as financial director of SOGARA mentioned his relationship with his immediate superior, Mr. Michel Laurent, and criticized how colonialist his attitude toward the Gabonese was. He explained his manager's behaviour as being that of an old-timer finishing his African career, or in other words, one of a world fast disappearing.[60]

The 1970s more generally marked the beginning of a first reassessment of France's policies of cooperation with Africa and the position the "coopérant" had within the former colonies. Individuals like Denyse Harari, Jacques Bousquet and François de Négroni were quick to criticize the imperialism and domination that was usually underlying "coopérants"' experiences (see fig. 4).[61] Such scholarship shows that the debate over France's involvement in Africa and the role certain groups of Frenchmen were playing in it, had started among officials and academics.[62]

[56] The landslide victory of De Gaulle's party in June 1968 was proof of such general conservatism.
[57] "Sondage J.A./Louis Harris : Comment Les FrançAis D'aujourd'hui Jugent La DéColonisation," *Jeune Afrique* 1978, 62, 65.
[58] Ibid., 63.
[59] Ibid., 62.
[60] Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Loisel, Philippe (Interviewee) 1942- December 21st, 2015*.
[61] Denyse Harari, *Le Rôle De Coopérant* (OCDE, 1974); Jacques Bousquet "L'expert Contesté," *Perspectives* VI, no. 4 (1976); François De Negroni, *Les Colonies De Vacances* (Editions L'Harmattan, 1977).
[62] Ibid.


MATCH-DOCUMENT

PARIS MATCH

N°1474/26 AOUT 1977

Que se cache-t-il derrière la « fraternité » des coopérants français du Tiers Monde ? Pour François de Negroni beaucoup de sentiments troubles.

LES ILLUSIONS PERDUES DE LA COOPERATION

François de Negroni, 33 ans, a passé cinq ans dans le Tiers Monde au titre de la coopération. Docteur en sociologie, il a posé sur l'espèce coopérante, l'impitoyable regard du scientifique et vient de publier « Les Colonies de vacances » (Ed. Hallier) où il livre ses impressions. Jean Cau a interviewé cet explorateur d'un type nouveau, revenu du Tiers Monde. Et de quelques illusions. Il le dit durement.

François de Negroni, docteur en sociologie, taille en pièces les coopérants français du Tiers Monde

Figure 4. Paris Match coverage of Negroni's book: "the lost illusions of Cooperation." It was also covered in Le Monde, Le Point and Le Figaro.

One of the main differences Bernadette noticed between her first (1967-68) and second stay (1975-1981) in Port-Gentil was that the French figure was no longer untouchable: "Now then, a phenomenal change: we had seen traffic lights appear but also annoying policemen who wanted to have a go at some whites, to show them that now they were the one running the show."[63] This statement reflects the new relationship between France and Gabon- if in the 1960s Gabonese

[63] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Bernadette (Interviewee) 1945- December 17th, 2015*.

elites' reliance on France was rather clear, in the 1970s the situation was no longer as straightforward. Gabon's elites were starting to assert themselves both on the international stage and in French politics.[64] As the intellectual and cultural foundations of the superior position enjoyed by French expatriates were challenged at home, their geopolitical and social justifications were also being undermined because of developments in Gabon and the international system.

This evolution in Gabonese attitudes towards France and its representatives on the ground is most likely the result of the 1973-74 Oil Shock.[65] Gabon's budget went from a mere 20 billion FCFA in 1970 to 255.8 billion in 1977. One can see that the break happened in

1974,[66] after Gabon aligned its pricing policies with OPEC's in 1973.[67] 1974 was also the year Gabon renegotiated its cooperation agreements with France, negotiations that resulted in more autonomy for Gabon vis-à-vis France. In his 1st of January address to Gabon's population, Bongo introduced the concept of Gabonization of the economy, which aimed at replacing French engineers and executives by Gabonese-trained ones.[68]

This newfound wealth was used to expand policies and trends that had started in 1960s – especially in the area of education. This rise of education proved, in the long run, to upset French expatriates' positions within Gabon's society and economy. Thus, as the years went by, primary education rose significantly to an 80% schooling rate in 1975.[69] Efforts were also pursued at the secondary level with more than 20,000 students in 1975,[70] and at the university level with the creation of the University Omar Bongo in 1970, with its number of students continuing to rise from a few hundred to just under 3,000 in 1988.[71] This was accomplished with France's help through technical assistants sent to the country and large sums of money supplied through Official Development Assistance.[72]

Ironically, successful cooperation policies in terms of education and training undermined the position of French expatriates, whose role became increasingly obsolete. This proved to be a catch-22 for France since Cooperation as a policy

[64] David E. Gardinier, "France in Gabon since 1960," *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 6/7 (1982).
[65] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Sibieude, Bernadette (Interviewee) 1945- December 17th, 2015*; *Interview with Anon. (Interviewee) 1929- December 18th, 2015*.
[66] "Gabon 1960-1980," *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* 1977, 1335.
[67] Douglas Andrew Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon* (Africa World Press, 1996), 67.
[68] Ibid.
[69] *Recensements Et EnquêTes DéMographiques Dans Les ÉTats Africains Et Malgache[S] : Situation Au 1er Janvier 1978*, ed. économiques Institut national de la statistique et des études (Paris: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 1978).Table XIV.
[70] Roland Pourtier, "Ville Et Espace En Afrique Noire: L'exemple Du Gabon," *Espace géographique* 8, no. 2 (1979): 123.
[71] Louise Avon, "L'aide Française Au Gabon. 1979-1989.," ed. Ministère de la Coopération (Paris1992), 113.
[72] Ibid., 50-53, 113.

was devised as one of the main ways for France to retain the influence it had lost during decolonization. The best example of such process is SOGARA's refinery: it was launched in 1967-68 with an almost entirely white workforce from factory workers to higher management. In the 1970s, most subaltern posts were held by Gabonese and some higher management positions were given to Gabonese assisted by French expatriate workers, some of whom were under the orders of these newly trained and promoted Gabonese executives and engineers. This dramatically unsettled the work-place framework identified by Murphree that lied at the heart of the French expatriates' social and racial identity. The refinery eventually functioned without any expatriate workers.[73]

These increasing numbers of Gabonese accessing primary, secondary and university education, thanks to policies started in the 1960s and expanded in the 1970s, do not tell the whole story. Indeed, this kind of education policy efforts take quite a long time to yield real results, and this is why even though these policies were starting to undermine the colonial mentality, it was not before the mid to late 1980s that a real change occurred. The deferred nature of the results of these policies also explains the following anecdote that Philippe Loisel, financial director of SOGARA, told me:

> "…in the late 1970s, refined products generated by SOGARA were regulated by the Ministry of Finance and every month it would issue a decree to adjust the prices. However, because the Ministry of Finance was either under-equipped on an administrative level or it was just careless, I then had to pre-write the decree so that when I would do my monthly visit to Libreville to the Finance Ministry, the minister could sign it. I would then go back to Port-Gentil to print out the different copies that were subsequently disseminated throughout Gabon's administrations and ministries concerned with refined products.…"

And as late as 1978, Claude Bouet would diagnose Gabon's educational system as not able to produce enough skilled workers and was recommending further immigration-friendly policies.[74]

To conclude this section, the seeming stability of the colonial mentalities maintained in the 1960s began to come to an end. Within a decade, debates in French society associated with huge newfound wealth had started to undermine the dominating position of French expatriates. However, one must wait till the 1980s to see how the French expatriate communities' positions within Gabon's society were oscillating between the persistence of a number of economic and social privileges and the growing insecurity they were experiencing: both literally as in 1990 anti-

[73] Baptiste Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Plasse, Jean-Louis & Béatrice (Interviewees) 1943-, 1945-, January 30th, 2016*.
[74] Claude Bouet, "Problèmes Actuels De Main-D'oeuvre Au Gabon: Conditions D'une Immigration Controlée," *Les cahiers d'outre-mer* 31, no. 124 (1978).

French riots erupted in Port-Gentil and symbolically in terms of to what extent these privileges were challenged by Gabon's society.

III. The 1980s: the end of an era?

The 1980s witnessed a rather clear continuation of the trends observed in the previous era. However when the 1960s and 1980s are compared, one gets the feeling substantial changes had occurred for French expatriates and with regard to France's position in Africa more generally.[75] In the early 1980s, a series of events and incidents threatened the generally protected and secure position of the French expatriates. First of all in 1981, to Bongo's great dismay, Mitterrand was elected president of France, and one of his first decisions was to appoint a "third-worldist" to the Ministry of Cooperation: Jean Pierre Cot.[76] It was as if the progressive anti-colonial ideology identified in the 1978 poll was finally prevailing.[77] By 1983, this impression would all but fade out: Cot was fired and the old ways were brought back much to the appreciation of Bongo and Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory-Coast.[78] This first friction between Mitterrand and the old-timers like Bongo and Houphouet-Boigny shows that by this time France was no longer always calling the shots as it used to do in the 1960s. The 1980s were also the decade that saw the number of "coopérants" operating in Africa shrink from 11,000 in 1982 to 3,600 in 1994.[79]

An anecdote recalled by Gregoire is illuminating in terms of how vulnerable certain parts of the French expatriate communities had become. Indeed, I have made few distinctions within expatriate communities throughout this essay because in the 1960s and 1970s the situation was favourable to most expatriate groups, but in the 1980s the independent Frenchmen, the "white immigrants", had become much more vulnerable in Gabon than the expatriate worker coming to Gabon supported by a large infrastructure.

> "…Jean Gregoire:
> We were always told […] that when it came to official documents we needed to be very careful […] and at one point, we were friends with this couple […], the husband was a baker and he worked for a long, long time for [his cousin] Mr. Delbos [and everything was fine].

[75] De Guiringaud.
[76] After his tenure as Minister of Cooperation, he wrote a book looking back at his experiences in the Ministry, Jean Pierre Cot, *A L'épreuve Du Pouvoir: Le Tiers-Mondisme, Pour Quoi Faire?* (Editions du Seuil, 1984).
[77] "Sondage J.A./Louis Harris : Comment Les FrançAis D'aujourd'hui Jugent La DéColonisation."
[78] Franck Petiteville, "Quatre Décennies De «Coopération Franco-Africaine»: Usages Et Usure D'un Clientélisme," *Études internationales* 27, no. 3 (1996): 584-85.
[79] Ibid., 595.

> But one day, this Mr. Delbos sold his business to a guy… and this young couple, there was the husband he was asking him "to draft a contract for his residency permit", "and yes, and no," so the guy was really stonewalling.
>
> And one day, policemen arrested the wife and asked her for her residency permit. So she told them "well, listen, I do not have it" they told her "How come?" "Because my husband doesn't have his contract." "So, send your husband our way then."
>
> When she came back, she saw her husband and a friend who said, "You know what we'll do, don't go with your husband, because he might get into trouble, we will go together tomorrow and see if we can't work something out." […]
>
> The wife went there saying, "Well my husband doesn't have the document …" "Come with us then, we are going to prison." "But to prison? What are you going to do?" And they jailed her, and they shaved her hair, and these are not hearsays, we lived it! And this girl— she was 35!
>
> Baptiste Sibieude:
>
> And she was Gabonese? French?
>
> Rolande Gregoire:
>
> French, French! To be frank that really shook us […] and especially since this girl she was a mother, a proper woman, not at all a…. She stayed there for a week and then she stood trial and was freed; but still! That takes some doing.…"80

The timing of this anecdote is crucial to understand again how events unfolding outside of Gabon could intersect with the way French expatriates were treated in Gabon. Gregoire remembered this event dating back to 1983, the same year Pierre Péan published *Affaires Africaines*, a piece of investigative journalism that shed light on "le Clan des Gabonais" [the Clan of Gabonese], which was associated with the dark side of French policies in Africa.[81] One interpretation of such harsh behaviour towards this woman could be that, because Bongo and the Gabonese state were not happy with the way Mitterrand handled the Péan fiasco,[82] they decided to be less tolerant with French expatriates who infringed the rules.

Just two years after this incident, François Gaulme, in an article reviewing Gabon's quarter of century as an independent country, noted that "a loss of confidence [had] appeared".[83] His reasons to explain such a development were the new economic problems that Gabon faced because of mismanagement on the one hand, and the oil deposits' expected depletion – between the late 1970s and 1985

[80] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Grégoire, Jean & Rolande (Interviewees) 1941-, 1944-, January 11th, 2016*.

[81] Pierre Péan, *Affaires Africaines* (Hachette Livre, 1983).

[82] Pierre Péan wrote a book shedding a light on the shadowy links of influence between French and Gabonese officials which created a political scandal in France and damaged Franco-Gabonese diplomatic relations.

[83] François Gaulme, "La Fin Des Pionniers: Vingt-Cinq Ans D'indépendance Du Gabon," *Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens* 41, no. 2074 (1985): 1975.



Figure 5. Gabon's oil production, 1957-1984

no further major oil deposit was discovered and the current ones were beginning to show signs of depletion.[84]

The first half of this decade was experienced by Gabonese policy-makers and Elf-Spafe as potentially the end of the oil adventure (see fig. 5 showing the trends in oil production as perceived in the mid-1980s), and this had important repercussions. Indeed, Gabon's economy offered fewer economic opportunities to its citizens just as the education policies were finally starting to deliver their promised workforce. Moreover, in 1986 oil prices started to fall because of market saturation. This created a situation in which Gabon's youth felt marginalized and was in turn one of the main reasons for the 1990 Port-Gentil anti-French riots.[85] In this case, the disparity of wealth and power between French expatriates and the wider Gabonese population must have proven too wide – especially in times of economic hardship.[86]

Béatrice Plasse, who was living in Gabon with her husband in the late 1970s and early 1980s, analysed this situation as the final break with the old colonial mentality, which was characterised by a certain paternalism, and the ideal of an army of builders. – she grew up in French West Africa because her father, Maurice

[84] Ibid., 1978.
[85] François Ngolet, "Fluctuating Anti-French Sentiment in Gabon, 1964-1998," *Etre étranger et migrant en Afrique au 20e siècle* 2 (2003): 463-66.
[86] Ibid., 465.

Robert,[87] was a soldier in "la Colo."[88] According to Béatrice Plasse, if the colonial officer was the all-powerful figure over his African "dependents", that gave him also the responsibility to care for them. This paternalistic framework was maintained in the 1960s but by the end of the 1970s the "get-rich-and-get-out"[89] attitude was the one that prevailed.[90] This shift in attitudes could be one explanation as to why anti-French sentiments came to a head in the early 1990s.

This decade, culminating in the Port-Gentil's anti-French riots appears to be a turning point. At this point, what was left of the colonial mentality and system of belief observed in the 1960s was the residual racial condescendence towards the Africans and the racially and socially segregated layout of the city; these residues remained despite the fact that by then, in the 1980s, many French expatriates had not experienced or were brought up in Colonial France.

***

We have started this article suggesting that to study French expatriate communities in Gabon is essential to understand the relationships existing between Gabon and France. Most expatriates implemented the policies decided in Paris by French policy makers, while also representing the former colonial power with all the political and economic implications this had. The main reasoning behind why these expatriates were sent to Gabon is linked to concerns France had regarding the effects of an independent Gabon, expressed clearly in the Cooperation Agreements signed just before independence was granted. The continuing influence of France over Gabon via its expatriates was undermined when Gabon saw its revenues boom thanks to the 1973 oil shock, further resulting in the ability to invest substantially in education.

This evolution in education undermined the ideological foundations of the colonial mentality that had survived throughout the 1960s based on the "work-place syndrome": that is, "the Frenchmen expected to direct and the Gabonese to be directed."[91] By the end of the 1980s, this assumption had been thoroughly challenged both in France and Gabon and French expatriates could not behave as they had in the 1960s.

Fifty years after my grand-parents and their four children stepped on Port-Gentil's soil for a brief but intense stay, what kind of broader conclusions can we gain from their life histories and the others I collected? Some habits clearly die hard,

[87] Maurice Robert and André Renault, *Maurice Robert : "Ministre" De L'afrique* (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
[88] Nickname referring to the French Colonial forces
[89] Maurice Robert and André Renault, *Maurice Robert : "Ministre" De L'afrique* (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
[90] Murphree, 164.
[91] Sibieude (Interviewer), *Interview with Plasse, Jean-Louis & Béatrice (Interviewees) 1943-, 1945-, January 30th, 2016*.

especially when it comes to mentalities. The colonial legacy has remained a consistent feature of post-colonial relations between France and its former African dependencies.

It is this tension between change and stability that lies at the heart of the analysis of these communities. These communities, because they are constantly evolving demographically through arrivals and departures, tend to respond to, or at least engage with, new trends emerging in France. Yet, at the same time, discourses and practices of and towards Africans remained unchanged. Only in the 1980s could one witness a turning point, primarily due to the fact that by then many French expatriates were too young to have known colonization.

Perhaps, the answer to this conundrum of change and stability is simply about demographic renewal, especially within elites in the position to shape public discourses. However, we would need to do more research in order to engage more thoroughly with that question. As we are about to enter the third generation since the end of the colonial era, it remains unclear whether we are living in a post-colonial era, or still transitioning out of the colonial one.

Banat Swabians on the Move: Reconsidering the History of a German-speaking Minority from East Central Europe in the Twentieth Century

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This article argues for a reconsideration of the twentieth century history of Banat Swabians – a German-speaking minority from East Central Europe – within the conceptual framework of migration studies. In particular, it examines the case of a Swabian migrant from the Banat village Sackelhausen/Săcălaz and members of her family, identifying and analysing the major patterns of their movements in a global perspective. In doing so, this article intends to show not only that Banat Swabians participated in many of the major European migration flows during the twentieth century, but also that a systematic study of the motives, restrictions, and contingencies in this particular group's migration history has the potential to enhance our understanding of European migrations in the twentieth century in general. The ultimate aim of such an approach is to devise a starting point and structural basis for future research on the topic.

Introduction

Banat Swabians, a German-speaking group from East Central Europe, were a people on the move in the twentieth century.[1] This makes it all the more curious that only a few of the many historical accounts published about the Banat Swabians have systematically and comprehensively tackled the aspect of mobility. Instead, the majority of narratives have tended to focus on origins, culture and identity politics, stressing continuity over change, and place the Banat Swabians within regional or local trajectories rather than more global developments.

[1] As with all ethnic or quasi-ethnic terms, there is no clear definition of Banat Swabians, especially vis-à-vis the broader term Danube Swabians. For the purposes of this paper, the term Banat Swabians refers to German speakers in the historical Banat province of the Austro-Hungarian empire within the borders of today's Romania. It therefore excludes Danube Swabians living in the Serbian and Hungarian parts of Banat.

Indeed, for a long time after settlement in the eighteenth century, most Banat Swabians hardly ever travelled farther than the next village, and while they certainly noticed what was going on in the rest of Europe and the world, they remained notably unaffected by most of the great transitions that took place until the twentieth century.[2] Even the connection of many villages and towns in Banat to the railway network in the middle of the nineteenth century did not induce much movement. That, however, changed at the onset of the twentieth century, when mobility suddenly became a dominant and essential factor in the lives of many Banat Swabians. Whilst this development has not gone unnoticed in scholarship on this group, these twentieth-century migration patterns have rarely been the analytical focus of any study on Banat Swabians.

In this paper, I shall show that since the late 1890s the migration patterns of Banat Swabians have mirrored almost every significant trend in the history of European migration in this period. Banat Swabians were among the millions of trans-Atlantic migrants who sought their fortunes in the New World; many were displaced as a result of World War II – most of them temporarily, but others never returned; some Banat Swabians became victims of post-war deportations; during the Cold War, large numbers crossed the Iron Curtain to get to the West – with some risking their lives as clandestine migrants; and by the end of the century virtually all of them – except for a small community that has remained until the present day – had left the Banat region for good. Their movements were mostly voluntary, occasionally forced, and sometimes proscribed. The networks in which they moved were transnational in scope, the communities they built diasporic in nature. Studying twentieth-century Banat Swabian history under the central theme of mobility therefore has the potential to enable a more differentiated perspective on migration outside the emigration-immigration dichotomy, on the complex interplay of migration regimes and national and international politics, on family, community and gender dimensions in migration decisions, and much more.

While a comprehensive history of Banat Swabian migration in the twentieth century is beyond the scope of this investigation, I will outline and contextualize the major developments and themes of Banat Swabian migration history on the basis of a specific case study, and will place this microhistorical approach into the conceptual framework of migration studies. In this way, I intend to demonstrate both that Banat Swabians actively took part in and shaped some of the great trends in twentieth-century migration, and that the study of Banat Swabian migration

[2] Contrary to what the term 'Swabian' implies, German settlers were not of homogenous Swabian (i.e. south-central German) descent. Most early migrants came from the Palatinate and Saar regions, but the general composition of settlers was highly heterogeneous. A good introduction to eighteenth century migration to the Banat region is William T. O'Reilly, "Agenten, Werbung, und Reisemodalitäten. Die Auswanderung ins Temescher Banat im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Mathias Beer and Dittmar Dahlmann (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1999).

history can offer a better, more nuanced understanding of Central and Eastern European migrations in the twentieth century more generally. The ultimate aim of such an approach is to devise a starting point and structural basis for future research on the topic.

The case study that will help to illustrate my line of arguments centres on the village Sackelhausen, located in present-day Romania, and some of its inhabitants, namely Barbara Ortinau (née Schuller, 1908 – 2006) and members of her family.[3] The reconstruction of her life story, as I have attempted it here, is based on a series of interviews with her daughter and son-in-law, conducted in early 2016.[4] Other sources include four so-called *Ortsmonographien*[5] about Sackelhausen from 1925, 1979, 1994 and 2006 respectively and material published by the *Heimatsortsgemeinschaft Sackelhausen.*[6]

I have divided the main part of this paper into four different sections, which are both topical and chronological, encompassing the major trends in Banat Swabian migration in the twentieth century. Some of those are temporally confined to a certain period, others represent longer-term, intermittent patterns. In the final part of the paper I will draw a brief conclusion and hint at possible directions for future research on the topic.

Across the Atlantic

Barbara Ortinau's personal migration history begins not in Banat, but in St. Louis, Missouri, where she was born in 1908. Her parents, a recently married couple from Sackelhausen, had left their village for the United States a year earlier in order to earn money to afford a piece of land and build a house back in Banat. For her mother, this was actually the second trans-Atlantic journey as a domestic worker, since she had made her first trip together with her two sisters at the age of 17 in 1905, returned to the village to marry and then came back to St. Louis with her husband. After giving birth to Barbara on that second stay in the United States,

[3] Sackelhausen is the German name of the village Săcălaz in today's Romania, located nine kilometres west of Timișoara.

[4] It should be noted that Barbara Ortinau was my great-grandmother, her daughter and son-in-law are my maternal grandparents. I have conducted and recorded two interviews with them via Skype, on 22 and 29 January 2016. In the following, those interviews are treated as a documentary source. Where possible, I have tried to corroborate their oral accounts with physical evidence from the family archives, such as birth certificates, passports and other official documents.

[5] *Ortsmonographien*, or village histories, focusing on the history of a certain locality, are a very common genre in the historiography of German-speaking groups in eastern Europe. They are, as in the case of Sackelhausen, mostly written by non-professionals and as such have to be considered with a certain amount of scepticism. However, they often provide valuable statistical and qualitative data that would be almost impossible to find elsewhere.

[6] *Heimatortsgemeinschaft Sackelhausen* is a subdivision of the Munich-based *Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben e.V.,* an association of Banat Swabians and their descendants in Germany, committed to the preservation of Banat Swabian community, culture and history.

she quit working in people's homes, and started cooking and doing the housework for a group of compatriot workers from Sackelhausen, who lived with her and her husband. By 1911, the small family had saved enough money and returned to Sackelhausen, this time for good, since a third tour – although envisaged by the husband – was deemed out of the question by Barbara's mother because of her extreme seasickness.[7]

Barbara Ortinau's story is hardly an exception. Labour migration to North America had been very common in Sackelhausen since at least the 1890s, mostly due to the rapid population growth the village experienced in the second half of the nineteenth century.[8] In 1850, a census conducted by the Habsburg authorities counted 2,714 inhabitants, by 1903 the number had risen to 4,112.[9] At the time, Sackelhausen, like most villages in Banat, was predominantly an agrarian community, and inheritance was patrilineal and impartible.[10] This induced the migration of non-heirs in light of population growth and lack of employment opportunities.[11] Single women in particular benefited from the opportunities associated with long-distance migration. Besides the prospect of income, employment in domestic work offered the chance to independently pursue a livelihood.[12]

An especially valuable source in tracking trans-Atlantic migration from Banat are U.S. passenger ship records. According to this data, Banat Swabian migration to the United States exploded at the turn of the century, rising from around thirty people per year between 1891 and 1900 to about 2,770 persons per year between 1901 and 1914.[13] A closer look at the places of origin and destinations of those migrants suggests the establishment of strong trans-local patterns in those years – reciprocal connections between particular towns and cities on either side

[7] Cf. "Interview with Barbara Ortinau's daughter and son-in-law," Katharina and Nikolaus Andres, conducted January 22, 2016.

[8] Cf. "Geschichte des Ortes Sackelhausen – Beginn der Auswanderung nach Amerika," Heimatortsgemeinschaft Sackelhausen (HOGS), accessed February 12, 2016, http://www.sackelhausen.eu/index.php?id=8.

[9] Cf. Egidius Haupt, *Geschichte der Gemeinde Sackelhausen*, *1765-1925* (Temesvar: Schwäbische Verlags AG, 1925), 127, and Josef Pitzer, *Sackelhausen – Anfang und Ende* (Reutlingen: Heimatsortsgemeinschaft Sackelhausen, 1994), 100.

[10] Cf. ibid., 121.

[11] Cf. Jan Kok, "The Family Factor in Migration Decisions," in *Migration History in World History. Multidisciplinary approaches*, ed. Jan Lucassen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 222.

[12] Christiane Harzig, "Domestics of the World (Unite?): Labor Migration Systems and Personal Trajectories of Household Workers in Historical and Global Perspective," J*ournal of American Ethnic History* 25.2/3 (2006): 54.

[13] The following numbers are derived from "Ship Extraction Database of the Banat. Number of Passenger Arrivals by Year," ed. David Dreyer, last updated July 27, 2013, accessed April 15, 2016, http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~banatdata/DDB/Dates-Y.htm. Even though those numbers can be generally regarded as accurate, methodological problems could have led to some Banat immigrants being excluded from Dreyer's statistics. According to the author, Banat Swabians are usually detectable in the records because they travelled with Hungarian passports, but declared their German ethnicity on the immigration documents. However, some might have slipped detection since a number of the lesser used North Sea ports did not require travel documents from passengers. It should also be noted that the above numbers include migrants who made multiple trips.

of the Atlantic.[14] Of 645 recorded entries of migrants from Sackelhausen between 1892 and 1912, an overwhelming majority of 459 went to St. Louis, and for several other villages in Banat similar linkages through chain migration were established.[15] World War I put a temporary stop to trans-Atlantic migration from Banat altogether, and while the numbers recovered slightly during the interbellum, they never reached their pre-war peaks again.[16] The reasons for this certainly include tighter restrictions in the wake of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, but the cultural 'boom' of Banat Swabian consciousness and identity after the largest part of Banat became part of the Kingdom of Romania in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon is also crucial in understanding the decline in migration. Romania's minorities policy at the time allowed for much greater cultural autonomy than the previous Hungarian administration in the region, which pursued Magyarization, an often coercive policy of acculturation.[17]

While many migrants returned after having earned sufficient money, thereby bringing their experiences gained through migration back to their villages, some decided to stay and thus paved the ground for others to follow in intermittent rhythms throughout the following decades and after World War II.[18] Because of these migration patterns, over the course of the twentieth century, the linkages established in the early years of the 1900s would evolve into a transnational migration system in the sense described by Nina G. Schiller et al, that is to say, distinct institutions, circular movements, and strong social and economic interconnections were formed.[19]

Wartime Migration

Movements of Banat Swabians during World War I were more or less confined to conscripts in the Austro-Hungarian army being deployed to the Russian and Serbian fronts. Even though the region experienced considerable economic and political turmoil during and after the war, living conditions remained comparatively stable.[20] Apart from a slight increase in the numbers of trans-Atlantic migrants after 1920, migration was not an issue for most Banat Swabians during the war or the interwar period. In World War II, however, their situation was mark-

[14] Cf. Dirk Hoerder, "Migration Research in Global Perspective: Recent Developments," *Sozial. Geschichte Online* 9 (2012): 70.
[15] Cf. David Dreyer and Anton Kraemer, "Pre-World War I Migration Patterns of Banat Germans to North America," *FEEFHS Journal* 10 (2002): 118.
[16] Cf. "Ship Extraction Database."
[17] Cf. Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Donauschwaben 1868-1948. Ihre Rolle im rumänischen und serbischen Banat* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014), 25f. and 94ff.
[18] Cf. Dreyer and Kraemer, "Migration Patterns of Banat Germans," 119, and "Auswanderung nach Amerika."
[19] Nina Glick Schiller et al., "From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration," *Anthropological Quarterly* 68.1 (1995): 48.
[20] Cf. Haupt, *Geschichte Sackelhausen*, 162.

edly different. This time conscripts fought in the Romanian army, the German Wehrmacht, and the Waffen-SS, reflecting both the territorial shifts during the interbellum era as well as the growing influence of the German Reich on German-speaking minorities in eastern Europe since the seizure of power by the Nazis in Germany 1933.[21] In 1944 the situation escalated: in August, the Kingdom of Romania, which had initially been a member of the Axis powers, joined the Allies when faced with the advance of Soviet troops into its territory. The result was a rather chaotic large-scale evacuation of Banat Swabians to Thuringia, Bavaria, Czechoslovakia and Austria starting in September 1944, orchestrated by the retreating Wehrmacht.[22]

In the midst of the turbulences, Barbara Ortinau and her family – now enlarged by a son and a daughter – managed to board a train in the nearby town of Hatzfeld that took them to Austria.[23] Others were not so lucky, and had to attempt the journey by wagon and horse, or had to stay behind. About a quarter of the total population of Sackelhausen remained, including Barabara's parents.[24] Those who had migrated to Austria also encountered numerous difficulties. The Ortinau family moved around Lower Austria multiple times, staying on different farms and in a refugee camp, until they were eventually taken in by a family in Waidhofen.[25] As the war drew to an end, the family had to make the decision that many people displaced by the war were facing, namely whether they should return, or whether they should start a new life elsewhere. In the case of the military administrations of Germany and Austria, these issues were debated under the terms of repatriation and resettlement, and as scholars have pointed out, the particular zone of occupation the refugees found themselves in could potentially limit their scope of action. Indeed, according to Peter Gatrell, repatriation was the preferred policy of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and was supported by both Soviet and Western military administrations until late 1946. However, with the founding of the International Refugee Organization – without participation of the USSR – Western military administrations abandoned the primacy of repatriation, leaving the final decision up to the refugees in most instances.[26]

Yet, as the example of the Ortinau family shows, the opportunities for movement might not have been so tightly circumscribed by Allied policies as Gatrell suggests. Even though Lower Austria was initially liberated by American troops, it had become part of the Soviet zone of occupation by May 1945. The question of return was nonetheless heavily debated by the family members, indicating that at

[21] Cf. Hausleitner, *Donauschwaben,* 200.
[22] Cf. ibid., 286.
[23] Cf. "Interview," January 22, 2016. Hatzfeld is the German name of Jimbolia, located 50 kilometres west of Timisoara.
[24] Cf. Pitzer, *Sackelhausen*, 128 and 135.
[25] Cf. "Interview," January 22, 2016.
[26] Cf. Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 94ff.

the time pressure to return was low even in the Soviet Zone and different options were on the table. Barbara's desire to return to Sackelhausen eventually prevailed over her husband's intention to move on to either Germany or the United States. By mid-June, several Banat Swabian families in the area had joined up and petitioned the Soviet administration to provide a train back to Banat, which they granted days later.[27] Upon arrival in their home village, Sackelhauseners found their houses occupied by Aromanians and Romanians, who had been promised land and property in the areas deserted by the Swabians.[28] A long and conflictual process of conciliation ensued, further complicated by communist expropriations and arbitrary acts of violence against the German-speaking minority, who were now considered perpetrators of the war by the Romanian state.[29]

By December 1945, of an estimated 3,000 war refugees from Sackelhausen, about four fifths had returned.[30] Those who did not return were either granted status as expelled persons in Germany ('Vertriebene'), made use of family ties to start a new life in the Americas or migrated elsewhere.[31] While those patterns certainly reflect different developments in refugee policies of the Allied military administrations as Peter Gatrell has shown, they also demonstrate that those policies were implemented rather arbitrarily in the first few months after the war. As the case of the Ortinau family reveals, the personal desires, fears and actions of the refugees were of at least equal significance. In this respect, the immediate post-war history of Banat Swabians fits neither into the master narrative of German expulsion, nor into the often assumed dichotomy between repatriation and resettlement of the post-war refugee regime.

Post-War Deportations

As a result of World War II, Banat Swabians were twice subjected to deportations. The first took place in January 1945 and thus affected those who had either stayed behind in the evacuations of 1944 or had served in the German or Romanian militaries and had since returned to their villages. These extraditions were part of a larger Soviet-led punitive campaign aimed at German-speaking minorities in Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, who were collectively considered Nazi-collaborators.[32] In Romania, nearly 70,000 German-speakers were deported,

[27] Cf. "Interview," January 22, 2016.
[28] Called "Mazedonier" by Banat Swabians, the Aromanians are a traditionally pastoralist group originating from the southern Balkans. Cf. Thede Kahl, *Ethnizität und räumliche Verteilung der Aromunen in Südosteuropa* (Münster: Institut für Geographie der Westfälischen Wilhelms Universität Münster, 1999).
[29] Cf. Hausleitner, *Donauschwaben*, 317ff.
[30] Cf. Pitzer, *Sackelhausen*, 138.
[31] Cf. Reinhold Fett, *Sackelhausen – Heimatbuch einer Banater Gemeinde* (Limburg: Limburger Vereinsdruckerei 1979), 94ff.
[32] Cf. Hausleitner, *Donauschwaben*, 319. For an overview of the role of National Socialism in Banat, see Mariana Hausleitner, "Der Einfluss des Nationalsozialismus bei den Donaus-

of which 32,000 were drafted from Banat. They were mostly put to work in coal mines and factories in different parts of the Soviet Union, including areas beyond the Urals.[33] For every village, quotas of able-bodied men and women of working age were put in place, and while the Romanian and Soviet forces carrying out the recruitments preferred to pick former members of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS and other political organizations closely associated with the Nazis, fulfilment of the quotas did not stop there.[34] In Sackelhausen, 72 men and 53 women were affected, of which 23 died due to the harsh conditions in the camps.[35] Most had returned by the end of the 1940s, with some making their way directly to Germany, where their families had stayed as refugees after the war.[36]

The second deportation took place in June 1951, when the Romanian Communist regime forcibly relocated about 40,000 'enemies of the people' – 9,000 of which were German-speaking – from the Banat to the Bărăgan Plain in eastern Romania, where they were left to their own devices.[37] Among those deported were wealthy landowners, Aromanians, alleged anti-communists, smugglers, refugees, criminals, and foreign citizens.[38] In Sackelhausen, 224 persons were affected, including Margarethe Ortinau, at the time engaged to Barbara Ortinau's son Johann.[39] Her family was most probably singled out due to the relatively large size of their landholdings. Over the ensuing years, Johann made multiple trips to visit his fiancée, as a result of which Barbara's first grandchild was born in Bărăgan.[40] In early 1956, the deported were allowed to return, mostly due to changes in Romanian foreign and domestic policy which came as a result of the incipient process of de-Stalinization across the Soviet sphere of influence.[41]

The immediate reasons for the 1951 deportations are to be found in a complex interplay of Romanian nationality politics, the shift towards a planned economy and rising tensions with Tito's Yugoslavia, neighbouring directly to the multi-eth-

chwaben im rumänischen und serbischen Banat," *Spiegelungen. Zeitschrift für deutsche Kultur und Geschichte Südosteuropas* 9 (2014).

[33] Cf. Hausleitner, *Donauschwabe*n, 323ff.

[34] Cf. ibid., 319.

[35] Cf. Mathias Reitz, *Sackelhausen. Beiträge zur Geschichte einer deutschen Gemeinde im Banat* (Reutlingen: Self Published, 2006), 22.

[36] Cf. ibid., 20f.

[37] Cf. Wilhelm Weber, "Das Schicksal der Deutschen im Banat nach dem Umsturz vom 23. August 1944 bis zur Deportation in die Bărăgan-Steppe," in *Deportiert in den Bărăgan 1951-1956*, ed. Walther Konschitzky et al. (München: Haus des Deutschen Ostens, 2001), 96f.

[38] Cf. Josef Wolf, "Die Zwangsumsiedlung in die Bărăgan-Steppe 1951/56. Deportationen und Deportationsformen im Banat des 20. Jahrhunderts," in *Deportiert in den Bărăgan 1951-1956*, ed. Walther Konschitzky et al. (München: Haus des Deutschen Ostens, 2001), 50.

[39] Cf. Reitz, *Sackelhausen*, 53.

[40] Cf. "Interview with Barbara Ortinau's daughter and son-in-law," Katharina and Nikolaus Andres, conducted January 29, 2016. Anecdotal accounts from this interview suggest that denunciators among the villagers and bribing Romanian officials played a considerable role in the drafting (and redrafting) of deportation lists.

[41] Cf. Wolf, "Zwangsumsiedlung," 59.

nic Banat.[42] However, aside from their local context, they should also be analysed in the larger framework of Soviet-style forced settlements throughout the Eastern bloc. As Josef Wolf has shown, a comparative approach can reveal significant commonalities with similar processes at the time, notably the forced resettlements in Hungary and along the inner-German border in the German Democratic Republic in 1952.[43] Despite their particularities, in all three cases the respective socialist governments aimed at creating, reaffirming or stabilizing spatial orders by means of forced relocation of 'undesired' populations.[44] In the Romanian case, overlapping socioeconomic, cultural and geostrategic motives make the deportations an especially interesting case study for investigating attempts at managing territoriality in the context of socialist forms of governance. Similarly, the Bărăgan deportations offer fascinating insights into the complexities of post-war nation-building in eastern Europe. 'The Deportation Regime', as Nicholas de Genova has called it, was about sovereignty as much as territoriality in that the governments of the newly-formed nation-states attempted to consolidate their power both internally and externally by physically relocating populations across their territories.[45] The Romanian example shows that the preference for deportations as a political instrument in that regard cannot be explained solely by the cultural politics of citizenship and alienation.

In the long run, the deportations also became a central theme of identity-building and memory culture among Banat Swabians, apparent, for example, in the commemorative events on the occasions of the respective 50th anniversaries of the deportations which took place in Munich in 1994 and 2001. The traumatic experiences have strongly contributed to collective self-images as an oppressed and suffering people, expressing itself in book titles such as "Der Leidensweg der Banater Schwaben im 20. Jahrhundert" [The Way of Grief of Banat Swabians in the Twentieth Century], published by the association of Banat Swabians in Germany. As such self-perceptions are often regarded as constitutive for the formation of diasporic communities,[46] a systematic study of the ways in which they have been created and reproduced by the many local, national and supranational associations of Banat Swabians in Germany and elsewhere could shed light on practices of collective remembrance and the construction of a Banat Swabian diaspora.

[42] Cf. ibid., 36ff.
[43] Cf. ibid., 76-79.
[44] Cf. ibid., 71.
[45] Nicholas de Genova, "The Deportation Regime. Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement," in *The Deportation Regime. Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement,* ed. Nicholas de Genova and Nathalie Peutz (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2010), 33.
[46] Cf. Heinrich Freihoffer, ed., *Der Leidensweg der Banater Schwaben im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert* (München: Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben aus Rumänien in Deutschland e.V., 1983), and Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas. An introduction*, 2nd ed. (London/New York: Routledge, 2008), 2ff.

Creeping Exodus

World War II and its aftermath had left many Banat Swabian families divided on either side of the Iron Curtain. For those affected, family reunion was the highest priority, and emigration – fuelled by the expropriations and deportations of the post-war years – just a matter of time and circumstance.[47] Since the end of the war, the movements of Banat Swabians were largely proscribed, and only a desperate few attempted to cross the Romanian border illegally.[48] According to numbers from Sackelhausen, between 1946 and 1955 only 44 persons succeeded in leaving the village.[49] After Romania joined the UN in 1956, family reunion became a legitimate means of migration, and the annual numbers of emigrants increased again, to about 20 per year between 1956 and 1969 in Sackelhausen.[50] The accession to power of Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1965, however, put an end to this, but simultaneously made the well-being of the German-speaking minority in Romania an issue for the government of West Germany. In 1967, diplomatic relations between West Germany and Romania were re-instituted, slightly easing the situation for prospective emigrants. Between 1970 and 1976, emigration from Sackelhausen increased to an average of 40 persons per year. Another important development were the first two meetings of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki 1975 and Belgrade 1977 that put international relations across the Iron Curtain on a new legal basis. It was, however, only after the West German government negotiated an agreement with Romania to 'buy out' German '*Volkszugehörige'* – a legal term for those living outside Germany who self-identify as Germans– in annual quotas at a set price per head in 1978 that emigration was significantly propelled.[51] This deal, one of the most comprehensive in a series of West German efforts to 'bring back' remaining German '*Volkszugehörige'* from eastern Europe starting in the 1960s, marked the beginning of what would later be called a "predominantly self-induced process" of "mass exodus" of the German-speaking groups from Romania.[52] However, even with the quotas in place, the application process for prospective migrants could take years and could become quite costly, since in many instances officers and agents of the notorious Romanian secret police agency *Securitate* had to be bribed.[53]

[47] Cf. Reitz, *Sackelhausen,* 62.
[48] Cf. for example Martin J. Fricko, "Flucht über die Grenze 1947," in *Der Leidensweg der Banater Schwaben im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert*, ed. Heinrich Freihoffer (München: Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben aus Rumänien in Deutschland e.V., 1983), 663ff.
[49] Cf. Pitzer, *Sackelhausen,* 211.
[50] Cf. ibid. and Reitz, *Sackelhausen,* 63.
[51] Cf. Rainer Ohliger and Câtâlin Turliuc, "Minorities into Migrants: Emigration and Ethnic Unmixing in Twentieth-Century Romania," in *European Encounters. Migrants, migration and European societies since 1945*, ed. Rainer Ohliger et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 63.
[52] Ibid., 64.
[53] Cf. Reitz, *Sackelhausen,* 77. *Securitate* is short for *Departamentul Securității Statului,*

Some managed to circumvent the system and again, Barbara Ortinau and her family provide a good example of this. Thanks to her birth on United States territory, she was able to claim U.S. citizenship for her and her daughter, which enabled the family to emigrate within a matter of months after they had made the decision to leave in 1977. However, instead of travelling to the United States as they had explained to the Romanian authorities, they joined the growing community of *Aussiedler* – a common term for ethnic German immigrants to Germany – from Sackelhausen in the West German district of Reutlingen, Baden-Württemberg. To be sure, trying to emigrate by claiming U.S. citizenship had not become possible only recently. For those with family members born in the U.S. the opportunity had existed for nearly three decades and it might retrospectively seem bewildering that the family did not make use of this earlier. Still, more than anything, this particular example shows the importance of individual and collective agency in making decisions about migration in environments with high restrictions on mobility. Most members of the Ortinau family left only very reluctantly. They had succeeded in regaining a certain level of wealth and especially Barbara, having lived through the hardships of migrating multiple times in her life, did not want to leave the village behind again. Yet, as neighbours, friends and relatives started leaving Sackelhausen in ever increasing numbers beginning in 1970, the family became convinced that the community was in irreversible decline. Eventually, in August 1977, they left the country, giving in to one of Barbara's granddaughter's wish to be with her boyfriend, a fellow Sackelhausener, who had already left the village in 1972.[54] It should also be mentioned that Barbara's son, Johann, was not able to claim U.S. citizenship and, together with his family, had to find an alternative means to leave the country. He had been born before the transmission of citizenship through U.S. citizen mothers was permitted in the so-called *Act of May 24, 1934*, which was not applied retroactively – an example that shows how contingent circumstances could be extremely significant on the individual level.[55] Between 1977 and 1990, the number of Sackelhauseners leaving the village rose to an average of 140 per year and by the end of the century, only a few dozen Banat Swabians still lived in the village.[56] On the whole Banat, a 2002 census counted 19,000 self-identified Germans, compared to 138,000 in 1977.[57]

The movements and the proscription of movements of Banat Swabians in the Cold War period can only partly be captured within the meta-narrative of "ethnic unmixing and ethnic cleansing in Central and Eastern Europe", as many authors have concluded.[58] This narrative implies a teleology by which nation-building

[54] Cf. "Interview," January 29, 2016.
[55] Cf. "U.S. Citizenship Acquired by Birth Abroad," Chang and Boos' Canada – U.S. Immigration Law Center, accessed February 15, 2016, http://www.americanlaw.com/citabrd.html.
[56] Cf. Pitzer, *Sackelhausen,* 212, and Reitz, *Sackelhausen,* 81.
[57] Cf. Hannelore Baier et al., *Geschichte und Traditionen der deutschen Minderheit in Rumänien*, 3rd ed. (Hermannstadt: Central, 2007), 29.
[58] Ohliger and Turliuc, *Minorities into Migrants,* 53.

processes intentionally and inevitably led to the disentanglement of the multicultural and multilingual societies in Central and Eastern Europe. By considering individual agency in terms of decision-making and the organization of mobility as well as the complex underlying dynamics of various enabling and disabling factors such as state-imposed migration restrictions and incentives, favourable and unfavourable constellations in the international system, and contingent individual circumstances, it becomes apparent that the process of German emigration from Romania was much messier and more complex than any such simplistic explanation might suggest. Paradoxically, however, it was the very paradigm of ethnic unmixing that spurred and legitimized West German interest in Romania's German-speaking minorities and which gave them opportunities for movement that other Romanian citizens did not have at that time. Above all, this paradox is indicative of the ways in which grand and enduring narratives in migration history should be regarded and studied, namely as powerful vehicles for political projects, benefitting certain actors and groups over others.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to outline a migration history of Banat Swabians in the twentieth century on the basis of the trajectories of the village of Sackelhausen and some of its inhabitants. In the given format and scope, this, of course, can only be a point of reference from which further and more comprehensive studies need to be conducted. I have shown that the migration patterns of Banat Swabians emerged within the complicated intersections of individual agency and external circumstance, where they were shaped by and shaped economic conjunctures, social relations, state controls and incentives, and international orders. Those patterns, I have argued, call for a more nuanced understanding of issues of migration, territorialization, sovereignty and identity in Central and Eastern European history, which should be decoupled from master narratives centred on the expulsion of ethnic Germans and the 'unmixing' of peoples in Central and Eastern Europe. Over the course of the twentieth century, Banat Swabians were described variously as labour migrants, refugees, displaced persons, expellees, returnees, deportees, illegals, and *Aussiedler*; they were citizens of the Austro-Hungarian empire, of Romania, Serbia, Hungary, the United States, Germany and many other countries. All those ascriptions in turn shaped their very own perceptions of their cultural identities, individually and collectively. However, the point of a systematic and comprehensive study of Banat Swabian migration history hardly lies in establishing the validity of a distinctive Banat Swabian identity and what it might entail.[59]

[59] For a recent sociological study on Banat Swabian identity, conducted in 2010/11 among Banat Swabians still living in Romania, see Gwénola Sebaux, "Die Banater Deutschen im frühen 21. Jahrhundert – Zwischen Mythos und Wirklichkeit," *Spiegelungen. Zeitschrift für deutsche Kultur und Geschichte Südosteuropas* 9 (2014).

Rather, such a project should aim to examine mobility in a conceptual framework that embraces the complexities and contingencies of individual agency, the political struggle for legitimacy, and geopolitics in a global context and goes beyond questions of identity, encompassing notions of sovereignty, transnationality and territorialization alike.

The history of Banat Swabian migration challenges the conception – especially prevalent in the current 'refugee crisis' – that migration is something that affects Europe 'from the outside' and serves as an exemplification of the eclectic spectrum of ways in which Europeans have and were moved in the twentieth century.

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Review Article: Where is the 'Human' in Contemporary Environmental Migration History? Readings on the Backdrop of the Ethiopian Famine Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s

"Sand Waves and Human Tides: Exploring Environmental Myths on Desertification and Climate-Induced Migration." by Giovanni Bettini and Elina Andersson, Journal of Environment & Development 23, no. 1, 2014: 160-185, DOI: 10.1177/1070496513.519896

Disentangling Migration and Climate Change. Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human Rights. Edited by Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), ISBN: 978-94-007-6207-7

Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration. Edited by Kerstin Rosenow-Williams and François Gemenne (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), ISBN: 978-1-138-93966-0

"Gardens of Eden or Hearts of Darkness? The Genealogy of Discourses on Environmental Insecurity and Climate Wars in Africa." by Harry Verhoeven, Geopolitics 19, no. 4, 2014: 784-808, DOI: 10.2080/14650045.896794

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The recent humanitarian refugee crisis in Syria and the forced migration of people has caused much debate regarding the causes of such migration. The most common arguments say it is caused by political turmoil, economic inequalities, international neglect or autocratic rule. This paper will investigate another explanation that is often overlooked: that people ultimately flee their homelands because of environmental degradation and violent conflicts arising from ever more scarce and contested resources. Furthermore, it will ask how historians can weigh

genuine environmental causes with other events?[1] This paper will give a review of recent literature which considers ways of embedding environmental migration debates into history. Its critical stance investigates how these approaches may gain salience once they embark on a reflection about the past of human rights and humanitarianism. The claim is that the later open perspectives on issues of environmental migration can provide a balanced and even challenging view on what social scientists and international policy makers privilege as a rationalized human security issue. Reflecting on the genealogies and on multiple perspectives of each historical event can make evident the many ambiguous realities of migrants and persons engaged in assisting refugees that can otherwise be overlooked.

This paper will strongly agree with the argument presented by political scientist Harry Verhoeven in a seminal article in *Geopolitics* in 2014, in which he challenged scholars in environmental migration "to historicise and to politicise the prevailing dystopian discourse about climate-induced insecurity".[2] Verhoeven's sharp critique of the heavy mortgage of colonial and post-colonial thinking about human life amidst hostile environments on the African continent helps to problematize the historical grounds in political and advocacy analysis. In turn, historical case studies may help to diversify the narratives which are employed in environmental migration debates, and to give names as well as social and regional contexts to individuals involved in migration movements. The ultimate goal is to inform policy makers and the public to question the dominant trope of climate catastrophe as a single brutal and ambiguous threat to global society.[3]

Troubling with agency in environmental migration studies: a new research agenda

Historical narratives can substantially and empirically contribute to debates on environmental migration that have only recently demonstrated a zeal for more interdisciplinary research and dialogue. In recent publications, scholars who problematize the very terms and conclusions derived from contemporary human security policies have widely acknowledged in recent publications the importance of having a closer look at the historical records of international organizations and NGOs in migration history. It is on these grounds that global security issues have been discussed among politicians and experts, and where decisions have been

[1] For more information on behalf of environmental migration policies and current research programs in that field: Environmental Migration Portal. "Environmental Migration Portal." Accessed July 11, 2016. https://environmentalmigration.iom.int. Regarding the Syrian war, the issue was aroused by Peter H. Gleick, "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria," *Weather, Climate, and Society* 6, no. 3 (2014): 331-340.

[2] Harry Verhoeven, "Gardens of Eden or Hearts of Darkness? The Genealogy of Discourses on Environmental Insecurity and Climate Wars in Africa," *Geopolitics* 19, no. 4 (2014): 787.

[3] See: Felicitas Hillmann and Marie Pahl and Birte Rafflenbeul and Harald Sterly, eds., *Environmental change, adaptation and migration: bringing in the region (*Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

made to take action. Furthermore, critical voices of human security policies have made efforts to bring the migrant back into the story. This article argues that it is precisely in this area that the best opportunities for future collaborations between historians and other scholars interested in migration studies lie.

Sociologist Kerstin Rosenow-Williams' and political scientist François Gemenne, in their promising edited volume *Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration* (2016), bring together insights of legal, political, and scientific policy makers as well as the views of humanitarian advocacy networks.[4] As several articles in the volume show, international institutions, such as UNHCR, UNDP or IPCC, have profoundly shaped the discourses and politics of environmental migration under the rubrics of global risk management and continue to do so.[5]

Although with a different emphasis, sociologist Thomas Faist and philosopher Jeanette Schade have presented a similar argument. Both editors of *Disentangling Migration and Climate Change. Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human Rights* (2013) underline the need to reflect on migrational practices as individual coping strategies. Following Faist and Schade along their line of thinking, it is the migrant who decides to move in order to adapt to looming disadvantages and hardships:

> As to agents, it is necessary to go beyond the notion of vulnerability because it often hides the very active role human beings play in interacting with their 'environment'. Agency needs to be brought in, which means recognizing that migration is most often a proactive and not simply a reactive choice. In a nutshell, we thus move from considering vulnerabilities to include capabilities. Seen in this way, migration in the frame of climate change is a case of spatial and social mobility, a strategy of persons and groups to deal with a grossly unequal distribution of life chances across the world.[6]

Such approaches to international organizations and individual migration strategies often run contrary to neo-malthusian views, in which mismatches of populations and dysfunctional regional ecologies must almost necessarily force people

[4] Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, "Introduction," in *Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration,* ed. by Kerstin Rosenow-Williams and François Gemenne (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 1-7.

[5] See Lars Thomann, "Environmental Migration: a concept between complexes and complexities," 21-37; Julia Blocher," Climate change and environmental related migration in the European Union policy," 38-56; Sinja Hantscher, "The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' discourse on environmentally displaced persons," 93-107; and Sarah Nash, "Towards an 'Environmental migration management discourse'", in *Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration, ed.* Rosenow-Williams and Gemenne, 198-215.

[6] Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade, "Introduction", in *Disentangling Migration and Climate Change. Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human Rights,* ed. Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 4-5.

to leave. The latter, in turn, are said create large turmoil and to threaten established social, economic and political systems. This has resulted in neo-malthusian alarmist claims that the destabilization of regional climates caused by human action must be contained by the means of global as well as national preventionist policies: "According to this view land loss due to sea level rise, desertification and landslides, or water stress and storm surges lead to the deprivation of crucial livelihood assets and ecosystem services, and thus forces people to leave. This may happen suddenly due to hazard events or gradually due to slow onset changes."[7]

What follows then, according to Faist and Schade, is a general heuristic difficulty to intertwine climate change and environmental migration without discussing individual or group migrational agency. Both authors also point to the uncertain causes and consequences of climate change, and the trouble in prefiguring the role of political conflicts and economic inequalities that precede human migrational movements.[8] In other words, the various contributions in Faist's and Schade's edited volume focus on sociological and political approaches to livelihood strategies. What needs to be accounted for, as the volume advocates, are the capabilities of individuals and groups to cope with situations of distress. Thus, claims for human rights in the wake of migration represent one strategy of transforming the challenges of environmental catastrophes into reasonable demands on the side of the individual.

This affects Sara Nash's remarkable and highly self-critical argument in *Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration*. Nash investigates whether recent shifts in migration management studies towards individual adaptation strategies will foster a rather neo-liberal and market-oriented logic: heralding the individual responsibilities of people who decide to migrate, while diminishing the involvement of global economic injustice and power relations, which raises doubts about the effects of agency embedded in capitalist biases.[9]

Environmental scholars Giovanni Bettini and Elina Andersson add to Faist and Schade's approach in a contribution to the *Journal of Environment & Development* (2014). Starting from the perspective of the migrant in his or her local setting, they clarify that scrutiny is not about disqualifying the realities of environmental hazards as such. A thorough analysis of regional ecologies threatened by situations of environmental distress can shape notions of climate change induced migration relationships on different spatial levels and through various time frames. Moreover, as Bettini and Andersson have demonstrated, a historical comparison between understandings of climate change and other environmental related issues can reveal the profound scientific uncertainties regarding the causes and effects of

[7] Ibid., 7.
[8] Ibid., 9-17.
[9] See Sara Nash, ""Towards an 'Environmental migration management discourse'", 198-215.

climate change, and unmask the various stages of political discourse considering the rhetoric of climate catastrophe and failed human management efforts.[10]

Dismantling the history of 'doom & dust' in the 'Horn of Africa' region

This section will elaborate further on the argument for historicizing environmental migration discourses and practices while reflecting on matters of agency and advocacy. Of particular interest in the following historical case study is how Verhoeven deems the well-publicized Ethiopian famine of 1983-85, as well as the peculiar ethnic and Cold War upheavals in the geopolitical region ascribed to the so called 'Horn of Africa', to play crucial roles in the contemporary history of policy dilemmas. Verhoeven's salient point about the colonial legacies regarding environmental disasters in East Africa is very convincing. He argues that notions of food shortages and drought caused by overpopulation and agricultural failure influence which direction most of the environmental risk analysis of Ethiopia and its regional neighbors takes.[11] However, in addition to critical stands on environmental phenomena, it is equally important to emphasize the advantages of incorporating human rights and humanitarian approaches here, one aspect that Verhoeven's historical argument does not account for.

By the time of the Ethiopian famine crisis of the 1980s, and this is the quintessential merit of the historical argument as it is claimed by Verhoeven, the 1970s had already witnessed considerable attention from political and economic scientists and policy-makers regarding food. This global attention was triggered by the need to understand why the issue of national and international food security had worsened the conditions of people suffering from malnutrition and hunger in some African countries, which were ultimately said to be doomed to scarcity or be at least fragile in attaining self-sufficiency.[12]

This and other research into food policies of the 1960s and 1970s help to bring to light the difficulty of defining the problem: food had become increasingly addressed in the framework of global risk and international security management, terms that were closely linked to perceptions of broad scale climate change. Scientific and political struggles with desertification processes constituted a much debated key phenomenon regarding the severity of droughts in the so called 'Sahel' region, extending well into the 'Horn of Africa' (i.e. Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya).[13] As Verhoeven explains, the problem of establishing a causal rela-

[10] Giovanni Bettini and Elina Andersson, "Sand Waves and Human Tides: Exploring Environmental Myths on Desertification and Climate-Induced Migration," *Journal of Environment & Development* 23, no. 1 (2014): 169-173.
[11] Verhoeven, "Gardens of Eden or Hearts of Darkness," 796-798.
[12] bid. 796-798.
[13] Jennifer Clapp, *Hunger in the Balance. The New Politics of International Food Aid (*New York: Cornell University Press, 2012); Christian Gerlach, "Die Welternährungskrise 1972-1975," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 31, 2005: 546-585; Margaret R. Biswas and Asit K.

tionship between drought and harsh arid environments on the African continent as a security issue derives from colonial and post-colonial environmental determinisms. Among these, 'African flora and fauna' had been described paradoxically as either incompatible with human settlement or abundant in economic opportunities to be seized. In both cases, Verhoeven can give good reasons that the neo-malthusian outcome was a deeply troubling assumption that environmental determinisms help to create the dead ends of inescapable resource conflicts, and the failure of African people to exercise not only the sufficient production of food but also its equal distribution.[14]

In turn, Verhoeven makes explicit that discourses about environmental determinisms surfaced again when the infamous Ethiopian famine of the 1980s unfolded, and the Ethiopian Socialist *DERG* military regime sought to justify forced and large-scale resettlement programs of ethnic peasantry groups inhabiting the Northern provinces of Wollo and Tigray, populations that were heavily affected by starvation. Applying large scale resettlement schemes against the moral backdrop of resolving poor human living conditions in hostile environments, became the moral stance of Ethiopian officials in order to prevent the repetition of the tragic and deadly outcomes of the 1973-1975 famine. In this period, food scarcity had led to the downfall of emperor Haile Selassie and his outspoken, ingenuous and ultimately mistaken attitude toward crisis management. Despite this historical antecedent, allegations soon gained international credibility that *DERG* militaries had deliberately abused foreign international emergency aid and political support in the resettlement program in order to combat Northern separatist rebel organizations, by removing the entire local population of Wollo and Tigray accused of being aligned with the rebels.[15]

The Ethiopian Famine of 1983-1985 from a transnational humanitarian and human rights perspective

In principal, Verhoeven makes a strong claim to have a close look at the historical 'long tails' of power relationships that have shaped a causal nexus between drought, famine and ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. However, a careful understanding of trans- and international food aid policies during the 1983-1985 famine should be more boldly present beside a historical analysis of how governments responded to allegations of atrocity concerning the Ethiopian resettlement program amidst outright civil war.

Biswas, eds., *Desertification: Associated Case Studies prepared for the United Nations Conference on Desertification* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980); Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, *The encroaching desert: the consequences of human failure (*London: Zed Books, 1986).

[14] Verhoeven, "Gardens of Eden or Hearts of Darkness," 787-788.

[15] Ibid., 794-798. See also, Alex De Waal, *Evil Days. 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991)

One suggestion for further research would be to merge the histories of migration management in Ethiopia with the trans- and international efforts of humanitarian organizations to rescue as many lives as possible.[16] Moreover, it is evident that conducting historical research on how humanitarian and human rights organizations have come to debate and engage with environmental migration, already lies at the heart of what is being discussed among social scientists. While acknowledging the growing threat of climate change to livelihoods, humanitarian organizations tend to see economic, political and societal conflicts or inequalities as the crucial triggers of migration. Thus, scrutinizing how human rights and humanitarian organizations took over the voice of migrants in order to change the Ethiopian resettlement program, opens a vast field of questions on how networks of transnational advocacy and power relations were conceived of in the 1980s. Migration is mostly accredited by humanitarian organizations with positive coping capacities on the side of the migrant, who should be supported via short-term protection and long-term development projects.[17] In the wake of famines, such a standpoint easily runs into issues of environmental management intertwined with development policies, leaving researchers to question how migrants can be helped on their way through the deserts, and how sustainable agricultural programs can be applied and fostered.

An investigation of German based documents related to the Protestant *Berliner Missionswerk* (BMW), which at the time had maintained a strong partnership with the *Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus* (EECMY), provides a historical case for such an expansion of narrative besides the ongoing focus on economic and political security approaches to the Ethiopian famines. When the revolutionary Amharic *DERG* regime decided to suppress religious institutions and to carry out brutal and bloody socialist collectivization[18] reforms against peasants and rival ethnic groups, BMW and EECMY staff politicized their missionary work in the name of human rights, and strongly opposed international emergency aid for the Ethiopian government and its forced resettlement program of people directly affected by the famine.[19] Ultimately the result of this transnational engagement facilitated a failed terror attack carried out by Ethiopian military and designed

[16] Tanja R. Müller, " 'The Ethiopian famine' revisited. Band Aid and the antipolitics of celebrity humanitarian action," *Disasters* 37*,* 2014: 61-79; Peter Gill, *Famine and Foreigners. Ethiopia Since Live Aid* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Florian Hannig, "Mitleid mit Biafranern in Westdeutschland. Eine Historisierung von Empathie," *WerkstattGeschichte* 68, 2014: 65-78.

[17] Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, "Environmental Migration and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement", in *Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration,* ed. Kerstin Rosenow-Williams and François Gemenne (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 126-144.

[18] Collectivization reforms in Ethiopia commenced with the DERG regime and resembled the great Sowjet collectivization reforms of the 1920s and 1930s, under which former peasant agriculture was transformed into large scale mechanized and state run cooperatives.

[19] Berliner Missionwerk, "Ethiopia. Revolution and Nation. Human Rights and Refugee Relief," *Horn of Africa 5*, no. 2, 1982: 41-47. Berliner Missionswerk, ed., *Hunger und Elend durch Vernichtung der Dorfer im Oromoland* (Berlin: Berliner Missionswerk, 1987).

to kill one of the BMW staff members responsible for Ethiopia in Berlin on 22 March 1982. In 1979 one of the charismatic leaders of EECMY, general secretary Gudina Tumsa (1929-1979), had been kidnapped and killed by Ethiopian government forces.[20]

After the EECMY was pressured to bring its transnational relationships with other churches to an end, the BMW cooperated in clandestine relief work to care for thousands of refugees in the Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti borderlands to Ethiopia.[21] This engagement in refugee assistance extended to Ethiopian asylum seekers living in Berlin. Many of those refugees in Germany at the time belonged to the Oromo people and had been persecuted in an arbitrary manner by the mainly Amharic Ethiopian military for insurrection against the state. Simultaneously, the BMW led several endeavors to impede aid and assistance efforts from the Federal Republic of Germany and from Church development programs, such as *Brot für die Welt*, from reaching Ethiopian state officials.[22] The transnational history of the BMW and the EECMY can be placed in both German and Ethiopian contemporary history of migration in the wake of famine and civil war. The case even established close links to ecumenical networks on a global level with the *International Lutheran Council* and the *World Council of Churches.* Concerning the relationships between the BMW and other Protestant churches in the former GDR that were worried about religious freedom and human rights in African countries such as South Africa, the Ethiopian famine helped to foster dialogues that surmounted Cold War thinking. Churches in the GDR were equally alerted about what happened to the EECMY in Ethiopia, for the German Democratic Republic had become deeply and covertly engaged in the contested climate of Cold War geopolitics at the 'Horn of Africa'.[23]

The history of BMW in the face of the Ethiopian famine points to the argument that humanitarian organizations were able to debate the ambiguities of aid and assistance in times of war and political unrest, without being inclined to recur on

[20] Gunnar Hasselblatt, *Naechstes Jahr im Oromoland. Von der eklatanten Verletzung der Menschenrechte durch den abessinisch-amharischen Rassismus in Athiopien. Ein Bericht* (Stuttgart: Radius, 1982).

[21] Documents are archived by the Berlin *Evangelisches Landesarchiv* (ELAB): Berliner Missionwerk, "BMW: report on visit to Somalia. - D.A. Wilson Feb. 11Th 1980 - March 1st 1980," File BMW 1/9765.

[22] Berliner Missionswerk, "Letter: Hollm to Linnenbrink, 29th March 1983," File BMW 1/9766. Berliner Missionwerk, "Letter: Kruse to Binder, Bevollmachtiger des Rates der EKD am Sitz der Bundesregierung, 29th June 1982," File ELAB 36/3166.

[23] Berliner Missionswerk, "Letter: Envangelisches Konsistorium Berlin-Brandenburg to Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR, 12th Jan. 1981," microfiche EZA/101/1528. Berliner Missionswerk, "Letter: Hasselblatt and Gruhn to LWB, 08th Oct. 1982," Digitalisat Gossner_G 1_0741. See also Patrice G. Poutros, "Asylum in Postwar Germany: Refugee Admission Policies and Their Practical Implementation in the Federal Republic and the GDR Between The Late 1940s and the Mid-1970s," *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 1, 2014, 115-133; Hanns Lessing and Tilman Dedering and Juergen Kampmann and Dirkie Smit, eds., *Contested Relations. Protestantism between Southern Africa and Germany from the 1930s to the Apartheid Era* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2015).

any form of environmental determinism, which Verhoeven has convincingly portrayed to be influential in human security debates. In a similar manner, the French organization *Médecins sans Frontière* had to leave Ethiopia in 1985 for their critical stand on the issue of forced resettlement.[24]

Of course, such modes of denunciation evoked other dilemmas. How could suffering people in Ethiopia and its neighbor states be aided without causing undesirable political side effects? Moreover, the goal for advocacy in the name of human rights and Christian solidarity often brought the BMW close to being questioned by other organizations and the EECMY to being questioned on the legality of speaking out for others who had to remain silent or engage in disguise. In this context it is not surprising to see that none of the published material issued by the BMW during the famine crisis included critical remarks articulated by ecumenical partners or by refugees on behalf of the BMW's human rights campaign. If Ethiopian people appear, their statements served as testimonies denouncing the cruel regime of the DERG and its Amharic elite against other ethnic and religious groups.[25]

The historical case of BMW advocacy shows that one cannot underestimate the importance of contemporary human rights discourses in humanitarian engagement with the Ethiopian famine. However, rights-based moral politics were also in the scope of authoritarian regimes, such as the DERG itself, which emphasised the fact that the social rights of its citizens to be free from hunger and poverty had to be valued above civil and political rights when planning forced resettlements on the countryside.[26] Hence, the humanitarian and human rights engagement by the BMW reveals how ambiguous the struggles about the causes of migration in the context of political, ethnic, religious and environmental calamities could be as the tragic famine of 1983-1985 unfolded. That being said, a historical perspective on how famine relief was debated among humanitarian organizations and in dialogue with other Ethiopian or foreign state authorities, not to mention international arenas and scientific or expert communities, offers a bridge for discussing the interplay of different agents and advocacy networks.

Merging the histories of human rights, humanitarianism and environmental migration

The above mentioned approaches to environmental migration, as they appear mainly articulated by social scientists, need to reflect on the rising issues of hu-

[24] Eleanor Davey, "Famine, Aid, and Ideology. The Political Activism of Medecins sans Frontieres in the 1980s," *French Historical Studies* 34, 2011: 529-558.
[25] Gunnar Hasselblatt, *Schreie im Oromoland* (Stuttgart: Radius, 1980).
[26] Roland Burke, "Some Rights are more equal than Others. The Third World and the Transformation of Economic and Social Rights," *Humanity,* 2012: 427-446; Ian Brownlie, *The Human Right to Food* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987).

man rights history and the growing political involvement of humanitarianism in the 1970s and 1980s.[27] Only then does the astonishing trans- and international attention to what happened in Ethiopia in times of famine crisis gain a balanced account, in which the historical uniqueness of environmental determinisms applied to drought, famine and politics of securitization can be thoroughly deliberated against the backdrop of migrants and their humanitarian advocates. Most importantly of all, it becomes evident that behind refugee numbers there are always people and individual destinies to be lamented and dealt with by state and non-state institutions.[28] The histories of contemporary humanitarianism and human rights discourses regarding the Ethiopian famine can offer an entry point to issues of advocacy and agency on different transnational, global and local levels regarding the subject of environmental migration. This approach would thereby embrace different groups from migrants to concerned citizens mostly in Europe and in the US, who gave credit to humanitarian interventions in Ethiopia.

This does not delegitimize the current trend in securitizing environmental migration on the questionable basis of historical determinisms and the limits of individual coping strategies, but only highlights the historical ambiguities of humanitarian appeal inside liberal policies: where Syrians suffer from hunger blockades, immediate alleviation and possible long-term remedies are deeply embroiled in controversies about decision making and power.[29] Still, those appeals cannot be refused without unforeseeable losses and unbearable calamities once humanitarian aid seems morally affordable and materially possible.

Ultimately, it seems clear that climate change discourse is very much attached to concepts of environmental migration that take human agency essentially as a hubris. A careful historical analysis of the now much cited catastrophes that occurred prior to contemporary human security policies in the wake of climate change debates, such as the Ethiopian famine crisis during the 1970 and 1980s, can help to bring the 'human' figure back in. This should not be for the purpose of blurring the deep ambiguities of humanitarian discourses once again, but in order to think through the critical histories of human rights and humanitarian aid from a global perspective, with a look at how different groups have accredited incidents of environmental distress with the power to substantially destabilize societies and affect migration.[30] Or at least, how it came about that climate scientists and politi-

[27] Jan Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten. Menschenrechte in der Internationalen Politik seit den 1940er Jahren* (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010).

[28] Jenny Edkins, *Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

[29] Andrea Böhm, "Hunger als Waffe," last modified January 8, 2016, http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-01/syrien-hunger-lebensmittelpreise-abgrenzung-madaja-zabadani-notstand. David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night. Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon&Schuster, 2002).

[30] This includes non-Western charity and emergency aid policies. See: Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown and Justin Pierce, *Charities in the non-western world. The development and regula-*

cians may engage with migration in terms of environmental phenomena and why other narratives became relatively marginalized. At the heart of such a research agenda lies the migrant who has been conceived of, at least until now, in terms of passive victimhood. To problematize this troubling absence of voice and the different political and humanitarian efforts towards advocacy, or even towards silencing, marginalization and abuse, can be one essential contribution of historical research to current debates on environmental migration.

tion of indigenous and Islamic charities (London: Routledge, 2013).

Book Reviews

The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalization, 1846-1896

By Marc-William Palen, Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. 331, Hardback $99.99, ISBN: 978-1-107-10912-4

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While in the last few decades the United States was regarded by many as the most vocal proponent of neoliberal economic policy and international trade deregulation, recent criticisms arising from heated debates around trade agreements such as TTIP, TPP, and CETA, as well as the Sanders and Trump 2016 campaigns' flirtation with protectionism, have shown that US free trade policy still remains a divisive and relevant issue today. Marc-William Palen, in his book *The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade*, explores this historic struggle, framing his study around free trade and protectionism in the United States during the nineteenth century, and contextualizing the rise of liberal economic thinking within Anglo-American relations. Palen's monograph aims at deconstructing common historical depictions of the nineteenth century as a 'laissez-faire era' in domestic economic policy with little control by a 'weak' state. Palen instead emphasizes the prevalence of economic nationalism and restrictive policies aimed at protecting the American market, including high protective tariffs, restrictions on immigration, and federal subsidization. He then follows a growing movement of British-influenced cosmopolitan free traders, opposing protectionist policies in the public discourse and in the government's policy conduct. Palen's work ultimately serves as a major contribution to the economic and imperial history of the United States, as he lays out a variety of original claims, challenging the way the rise of American informal empire has been portrayed in historiography.

The genesis of the division between prevalent protectionists and struggling free traders in American history has been widely overlooked by the dominant strand of scholarly publications in economic and diplomatic history, advocating the narrative of the US as an 'open door' empire. Notably, the Wisconsin school of diplomatic history and its revisionist founder William Appleman Williams have es-

tablished the tradition of describing the US as an 'empire of free trade', pursuing liberal economic policies in world politics in order to maintain informal, capitalist imperial ambitions.

Palen's foremost and most original claim stresses that the idea of an 'empire of free trade' neglects the prominence of protectionism in the United States government during the nineteenth century. He proposes instead that US economic policy in that period is better described as the 'imperialism of economic nationalism', forcing access to foreign markets while staying protective at home.

Palen supports his argument by tracing the debate surrounding free trade and protectionism to an ideological battle between 'Cobdenites' and 'Listians'. 'Cobdenites' subscribed to the economic thinking of British reformer Richard Cobden, leading thinker of the Manchester school of economic liberalism. 'Listians' on the other hand drew inspiration from the German economist Friedrich List, main proponent of the German *Zollverein* and one of the first economists to argue for an *Entwicklungsökonomie* – proposing that economically underdeveloped nations like France, Germany, and the US would be able to catch up with developed nations like the British empire inside a system of protective tariffs only. Palen illustrates how both Cobdenites and Listians saw free trade as a sort of economic goal, but Cobdenites wanted to establish a free trade economy modeled after the British system right away, while Listians stressed the importance of only establishing free trade policies between equally developed countries.

Palen successfully links Cobdenite ideology to intellectuals like William Cullen Bryant, Edward Atkinson, and Henry Ward Beecher, all of whom were in the latter half of the nineteenth century organized into the so-called 'Cobden Clubs' that were founded in England and the US. He furthermore argues that these intellectuals were invested in abolitionism and then traces the rise of free trade sentiment in the Republican Party before and during the Civil War in connection to the party's abolitionist stance. He finally identifies an estrangement of free traders from the Republican Party following the end of the Civil War resulting in a party realignment that became widely visible in the 1884 elections when many former Cobdenite Republicans voted for the Democrat Grover Cleveland.

Palen's book is structured chronologically and greatly illustrates the ideological battle between Cobdenites and Listians in the American party system, the press, and even popular culture. Palen's narrative draws upon a wide variety of sources ranging from personal communication between intellectuals involved in the ideological battle, various press articles from newspapers engaging in the debate, to the writings of authors such as Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Edward Bellamy. *The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade* contributes widely to the history of the American party system by connecting the realignment of the Republican Party to its prevalent protectionist members, with the Cobdenites as "mugwumps" moving to the Democratic Party as a result.

As a second big claim, Palen links the ideology of Listian protectionism to a sentiment of Anglophobia, which served as the basis of various 'conspiracies' surrounding free traders in the US during the 19th Century. While Palen's use of archival sources illustrates greatly how Listians linked Cobdenities to British money and accused them of promoting free trade as agents of the British empire, he falls short of defining the very term 'conspiracy theory' and connecting it to the wide array of scholarly research in that respective realm. In the end, Palen's allusion to conspiracy, already present in the title, fails to be properly addressed in his monograph.

Another shortcoming of his book is its failure to provide a truly global narrative of the intellectual networks he proposes. While Palen connects the story of the battle between Cobdenites and Listians to the globalization of ideas and elaborates widely on the influence of American tariff policies on a global scale, he fails to address perspectives from countries outside the Anglo-American realm. He discusses Canadian and Australian Cobdenites and Listians in detail in the sixth chapter of his book, but neglects to look into more detail as to how reformers in Latin America reacted to the US imperialist policy of forcing access to markets. He acknowledges the influence of Listian economics on the Meiji period in Japan but then does not provide any further information about how the Japanese reformers interacted with the network of globally connected Listian thinkers he proposes. However, it has to be said that Palen does state from the beginning that his focus will center on the influence of Cobdenism and Listian economics on the Anglo-American relationship. Ultimately, the globally-connected network approach he chose deserves further academic attention and the integration of intellectuals from a wider array of national backgrounds.

Despite these shortcomings, Palen very originally ties the debate within the US to the history of American imperialism, keeping in mind its global implications. He succeeds in showing how Cobdenites, despite their adherence to worldwide free trade, were very much invested in cosmopolitan anti-imperialist movements. His evaluation therefore does not only serve as a great contribution to the history of domestic economic policy in the United States but also challenges the way American empire building is perceived in a global history of modern imperialism. Scholars of global history should especially embrace Palen's eighth chapter *Free Trade in Retreat* in which he traces the global implications of the protectionist McKinley Tariff of 1890 and furthermore links the policy to rising demands for a 'Greater Britain' pursuing protectionist policies all over the British empire.

The *Conspiracy of Free Trade* serves as a fresh take on the history of the American party system and the economic relationship with Great Britain. Its compelling narrative illustrates greatly the struggle around trade liberalization and empire that was prevalent in the nineteenth century United States. The book challenges the traditional notion of an 'open door empire' and instead proposes a new take on US imperialism by emphasizing protection at home and the forced access to

markets abroad. Global historians and practitioners working on the history of the American party system alike should consider this publication when researching historical economic dynamics in the United States and positioning these in the context of a globalizing Anglo-American realm.

The Silk Roads: A New History of the World

By Peter Frankopan, London: Bloomsbury, 2015. Pp. 638,
Hardback £30.00, ISBN: 978-1-4088-3997-3

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Peter Frankopan's intentions in writing *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World* can only be described as ambitious. Well-researched and eloquently written, Frankopan's mission statement is clear: to correct the imbalanced Eurocentric perspective that has thoroughly dominated the writing of 'world history', to recalibrate our view of history and the world, and to highlight the central importance of the various trade routes which have run through Central Asia for millennia, connecting Europe to Asia and beyond. Certainly not an easy task, his mission to write a "new world history" in 638 pages has produced a manuscript dripping in detail which is as fascinating as it is frustrating.

Frankopan's critique of Eurocentric world histories, and his desire to reject such grand historical narratives are certainly valid when set against the traditional view of human development taught in many Western intellectual institutions. These traditional narratives of development and 'progress' focus on Europe as the centre of intellectual, economic, technological, and institutional innovation, innovations which enabled European domination of most of the globe. In such histories, Central Asia, if mentioned at all, is orientalised and 'othered', described purely to highlight the dangers faced by European traders who wished to access Asian markets, or to critique and 'primitivise' Central Asian forms of social order and governance in comparison to the European. This perspective, dubbed the "lazy history of civilization" by anthropologist Eric Wolf, is a relatively recent development, however; a product of colonial and civilizing discourses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Before this many historians and writers, including Christopher Marlowe in 1587, identified the world's centre as laying to the east beyond Mesopotamia and the Causasus, in Iran and the "stans", where the 'Silk Roads' met.

First employed in 1877 by the German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen, the term 'Silk Road' (*Seidenstrasse*) describes the weft of commercial arteries

that stretched between China and the Mediterranean, a network of tracks that split and converged across the breadth of Asia for a quarter of the length of the equator. Along these arteries, people, goods, ideas, religions, diseases and many other commodities and cultural products have flowed, and different groups met, negotiated, and traded together for millennia. In arguing that trade-based globalization has been a reality since before the written record, Frankopan begins his narrative by highlighting the multilateral nature of exchange within the region, offering an account of the early interaction between European and Asian parties as one not based on domination and subjugation, but rather, a mutually beneficial relationship between the participant peoples, regions, nations, and companies. In doing so, Frankopan thoroughly rejects the thesis of globalization championed by the likes of Thomas Friedman, who argues that processes of globalization began in 1492 with the European voyages of discovery. If, as is often understood, globalization is to be conceived as the transnational exchange of people, goods and ideas, then, argues Frankopan, this took place long before 1492 with the conquest of the Silk Roads by Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC. With this as its starting point, the twenty-five thematic chapters of *The Silk Roads* offer something for everybody interested in the development of transcontinental trade, and the political and social ramifications of cultural exchange.

The book certainly has its highlights. Frankopan's treatment of the rise of the Mongols is very interesting, as is his treatment of the British and American interventions in the region since the nineteenth century. Also of interest is the connection made between the spread of the Black Death and the flowering of the Renaissance. The book, however, also has its weaknesses, chief amongst them, the age-old question of what to do with Europe. Despite his clear intention to decentralise Europe, the continent remains central in Frankopan's narrative, seeming almost like a stick against which to measure (and legitimise) the achievements of Central Asian rulers, and as the narrative continues, Europe emerges as the villain of the piece. Indeed, Frankopan concludes his chapter on the rise of Europe as the dominant global power through its "entrenched relation with violence and militarism" by stating, "Europe's distinctive character as more aggressive, more unstable, and less peace-minded than other parts of the world now paid off." Given the history of their often violent involvement in the region, this highly negative portrayal of Europeans by Frankopan is somewhat justified, but rather than presenting an even-handed history which redresses the disproportionate emphasis on European development in world history, Frankopan has instead written a 'Eurasiancentric' history which replicates many of the weaknesses associated with Eurocentrism through a highly problematic use of sources. This is not to undermine the achievements of Frankopan - a historian at Oxford University and Director of the Oxford Centre for Byzantine Research – but rather to point out his biases, which become increasingly obvious as one reads along. Fluent in both Russian and Arabic, and familiar with several other languages, Frankopan is

without a doubt eminently qualified to write this history, but his selection of material is key to the success of the book. His emphasis on European violence - the "acclaimed violence and killing" of ancient Rome, for example - while justified, appears somewhat uneven when followed by a discussion on the use of violence by the Mongol's as "selective and deliberate", underplaying their destruction of countless cities in their quest for continental domination as necessary in the establishment of free-trade policies. Equally problematic is his judgmental treatment of the Northern European intervention in the Asian slave trade while failing to mention the considerable demand for such slaves in the markets of Central Asia and the Middle East. Throughout the book, Frankopan highlights the deplorable actions of the Europeans while failing to mention the equally horrific acts perpetrated simultaneously in Eurasia. Given his considerable knowledge and skill as an historian and linguist, and the considerable body of work already undertaken on the more unsavory elements of the Central Asian societies of old, one can only assume that this silence is deliberate, a conscious attempt to rewrite the historical record by utilising the same narrative techniques employed by historians wishing to justify the terrible actions of Europeans in their domination of the world.

Additionally, despite claiming to write a history of whole civilizations and continents, the roles of Africa and the Americas in his world history are minor at best, entering his narrative only when they've come under the influence of the Europeans. Equally problematic is his representation of the diverse inhabitants of the Eurasian land mass as a homogenous whole rather than as a collection of largely autonomous sub-regions and peoples, a move straight out of the Eurocentrics' handbook, so to speak. There is, for example, no such place as the "Arab-speaking-world" and yet Frankopan consistently utilises this as short-hand for the region. While one can assume that both issues have arisen due to the forced brevity of this work and its intention as a source of public history, they are still jarring when his aim is to not only write a history of the world, but to reject Eurocentric discourses on Central Asia and the Middle East.

None of this, however, can detract from the importance of this project. The greatest strength of *The Silk Roads* is its readability and focus on trade as the engine of connection and integration in the region. Frankopan's history draws attention to an oft-ignored corner of the world which saw the first transcontinental trade and was central to the spread of goods, ideas, and people. Aforementioned issues aside, this is a history which should be known, providing a new perspective on the writing of world history and functioning as a model for the writing of neocentric historiography.

Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First

By Frank Trentmann, London: Allen Lane, 2016. Pp. 862, Hardback £30.00, ISBN: 978-0-713-99962-4

REVIEWED BY BENEDICT OLDFIELD

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Good histories of consumerism should invoke various perspectives to explain and evaluate patterns of consumption, be it economic, cultural, social or intellectual. Frank Trentmann's new book, *Empire of Things*, provides a comprehensive and authoritative account of the rise of consumer societies precisely through such an engagement with various approaches to consumerism. This ambitious work deconstructs dominant paradigms cultivated by the Cold War which view consumerism as an American innovation, and its global spread as 'Americanization'. To achieve this, Trentmann, Professor of History at Birkbeck University, London, employs a longue dureé approach to trace the emergence of the consumer from the early modern period. In this, he shows how institutions and ideas shaped consumption over time, just as consumption, in turn, transformed the value systems, power hierarchies and social relations of societies around the world. (p.6) *Empire of Things* is also a global history, stressing the multi-directional diffusion of ideas and practices of consumption as well as goods across regions and nation-states, all of which shaped and reshaped identities and perceptions of the self and others.

The volume is divided into two parts, the first traces the rise of consumerism in chronological fashion from Renaissance Italy and late Ming China to the present day. The second part, organized thematically, critiques and problematizes various common assumptions and topics associated with mass consumption and consumerism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including secularization as an inevitable phenomenon of mass consumption, inter-generational dynamics, leisure, and the idea that consumer society is more wasteful. While the second part of the volume does tend to repeat arguments offered in the first, Trentmann's appeal for an historical perspective to relativize contemporary condemnations of consumerism and mass consumption are largely successful. Indeed, he cogently shows that moralistic arguments about conspicuous consumption have always been a feature of human society's interaction with things. It is this longue dureé approach, which treats the rise of the consumer as a political and economic actor over the course

of the last three hundred years as a gradual and complicated phenomenon, that deserves the most attention and praise.

Whilst Trentmann offers numerous arguments for the rise in the volume and variety of things we consume, at the core of his thesis is the idea that the rise in consumption required more than socioeconomic factors such as urbanization, increases in wealth and productivity, and the rise of the middle class. Instead, he contends that the prerequisite for the rise in private consumption necessitated a "historic shift in humans" relations to 'things'. (p.1) In other words, what occurred in the early modern period was a gradual cultural, moral, and institutional transformation in man's relation towards things and their role in society. Sumptuary laws and a moral straitjacket had constrained conspicuous consumption, even in relatively affluent societies, because of the perception of private pleasure as pernicious to the common good. This changed, first in the Netherlands and Great Britain, as consumption became seen as positive, leading to self-improvement as well as to greater state wealth. Trentmann refers to Adam Smith's well-known assertion of consumption as the sole end and purpose of production (p.3) to illustrate the sea-change in man's perception to having and desiring 'more'. To be sure, critics of excessive consumption and materialism remained a powerful voice throughout the modern period, be it Rousseau, Marx, or Veblen and Taut. Yet for Trentmann, a general cultural and institutional climate favourable to the consumption and production of consumer goods prevailed. It is these cultural changes, rather than the increase in abundance *per se,* that explain the trajectory towards consumer societies which first began in Northwest Europe before spreading to the rest of the world. In his own way, Trentmann thereby implicitly contributes to the debate on the Great Divergence by locating the roots of consumerism in Britain and the Netherlands.

Trentmann makes numerous compelling arguments to illustrate the global rise of consumerism over the last centuries. Above all, the role of empire and colonialism is shown to have led to this expansion of consumption. This argument is not new. Indeed, Trentmann builds on his previous publication relating to free trade imperialism to show the doctrine's centrality to the global spread of consumption in the nineteenth century. Describing the British empire as the first "consumer-friendly empire" because of the cheaper goods and lower taxes created by free-trade doctrines (p.120), Trentmann brings together several strands of historiography of what he describes as 'commodity biographies', such as sugar, cotton, and cocoa, to show that the explosion of trade in goods procured from colonies shaped taste and consumer spending. Thankfully, Trentmann shows that it was not only the colonial metropole which exploited such goods, rather, they enjoyed a global demand. In this, Trentmann manages to convey the role of empire and colonialism without contending that consumerism was an export of Anglo-Saxon material civilization.

Empire of Things also addresses the lack of a global, homogenous consumer culture through the prism of colonialism and imperialism. By focusing on pre-colonial Africa, Trentmann illustrates the existence of consumerism in African societies with specific tastes and desires. In contrast to narratives of consumer society as a democratic process involving the advance from elite to bourgeois and then to mass consumption (p.136), Trentmann problematizes this thesis within the colonial context: Western colonial projects gradually led to the disappearance of the African consumer since this category became irreconcilable with European racial doctrines, despite the role of consumption in imperialist civilizational narratives. Racial conceptions also shaped taste, and marketing and advertising of exotic goods were increasingly nationalised to eliminate the colonial heritage of the material goods, something Trentmann describes as the "spatial reordering of goods" (p.173). To this day, the origin of goods plays an important role in marketing products to suit consumer tastes: just as local elites in colonized societies demanded goods from Paris and London as a sign of quality, British tastes in tea were shaped by geopolitical circumstances and the role of the imperial empire in branding (Indian tea was preferred to Chinese tea). Post-colonial nation-states came to perceive of mass consumption as a Western export, and thus displayed an ambivalence towards consumerism as a colonial legacy, in the initial years of independence at least. In this regard, Trentmann shows that, even in the early nineteenth century, taste and fashion was manufactured based on appeals to symbols and constructed associations of goods and practices of consumption. Trentmann's focus on consumption patterns for goods of colonial origins along with the diffusion of ideas of consumption serves as a resourceful perspective for analysing the contradictions of European colonialism as well as the reconstruction of power hierarchies through material civilization in the colonizes societies themselves.

Throughout the volume, Trentmann prefers to speak of consumerisms rather than a single, monolithic material culture: even at the end of the twentieth century, Trentmann sees consumerist dynamics as an interaction between the global and the local. Thus, while all societies have embraced consumerist impulses to a certain extent, there is still significant divergence, even within conceptually analogous regions, such as Europe. Trentmann's analysis of the Asian experience of consumerism is particularly useful in this regard. Whilst Trentmann takes the questionable decision to compress the Japanese and Chinese experiences into a single chapter, distorting the significant differences between the two in the post-1945 world, he does show that significantly different paths to a consumer society may be taken. To further refute the Americanization thesis, Trentmann contends that early seeds of consumerism existed in pre-colonial China and India. In fact, he treats Maoism and Nehru's reign in India, a time of declining private consumption, as "deviations from a longer path of commercial development" (p.357). In this regard, consumerism in East and South Asia had just as many endogenous causes as exogenous influences.

The role of things in identity-construction is emphasised throughout, reflecting the most recent historiographical trends recognizing the role of objects as symbols and as a means of social communication. This informs Trentmann's analysis of the spread of consumption to all social classes and therefore the role of consumption in politics. By the end of the nineteenth century, the consumer is seen to have emerged as a political category. This had implications for twentieth century ideologies of mass society, be it fascism, capitalism, or socialism, since they were all predicated on promises of a better standard of living. The politicization of consumption meant that twentieth-century societies were either legitimized or delegitimized by the state's ability to facilitate consumption for its citizens. Within individual societies consumers, as opposed to citizens, are recognised as political actors with agency to influence through their purchasing power. The result, according to Trentmann, was raised expectations and the transformation of the social system by consumption: now, one could speak of consumer society as an entire social system, a way of life. (p.302) This dynamic reached its zenith in the Cold War and continues to inform present-day society. What is under-emphasized in Trentmann's examination is the fact that 'standard of living' has become the key category for regional and international comparison and the ideational ordering of the world. It is now the extent of mass consumption which distinguishes the 'developed' world from the 'developing' world. Trentmann further excels in incorporating non-market actors and institutions in the story of consumerism. Principally it is the state which, in his view, catalysed mass consumption. Migration also had a significant role to play, although this is under-explored in his analysis. Despite this, Trentmann rejects presentist accounts of consumerism as the triumph of neoliberal individualism as the sole engine of the rise of consumerism by assigning a key role to the state.

Despite the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of Trentmann's arguments, there are certainly a few shortcomings with the text. In terms of style, the relentless paragraphs of statistics to show upward trends in consumption around the world is sometimes overwhelming, and sometimes superfluous, since it interrupts the flow of his argument without contributing much new to it. In terms of his thesis, while Trentmann engages with a thorough intellectual history related to consumerism, it is not always clear how intellectual thought explains the rise of mass consumption. While the influence of Marx and Adam Smith on ideologies of government needs no explanation, in other regards intellectual discourse appears symptomatic rather than integral to the story of the ascendancy of consumerism. More generally, while Trentmann investigates the evolution of the meaning of consumption, the meaning of consumerism is never made explicit, nor is it particularly problematized.

In spite of these few points of contention, it is clear that this is a masterful work. Trentmann engages with things as markers of identity as well as with their influence on individual and group behaviour. He relativizes contemporary critiques of

consumerism by subjecting them to extensive historical investigation. The principal success of this book lies in the contention that the rise of consumerism is a global phenomenon, rather than a product of post-war American world hegemony. Through this, Trentmann argues against globalization as a homogenizing force by showing the persistence of differences in material culture despite the increasingly standardized set of things which occupy our world.

The Invention of Nature: Alexander von Humboldt's New World

By Andrea Wulf, London: John Murray Publishers, 2015. Pp. 496, Hardback £25.00, ISBN: 978-0-385-35066-2

REVIEWED BY CLARE RICHARDSON

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If you could invite one historical figure to a dinner party, who would it be? Andrea Wulf answers that question with resounding certainty in *The Invention of Nature: Alexander von Humboldt's New World.* Her biography of the Prussian scientist and adventurer makes it hard not to agree that he should be at the top of anyone's guest list. Not because Alexander von Humboldt seems like great company – his tendency to babble relentlessly and his disdain for social formalities made him an initially reluctant celebrity – but because his ideas are foundational to the way we understand the world today across several fields of study. Wulf, a design historian by training who has previously published two books on gardening histories, breathes life into Humboldt's litany of discoveries, follows his death-defying travels from the peaks of the Andes to the plains of Siberia, and highlights the influence of his work on poets, writers, and scientists.

Humboldt was a global thinker whose ideas were nothing short of revolutionary for Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Wulf repeatedly – almost incessantly – describes how Humboldt identified previously unseen connections by researching natural features in distant lands and viewing the world as a network of forces. His widely-read books described nature as a global system at work. Rather than group plants according to traditional taxonomy, he used their climate and location to plot zones with similar distributions of flora stretching across the earth. For example, Humboldt noticed a moss species in the Andes that was similar to one in northern Germany. Another group of coastal plants led him to suggest there must have been a connection between Africa and South America at some point in time. Similarities like these helped him articulate an early understanding of tectonic plates. Humboldt warned scientists that failing to consider specimens from far reaches of the planet would be like geologists piecing together the world 'according to the shape of the nearest hills around them.' (p.128) Throughout his career, Humboldt meticulously documented natural features, flora, and fauna across different continents, describing interconnected phe-

nomena thousands of miles away from one another. In nature he saw 'a reflection of the whole.' (p.128)

Wulf also focuses on Humboldt's previously unrecorded connections between the economy, slavery, and colonialism. He saw the mistreatment of people to harvest labor-intensive crops as 'interwoven with man's relationship to nature and the exploitation of natural resources.' (p.106) He became a committed abolitionist following his forays into the Americas, and loathed Americans for their practice of slavery despite admiring their revolutionary spirit. Similarly, his *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, published in several volumes from 1808 to 1811, asserted that Spanish colonialism was founded on inequality and premised on the false notion that local peoples were barbaric and unsophisticated. Instead, Humboldt insisted that the indigenous peoples were 'as capable of scientific discoveries, art and craftsmanship as the Europeans.' (p.152) In later accounts, his condemnation of Britain's treatment of its colonies in the South Pacific paralleled his writings on Spanish colonialism in Latin America, where his work inspired Simón Bolívar and the revolutions that liberated the continent. This can be seen in the fact that the revolutionaries viewed science as an inherently transnational phenomenon, 'a nation without borders' that could unite people and put independent Latin America on the same page as Europe. (p.174) Today Humboldt has been largely forgotten in North America – partly due to anti-German sentiment and the purging of German cultural influences following the First World War – but his name is widely known in South America as a result of his considerable influence on the continent.

Humboldt was also the first to elucidate the connections between colonialism and environmental degradation. 'Everything is interaction and reciprocal,' (p.59) Wulf quotes Humboldt as saying after he comes to understand how Spanish monks depleted future resources by over-harvesting turtle eggs on the Venezuelan coast. Humboldt noted how Spanish efforts to reduce flooding by building a dam out of trees backfired: they failed to foresee how the logging would increase soil erosion, making future flooding even worse. He also recorded how diverting water for local irrigation could deplete valleys further downstream. Wulf writes that 'he debated nature, ecological issues, imperial power and politics in relation to each other.' (p.105) These ideas would shape the way we understand the world around us as a web of interconnected phenomena. Humboldt's 'invention of nature,' as Wulf describes his contributions in the book title, refers to the way his work influenced the thinking of his predominantly European audience, shaping their conception of the environment as an interconnected global force.

Although the primary aim of Humboldt's numerous journeys was the collection of scientific data, he also used the opportunity to write sentimental travel accounts that captured imaginations at home in Europe. However, where Humboldt took care to meticulously record data and file precise reports, Wulf romanticizes the mundane and is at times speculative in her effort to make his scientific missions

sound thrilling. As a result, the book reads more like an adventure novel than a historical biography.

Despite Wulf's gripping prose, her unwavering praise of Humboldt fails to take into account the implications of this sort of narrative. Other scholars have criticized Humboldt as an imperialist wielding scientific tools instead of a sword. Humboldt was a white Protestant man traveling primarily in parts of the Americas under Spanish colonial administration, and despite his anti-imperialist beliefs, his worldview was shaped by these circumstances. Wulf's biography often reports Humboldt's impressions of South America as matters of incontrovertible fact without offering such nuance. By doing so, she casts Humboldt as a hero with the righteousness of science on his side to conquer unknown lands.

To be certain, his work played a pivotal role in the way nineteenth-century Europeans perceived South America. His travel narratives cast him as an adventuring hero, and they helped bring exotic regions of the world into the public consciousness. Mary Louise Pratt has argued that Humboldt kindled the imaginations of his ilk, encouraging further European exploration and involvement in previously distant and foreboding places.

The second part of Wulf's book also loses its captivating pace as it slogs through chapters documenting the travails of the American diplomat George Perkins, writer Henry David Thoreau, naturalist John Muir, and German biologist Ernst Haeckel to show their connections to Humboldt. Some of these relationships are tenuous at best, such as Wulf's claim that Thoreau's *Walden* was a direct answer to Humboldt's landmark 1845 work *Cosmos* based on the fact that Humboldt's 'view of nature gave Thoreau the confidence to weave together science and poetry.' (p.250) These chapters seem unnecessary as Humboldt's influence is well-established in the first half of the book.

Humboldt's achievements in his 89 years of life are dazzling. So too is Wulf's ability to spin at times drab science experiments into a tale of adventure. Although she overlooks the problems of glorifying the Eurocentric vision Humboldt brought back to his home continent, her goal from the start is admittedly to champion the scientist and his accomplishments. The man who inspired Charles Darwin, observed man-made climate change, and wooed crowds of both the elite and general public from Paris to remote parts of the Amazon now has his name plastered on natural features, plants, animals and institutions around the world – including, together with his brother Wilhelm, the Humboldt University in Berlin. The popularity of Wulf's biography will mean that a new generation of readers will remember Humboldt as one of the greatest European thinkers of his time.

What is Global History?

By Sebastian Conrad, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. 312, Hardcover, £22.95, ISBN: 9780691155258

REVIEWED BY DARIA TASHKINOVA

Daria Tashkinova completed her undergraduate degree in Area Studies at Ural Federal University (Russia) in 2014, focusing on history and politics of Eastern and Central Europe. The same year she started an MA in Global History at both Free University and Humboldt University of Berlin. Her research interests include economic, social and gender history of the late Soviet Union; transnational labour migrations; history of imperialism; gender and education history.

If you type the word 'global' into the world's largest search engine Google, approximately 1.6 billion results will appear on the screen. The last twenty to twenty-five years, following the rise of globalization, has seen a period in which the term "global" has become a trend that has influenced almost every sphere of human life.

In a world where global has become the synonym of all that is modern and up-to-date, this trend has not left history and academia out of its influence. Histories with a 'global' prefix have been appearing in academia since the late 1990s: global intellectual history, global urban history, global history of ideas, etc. While some scholars are enjoying the obvious bloom of these new approaches, others might still be wandering in the darkness of uncertainty regarding what the core ambition of global history actually is. Historical methodology has already seen the rise of world history, transnational history, and international history. Is "global" just a new way to address the same issues using a new terminology? Should global history be considered just another response to the challenges of globalization and an attempt by historians to stay relevant in a fast-changing world?

In his new book *"What is Global History?"* Sebastian Conrad, one of the leading historians in the field and a professor of Global History at Free University of Berlin, confronts the existing narratives of global history and pursues the creation of a systematized guidebook to global history. Conrad is not the first historian to work on methodology and approaches to global history. Most notable of previous efforts is an edited volume titled *"Writing the History of the Global"*, in which leading historians in the field, including John Darwin and Kenneth Pomeranz, were re-thinking approaches to history in an increasingly global world. Their obvious response was to embrace global history as the new approach. However, Conrad appears to be less certain, and while advocating for global history he does not ignore its challenges and limitations. His study, being one of the most recent and productive, consolidates the previously sporadic research on the various problems and apprehensions of this new way to write history.

Conrad clarifies the long-existing differences between global history, globalization and big history, drawing a dividing line between them and creating a special place for global history in the spectrum of various histories. Although he treats global history as an approach in its own right, he nevertheless discusses the previously existing approaches to doing what is now called global history. In Conrad's perspective comparative history, transnational history, postcolonial studies, multiple modernities and world-systems theory have all influenced global historians and can potentially be used for writing a coherent global narrative. The first several chapters of the book are brilliantly structured and are perfectly suited for clarifying the existing approaches. The reader leaves the first five chapters having almost no questions left to ask, and even if they appear, the answers could be easily found in the following chapters that deal with specific categories of time, space and positionality in global history.

Arguably, the best chapter of the book is *"Global history for whom? The politics of Global History"*. Conrad goes beyond history as an academic field and stretches out his argument into the questions of the interdependence of politics and society and history (both global and non-global). He follows the question once stated by Lynn Hunt: "…history is in its crisis and not just of university budgets. The nagging question that has proved so hard to answer is, "What is it good for?"[1] Conrad argues that global history represents not a methodological alternative but a way in which historians can examine the world and therefore become citizens of the world themselves. Historians, accountable to the public today, should thus become the advocates for integration and cooperation in the world, while not debunking the concept of nation-states completely. Conrad therefore tries to create a place for historians in modern society, and global history is perhaps the best tool to use in order for history to rethink itself.

With his usual grace and coherency, Conrad emphasizes the linguistic and geopolitical concerns that many historians have with global history. The difficulties inherent in the concept of Eurocentrism, or to put it more specifically, "westcentrism", shine brighter in the last chapter, as Conrad pushes beyond only addressing this as a historical narrative and cliché (like he did in the earlier chapters). Here he mostly focuses on the questions of eurocentrism and westcentrism in historical studies and academic circles. Including a subchapter on English as the lingua-franca for the academia, and the concerns about the Anglo-Saxon world as being the pioneers of global history and thus leaving no place for the development of global histories in Asia, Latin America or Africa, Conrad once again discusses these questions, without avoiding them completely (as other historians have done). Therefore, his book does not suppress the discussions and concerns of a wider public, but discusses ways in which to address these issues. In this lies one of the most valuable benefits of the book. In a calm and very well-balanced

[1] Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York [u.a.]: Norton, 2014), 1.

argumentative narrative Conrad is not afraid to face the questions and accusations that have been brought to the table by various historians involved in the field. He not only gives his answers to the existing criticisms and concerns but also poses further challenges for new generations of global historians. For example, in the last part of chapter ten, he emphasizes four challenges caused by limitation of the «global» as a concept (p. 224-230), therefore pointing to the future global history and proposing ways in which historians can write themselves into new narratives.

As Conrad argues throughout his book, global history is not a universal remedy from all the problems in historical research. However, it can potentially give incredible insights into the world of previously unknown interactions and entanglements. Conrad presents a wonderfully structured and researched narrative of global history, mapping out the potential problems and presenting his own solutions. The conclusions and chapters written make this study a well-suited guidebook for newcomers, as well as offering fresh perspectives and suggestions for the scholars already active in the field. Moreover, Conrad has successfully written an informative book, which will be a great inspiration for many more generations of historians to come. Even if we remain uncertain about the future of global history as a legitimate field, in this text Conrad manages to get out of the box and speak for historians as academics, giving new suggestions on how to deal with long-standing problems. *"What is Global History?"* shows that there is light at the end of the tunnel for historians who seem to believe that "the End of History" is approaching.

The Polar Regions: An Environmental History

By Adrian Howkins, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016. Pp. 248, Hardback, £20, ISBN 978-0-7456-7080-5

REVIEWED BY WILLEM VAN GEEL

Willem graduated magna cum laude from University College Utrecht in 2014, where he studied Liberal Arts & Sciences and specialized in history, philosophy and international relations. Since then, he has pursued his transnational research interests by undertaking an MA in Global History at both Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and Freie Universität Berlin. He is currently in the process of writing his MA thesis on Antarctica in twentieth-century global history.

Antarctic sealers caused Russians to lose interest in Alaska by 1867; the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty influenced the Antarctic Treaty System; and the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska made Antarctica the most protected environment on the planet. These are just three of the intriguing connections Adrian Howkins draws between the far north and the far south in his latest publication. As an expert on mid-twentieth century Antarctic history, Howkins has now expanded his view to the north and written his most ambitious work yet. *The Polar Regions* presents pioneering research that studies the interconnectedness of the Polar Regions – as well as other parts of the world – by applying an environmental history approach. This approach leads Howkins to balance the interplay between material environments, human perceptions thereof, and human actions, to present a fresh reevaluation of polar history in an interconnected world. Throughout this short but concise story that deals with a wide range of periods, themes, and perspectives, the author has cleverly interwoven three arguments: (i) histories of the Arctic and Antarctic are enriched by studying them together; (ii) these histories offer good opportunities to think about important environmental themes; (iii) and these histories are marked by contrast and contradiction, not offering simple messages of positive and negative.

Howkins' environmental history is told through six rich chapters divided by theme as well as chronology. "Myth and History" explores polar history before 1800 and links the far north and the far south through their status in mythologies. Furthermore, by blurring the lines between myth (imagined constructions) and history (actual events), it shows how culture and human perception construct understandings of place and political power. "Scarcity and Abundance" looks at the development of both subsistence and commercial hunting of seals and whales up to the twentieth century to illustrate how material environments shaped human actions in polar history. Howkins links sealing and whaling not only to global markets, but also to debates on resource frontiers and uses Garrett Hardin's *tragedy of the commons* concept as an analytical tool throughout. Howkins directly

contributes to the wider debates on this postwar concept in applying it to a period and context in which it rarely appears.[1] Here, more so than in later chapters, he successfully showcases the versatile applicability of the term.

"Nature Conquered, Nature Unconquered" examines how the same institutions and even the same individuals were involved in the exploration of both poles, taking experience from one side of the world to the other. It also describes the disastrous effects the environment could have on the bodies of explorers and firmly roots this story in imperialist projects. "Dreams and Realities" is likewise based on environmental histories of imperialism but investigates the early twentieth century visions of economic development of the Polar Regions. It uses the debate surrounding Vilhjalmur Stefansson's notion of an inhabitable and "friendly Arctic" to critically reevaluate imperial visions as diverse as Richard Byrd's Little America base in Antarctica, the international coal mining in Spitsbergen, South American nationalist claims to Antarctica, and Danish administration in Greenland. Together, these two chapters speak to the existing literature on the links between environmental and imperial history. They directly refer to the work of historians such as Christina Adcock and Edward J. Larson, but could just as easily be connected to that of Richard Drayton or, more specifically, Pascal Schillings.[2] As Howkins indicates in the introduction, studies of the Polar Regions can make valuable contributions to this literature by questioning the very reasoning behind imperialism: "why bother with making sovereignty claims to an unproductive expanse of ice?" (p. 13).

The remaining two chapters move into the post-WWII period. "War and Peace" considers how communism and capitalism competed for superior displays of environmental authority in the highly militarized Arctic and relatively peaceful Antarctic during the Cold War. It uses the strongly diverging environmental outcomes of this era – the pollution and destruction in the Arctic on the one hand and the lack thereof in the Antarctic on the other – to challenge environmental determinism. Finally, "Preservation and Exploitation" shows how environmental issues such as resource extraction, climate change, and polar tourism have increasingly shaped the political histories of the Polar Regions over the last few decades. Interestingly, here Howkins highlights the difficult role indigenous Arctic communi-

[1] The term was first popularized by Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162 (1968): 1243-1248. For a starting point into the literature on the concept, see Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor Ostrom, "Traditions and Trends in the Study of the Commons," *International Journal of the Commons* 1 (2007): 3-28.

[2] Christina Adcock, "Tracing Warm Lines: Northern Canadian Exploration, Knowledge, and Memory, 1905-1965" (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2010); Edward J. Larson, *An Empire of Ice: Scott, Shackleton, and the Heroic Age of Antarctic Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); for Richard Drayton, for example see *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the "Improvement" of the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); for Pascal Schillings, see "First at the South Pole: the production of geographical 'matters of fact' during the Norwegian Antarctic expedition, 1910-12," *Historical Social Research* 40 (2015): 219-238.

ties find themselves in when they get caught between economic developers and environmental activists. He also further investigates the close links between the far north and the far south as the influence of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on banning all mining and marine pollution in Antarctica so powerfully shows.

The chapter titles clearly illustrate Howkins' third central claim: polar history is marked by contradiction. This is additionally emphasized throughout each chapter as we are often reminded of the presence of indigenous human communities in the Arctic and their absence in the Antarctic as well as the current popular image of the Polar Regions which directly links icy environments to a warming planet. The strongest contrast however is the repeated presentation of the Polar Regions as a scarce, wild, and unspoiled environment with the promise of abundance, power, and spoils in the future. At times, this constant creation of dichotomies starts to feel exaggerated and the recurring imagery of light and darkness simply forced. Polar tourism appears as one of the few human activities to exist in a grey zone for both exploiting polar environments and raising awareness and money for their preservation. This is easily one of the most fascinating discussions found in the book and it would have been fruitful and relevant to his central aims if Howkins had further expanded on this line of discussion.

In fact, other parts of the book would also have benefited from more elaboration. Each of the chapters tells an intricate and decades-spanning history in a mere 20 to 30 pages, whereas these might well warrant full books by themselves. It is a testament to Howkins' skills as a researcher and historian that he largely succeeds in presenting a convincing environmental history of the Polar Regions in merely 188 pages. Although he does not explicitly reflect on this, Howkins can therefore be placed among the growing number of historians who embrace longue durée approaches – recalling David Armitage and Jo Guldi's plea from 2014 or even Sebastian Conrad's recent observations.[3] While this forces Howkins to argue as concisely and clearly as possible – and he does this admirably – it also leads to some inevitable omissions. Omissions are certainly to be expected from an ambitious study like this one, but some still form a reason for surprise as the reader would have expected their inclusion. One such notable exclusion is the role of nineteenth-century fiction in shaping the environmental perceptions of polar explorers and policymakers. For examples, just think of Shelley's *Frankenstein*, Poe's *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket*, and Melville's *Moby-Dick*.

Furthermore, some of the topics that are included would have deserved more attention or nuance. The first chapter for instance does a good job of criticizing European primacy in Antarctic history and mentioning alternatives to European modern scientific creation stories in polar history, but these alternatives are largely left unexplored. At times Howkins seems to be calling for alternative narratives

[3] See David Armitage and Jo Guldi, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

rather than providing them or simply leaves the reader wondering how he expects others to pick up on these narratives. Additionally, the first chapter does not discuss its claim that Captain Thaddeus von Bellingshausen was the first to sight Antarctica, while a specialist like Howkins should at least have pointed to the ongoing debate about the first sighting of the continent. Similarly, his portrayal of 1950s Antarctica seems rather simplistic for an expert such as himself. His account of the Antarctic Treaty dedicating the continent to peace and science for instance appears more triumphalist than in his previous work. Moreover, he flat out ignores recent studies that have questioned the influence of scientific cooperation during the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 on the treaty negotiations.

Despite these issues, Howkins is careful not to lean too much towards a certain side in addressing larger debates as he there again emphasizes contrasts and contradictions. This becomes the most apparent in the conclusion, which is entitled "Geographies of Despair and Hope". For Howkins, over-exploitation of resources, pollution, and climate change give reason for despair, while recovering seal populations, far-reaching environmental protection measures, and climate research foster hope. Although his claim that both perspectives are needed to prevent declensionist narratives from leading to paralysis or triumphalist ones leading to hubris and his desire to emphasize these contradictions in order to create space for constructive discussion are appealing, he again overplays the dichotomy. Howkins would have done well to elaborate on how he imagines these sharply distinct narratives to grow more connected or on what constructive discussion could take place in the space between them.

Ultimately though, this approach helps Howkins to steer clear of preaching either on behalf of environmental activists or that of business interests, which in itself is impressive considering the highly politicized topics he deals with. He maintains an academic tone throughout the book that is both engaged and distant enough to analyze this material. Therefore, his analysis might help some to make up their minds about a desirable future for the Polar Regions, but will fall short for those who have made up their minds already. The conclusion that both declensionist and triumphalist narratives of polar history can contribute to another is ultimately persuasive at its core and it might be unfair to expect Howkins to have all the answers and nuances as historians are only just opening up this field. This book then should be read as introducing new directions of research for the polar historian. It contains enough information to be educational and enough ambition to be inspirational to the general reader and the polar expert alike. Not only is *The Polar Regions* a convincing new take on polar history, it is also the most global history of the Arctic and the Antarctic yet.

Future Projects

Blog and History on Tape

Dear Reader,

We hope that you have enjoyed this, our second issue of the Global History Student Journal. We would now like to take a moment to let you know about two new up and coming projects which we have recently launched - the Global History Student Blog and the web series History on Tape, both of which will be available online. Both of these projects have been developed by many of the same students who have been involved in working on both Global Histories: A Student Journal and the Global History Student Conferences, with the addition of many more new associated students from Berlin and beyond.

The Global History Student Blog was first conceived in April 2015 as a way to include material that could not, for either stylistic or technical reasons, be included in either the journal or the conference projects. To this end the blog's aim is to provide a useful tool for students of Global History to gain both information about relevant recent books, debates, questions, individuals, projects, and events; and to create an entry point for students to directly contribute to the conversations surrounding these fields. The blog is therefore conceived as a platform for students of Global History to interact both with each other and with information relevant to the field. The reasoning behind this particular project as with its affiliated sister projects is first and foremost to demonstrate the strength and value of student work, and to highlight the potential of student-driven initiatives. In particular the Global History Student Blog aims to highlight these virtues in innovative new formats, such as short form articles, interviews and podcasts. Furthermore and in line with this aspiration the blog seeks to create an online space for students of Global History to discuss, submit and develop ideas, in an environment which does not seek to alienate them, and will encourage communication between all participants regardless of their educational background and affiliation. Additionally the blog aims to incorporate new digital media, such as audio-visual material, in order to demonstrate alternative pedagogic approaches, promote broader engagement with historical discussions and create a network of young scholars interested in the field of Global History.

History on Tape is new series which has been developed by student of the Global History Masters in Berlin, which seeks to deliver detailed interviews with historians about both their teaching and research. Initially conceived in April 2016 this series places cutting edge historians into the limelight allowing them to discuss their work openly and in detail. This series, which will be available to watch online or to download as a podcast, seeks to explore the contemporary scholarly landscape and provide a new and accessible format for students to gain access to notable and significant recent historical study. To this end this project seeks to further student's access to historians, and similarly historian's access to a wider

public. Like the Global History Student Blog, History on Tape aims to use new technology as a means towards advancing alternative approaches to presenting historical work.

If you'd like to find out more about these projects visit us at.

http://www.global-history.de
http://twitter.com/historyontape
http://www.facebook.com/historyontape/