Global histories

a student journal

volume v
issue 2
2019

Global histories: a student journal

Volume 5, Issue 2 (2019) ISSN: 2366-780X

EDITOR

Alina Rodríguez

EDITORIAL BOARD

PUBLISHER INFORMATION

Founded in 2015 by students of the M.A. program Global History at Freie Uni- versität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Global Histories is a Berlin based bi-annual journal published in association with the Freie Universität Berlin.

Freie Universität Berlin
Global Histories: A Student Journal Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut
Koserstraße 20
14195 Berlin

SPONSORS

This journal project is realized with generous support from Freie Universität Berlin, specifically from the Center for Global History of the Friedrich-Meinecke- Institut, the OJS e-publishing project at CeDiS, and the ZEDAT hostmaster team.

PUBLICATION FREQUENCY

The journal is published twice yearly in spring and autumn. Please see the website for further details.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, Global Histories: a Student Journal aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

COPYRIGHT AND PUBLICATION DATES

This issue was published on November, 2019.

PEER REVIEW STATUS AND ETHICS

This journal provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. All articles which appear in this issue, with the exception of editorial content, were subject to peer review.

CONTACT INFORMATION

For librarians to submit information or questions about the bibliographic history and publication title, please contact the editor at: admin@globalhistories.com.

For more information, please consult our website www.globalhistories.com or email admin@globalhistories.com

1 Research articles

2 Public history

edited by Ben Miller

3 Methodology

4 Reviews

Dear reader,

Empires are very much alive, at least in the historiographical constellation that constitutes the autumn issue of this journal. More than empires: the imperial. The imperial entails the empires that were officially dismantled after wars, but also the ones that never existed de iure; the conditions that led to their creations and their demises, and the aftermath, the consequences of their existence still part of our own worlds, on plain sight or cleverly concealed between oblivion and normalization.

In this issue we present to you just a part of the myriad of angles that engage with history of empire and the imperial—past shapes, patterns, relations and continuities—while also reflecting on how history writing itself can mimic, more that it is aware of, gestures from past historiographies which were actively committed to sustain imperial projects. In the methodology section of this issue, Benjamin Gaillard reflects on the concept of empire, the scope and limits of its use for global history. Luis De la Peña proposes comparison as an effective tool to understand fragmenting empires, arguing that the Colombian and the Greek independence movements during the age of Revolutions have more in common than the appear at first glance. In the Public History section there is a reflection on the aftermath of 'the imperial' with articles from Christian Jacobs and Paul Sprute on the Berlin Postkolonial tours that try to problematize Germany's colonizing past still inscribed in the city, as in street names or gardens. Freya Schwachenwald critically assesses the alternative forms of knowledge—within art production—that have been proposed in the face of epistemological, environmental and colonial violence.

On the research articles section, Harry Edwards and Julia Boechat tackle the cultural networds and art circulation in two different settings. Edwards deals with batida, a genre of electronic dance music from Lisbon, and its ties with African-diaspora identity from 1990s. Boechat studies Bulgakov's novel The Master and Margarita looking at its distribution and reception in the USSR. Florian Wieser analyzes the operation of the gender-race matrix in the Spanish empire from the

discourses on masculinity in the others they encountered during the 16th century expansion campaigns. Mirjam Limbrunner looks closely at the history of Socialist Zionism to try to understand one of the many historical layers of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In the final section of the journal we have included the book and conference reviews, all of them have been published or taken place within the past year.

As in past editions of this journal, the articles cover a vast region of academic areas. Chronologically, geographically and methodologically different from each other, they all share two traits. The first is that all articles, essays and reviews are written by students. The second one is that they are deeply committed with writing history in a thorough and critical way.

We hope you enjoy this issue.

Best regards,

The Global histories editorial team

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to acknowledge the work and interest of all students who submitted an article, essay or review during the last call for papers and are especially grateful to the authors published in this edition with whom we have had an extensive and fruitful collaboration throughout the production of this journal: Harry Edwards, Julia Boechat Machado, Florian Wieser, Freya Schwachenwald, Luis Alfredo De la Peña, Benjamin Gaillard, Christian Jacobs and Mirjam Limbrunner.

We would also like to acknowledge the dedicated work of the editorial board, this journal could not be realized without their committed contributions: David A. Bell, Joseph Biggerstaff, Jack Clarke, Diego Dannemiller, Daniela Greca, Daniel Hinchey, Natasha Klimenko, Nele Küüts, Ben Miller, Peder Østebo, Lisa Phongsavath, Kian J. Riedel, Sam Plumb, Marjory Ruiz, Billy Sawyers, Paul Sprute, Mary Walle and Lara Wankel.

We would also like to thank Oscar Broughton and Marília Arantes for their contributions as reviewers for this issue.

Finally, we are grateful for the continued support and assistance for this project by the Freie Universität Berlin, particularly the Global History faculty, chaired by Prof. Dr. Sebastian Conrad, and the Online Journal Systems team at CeDiS.

1

Resea

a

rch

rticles

Musical *Lusofonia* and the African-Diaspora in Postcolonial Portugal: *Batida* and Lisbon as a Global Cultural Capital

by
HARRY EDWARDS

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the role of music as an agent of change in Portugal since the 1990s, using batida, an African-diaspora inspired and created electronic dance music from Lisbon, as a case study. Using music as a focal point, it will analyse postcolonial discourses around Portuguese national identity and the status of the African-diaspora community within Portuguese society. The paper will seek to address whether it is possible to transform unequal cultural and linguistic relations established under colonialism into new egalitarian and multicultural urban spaces and cultures. It argues that while the agency of African-diaspora artists is greater than has previously been acknowledged, structural constraints of poverty and racism still undermine the extent to which the postcolonial Portuguese national identity has shifted to truly embrace its African-diaspora population.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Harry is currently completing his master's degree in Global History at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Since starting the MA Global History program, his research focus has been on music in history and how it intersects with power, politics and identity in post-colonial contexts. He is particularly interested in how different forms of electronic dance music transfer, translate and transform as they travel around the world.

> "As a portuguese Girl living in a foreign country i Can't be more Proud of my country for showing to the World our multicultural roots with those African beats with these Amazing artists and giving them the spotlight they deserve. We don't forget about you,you guys are part of our history/ culture and we love you Cap vert,Angola,Mozambique,Sao Tomé, Guinée-Bissau and Timor oriental. Africa and Portugal united♡" – valoo2807, 2018.[1]

As vivid red light engulfed the stage of Lisbon's *Altice Arena*, a man dressed all in white is revealed to the twenty-thousand capacity crowd gathered for the 63rd edition of the *Eurovision Song Contest*. Scheduled to perform just after the overwhelming sonic smorgasbord of the main contest, João Barbosa (better known by his artist alias *Branko*)— the man dressed all in white—starts to play his melodic electronic beats for the night's interval act. 2018 was the first time Portugal had hosted the world's largest music event and the interval performance was one of the main platforms the organisers had to stamp their own mark on the event. Rather than remain within the traditional musical paradigm of *Eurovision* however, the Portuguese planners decided to share a very different musical offering with the estimated 186 million viewers tuning in from around the world.[2] The performance was notable because unlike most *Eurovision* performances, it blended together several musical styles originating from migrant and African-diaspora communities in Lisbon. Since the 1990s, an increasing number of young artists from predominantly disadvantaged diaspora communities have created new types of music inspired by various musical styles from Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP), their material conditions in postcolonial Lisbon, and other global youth cultures, primarily electronic dance music and hip hop. Fernando Arenas claims that the dissemination of these artists' music has fundamentally changed popular culture in Lisbon, be that in everyday language, fashion trends or in the city's nightlife.[3] It seemed somewhat apt, therefore, that the interval performance at *Eurovision 2018* was sound-tracked by Lisbon born veteran DJ and producer *Branko*, famous for his role in the band *Buraka Som Sistema* who popularised Angolan *kuduro* music around the world, alongside three Lisbon based vocalists all of Cape

1 Comment by *YouTube* user valoo2807 on Eurovision Song Contest, "Interval Act: Branko & Sara Tavares / Dino D'Santiago / Mayra Andrade – Eurovision 2018." *YouTube Video*, May 15, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1w1lLjEeDw0.

2 Evert Groot, "186 Million Viewers for the 2018 Eurovision Song Contest," *Eurovision.tv*, May 23, 2018. https://eurovision.tv/story/186-million-viewers-2018-eurovision-song-contest.

3 Fernando Arenas, "Migration and the Rise of African Lisbon: Time-Space of Portuguese (Post)colonialit,." *Postcolonial Studies* 18, no. 4 (2015): 159-160.

Verdean descent: Sara Tavares, Dino D'Dantiago and Mayra Andrade. The inclusion of African-diaspora musicians as representatives of Portugal on such a prominent stage is testament to the country's increasing emphasis on diversity as a part of Portuguese national identity.

Left under the official video of the *Eurovision 2018* interval performance, valoo2807's *YouTube* comment quoted above is illustrative of a developing postcolonial Portuguese identity that embraces multiculturalism domestically and historic ties to Portugal's former colonies abroad.[4] While seemingly well-intentioned, the comment is nonetheless tone-deaf to a longer history of colonial inequalities and racism in Portugal. Jorge de la Barre and Bart Vanspauwen argue that it can "neither be discarded nor asserted" that *lusofonia*, the idea alluded to by valoo2807 that the Portuguese-speaking world shares a unique cultural and historical bond that should be celebrated and strengthened, is "a mere extension of Portugal's imperial dream in the postcolonial age."[5] However, *lusofonia* is a contested ideology in itself which cannot be purely defined as an elite project. The fact that *Branko* was made the designated performer by the Portuguese *Eurovision* organising committee demonstrates the national significance that music originating from Lisbon's African-diaspora communities has gained. This is testament to the ability of the music and those who make and support it to insert themselves into and alter popular conceptions of *lusofonia*. However, the choice of Branko, who is White, as the central artist of the performance is also indicative of the limits of official expressions of lusofonia.

After first analysing postcolonial discourses around Portuguese national identity and the status of the African-diaspora community within Portuguese society, this paper will thoroughly investigate the role of music as an agent of change in Portugal since the 1990s. In doing so, it will seek to address whether it is possible to transform unequal cultural and linguistic relations established under colonialism into new egalitarian and multicultural urban spaces and cultures? This is an important question for researchers, not only in Portugal, but across Europe as changing demographics alter postcolonial European identities.[6] This paper will supplement the existing literature by using the underutilised case study of *batida*, the African-diaspora inspired and created electronic dance music from Lisbon in the 2000s and 2010s.[7]

4 Ibid., 358.

5 Jorge de la Barre and Bart Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'? Music Scenes and the Imagination of Lisbon," *The World of Music New Series* 2 (2013): 119, 125; 139-140.

6 Derek Pardue, *Cape Verde, Let's Go: Creole Rappers and Citizenship in Portugal* (University of Illinois Press, 2015), 11.

7 For an insightful overview of contemporary electronic dance music in Lisbon alongside a general history see Sam Backer, "Afro-Lisbon and the Lusophone Atlantic: Dancing Toward

Using a mixture of secondary sources and primary reporting on Lisbon's music scene, this paper will argue that the agency of African-diaspora artists is greater than has been acknowledged in the existing historiography, thanks in part to the democratising effects of the internet. Nevertheless, structural constraints of poverty and racism still undermine the extent to which postcolonial Portuguese national identity has shifted to truly embrace its African-diaspora population.

LUSOTROPICALISM, *LUSOFONIA* AND MIGRATION

Portugal at the tail end of the Twentieth Century had to fundamentally recalibrate its national identity and foreign policy. The 1974 Carnation Revolution, decolonisation, migration from the ex-colonies, and European Union membership in 1986 had drastically altered Portuguese society, economy and its image of itself.[8] By the 1990s, nearly all discussions of national history, culture and identity had focused around asserting the Portuguese's unique facility to promote cross-cultural exchange and fusion between different world cultures. However, these new discourses came imbued with considerable imperialist baggage that represented a failure to critically engage with Portugal's colonial legacy.[9] Animated by the classic tropes of Portuguese national identity—sea, earth, homeland and language—key components of colonial-era *lusotropicalism* were recycled back into the contemporary political zeitgeist in the form of *lusofonia*.[10] António de Oliveira Salazar's authoritarian colonial government had adopted *lusotropicalism* as its official foreign policy for Portugal's remaining African colonies from the 1950s until its demise in 1974.[11] Theorised by Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre, the novelty of *lusotropicalism* was that it forwarded a positive interpretation of Portuguese colonialism that emphasised Portugal's supposedly less repressive rule, enlightened culture and higher levels of miscegenation when compared to other European colonisers. While the official advocacy of *lusotropicalism* was abandoned after 1974 by subsequent democratically elected governments in Portugal, a similar sense of inherent cultural exceptionalism

the Future," *Afropop Worldwide* [Podcast audio], September 8, 2016. http://afropop.org/audio-programs/afro-lisbon-and-the-lusophone-atlantic-dancing-towards-the-future.

8 Miguel Vale de Almeida, "Portugal's Colonial Complex: From Colonial Lusotropicalism to Postcolonial Lusophony," *Paper Presented at Queen's Postcolonial Research Forum*, Queen's University, Belfast, April 2008. http://miguelvaledealmeida.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/portugals-colonial-complex.pdf, 8 and Timothy Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia: Multiculturalism and National Identity in Lisbon's 1998 Musical Scene," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 11, no. 2 (2002): 163.

9 Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia," 163 and Almeida, "Portugal's Colonial Complex," 8.

10 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 121 and 123.

11 Almeida, "Portugal's Colonial Complex," 1.

continued to inform Portuguese attitudes towards its former colonies.[12] Despite the widespread popularity of Brazilian music and television having a more significant role in creating a postcolonial *lusophone* imagination, that did not stop Portuguese politicians and cultural institutions in the 1990s more confidently asserting the centrality of Lisbon as the cultural apex of the Portuguese-speaking world.[13] The 1990s would subsequently prove to be a vital decade in both solidifying and increasing the visibility of *lusofonia*. The decade saw not only the hosting of the *World Exposition (Expo '98)* in Lisbon and the formation of the *Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP*) commonly known as the Portuguese Commonwealth, but it also saw the concept of *lusofonia* taken up by journalists, politicians, non-governmental institution and scholars.[14]

The historical origins of *lusofonia* can therefore be found in Portuguese colonialism. Nevertheless, migration from Portugal's former colonies has changed the emphasis of the concept.[15] Since the Fifteenth Century, migration out of Portugal, mainly to its colonies or elsewhere in Europe, had been higher than inward migration. However, in the 1960s and 1970s this started to change.[16] The first notable increase in immigration started in the 1960s as thousands of Cape Verdeans were recruited to fill burgeoning labour shortages in the metropole caused by conscription to the colonial wars and high rates of emigration. As with later non-White migrants, these peoples' economic activity was mainly restricted to construction and low-skilled employment. Nevertheless, this marked the first steps in what Angolan writer José Eduardo Agualusa would later celebrate as the "re-Africanisation of Lisbon," referring to the city's ten percent African population during the early-modern period.[17] Decolonisation in the 1970s would again alter Portugal's demographic make-up, only this time much more radically. Over half a million Portuguese nationals would migrate into Portugal from the former colonies in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation. This accounted for over 5% of the total Portuguese population at that time. While most of the predominantly White *retornados* were able to integrate relatively seamlessly into mainstream Portuguese society, along with later groups of migrants

12 Ibid, 3.
13 Isabel Ferin Cunha, Stuart Davis, and Joseph Straubhaar, "The construction of a transnational Lusophone media space: A historiographic analysis," *Popular Communication* 14, no. 4 (2016): 212-213.
14 Bart Vanspauwen, "The (R)Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon." MA diss., Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2010. https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/5681/1/bart.pdf, 13-16. Vanspauwen's argument is repeated in Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 132-133.
15 Vanspauwen, "The (R)Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 16.
16 Arenas, "Migration and the Rise of African Lisbon," 354.
17 Ibid., 354 and 359.

from PALOP countries in the 1980s and 1990s, non-White migrants faced systematic discrimination.[18] Common with other postcolonial European countries, Portugal sought migrants to boost its economy and allay its low demographic growth, yet those same migrants habitually faced prejudice and racism.[19]

Fed by latent *lusotropicalist* assumptions, statements on the non-racist character of the Portuguese are hegemonic in mainstream discourses.[20] All the while, migrants and diaspora communities from the PALOP are disproportionately confronted with social exclusion, economic exploitation, restrictions to citizenship and substandard living conditions.[21] Pedro Gomes, a founding member of the influential Lisbon record label *Príncipe Records*, argued in an interview with online music publication *Resident Advisor* that Portugal "didn't do ghettos the way New York City did ghettos." The Portuguese government "put these people in the middle of fucking nowhere, sometimes with no roads to connect them to civilisation." It was this isolation he reasons that has fuelled levels of distrust between African-diaspora communities and mainstream Portuguese society.[22]

The issue of citizenship for children of migrants born in Portugal has exacerbated issues of distrust and economic deprivation even further. Denied Portuguese passports under the *jus sanguinis* citizenship policies established by the 1981 *Portuguese Nationality Law*, these people were economically and socially barred from accessing the state, despite living their whole lives in Portugal. While the law was amended in the summer of 2018, the damage of decades of legal uncertainty has left the relationship between the Portuguese state and many in African-diaspora communities irreconcilable ruined.[23] Portugal's migratory history is thus inextricably linked to its colonial history, with many of the same racial inequalities under colonialism reflected back into cities such as Lisbon.[24] Consequently, *lusofonia* cannot only be assessed as a concept to understand cultural exchanges between Portugal and its former colonies, but also as a domestic category that tries to grapple with an increasingly diverse country.

18 Ibid., 355.
19 Ibid., 356-357 and Etienne Mullet, Neto Félix and Maria Conceiçao Pinto, "Can music reduce anti-dark-skin prejudice? A test of a cross-cultural musical education programme," *Psychology of Music* 44, no. 3 (2016): 389.
20 Arenas, "Migration and the Rise of African Lisbon," 358.
21 Almeida, "Portugal's Colonial Complex," 9.
22 Ryan Keeling, "The Ghetto Sound of Lisbon," *residentadvisor.net*, March 10, 2014. https://www.residentadvisor.net/features/2021.
23 Ana Rita Gil, "Amendments to the Portuguese Nationality Law – Towards an (even) More Inclusive Citizenship." *globalcit.eu*, August 1, 2018. http://globalcit.eu/amendments-to-the-portuguese-nationality-law-towards-an-even-more-inclusive-citizenship/.
24 Arenas, "Migration and the Rise of African Lisbon," 354.

MUSIC AND THE POSTCOLONIAL *LUSOPHONE* WORLD

The 2008 economic crash and Eurozone debt crisis hit Portugal particularly hard. The Portuguese government's subsequent acceptance of international financial assistance on the condition of enacting austerity significantly exacerbated social inequality in the country. In this context, Portugal's out-migration overtook in-migration once again. To a much greater extent than other former colonial European countries, many Portuguese emigrants intriguingly decided to relocate to former Portuguese colonies, particularly Brazil and Angola.[25] Powerful diaspora connections and the trade in Portuguese-language cultural goods over time has consolidated a social space around which *lusofonia* could be imagined.[26] Nevertheless, as Barre and Vanspauwen argue, it was with music that *lusofonia* found its most natural expression with Lisbon as its epicentre. Historically the performance of various *lusophone* musical styles has taken place in Lisbon. Simultaneously, music provides a useful platform with which to explore age-old Portuguese cultural fascinations such as sea, discovery and homeland. Unlike other mediums, music also provides a way to communicate and engage culturally with the wider *lusophone* world, as well as acting as a tool with which to understand an increasingly multicultural Portugal.[27] However, in the formative stages of what will be referred to from now on as *musical lusofonia*, the concept was characterised by appropriation and one-sided exploitation of cultural capital.

An indicative example of the one-sided relationship established under a *musical lusofonia* framework was Lisbon's *Expo '98*. Timed to coincide with the quincentennial of the Portuguese 'discoveries', the exposition provided the Portuguese government with a prominent stage on which to promote their capital as a modern European city and as an important link between Europe, South America and Africa.[28] The musical programming at *Expo '98*—one of the main draws of the festivities—aimed to magnify Lisbon's global cultural significance based on its historic role as a colonial metropolis, its European connections and its reputation as a haven for *lusophone* culture.[29] However, the musical messaging at *Expo '98* rarely transcended essentialist framings of Portuguese national identity. Despite the official rhetoric praising cultural and musical fusion,

25 Ibid., 356.
26 Vanspauwen, "The (R)Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 13 and Cunha, Davis, and Straubhaar, "The construction of a transnational Lusophone media space," 212 -213.
27 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 119 and 139-140.
28 Details on *Expo '98* from Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia," 163 and Vanspauwen, "The (R) Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 21.
29 Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia," 163-164 and 169.

Portuguese music was consistently presented as strictly White, while music from the PALOP was reserved only for the smaller stages and migrant communities were priced out from attending.[30] Timothy Sieber poignantly argues that the *musical lusofonia* on display at *Expo '98* was fundamentally hierarchical, defining Portuguese music and Lisbon as the universal agent, influencing music from elsewhere, but never being influenced by them in return.[31] Indeed, this would become a recurring theme of how *musical lusofonia* was presented in the aftermath of the exposition.[32]

It was not until the influential release of Red Bull Music Academy's (RBMA) 2006 documentary *Lusofonia: a (R)Evolução*, that *musical lusofonia* became a more clearly defined concept.[33] The film starts by insisting contemporary musical movements in Lisbon such as *kuduro* and *kizomba* are just the newest expression of a five-hundred-year-old cultural relationship emerging from Portuguese colonialism. Against the dark backdrop of slavery, colonial wars and racism, the documentary suggests that "music and dancing were [positive] elements of integration." The press release for the documentary gleefully continues that in the Twenty-First Century we are witnessing a new generation for whom "a *lusophone* streak is finally assumed in the creative sphere." The stated aim of the film was to "awaken" Portugal's media and cultural institutions to the "commercial potential lying in the Lisbon music movement" that "radiates" unique traits, whether rhythmic, melodic or lyrical which "epitomise, by way of sounds, five centuries of joint history in the territories which today share the Portuguese language."[34] Barre and Vanspauwen persuasively argue that RBMA insufficiently demonstrates how the groups of diverging sounds featured from Portugal, Brazil and the PALOP necessarily belong together under the banner of *lusofonia*. Indeed, they accuse the documentary makers of constructing a *musical lusofonia* movement and revolution "from scratch" in order to justify RBMA's commercial goals.[35] Nevertheless, they implicitly seem to agree with the film's central aim, arguing that "official support is required in order for this musical fusion to gain the visibility it warrants."[36] Underlying Barre and Vanspauwen's claim are questions around globalisation and visibility in a global cultural marketplace. They quote *EMI* record-label boss

30 Ibid., 170-171.
31 Ibid., 168.
32 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 125-126.
33 Ibid., 119.
34 The Press Kit released to accompany the documentary *Lusofonia: a (R)Evolução*, as quoted in Barbara Alge, "Lusofonia, a (R) Evolução: Discourses of Atlantic Roots and Routes in Luso World Music," *norient*, March 6, 2015. https://norient.com/academic/alge2013/.
35 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 119, 121, 128-129 and 131-132, and Vanspauwen, "The (R)Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 47.
36 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 119.

David Ferreira from *Lusofonia: a (R) Evolução*, when he says *lusofonia* "might be a vital space for [marketing music from Portugal], if we become bigger, we'll survive as a culture." Otherwise he claims, "we'll disappear, we'll be second-rate Spaniards, or fourth or fifth-rate Americans or whatever."[37] Therefore, *musical lusofonia* must be understood in relation to changing economic and social condition due to globalisation which makes it increasingly difficult for small countries like Portugal to be seen on a global stage, irrespective of their historical influence.[38]

LISBON – THE GLOBAL CULTURAL CAPITAL

In the 2000s and 2010s, Portuguese cultural institutions and Lisbon's tourism industry increasingly promoted the city as a unique city of culture, musical fusion and nightlife.[39] Indeed, efforts to increase awareness and improve the brand image of the city have proven to be remarkably successful. Numerous foreign publications have covered Lisbon as one of the coolest cities to visit in Europe. "12 Reasons to Love Lisbon" in *Forbes* (2016), "23 Reasons Why Lisbon Should be Your Next City Break" in *The Telegraph* (2018) and "7 Reasons Lisbon Could Be the Coolest Capital in Europe" on *CNN* (2017) to name but a few.[40] Another example is the Will Coldwell piece in the *The Guardian's* travel section in 2015, which explicitly focuses on Lisbon's "new clubbing scene." Coldwell discovers in the piece that nightlife in Lisbon has been directly inspired by *batida* artists. Employing important figures from Lisbon's musical landscape such as *Branko*, Pedro Gomes and Angolan-born Pedro Coquenão (more commonly known by his artist pseudonym *Batida*) as guides, he describes a night-out enjoying the delights of several of Lisbon's most lively bars, clubs and major nightspots. "The outdoor drinking culture," Coldwell proclaims, "reinforces the idea that this is a city where people can mix freely." This vibe is "something you rarely experience in a capital, but fits neatly with the collaborative, outward-looking nature of Lisbon's music scene."[41] In the academic

37 Ibid., 132.
38 Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia," 183.
39 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 120.

40 Examples of Lisbon's good publicity in foreign publications: Fiona Dunlop, "7 Reasons Lisbon Could Be Coolest Capital in Europe," *cnn.com*, August 25, 2017. https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/lisbon-coolest-city/index.html; Will Coldwell, "Nightlife Reports: Lisbon's New Clubbing Scene," *theguardian.com*, January 23, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2015/jan/23/lisbon-new-clubbing-scene-nightlife-reports; Ann Abel, "12 Reasons to Love Lisbon," *forbes.com*, August 18, 2016. https://www.forbes.com/sites/annabel/2016/08/18/12-reasons-to-love-lisbon/#7fa589b63b68, Nina Santos, "7 Reasons Why You Should Visit Lisbon at Least Once in Your Lifetime," *theculturetrip.com*, April 29, 2017. https://theculturetrip.com/europe/portugal/articles/7-reasons-why-you-should-visit-lisbon-at-least-once-in-your-lifetime/, and Hugh Morris, "23 Reasons Why Lisbon Should Be Your Next City Break," *telegraph.co.uk*, May 12, 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/portugal/articles/lisbon-portugal-best-city-break/.
41 Coldwell, "Nightlife Reports: Lisbon's New

literature, Arenas forwards more broadly that 'African Lisbon' from the 2000s onwards has become an increasingly "important source of cultural capital for the city… as Africans and their descendants have become woven into the city's social and economic fabric." African restaurants, nightclubs and diasporic urban culture in the form of music "emerges as an integral part of [Lisbon's] appeal."[42] Similarly, Barre and Vanspauwen argue that by promoting Lisbon's diversity as a "source of cultural richness," *lusofonia and musical lusofonia* "eventually become an instrument for the promotion of Lisbon as an open, multicultural city."[43]

In Coldwell's article in *The Guardian*, Coquenão also explains that "Lisbon's relationship with Africa is like London's with Jamaica," as it is from "those places [that music] gets translated for a European audience."[44] His comments are instructive as both a direct suggestion that Lisbon should be considered alongside London as a major agent in postcolonial musical production, but also that *lusophone* music is part of a wider process of musical consumption happening on a global scale.[45] Before the mid-2000s, the highly dubious denotation of 'world music' in the pre-internet record industry—under which most music from the PALOP was included—unfairly benefited metropolitan centres such as Lisbon where the music was distributed from. 'World music' as a categorisation ultimately flattens cultural and musical distinctions for convenient consumption in Western media markets.[46] The same is true for *musical lusofonia*, whereby music from African-diaspora and PALOP musicians is assimilated under a categorisation that denotes its artistic lineage as coming from Portugal's historical, linguistic and cultural legacy.[47] However, the internet has democratised music distribution to a point where it's possible to circumvent the traditional record industry and their blunt classifications. In *Rave On: Global Adventures in Electronic Dance Music,* Matthew Collin postulates that the worldwide expansion of the internet has extended the reach of previously localised music scenes into new networks of global cultural consumption. Subsequently, new borderless networks can coalesce around any kind of sound one might hope to create. Collin argues this is particularly true for electronic dance music cultures that developed alongside the internet and knew instinctively how to take advantage of the new possibilities available.[48]

Clubbing Scene."

42 Arenas, "Migration and the Rise of African Lisbon," 359.

43 Jorge de la Barre, "Music, City, Ethnicity. Exploring Music Scenes in Lisbon." *Migrações* 7 (2010); 145.

44 Coldwell, "Nightlife Reports: Lisbon's New Clubbing Scene."

45 Barre, "Music, City, Ethnicity. Exploring Music Scenes in Lisbon", 140.

46 Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia," 184.

47 Almeida, "Portugal's Colonial Complex," 10.

48 Matthew Collin, *Rave On: Global Adventures in Electronic Dance Music*. Profile Books, 2018, 6 and 10.

Via the internet, *batida* music can be listened to and enjoyed around the world. The internet has consequently allowed artists who come from hitherto commercially ignored scenes or genres to locate themselves in the global music scene independently of official recognition. *Musical lusofonia* is therefore not just a concept shaped by governmental, institutional or mainstream political agendas as had predominantly been the case at Expo '98 and with the RBMA, but it is also increasingly shaped by artists expressing their own experiences through music. Increased visibility has subsequently influenced official and quasi-official branding of Lisbon.

BATIDA, *BURAKA SOM SISTEMA* AND *PRÍNCIPE RECORDS*

No band has been more important in spreading the influence African-diaspora music from Lisbon than *Buraka Som Sistema*.[49] Formed in the multicultural Amadora district of Lisbon, the band is made up of talent with both White-Portuguese and African-diaspora backgrounds. The collective reinterpreted the high-octane sound of Angolan *kuduro* in the mid-2000s with other electronic dance music influences from around the world. Proponents of sample-based production, the band prided itself on uncovering little-known underground dance music records via the internet and working directly with the artists responsible to synthesise their production styles into the band's own unique sound. *Buraka Som Sistema's* volatile but exhilarating music subsequently spread around the world, in no small part thanks to their eccentric live shows.[50] *Mr. Angelo*, a vocalist in the band who moved to Lisbon from Angola when he was 17, says *Buraka Som Sistema's* global appeal came from the bands ability to combine so many different sounds. Mixing "the Rio de Janeiro scene via the Jamaica scene —all those movements somehow made sense on a big scale."[51] After 800 live performances and three critically acclaimed albums, it's difficult to dismiss *Buraka Som Sistema's* influence on both electronic dance music not only in Lisbon, but globally. The *New York Times* even wrote that *Buraka Som Sistema* "is postcolonialism you can dance to."[52] Thanks to their success, the band became synonymous with the *lusophone* 'revolution' as presented *Lusofonia: a (R)Evolução.* Indeed, they were supported by *RBMA* throughout their existence until the band's hiatus in

49 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 131.

50 BURAKA, "OFF THE BEATEN TRACK - Official Documentary (Web Version)." *YouTube Video*, December 1, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?51=&v=u5vAINF-D5Q.

51 Rachel Donadio, "In a Lisbon Band, Echoes from Afar: Buraka Som Sistema Reveals Lisbon's Musical Melting Pot," *nytimes.com*, November 3, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/arts/music/buraka-som-sistema-reveals-lisbons-musical-melting-pot.html.

52 Ibid., and Marcus Dowling, "5 Buraka Som Sistema Moments That Changed the Game," *remezcla.com,* August 18, 2015. http://remezcla.com/lists/music/5-buraka-som-sistema-moments-that-changed-the-game/.

2016.[53] However, it would be unfair to claim *Buraka Som Sistema* were interested in forwarding *lusofonia* per se. Although the band claimed they could only have come from Lisbon's unique mixture of *lusophone* speaking diaspora communities, *Buraka Som Sistema* in their own self-produced documentary visited Venezuela, South Africa and London alongside Lisbon and Angola, giving as much importance to their influences from outside the *lusophone* world as within it.[54] The members of *Buraka Som Sistema* therefore exerted their own agency and globalising mission that had horizons beyond the Portuguese-speaking world. They also provided a pathway for future electronic dance music producers in Lisbon to get their music heard outside of their localised scenes.[55]

In the late-2000s and 2010s there was a proliferation of producers making *batida* beats in African-diaspora neighbourhoods around Lisbon.[56] However, it was the pioneering influence of DJ Nervoso and DJ Marfox that proved instrumental in formulating the next breakout sound from Lisbon. This sound was harsher than what had come before, stripping out the lyrics and bringing the percussion to the forefront of the mix. Music journalist Ian McQuaid said that if the *kuduro* popularised by *Buraka Som Sistema* was disco, then what DJ Nervoso and DJ Marfox created was the *techno* response.[57] The harshness of the sound and racism against this preserved 'ghetto music' saw the burgeoning scene ostracised from clubs and bars in the city centre. Consequently, the music was left to develop in the housing projects on the edge of the city. This geographic isolation allowed the scene to develop its own distinct traits, including the naming convention of DJs ending their pseudonym 'fox', a quick mixing style and the use of cheaper production software such as *Fruity Loops*.[58] However, when a group of record shop workers and club-promoters, who would later form *Príncipe Records*, discovered the new sound emerging on the city's periphery they attempted to build a relationship with the scenes pioneers. Aware it would be problematic for a group of White club-promoters to swoop in and try and monetise a sound created by Black musicians, the *Príncipe Records'* crew attended parties and familiarised themselves with the scene for over two years before approaching DJ Nervoso and DJ Marfox to release their music.[59]

53 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 131.
54 BURAKA, "OFF THE BEATEN TRACK."
55 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 131-132.
56 Kate Hutchinson, "Nídia is Bringing the Sound of Lisbon's Ghettos to the World," *nytimes.com*, June 14, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/arts/music/nidia-batida-lisbon.html.
57 Ian McQuaid, "Príncipe and the New Sound of Lisbon," daily.*bandcamp.com*, November 17, 2016. https://daily.bandcamp.com/2016/11/17/principe-records-feature/.
58 Keeling, "The Ghetto Sound of Lisbon."
59 McQuaid, "Príncipe and the New Sound of Lisbon" and Duncan Harrison, "Reflecting on Principe, The Portuguese Record Label That Put Lisbon's Ghetto Sound on the Map," *thump.vice.com*, August 13, 2015. https://thump.vice.com/

While this dynamic still exists, the success of *Príncipe's* monthly parties and the respectful relationship between label and artists shows the potential of music to bridge social, economic and geographical divides.[60] By bringing this music into Lisbon's centre, McQuaid argues music from Lisbon's poor immigrant and diaspora neighbourhoods was no longer "being ghettoised," but was instead being released and played alongside other acts in Lisbon's electronic music scene. This move "demanded the African artists and their Portuguese counterparts be treated with parity," and McQuaid contends, "it paid off."[61]

The scene and the communities it originated from still face severe issues of racism despite the success of artists such as DJ Nervoso and DJ Marfox who now regularly tour around the world.[62] As Lisbon rapper *Biggie* once told ethnomusicologist Derek Pardue, "maybe Portugal is in the EU, but the PALOP aren't. We're just in Portugal [children of PALOP migrants who are denied citizenship]... not quite Portuguese, not quite European... forever African and always Black."[63] Nevertheless, DJ Marfox argues that today's rappers and producers in Portugal serve a function similar to the protest singers of the Carnation Revolution. While "society looks down on me for being Black and doing *kuduro* music in the suburbs," he contends "the new Lisbon will be the periphery of the city, then they will be forced to acknowledge and represent us."[64] Gomes has also picked up on a change whereby people are now less scared to venture into Lisbon's African-diaspora neighbourhoods. By seeing more Black faces from the music scene in clubs and in the press, people are more willing to interact and less fearful of being robbed.[65] Music journalist Duncan Harrison goes further and argues that there has been "a genuine socio-political significance to what *Príncipe* have achieved." They have "amplified the voices of those from an isolated area and immersed those voices with the inner-city populace."[66] Like *Buraka Som Sistema*, Gomes argues *Príncipe*'s success comes from the label's international appeal. This music "can work in Africa... this can work in all of Latin and North America, in Asia and, of course, in Europe." Gomes makes a similar narrative argument to that assumed by *musical lusofonia* when he told Ryan Keeling that "this music has been brewing for centuries, through the slave trade, through immigration, and now through digital

en_uk/article/53agj3/reflecting-on-principe-the-portuguese-record-label-that-put-lisbons-ghetto-sound-on-the-map.

60 Keeling, "The Ghetto Sound of Lisbon."

61 McQuaid, "Príncipe and the New Sound of Lisbon."

62 Andy Beta, "Lisbon's Batida Revolution," *pitchfork.com*, August 29, 2014. https://pitchfork.com/features/electric-fling/9490-lisbons-batida-revolution/.

63 Pardue, *Cape Verde, Let's Go,* 156.

64 Beta, "Lisbon's Batida Revolution."

65 McQuaid, "Príncipe and the New Sound of Lisbon" and Félix and Pinto, "Can music reduce anti-dark-skin prejudice?," 388.

66 Harrison, "Reflecting on Principe."

technology."[67] However, unlike at *Expo '98* and previous expressions of *musical lusofonia*, *Príncipe* gives clear authorship to the African-diaspora musicians that created the sound, not malign Portuguese cultural and colonial legacy.[68] Most of the musicians themselves do not identify themselves as *lusophone* musicians, nor does the term play a role in their creative process. The only relevance most artists find in *musical lusofonia* is the potential to get their music into city centre venues and disseminate their music further with institutional support.[69] Meanwhile, labels like *Príncipe* prove artists and promoters have their own agency and can forward their own objectives in an internet age.

CONCLUSION

African-diaspora musicians in Lisbon still have to act within the structural confines of their position in postcolonial Portugal, one often characterised by poverty and intolerance. However, it has not been the official attempts to promote *lusophone* culture that has changed global perception of Lisbon, but principally the work of the musicians themselves. It should be noted that hip hop when adopted in Lisbon's African-diaspora communities also had a big impact on the musical landscape of the city.[70] A group of mostly young men of Cape Verdean descent since the 1990s have drawn attention to the plight of people in their communities, by using lyrics spoken and rapped in creole.[71] Pardue argues that the existence of creole hip hop, performed by PALOP and Cape Verdean diaspora MCs, has changed postcolonial discourses around multiculturalism in Portugal as these musicians assert their voice in a language historically refused official recognition.[72] Whether it is hip hop or *batida* therefore, the power of African-diaspora music has changed Portuguese national identity as their voices can no longer be ignored. While the racial, social and economic inequalities of colonialism still permeate in postcolonial Portuguese society, music has created new egalitarian and multicultural urban spaces in which these differences can be addressed. Laura Filipa Vidal, director of the *CPLP* and EU supported *Festival Conexão Lusófona*, contends that "Portuguese colonialism happened, whether for good or bad, and we must recognize that a mixture has taken place." We therefore "have to work positively

67 Keeling, "The Ghetto Sound of Lisbon."
68 Hutchinson, "Nídia is Bringing the Sound of Lisbon's Ghettos to the World."
69 Alge, "Lusofonia, a (R)Evolução" and Vanspauwen, "The (R)Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 60-66 and 70-74.
70 Pardue, *Cape Verde, Let's Go*, 17, Derek Pardue, "Cape Verdean Creole and the Politics of Scene-Making in Lisbon, Portugal," *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology*, 22, no. 2 (2012): 42-46, Federica Lupati, "Voices from the Periphery? The Polyphony of Hip Hop and the Portuguese Community," *Cultural and Religious Studies* 4, no. 12 (2016): 727 and Vanspauwen, "The (R) Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 42.
71 Pardue, "Cape Verdean Creole and the Politics of Scene-Making in Lisbon," 42-43.
72 Pardue, *Cape Verde, Let's Go*, 156.

on this legacy towards the future."[73] Latent neo-imperial discourses still permeate in the mainstream, but a study of Lisbon's *batida* scene illustrates artists are successfully challenging this and improving community relations within Lisbon. As the interval performance at *Eurovision 2018* demonstrated, music can fill a gap in representation of diaspora communities in Portugal, and by extension, possibly across other multicultural European countries dealing with their own legacies of colonialism.[74]

73 Barre and Vanspauwen, "A Musical 'Lusofonia'?," 137.
74 Vanspauwen, "The (R)Evolution of Lusophone Musics in the City of Lisbon," 2-3.

Manuscripts don't burn: *The Master and Margarita* as a case study of Samizdat in an Extra Gutenberg Culture

by
JULIA BOECHAT MACHADO

ABSTRACT

New methods and theoretical approaches to the study of Samizdat - self-publishing and autonomous circulation of texts in the Soviet Union - have been challenging the traditional views that portray it as a mere form of dissident activity. Recently, a study by Historian Ann Komaromi classified it as an extra Gutenberg culture, distinct from "print culture" because it lacks its characteristics of standardization, dissemination and fixity. Samizdat, in comparison, was spontaneously copied and distributed, and even altered by anonymous volunteers, and was marked by its instability. Other oppositions for too long used in the study of Samizdat are also becoming obsolete: official publishers and culture versus dissidents, or Stalinism versus the Thaw. Bulgakov's novel *The Master and Margarita* is an interesting case study for new perspectives in Samizdat because it was part of official and unofficial culture, being officially published, circulating as Samizdat, and becoming the inspiration of a collection of thousands of graffiti that appeared in Moscow. It was also relevant in different phases of Soviet history, from Stalinism, when it was written, to the late Soviet years when it gained cult status. When the novel was published, censors did not cut parts that showed an ideology opposite to Soviet ideas of religion, the part of the novel that could more easily be regarded as dissident, but references to the housing crisis and to nudity. When the novel started circulating as a Samizdat, with the censored parts taped to it, it made a mockery of the official institutions, showing the unreliability of its publication system, the existence of censorship and its pettiness, and how the same deficiencies the author satirized remained common in the Soviet Union twenty years later. The case study will therefore show how the new perspectives in the study of Samizdat give insight into the wider political implications of a work of fiction.

INTRODUCTION

Samizdat and related practices were present in several different epochs of the Soviet Union, even if with different intensity and focus. The mere importance given to the censorship and publishing of literary and poetic text can be enriching in order to analyze Russian cultural history.

With this purpose, this paper is divided in three sections. The first one tells a brief history of Samizdat, focusing on its origins and development throughout the twentieth century. Even though the practice can be traced at least to the beginning of the Revolution, the self-publishing of literature became more common during the Thaw. At the same time that this brief phase of a politically liberalizing atmosphere allowed poet Evgueni Evtushenko to read his poetry in stadiums and young people to meet in Moscow under Pushkin's statue to read poetry, *Doctor Zhivago* was censored and then smuggled abroad to be published. The very event - considered to put an end to the Thaw - is related to the Samizdat publishing of fiction: the Siniavsky-Daniel trial, marking the first time writers were convicted for writing works of fiction since the show trials of the Stalinist era. Both were convicted under article 70 of the penal code, "Agitation and Propaganda with the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime," despite the fact that they protested their innocence. The retelling of the events in the trial would soon also receive wide circulation as Samizdat.

The second part is dedicated to practices and examples in Samizdat through a literature review. Historian Ann Komaromi's work was one of the main sources, with special regard to her concept of Samizdat as an extra-Gutenberg culture, examining common characteristics it has with the beginning of "print culture", before the standardization, dissemination and fixity that we see as typical of print culture had occurred. I also look into the modern critiques to the opposition between the studies of Samizdat as an instrument for spreading literature and as a vehicle for dissident activity. Distributing censored literature can be seen as a political act, even if the novel itself is not overtly political, and for this reason the opposition is reductionist and has been challenged in more recent works.

The third part presents the mentioned case-study, the publication of the novel *The Master and Margarita* decades after it had been written. The novel quickly became part of the official culture, being published in a magazine just after the Siniavsky-Daniel trial, and unofficial culture, circulating as Samizdat and inspiring popular expressions and thousands of graffiti in Moscow. Because of the complex history of its publication, the novel is not only a case study in an extra-Gutenberg culture, but also a challenge to common portrayals of Samizdat.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAMIZDAT

The origins of the practice of sharing typed uncensored texts in Soviet Russia are difficult to trace. According to prominent dissident writer Siniavsky, it started as a mass practice in the 1950s with the copying of the poetry of writers such as Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak, that had become inaccessible in the published form.[1] But the term Samizdat has since been used retroactively, referring to texts published and distributed autonomously during Tsarist times. Other authors prefer to refer to these as proto-Samizdat. The neologism Samizdat is attributed to poet Nikolai Glazkov, who typed his poetry in notebooks and distributed it to friends during the 1940s with the imprint "samsebiaizdat", roughly translatable as "myself publisher". The term Samizdat became common among Moscow's elite in the 1950s and gained a wider usage in the 1960s, when references to it started appearing in the official press.[2]
A related practice was Tamizdat, "over there publishing", smuggling manuscripts out of the Soviet Union to be published abroad. As with Samizdat, the word has been used to refer to previous events, specifically about the works of Boris Pilniak and Evgueni Zamyatin, published abroad in the 1920s to avoid Soviet censorship.

According to Peter Steiner, the production and distribution of Samizdat increased much after the fall of Stalinism.[3] In February 1956, Khrushchev gave his famous speech called *On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences*, in which he denounced Stalin for having distorted Leninist principles and establishing a cult of personality. The speech was often read in meetings of the Communist Party and the Komsomol, but it was not meant to be distributed widely. However, it soon started circulating as a Samizdat and it was also smuggled abroad and published in the Western press. There was unrest following the speech, with reports that members of the audience reacted with applause and laughter whenever it was read, while others were reported to have suffered heart attacks or attempted suicide. It provoked strong reactions, and "Nowhere did the cry for liberalization sound more loudly than in literature".[4] Writers became bolder in exposing the Soviet Union, the crimes committed by the State, and the miseries of everyday life that undermined the notion of a communist paradise. However, in the same year limits were made clear when Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* was denied publishing and smuggled

1 Serguei Oushakine, "The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat," *Public Culture* 13, no. 2 (2001): 191-214, doi:10.1215/08992363-13-2-191

2 Ann Komaromi, *Uncensored: Samizdat Novels and the Quest for Autonomy in Soviet Dissidence* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 132.

3 P. Steiner, "Introduction: On Samizdat, Tamizdat, Magnitizdat, and Other Strange Words That Are Difficult to Pronounce," *Poetics Today* 29, no. 4 (2008): 613-628, doi:10.1215/03335372-079.

4 Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2000) 211.

abroad as a Tamizdat in 1957. Dmitri Pospielovsky understands that event as the impetus for the birth of Samizdat as we know it today, as a parallel culture to the official press.[5] Pospielovsky sees a double influence that the whole affair had on aspiring writers: to show the challenges of being published in the official press, even for a recognized writer like Pasternak, and on the novel's own critique of the Revolution and the establishment of communism in Russia.

In 1958, a monument to futurist poet Vladimir Mayakovsky was inaugurated in Moscow, and famous poets were invited to read their works in the ceremony. Volunteers from the crowd followed them, also reading poetry. The atmosphere of relative openness attracted others, that started meeting in the square to read poems from repressed or forgotten authors. Many of the students involved were soon expelled or blacklisted from universities, and a few were arrested and tried under article 70 of the penal code, agitation and propaganda with the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime. Two students, Vladimir Osipov and Eduard Kuznetsov, were sentenced to seven years in labor camps, while a third one, Ilia Bokshetyn, was sentenced to five years. Aleksandr Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov, two students who also frequented the meetings, were afterwards arrested for creating and distributing Samizdat journals dedicated to poetry.

One of the main events that marks the history of Samizdat is the Siniavsky Daniel-trial, in February 1966. Andrei Siniavsky was a main Soviet literary critique, close to Pasternak, while Yuli Daniel was a schoolteacher and translator. They both smuggled works of fiction abroad to be published under pseudonyms, respectively Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak. When exposed, they were the first people to be tried for writing works of fiction since the show trials of the Stalinist era, and many dissidents were afraid that it meant a comeback to that level of repression. In the 1930s, prominent writers had been prosecuted for counter-revolutionary activities and accused of being spies for foreign countries or for Trotsky, or even for both. Poet Ossip Mandelstam had been sent to the Gulag on such charges, where he died in 1938, while short story writer Isaac Babel had been shot in prison in 1939, and novelist Boris Pilnyak had been executed in 1937. The Siniavsky-Daniel trial, a few decades later, was new however in several regards, specifically on the fact that both of them pleaded innocent. Soon after their arrest, mathematician Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin organized the "Meeting of Openness", when two hundred people gathered in the Pushkin Square in Moscow demanding a fair trial for the two writers. The strategies developed by Esenin-Volpin in the

5 Dmitri Pospielovsky, "From Gosizdat to Samizdat and Tamizdat," *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* 20, no. 1, Conference Papers 1977 (March 1978): 44-62, 48.

campaign would often be used in the next few years, including the writing of open letters written in the occasion. Around 80 intellectuals signed a letter in support of Siniavsky and Daniel, 60 of them being members of the Moscow Writer's Union.[6] Esenin-Volpin always made appeals for the law to be upheld, quoting from Soviet law books. That was also a common strategy in the following decades, not to question the principles of the political order, but whether these laws were being implemented correctly, using juridical arguments. In the following year, 25 intellectuals, including physicist Andrei Sakharov and composer Dmitri Shostakovich, wrote a letter to Brezhnev asking him not to rehabilitate Stalinism. The letter later circulated in Samizdat. However, the authorities could never find any ground to report it as anti-Soviet, anti-communist or anti-government, perhaps, as Serguei Oushakine argues, because the "discourse so closely matched their own".[7]

In 1966, new laws were created to deal with the phenomenon of underground publishing, including article 190-1, about slander against the Soviet system, and 190-3, for public meetings that disturb peace. Article 70, the one used against the students in Mayakovsky Square, Siniavsky, and Daniel, required proof of anti-Soviet intent, while article 190 only required proof of "defamation", "discreditation" or "false fabrication". With these new tools Article 70, while still in place, was not invoked nearly as often. It also created differences under the law between producing and distributing material.[8] In the following year, there was the Trial of the Four, in which Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Aleksei Dobrovolsky and Vera Lashkova were arrested in connection with the publication of the *White Book* in Samizdat, an account of the Siniavsky-Daniel trial. They were sentenced to time in labor camps. Other such books soon appeared, reporting on their trial, and their attorneys' closing statements also circulated in Samizdat.

In the West, there was a concerted effort to spread Samizdat writings, but they were mostly portrayed in simplistic terms as an example of dissident activity. The result in the Soviet Union was an increase in repression during the 1970s, with increasingly harsher sentences being carried out against those accused of writing and distributing underground literature. Several prominent authors were expelled from the country, including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Joseph Brodsky, Vladimir Voynovich and Siniavsky himself after his release from the Gulag. In the meanwhile, Samizdat became more overtly political. According to Oushakine, Samizdat became dominated by political documents, with a high

6 Komaromi, *Uncensored,* 44.
7 Oushakine, *The terrifying mimicry,* 198.
8 Gordon Johnston, "What is the history of Samizdat?," *Social History* 24, no. 2 (1999): 115-133, 123.

circulation of "letters, petitions, commentaries, and transcripts of trials, pamphlets and so forth."[9] Finally, Aleksandr Etkind shows how in the Glasnost in the eighties, Russian readers finally gained access to books by Nabokov, Pasternak, Vassili Grossman, Platonov, Anna Akhmatova, and Brodsky, among others, that were finally published in the official press. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the appearance of non-State controlled publishing houses, and the end of the state's monopoly on publication.

PRACTICES AND EXAMPLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW

In her influential article "Samizdat as an Extra-Gutenberg phenomenon", Ann Komaromi studied Samizdat as a textual culture opposed to modern print culture, not merely as a mouthpiece for dissidence. This perspective is informed by Anna Akhmatova's famous commentary that the Soviet Union was "pre-Gutenberg", since people relied on memorization and declamation when writing was too risky, and conceptualist Lev Rubinstein calling it an extra-Gutenberg culture. Komaromi references Adrian Jones' *The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making*, that highlights the instability of the book in the beginning of the print and applies it to Soviet times. She also uses Elizabeth Eisenstein's claims that after the invention of the press, print has been characterized by three features: standardization, dissemination, and fixity. Those characteristics would be typical of what Eisenstein calls print culture, and are the ones that Komaromi opposes to Samizdat when calling it an extra-Gutenberg culture characterized by "epistemological instability".

Samizdat was not under centralized control, and for that reason, not standardized. There are numerous instances of passages being excised or changed by typists who were tired or honestly felt they were improving it. One of the most famous examples of this is Leon Uris' book *Exodus*. In some instances, the translators cut parts of the book for brevity, in others, they cut a whole plot, the romance between a Jewish man and a Christian woman. The resulting text was about 150 pages long, one quarter of the original. Another version resulted from a man who had heard the story in the Gulag, retold by another prisoner who had read the book in English, and who typed it when he was released. That version had around eighty pages, and variations of it appeared not long after.[10]

Another example is that of Varlam Shalamov, who disavowed his works published in Samizdat and Tamizdat in 1972. His prose in the 1970s would be written exclusively "for the desk drawer",

9 Oushakine, *The terrifying mimicry,* 194.

10 Komaromi, *Uncensored*, 635.

with no intention of publishing it.[11] *The Kolyma Tales*, his works about the almost two decades he had spent in Gulags, had been smuggled abroad and published as Tamizdat. Not until 1978, however, the *Tales* would be published as a single volume, as the author judged it to be of vital importance, and previous publications were selections of stories, often arranged around topics and ideas chosen by editors. In Samizdat also he had no authorial control of how the tales were published. Typists did not only often select the tales or change their order, but they did make constant alterations. In the short story "How it Began", Shalamov left a word unfinished as a reference to British writer Lawrence Sterne and to highlight the narrator's exhaustion, and in Samizdat the word was often completed by typists, who probably judged it a mistake made by a previous typist of the work. Repetitions, contradictions and ambiguities purposely included by the author as marks of the novel's authenticity were often seen as mistakes and changed in an attempt to correct them.[12]

Dissemination was also an issue. It was too difficult to make several copies of a text to be distributed. On a typing machine, writers used carbons and papyrus paper to make seven or eight copies at once, but the last one of the bunch would be almost unreadable. Taking pictures of the paper and printing it in photographic paper was also an option, but it generated a book that was very thick, expensive and that tended to curl. With the number of copies being so limited, the work had to be constantly retyped by different people, with no centralized control. Copies could also be lost or seized, as was the case with the Samizdat translations of Jorge Luis Borges and Eugène Ionesco and with Venedikt Erofeev's lost novel *Dmitri Shostakovich*.[13]

Fixing a Samizdat text meant in most cases that the text had been smuggled out of the Soviet Union and had been officially published in the West. This only happened to a small proportion of books, and a novel could also be brought from the West and then distributed as Samizdat, as was the case with Leon Uris's Exodus.

Samizdat was portrayed in the West as a rebirth of free speech in the Soviet Union, and scholarship has largely studied it as either an instrument for dissidence or for distributing literature, not as a culture by itself. This opposition has been challenged since then.[14] An opposition commonly seen on the press is that between Gosizdat, officially published texts, and Samizdat or Tamizdat, underground autonomous publishing

11 Leona Toker, "Samizdat and the Problem of Authorial Control: The Case of Varlam Shalamov." *Poetics Today* 29, no. 4 (2008): 735-758, doi:10.1215/03335372-083: 736.

12 Toker, "Samizdat and the Problem," 743.

13 Komaromi, *Samizdat as an Extra Gutenberg Phenomenon*, 636.

14 Oushakine, *The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat.*

of uncensored literature. However, many texts published in Samizdat had been published officially before. Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* had been published in 1963 by a literary journal, and even ran for the 1964 Lenin Prize in the field of arts. It was only distributed as Samizdat after it had been banned in 1974.[15] Even when the two versions, the official and unofficial, had the exact same text, however, they should not be seen as versions of the same book. Having a Samizdat was still considered subversive and punishable by law, and "no seasoned reader from the region would have failed to distinguish between the two and have confused, so to speak, Pierre Menard's Don Quixote with Cervantes's identically worded novel. For, as Borges did not neglect to tell us, they are a function of very unlike contexts".[16]

THE MASTER AND MARGARITA: FROM GOSIZDAT TO SAMIZDAT

The late publication of Bulgakov's Master and Margarita makes for an interesting case-study on Samizdat. It belongs to several different Soviet periods: to the Stalinism of the late 1920s and 1930s, when it was written, to the 1960s, when it was printed for the first time and caused a sensation among Moscow's intelligentsia, most of whom only knew Bulgakov as a playwright and had no reason to expect that the new publications of his work would reveal a major novel, and to the seventies and eighties, when it gained cult status in the Soviet Union. It also belongs not only to the official press, since the book was officially published in the *Moskva* newspaper, but also to Samizdat. It received literary criticism in the official sources after its publication, but it was also successful with the intelligentsia and became part of popular culture. It was difficult to classify: Stephen Lovell enumerates several different genres attributed to it by Soviet critics: "satire, menippea, parody, fantastic tale, adventure story, science fiction - and a number of compound descriptions".[17] Its own existence and convoluted publication history seems to challenge some of the aforementioned oppositions.

The novel portrays a visit of the devil to Moscow in the 1930s, during Stalinist persecution of religion. The devil first appears in the Patriarch Ponds in Moscow, under the name Voland, talking to poet Bezdomni and head of literary bureaucracy Berlioz. He interrupts their discussion on atheism by stating that he knows what really happened between Jesus Christ and Pontius Pilatus, claiming to have witnessed these events. The two men consider him a madman, but they both soon realize that he

15 Oushakine, *The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat*, 202.
16 Steiner, *On Samizdat*", 614.
17 Stephen Lovell, "Bulgakov as Soviet Culture," *Slavonic and East European Review* 76, no. 1 (January 1998): 28-48, 30.

has supernatural powers. Through these characters and a few others, the novel satirizes the bureaucratic organization of Soviet writers. One of the main events of the first part is the magic show organized by Voland in a variety theatre, satirizing the vanity, greed and gullibility of the Soviet public. Voland is accompanied in these efforts by his assistant and translator, Korovyev, a talking black cat called Behemoth, a fallen angel called Azazello, and a succubus called Hella. Other main characters are the Master, who has written and burnt a manuscript about Pontius Pilatus, the text of which we read as a novel inside the novel, and his lover Margarita, who searches for him and is invited to attend a Walpurgis Night ball organized by Voland.

FIGURE 1
A sign placed in the Patriarch Ponds in Moscow warning people of one of the novel's mottos: "запрещено разговаривать с незнакомцами", "it's forbidden to talk to strangers". April 2018. Personal archive.

Until the publication of *The Master and Margarita*, Bulgakov had been known mainly for his work on the theatre during the twenties. His play *The Days of the Turbins,* about the members of a Kiev family involved in the White Army, gained him instant fame. Stalin liked it so much he saw it fourteen times in the theatre. But in the following years Bulgakov was often targeted by censorship and could not get his plays on stage. In 1929, he decided to write a letter directly to Stalin. On it, he asked for permission to emigrate abroad, since the attacks by critics connected to the Communist Party made it impossible for him to find work. The answer was a personal phone call from Stalin the following year, who got him a job in the Moscow Art Theatre.[18] Despite the climate of persecution, Bulgakov kept working in a novel he had started in 1929, about the devil visiting Soviet Moscow. In the beginning, he had briefly held the illusion of publishing it, even sending a chapter to Nedra publishing house,

18 J. A. E. Curtis, *Bulgakov's Last Decade: the Writer as Hero*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 18.

which were refused. Soon he realized that he would be unlikely to publish it in his lifetime, and subversive themes started to appear more often. Even if he no longer held illusions of publishing the novel, it was a dangerous task, and Siniavsky has argued that if Stalin had suspicions about his work, it would have been destroyed and Bulgakov would have been killed.[19] Bulgakov burnt the manuscripts several times, but repeatedly restarted the novel. He would read his unpublished works to friends in his apartment, turning it into a literary salon. He died in 1940, of a hereditary disease, leaving the manuscripts to his wife, Yelena Shilovskaya. She kept it for the next twenty-five years, showing it only to a few friends.

Many of Bulgakov's works were finally published in Russia during Khruschev's Thaw, when he was formally rehabilitated. Seven plays and four novels that were kept by his wife were published between 1962 and 1967.[20] *The Master and Margarita* was published in the journal *Moskva* in two issues of the magazine, the first in November 1966 and the second in January 1967. The last versions of the novel dictated by Bulgakov contain a few inconsistencies, and Shilovskaya altered the manuscript in 1965 to correct them, and that was the basis of the published version.[21] It was a strange time for the work to come out, since the Thaw had been waning for a few years. The Siniavsky-Daniel trial had taken place in the beginning of the year, an event that many historians point out as the end of the Thaw. Until the publication, the fate of the book was uncertain, however the publication was maintained as scheduled. The novel was censored, though surprisingly most of the Biblical plot regarding Pontius Pilatus was untouched, even though the Soviet regime was officially atheist. The biggest cuts where in references to the housing crisis, the descriptions of Griboedov House and Margarita's nudity while flying around Moscow. Griboedov House is the seat of the MASSOLIT, a literary organization and a parody of Herzen House, the seat of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), receiving even a Soviet-style abbreviation. According to Michael Curtis, the Griboedov episodes were already included in the first drafts of the novel.[22] Comparing this to Pospielovsky's assessment of RAPP that in the liberal post-Stalin era it deteriorated and became even more bureaucratized, it is not difficult to imagine why this parody became a target for censorship.

The publication of this first edition was an event for the Moscow intelligentsia. According to Stephen Lovell, having a copy was considered

19 Curtis, *Bulgakov's Last Decade*, 131.

20 Kalpana Sahni, "The Tragic Irony of Fame" in *Bulgakov: Novelist Playwright*," ed. Lesley Milne (Harwood Academic Publishers,1995), 205-214.

21 Mikhail Afanasievitch Bulgakov, "A Note on the Text and Acknowledgements," *The Master and Margarita*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 9–10.

22 Curtis, *Bulgakov's Last Decade,* 131.

as a minor display of dissidence.[23] It was a shocking work, and there was very little literary criticism on Bulgakov's works as a guide to the reader. Again according to Lovell: "Readers accustomed to a diet of Soviet classics were ill-equipped to interpret the novel's complex network of symbols and plot levels, its unusual treatment of time, its use of irony and the fantastic, and its references to Christianity and myth".[24]

The official version would soon start to circulate with the censored parts typed and taped to it, "thereby calling into question the authenticity of the official Soviet version".[25] Circulating the official copies with censored parts added to it made a very visual way to show that censorship affected not only overtly political writings, but those capable of revealing the everyday miseries of life in the Soviet union. Without it, people may not even realize the text had been censored, but the fact that a part had been manually added to an edition circulating hand to hand made it obvious. It showed why there was a need for an extra Gutenberg culture, since the official press couldn't be trusted to fix a text. This also relates to the novel's own plots regarding the writers' association, seen as a group of sycophants and mediocrities. The novel's most often quoted phrase, "Manuscripts don't burn", refers in *The Master and Margarita* to the Master's manuscript about Pontius Pilatus, that the devil pulls from the fire and that we read as a novel inside the novel. But it was also used to reference Bulgakov's novel itself, that he had burned and then rewritten repeatedly, that had been hidden and censored, but kept reappearing.

The 1965 version of the novel was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published in Switzerland by Scherz Verlag in 1967, by Possev Verlag edition in Frankfurt in 1969, with the censored parts in italic, and by YMCA in Paris in 1969.[26] It was also the basis for a translation published in Estonia in 1969, the first official edition of the book in the Soviet Union. The first uncensored version of *The Master and Margarita* was published in 1973, but editions were infrequent and small by Soviet standards, meaning that the book remained difficult to find.[27] In 1988, it was the 12th book in the list of longest waiting queues in Moscow's public libraries.[28]

Bulgakov's works also became an object of cult in the later decades of Soviet Union. The apartment building where he briefly lived in Sadovaya Street - and where the Devil stays in Moscow - was often visited by fans of the novel, who wrote quotes and references to it on the walls of the staircase. Historian John Bushnell wrote an article in 1988 about this graffiti, claiming that

23 Stephen Lovell, "Bulgakov as Soviet Culture," *Slavonic and East European Review* 76, no. 1 (January 1998): 28-48, 34.
24 Lovell, *Bulgakov as Soviet Culture*, 31.
25 Komaromi, *Uncensored,* 139.
26 Bulgakov, "A Note on the Text and Acknowledgements," 9-10.
27 Lovell, *Bulgakov as Soviet Culture,* 31.
28 Lovell, *Bulgakov as Soviet Culture,* 45.

according to the residents it started appearing in 1983, and that in a year that were already between eight hundred and a thousand different inscriptions. In the following years, the walls have been whitewashed semi-annually and the stairs were closed with a combination lock to prevent fans from entering the building, with little success: fans kept gaining access to the stairs and graffitiing the walls. He points out that the recurrence of the graffiti shows the very unusual admiration dedicated to the author: "There is no similar cluster of graffiti on any other subject in Moscow, no graffiti collection devoted to any other Soviet or Russian writer-or to any writer anywhere in the world, so far as has been reported. There is no other museum, official or unofficial, in

FIGURE 2
Cluster of graffiti in the staircase of Bulgakov's apartment. April 2018. Personal archive.

FIGURE 3
Graffiti with one famous quote form the novel, "запрещено разговаривать с незнакомцами", "it's forbidden to talk to strangers", the same sentence from the sign put in place in the Patriarch Ponds. April 2018. Personal archive.

Moscow or anywhere else in the Soviet Union, apparently, that has been opened as a direct response to popular demand".[29] Several quotations from the novels were often written on the building, and became common sayings in Russia, such as "no document, no person", making fun of Soviet bureaucracy, or "there's only one degree of freshness, the first, which makes it also the last", a joke with the low quality of groceries. The apartment

29 John Bushnell, "A Popular Reading of Bulgakov: Explication des Graffiti," *Slavic Review* 47, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 502-11, 506.

had become, as he shows, an object of pilgrimage. Today, new graffiti still appears constantly in the staircase.

The case-study of Bulgakov's last novel, *The Master and Margarita* is enlightening for its diversity. It is a part of both official and unofficial culture, or of Gosizdat and Samizdat, while its convoluted publication history reflects several different epochs of the nation's history. It is also illustrative of the studied authors' perception of Samizdat as more of a mere mouthpiece for dissidence, since the book is a work of fiction, both adored and targeted for its parody of everyday Soviet life, but not expressing any specific disagreements with the political system. The parts that were censored, and that resonated with the public decades after the novel had been written, when it circulated as a Samizdat, were about low quality groceries and communal apartments. Even though these were serious problems during the USSR, this kind of parody is still not the archetype for dissident literature. The characters that act in the most controversial acts, such as accepting foreign money, are being led by corruption and self-interest, and are mocked by the author for it. The only character who expresses nostalgia for the days before communism is the devil himself. Despite the fact that it could have led Bulgakov to the Gulag, it would be difficult to characterize it merely as a dissident work.

CONCLUSION

The study of Samizdat is based on oppositions, like the one between different epochs and focuses ascribed to Samizdat in each one and the opposition between official and unofficial press. *The Master and Margarita* was, however, part of several different epochs and of both official and unofficial press. By showing the system's shortcomings and that the official press tried to censor these mentions, it also highlights that they were still way too resonant to Soviet readers decades later. More than that, it became a part of popular culture, and just by being quoted it ridiculed the very own necessity of the existence of an extra-Gutenberg culture to express daily concerns about the quality of groceries and the miseries of living in a communal apartment. For allowing all these different approaches, the novel is an interesting case study in an extra-Gutenberg culture.

The end of the Soviet Union has not allowed the text of *Master and Margarita* to be properly fixed in a book. Should the 1965 version be considered the standard, or other versions prepared taking the Bulgakov archive, now available, as basis? Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, translators of the book to English, point out in their preface to the 1997 Penguin edition that "Given the absence of a definitive authorial text, this process of

revision is virtually endless."[30] Being published in an extra-Gutenbeg culture, the book could not be standardized during the author's life – and now the process is infinitely more complex.

As the decentralization of the production and distribution of knowledge becomes commonplace in the age of the Internet and social media, the methods of Samizdat may seem outdated. However, in countries where state Internet control and censorship are the norm, webpages trying to escape it have been called Samizdat blogs. When analyzing their influence on the Kyrgys Revolution, authors Svetlana Kulikova and David Perlmutter go as far as comparing them to the tavern meeting groups of the pre-revolutionary United States, in that they create their own communities.[31] There are also similarities of Samizdat with digital media in that both transform readers into self-appointed editors, with the possibility of altering a text and reproducing it without mention to the change made, creating several versions of it. In this way, the study of ways in which Samizdat – and the alterations done to a novel in particular – challenged modern print culture can be relevant today.

30 Bulgakov, "A Note on the Text and Acknowledgements," 9-10.

31 Svetlana V. Kulikova and David D. Perlmutter, "Blogging Down the Dictator? The Kyrgyz Revolution and Samizdat Websites," *International Communication Gazette* 69, no. 1 (2007): 29-50, doi:10.1177/1748048507072777.

Talking to Strange Men: The Bodily Masculinity of the Ethnic Other in Early Modern Spain's Global Empire

by
FLORIAN WIESER

ABSTRACT

Recent academic debates have emphasised the ways globalisation fluctuates between more and less integration over time, producing anti-global sentiment through the overwhelming experience global contacts entail. Basing itself on these ideas, this paper seeks to investigate the origins and development of racist ideology in a Global History context, arguing that such ideology, too, is produced from intercultural encounters. In examining that ideology in particular, the observation is made that discourses of the racialised body have historically been connected to those of bodily sex. They form a "sex-race matrix" together that could be wielded by European powers against the effects of globalised cultural contact. Limiting itself to analysing a mere piece of that history in detail and focussing on the masculine sex only, the paper takes a selection of sources from the sixteenth- to the seventeenth-century Spanish Empire to trace the workings of three such sex-race constructions applied to populations that the empire encountered throughout its expansion. These are the moros (Moorish/Muslims), the *indios* (Native Americans), and *moro-indio* Filipino people (exemplified by the Visayans). The sources, both narrative and judicial, contain such varied examples as sex-changing surgeons, well-endowed prostitutes, impotence-inducing bloodletting, and bejewelled penises, that is, bewildering Others that threatened Spanish definitions of masculinity and thus humanity itself. In analysing these, attention is paid not only to the internal coherence of the constructs, but also to their relations to the Spanish self-image and each other. All of this ultimately lends itself to an attempt at a model depicting the interrelationship between the social hierarchies of race, sex, and gender.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Florian Wieser completed his B.A. in History at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich in 2017 with a thesis on Spanish colonial representations of Aztec homosexuality that was subsequently published. He is now writing his M.A. thesis on leadership structure among Spanish- American maroons at the same institution and has been working as a Student Assistant there for the past two years. His research generally concerns the impact of Early Modern colonialism upon identities and ways of thinking and has been enriched by his stays in Madrid and Seville.

INTRODUCTION

Two observations inspire this paper: First, that from "Latin Lovers" to "Angry Black Women," modern conceptions of race are deeply connected to images of bodily sex, gender expression, and (sexual) behaviour. Second, that race as a concept is the product of experiencing globalisation, i.e. the horizon of a community broadening beyond what it can identify with, and stable connections arising between areas whose inhabitants would, in most cases, never encounter each other in person. These observations lead to a number of questions: How do race, sex, and gender relate to each other? How and why are they produced? How are they fixed in time? How do they develop across it? No single study can answer these questions fully, of course. Instead, I want to examine them in a limited fashion, analysing one of the many scenes that make up the process I term the "sex-race matrix," the entanglement of mutual reference and construction between these two concepts.

Limits cannot be drawn too freely here, though. The fact that the sex-race matrix is framed by such experiences of globalisation is central to its constitution. On this matter, I want to engage with ideas raised by the debate between Jeremy Adelman, Richard Drayton, and David Motadel regarding the challenges facing the discipline of Global History during the current resurge of nationalism.[1] Drayton and Motadel characterise nationalism as a "response to increasing connection,"[2] a stress reaction to deal with the overload of globalisation. I believe that a certain layer of the development of racism can be investigated in a similar way, by viewing it as a simplifying process applied to a world unbearably diversified by globalisation, while at the same time recognising that this simplifying narrative was immediately used to establish the dominance of one's own group over others.

To follow this train of thought and to preserve the connection Adelman and Drayton and Motadel have observed between globalisation and nationalisation, I have chosen to draw the limits of my study so as to investigate "globalisation in one state," a sum of globalisation experiences as found across territories controlled by a single state. The setting for this investigation will thus be the expanding Spanish Empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Within this setting, I will attempt to show how sex and gender were sources of cultural anxiety, especially where cultures with different notions of these concepts came into contact. An ideological discourse then

1 Jeremy Adelman, "What Is Global History Now?," *Aeon* 2 (March 2017); Richard Drayton and David Motadel, "The Futures of Global History," *Journal of Global History* 13 (2018): 1-21.

2 Drayton and Motadel, "Futures," 2. In his response, Adelman himself further notes that nationalism is also transmitted and exchanged globally, see Drayton and Motadel, "Futures," 18.

developed that sought to alleviate these anxieties by tying the bodily sex to the bodily race, helping to confirm the social order as it was.[3] To further sharpen the focus of my work, I would like to limit myself to addressing only issues of the masculine sex here, the "superior sex" the preservation of which would have been more pressing.

Thus, three source groups shall be examined as examples: encounters of the Spanish with *moro* and *morisco* (Muslim and Muslim-descended Christian) men in their homeland, with *indio* men of the Americas, and with men of the Visayan people in the Philippines. My aim is to show how the sex-race matrix was constructed within that temporal and cultural framework, and how this construction fits into the larger discursive continuum of sex and race.

SEX, RACE, AND CULTURE

Before any statement can be made about specific historical manifestations of race, sex, and gender, their nature as such must be considered. While Judith Butler's characterisation of gender as a discourse and performance has been one of the most influential contribution on that matter,[4] her attempt to define sex and thus the body in a similar way has been met with more criticism.[5] Caroline Bynum has rightfully pointed out that the body has diverse functions in society that cannot all be reduced to language;[6] the body must be admitted a material minimum. Nonetheless, it is not "just an accumulation of flesh and liquids" either, as Sebastian Jobs and Gesa Mackenthun have cautioned, but an object of "symbolic and metaphorical quality" within society.[7] Thus, when I speak of sex in the following, I want to carefully define it as a discourse designating which elements of the material body are pertinent to assigning a certain sex role to an individual. By this I mean that while sex is generally a category of the body, the question of which body parts (genitals, chromosomes, hair, humours, etc.) identified a certain sex was not stable across historical eras and cultures.

For the era here examined, the "one-sex model" described by Thomas Laqueur is deciding. As

3 John Huxtable Elliot, *The Old World and the New: 1492-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) is the classic text questioning whether the encounter of Europe with America actually caused cultural anxiety. However, as the following will show, the way in which I speak of anxiety and its alleviation is in fact in line with Elliot's ideas of averting anxiety through reference to tradition.

4 Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," *Theatre Journal* 40 (1988): 519-531; Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York, London: Routledge, 1990).

5 Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 7f; Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (New York, London: Routledge, 1993), 1-3.

6 Caroline Bynum, "Why All the Fuss about the Body?: A Medievalist's Perspective," *Critical Inquiry* 22 (1995): 5f.

7 Sebastian Jobs and Gesa Mackenthun, "Introduction," in *Embodiments of Cultural Encounters*, eds. Sebastian Jobs and Gesa Mackenthun (Münster e.a.: Waxmann, 2011), 8.

Laqueur observed, Early Modern Europeans, inspired by Ancient Greek thinkers, assumed that there was only one type of human body. It wore certain parts either outside or inside, making the vagina nothing more than an inverted penis, the womb an inverted scrotum, woman an inverted man. A hierarchy of the sexes was directly written into this model, with different body temperatures giving the bodies shapes of differing perfection.[8]

This can be seen to tie directly into race, another system of ranking bodies. However, even more so than the modern, analytical terms "sex" and "gender," "race" is problematic to use in this context. I will continue using "race" analytically in the following, but to do so I must problematise it first. On the surface, the term may seem very appropriate to my topic, as it does have its origins in Early Modern Spain. Originally meaning a flaw in a piece of cloth,[9] to have *raza* came to mean over the course of the sixteenth century having flawed blood polluted by Moorish or Jewish descent.[10] The first problem with this is that *raza* cannot yet have positive meaning here the way the modern term allows (e.g. speaking proudly of a White, Aryan, etc. race). Secondly, "race" is inseparable from "racism," a term usually describing the systematic, pseudo-scientific ideology that blossomed from the eighteenth century forward. Yet in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the rationalist foundations for this ideology were still to arise, and notions of the human body and its differences were ruled more by humoralism and theology.

This has been shown clearly by Max Sebastián Hering Torres for the case of *conversos*, Jewish converts to Christianity who only gradually came to be a physically rather than just religiously distinct group.[11] Following his discussion of the thoughts of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, I will address the racialising ideologies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries only as "proto-racism" in the following.[12] This proto-racism, being produced by a sex-race matrix, also takes its place within the genealogy of race-sexuality entanglement described by Ann Laura Stoler. She has shown how a differentiation in descent and

8 Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1990), especially 8, 26-28, 63-66, 70.

9 Elio Antonio de Nebrija, *Vocabulario español-latino*, facsimile edition (Madrid: Alicante, 2005), fol. 86r: "Raça del paño. panni raritas."

10 Sebastián de Covarrubias Orozco, *Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1611), fol. 3r: "Raza en los linages se toma en mala parte, como tener alguna raza de Moro, o ludio."

11 Max Sebastián Hering Torres, *Rassismus in der Vormoderne: Die 'Reinheit des Blutes' im Spanien der Frühen Neuzeit* (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus, 2006). See also the discussion of the lack of physical markers of Jewishness in José Pardo Tomás, "Physicians' and Inquisitors' Stories?: Circumcision and Crypto-Judaism in Sixteenth–Eighteenth Century Spain," in: *Bodily Extremities: Preoccupations with the Human Body in Early Modern European Culture*, eds. Florike Egmond and Robert Zwijnenberg (Oxon, New York: Ashgate, 2003), 171f.

12 Hering Torres, *Rassismus in der Vormoderne*, 206.

sexual conduct served to establish the identity of the White coloniser as superior. Colonial ethnography thus shaped not only the view of the Other, but also of the Self.[13] It is from her as well that I take inspiration in identifying (proto-) racism as a response to cultural anxiety.[14] Although Stoler deals primarily with the nineteenth century, she stresses that the roots of its racism lie in the sixteenth century, and particularly in the aforementioned discrimination of *conversos*.[15]

With these caveats, I see the foundation laid for my analytical use of race, sex, and gender in the following. Gender will only play a minor role, complementing sex where they most strongly overlap. The primary focus will instead be on the bond between sex and race – sex as the discourse specifying bodily characteristics pertinent to assigning a sex role, and race as a discourse differentiating and grouping human beings based on another set of bodily characteristics that includes sex. In this, the latter category must be recognised as still being formulated during the period in question. The following examples shall serve to show how this process played out and to attempt a partial answer to the questions raised in the beginning.

13 Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's* History of Sexuality *and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1995), 4-7, 22, 39.
14 Ibid., 31f.
15 Ibid., 26f, 50-52.

"LARGE NATURAL PARTS" – MASCULINE BODIES OF *MOROS* AND *MORISCOS*

The inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula had known Muslim groups ever since those had overrun the Visigothic Kingdom in the eight century. Thus, Muslims had been present both as enemies of and as subjects within the kingdoms that arose from the so-called Christian reconquest of Iberia. Due to this long acquaintance, the corpus of Spanish sources on the varied peoples lumped together as *moros*[16] is as large as for few other ethnic groups. Here, however, I will examine only two exemplary cases, both from court records.

The first has gained some fame due to its uniqueness, and considering the extensive discussion it has already received, I will treat it only shortly. It is the inquisitorial case led in 1587/88 against someone calling themselves Eleno de Céspedes.[17] Although the authorities

16 On the complete equation of all Muslim-adherent ethnicities, see Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra, *La imagen de los musulmanes y del Norte de Africa en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII: Los caracteres de una hostilidad* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1989), 69, 76, 102.
17 I will not attempt an interpretation of Eleno's self-image here. For various attempts at this, see e.g. Israel Burshatin, "Elena Alias Eleno: Genders, Sexualities, and 'Race' in the Mirror of Natural History in Sixteenth-Century Spain," in: *Gender Reversals and Gender Cultures: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 105-122; Israel Burshatin, "Interrogating Hermaphroditism in Sixteenth-Century Spain," in: *Hispanisms and Homosexualities*, eds. Sylvia Molloy, Sylvia and Robert McKee Irwin (Durham, London: Duke

stubbornly insisted on calling him "Elena," I will use the pronouns and name he himself specified in his own testimonies. Assigned female at birth and brought before the Inquisition because he had been found in a seemingly sodomitical marriage to a woman, Eleno related that he had indeed once been a woman. Over the course of his life, however, a penis and testicles had sprouted from his loins, and he had perceived himself and lived as a man ever since.[18] Within the one-sex model adhered to in the sixteenth century, this would, so far, not be out of the ordinary. Natural sex changes due to fluctuations in the bodily heat were thought fully possible, though only ones from feminine to masculine, from less to more perfection.[19] The real problem of Eleno's case, however, lay in the details.

Doubts had first been cast on Eleno's sex by the vicar officiating his wedding, who had thought Eleno a eunuch because of his beardless cheeks.[20] Two doctors had then examined Eleno, and given approval for his marriage due to him having a penis that was "well-proportioned to his body"[21] and "testicles shaped like those of any man."[22] Eleno even drew a line on paper to show the inquisitors the size of his member (fig. 1). When the examination was repeated for the trial, however, neither penis nor testicles were found, but only a vagina. Eleno explained this by his masculine parts having been injured and then amputated following a riding accident; the doctors claimed to have been deceived by witchcraft during the first examination.[23] One observation to be made from this is that in spite of their ambiguity, genitals played a large role in the official assignment of sex to an individual.[24] Another is that with

University Press, 1998), 3-18; Israel Burshatin, "Written on the Body: Slave or Hermaphrodite in Sixteenth-Century Spain," in: *Queer Iberia: Sexualities, Cultures, and Crossings from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, eds. Josiah Blackmore and Gregory S. Hutcheson (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1999), 420-456; Richard Cleminson and Francisco Vázquez García, *Sex, Identity and Hermaphrodites in Iberia, 1500-1800* (London, Brookfield: Pickering & Chatto, 2013), 46-50; Patricia Simons, *The Sex of Men in Premodern Europe: A Cultural History* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 27-33; François Soyer, *Ambiguous Gender in Early Modern Spain and Portugal: Inquisitors, Doctors and the Transgression of Gender Norms* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012), 50-95.

18 Sara Cano Fernández e.a. (eds.), *La máscara infame: Actas de la inquisición a Eleno de Céspedes* (Madrid, Zaragoza: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2010), 5-40. For a problematisation of the term "sodomy" and an overview of the literature on it, see Florian Wieser, " '... und ich weiß, dass sie alle Sodomiten sind': Diskurse von Macht, Männlichkeit und Homosexualitäten in Darstellungen des frühkolonialen Neuspanien (Mexiko)," in: *Invertito. Jahrbuch für die Geschichte der Homosexualitäten* 19 (2017): 9-39.

19 Cleminson and Vázquez García, *Sex, Identity and Hermaphrodites*, 12-15, 41; Laqueur, *Making Sex*, 101, 106, 127.

20 Cano Fernández e.a. (eds.), *La máscara infame*, 13f, 30.

21 Ibid., 50: "bien proporcionado as su cuerpo." Here and in the following, translations are mine, unless stated otherwise.

22 Ibid., 15: "testiculos como los de cualquier hombre."

23 Ibid., 16f, 21, 34-38.

24 Laqueur, *Making Sex*, 135, 138 and Soyer, *Ambiguous Gender*, 286 argue that self-perception played no role in such cases, but only the body and most of all penis and testicles. Thus, even eunuchs were denied the status of men, see also Edward Behrend-

disbelief and accusations mounting against Eleno, his race reveals its role in the case.[25]

Eleno was described as being "of *mulatto* colour,"[26] with "a slave who was black and [...] of the gentile caste" for a mother.[27] What this comes down to is that he was viewed as *morisco* by his judges.[28] As such, certain elements ascribed to Islam were considered anchored in Eleno's body from birth, including associations with unnatural sexuality and witchcraft.[29] This kind of thinking is also shown vividly in the 1606 pamphlet *Retrato de un môstruo*, a tale of male pregnancy caused by sorcery set in a *morisco* community.[30] Thus, the same sex-race associations appear in Eleno's formal court case and in a popular anti-*morisco* polemic two decades later. However, even when referencing images of infidels and witches, the Inquisition ultimately failed to prove its main accusations against Eleno. He was only sentenced to a whipping and forced labour at a hospital, avoiding the fiery death that awaited witches and sodomites.[31]

The second subject I examine was less lucky. Convicted of sodomy and subsequently burned at the stake in 1616, the story of the Turkish slave named Hamete (or, after his last-minute baptism, Juan) is recorded by his confessor, Friar Pedro de León.[32] A little boy he had raped had denounced Hamete to the authorities. During the interrogations that followed, he then revealed a number of other men involved in a strange case of same-sex prostitution. Having previously committed the nefarious sin of sodomy with an unnamed Spanish nobleman for money, Hamete had helped this man search for "a pair of Moors or Turks who were very potent to buy and keep them for this accursed act," further specified as

Martínez, "Manhood and the Neutered Body in Early Modern Spain," *Journal of Social History* 38 (2005): 1073-1076, 1084f. It is interesting that Simons, *Sex of Men*, 29f gives the beard equal importance to genitalia, since this was the very characteristic with which Eleno's case began.

25 Soyer, *Ambiguous Gender*, 94 states that Eleno's claim would have been medically possible. See also Simons, *Sex of Men*, 29 suggesting this was dismissed based on racial prejudice, and Cleminson and Vázquez García, *Sex, Identity and Hermaphrodites*, 45f comparing Eleno's case to that of another person of fluid sex who defended themselves by pointing to their Old Christian heritage.

26 Cano Fernández e.a. (eds.), *La máscara infame*, 16: "de color mulata."

27 Ibid., 26: "esclava, que era negra y [...] de casta de gentiles." *Gentiles* here means non-Christians.

28 On the virtual equation of *moros* and *moriscos* in spite of their religious affiliation, see Bernard Vincent, "The Moriscos and Circumcision," in *Culture and Control in Counter-Reformation Spain*, eds. Anne J. Cruz and Mary Elizabeth Perry (Minneapolis, Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 88, 90.

29 Mary Elizabeth Perry, *The Handless Maiden: Moriscos and the Politics of Religion in Early Modern Spain* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 9n16, 56n69.

30 Pedro Manchego (?), *Retrato de un môstruo, que se engendro en un cuerpo de un hombre, que se dize Hernando dela Haba, vezino del lugar de Fereyra, Marquesado de Cenete, de unos hechizosque le dieron* (Barcelona: Sebastián de Cormellas, 1606). See also the discussion of the text in Sherry Velasco, *Male Delivery: Reproduction, Effeminacy, and Pregnant Men in Early Modern Spain* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006), 85-87.

31 Cano Fernández e.a. (eds.), *La máscara infame*, 77-84.

32 Fr. Pedro de León: *Grandeza y miseria en Andalucía: Testimonio de una encrucijada histórica*, ed. Pedro Herrera Puga (Granada: Facultad de Teología de la Universidad de Granada, 1981), 589-592.

"having large natural parts."[33]

At this point, Friar Pedro himself felt compelled to state his astonishment that a Spaniard, even one as depraved as a sodomite, would want to *be* penetrated by a *moro*.[34] Furthermore, it is interesting to see a marker of the masculine body, namely the penis, showcased so clearly here. Noted as exceptional, the size of these penises connects to the race of their bodies, a stereotype still alive today. Thus, this "pair of Moors or Turks" was at the same time marked as emasculated by their sodomy and as hyper-masculine due to their physical endowment. This was not a contradiction in Early Modern Spain. There was no heterosexual and homosexual desire in its discourse; instead, all lust formed a single spectrum. Every man felt lust, and thus, every man could, if he let that sinful desire take him too far, fall into sodomy, itself the pinnacle of lust.[35] Therefore, an overabundance in sexual prowess actually put a man in more rather than less danger of becoming unmasculine; excess devotion to women and the pleasures they offered could itself turn a man into an effeminate rather than a stud.[36]

The origin of such sexual tendencies lay not only in the outward shape of the body (itself racially determined), but also, as with Eleno's association with witchcraft, in a more deeply inscribed racial character. Thus, Friar Jaime Bleda in his history of the Andalusian Moors stated that, because Arabia stood under particular astrological influence of Venus, excessive lust was inherent to the *moros* by birth and descent.[37] Shaped by such factors, the *moro* male body was imagined as intrinsically beautiful, erotic, and seductive in its mixture of effeminacy and hyper-masculinity.[38] Contemporaries like Antonio de Sosa framed this racial trait as threatening, fearing that *moros* would use their wiles to seduce Christians into Islam and build whole harems of male apostates.[39] Thus it becomes all the more apparent how Eleno de Céspedes, who changed sex back and forth and married first a man as a woman and then a woman as a man, was seen as a personification of everything dangerous about the *moro*. This danger lay in the *moro*'s body itself, which was interpreted by the Spanish according to preconceived notions that made treachery and libido inherent to it. In the following, I want to compare these notions to those formed around another set of masculine bodies: those of Native American *indios*.

33 Ibid., 589: "un par de moros o turcos que fuesen muy potentes," "moros o turcos que tuviesen grandes naturales."
34 Ibid., 592.
35 Wieser, " '... und ich weiß ...' ," 17, 17n32.
36 Behrend-Martínez, "Manhood and the Neutered Body," 1075; Laqueur, *Making Sex*, 123.
37 Fr. Jaime Bleda, *Coronica de los moros de España* (València: Felipe Mey, 1618), 19f.
38 José R. Cartagena Calderón, *Masculinidades en obras: El drama de la hombría en la España imperial* (Newark: Juan de la Cuesta, 2008), 97.
39 Antonio de Sosa (wrongly attributed to Diego de Haedo), *Topografía e historia general de Argel* (Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1927), 52f, 76, 176.

"PHLEGMATIC BY NATURE" - MASCULINE BODIES OF *INDIOS*

The bodily peculiarities of the *indio* provoked discussion in Spain from the first moment on. Christopher Columbus already described the Caribbean natives as having "handsome bodies and good faces" and thus making "good and intelligent servants."[40] This connection between the mind, body, and servitude of the *indio* was to continue for a long time after. Law, theology, and philosophy were drawn upon to decide whether their bodies and mores, both seen as effeminate, marked the *indios* as "natural slaves." Only if they could be proven inherently lesser, could their full enslavement be justified.[41] The Early Modern conflation between being male and being human played a decisive role in this debate. Linguistically, *hombre* still meant both "man" and "human" at this point,[42] and anatomically, as pointed out above, woman was herself only seen as a failed man. Both because of the medical theory of inversion and because of her creation from man's rib, woman owed her very humanity to her similarity to man.[43] In fact, masculine behaviour was something respected and esteemed in women in Early Modern Spain. It made them rank higher on the scale of human perfection. Effeminate men were meanwhile seen as all the more shockingly perverted; even an inborn, purely bodily effeminacy like having fair hair was considered to increase the risk of sodomy.[44]

The Native American body was seen as just such a problem of inherent effeminacy. Generally lacking beards and often long-haired, the *indios* seemed an altogether sexless people, and all the more alien because of it.[45] This did not only call the *indios*' humanity into question but made fixing the sex role of an individual as such an issue. A letter addressed to Emperor Charles V by *conquistador* Beltrán Nuño de Guzmán during his 1530 campaign in Northern Mexico exemplifies the confusion and frustration this caused the Spanish.[46] During a skirmish with

40 Christopher Columbus, *The* Diario *of Christopher Columbus's First Voyage to America 1492-1493: Abstracted by Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas*, transcr. and transl. Oliver Dunn and James E. Kelley, Jr. (Norman, London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 66-69 (fol. 9r-v, October 10th): "fermosos cuerpos y mūy buenas caras," "buenos s[er] uidores y de buē ingenio," translated by Dunn and Kelley.

41 For a full discussion of the function of discourses de- and re-humanising the *indios*, see Wieser, " '... und ich weiß ...' ."

42 Covarrubias Orozco, *Tesoro*, Vol. 1, fol. 475r-v. Commented upon by Behrend-Martínez, "Manhood and the Neutered Body," 1073.

43 Laqueur, *Making Sex*, 97.

44 Cleminson and Vázquez García, *Sex, Identity and Hermaphrodites*, 12f; Soyer, *Ambiguous Gender*, 18, 22f.

45 Alex Kerner, "Beard and Conquest: The Role of Hair in the Construction of Gendered Spanish Attitudes towards the American Indians in the Sixteenth-Century," *Revista de Historia Iberoamericana* 6 (2013): 105.

46 The passage I examine has previously been discussed in the controversial Richard C. Trexler, *Sex and Conquest: Gendered Violence, Political Order, and the European Conquest of the Americas* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1995), 68, 88, where Trexler calls it proof of pederasty among the Aztecs. This conclusion must be rejected on two grounds: Firstly, the strong political motivations of Nuño de Guzmán make his writings doubtful as a source on actual cultural fact, and, secondly

the Spanish, a number of *indios* had entrenched themselves on a small island in a river. Among them was an apparently female warrior who "fought [...] so well and so spirited [...] that all were in admiration to see such heart and strength in a woman."[47] Ultimately, the Spanish took the island and captured the warrior. That was when Nuño de Guzmán realised that the warrior was "a man in woman's clothing."[48] How masculinity was ascertained here is not stated precisely, only that it could be "seen."[49] When asked why they were dressed this way, the warrior replied that it was because they had served men as a sexual passive "since boyhood."[50] Nuño de Guzmán then had them burned on the spot. This is not an isolated case, though the only one involving martial prowess. In more peaceful roles, such "cross-dressed men" appear all over early Spanish accounts (fig. 2).[51]

On the surface, this seems like a matter of gender and sexuality rather than sex and race, of a *behaviour*, not a *body*. Yet the fact that the warrior was accepted as a woman from afar, then "seen to be a man" upon closer inspection, shows us what a role the material body must have played in this situation. The body determined whether an action was conforming and correct, or not. For example, in the 1617 case of the sex-changing nun María Muñoz, suspicion was also first raised by María's martial, masculine behaviour and not by any visible change of the body.[52] Furthermore, within the Early Modern logic, behaviour was both caused by the bodily humours and influenced them in turn. Laqueur explains how actions affected body temperature, which then affected the physical manifestation of sex.[53]

Meanwhile, sympathetic clerics like Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas tried to explain away the disconcerting gender presentation of the *indios* through recourse to their anatomy. Las Casas stressed very strongly that the wearing of femininely gendered attire by masculinely sexed *indios* "cannot have been for the exercise of this

and more damningly, the described event takes place far outside the actual cultural territory of the Aztecs. For a full discussion of same-sex phenomena in Aztec culture see Wieser, " '... und ich weiß ...' " and as a summary of previous literature Caroline Dodds Pennock, *Bonds of Blood: Gender, Lifecycle, and Sacrifice in Aztec Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 141-154.

47 Beltrán Nuño de Guzmán, "Carta á su magestad del Presidente de la Audiencia de Méjico, Nuño de Guzman, en que refiere la jornada que hizo á Mechuacan, á conquistar la provincia de los tebles-chichimecas, que confina con Nueva España (8 de Julio de 1530)," in: *Colección de documentos inéditos, relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas en América y Oceanía, sacados de los Archivos del Reino, y muy especialmente del de Indias*, Vol. 13 (Madrid: José María Pérez, 1870), 367: "peleó [...] tan bien y tan animosamente [...], de que todos estaban admirados ver tanto corazon y esfuerzo en una muger."

48 Ibid.: "un hombre en ábito de muger." I will refer to the warrior by the neutral pronoun "they," since their address as a man is an outside ascription. Unlike with Eleno, there is no testimony by them on how they perceived their sex and gender themselves.

49 Ibid., 367f: "bióse ser hombre."

50 Ibid., 368: "desde chequito."

51 See Trexler, *Sex and Conquest*, 66 for a number of examples.

52 Cleminson and Vázquez García, *Sex, Identity and Hermaphrodites*, 16

53 Laqueur, *Making Sex*, 126

ugly sin [of sodomy]."[54] Instead, he argued, their situation:

> agrees well with what Galen says [...], that many of the Scythians [...] are like eunuchs, unable to be married, because of which they exert all the offices of women [...]. The reason for falling into this state [...] seems to come from the [...] custom of horseback riding [...]. Because this causes them certain pains [...], they bleed themselves from two veins below the ears [...]; [and these veins] are of such nature that bleeding them causes sterility. [...] This is what may have happened to those *indios* which have been seen in the clothes of women [...], not because of horseback riding, but maybe because of all the blood which they sacrifice [...] from their ears [...].[55]

Even while seeking to justify and protect the *indios*, Las Casas thus contributed to a discourse of the weak and inferior Native American body. However, that discourse and the problem of *indio* masculinity that it sought to address went deeper than just dress. This strange masculinity appeared imperfect not just in performance, but also in its physical manifestation as sex. This was most obvious in the *indios*' beardlessness.[56] I have shown the importance of facial hair in sex assignment with the case of Eleno de Céspedes already. With hair growing only on the head for many Native American ethnicities, a deeper investigation appeared necessary to contemporaries. For instance, two Spanish thinkers, Juan de Cárdenas in the late sixteenth and Friar Gregorio García in the early seventeenth century, each devoted an entire chapter in their works to the beardlessness of the *indios*. A main concern of theirs was that the leading explanation for any bodily characteristic during their time was geographic. Weather, temperature, and astrological alignment (as with Venus and Arabia above) were thought to shape a country's inhabitants. This, then, roused the fear that if the *indios*, perceived as weak and feminine, were so because of their environment, America could have its Spanish colonists suffering a similar fate.[57]

Both Cárdenas and Friar Gregorio thus sought alternative

54 Fr. Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Apologética historia de las Indias*, ed. Manuel Serrano y Sanz (Madrid: Bailly, Bailliére é Dijos, 1909), 475: "puede haber sido no por fin de usar aquel feo pecado."

55 Ibid.: "se prueba bien por lo que dice Galeno [...], que munchos de los scitas [...] son como eunucos, inhábiles para ser casados, por lo cual hacen todos los oficios de las mujeres [...]. La causa de venir á caer en él [...] parece ser de la [...] costumbre de andar á caballo [...], porque les vienen ciertos dolores [...] sángranse de ambas á dos venas detrás de las orejas [...]; [y las venas] son de tal naturaleza que sagrándolas causan esterilidad [...]. Así que desta manera pudo acaecer á los indios que en hábitos de mujeres [...] sen han visto, no por andar á caballo, sino por la mucha sangre, quizá, que se sacaron de las orejas [...]."

56 Kerner, "Beard and Conquest," 108.

57 Jorge Cañizares Esguerra, "New World, New Stars: Patriotic Astrology and the Invention of Indian and Creole Bodies in Colonial Spanish America, 1600-1650," *American Historical Review* 104 (1999), 34-37.

explanations that would affirm their countrymen's masculinity and explain the effeminate hairlessness of the *indios*. Cárdenas offered that "the *indio* is phlegmatic by nature."[58] This nature had been acquired in remote antiquity, when the *indios* had lived unsettled lives and the harsh weather had made their skin too tough for hair to penetrate.[59] Friar Gregorio, meanwhile, suggested that the hot climate of America had used up the humour needed for hair production over a long time, which had also caused them to be "of little strength and vigour, not very corpulent, not made for too much labour, of little ingenuity for letters, effeminate, and pusillanimous."[60] In both cases, the Spanish colonists were safe from environmental emasculation. Even if America was accepted as a feminine land as such, the effeminacy of the *indios* was caused only by the coincidence of that environmental femininity with an inborn one they had acquired long before.[61]

Arguments like these codified Spaniards and *indios* as inherently racially different. Nonetheless, to make their souls saveable and preserve the logic of God's creation, Native Americans had to be accepted as human at least.[62] They were even assigned a position in the racial hierarchy more positive than that of the *moros* – weak and dependent like women, yet not as dangerously oversexed as raving Muslim sodomites. However, the further expansion of the Spanish Empire led to contact with ever more populations to challenge such systematisations. The following example from the Philippines shows how these categories had to cope with new situations and were ultimately used to fold the whole world into a single racial system.

INDIOS Y ENEMIGOS – MASCULINE BODIES OF THE VISAYANS

When Spain conquered the Philippines in the late sixteenth century, they found peoples closer to the mythical India that gave the *indios* their name, yet less "innocent" than them: Certain Filipino groups were already staunch Muslims instead of malleable pagans. Thus, the colonial imaginations of *moro* and *indio* clashed and mingled as the Spanish considered these peoples, making the racial order solidify and become increasingly self-explanatory. Ethnicities were assigned to the stereotypes of *moro* and *indio* based on religious affiliation, and their behaviours and looks derived as much from that as actually observed.

58 Juan de Cárdenas: *Primera parte de los problemas y secretos marauillosos de las Indias* (Museo Nacional de Arqueología, Historia y Etnología: Mexico City, 1913), 167: "el indio de su propia naturaleza es flematico."
59 Ibid., 169.
60 Fr. Gregorio García, *Origen de los indios de el Nuevo Mundo, e Indias Occidentales* (Pedro Patricio Mey: València, 1607), 150, 161: "de poca fuerça y vigor, no muy corpulentes, para poco trabajo; de poco ingenio para letras, afeminados y pusilanimes."
61 Cañizares Esguerra, "New World, New Stars," 39, 60f.
62 Wieser, " '... und ich weiß ...' ," 29f.

One conspicuous fact is that the Spanish tended to describe their allies as taller and more light-skinned than their enemies.[63] In general, skin colour and the presence or absence of a beard were prime characteristic in assigning a Filipino group to a Spanish-defined race.[64] Out of this great diversity, I have chosen one example to examine in detail: the Visayan people and the penis jewellery they wore, the *sacra*.

Among the pre-Christian Visayans, every male was expected to have his penis perforated during boyhood so that a small rod could be inserted and an adorned ring fastened to that (fig. 3).[65] This is again more behaviour than physical trait, but it resonates strongly with my previous discussion of bodies. The *sacra* had no clear point of reference in Spanish experience, yet it provoked scandalised reactions. The Jesuit Francisco Ignacio Alzina called it "very dirty" and the deaths sometimes caused by it "just punishment from God."[66] As I have shown so far, intact and unquestionable masculinity was intrinsically important to the Early Modern Spanish conception of humanity as such. The modification of the penis was thus tantamount to sacrilege.

All the more surprising it may seem then that while the *sacra* as such was condemned, it was not used to demonise the Visayans themselves, but in fact excused and explained away. This becomes more comprehensible when one realises that the Visayans were pagans and on good terms with the Spanish. They were thus *indios*, and *indios* and *moros* in the Philippines had clear roles: the ones to be converted, the others to be expelled.[67] As *indios*, the Visayans were superficially deluded into sin, but ultimately saveable. Alzina thus offered two explanations for their use of the *sacra*: On the one hand, it was a test of courage, and thus actually proof of masculinity; on the other, it was a concession towards the exorbitant lust of Visayan women, who received additional stimulation when their partner wore the *sacra*. Thus, the whole practice was "not so much for the men as for the women."[68]

Altogether, the Visayans were actually *less* lustful than

63 William Henry Scott, *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 17f.

64 Carmen Y. Hsu, "Acerca de la representación del archipiélago filipino en los 'Sucesos' de Antonio de Morga," *Hispanófila* 157 (2009): 121; Antonio de Morga, *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, ed. José Rizal (Paris: Libreria de Garnier Hermanos, 1890), 258.

65 For source accounts of the practice consulted here, see Francisco Ignacio Alzina, *Historia natural de las Islas Bisayas*, ed. Victoria Yepes (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1996), 32f; Fr. Juan de Medina, *Historia de los sucesos de la orden de N. Gran P. S. Agustin de estas Islas Filipinas, desde que se descubrieron y se poblaron por los españoles, con las noticias memorables* (Manila: Chofré y Comp, 1893), 58f; Morga, *Sucesos*, 309. For a comparative discussion, see Scott, *Barangay*, 24f.

66 Alzina, *Historia natural*, 32f: "muy soez," "justo castigo de Dios."

67 Eberhard Crailsheim, "Wandel und Ambivalenz der Darstellung der 'Moros' auf den kolonialspanischen Philippinen (16.-17. Jahrhundert)," in: *Saeculum* 64 (2004), 29, 31; Scott, *Barangay*, 6-8.

68 Alzina, *Historia natural*, 32f: "no tanto de parte de los hombres cuanto de las mujeres."

other peoples, Alzina wrote, and this measured temperament of theirs was rooted in their bodies.[69] That their women, libidinous like those everywhere,[70] could even tempt them that far was, so argued the Augustinian Friar Juan de Medina, due to the Visayans having previously been ruled by Muslims. In Islam, after all, no sin was forbidden. Where Christianity was helping the Visayans to leave their sinful customs behind, Islam had actually reaffirmed them.[71] This shows how far the dichotomy between Filipino peoples was sharpened so that they would fit into the Spanish worldview. The Philippine *moros* were fully divorced from their homeland, seen not as natives, but as the descendants of the expelled Andalusian Moors themselves.[72] *Moros* were considered bloodthirsty corsairs, pagans like the Visayans innocent victims, fully fitting their role as *indios*. How far this strayed from reality is shown by comparison with Chinese accounts, which knew the Visayans as fierce pirates themselves.[73]

Bodies with fixed sex and race were thus assigned to the different Filipino ethnicities based on their behaviours, and their behaviours explained based on their sex and race. Thus, the sex-race matrix of the Early Modern Spanish lent itself to a circular, self-fulfilling logic. Viewed from within, it was without gap and served effectively to simplify the increasingly complex, global world of empire, making it both less threatening and easier to administrate.

CONCLUSIONS

I believe that my findings both underline and broaden the ideas of globalised experience and national response raised in the debate between Adelman and Drayton and Motadel. The expanded horizons of the Early Modern world were uncomfortable even to the European powers that were becoming dominant within it, at least until they could assimilate that world into models of thought that reassured the colonisers in their perceived superiority. A centrally important part of this process was the sex-race matrix, a self-affirming discourse that explained sex through race and race through sex and all behaviours and cultures through sex-race interplay. Closest to this matrix, always inseparable from sex, was gender, and thus I suggest imagining these three factors as the axes of a three-dimensional coordinate system, the social esteem of an individual being represented by how high their coordinates were (fig. 4). The axis of sex is the one-sex model, with man as the highest and woman as the lowest

69 Francisco Ignacio Alzina, *Una etnografía de los indios bisayas del siglo XVII*, ed. Victoria Yepes (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1996), 124, 131.
70 Pointed out as such in ibid., 132f.
71 Medina, *Historia de los sucesos*, 58f.
72 Morga, *Sucesos*, 316, discussed in Crailsheim, "Wandel und Ambivalenz," 30 and Hsu, "Acerca de la representación," 120.
73 William Henry Scott, *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain and Other Essays in Philippine History* (Quezon City: New Day Publishing, 1982), 21.

point, and all manner of curiosities in-between. The axis of gender posits woman in a benign middle, between perfect man and abominable effeminate.[74] Lastly, the axis of race was undergoing change in the era in question. Had it previously known only Christians and non-Christians, the Self and Other, it was now becoming ever more complex. Out of the racial categories I have been able to address here, the Spanish themselves of course ranked highest, with the weak but ultimately good *indios* below and the unsaveable *moros* at the bottom.[75]

By the end of the seventeenth century, all three axes were already changing further, as new ideologies like empiricism affected them. The one-sex model was replaced by the hard male-female binary, and proto-racism by racism proper, an intricate affair of catalogues and skull measurements. Thus, this historical "scene," momentary as it may be, takes a marked role in the larger development of racist ideology, exemplified by its relationships to the body, the sexual, and the global.



FIG. 1
Line drawn in the court protocol to indicate the size of Eleno de Céspedes's penis. Source: Soyer, *Ambiguous Bodies*, 64.

74 See also Wieser, " '... und ich weiß ...' ," 19.
75 The most important groups not addressed here are the *judíos* (Jews) and *negros* (Black Africans) as well as the perceived difference between the Spanish and other Europeans. I intend to develop this model further to include them in my future work.

FIG. 2
Possible depiction of a *xochihua* (right), an Aztec social role possibly filled by masculinely sexed persons wearing femininely gender clothing. Source: Fr. Bernardino de Sahagún: *Historia general de las cosas de nueva España*, Vol. 10, fol. 25v, in: World Digital Library: https://www.wdl.org/en/item/10096/view/3/66/ [07/13/2019].

FIG. 3
Fragment of a drawing of a *sacra*. Source: *Boxer Codex*, fol. 41r, in: Indiana University Digital Library: http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/metsnav3/general/index.html#mets=http%3A%2F%2Fpurl.dlib.indiana.



FIG. 4
Visualisation of the relationships between Early Modern Spanish conceptions of race, sex, and gender in the form of a three-dimensional coordinate system. Source: own work.

The Struggle between Communism and Zionism: Jewish Identity between Class and State in Revolutionary Russia and Historic Palestine

by
MIRJAM LIMBRUNNER

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the 19th century, Jewish-Socialist Russians have played a major part in the development of Zionist thinking and the establishment of Israel. However, their idea of building a Jewish State in Palestine was fiercely opposed by non-Jewish Russian Socialist on the one hand and by anti-Socialist Zionists on the other. How did these Russian Jews reconcile their Socialist ideology with their Zionist identity? And, after many of them had emigrated to Palestine, how did it influence their relationship with the Arabs and the British during the early 20th century? To understand the Socialist-Zionist worldview of that time, the emergence of modern political parties in the Tsarist Empire and the question of Jewish alignments during the Bolshevik revolution will be examined in the first part. The second section analyses Ber Borochov's early writing "The National Question and the Class Struggle" which attempts to build a synthesis between Marxism and Zionism—two hitherto opposing ideologies. Lastly, the fate of the Socialist-Zionist Poale Zion party in Ottoman and later Mandatory Palestine will be traced, looking at how it coped with the realities on the ground and with the Third Communist International.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mirjam Limbrunner completed her Undergraduate Degree at the University of Erfurt, Germany, where she studied International Relations and History. Before and during her studies, she traveled to Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Jordan several times. Recently, she spent a semester abroad at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and completed a Junior Scholar term at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is now doing her MA studies in International Criminology at Hamburg University.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ahdut HaAvoda
"Labour Union", Jewish Labour Union (1919-1930)

Bund
General Jewish Labour Bund (1897-1920)

Comintern
Third Communist International (1919–1943)

Hagana
"defense", Jewish defense organization and forerunner of the Israeli Defense Forces (1920-1948)

HaPoel Hatzair
"The Young Worker", Jewish workers' party (1905-1930)

Histadrut
Israeli General Federation of Trade Unions (1920 – present)

KPP
Komunistische Partey fun Palestine

PCP
Palestine Communist Party (1923-1943)

Poale Zion
"Workers of Zion", Socialist-Zionist workers movement in Russia, Palestine and other places in the Jewish diaspora (1903-1919)

WZO
World Zionist Organization, non-governmental organization promoting Zionism (1897 – present)

JNF
Jewish National Fund, Zionist Organization to buy and develop land in historic Palestine and later Israel (1901 – present)

YKP (Yevsektsiya)
anti-Zionist Jewish Section of the Soviet Communist Party (1918-1929)

Yishuv
Settlement", Jewish Population of Palestine before the foundation of Israel

INTRODUCTION

Israel is considered a Western-democratic and "americanophil" State, quite in contrast to the Arab region at large, that has received support from the Soviet Union and later Russia since the beginning of the Cold War. Since the end of the Second World War and the polarization into East and West Israel has been a close U.S.-American ally.[1] Even before that, the British involvement in pre-State Palestine is remembered mainly for their support of a Jewish homeland—one only has to think of such powerful statements as the Balfour Declaration. The Arab population in Palestine, on the other hand, let down by the British and the West, had found its "natural" ally in the Soviets. However, the situation in Palestine before 1948 was much more ambiguous than that. Since having spent some time in a kibbutz a few years back I have been aware of the Socialist traces in Israeli society and have heard some stories from third-generation Russian and other Eastern European immigrants whose ancestors came to Palestine as Socialists. However, Israel's rich Socialist Russian heritage seems to have been largely forgotten.

Long before Jewish immigrants from Western Europe and the United States arrived in large numbers, several generations of immigrants from Eastern Europe and Russia laid the groundwork for building the Israeli State, founded its first agrarian settlements and many of its institutions such as the Histadrut, the Israeli Trade Union. Countless of its leaders, among them David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir or Moshe Sharett, were born in the Russian Empire and experienced to some extent the beginnings of the revolutionary period. They arrived in Palestine not only as Zionists but as fervent Socialists. How did they adopt and reconcile these two ideologies in the first place? How did their worldview evolve after having arrived in Palestine, more specifically vis-à-vis the Yishuv, the Arab population, and the Communist International? And does this Socialist-Zionist history still matter today?

In this paper, I aim to examine Socialist-Zionism's ideological and political sustainability by answering the aforementioned questions. Therefore, the Socialist-Zionists' founding text—Borochov's *The National Question and the Class Struggle*—and the history of key organizations in both Tsarist Russia and Mandate Palestine, will be analyzed, ranging from the 1880s until the 1930s. I intend to draft a concise history of Socialist-Zionism both in Russia and Palestine by merging research from separate

1 According to the latest Congressional Research Service Report, "Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of military assistance from the United States since World War II." Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," *Federation of American Scientists,* updated August 7, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf; for bilateral treaties see e.g. "Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty" (1951) and "Agreement on industrial investment guaranty program" (1952).

scholarly fields[2] and including my own observations in order to contribute a new perspective to the debate about Zionism in the context of the current Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The paper is organized into three main sections:

The first and second parts deal with my first question, particularly how Zionist identities and Socialist ideologies came to be intertwined. The first section begins with describing the socio-economic situation as well as the emergence of modern political parties among the Tsarist Empire's Jewish population and ends with a brief outline of Jewish alignments during the Bolshevik revolution. All this historical backdrop is needed to fully contextualize Ber Borochov's early writing *The National Question and the Class Struggle,* which will be analyzed as an intermezzo part, so to speak. Borochov attempted to build a synthesis between Marxism and Zionism—two hitherto opposing ideologies. His writings constitute the most orthodox ideological basis of the Socialist-Zionist worldview. The third section sets out to discuss my further resulting questions, namely what happened to the Socialist-Zionists' ideology when faced with the realities in Palestine. The fate of the Palestinian Socialist-Zionist *Poale Zion* party will be traced. From its founding in 1906, continuing through the years leading up to World War I and during the British Mandate, the original *Poale Zion* passed through many inner-party splits and ideological transformations triggered by developments within the Yishuv, in regard to the Arab population as well as by its affiliation with the Communist International. Eventually, my conclusion addresses the question of whether and to what extent this Socialist Zionist history still bears value today, despite the fact that it can be considered a failed history. I argue that Socialist-Zionism was an unsustainable ideology due to the clashes between its theoretical foundations and the socio- and geopolitical realities in Mandate

2 Existing literature on Communism and Zionism could be divided into two different groups: works that are concerned with the Soviet-Internationalist perspective and those that focus on the Jewish-Zionist one. While they all contribute to a more diverse understanding of Zionism and point out the existence of different, non-hegemonic types of Zionism, they otherwise differ from each other in terms of scholarly interest. The former is usually set within a wider geopolitical context of Soviet policy towards the Middle East conflict and covers the time period from 1918/19 until or transcending the founding of the State of Israel (see e.g. Walid Sharif, "Soviet Marxism and Zionism," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977): 77–97; Johan Franzén, "Communism versus Zionism: The Comintern, Yishuvism, and the Palestine Communist Party," in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 36, no. 2 (Jan. 2007): 12-15). The latter, largely written by Western-Jewish historians, is set within a wider context of Jewish history, Antisemitism studies or the Jewish-Arab Conflict. It focuses either more or less exclusively on the pre-Palestine period in Russia until 1918/19 (see e.g. Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics. Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews*, *1862-1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1984)) or it only discusses the post-revolutionary period in Palestine (see e.g. Jacob Hen-Tov, *Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the British Mandate* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2012); Mario Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina: Nation und Klasse in der antikolonialen Revolution* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1975)). Lastly, the language barrier should be mentioned. Since I am neither a Russian- nor fluent Hebrew-or Arabic-speaker, my literature research was confined to English-speaking works and translations.

Palestine. While Socialist-Zionism was maybe an idiosyncratic but still feasible identity project in Eastern Europe, it failed to provide a viable framework for action on the ground. Despite its utopian nature, the paper concludes that Socialist-Zionist history is still relevant today since it opens up a new perspective on the current debate about Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

THE ROOTS OF SOCIALIST ZIONIST IN RUSSIA

1. THE EMERGENCE OF JEWISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM IN THE TSARIST EMPIRE

As the founding father of Communism, Karl Marx formulated the cornerstone of Socialist thinking about Zionism. Marx, who was himself born into a Jewish family, never identified as Jewish, neither in a religious nor a cultural sense, but still felt compelled to address the "Jewish Question" in his early writings. In line with his historic-materialist worldview he regarded as the cause for Anti-Semitism and Jewish isolation their economic attachment to capitalism and money. By giving up their bourgeois way of life, Marx proclaimed, Jews would be able to rid themselves of their minority status and would no longer be subjected to discrimination. From a communist point of view, being Jewish first and foremost represented a social class that was intimately linked to finance and trading. Within a classless society, however, there would be no more discrimination against any social or religious group, since everyone would adopt the same universal proletarian identity.[3]

Even though Marx had in mind nineteenth-century Western European Jewry when formulating his theories, they were later adopted by the early Soviets without many alterations. They did not, however, represent the reality of Jewish life in Russia. To understand the social, cultural background of those Russian-Jewish thinkers who laid the groundwork for socialist-Zionist movements in Palestine, one has to look at the situation of the Eastern Jewish population during the 1880s.

Even before the emergence of Herzl's political Zionism, Russian Jews adopted the conviction that a large-scale exodus and the building of a Jewish State was the only way to free the Jewish people. In Western Europe at the time, many Jews still felt very strongly about their national identities.[4] Jonathan Frankel and Walid Sharif both accentuate the fact that "the Jews in Russia [in contrast to the enlightened European Jewry] were still living in a quasi-feudal medieval society"[5] when Marxist thinking spread towards the end of the nineteenth century.

3 See Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Schocken Books, 2003); Walid Sharif, "Soviet Marxism and Zionism," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977): 77–97.
4 See Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*.
5 Sharif. "Soviet Marxism," 81. See also for Jewish Life in Tsarist Russia: Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*.

The majority of Eastern Jews lived in the ghettos of western Russia, called the Pale of Settlement. Only a fraction of Jews with higher education were given permission to live outside the Pale in cities like St. Petersburg and Moscow. The numbers of Jews living in poverty, isolation, and unemployment within the Settlement grew immensely throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and constituted more than half of world Jewry; 5.2 million according to the Russian Empire's census of 1897.[6] The Pale of Settlement was mostly made up of rural to town-sized communities, economically less developed and isolated from the Empire's cultural and political centers. With the population size grew the difficulty of finding employment, which was aggravated by the limited possibilities of geographical dispersion. The term *Luftmensch* was coined during this time, a Yiddish metaphor describing people living "on thin air"; mainly day laborers who did not have any steady means of income and were forced to move to wherever they could find a job for the day.[7] Slightly more than eighty percent of those Jews that did have an occupation were working in commerce and manufacture as the two single most Jewish-dominated sectors. With only 3% of peasants, agriculture constituted the most underrepresented vocational field among the Jewish population, whereas 56% of non-Jews were working in agriculture and only 16% in trading and manufacture.[8] Considering the Jewish occupational and economic realities that differed so enormously from that of the non-Jewish populations, it doesn't surprise much that Jewish socialists would soon realize that the popular socialist movements did not address many of the challenges the Jewish masses were facing and therefore saw the need to come up with a Jewish version of Socialism.

Russian-Jewish political activities during most of the nineteenth century were mainly confined to a small elite circle of the Jewish intelligentsia in St. Petersburg and its members were mostly occupied with philanthropic issues and trying to gain a favorable position in the eyes of the Tsar. Inherent in the way that this Jewish elite did politics was the belief that one had to work and network within the system and that the government eventually would find a solution to the Jewish Question. In that regard, the pogroms of 1881 constituted a watershed.[9] This unprecedented wave of overt anti-Semite violence lasted for about a year and affected more than 200 towns and villages inside the Pale. When the Russian government, instead of taking political action against antisemitism, legitimized the violent outbreaks and issued a new series of discriminatory decrees against Jews, known as

6 Cited in Robert E. Mitchell, *Human Geographies Within the Pale of Settlement* (New York, NY: Springer, 2018), 52.
7 Mitchell, *Human geographies,* 47-69.
8 Cited in Mitchell, *Human geographies,* 153.
9 See Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 49ff.

the May Laws of 1882, ambitions for emancipation and autonomy came to the forefront of the already established Jewish political life and spread among the hitherto un-politicized masses. The pogroms also triggered what is known in Israeli historiography as the *First Aliya*, the first—at least partly—organized wave of immigration into Ottoman Palestine, which was still considered small compared to the ones to come.

Mainly two political streams spread among Russian-Jewish communities: Socialism and Zionism. Both ideologies offered an alternative to waiting for change to be triggered from above or to retreat to traditional Judaism. Rather, they both promised radical social change through self-emancipation, a term that entered Russian-Jewish discourse through Leon Pinsker's pamphlet *Auto-Emancipation*, published in 1982.[10] In the beginning, Zionist organizations in Russia were directed towards the middle-class whereas socialist ideas corresponded with the communities of the poor Jewish masses. When the first Zionist Conference in Basle convened in 1897, most Zionists "would have angrily rejected any attempt to adulterate Zionism with Socialist ideas."[11] In fact, Zionism was regarded as anti-revolutionary and did not challenge the Tsar or the prevailing social system. The last Tsarist government, despite its anti-Semite policies, granted it semi-legal status, since it "saw an overlap between the objectives of Zionism and its own aspirations, such as keeping down the number of Jews"[12] and diverting their attention away from revolutionary anti-Tsarist movements. As for Jewish socialists, many of them became active in Russian Socialist movements and did not identify with Zionist ideas. To them, Zionism couldn't have been further away from their realities, something that was being brokered by the rich of Europe who were not concerned with the day-to-day struggles of the working class. Soon, however, many Jewish socialists felt that the Jewish masses faced difficulties that were not being addressed by the socialists' programs. Whereas the majority of populist Russian politics was directed towards the needs of workers and peasants, the Jewish communities struggled with high unemployment rates and anti-Semitism. Especially after Russian Socialist leaders failed to make a clear statement of solidarity with their Jewish comrades in the wake of the pogroms, Jewish socialists started to question their allegiances.[13] Socialism and Jewish nationalism began to merge into political movements such as the General Jewish Labor Union, in short, the Bund, which was founded in 1897 in Vilna and which would have a profound impact on the Socialist Zionists in Palestine in later years.

10 Ibid., 2ff.
11 Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 270.
12 Joseph Goldstein, "The Attitude of the Jewish and the Russian Intelligentsia to Zionism in the Initial Period (1897-1904)," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 64, no. 4 (Oct. 1986): 547.
13 Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics. Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews.*

2. INNER-JEWISH STRUGGLES IN REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA: THE BUND, THE SOCIALIST ZIONISTS, AND THE ASSIMILATIONISTS

With popular political parties spreading and gaining huge popularity within the Pale of Settlement, the Bundists did not remain uncontested for long. The Bund was mainly concerned with tending to the needs of the Jewish proletariat and mobilizing the Jewish masses against the oppressive Tsarist regime. Even though it demanded Jewish autonomy it fervently opposed the Zionists. There were instances when the Bundist press described Zionism as a fouling body "crawling toward the proletariat to get it to deviate from the path of the class struggle."[14] The Bund wanted its nationalist aspirations to be implemented on a federal basis within Russian territory, viewing Zionists as rejectionist, religious zealots.[15] Its main political agitator became the Socialist Zionists, who argued that the politics of the Bund did not go far enough—neither on the socialist nor on the nationalist spectrum—and therefore was not able to bring about any change for the Jewish proletariat that could never come to its full potential while remaining in Russia. After the Socialist Zionist *Poale Zion* party was founded, which will be discussed in detail in the next section, a violent inner-Jewish Socialist-Zionist battle broke out in which both parties struggled for majority votes from the Jewish masses in the Pale.[16]

It was to some extent due to the activities of the Bund as the more immediate danger to the Empire's integrity that more radical Socialist Zionist movements could flourish almost unrestrictedly in their early stages among Russian-Jewish communities. The Russian Socialists, on the other hand, did not see a big difference between the goals of the Bund and the Zionist endeavor. For them, both were ethnic-nationalistic, rejectionist movements that by proclaiming a false idea of socialism diverted the Jewish masses away from true internationalist class struggle. The Bund, however, challenged the integrity of a centralized Soviet State. Thus, Marvin S. Zuckerberg remarks in the preface to Bernard Goldstein's Memoir about life as a Bundist in Russian Poland: "As the great Russian early Social Democrat, Lenin's teacher, Plekhanov, once wittily put it—'Bundists?—Zionists who suffer from seasickness.'"[17] In hindsight—and from a less ideologically ridden standpoint—it is safe to say that there were indeed more commonalities between the Bund and the Socialist Zionists than either movement would have wanted to admit. The Bund

14 Cited in Goldstein, "The Attitude of the Jewish and the Russian Intelligentsia," 550.
15 See Sharif, "Soviet Marxism."
16 See Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 270-277.
17 Bernard Goldstein, *Twenty years with the Jewish Labor Bund: A memoir of interwar Poland*, ed. Marvin Zuckermann (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2016), xix.

might have opposed nationalism but was nationalistic in many ways. And the Bundists achievements in struggling for Jewish autonomy in different spheres of life laid the groundwork for many of the Socialist Zionists' later institutions in Palestine. Apart from full Jewish civil rights and a trade union, the Bund advocated a separate school system and laid the focus on the preservation of Jewish culture rather than religion when it came to educate its youth. First and foremost, it implemented for the first time Jewish self-defense units who evolved into well-organized militias during the revolutions in 1905 and 1918. Some leaders of Labor Zionist parties and youth movements such as Yitzhak Tabenkin and Simon Dubnow grew up inside Bundist structures in Tsarist Russia.[18]

As much as the Bundists and the left-wing Zionists struggled against each other, they both opposed the assimilationists which were mainly composed of the center and right-wing Jewish avant-garde, or—as the socialists would call them—the Jewish bourgeoisie. Their main argument against Zionism was that a Jewish national state and the estrangement from Russian nationality would only lead to further isolation of the Jews. In their eyes, Zionism was a religious-utopian, totally irrational endeavor that would only lead Jews away from Enlightenment and true progress in the civilized world. How could one build a Jewish autonomous and democratic state in backward Turkey if Jews were still struggling for civil rights in Europe? These Assimilationsts, despite being neither Zionists nor Socialists are being included here for two reasons: First—ironically enough—their assessment of Zionism reaches the same bottom-line as Marxist orthodoxy when stating that assimilation was "the only way to attain self-realization and social emancipation."[19] Second, the Jewish intelligentsia illustrates that even in the period following the pogroms of 1881-2 and lasting until the October Revolution, not all Jews could simply abandon their Russian-Jewish identities in exchange for radical socialist and/or Zionist ideals. Many Jews in this social stratum felt an emotional attachment to both their Jewish and Russian heritage and were still trying to reconcile both into a synthetic nationalist identity. Accounts of Leib Jaffe,[20] a very prominent Zionist leader who at the same time fostered many links into the Russian cultural elite throughout the revolutionary years, as well as Daniel Pasmanik,[21] also a Zionist, but a fervent supporter of the counter-revolutionary White movement, show that sometimes Russian-Jewish identities clearly transcended

18 See Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*. 40-84.

19 Goldstein, "the Jewish and the Russian Intelligentsia," 554.

20 See Brian Horowitz, "Russian-Zionist Cultural Cooperation, 1916-18: Leib Jaffe and the Russian Intelligentsia," *Jewish Social Studies* 13, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 87–109.

21 See Taro Tsurumi, "Jewish Liberal, Russian Conservative: Daniel Pasmanik between Zionism and the Anti-Bolshevik White Movement," *Jewish Social Studies* 21, no.1 (Fall 2015): 151-180.

socio-ethnic camps. Soon after the revolution, such complex identities constructs dissolved. As Brian Horowitz argues in his essay "What is "Russian" in Russian Zionism?: Synthetic Zionism and the Fate of Avram Idel'son" that: "1917-18 represented a tragic watershed. The Bolshevik victory ended an era. To succeed in the post-war era, one either had to transform oneself entirely or leave the scene."[22]

3. JEWISH ALIGNMENTS DURING THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Considering the fact that Jews made up only a small fragment of the general Russian population their actual impact on the October Revolution was perceived as disproportionally high. Demonstrations and violence against the revolutionaries would oftentimes turn into pogroms against Jews and therefore only exacerbated the Jewish problem.[23] This prevailing antisemitism among the "Whites" was an additional motivation for Jews to generally side with the Bolsheviks that were considered the least anti-Semitic among all of the political movements. It was a commonly held belief, not only among Jews in Russia but among the Labour Zionists in Palestine and the West, that the Russian revolution would finally solve the Jewish Question, glorifying the revolutionists as the saviors of the Jews freeing them from the oppression and backwardness of the Tsarist Empire.[24] Chaim Weizmann, one of the leading Zionists of the first generation, proclaimed in an article for the *Zionist Review* in 1917:

> The Russian Revolution is a landmark in Jewish history which promises a brighter future for our sorely-tried nation. Russia, which contains more than half of the Jewish population of the world within its borders, is passing from serfdom to freedom. The country in which a Jewish tradition—a complete Jewish life with its hopes and aspirations—has been built up is passing from a state of medieval reaction to that of extreme modern liberalism. Such, briefly, is the momentous change which is taking place.[25]

Since the support of the Pale regions was considered a strategically important factor in the Bolsheviks' war aims the military leadership played into these beliefs in order to recruit Jews into their ranks. A much smaller but still considerable number of middle-

22 Brian Horowitz, "What is "Russian" in Russian Zionism?: Synthetic Zionism and the Fate of Avram Idel'son," in *Russian idea - Jewish presence: essays on Russian-Jewish intellectual life*, (Brighton, Mass.: Academic Studies Press, 2013): 70.

23 See Oleg V. Budnitskiĭ, *Russian Jews between the Reds and the Whites, 1917-1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 34ff.

24 See Anita Shapira, "Labour Zionism and the October Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History* 24, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 626f.

25 Chaim Weizmann, "The Russian Revolution and Zionism," *The Zionist Review* 1, no. 1 (May 1917): 4.

class Jews feared the degeneration of Russian culture, morale, and economy under a revolutionary government which would, eventually, also threaten Jewishness and therefore sided with the White Movement. But also among the socialist Jewish movements, some remained critical of the Reds. As the Jewish socialist Bernard Goldstein describes in his memoir, many comrades felt drawn towards the Bolshevik ideology, which he saw as a rather concerning trend:

> The Bundist comrade who became pro-Bolshevik did not simply change his opinion. He suddenly became unrecognizable, an altogether different person. In the factional fight, betrayal, trickery, and disloyalty became his weapons. Painfully we witnessed how the Bund spirit of comradeship, the feeling of belonging to one family, began to dissipate. In its place came distrust and suspicion.[26]

Bolshevik ideology left no room for identities that comprised anything more or less than proletarian internationalism. As Budnit˘ s˘ kii sums up the outcome of the revolution, "[t]he Jews finally achieved equality . . . having ceased to be Jews."[27] Under the Bolshevik administration, Soviet Jews could take up any profession and even work as state officials, as long as they gave up all of their Jewish religious or cultural practices and devoted themselves only to the Soviet State. With the publication of the Balfour Declaration, however, the Zionist dream of a Jewish State in Palestine did not seem so utopian anymore. In addition—and contrary to all expectations—Anti-Semite discrimination under the Reds did not suddenly seize to exist. In fact, a new series of Jewish pogroms occurred immediately after the Bolsheviks took power from the provisional government in October. With this turn of events, the left-wing Zionists in Russia rapidly gained popularity at the expense of the Bundists. While the Bund was still clinging onto the hope of a normalization of events, urging their voters "to keep faith in Russia's future and in the Constituent Assembly,"[28] anti-Semitism by rampaging Bolshevik soldiers paired with worsening economic conditions and the prospect of a long hard winter impelled many former anti-Zionist socialist Jews to turn to the Zionists' promise of a brighter future in Palestine. The *Zionist Review* reported that during the October 1917—elections for the newly established Jewish communal authority in Moscow the general Zionists had gained three times as much support as any other Jewish party.[29] All this translated into the hitherto highest

26 Goldstein, *Twenty years with the Jewish Labor Bund,"* 10.
27 Budnitskiĭ, *Russian Jews between the Reds and the Whites,"* 412.
28 Michael Hickey, "Revolution on the Jewish Street: Smolensk, 1917," *Journal of Social History* 31, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 839.
29 "Moscow Elections," *The Zionist Review* 1, no. 7 (Nov. 1917): 167.

immigration numbers into Palestine by people that were hugely impacted by Socialist ideals— and highly motivated to put these ideals into practice. The "Third Alyia" came to be considered more radically left than the second immigration wave, at the turn of the century. Having experienced the turmoil and, eventually, the disappointment of the Russian revolution, these new immigrants wanted to finally bring their socialist vision of a Jewish state to life.[30]

MARXIST RATIONALE AND ZIONIST PATHOS: BER BOROCHOV AND THE *POALE ZION* PARTY PROGRAM

After having discussed the beginnings of popular political parties in the Pale of Settlement during the 1880s, it is time to introduce the establishment of the socialist Bund and its many struggles against inner- and outer-Jewish political opponents leading up to the Russian Revolution. The Jewish Social Democratic Labour Party, called in short *Poale Zion* (Hebrew for "Workers of Zion"), was founded in 1906, about a decade after the General Jewish Labour Union (Bund). It only gained significance in Palestine when the third wave of immigrants arrived after the end of the Revolution and World War I—the same year that Ber Borochov, *Poale Zion*'s most prominent figure, died.[31] It should be mentioned, before dealing with Borochov and his theories in greater detail, that the ideological spearhead of Socialist Zionism was, in fact, Nahman Syrkin. Even before Ber Borochov and the 1905 revolution he stirred outrage at Zionist congresses by presenting his Marxist views and disdain for the bourgeois lifestyle. Syrkin, however, was not remotely as successful in establishing a cohesive party program or enough support for his cause. He might have simply been slightly ahead of his time, as Frankel argues.[32]

Therefore, we are going to trace what could be considered the Socialist Zionist breakthrough thanks to "Borochovism" in the early nineteenth century. Just like the Bund came to be regarded in academic historiography as an eventual result of the "Haskala," the Jewish enlightenment period after the pogroms of 1881, "Borochovism" emerged during the first revolution in 1905. Frankel points out in his book that Ber Borochov was exceptionally central to the socialist Zionists' party doctrine and spirit, lending it his dynamism, charisma and ideological zeal, which stood in contrast to the other, more inclusive and collectively organized socialist groups. He further describes Borochov as "the peripatetic agitator and *referant*, the ever resourceful *teoretik* and indefatigable *praktik*, the party champion relentlessly exposing the doctrinal errors of

30 See Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 308-314.
31 See Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 329f.
32 See ibid., 133f.

rival organizations"[33]—hence the personified term "Borochovism" to describe the essence of orthodox Socialist Zionism. The first phase of Borochov's political career began when he had barely graduated high school, after meeting Menachem Ussishkin, one of the most famous Russian Zionists, for whom he worked as a very gifted spokesperson for the pro-Palestinian Zionist cause. In those beginning years, Borochov was touring all across the Pale of Settlement, holding speeches among workers and giving lectures in Jewish intelligentsia circles, constantly moving from one place to the next. He soon had made himself a name among the lower class as a "man of the people" who could sway even the most critical anti-Zionist in his favor, as well as in well-educated conservative-Zionist circles where he was respected for his debating skills and his expertise in philosophy and Jewish history. He remained in constant correspondence with Ussishkin, keeping him updated about the conditions and political landscape of every place he visited, eagerly awaiting further instructions by his employer and mentor.[34] As one might wonder, Borochov's Marxist ideology did not play a very dominant role during that early period in the public sphere. As Walter Laqueur implies, Borochov initially kept his socialist convictions separated from his work as a political agitator for the Zionist cause.[35] Only after the revolution of 1905, he began to openly adopt a revolutionary ideology, advocating a synthesis between Marxism and Zionism. Borochov managed to walk the fine line between stirring debate and objection, while never alienating himself completely from either the general Zionist or the Communists' camp. He made it his mission to prove with all his analytical might that Socialism and Zionism, hitherto considered as inherently opposing, were actually inherently intertwined and that one could not be reached without the other. To put it in other words, for him, Zionism was the Jewish pre-requisite for Socialism.

The National Question and the Class Struggle (1905) was published one year before Borochov formulated *Our Platform*, which was adopted as *Poale Zion*'s party program in Russia. Almost identical in their claims, Borochov's earlier work spells out his argument for the synthesis of Marxism and nationalism the most thoroughly, hence why I chose his "Nation and Class" essay to trace his line of thought, which became so essential for the *Poale Zion*'s ideological struggle in Palestine.

The fact that Borochov starts out his whole argumentation with a quote from Marx couldn't be more revealing. Large extracts of his essay could very easily be taken from a schoolbook on Marx' Historic Materialism: All men are bound by

33 Ibid., 330.
34 Ibid., 329ff.
35 Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 275f.

the relations of production between them and the quality of these relations creates a division of society into different classes. Classes are determined by the ownership of and access to the means of production. Due to these inequalities, the societal split exists largely between the bourgeoisie that own all means of production and the proletariat,

that has lost all ownership thereof. Borochov now transfers all that Marx said about class differences onto differences between societies. His first deviation from orthodox Marxist theory, therefore, is based upon the assumption that it can be considered "common knowledge" that several societies exist: "If this were not so, we could not speak of an English bourgeoisie, for example, and a German bourgeoisie or an American proletariat and a Russian proletariat. Then we would speak only of mankind as a whole, or at least of civilized humanity, and no more."[36] He argues that there exists a two-fold split of humanity: the split along class lines and the split along societies, the latter of which has so far been largely ignored by Marxism. These differences between societies "give rise to the whole national question." Just like class struggle, the national struggle aims at abolishing inequalities that arise not due to different *means of production* between classes but due to unequal *conditions of production* between societies. Most importantly, Borochov postulates that "[t]he national struggle is waged not for the preservation of cultural values but for the control of material possessions, even though it is very often conducted under the banner of spiritual slogans. Nationalism is always related to the material possessions of the nation, despite the various masks, which it may assume outwardly."

Borochov defines *conditions of production* as the material resources a society has at their disposal, namely territory, and deriving from that, the means to protect its territory, political institutions and so forth. However, he also remarks that over time the anthropological and historical distinctiveness of one social group influences these conditions of production as well. A society that is continuously subjected to the same conditions of production over time develops into a people. If peoples further acquire a group consciousness of their shared conditions of production they evolve into nations, being the more sophisticated version of peoples. According to Borochov, a feudal system cannot produce lasting national consciousness since it lacks "harmonious wholeness in the conditions of production." Only within a capitalist system nationalism in its more permanent form can develop. In this sense, Borochov breaks with the idea that nations are ancient, mythical

36 This and the following citations are taken from an English translation of Borochov's text: "The National Question and the Class Struggle by Ber Borochov 1905," Marxists Internet Archive Library website, accessed July 6, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/archive/borochov/1905/national-class.htm.

entities that exist on their own, which traditional Zionism, and most national narratives for that matter, were based upon. He states that "[t]hose who berate nationalism in general as something obsolete and reactionary, as a traditional thing, are remarkably shallow and ignorant"[37]—which is clearly aimed towards the Communist mainstream belief. To refute their most common argument against nationalism, he clearly distances himself and his idea of national consciousness from "nationalistic propaganda" of the oppressing ruling class. The difference is, he proclaims, that national thinking recognizes the disparities between classes within every social system, which nationalistic ideology tries to obscure. It is this entirely different concept of a nation which Borochov and Socialist Zionism postulate that will make it so difficult for them to accept the Communists' hostile attitude towards their efforts in Palestine. Borochov attacks the ideology of the socialist Bund very bluntly, accusing it of inconsistency from a historical materialist point of view: "To be concerned, however, about the struggle without considering the conditions of the struggle-base and the workplace is stupidity."

Lastly, in his essay, Borochov elaborates on the connection between nationalism and the proletariat. Each class, according to him, attaches different significance onto its national territory. For the landlords, being part of a nation means having a territorial property that translates into political power. For the great bourgeoisie the nation constitutes the "operating base" from which to struggle for domination of the world market and for the middle-class, a nation mainly provides a consumers' market. For the proletariat, however, national territory provides a secure workplace. Therefore, "[n]o one is bound to accept the widely spread fallacy, which claims that the proletariat really bears no relationship to the territory, and consequently possesses neither a national sense nor national interests." Consequently, the proletariat as the most vulnerable of the classes is especially concerned with the national question and the securing of sufficient conditions of production. Whenever "abnormal conditions of productions" prevail, such as the lack of a territory, the national question becomes more acute and the struggle between classes subsides. Only as long as "normal" conditions of production can be provided for, the class struggle will resume, therefore creating antagonisms between national and class struggle. Only "among the most progressive elements" of a nation, the organized proletariat, "genuine nationalism" develops and seeks "to restore to normal its conditions and relations of production." Only then, the class struggle can be pursued and fully exercised.

To end this section about Borochov's theory on nation and class, I am going to touch upon a few inconsistencies that arise from

37

his arguments and that already foreshadow the many challenges that the Socialist Zionists were confronted with in their struggle in Palestine.

Naturally, Borochov speaks of "the Jews" as one sufficiently coherent social group, a people with a national consciousness. Zionism, defined as the Jewish national struggle for material conditions of production requires a short-term allegiance between the bourgeoisie and the proletarian class against outside forces that deny them equal conditions of production. Only when the national struggle is solved can a nation be concerned with class struggle. At the same time, Borochov seeks the support of the Russian communists, which in his own wording, belong to a different people. Why would he expect them, in times of national struggle, to compromise on their material conditions of production by supporting large-scale emigration of workforce?

Even though Borochov makes a strong point when formulating his concept of a nation as a construct of the modern capitalist system he remains inside the very confines that, as a Marxist, he eventually seeks to overthrow. A classless society means a nation-less society. Borochov does not disagree with this fundamental communist premise, which is why he talks of Zionism only as the "minimalist program", a preliminary step concerned with the present needs of the Jewish workers. The "maximalist program" that is concerned with the ultimate goal of an internationalist proletarian society, can only follow as a second step.[38] Nevertheless, the fact that he considers the creation of a Jewish state necessary to fulfill this eventual goal might not be so comprehensible for non-Jewish communists in Tsarist Russia for whom the national forces have hitherto always represented the enemy.

Following Borochovist rationale, the colonization of Palestine had to be taken upon by the Jewish proletariat and was rationalized as the historic materialist consequence of the Jewish people's need for territory. His entire argument is based upon the idea of a Jewish workers proletariat as the central agitator for change. However, among the Jews of Tsarist Russia, as discussed in more detail in the first section, there was no Jewish proletariat in the Marxist sense. Most Jews were either working in the trade and manufacturing sectors, were simply poor and unemployed due to the situation in the Pale or were part of the educated intelligentsia. Borochov wanted to create a Jewish proletariat in Palestine by addressing a Jewish proletariat in Russia that not yet existed.

Borochov also denied any emotional attachment to Palestine or any other territory stemming from a historic or mythical connection to the land. This begs the question: Why Palestine? Borochov, for a very long time, does not provide any

38 Ber Borochov, "Was wollen die Poale Zion? (1906)," *Das Klasseninteresse und die nationale Frage*, (Berlin: Hechalutz, 1932), 46-61.

answers for this heatedly debated issue among Zionists. Over a decade later, in his last recorded speech titled *Palestine in our Program and Tactics,*[39] Borochov gives more substantial reasons why Palestine has always had his full support. In this speech, he also adopts a position that seems very much at odds with some of his earlier statements. He refers to the Jewish state as "Eretz Israel, the Jewish homeland" and overall speaks in more sentimental, emotional terms about the Zionist project. He argues that Palestine has a much-underrated population capacity—according to some alleged research undertaken by his party colleague Yitzhak Ben Zvi. Furthermore, he continues, the fact that the land would soon be without any native jurisdiction after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire meant that it would require assistance in developing a more productive agricultural economy from which the Arabs would profit as well. These arguments do not differ much from the official Zionist narrative of the time but seem quite detached from the communist standpoint that considered the Arab population as the victims of outside intervention rather than their beneficiaries. But even if following Borochov's initial theory he never considered the Arab population in Palestine to be equal to the Jewish people, since the former still lived in a feudal system that neither granted them a strong enough national consciousness nor an exclusive territory.

Finally, how does Borochov legitimize his sentimental outlook on Palestine and Zionism in 1917, when a decade before he had warned his followers of too much bourgeois emotion? One could say he was adapting to new realities. As he mentions himself at the beginning of his speech, much had changed since the party's founding. The "experiment of labor" in Palestine had matured and extended the party's program from a minimalist approach to a maximal minimalist one, meaning that beyond securing the territory, the proletariat wanted to be actively involved in developing the Jewish homeland. Even though Borochov had become more emotionally attached to Palestine and Zionism, he continued to elaborate Marxist rationalizations, bending his theory over backward to best fit his growing Zionist pathos and the activities of the *Poale Zion* members in Palestine.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PRE-STATE PALESTINE

1. THEORY MEETS REALITY: *POALE ZION'S* EARLY YEARS IN PALESTINE

As the section above has shown Borochov's greatest strength and at the same time greatest weakness was his fixation on theory and abstraction. His writings reflect his very analytical way of thinking, but

39 Ber Borochov, "Palästina in unserem Programm und in unserer Taktik (1917)," *Das Klasseninteresse und die nationale Frage* (Berlin: Hechalutz), 99-103.

also reveal how naïve and detached from realities on the ground his drafts for a Jewish nation were. Towards the end of his career, Borochov felt compelled to renew the party's aims and tactics as could be seen in his last speech. Among Israel's Russian-born founding generation there were famous former *Poale Zion*-members such as David Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Tabenkin, Moshe Sharett or Golda Meir. At some early stage in their careers, they all felt drawn towards Borochov's deterministic, revolutionary theories that rid Zionism of any Utopian elements.[40] However, these beliefs did not necessarily reappear in their later state-building policies. There was a time for theorizing and a time for taking action; or, as Ben-Gurion put it when describing an encounter with other newcomers at the Jaffa port:

> Here I had come to build Eretz Israel and first thing, after a long journey, after turning my back on education and my father's hopes for me, after finally arriving in the land of my ancestors, I was being asked to pronounce on Marxism. I burst out: 'Got to hell with your historical materialism. I've come to Eretz Israel and you talk to me of theories. What sort of Jews can you be?'[41]

This somewhat flippant distancing from constant theorizing over Marxism rather than setting to work describes, in a nutshell, *Poale Zion*'s generational struggle that it had to face once having arrived in Palestine.

The *Ramle Platform* of 1906 constitutes the founding document of *Poale Zion*'s Palestine branch and coincided with the second Jewish immigration wave from Russia and Poland. It was set out to be the Palestinian counterpart to Borochov's *Our Platform*, mentioned in the earlier section of this paper. Even though there exists no translation of the Hebrew original, Rubenstein remarks that "[i]f one were to remove from the [*Ramle Platform*] document the adjective 'Jewish', one would be left with a clearly Marxist document [...]."[42] Right from the start, the generational gap among the new immigrants between the older Marxist "theoreticians" and the younger party segments that wanted to hurl themselves into the construction of their homeland became evident and resulted in the founding of the *Hapoel Hatzair*, the "Young Worker"-movement. Whereas the *Hapoel Hatzair* group focused on dealing with daily life in Palestine and sparked to life the idea of the agricultural communal settlements, the old *Poale Zion* was still completely devoted to class struggle and building a strong proletariat as

40 See Shapira, "Labour Zionism and the October Revolution," 625f.

41 David Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs David Ben-Gurion,* ed. Thomas R. Branstein (New York City: The World Publishing Company, 1970), 48.

42 Sondra M. Rubenstein, *The communist movement in Palestine and Israel, 1919-1984* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985), 37.

the basis of a Jewish state. However, realities on the ground soon led the Palestinian *Poale Zion* to divert away from total conformity with their Russian headquarters. The Ottoman authorities' strict stance against Socialism highly impaired their political activism in the urban centers, forcing them to retreat to the countryside, where they found soon found a lot more common ground with the *Hapoel Hatzair*.[43] Walter Laqueur describes the reasons for this drift away from the international union of *Poale Zion* movements led by their Russian "original" as follows:

> Who needed yet another Bund? When the world association of Poale Zion, its parties embarrassed by its collaboration with the bourgeois elements, decided to leave the Zionist congress, the Palestinians did not follow suit. While the world organization continued to hold its meetings and to publish its literature in Yiddish, the language of the 'Jewish toiling masses', the Palestinians switched to Hebrew. When the Palestinians began to found cooperative agricultural settlements, they had to face bitter resistance from sections of the world movement, who argued that according to the teaching of Marxism, workers ought to fight for their class interests, and were not called on to establish economic enterprises within the framework of the capitalist system.[44]

43 See ibid., 35-38.
44 Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 284.

One might wonder why, in the beginning, the *Poale Zion* headquarters were so rejecting towards the idea of Jewish settlements that wanted to put the socialist communal spirit into practice on the basis of agricultural labor. The first truly communal "kvutza" (*Hebr.* "collective") established in 1910 by its twelve pioneering members became a success story and drew a lot of attention especially from the Socialist-Zionist youth movements in Palestine and abroad. What is often forgotten or hardly commented upon in Western/Jewish historiography at this point is that in order to establish such communities, the Jewish Socialists had to ask the Jewish National Fund to assign them land, the very same Zionist-imperialist institution they were supposed to defy. By entering into this dependent relationship, they were not only participating in the "capitalist system" as pointed out above. They were also supporting the expulsion of Arab-Palestinian peasants. More often than not these lands had long been sold under Ottoman land reform laws to wealthy Arab notables, turning the original owners into tenants, but at the same time developing sort of kinship bonds with the local communities who hitherto had been living in complete remoteness and political incapacitation.[45]

45 see James L. Gelvin, "The 'Politics of Notables' Forty Years After," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 40, no. 1 (June 2006): 19–29. See also Mario Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina: Nation und Klasse in der antikolonialen Revolution* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1975), 17-25.

Consequently, when the Zionist World Organization began to purchase land in Palestine, the *de-jure* landowners were not the ones affected by the loss of property and displacement. When the WZO approached the landlords, desperately in search for acres to meet the hugely increasing demand among the new immigrants, the urban notables' only interest was selling their land in the most profitable way. Even though the history of Ottoman land reform and the Palestinian agricultural system before the large-scale Russian-Jewish immigration would far outreach the scope of this paper, it did play a pivotal role for Arab-Jewish relations in general, but also for Socialist-Zionist history in particular. The limited knowledge and ignorance towards such local conditions paired with total entrenchment in their theories could be considered one of the reasons why the attempt of the left-wing Zionists to establish friendly relations with the Arabs and to mobilize them for their socialist cause failed eventually.

Meanwhile in Russia, the *Poale Zion* had an increasingly hard time to focus on their Zionist efforts while coping with ongoing Jewish pogroms, the hostile atmosphere of inner-Jewish party politics and the growing radicalization of the general Left due to the emergence of the Bolsheviks. After the Bolshevik takeover, the *Poale Zion* splintered into a more extreme pro-Bolshevik section that called itself the Jewish Communist Party (YKP) and the "leftover" *Poale Zion* who did not join the Bolsheviks and remained faithful to the Palestine cause.[46] The end of the First World War and the Russian Revolution not only triggered the third wave of immigration into Palestine but also ended the hitherto still significant influence of the Russian *Poale Zion* on its Palestinian branch. The World War and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration had brought the left-wing Zionist groups in Palestine closer together and in an effort to coordinate their activities they formed the Ahdut haAvoda (*Hebr*. Unity of Labour) in 1919. This was the beginning of the less ideological Labour Zionist movement, in whose ranks David Ben-Gurion and other important figures of Israeli state-building rose to prominence. Only two small factions chose not to join the party and remain devoted to their Marxist principles. They called themselves the Left Poale Zion and the Mifleget Poalim Sotsialistim (MPS, *Hebr.* Socialist Workers' Party).[47] These two splinter groups as the last remnants of Borochov's early orthodox Socialist Zionism remained on the outside of mainstream politics and when the British Mandate for Palestine took effect in 1923 they were faced by double opposition from the Jewish Yishuv and the British authorities. In the following section, we are going to trace the transformation of the MPS

47 Idem.

46

47 See Rubenstein, *The Communist Movement,* 38f.

into the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), examine its role in the rising local Arab-Jewish tensions, and its relations with the Third International under Lenin's leadership.

2. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY IN PALESTINE AND THEIR STRUGGLE WITH THE COMINTERN, THE BRITISH, THE ARABS AND THE YISHUV

The dilemma of the Socialist Zionists was accelerated by the question of participation in the newly established Third International (Comintern) and the World Zionist Organization (WZO). These institutions constituted two opposing fronts between which there seemed to be no middle-ground. Even though none of the different sub-groups within the original *Poale Zion* wanted to give up their claim to be Socialists as well as Zionists, de-facto, becoming loyal to the Comintern meant cutting ties with the WZO and vice versa. These issues rose to the surface at the Conference of the World Union of the Poale Zion in Vienna in 1920, a conference described as "one of the most stormy in the history of the Jewish labor movement."[48] What emerged were two minuscule orthodox leftist groups now opposed by an overwhelming and more pragmatic "right-wing" *Poale Zion* led by David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. The left Left pledged to continue to put all their efforts into applying for membership in the Third International while the majority of the Left-wing, the Labour movement, wanted to "conquer the Zionist movement from within."[49] In their opinion, the Comintern's demands for admission were too extreme and would merely turn them into a Palestinian adjunct to the Communist International. The Comintern itself further encouraged this split, stating in 1922:

> That makes the situation clear. Since the third congress [of the Comintern] the petty-bourgeois, nationalist, and opportunist elements in the majority of the delegations of the [Poale Zion World] Federation have tried to sabotage and damp down the urge of the proletarian and communist elements for amalgamation with the Communist International…The theme of Palestine, the attempt to divert the Jewish working masses from the class struggle by propaganda in favor of large-scale Jewish settlement in Palestine, is not only nationalist and petty-bourgeois but counter-revolutionary in its effect, if the broad working masses are moved by this idea and so diverted from an effective struggle against their Jewish and non-Jewish capitalist exploiters…The only possible attitude of communists to the Poale Zion Federation after its rejection of the conditions of admission is one of complete hostility.[50]

48 Cited in ibid., 53.

49 Laqueur. *A History of Zionism*, 317.

50 "Extracts from an ECCI Statement on the

The MPS, emerging as the outsider among the Left-wing political spectrum, never actually managed to fulfill all the Comintern's conditions and was granted a very short lifespan in the Yishuv due to events to come. Against the party's refutations, it was considered to be anti-Zionist, while the Communist movement believed them to be too closely linked to Zionism to grant them membership. When during that same year the General Organization of Workers (Histadrut) emerged as the successor of the Ahdut haAvoda the MPS was denied seats and therefore shunned from legitimate political activity in the Yishuv. As Offenberg argues quite plausibly, denying the left stream of the former *Poale Zion* any Zionist legitimacy and painting them as outright anti-Zionists seems, quite frankly, absurd. A Jewish Socialist who did not believe in Zionism, instead of staying in the Yishuv, would have been significantly more likely to leave and join the Bolsheviks or the Communist movements of their respective nationality instead of taking a "detour" over Palestine.[51] This was, however, the narrative of not only the British authorities but the majority of the Jewish Yishuv.

While the British Mandatory authorities had a very clear motive in marginalizing any Communist elements among the Jewish immigrants, the Yishuv was more concerned about the extreme Left's policies towards the Arabs. After World War I, an economic depression had begun to spread across Palestine and had swept away much of the optimism and pioneering spirit of the early years. Unemployment rates soared with no financial assistance yet in place, the newly established Histadrut was close to bankruptcy and Arabs were considered a major threat on the job-market as they were often better trained for the scarce jobs that were available.[52] Conversely, the continuing immigration rates during times of poor economic conditions heightened agitation among Arab communities. In Zionist historiography, the growing discontent among the Arab population is oftentimes painted as a somewhat jealous and spite reaction to the prospering of the Yishuv "that left the Arabs suspicious, frustrated, and deeply concerned about the future."[53] Such accounts seem to be oblivious to the fact that national aspirations in the Arab world had undergone a development of their own and that during the war Arab support for the British troops in their struggle against the Ottomans was based on the promise of Arab independence in Greater Syria.[54]

Decision of the Poale Zion not to affiliate to the Third International," in *The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents I,* ed. Jane Degras (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 365-66.

51 See Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina,* 69-71.

52 Ssee Laqueur., *A History of Zionism*, 306f.

53 Jacob Hen-Tov, *Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the British Mandate* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2012), 12.

54 For a concise overview see e.g. M.A. Aziz, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," *Pakistan Horizon* 62, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 59–66.

Keeping this in mind, the violent outbursts in Jaffa on May Day 1921 as well as all other Arab-Jewish clashes that were to follow appear against a much broader backdrop than the recurring narrative of Arabs against Jews.

The MPS, in order to fulfill the Comintern's conditions of admission demanding "systematic and well-planned agitation" among the "rural proletariat and the poorest peasants,"[55] launched mobilizing campaigns to attract not only Jews but also Arab fellahin into their ranks. One such effort was conducted as part of a May Day demonstration in 1921. The protest turned into a scuffle with members of an authorized Labour movement demonstration and eventually ended up in anti-Jewish rampages by Arab villagers, resulting in a number of deaths. The official British investigative report on the incident concluded that the MPS, having been "the spark that set alight the explosive discontent of the Arabs,"[56] was to blame for the escalations. Other interpretations blamed the British police for provoking the Arabs into attacking Jewish demonstrators, using the MPS a scapegoat that had been at the wrong place at the wrong time.[57] Offenberg describes in great detail how the MPS in its efforts to simultaneously attract Jews and Arabs into their ranks, greatly adapted the contents of their posters depending on whether they were written in Hebrew or Arabic.[58] Regardless of whether or not or to which degree the MPS can be blamed for the bloodbath that occurred that day, these May Day demonstration posters give a valuable insight into the radical Jewish Left's campaign strategy.

The Arab version of the poster texts played into Arab grievances of being denied freedom and independence on their own land blaming not the Zionists per se but the Jewish, British and Arab capitalists. The MPS wanted to get the Arab masses to distinguish between the "Jewish capitalists" colluding with the British and local Arab capitalists and the "Jewish worker who reaches out his hand as a comrade."[59] A distinction that, from the viewpoint of an Arab dispossessed peasant, might not have been so easy to make. When calling upon all Arab workers "to destroy their tormentors and exploiters"[60]— an appeal that is missing from the Hebrew version— one feels inclined to blame the MPS at least in part for the violence that ensued. The hitherto still almost exclusively Jewish Socialist Workers' Party, so entrenched in their communist jargon, might not have realized the effect their campaigning

55 See "Conditions of admission to the Communist International approved by the Second Comintern Congress," in Degras, *The Communist International I,* 166-172.
56 Cited in Rubenstein, *The Communist Movement,* 61.
57 See ibid., 60. See also Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina*, 221.
58 See Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina*, 211-219.
59 Ibid., 218.
60 Ibid., 217.

had among the local communities and the scope of blanket anti-Jewish hatred that had been spreading among Arabs, many of whom had lost their jobs and homes due to the Zionist expansion. Contrary to what the MPS wanted to believe the struggle that the Arab workers and peasants were fighting was not the same as that of the Socialist Zionist Jews. It was not the struggle against Arab, Jewish and British factory owners cutting their wages short, it was first and foremost a struggle against the Zionist movement very generally. Furthermore, the majority of Arabs did not at all identify with the International Communist movement, especially not at a time when Arab nationalist aspirations were on the rise. There was hardly any overlap between the Communists' and the Arab peasants' agendas, other than their aversion against Zionism and British colonialism. Ideologically, there was no common ground at all and the Arabs' impression of the Soviets and the Communist movement was one of suspicion rather than solidarity.[61]

The May Day unrests led to the MPS' complete ban and the expulsion of its leaders. The British authorities temporarily stopped all immigration into Palestine and stated the fear of "further Bolshevik infiltration"[62] as one of the reasons for this rather extreme policy. The MPS, after its remaining members had gone into hiding for a while, splintered once again and returned onto the political scene as the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) and the Komunistische Partei Palestine (KPP). And again, the bone of contention was the degree of solidarity with the Comintern and with the Poale Zion Left. The KPP as the more extreme faction, distanced itself entirely from Zionism, hence why the Yiddish name. To all the other left-wing Zionist factions they became known as "liquidationists," calling upon their Jewish workers to "leave the Zionist hell"[63] and emigrate back into their respective home countries. Considering that the party members themselves were Jewish immigrants in Palestine and therefore de-facto affiliated with the Zionist movement, even if they opposed it ideologically, their agenda seemed somewhat bizarre. Nevertheless, they gained some popularity among recent immigrants who, arriving at a time of economic depression, soon became disillusioned with Zionism and decided to emigrate back. In these cases, and for some of the most fervent communists, the party was regarded as a "transit camp on the way to the Soviet Union."[64] The PCP, on the other hand, tried to join the Third International without leaving its Zionist ground. At this point, they were the only group still holding on to the original "Borochovist" version

61 See Rubenstein, *The Communist Movement,* 105ff.
62 Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina*, 225.
63 Cited in ibid., 247.
64 Musa Budary, *The Palestine Communist Party, 1919-1948: Arab & Jew in the struggle for internationalism* (Chicago, Ill.: Haymarket Books, 2010), 6.

of Socialist-Zionism.[65] Eventually, in 1923, both the remaining KPP members and the more moderate Palestinian Communists decided to merge into one big PCP and apply for Comintern membership as a united front. When one year after the merger the PCP admission to the Third International was finally granted, it was under the condition of transforming the PCP "from an organization of Jewish workers into a truly territorial party."[66] This happened only a few weeks after Lenin's death, when Stalin took power in Moscow, effecting major ideological and policy changes within the Comintern.

It should be mentioned here that since the Poale Zion's split into a left- and a right-wing faction, the original idea of Socialist Zionism had seized to exist. There would never be a rapprochement between these factions. The Labour movement would soon gain political hegemony in the Yishuv and would have a decisive impact on the Israeli State, its institutions, policies, and society. It would still promote Socialist principles and try to find common ground with Arabs on the basis of class solidarity rather than brokering deals with their ruling elites. But they were Zionists first and willing to sacrifice as much of their Socialist ideology to the Zionist cause as necessary. In the following, I am only going to trace the evolution of the PCP, the former Poale Zion Left, whose story continues outside the realms of Zionism, at the margins of the Yishuv, and in close collaboration with the Third International. For them, the struggle between Zionism and Communism still continued. Shuttling back and forth between Moscow and Palestine as Russia's agents, persecuted by the British Mandatory authorities, under close watch by the Comintern for any "deviationist activities" and despised by Arab leaders and Zionists alike, they were willing to sacrifice their lives to this struggle.[67]

3. ARABIZATION VS. YISHUVISM IN THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

After having established an official link with the Communist movement and having received clear instructions from Moscow, the PCP was still divided in matters of how to best achieve their goal of becoming a "territorial party" and how to continue mobilizing Jewish workers in the Yishuv while cutting ties with Zionism.

In its initial period, the years leading up to the Arab rebellion in 1929, the PCP was working towards two parallel goals: Finding a way to separate the working class in the Yishuv from any Zionist affiliation and convincing them to join forces with the Arabs, while at the same time "Arabizing" the party's ranks and forging links with the national

65 See ibid., 244ff.
66 Cited in ibid., 6.
67 For biographical accounts of Jewish members of the Palestinian Communist Party see Hen-Tov, *Communism and Zionism,* 27-38 and Rubenstein, *The Communist Movement,* 121-146.

movements in Palestine, Syria and Egypt. According to the Comintern, collaboration with Arab nationalists was possible because they were revolutionary in character, meaning they opposed the British and their feudal ruling elite. Zionism, on the other hand, was seen as a thoroughly rejectionist and bourgeois nationalist movement because it was in collaboration with the British and behaving, in their eyes, like a colonizing power. The Comintern's directions were clear: Jewish communists had to give up the idea of a Jewish national home but support the Arab national struggle because it carried a lot of revolutionary potentials. The concept of Yishuvism could be considered the Jewish Communists' last effort in finding a synthesis between their communist ideology and their Jewish collective identity.

Yishuvism echoed very closely the original Borochovist doctrine when stating that Jewish immigration and the influx of Jewish capital followed an "objective" course of history, driven by conditions in Europe that forced the Jews to leave. This form of "natural" Jewish immigration was regarded to be in sync with the Communist project because it would disrupt the dominantly feudal structures in Palestine and create a joint Jewish-Arab proletarian society. The other, politically motivated form of Zionism that was promoted by the British and the Jewish capitalists had to be stopped. Nahman List, one of the former PCP members, describes this Yishuvism doctrine in hindsight as some form of "antizionist Zionism", a choice of words that says a lot about its viability and conclusiveness as a party program.[68] Its proponents wanted to create a distinction between the Jewish community in Palestine that had evolved from "natural" immigration and the Zionist Jews that immigrated due to Zionist ideology—a distinction that was simply non-existent. All Jews that decided to immigrate to Palestine did so through some Zionist institution abroad, were therefore affiliated with the Zionist movement and, whether they wanted to or not, with the colonization of former Arab land.[69]

While having gained some foothold within the Yishuv throughout the 1920s, the party was still overwhelmingly Jewish. Even though PCP members had taken a solidary public stand with the Arabs whenever land seizures and the subsequent expulsion of villagers turned violent, the party was struggling with recruiting Arabs into their ranks.[70]As long as this was the case, according to the leadership in Moscow, the PCP could never successfully struggle against Zionism and the British imperialists. Amongst scholars there seem to be different interpretations of the Comintern's Arabization agenda for the PCP:

According to Hen-Tov, many

68 Cited in Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina*, 289.

69 for a more detailed critical analysis of Yishuvism see Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina*, 289-298.

70 see e.g. Afula-Affair: Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina,* 334-345.

Jewish Communists suffered such tragic fates[71] because they "failed to understand" that the Comintern was discriminating against them "by constantly demanding that they Arabize the Party's leadership" and "that racist considerations, motivated by political expedience, were to prevail over the international principles of their revolutionary cause."[72] Drawing such a conclusion not only paints these Communist Jews as simply too naïve to grasp what or who they were supporting but also confirms the black-and-white notion that anything anti-Zionist must be stirred by anti-Semitic inclinations.

While being more nuanced and less tendentious, Rubenstein's accounts correspond in as much as they describe the PCP as a "Soviet anti-Zionist tool." By giving "unqualified support for the Arab worker" while insisting on "unmitigated antagonism toward the Zionist movement" the Comintern led the party into complete and total demise.[73]

Offenberg sheds more light on the regional developments in Palestine that were beyond the Comintern's realm of influence. Quoting the PCP's founding member Joseph Berger-Barzilai the party's goal of Arabization was only partly due to the Comintern's orders. There was also the genuine belief among its members that the anti-imperialist struggle had to be fought on the basis of an international, not ethnically exclusive, party composition.[74] Offenberg points out that, against all odds, the PCP's recruiting efforts were to some extent successful, however not in the way that the leadership in Moscow had anticipated. Sometimes, surprising connections were forged on the basis of a shared affinity towards Russia. This was especially the case for Orthodox-Christian Arabs. They felt drawn towards the Russian language and culture due to its large Orthodox-Christian community. Paradoxically, some of these Arabs saw the Communists as Russia's agents, who represented some link to their religious faith, despite the fact that the Orthodox Church, just like any other religious institution, was suffering from great oppression and persecution under Bolshevik rule.

In 1928, the Communists' agenda for Palestine shifted. After having experienced a devastating blow in China, where the Communists were toppled by their former nationalist ally, the party leadership was not willing to risk any more collaboration with Yishuvist "pseudo-revolutionary" elements in Palestine.[75] Borochovism and any doctrine affiliated with it was officially declared anti-communist. The China debacle also led to a more cautious approach towards the Arab national movement. In line with their new policy which is

71 Hen-Tov, *Communism and Zionism,* 39.
72 Hen-Tov, *Communism and Zionism,* 39.
73 Rubenstein, *The communist movement,* 147.
74 Cited in Offenberg, *Kommunismus in Palästina,* 355.
75 See Rubenstein, *The communist movement,* 153f.

referred to as the "Third Period"[76], the Comintern reinforced its call for a widespread Agrarian Revolt among the Arab peasants against the British, the Zionists and their local effendis.

It was the Arab riots that occurred the following year that eventually revealed the discrepancy between the Comintern's total entrenchment in their Communist ideology and the situation on the ground. The rebellion began as an agitated group of Muslims began protesting at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The protest soon spread and erupted into several violent attacks against Jews in Hebron, Jerusalem and other places. Reportedly, the British police did not intervene, which prompted the PCP to accuse the British of deliberately supporting and even instigating violence between Arabs and Jews as a "divide and rule" policy. The PCP's official position, some of whom had witnessed the incidents first-hand, was one of unwavering solidarity with the Jewish victims. To them, the fault lay clearly with the Muslim clericals and the Mufti in Jerusalem that had incited the Arab masses into anti-Jewish violence. It called the Arab attacks "pogroms" that were entirely racially motivated rather than serving any revolutionary cause.[77] The Comintern, on the other hand, interpreted the events as a first success in mobilizing the Arab masses and as "an integral part of the revolutionary wave which is sweeping over the whole of Asia."[78] To them, the riots were of clear anti-imperialist character, directed against the Zionist oppressors and "[t]hose Jewish members of the party who opposed this reformulation were expelled as were those who had played an active role in the Jewish defense effort in Jerusalem."[79]

These two, so very obviously subjective narratives of events not only illustrate more than anything else that the Communist endeavor in Palestine had eventually fallen prey to the Jewish-Arab conflict. In a conflict in which differentiation between Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews was not recognized as such, neither by the Zionist nor by the Arab side, how could there still be an anti-Zionist Jewish force? In that sense, the Comintern and its leadership in Moscow aligned itself with the anti-communist narrative represented by the British, the Zionists and the Arab Higher Committee. Namely that all Jews were Zionist per definition and therefore could not lead a revolutionary struggle, while the Arab masses were the only true Anti-Imperialists and Anti-Zionists in Palestine. Any deviationists who did not align themselves with this nationalist divide were no longer able to remain in the PCP.

The official split of the Palestinian Communist Party into a Jewish and an Arab section

76 see ibid, 165f.
77 see Budary, *The Palestine Communist Party,* 18-23.
78 cited in Rubenstein, *The communist movement,* 164.
79 Budary, *The Palestine Communist Party,* 29.

happened only in 1936 after another round of Arab riots had led to the same confrontation between the party's remaining Jewish members and the Comintern.[80] After the PCP's Arab leadership had been arrested by the British after the revolt, the idea of this exclusively Jewish PCP section was a very pragmatic one, trying to ensure the party's functioning in the absence of the majority of its high-rank members. However, it was not long until this divide within the party catapulted the Jewish section back into the Yishuvist path, becoming more and more affiliated with left-wing Zionist politics.[81]

When the Comintern lost its power and was dissolved by Stalin in 1943, Soviet policy toward Zionism had already softened. Due to the outbreak of World War II and the need for a united communist movement in the face of the Nazi crimes made formerly rejected ideological differences less preponderate. Especially since the "Great Patriotic War" with Germany, when the Soviet's priority lay on defending and consolidating their Union, "there was once again increased leeway for cooperation with previously 'suspect' organizations on the political left."[82] Eventually, in 1947, the Soviet Union supported the partition of Palestine and the establishment of an Israeli State, a decision that surely had more to do with (geo)political opportunism rather than ideology. After 1948, the PCP's Jewish and Arab section morphed into a Jordanian and an Israeli communist party and became emerged in their respective national politics.

CONCLUSION

Borochov's history and that of the Poale Zion and its many successors in Palestine could be considered a failed attempt at reconciling two irreconcilable ideologies. One could say that upon arriving in Palestine and being confronted with the realities on the ground and the overwhelming pull of the anti-Zionist Communists on the one hand and the anti-communist Zionists on the other, the movement failed to establish itself in the in-between. Poale Zion's vision of a Jewish State might not have become reality, but it can still serve as a reminder that there existed Zionist debates that go beyond the Western-democratic concept of a nation. Especially in the context of the Middle East Conflict, the largely forgotten history of Socialist Zionism might offer new impulse for solidarity-building between Jewish and Arab communities by putting class similarities over national differences.

In his preface to the 2003 edition of *A History of Zionism* Walter Laqueur addresses the post-Zionism

80 Ibid. 29

81 see Johan Franzén, "Communism versus Zionism: The Comintern, Yishuvism, and the Palestine Communist Party," in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 36, no. 2 (Jan. 2007): 12-15.

82 See ibid., 16.

controversy.[83] Since the beginning of the 21st century, a new generation of Israeli academics has come up with this term in an effort to re-narrate recent Jewish history from a post-colonial perspective. Their approach questions the very existence of Israel, asking whether the Zionist project was justified, or whether it was colonialism in disguise. Their work has been criticized, not only by Laqueur, for referring to the negation of Zionism as something "post", even though there is very little modern or innovative about it. And indeed, one could say that post-Zionist rhetoric is reminiscent of that of former Communists who supported the Arab struggle against the British-Zionist "bourgeois plot". However, I believe that there is still a difference between opposing Zionism from within one's own Communist ideological confines rather than attempting to deconstruct it from a post-colonial perspective.

As this paper aimed to illustrate, one does not have to look "post" Zionism to criticize the current narrative that mainstream Zionism has established. Not all criticism of the Israeli State has to come from an "anti-Zionist" standpoint. Supporting the Palestinian cause does not make one "anti-Zionist" per definition. There used to be and there still is leeway for different interpretations of Zionism. Despite their many flaws, inconsistencies and deterministic view of history Socialist Zionists, and even Communist Yishuvists, offered alternative concepts of a Jewish state in Palestine that are less defined through its exclusivity as a nation but rather through its class character and potential for building class solidarity. Back in 1969, in a preface to Borochov's writings, the journalist Dany Diner argues that the solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict might not be "De-Zionisation", but "Re-Zionisation", since Zionism in a strictly socialist sense was only supposed to be the framework or "minimal program", never the political core, of a Jewish State. By ending the discourse on whether or not Zionism has any legitimacy at all, but rather reviving alternative versions of Zionism, Israel would have to get out of its defensive state and would have to divert its policies away from trying to assert itself against the hostile "anti-Zionist Outside". It goes without saying that mitigating the grievances between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs is not as simple as that. But there is still value in re-introducing some of the complexity and diversity that the Zionist debate has lost after the establishment of the Israeli State. There needs to be a greater awareness of what it meant back then and what it could still mean to be a Zionist since there is a wide political and ideological spectrum that it could encompass.

83 Walter Laqueur, "Preface to the 2003 Edition," in *A History of Zionism. From the French Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel* (New York City: Schocken Books, 2003).

2

Public

h

c

edited by

BEN MILLER

istory

Articulating the Contemporary? Collaborative aesthetics and indigenous knowledge in Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad's *Field of Sight* (2013-ongoing)

by
FREYA SCHWACHENWALD

This paper takes a critical stance towards the propagation of particular 'alternative' forms of knowledge which are, first, based on collaborative aesthetic practice and, second, on the inclusion of indigenous cosmologies. This critique does not mean to play down the urgency to rethink our relations to our lived world with regards to capital-driven environmental destruction and neo-colonial violence against indigenous communities world-wide. Examining the particular case of a politically engaged, artistic collaboration on indigenous knowledge – Gauri Gill's and Rajesh Vangad's *Fields of Sight* (2013-ongoing) – allows us to question the vocabularies of 'alternative knowledges' which have permeated recent scholarship on political ecologies, the anthropocene and contemporary art. By combining existing scholarship on collaborative artistic practice, political art and knowledge production, the hope here is to critically reflect on simplicistic solutions to the persistence of epistemological violence and marginalization.

In the first part, this paper will argue that the disruptive interpretation of *Fields of Sight,* as a proposition of new visual epistemologies, is entangled with certain assumptions on the role of photographic representation and its construction of space, time and subjectivity. Building on this, the second part will assess in which ways *Fields of Sight* as a collaborative practice is both asymmetrical and emancipating. Here, the contextualization of the writings on Vangad's Warli paintings and Gill's collaborative photographic practice will unfold the multiple layers through which their work is oscillating between local, national and global scales. The third part will then conclude with an investigation into strategies of collaborative instability of meaning and of linkages to the vernacular that might offer alternatives to static art conceptions and practices. All three parts of the paper build on previous research on collaborative artistic practices on the one hand, and on indigenous knowledge production on the other. The combination of art history with reflections on intellectual and public history, as they are applied in this paper, will enable an expansion of critical reflection on alternative knowledge production, beyond the particular case study of *Fields of Sight*.

If we believe a large number of ambitious, critical scholarship on contemporary art, the politically engaged and collaborative artwork is the preferred path to salvation from the predicaments of epistemological, (neo-)colonial violence and environmental destruction.[1] Taking Jacques Rancière's writings on the "distribution of the sensible" as

1 See for example Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics*, Collection Documents Sur l'art (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2002); Chantal Mouffe, "Artistic Acticism and Agonistic Spaces," *Art & Research* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 1–5; T.J. Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016).

its starting point, this scholarship foregrounds art's ability to contest dominant structures of visibility and invisibility.[2] Art, this argument goes, proposes alternative ways of seeing, perceiving and knowing. It allows us to shift ontologies of time and contemporaneity, of definitions of the human and other-than-human and of legitimate and disqualified knowledge. In this understanding, art as "intersectional politics of aesthetics" draws attention to processes of injustice and violence on the one hand, and productively proposes political, social and ontological alternatives on the other.[3] These redemptive narratives of including 'alternative' forms of knowledge production resonate with larger efforts within the humanities and social sciences to critically reflect on the legacies of the European Enlightenment and the ensuing catastrophes of colonialism.[4] Within these narratives, one can observe a particular focus on the cosmologies and epistemologies of indigenous communities. Art as an experimental, collaborative and speculative form of knowledge production seems to have gained prevalence as a means of political activism for marginalized groups.[5] This larger trend resonates through academic disciplines from art history to anthropology. Also, an increasing number of internationally established artists cooperate with a variety of communities in order to render their concerns visible.[6] But as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Young remind us, the reconciliatory and reparative efforts initiated by hegemonic agents and institutions to alleviate the injustices of colonialization have a long-standing history. Additionally, they are closely entangled with efforts to maintain the hegemonic status quo through demonstrations of benevolence and inclusion, whilst simultaneously consolidating essentialist assumptions of marginalized groups and individuals.[7] It is therefore necessary to critically pause and reflect on the role of collaborative art as a practice of decolonization. This paper understands art as a "mode of world-making":[8] a network of institutions and agents with asymmetric

2 Jacques Rancière, "Contemporary Art and the Politics of Aesthetics," in *Communities of Sense. Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics*, ed. Beth Hinderliter (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 31–50.

3 Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology*, 13.

4 See for example Jessica L. Horton, "Indigenous Artists against the Anthropocene," *Art Journal* 76, no. 2 (2017): 50, https://doi.org/10.1080/00043249.2017.1367192.

5 Laura Hall, "My Mother's Garden: Aesthetics, Indigenous Renewal, and Creativity," in *Art in the Anthropocene. Encounters Among Aesthetics, Politics, Environments and Epistemologies*, ed. Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin (London: Open Humanities Press, 2015), 283–92; Zoe Todd, "Indigenizing the Anthropocene," in *Art in the Anthropocene. Encounters Among Aesthetics, Politics, Environments and Epistemologies*, ed. Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin (London: Open Humanities Press, 2015), 241–45.

6 Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology*, 20.

7 Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 3.

8 Monica Juneja, "'A Very Civil Idea…' Art History, Transculturation, and World-Making - With and Beyond the Nation," *Zeitschrift Für Kunstgeschichte* 81 (2018): 463.

power relations that structures our perceived realities, that connects people, objects, ideas and markets.

Previous discussions of Gauri Gill's and Rajesh Vangad's series *Fields of Sight* accord the series the revolutionary and redemptive function of decolonizing both artistic practices and knowledge production. Feminist scholar Inderpal Grewal, for example, calls the project "a new language for art practices that address the politics and aesthetics of environmental destruction".[9]

Fields of Sight consists of a growing number of monochrome photographs (still being created) first taken by Gill and inscribed with black drawings by Vangad. The photographs are all taken in and around Vangad's native village Dahanu in the Thane District of Maharashtra, India. Vangad describes himself as a Warli painter. His artworks are being exhibited and sold under this category in the growing international market for indigenous, tribal or – in the case of India – Adivasi art.[10] Conventionally, his category is either considered separately from the realms of 'global' contemporary art, or added in an inclusionary manner. The inclusion of formerly marginalized artists and their works into the canon of 'global' or 'world' art is problematic, because, too often, it revives an epistemological vocabulary of modernist and primitivist ideologies.[11]It becomes clear that in previous discussions of *Fields of Sight*, but also in other works of Gill and Vangad, certain modalities of the power of art as a revelatory medium have been assumed without questioning. Therefore, this paper searches to critically examine the demands that are made toward *Fields of Sight* as a site of re-articulation of vision and the (in-)visible: what is it, exactly, that is made visible? What remains unseen in the act of collaboration and representation? If we understand *Fields of Sight* as an articulation of art's ability to "challenge the existing distribution of the real and the fictional", as Rancière suggests, where do we position the collaborating artists?[12] If we proceed to understand art as constitutive of a certain vision of the world, who is seeing and speaking through it? And what implications do these reflections have on the decolonizing of academic and artistic practice?

9 Inderpal Grewal, "Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad: Fields of Sight," *The Trans-Asia Photography Review* 5, no. 2 (Spring 2015), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7977573.0005.205.

10 See Vangad's self-description on his website, "Rajesh Vangad," Rajesh Vangad, accessed June 20, 2018, http://vangad-adiyuva.blogspot.com/; Jyotindra Jain, "Crossing Borders: Contemporary Folk and Tribal Artists in India," in *Indian Painting: The Lesser-Known Traditions*, ed. Anna Libera Dallapiccola, n.d.; Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology*, 8; Nirmal Sengupta, "Reappraising Tribal Movements-II: Legitimization and Spread," *Economic and Political Weekly of India*, May 14, 1988, 1003–5.

11 See for example Hans Belting's definition of "global art" or the concept of the critically received 1989 exhibition *Magiciens de la Terre* at the Centre Pompidou Hans Belting, "Contemporary Art as Global Art. A Critical Estimate," accessed July 13, 2018, http://rae.com.pt/Belting__Contemporary_Art_as_Global_Art.pdf; Benjamin H.D. Buchloh and Jean-Hubert Martin, "Interview," *Third Text* 3, no. 6 (January 3, 1989): 19–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/09528828908576210.

12 Rancière, "Contemporary Art and the Politics of Aesthetics," 49.

In previous research, Vangad and Gill are repeatedly presented as having emerged from disparate, even opposite artistic fields. Additionally, their collaboration is evaluated as a revelatory sensorial and perceptional practice through the combination of supposedly unrelated methods of artistic expression: photography on the one hand and indigenous Warli painting on the other. For instance, Grewal argues for the contemporaneity of urban and rural narratives in the collaboration of Vangad and Gilly.[13]Some of the claims asserted in the analysis of Grewal and others are indeed relevant to understanding the collaborative practices of meaning production operating in *Fields of Sight*.[14] Nevertheless, simply understanding the series as a revolutionary and revelatory expression of the contemporaneity of creative indigenous articulation risks leading into an epistemological and ideological dead end. While *Fields of Sight*, along with the rest of Gill's oeuvre, has been celebrated as an example of "Another Way of Seeing"[15] through dialogical and collaborative artistic practice, this euphoria must be critically examined: the call for 'new' methods of visual practice and knowledge production through the mobilization of 'traditional', 'alternative' or 'indigenous' ways of seeing runs risks once again reifying an essentializing definition of the indigenous as modernity's 'Other'. As Sangeeta Kamat critically notes on tribal movements in the Thane District, in an "emergent global context [...] indigenous/tribal culture as a universal type finds new relevance as a mirror for the critique of metropolitan modernity".[16]

To avoid replacing old universalisms with what appear to be new ones, it seems critical to mobilize Grant Kester's question: to what extent an artwork such as *Fields of Sight* "remains mindful of the violence of community and of representation itself."[17]Taking *Fields of Sight* as a critique of modern ways of seeing and representing the world through an alternative, indigenous world view, in which human and nature, present and past are co-present and co-relating,

13 Grewal, "Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad: Fields of Sight."

14 Rashmi Meenakshi Viswanathan, for instance, proposes to understand the series as a new "architecture of memory", arguing for the multivalent constructions of space through the collaboration. Sociologist and art historian Stuti Kakar emphazises that the series proposes "new ways of viewing the world" from the perspective of the "Global South". The centrality of the metaphor of vision also becomes evident in Michael Collins discussion of the series which is titled "Another Way of Seeing". Rashmi Meenakshi Viswanathan, "An Architecture of Memory," *Third Text*, 2017, http://www.thirdtext.org/architecture-memory; Stuti Kakar, "Fields of Sight: Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad," openDemocracy, February 8, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/fields-of-sight-gauri-gill-and-rajesh-vangad/; Michael Collins, Gauri Gill, and Rajesh Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing," *Granta Magazine*, July 3, 2015, https://granta.com/another-way-of-seeing/.

15 Collins, Gill, and Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing."

16 Sangeeta Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," *Cultural Dynamics* 13, no. 1 (January 3, 2001): 31.

17 Grant H. Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 75.

carries two perils: first, it allocates the artworks a revelatory power that pre-defines certain assumptions on the relationship between artist, artwork and beholder. According to Grant Kester, in this understanding of art, the meaning of the artwork for the beholder is created through "an 'orthopedic' aesthetic (in which the viewer's implicitly flawed modes of cognition or perception will be adjusted or improved via exposure to the work of art)."[18]

The second risk is that of re-articulating tropes of the colonial 'Other' which favor the senses and emotionality over imperialist rationality.[19] Both Vangad and Gill are professional artists. Nevertheless, the question remains if they are actually equal: Vangad remains bound to his Adivasi identity, while Gill positions herself as the medium between the audience and him. She grants the viewers an insight into his indigenous subjectivity and worldview, a gesture that reveals the asymmetrical power relations between the two artists. While Gill reveals little to nothing about her own identity, Vangad has to stand for modernity's Other, for alternative sensibilities and epistemologies.

A critical analysis of *Fields of Sight* allows to problematize the persisting powers of essentializing indigenous identity, whilst taking into account the violent and exploitative past and present, the current environmental crisis – *and* the emancipatory possibilities of collaborative, localized artistic practices. It thus sheds a critical light on contemporary forms of (aesthetic) knowledge production that depart from previous colonial, imperial and modernist epistemologies. However, as this paper argues, the positivist hopes that are invested into *Fields of Sight* might reveal more about the social and political context of the role of contemporary art and artists, than about actual possibilities of decolonization.

SPEAKING FROM THE SURFACE

This section will critically contextualize the idea of art as a correctional tool of sight, of the perception of space and time and of subjectivity. In *Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces,* Chantal Mouffe does not distinguish between political and non-political art. To her, the ambiguity of art can contribute to proposing alternatives, shifting the boundaries of visibility and invisibility, thereby enabling new ways of seeing and envisioning subjectivities.[20] And indeed, Rashmi Viswanathan argues that *Fields of*

18 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 35.

19 This is a risk that comes along with James Clifford's proposition of "Becoming Indigenous" and other reflections on post-anthropocentric theories that promote "long-standing Indigenous views of nature as a pluriverse of agents." Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology*, 23; James Clifford, *Returns: Becoming Indigenous in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013).

20 Mouffe, "Artistic Acticism and Agonistic Spaces," 4–5.

Sight "allows the viewer to move into their not-as-yet-visible depths in an imaginative resistance of rational time and photographic space."[21] From this perspective, the artwork is understood as a challenge to the "conventionality of rural landscape-documentary photographs, a genre with rich colonial roots and touristic resonance."[22] On a material and sensorial level, Vangad's inscriptions render the photographic surface visible as a site of meaning. According to Christopher Pinney, this surfacism enables post-colonial emancipation far from photography as a purely 'Western' or 'colonial' representative practice.[23] Nevertheless, *Fields of Sight* cannot simply be taken as a demonstration of indigenous or subaltern self-assertion. Throughout its creation and reception, it is still inserted into an aesthetic epistemology postulating certain assumptions on the representational power of art. Making visible the surface the materiality and the technique of photography, as Pinney notes, allows us to articulate a post-colonial art practice.[24] Instead of searching for representational depth in the depiction of the colonial 'Other' through, amongst other devices, the establishment of a singular view point, the "vernacular modernism" of the *surface* allows us to invest multiple layers of meaning into an image. Pinney resumes that, while colonial photography sought to fixate its people and objects through visual certainty, through rendering the photographic surface invisible, postcolonial practices emphasize the surface of the photograph. They thus reject the colonial illusion of depth and rationality and replace it with more mobile interpretations of the space and time of the image.[25]

In *Fields of Sight*, the surface ruptures with the photographic rationality of Gill's landscape and portrait photographs. Through Vangad's inscriptions, Gill's singular view point is broken into several unstable perspectives from which the viewer can access the artwork. In some works of the series, Vangad directs the central point of view to a certain landmark, figure or object. For example, in *The Eye in the Sky*, his drawings concentrate on the Mahalaksmi peak, a religious site of the Warli community that bears special importance for the rituals of harvest festivities.[26] All other objects are radiating towards this central point: humans, birds and planes, mountains, trees, cars, skyscrapers and rice fields. Gill's choice of framing

21 Viswanathan, "An Architecture of Memory."
22 Viswanathan, "An Architecture of Memory."
23 Christopher Pinney, "Introduction," in *Photography's Other Histories*, ed. Christopher Pinney and Nicolas Peterson, Objects/Histories (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 1–16.
24 Christopher Pinney, "Notes from the Surface of the Image: Photography, Postcolonialism, and Vernacular Modernism," in *Photography's Other Histories*, ed. Christopher Pinney and Nicolas Peterson, Objects/Histories (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 202–3.
25 Pinney, "Notes from the Surface of the Image: Photography, Postcolonialism, and Vernacular Modernism," 202–3.
26 Yashodhara Dalmia, *The Painted World of the Warlis. Art and Ritual of the Warli Tribes of Maharashtra*, Loka Kala Series (New Delhi: Lalit Kala Academy, 1988), 49.

the photograph would not have demonstrated the centrality of the mountain in such a complex way. Vangad redirects the view through his inscription.

In most of the artworks of *Field of Sight*, as in other works that are classified as Warli painting, there is little 'empty' space between the drawings: Yashodhara Dalmia argues that in Warli paintings, "[t]he very tendency to eliminate [space] is only another method of representing [it]".[27] In this sense, in *Fields of Sight,* the formerly empty space of the surface enables a different experience of space that draws attention to representational practices beyond the photograph. Furthermore, it ruptures with the relationship to time established by the colonial photograph. Instead of claiming a singular fixed point in time, there are multiple *chronotopics,* interrelations of space and time, at play in the series. In *Hiding in the Seth's House During the Great Raid*, Vangad is shown with his back towards the camera's lens in front of a house, seemingly looking inside. His hands are tucked into his jacket and he is decentered and small at the right edge of the frame. Grewal argues that Vangad's presence which is "blocking [the viewer's] ability to see him, replaces [the] perspective of power with another one, Vangad's own."[28] Additionally, his drawings of figures fighting or fleeing, as well as the title of the work, re-visualize a temporal past that is not visible in the photograph itself: the violent confrontation between Warli people and local politicians, landlords, moneylenders, the police and forest department officials of the region in the 1970s.[29] According to Grewal, this concept of indigenous time is not caught in an eternal past, but articulating a different contemporary: "There were other worlds, Vangad and Gill tell us, other people, other lives and stories.. [*sic*] They are there, not gone, not past. [...] The photograph captures [Vangad] in the place that is his own, but the language of the photograph is not the only one that can speak for him."[30] Viswanathan argues accordingly that Vangad's construction of an "architecture of memory" is alternative and personal, "capitaliz[ing] on the distinct ontologies of Warli and landscape photographic traditions and their performances in the contemporary

27 Dalmia, *The Painted World of the Warlis. Art and Ritual of the Warli Tribes of Maharashtra*, 215.

28 Grewal, "Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad: Fields of Sight."

29 Collins, Gill, and Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing"; Vangad himself was born in 1975 and it is therefore not evident if these are personal early childhood memories or rather stories of the collective memory of the Warli people who have struggled with violent oppression and exploitation since British colonial rule. The most violent of these confrontations were the Warli revolts of the 1940s, which were the organized political actions of the Warli people against their exploitation and alienation. According to Kamat, this had significant impact on their self-definition as a community: "[s]ince the late 1940s, tribals in Thane District have been organizing, not as 'tribals' but as landless peasants stressing class-based solidarity with other peasant groups in the region." Sangeeta Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," *Cultural Dynamics* 13, no. 1 (January 3, 2001): 41.

30 Grewal, "Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad: Fields of Sight."

imagination."[31] Thus, Viswanathan proceeds, Gill's and Vangad's "collaboration sets up alternative relationships between photography and time, through a range of pictorial strategies that counter their expected (modern) relationship."[32]

However, it is not enough to just consider the collaboration between the two artists. The meaning of an artwork is never solely defined by its creator, but by a network of diverse agents within and beyond the "art world". Art, as Wyatt McGaffey reminds us, is a space in constant negotiation with authoritative, institutional definitions, a process that involves, amongst others, art critics, art historians, curators, auctioneers, collectors and exhibition goers. [33] In the discussions of *Fields of Sight* examined above, the collaborative aspects of the creation of meaning in the artwork are only acknowledged in a very limited way. In the case of *Fields of Sight*, the meaning of the artwork is not created through a dialogue between the artist and the viewer. Instead, the artwork's disruptive meaning is pre-articulated by the artist and by the institutional epistemologies in which the artwork is presented. *Fields of Sight*, although created through a collaboration, is repeatedly presented and analyzed as a finished artwork with one particular function and meaning: that of disrupting a certain visual hegemony. But paradoxically, throughout its production and circulation, it reinforces and stabilizes some of the asymmetric hegemonic concepts it attempts to overcome, or at least criticize. For instance, the anticipated meaning of the artwork consolidates certain self-assertions of the critical art viewers as self-congratulatory, "liberal-minded risktakers".[34] Kester argues that these art viewers might identify themselves "with the subject positions of the artist rather than the hapless implied viewer."[35] In this case, instead of disrupting, the artwork just aligns itself into an elitist logic of institutional art.[36] Kester's reflections on collaborative art are certainly helpful in the context of Gill's and Vangad's practice. Nevertheless, they have to be extended: it is not only the relationship between the artists and the viewer that needs to be examined, but also between the two artists themselves. Therefore, the next paragraphs will delve further into the different roles and contexts in which the two artists position themselves – and in which they are positioned.

31 Viswanathan, "An Architecture of Memory."
32 Viswanathan, "An Architecture of Memory."
33 Wyatt MacGaffey, "'Magic, or as We Usally Say, Art': A Framework for Comparing European and African Art," in *The Scramble for Art in Central Africa*, ed. Enid Schildkrout and Curtis A. Keim (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 220; David Freedberg, *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
34 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 35–36.
35 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 35–36.
36 After all, *Fields of Sight*'s circulates within the dominant canons and institutions of contemporary art: it has been exhibited internationally, as for example during the dOCUMENTA (13) in 2012. The institutional success of the series contradicts its supposedly 'revolutionary' character.

BETRAYAL OR ARTICULATION? THE AMBIGUITIES OF COLLABORATIVE ART PRACTICES

The collaborative approach of Fields of Sight has to be understood as both asymmetrical and emancipating for Vangad. To articulate an indigenous worldview requires a close examination of the labels under which the series is handled. It is thus a highly ambivalent project and its analysis requires us to consider the social, political, economic and institutional contexts of the two artists in order to understand the forms of knowledge production at stake.

There is an undeniable asymmetry of access and visibility between the two artists: Gill – as an internationally recognized agent of contemporary art – enters Vangad's everyday environment as an outsider from urban Mumbai, takes pictures of him and brings them back into her globally informed world, thus granting Vangad access to an audience that he might not have acquired otherwise.[37] Considering that Gill is always the first artist to be named and referred to in the context of the series, she seems to claim a much more privileged position than Vangad. While in her statements, her intentions seem to be the opposite, this gives her significant power over the framing and representation of Vangad's art and subjectivity. Kester cautions in any case of collaborative practice to "fear the power of the one, for whom the world in all its concrete particularity is a mere resource to be joyfully manipulated and transformed."[38] For Kester, collaboration also always means betrayal. The betrayal in *Fields of Sight* might be the assumption that Vangad's personal articulation and depiction of his environment are essentially Adivasi or indigenous.

However, Vangad's artistic practice is inseparable from the local context of his community. Gill's and Vangad's collaboration is based on Gill's long-term work with indigenous communities in rural Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Her work is often described as a poetic documentation of the lives of specific communities, for example *Notes from the Desert* (1999-ongoing) or *Acts of Appearance* (2015-ongoing).[39] While Gill is always providing a framework when working with the communities, she also leaves a certain interpretative agency to them. In *Acts of Appearance*, for

37 Of course, this has to be relativized: with his solo art works, Vangad has previously gained international recognition through works of his shown at the Asia Pacific Triennal of Contemporary Art at the Queensland Art Gallery, Australia, in 2016. Nevertheless, Vangad does not lose his label of "Indigenous Contemporary Artist." Also, unlike other artists of this exhibition, he is not listed with an individual biography, but together with his colleague Balu Ladkya Dumada, although the two did not collaborate for this exhibition. "Warli Artists," Queensland Art Gallery & Gallery of Modern Art, accessed August 18, 2018, https://www.qagoma.qld.gov.au/whats-on/exhibitions/apt8/artists/kalpa-vriksha/warli.

38 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 2.

39 Natasha Ginwala, "A Multitudinous Cast," *Nature Morte*, January 2018, http://http://naturemorte.com/exhibitions/actsofappearance/.

example, she portrays members of the Kokna Tribe, which is famous for crafting masks. She commissioned two famous craftsmen, the brothers Subhas and Bhagvan Dharma Kadu, as well as their families and a group of volunteers, to create masks that would represent the participants as contemporary individuals whose experiences and emotions are universally human.[40] Here, the full ambiguity of Gill's collaborative approach unfolds: in her own words, her artistic practice in *Acts of Appearance* is not about "telling a scripted story about any particular issue. If at all, the series only represents the idiosyncratic process of engaging with fellow artists, of trying to have a dialogue through our work, our personal mediums of photography and paper mache."[41] Still, as noted above, she is the one framing the work – both with her camera and with her access to an institutional art world that usually labels tribal artists differently. Through this approach, in the moment the artwork is presented as a finished object in the exhibition, the indigenous artists give away their interpretative agency. The great difference between *Acts of Appearance* and *Fields of Sight* is that in the former, a large number of community members are involved in the creative process. In the latter, Vangad comes to stand (or is taken) as an individual representing the entire Warli community and worldview. Gill herself reproduces an essentializing vocabulary, including the oppositions of tribal and Contemporary art, and the sensitivities and perceptions that are associated with them. She uses metaphors of contrasting languages, rationalities and temporalities to emphazies their diverging cultural and social backgrounds, continuing preexisting tropes of the timeless, myth-oriented indigenous.[42]

In her words, the idea of opposite epistemologies is reinforced. And indeed, when Vangad himself speaks about *Fields of Sight*, he does not use the same vocabulary as Gill, a vocabulary that presents itself as familiar to the informed art viewer or theoretician. Vangad's comment on the series is the retelling of a story that was passed down to him by his father. In his comment, he refers to mythological figures and connects them with contemporary phenomena of environmental destruction.[43]

He thus uses the stories that circulate in his community to make sense of the world. Subject and object positions do not appear in dichotomic terms, but he sees himself as part of the stories that he depicts. Past and presence are not

40 "Nature Morte - Acts of Appearance," Nature Morte Gallery, December 7, 2018, http://www.naturemorte.com.

41 Manik Sharma, "Photo Exhibition: Gauri Gill Collaborates with Paper Mache Artists of the Kokna Tribe," *Hindustan Times*, February 15, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/art-and-culture/photo-exhibition-gauri-gill-collaborates-with-paper-mache-artists-of-the-kokna-tribe/story-XeTqC3Btg4sI0vlZ2nCY5H.html.

42 Collins, Gill, and Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing."

43 Collins, Gill, and Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing."

constructed in a linear way. But at the same time, his artistic articulations are not timeless.

As an artist of the Warli community, Vangad is involved in multiple scales of making sense of the world: asserting himself and being positioned at the same time.

In a way, one could understand this as strategic essentialization: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak proposes that subjects can make strategic use of their essentialization to put forward their own political or social agendas.[44] T. J. Demos even argues that the recent valorization of indigenous "cosmopolitics – a creative social organization merged with world making –"[45] might even allow some optimism in "that it provides a new location of power for tribal/ indigenous peoples to assert their rights, to present a counter logic to development and modernization, to be agents of history rather than its objects."[46] Indeed, Vangad is not simply the passive victim of hegemonic structures of the contemporary art world. Rather, he is also an active agent who uses his art as a means of social and economic emancipation within a wider network of so-called 'Tribal' artists. Tribal or indigenous art, especially Warli painting since its commercial 'discovery' in the 1970s, has gained a considerable position as a specific category on the international and national art market.[47] Around that time, Warli communities were provided with paper and paint by the Handicraft and Handloom Board.[48] Thus, their artworks changed from ritual murals to mobile (and sellable) paintings that accommodated both ancient and contemporary motives from the everyday life and personal experiences of the artists.[49] Not only did the medium and motives change, but also the functions of the artwork. Formerly practiced by the women of the community and mainly as part of marriage rituals, their significance and function shifted from the creative performance to the finished product as a means of social and financial emancipation. This also led to a certain institutionalization of the Warli art practice. Vangad and some of his (exclusively male) colleagues, for example, are organized in a collective in order to promote their art and their activities, defining Warli painting on their website as "India's global art, proudly tribal".[50] The triple claim toward the global, the national and the tribal shows that the artists make use of their oeuvres as a means of positioning themselves

44 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Criticism, Feminism and the Institution," *Thesis Eleven* 10, no. 11 (1985): 157–87; Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," 35.

45 Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology*, 23.

46 Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," 35.

47 Dalmia, *The Painted World of the Warlis. Art and Ritual of the Warli Tribes of Maharashtra*, 10.

48 Sudha Satyawadi, *Unique Art of Warli Paintings* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2010), 2.

49 Satyawadi, 2.

50 "Warli Painting. India's Global Art, Proudly Tribal," accessed June 20, 2018, http://warli.adiyuva.in/.

in the contemporary world: they affirm their indigenous identity to articulate their own particularity in relation to the hegemonic discourses of the national and the global. Here, the tribal becomes indeed a tool of strategic essentialization, as it is the artists themselves who speak of their worldview. Nevertheless, this agency does not free them from external expectations to perform a certain kind of indigeneity, as it is articulated in the discussions of *Field of Sight*. Taking Vangad as a representative of the Warlis, informing the outside world of "the particularity of place, the history and cosmology of his community" through his painting,[51] is a dangerous essentialism: the representation unifies a community that is as heterogenous and intrinsically contradictory as any other, and whose boundaries are blurred: Kamat describes the work of tribal organizations in the Thane district as having to "constantly negotiate the internal contradictions within the community, and struggle arduously to build consensus within the community over their relation to forests, to land, and to each other."[52] Thus, the idea that Vangad could represent an indigenous way of seeing as such is misleading. Kamat summarizes the problematics of representing the Tribal communities of Thane: "Representation requires that complex social identities are presented as unitary, fairly simple, and located in bounded places. I problematize this desire to represent tribal culture as it involves an essentialization of tribal/indigenous groups, making invisible the complex cultural dynamics of their struggles for livelihood, security, and dignity."[53] Hence, reading *Fields of Sight* as a "Another Way of Seeing"[54] risks to turn the series into a representative practice that simplifies complexity. Asymmetries remain constitutive of any kind of representation in which the dichotomy of an inside and an outside is involved. How (and how much), then, can the local communities speak through Gill's artworks as in *Fields of Sight* or *Acts of Appearances*? The last paragraphs of this paper will investigate these issues of articulation, representation and locality.

"EMPATHETIC INSIGHT" AND THE LOCAL

Kester introduces the idea of "empathetic insight" in the context of dialogical aesthetics.[55] Through an open relationship between the collaborators and the audience, "[d]ialogical works can challenge dominant representations of a given community, and create a more

51 Grewal, "Gauri Gill and Rajesh Vangad: Fields of Sight."
52 Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," 42.
53 Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," 45.
54 Collins, Gill, and Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing."
55 Grant H. Kester, "Conversation Pieces: The Role of Dialogue in Socially-Engaged Art," in *Theory in Contemporary Art since 1985*, ed. Zoya Kocur and Simon Leung, Second edition (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 158.

complex understanding of, and empathy for, that community among a broader public", and thus conjure emphatical insight.[56] But according to Kester, this open relationship demands a highly inclusive and unstable approach to the production of meaning of an artwork. He criticizes the practice of collaborative projects in which the artist alone articulates the significance of the artwork: "a dialogical aesthetic does not claim to provide, or require, this kind of universal or objective foundation. Rather, it is based on the generation of a local consensual knowledge that is only provisionally binding and that is grounded precisely at the level of collective interaction."[57] In the case of Gill's projects, the "generation of local consensual knowledge" follows her framing, and her approach therefore carries many of the flaws that Kester criticizes.

It is important to note that Gill did not plan out the collaboration with Vangad from the beginning. She came to spend time with Vangad while she was working on another project in his village. She took the photographs while Vangad was showing her around and telling her his stories and memories. They built a personal connection before Gill, back in her studio, looked at the developed photographs and felt that Vangad's narrations were "missing" in the pictures that she had taken.[58] Only then she sent the photographs back to him, so he could transform them according to his own ideas. Gill envisions her projects as "elastic and open-ended",[59] as an attempt to "mark making."[60] The communities she works with might be the only ones who can justifiably determine if she succeeds to do so or not. So how to think about her artworks from an academic, art historical perspective that is interested in narratives and knowledge production?

Artworks like *Acts of Appearance* and *Fields of Sight* reify the ways in which we make sense of the world. They negotiate and navigate between an abundance of themes that are often articulated as separate entities: the tensions between the local and the global, between different spatial and temporal scales, the ongoing crisis of social and economic exploitation and marginalization of subaltern groups, environmental destruction, the negotiations of authoritative knowledge and self-determination, and the search for alternatives and solutions to all of this. To make (a different) sense of this seeming chaos, many scholars propose a return to the local to then analyze the vernacular's relation to the global. Demos, for instance, demands to create "relational geographies" as the

56 Kester, "Conversation Pieces: The Role of Dialogue in Socially-Engaged Art," 159.
57 Kester, "Conversation Pieces: The Role of Dialogue in Socially-Engaged Art," 157.
58 Collins, Gill, and Vangad, "Another Way of Seeing."
59 Viswanathan, "An Architecture of Memory."
60 Reema Gehi, "Retellings," *Mumbai Mirror*, April 20, 2016, https://mumbaimirror.indiatimes.com/others/sunday-read/Retellings/articleshow/51858210.cms.

"aesthetic dimension of experimental and perceptual engagement with the commitment to postcolonial ethico-political praxis, and do so with sustained attention to how local activities interact with global formations."[61] Similarly, Kester calls for collaborative projects that possess "the dual consciousness of both the local and the global implications and interconnections of a given site and situation."[62] Again, Kester demands that the "the orientation and trajectory of critical insight aren't predetermined, but rather, depend on the collaborator's response to the contradictions, possibilities, and points of resistance thrown up by the problem-at-hand".[63] Thus, *Fields of Sight* becomes problematic in the moment it is taken as a 'universal' solution for 'universal' problems. While the series was indeed created in a rather processual than predetermined manner, the meaning it was given *a posteriori* is still informed by powerful dichotomies of art theory. As a discipline, like Kamat notes in the case of anthropology, it plays "a critical role [...] in interpellating the local with global projects, the particular with the universal. In so doing, it constitutes the local, harmonizing it with transnational discourses that are signified with other meanings and desires."[64] It is therefore not enough to celebrate projects that articulate themselves around a particular locality, as Kester does. Additionally, one has to consider *how* and *by whom* this locale is defined. Instead of creating new forms of representation, artistic practice could set out to enable ways of articulation, "theorize[ing] subjects as constituted by, and constitutive of, global forces and discourses. [A]rticulation compels us to engage with structural and discursive relations that produce social identities, rather than assume them as a priori."[65] To investigate whether the conceptual framework of the artistic realm allows such forms of articulations or whether art and representation are inseparably entangled with each other, are questions that must be asked along the way.

CONCLUSION

As elaborated at the very beginning of this paper, Demos sees political art at the nexus of politics, knowledge production and creative experimentation. Similarly, Mouffe argues that critical art "makes visible what the dominant consensus tends to obscure and obliterate. It is constituted by a manifold of artistic practices aiming at giving a voice to all those who are silenced within the framework of the existing hegemony."[66]

61 Demos, *Decolonizing Nature: Contemporary Art and the Politics of Ecology*, 12.
62 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 225.
63 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 225.
64 Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," 30.
65 Kamat, "Anthropology and Global Capital. Rediscovering the Noble Savage," 45.
66 Mouffe, "Artistic Acticism and Agonistic

These definitions of art, with all their attractive promises, are informed by certain assumptions about the revelatory, educational power of art. In *Fields of Sight,* these assumptions articulate themselves around the idea of indigenous counter-visualities that are attributed with the hope of envisioning a counter-modernity to solve ecological and representational crises. Searching for self-determined forms of asserting one's presence in the world and finding solutions to the existing violence and injustices of the present is relevant and important. Keeping this perceived sense of urgency in mind, this paper has sought to critically contextualize the replacement of one essentialism with another. The paradox of expected instability dominates the conceptualization and reception of *Fields of Sight*. It is this ambiguity that positions Vangad as a representative of a particular indigenous experience and sensitivity and fixes him in this position. According to Kester, the "intellectual challenge does not lie in yet another reiteration of this familiar claim [of 'undecidability' or 'ambiguity'], but in working through the various ways in which this ambiguity is produced situationally, what effects it has at a given site of practice."[67] The ambiguity of *Fields of Sight* certainly is an important component of its concept and interpretation. But at the same time, it seeks to stabilize certain notions of indigeneity, art and cosmopolitics – claims that have to be critically assessed.

Spaces," 5.

67 Kester, *The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*, 60–61.

Placing German Colonialism in the City: *Berlin Postkolonial*'s Tour in the African Quarter

by
CHRISTIAN JACOBS
& PAUL SPRUTE

After decades of neglecting Germany's history of colonial rule and ambitions, the German public – from the national to the local level – finds itself increasingly often exposed to the challenge of dealing with its (post) colonial past and present. In Berlin and beyond, activists and some critical historians have confronted hesitant and quite often ignorant institutions, politicians, or citizens with the need to begin working through this aspect of Germany's history. They have pointed to wider implications and continuities beyond the time period between 1884 - the year of the Berlin Conference as an important moment for the division of the African continent between European imperial interest - and 1919 - when the German Empire was forced to give up its colonies - not only overseas but also within Germany itself. The comparative brevity and sudden abortion of this era of formal colonial rule abroad have frequently been used as arguments to diminish its historical relevance, especially compared to Nazi rule and the Holocaust as the central turning point of Germany's history in the twentieth century.[1]

One of the most striking examples of underexposed colonial connections in Berlin's cityscape is the so-called Afrikanisches Viertel, the African Quarter (Figure 1); just a few subway stops away from the apparently more central sites of Berlin's (colonial) history, such as the Reichstag or the world-renowned Museum Island opposite to which the historical city palace is currently being reconstructed. *Berlin Postkolonial*, an association established by activists from Germany and former German colonies in 2007, organizes guided tours through this neighborhood of unassuming housing blocks in the former working-class district of Wedding.

The Afrikanisches Viertel owes its name to its street signs – all related to former German colonies or colonialists in Africa. The streets were designated prior to the First World War when Carl Hagenbeck planned to build a zoo in the nearby Volkspark Rehberge. Similar to his zoological garden in Hamburg, Hagenbeck wanted to display both animals and humans from the German colonies. Exhibiting "exotic" humans as uncivilized was a common practice in Europe at the time, helping to legitimize colonial empires in the metropoles.[2] While Hagenbeck's plans were not realized due to the First World War, the street names selected during the planning process remained in place.

On the tour through the neighborhood, the activists of Berlin Postkolonial stop at specific streets and explain the historical background of their names. This way, the tour can recount Germany's colonial past

1 For the recent debates on German colonialism and its legacy see: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* no. 40-42 (2019) "Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte," 30 September 2019; Britta Schilling, *Postcolonial Germany: Memories of Empire in a Decolonized Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

2 Anna Dreesbach, "Colonial Exhibitions, 'Völkerschauen' and the Display of the 'Other'," *European History Online* (Mainz, 2012), https://d-nb.info/1043575553/34.



FIGURE 1
Map of the African Quarter. Courtesy of Kyle Riffe.

and address prevailing structures of colonial ideology within German society. Moreover, the tour guides explain the efforts Berlin Postkolonial has made in the last decade to change Germany's politics of memory, not least by pushing for the street names to be changed. Thus, the tour is a good opportunity to discuss the role of civil society activists in promoting debates about the colonial past in Germany.

SWAKOPMUND TO LÜDERITZ: THE HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STREET NAMES

The tour starts at the subway station Afrikanische Straße, right next to Swakopmunder Straße. Swakopmund, today a port in Namibia, used to be one of the main entry points in Germany's most important settler colony. With the help of legal tricks and discriminatory laws German settlers acquired more

and more land, leading to conflict with indigenous peoples under increasing economic and social pressure. In 1904, both the Herero and Nama people started a rebellion attacking German settlements, in reaction to which the German government sent General Lothar von Trotha with additional troops to crush the revolt. The German strategy was aimed at exterminating the Herero and Nama: Forced into the desert, thousands died of thirst while those who survived were imprisoned in concentration camps where every second prisoner died.

Even though generals had officially articulated the extermination of the Herero and Nama people as the goal of the campaign, no German government acknowledged the events as genocide until 2015. Today, Germany has still not officially apologized to the victims. While Herero and Nama representatives have pushed the Federal Republic to do so for a long time, the matter has become a topic of debate within the German wider public only in the last decades, as part of a larger trend of rediscovering the German colonial past.[3]

From Swakopmunder Straße the tour of *Berlin Postkolonial* turns into Togostraße, walking down to the square Nachtigalplatz. It is named after the colonial scientist Gustav Nachtigal who was appointed special commissioner of the German Empire in West Africa in 1884. In the next two years, he integrated Togoland, Lüderitzland (later German South West Africa) and Cameroon into the German Empire as protectorates. Thus, Nachtigal's mission marked the beginning of the official German presence in Africa and he was portrayed as a heroic founding figure in the German public. In order to mark a departure from this glorification of the German presence in Africa, *Berlin Postkolonial* has urged the district council to rename Nachtigalplatz.

The square is crossed by Petersallee which has officially been named after Hans Peters, a German politician and member of a resistance group during the Third Reich, since 1986. However, the street was originally dedicated to *Carl* Peters who acquired 12,000 square kilometers of land in East Africa in 1884, signing treaties with African chiefs who did not share the colonialists' understanding that such treaties legitimized direct colonial rule. The lands were declared German East Africa and Peters was appointed to rule the colony as the imperial commissioner. Peters' notorious brutality and cruelty was later scandalized by members of the *Reichstag*, leading to his dismissal. Even though the street is officially named after another Peters nowadays, *Berlin Postkolonial* has argued that this solution is inadequate in the environment of the Afrikanisches Viertel. This tendency

3 For the current position of the German Foreign Office see: Auswärtiges Amt, "Addressing Germany's and Namibia's Past and Looking for the Future," 1 July 2019, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/afrika/-/1991702.

FIGURE 2
Flag of the German Colonial Office hoisted in Volkspark Rehberge, Berlin 2019. Photo: Hauke Jacobs.

to incidentally deny the colonial character of the Afrikanisches Viertel by introducing a decontextualized street name is echoed in the one street named after the Second World War, *Ghanastraße*, celebrating independence in a neighborhood set up to serve the opposite purpose.

Next, the tour turns to walk through the "Togo" garden colony (*Kleingartenkolonie*) that was until recently called "Dauerkolonie Togo" – a 'permanent colony'. In both the garden allotments "Togo" and the nearby gardens in Volkspark Rehberge the open glorification of German colonialism is strikingly common: signs label gardens as German protectorates or colonies while some garden owners hoist flags of the German Empire (Figure 2). Walking through the community garden "Togo," a resident threw a raw egg from his window at Mnyaka Sururu Mboro, our tour guide (fortunately missing him). Mboro took the opportunity to share that the tours are frequently disturbed by people blocking the few benches available for seating or yelling at the tour groups. It is obvious that a significant portion of local residents do not accept the presence of critical perspectives on the history of 'their' district and its links to German colonialism.

After this incident, our tour ended on the other side of the community garden, in Lüderitzstraße. Adolf Lüderitz was a German merchant who in 1883 acquired the first German territories in today's Namibia – basing his claims to large swathes of territory on the preposterous proposition that German miles were the basis of his contract with Nama Captain Josef-Fredericks II – instead of the much more common (and for Lüderitz inconveniently) shorter English ones.

Berlin Postkolonial has advocated for the renaming of this street as well.

THE AFRICAN QUARTER AS AN EXAMPLE FOR POLITICAL ACTION?

After years of political debate and campaigning in favor of and against taking action,[4] during which local politicians and societal actors often failed to come to a consensus, the district council finally decided in 2018 to change three of the street names in Afrikanisches Viertel. In the future, Lüderitzstraße will honor Cornelius Frederiks, a Nama chief who fought German colonial troops during the genocide; Nachtigalplatz will be named after the Bell family, which took a leading role in the anti-colonial resistance movement in today's Cameroon; Petersallee will be divided and named after Anna Mungunda, an activist for Namibian independence in the middle of the 20th century, while the other part will commemorate the Maji-Maji war, a major anti-colonial rebellion in the German colonies in East Africa. Long prevailing tendencies to ignore the colonial character of the Afrikanisches Viertel, or to just kick the can down the road, have therefore reached their end in this case. By putting the issue on the political agenda and making an argument for historical justice, *Berlin Postkolonial* initiated this decision. Most importantly, its persistent activism has kept the question on the agenda for years, showcasing and eventually overcoming political inertia.

The interest in hundreds of these tours offered in the Afrikanisches Viertel also indicates the demand for historical knowledge and reflection within society. However, the frequent harassment by residents equally shows how the debate is rejected by many insisting on keeping their postal address, or simply spouting colonial ideology.

While the patience and persistence of activists has had concrete results in the Afrikanisches Viertel, where three very dubious figures will no longer be publicly honored, it should also be kept in mind that similar campaigns in slightly less clear-cut cases, such as the renaming of *Mohrenstraße* ("Moors' Street") in Berlin's center,[5] have been in vain so far. Yet, whether it is successful in its concrete demands or not, such activism has surely catalyzed larger trends to establish critical perspectives on Germany's colonial past and elevate it to become a more official concern.

The activities of groups like *Berlin Postkolonial* also show how effective it is to localize and concretize the political objectives of

4 For a theoretically informed treatment of this debate, please see: Susanne Förster et al., "Negotiating German Colonial Heritage in Berlin's Afrikanisches Viertel," Journal of Heritage Studies 22 no. 7 (2016): 515-529.

5 "Mohrenstraße" in *Stadt Neu Lesen* (Berlin: Berliner Entwicklungspolitischer Ratschlag, 2016), http://eineweltstadt.berlin/publikationen/stadtneulesen/mohrenstrasse/.

memory culture.[6] In Berlin, the debate over the repatriation of specific objects from museums has picked up speed, further exemplifying this notion. With it, the German debate has moved on from cases of violence and malice personified in Lüderitz, Nachtigal and Peters, presenting the opportunity to discuss more complex and systemic issues of unequal relations or epistemological hierarchization. Here, the debate surrounding the legitimacy of museum collections of colonial artifacts serves as an important test case.

It remains to be seen how successfully activism around these issues reaches the wider public and how it can be influenced and accompanied by the work of academics. With the aforementioned city palace under reconstruction, in which most of Berlin's overseas museum collections will be exhibited, this ongoing debate has already found its symbolic center.[7]

6 Three other locales of less-established post-colonial interest in Berlin, namely the streets named after anti-colonial activists in the former socialist part of the city, the "Thai Park" as a meeting place for Berlin's South East Asian community and the Museum for Natural Studies are discussed in the Podcast series "Decolonization in Action," hosted by Edna Bonhomme and Kristyna Comer of the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science, https://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/research/projects/decolonization-action.

7 See: Graham Bowley, "A New Museum Opens Old Wounds in Germany," *New York Times*, 12 October, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/arts/design/humboldt-forum-germany.html; AfricAvenir International e.V., ed., "No Humboldt 21!. Dekoloniale Einwände gegen das Humboldt-Forum, Berlin 2017"; For the larger debate on restitution see. Felwine Sarr; Benédicte Savoy: Restituer le Patrimoine Africain (Paris: Philippe Rey, 2018).

3

Metho

d

o-

logy

“The Hidden Hand of the Market Will Never Work Without a Hidden Fist”: History-Making Between Capital and Empire, Contributions to a Conceptual Turn in Global History

by
BENJAMIN GAILLARD-GARRIDO

ABSTRACT

Conventional global histories usually narrate the epochal shift of order that succeeded both World Wars as the passage from colonial subjugation to national independence. New historians of empire and capitalism, however, have complicated these narratives and shown the continuities between both periods. Their work has led them to challenge the former conceptions of empire on which these conventional histories relied. By leaning on their recent insights, this paper intends to contribute to the larger refiguring of the notion of empire that has been taking place in contemporary historiography. Arguing for an anchoring of histories of empire within histories of political economy and for a networks-based approach to state as well as non-state actors, its main aim is to convey that empire should be conceived of not as a thing or a territory, but as a "social relation." This conceptual turn would allow historians to unravel the various forms of unthinking that conventional notions of empire carry. In turn, this shift in focus would spur important debates concerning the limits of global history. The question would ultimately be: where does the *unthought* of global history itself lie?

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Benjamin Gaillard-Garrido is a second-year Masters student in the International History Department of the Graduate Institute, Geneva. He is currently writing on the social history of subjectivity using a critical value theory perspective. His main focus is on New Granada and 19th-century Latin America. His Masters' thesis will bear on the trajectory, pedagogy, and political philosophy of creole itinerant intellectual Simón Rodríguez. Before studying International History, Benjamin received a Bachelor's degree in Francophone and German literatures from the University of Bern.

1. INTRODUCTION

Numerous global histories narrate the epochal shift in order that succeeded both World Wars as the passage from colonial subjugation to national independence. The period stretching from the fall of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires to the independence of the Global South is thus generally portrayed as the pivotal point between a world of empires and a world of nation-states. New historians of empire and capitalism, however, have complicated these narratives and shown the continuities between both periods.[1] Their work has led them to challenge the former conceptions of empire on which conventional narratives relied. By leaning on their recent insights, this paper intends to contribute to the larger refiguring of the notion of empire that has been taking place in contemporary historiography. Its principal focus is thus a theoretical one. It is about the concepts and methods we mobilize when we write *modern* imperial history.[2] Its argument is fourfold. Firstly, it will call for an anchoring of histories of empire within broader histories of political economy. Secondly, it will argue for a networks-based approach of state as well as non-state actors straddling political, economic, and cultural spheres. Thirdly, following Paul A. Kramer, it will advocate for a theoretical shift from the term of "empire" to the *concept* of "the imperial." Lastly, it will encourage historians interested in analysing the intentionality of imperial actors to resort to ethnographical and anthropological approaches, mainly from anthropology of state and of institutions. What these arguments all seek to convey is that empire should be conceived of not as a thing or a territory, but as a "social relation."[3]

In their research, recent historians have shown how the "durable hold of th[e] narrow definition of empire among scholars"[4] has hampered the ways in which they write about empire. This definition has indeed clouded trajectories and structures whose histories would be better understood if we were to place them under a lens attuned to the category of "the imperial." By questioning previous accounts of empire, decolonization and capitalism, new histories have indeed come to challenge their premises. The first one of these is the "old, legalistic"[5] "definition of empire as territorial control,"[6] which "narrow[s] the imperial to the state control of

1 For summaries and reviews of this literature, see Paul Kramer, "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the U.S. in the World," *American Historical Review* (December 2011): 1348-1392 and, by the same author, "How Not to Write a History of the U.S. Empire," *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 5 (November 2018): 911-931.

2 Its scope thus does not cover, for example, the Roman, the Inca, or the Aztec empires.

3 Stuart Schrader, "Imperialism after Empire," *Boston Review*, March 19, 2019, https://bostonreview.net/war-security/stuart-schrader-imperialism-after-empire

4 Kramer, "How Not to Write a History of the U.S. Empire," 915.

5 John Gallagher and Roland Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review* 6, no. 1 (1953): 7.

6 Kramer, "How Not to Write a History of the U.S. Empire," 914.

territory,"[7] and usually goes under the label of "formal empire." As Gallagher and Robinson wrote in their seminal 1953 article, focusing on the "formal empire" alone is "like judging the size and character of icebergs solely from the parts above the water-line."[8] It leads the analyst focusing on imperial histories astray. Another questionable premise is the contraction of a nation's political sovereignty to its legal expression, or so-called "formal" sovereignty. This premise struggles to differentiate between "formal" and "substantial" sovereignty. Its major flaw is that it diverts from refined analyses of state sovereignty that dissect financial, economic, military, diplomatic and cultural asymmetries and in so doing draws the analyst into arguments that rest on fuzzy premises. Undeniably then, historians are "very much at the mercy of [their] own particular concept of empire."[9] The important question they should be asking themselves is this one: which silenced histories, which imperial topics lie out there, waiting to be unearthed by a revised imperial optic?

Furthermore, I argue that this narrow definition of empire has obscured the persistence of imperial structures and networks in our contemporary world. The formal definition of empire is the cornerstone of traditional narratives that showcase the period of decolonization as the transition from a world of empires to a world of nation-states. These narratives discount Ann Laura Stoler's critical observation that "blurred genres of rule are not empires in distress but imperial polities in active realignment and reformation."[10] They therefore contribute, wittingly or unwittingly, to the concealment of empire in the allegedly "post-imperial" world of nation-states.

Last but not least, the changes in the structure of capitalism and the emergence of a "global ruling class,"[11] as well as what Samuel Moyn has described as "the ideological dissociation of liberalism and empire, after more than a century of long and deep connection,"[12] compel us to operate a conceptual shift in our ways of thinking about empire. Thus, beyond historiographical concerns, I believe that a revised concept of empire is necessary if one also wishes to understand contemporary imperial configurations. A critical vocabulary is necessary not only for robustly critical historiographies of empire and capitalism, but also for critical analyses of our contemporary world.[13] This shift of optic should

7 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1349.
8 Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," 1.
9 Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," 1.
10 Ann Laura Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty," *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (2006): 138.
11 See William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," *Science and Society* 64, no. 1 (2000): 11-54.
12 Samuel Moyn, "Imperialism, Self-Determination, and the Rise of Human Rights," in *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History,* ed. Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde and William I. Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 172.
13 Kramer, "How Not to Write a History of the U.S.

contribute to devising not only past, but also present imperial phenomena in a more fine-grained manner.

Before exposing each of these arguments, however, I will demonstrate how salient global imperial networks were before the advent of the nation-state system. I will argue that their significance for contemporary history writing can best be unearthed if we adopt a lens attuned to "the imperial," which allows us to chart the "long-distance connections and interactions" between polities, networks, and political economies.[14] Here, Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan's concept of "imperial formation" will prove particularly useful in addressing this first conceptual hurdle.

2. IMPERIAL FORMATIONS: RENDERING EMPIRES COMMENSURABLE

European imperial polities and their offshoots enclosed much of the globe by the turn of the twentieth century. Along with the British, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Russian empires, the United States also embarked on a trajectory of imperial expansion. From the seventeenth century onwards, as wealth became the nerve of power, these rival empires engaged in a political, economic and cultural competition from the North Atlantic to Southeast Asia. They were all part of an imperial political economy whose defining trait was the mobilization of "state power to achieve territorial footholds and access to the commodities, markets, and labour-power needed for industrial-capitalist competition."[15] One telling example of these imperial connections are the projects for agricultural and pauper colonies devised by the French government in the middle of the nineteenth century:

French blueprints for agricultural and pauper colonies drew on strategies of empire, strategies that scholars have often presumed followed European models. However, French observers in the nineteenth century, for example, also considered initiatives by Catherine II and her successors in Russia to be exemplary efforts to create a reasoned empire through colonization. As France turned to Russia, Russia in turn looked to the American West for models of settlement and expansion. Such borrowings that stretched from France to Russia and Russia to the United States of America mark a competitive politics of comparison that accelerated circuits of knowledge production and imperial exchange.[16]

These imperial ties were dense and extensive. As a means of capitalist integration, then,

Empire," 917.

14 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1351.

15 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1359.

16 Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2007): 3-42, here 4.

imperial networks straddling across polities spawned histories whose shared political and discursive economies that still resonate today. Nevertheless, nation- and state-centred histories and historiographies have obscured the history of the "exchange of principles, practices and technologies between empires in their metropolitan regions and far-flung domains" and their significance for our present.[17] These "long-buried connections" now appear as "dislocated from each other and from the commensurabilities that once linked them."[18] Indeed, nation-state centred historiographies have severed national from imperial histories: as "the nation form increasingly 'captured' history, imperial histories became nationalized in manners that obscured [the] imperial formations [that preceded them] altogether."[19] Briefly said, the nation-form "erases" past and present imperial polities. However, since the seventeenth century imperial expansion, capitalist integration, state building, and regimes of political-economic discipline "were not separately conceived and executed projects with wholly different architects and different names."[20] The question therefore arises, how can historians meaningfully shed light on these overshadowed and entangled pasts?

As I have argued, Stoler and McGranahan's concept of "imperial formation" might prove useful as a clearing ground for historians seeking to weave together what at first glance may seem as disparate imperial histories. The authors adapt their notion from Althusser and Balibar's concept of "social formation" which describes the "concrete complex whole comprising economic practice, political practice, and ideological practice at a certain place and stage of development."[21] Recognizing the important contributions of the cultural turn, they "include cultural practice in [their] configuration to stretch [their] concerns to a broader set of practices structured in dominance."[22] The advantage of Stoler and McGranahan's concept is precisely that it points to an extensive range of practices cutting across scales, thus inviting the historian into exploring narratives of power and connection that stretch between networks, state, and non-state actors, across different political economies.

While Stoler and McGranahan's notion of "imperial formation" is useful to direct our gaze towards state and non-state practices that might not have been perceived as imperial had another analytical category been applied, their concept also carries several shortcomings. First of all, it lacks a political-economic anchor. Second,

17 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 4.
18 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 5.
19 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 21.
20 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 4.
21 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 8.
22 Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 8.

the Althusserian notion of "*social* formation," from which they derive their own, might end up neglecting the centrality of government and politics, which are essential when it comes to imperial projects, precisely because of its overemphasis on the "social." This may result in a category of analysis that is, in itself, depoliticizing. Because of its genealogy, then, the category of "imperial formation" could have a hard time tackling matters of sovereignty and power asymmetries, in which political economy and forms of government are essential variables. However, the adjective "imperial" in "imperial formation" does prove adequate to address this danger, provided we understand it correctly. Still, the main advantage of the category of "imperial formation" lies precisely in its ability to render formerly bound practices commensurable and historically relevant again. This is promising for historians seeking to critically engage not only past but also contemporary global imperial polities. The next sections will explore promising avenues for delineating a productive concept of empire for historical and contemporary analyses.

3. RETHINKING "EMPIRE"

3.1 POLITICAL ECONOMY

As I have argued, past imperial practices share trajectories whose commensurability has been overshadowed by nation-centred and state-centred historiographies. In other words, many contemporary conceptualizations of empire are informed by sets of categories that emerged with the nineteenth-century advent of the nation-state. However, empire-building and commercial expansion – two defining features of modernity – form the historical matrix of past and present dynamics of capitalist integration. Now, as wealth became the crucial underpinning of power in the early modern period, practices and discourses of government, and practices and discourses of political economy became increasingly intertwined. While political-economic thought largely provided the resources with which actors reflected on empire, imperial expansion itself had an impact on discourses and practices of political economy. Capitalist political economies and imperial modes of government have thus, since then, stood in a dialectical relationship. This is why anchoring histories of empire within broader histories of global political economy should be the starting point for any critical analyses of empire.

The proximities between imperial government, commercial expansion, and political economy can be traced to the early modern period. At the turn of the seventeenth century, positive balances of trade, credit finance, and colonialism became "central nodes in the expanding web of capitalist control."[23]

23 Jerome Roos, "The New Debt Colonies," *Viewpoint Magazine*, February 1, 2018, https://

The trajectory of early eighteenth century Scottish financial architect John Law, for example, is a prime illustration of the "intimacies" between empire and political economy[24]. Acting on behalf of the French Crown, Law created what came to be known as his "System", a political-economic program, which "is universally regarded as a landmark in history of finance."[25] According to John Shovlin, however, its impact on latter capitalist political economies has been underestimated. It should nonetheless be taken seriously into account, since, as could be argued, what renders modern empires commensurable is, first and foremost, their shared political economy.[26]

The 1719 creation of the French *Compagnie Perpétuelle des Indes* under Law's aegis, best exemplifies his contribution to the merging of public finances with colonial ventures – and thus of political economy with empire. The *Compagnie* embraced all French colonial commerce and took over part of the unfunded French public debt. His project to transform France's economic and financial system followed the prior English model. The newly created Banque de France would issue credit-backed notes and, together with other chartered joint-stock companies, also sell shares to the public in order to ensure monetary expansion.[27] Public finance backed by credit and public finance backed by trade thus merged. This fusion typifies the symbiosis between expansionist political economies and imperial modes of governing. John Law laid down the blueprints of modern political economy, and thus of empire, by uniting what Istvan Hont has called "Jealousy of Trade" – a polity's anxious focus on maintaining positive balances of trade – with what John Shovlin has termed "Jealousy of Credit" – a polity's "anxious watchfulness directed toward the public credit of rival states."[28] For contemporary analyses, Law's trajectory is also strikingly significant. Law's description of his "System's" benefits for French hegemony echoes subsequent features of British and U.S. imperialisms. With his "System", Law argued, France would "command other nations without dominating them and give them the law without usurping any of their rights."[29] This account shares similarities with contemporary strategies of economic penetration, which achieve their goals "by funnelling capital indirectly through powerful local intermediaries"[30] or

www.viewpointmag.com/2018/02/01/new-debt-colonies/

24 I borrow the concept of "intimacy" from Lisa Lowe's *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, Duke University Press, 2015), 17-21.

25 John Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit: John Law's "System" and the Geopolitics of Financial Revolution," *The Journal of Modern History* 88 (2016): 275-305, here 276, and Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010).

26 Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit," 276.

27 Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit," 279.

28 Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit," 278.

29 Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit," 283.

30 Gilbert M. Joseph and Allen Wells, "Collaboration and Informal Empire in Yucatán: The Case for Political Economy," *Latin American Research Review* 18, no. 3 (1983): 204-218, here

by dominating peripheral polities through "asymmetrical economic partnership agreements leading to deep integration."[31] While Law's trajectory is a case in point for our argument, the objection could be made that it is only that: *a* trajectory. By weaving it together with contemporary imperial practices, the risk we run is that of homogenizing a plurality of imperial political-economic histories. However, the subsequent influence of Law's "System" and its significance for understanding our present should not be underestimated. Law's economic and geopolitical vision largely influenced latter political-economic and imperial thinkers.[32] As John Shovlin argues, the "structural significance" of the System "has often been elided by historians."[33] Moreover, in his article, Shovlin is too quick to separate the financial aspect of Law's System from its commercial correlate, so that his argument ends up understating the intimacies between capitalist finance and imperial ventures. These intimacies should be taken into account when approaching imperial formations from a political-economic angle.[34]

Historians of empire anchoring their enterprise in political-economic histories can thus make significant contributions further linking, either synchronically, early eighteenth century French political economy, French colonial expansion, and empire, or diachronically, eighteenth century European expansion and contemporary capitalist integration. The latter procedure is all the more vital since the "structural dependencies and asymmetrical power relations intermediated by the globalized logic of financial markets" – to which globalized commercial, technological, and security structures are intimately tied – can better be analysed if we envision them as heirs to the early modern period's political economy.[35] As we have argued before, formal transformations in the world of polities should not conceal the "continuity in change" of global political-economic trajectories. The common matrices of past and present imperial political-economies that Law's trajectory – arguably an example among countless others – serves to illuminate are better understood if we approach them through the lens of political economy. Capitalist power relations are indeed "the historical ground within which [imperial, and subsequently,] nationalized state power grew."[36] Evaluating polities' historical

204.

31 Alfred Zack-Williams, "Neo-imperialism and African Development," *Review of African Political Economy* 40, no 136 (2013): 179-184, here 179.

32 Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit," 297-300.

33 Shovlin, "Jealousy of Credit," 276.

34 For a compelling account of the structural embededness between colonial trade, discourses on society, and discourses of political economy, see Andrew Sartori, "From Statecraft to Social Science in Early Modern English Political Economy," *Critical Historical Studies* (Fall 2016): 181-214.

35 Roos, "The New Debt Colonies"

36 Kramer, "Embedding Capital: Political-Economic History, the United States, and the World," *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 15 (2016): 331-362, here 336.

trajectories from a political-economic perspective can thus add to our understanding of empire's formal and informal, national and transnational, as well as structural and networked aspects. Reframing histories of empire "in methodological terms, as political-economic history,"[37] will therefore undoubtedly contribute to historians' inquiries into imperial polities. These analyses are all the more vital in today's "post-imperial world" where, in spite of appearances, empires do subsist.

3.2 NETWORKS

Just as institutions were always embedded in capitalism, modern capitalist formations were always embedded in state and non-state institutions. In the case of empires, "their existence and unity was [and is] made possible by supranational connections" and global networks of state, but also, crucially, non-state actors.[38] While these connections upheld empire, empire in return fostered networks that went beyond imperial boundaries. However, a state-centred approach to empire has tended to lay too strong an emphasis on governmental actors, thus neglecting imperial networks whose reliance on state structures has varied substantially. While imperial formations have regularly mobilized state power to achieve their objectives, too exclusive a focus on state actors and structures ultimately obscures the relevance, as well as the density of other, at first glance not necessarily state-related imperial networks. One early concept marshalled to address this issue was that of "informal empire." However, by dividing "both imperial practices and types around the issue of state and corporate control,"[39] it implied that "capital's disciplines were separable from and looser than governmental ones,"[40] thus "abstract[ing] the relationship between state and capital."[41] The term "informal empire" therefore "introduced as many problems as it solved."[42] Ultimately, the notion's "utility crumble[d]" when historians finally showed "governments' active role in building [informal empires]."[43]

The concept of networks, on the other hand, can contribute to highlighting state and non-state actors, thus shifting the focus towards analyses of their embededness in imperial contexts and transcending the unproductive distinction between imperial "formality" and "informality." Frederick Cooper, for example, "argues for the value of the network concept in analysing with greater precision long-distance connections over extensive periods of time."[44]

37 Kramer, "Embedding Capital," 333.
38 Andrew Thompson, "Afterword: Informal Empire: Past, Present and Future", in *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital*, ed. Jean Grugel, David Howard, Tony Kapcia, Geoffrey Kantaris (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 234.
39 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1357.
40 Kramer, "Embedding Capital," 338.
41 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1357.
42 Kramer, "Embedding Capital," 338.
43 Kramer, "Embedding Capital," 345.
44 Thompson, "Afterword," 234.

This emphasis on the continuity and resilience of networks is particularly useful, for example, in the case of France and its former colonies, where economic, commercial, military, cultural and political networks have upheld and deepened sets of structural dependencies and asymmetrical power relations. One of the risks a misuse of the network concept entails is that of partaking in liberal narratives of capitalist globalization, which convey tropes of liberating flows and emancipatory connections and interactions.[45] Here, a political-economic anchor could remind transnational historians of what these networks, ultimately, were – and still are – all about. That is, "high-stakes, multi-scale struggles over resources, economic power, and material survival."[46] Historians should keep in mind that imperial networks are, more often than not, "networks of power relationships affecting structures,"[47] as Joseph and Wells argue in their case study of Yucatán.

And, since we're writing about power, accumulation and strategies for their preservation, thinking in terms of imperial networks can help to unearth the intrusive "tools [...] intended to transform entire political economies, [such as] military and police training, political and economic expertise and education, technical assistance, foreign loans, and the pressure of financial institutions."[48] Here, for example, histories of neoliberalism could benefit immensely from a networks perspective. Such a polymorphous, dynamic and evasive historical movement as neoliberalism, with ties to state and non-state actors, and with a considerable impacting capacity in terms of shaping macro-policies at a global level, can best be grasped only if we inquire into its web-like, networked aspect.[49] We could also mention histories of the VoC or the EIC, straddling governmental and non-governmental spheres of action and influence.[50] Lastly, a networks-based approach would be extremely useful in shedding light on structures of global counterinsurgency, such as the one Kyle Burke traces in his *Revolutionaries for the Right*,[51] or as the one Nakil Ak'abal identifies as straddling diachronically from Algeria to Guatemala via South Vietnam, Argentina, and Israel.[52] In

45 For critiques, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., "We Are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the International," *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002): 558–566.
46 Kramer, "Embedding Capital," 352.
47 Joseph and Wells, "Collaboration and Informal Empire in Yucatán," 212.
48 Kramer, "Embedding Capital," 338.
49 Also bearing in mind that histories of neoliberalism are intimately tied to histories of empire. Adom Getachew, for example, argues that neoliberalism is less a "post-imperial project than a moment of empire's reinvention". See her review of Slobodian's *Globalists* in *H-Diplo*, Roundtable Review 20, no. 27 (2019): 5-8. For a compelling account of neoliberalism from a network perspective, see Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2018.
50 See, for example, Julia Adams, *The Familial State. Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
51 Kyle Burke, *Revolutionaries for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018).
52 Nakil Ak'abal, "Under the Shadow of the

these cases of counterinsurgency, private security firms, such as today's Blackwater, played a crucial role sometimes within and at other times exceeding governmental scrutiny.[53] As an imperial private contractor, approaching Blackwater through a networks perspective could be promising for those interested in shedding light on the symbiosis between state and non-state imperial actors.

4. FROM "EMPIRE" TO "THE IMPERIAL"

This essay was intended as a contribution to the larger refiguring of the notion of "empire" that has been taking place in contemporary historiography. It argued for an anchoring of histories of empire within histories of political economy and for a networks-based approach to state as well as non-state actors, straddling economic, political, and cultural spheres. In this sense, its focus was principally a theoretical one. Its aim, however, is political. Its intent is to clearly state that empire – both past and present – should be conceived of not as a thing or a territory, but as a social relation. In order to do this, and following Paul A. Kramer, I will now argue for a theoretical shift from the term of "empire" to the *concept* of "the imperial". As an adjective, Kramer's concept of "the imperial" stresses *transitivity* and thus puts a much-needed emphasis on the relational aspect of imperial power. It is therefore relevant not only in terms of history-making, but also in terms of articulating contemporary political resistances to imperial networks.

"The imperial" "refers to a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation."[54] As such, the category of "the imperial" not only contains but also points towards the categories of networks and political economy. Firstly, seeing as it "hinges on the material, institutional, and discursive organization of space, the imperial "remains open to non-territorial, networked forms of spatial order."[55] This is crucial for a networks-based approach to imperial histories, which should seek to surpass the unproductive distinction between "formal" and "informal" empire while remaining attentive to the traction of state disciplinary mechanisms as major imperial tools. Secondly, through its attention to "relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation," and

Phoenix: The Battle of Algiers, the Pacification of South Vietnam, and the Civil Wars of Central America – A Study of French-American Cold War Counterinsurgency Tactics and their Application in Guatemala," (MA thesis, Geneva Graduate Institute, 2019, forthcoming).

53 For Blackwater's imperial ties, see, for example, James Ridgeway, "The Secret History of Hurricane Katrina", *Mother Jones*, August 29, 2018, https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2009/08/secret-history-hurricane-katrina/.

54 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1349.

55 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1349-1350.

through its emphasis on power and scalar asymmetries, the imperial "foregrounds the analysis of power and politics on a global scale" and is therefore attuned to the referential force of the political-economic.[56] It thus also points towards political economy as a critical anchor for histories of empire.

Moreover, the category of "the imperial" is attentive to the large-scale, non-national, and non-state-centric dimensions of empires. Concurrently, it renders former imperial ties cognitively salient again, thus dealing with the issues raised by Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan previously mentioned in chapter 2 of this essay. Furthermore, in that it foregrounds the analysis of power and politics, "the imperial" addresses the depoliticizing tendencies that, through its genealogy, Stoler and McGranahan's concept of "imperial formation" risks carrying. It also goes beyond it in that it does not name an object, which the term of "formation" would instinctively imply. Indeed, "the imperial" is "not a kind of entity," but a sensitivity, a "way of seeing," a concept that serves to shed light on a topic through the application of an optic.[57] In this sense, the imperial is better suited at avoiding reification than the "imperial formation."

Historians could argue that a shift to "the imperial" might risk turning the category into a catchphrase that sees every power asymmetry as imperial, thus sacrificing analytical precision on moral and rhetorical grounds. Two counterarguments: firstly, this objection would be more convincing if historians of modernity were more inclined to take account of the profound commensurability between empire and modernity. They should not shy away from remaining attentive to the imperial relations that often lie dormant beneath their subjects of analysis. Secondly, Kramer's definition of "the imperial" has the benefit of being precise and constructive. Its relevance, however, will hinge on historians' ability to apply it with rigour and nuance, while avoiding the generalizing tendencies that plague other literatures.[58] More importantly, the relevance of "the imperial" will ultimately rest on their ability to confront our general inclination towards naturalization and reification. When applied rigorously as a *concept*, "the imperial" should dissolve itself after analysis – after having served to construct an object. Lest we end up mistaking the object for the concept, this is how we should make use of "the imperial."Finally, it must be stated that "the imperial is defined by its effects," it therefore understands imperial practices "through [their] consequences, intended or not."[59] If historians' desire is to investigate degrees of intentionality, they should resort to ethnography and anthropology of

56 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1391.
57 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1350.
58 See, for example, Aijaz Ahmad, "Imperialism of Our Time," *Socialist Register* 40 (2004): 43-62.
59 Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1350.

state, as well as non-state, actors.[60] These disciplines have developed methods calibrated to pinpoint the meanings of human practices embedded in these contexts. Drawing from them, historians will contribute to more fine-grained analyses of the ontologies of imperial actors. Moreover, in analysing the embededness of state and non-state actors in imperial contexts, historians could make good use of Michael Cowen's concept of "straddling", which highlights actors' variable positions of power and accumulation, covering economic, political, as well as cultural spheres. What these disciplines and concepts have in common is their emphasis on the relational aspect of imperial power.

A networks-based perspective, a political-economic anchor, and methods from anthropology of state and of institutions are all tools from which global history could draw. Their common trait is that they all emphasize the *relationality* of imperial power. Exploring "the imperial" as an analytical fulcrum thus bears the promise of shedding light not only on formerly unseen practices, discourses, and trajectories, but also on their eminently political significance for our present. As a final comment, it must be said that this conceptual turn to "the imperial" would allow for a much-needed shift in debates in global history. From a focus on the question of the nature of empires (formal/informal; national/international), historians would turn to a focus on the question of the objects of global and imperial histories. The issue would then be: which archives can global and imperial histories trace when using "the imperial"? What are, for example, the consequences of seeing the Dutch Golden Age from an imperial perspective instead of a national or Eurocentric one?[61] In other words, which forms of historical unthinking can "the imperial" unravel? Conversely, this shift in focus to the "objects" of global history would spur important debates concerning the limits of the field: where do global history's blind spots lie? What does an imperial optic in global histories unearth, and what does it obscure? In other words, where does the *unthought* of global history itself, lie? This back-and forth between the objects and concepts of global history is essential to defining its scope and limits. It is under the banner of these final interrogations that a global history may, for the moment, ride.

60 See, for example, Tatjana Thelen, Larissa Vetters, and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (eds), *Stategraphy. Toward a Relational Anthropology of the State* (New York: Berghahn, 2017).

61 See, for example, Simon Schama, *The Embarassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (New York: Knopf, 1987) and the critique by Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," *Critical Inquiry* 26, no. 4, (2000), 823-824.

The Independence Processes of Greece and Colombia: Topics and Possibilities of Comparison

by
LUIS ALFREDO DE LA PEÑA JIMÉNEZ

The historiographical production on the Age of Revolutions, a period of crisis and transformation in a global scale broadly framed between 1760 and 1850, has revitalized, contextualized and integrated the processes of modernization of political culture into non-European spaces. The latest literature on the field is trying to challenge the Eurocentric approaches of the main historical narratives that defined and delimited the period in historiographical terms. These works are concerned with questioning the narratives of seminal works such as those authored by Eric Hobsbawm and R.R. Palmer about the Age of Revolutions.[1] However, despite the growing literature on regional historiography and efforts that aim to contextualize this revolutionary period globally, most of the current scholarship focuses on case studies, relegating the topic's relevance within a broader international framework. Further, methodological and perspectival issues complicate the comparison of processes in different locations and historical circumstances, especially for fundamentally opposite contexts like the post-Napoleonic revolutions in the Balkans and Latin America.

This essay will test the use of a comparative approach to examine the possibilities of analysis on the similarities and differences between the Colombian and Greek revolutions. Despite the spatial distance between the two, their contemporaneity establishes a platform that showcases their concordances. Perhaps the main similarities that both conflicts share are their nature as post-Napoleonic wars, both were largely waged with irregular warfare using both human and economic resources to the limit, with a new indoctrination of combatants and the permanent presence of geographical obstacles.[2] Performing this comparison is important because it helps uncover correlations between the cases that can inform our understanding of an important period of global history, and construct a more cohesive narrative of events hitherto neglected by global scholarship. In short, despite the spatial distances and the differences, there is a possibility to compare two different cases of state-building who share political features and a periodical context, finding similarities and correlations in between, framing them in a global discourse.

It is relevant to contextualize these comparisons into the main historical context of the Age of Revolutions. The struggles for

1 Eric Hobsbawm, *La era de la revolución 1789-1848 (*Buenos Aires: Crítica, 2009), 107; R. R. Palmer, *The World of the French Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). For the criticism to the Eurocentric approach of Hobsbaw and Palmer see David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xvi-xxiii.

2 Jorge Conde and Luis Alarcón, "La conversión de milicianos y guerrilleros en ciudadanos armados de la República de Colombia," *Historia Caribe* IX, no. 25 (2014): 17-37. http://dx.doi.org/10.15648/hc.25.2014.1

independence of the New World colonies from the European empires in the early nineteenth century are particularly interesting for numerous reasons: firstly, in 1804, Haiti gained its independence from the French Metropolis. Secondly, prompted by the Napoleonic invasion in Spain, pro-independence insurrections across Spanish America began to take off simultaneously in 1810. Noteworthily, New Granada's independence, being the epicenter of the independent movement in the north of South America, played a fundamental role in the liberation and future political configuration of the continent.[3]

At the same time but in a different hemisphere, the Ottoman Empire experienced serious territorial decline after the defeat in the Russo-Turkish war of 1774 and the Napoleonic invasion of 1798. Also, in 1798 France, the Ottoman Empire's greatest ally in Western Europe for centuries, invaded first Egypt and then Syria, both of which had been under Ottoman rule. From the late eighteenth century onwards, important parts of the empire were governed by autonomous administrations that often despised the authority of the Sublime Gate. As such, in 1806 the Ottoman sultan was faced with the rebellion of the Wahabbite religious fanatics in Arabia. In response, the Ottoman governors of Egypt and the Balkans, tried to reassemble the troops that Napoleon had defeated to support the Sultan in suppressing that rebellion. This attempt was futile, and the rebellion later triggered the Greek War of Independence in 1821.[4] Thus these two processes deserve a comparative analysis.

SO CLOSE AND YET SO FAR: COMPARATIVE AND ASYMMETRIC HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENCES

According to Marc Bloch and William Sewell, the comparative method has two equally important applications in history: discovering the uniqueness of different societies and formulating problems for historical research.[5] By applying this approach to the two case studies, not only the parallels between the divisions of territory and loss of control in the Ottoman and Spanish empires become clearer, but also the unique character of each one of these experiences is confirmed. Each of the two empires were in turn protagonists and antagonists of the history of the world for centuries. Indeed, both empires went through a phase of expansion, both experienced a "Golden Age" during which they were considered as a representative or the messiah

3 Alan Forrest e.a., *War, Demobilization and Memory. The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2016), 416.

4 Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the sand: the struggle for mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 12.

5 William Sewell, "Marc Bloch and the logic of comparative history," *History and Theory,* 6 (1967): 208.

of the faith they represented, and both were directly embroiled in conflict with each other on more than one occasion. Yet, these similarities are generally overshadowed by the structural differences of both imperial experiences and their unique development. The ignorance of the similarities between the Spanish and Ottoman empires is reflected in both Spanish and Turkish language historiographical production on the history of the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with the Spanish Empire, and vice versa. Despite the existence of these and more obvious similarities (their Mediterranean character for example) there is a lack of historiographical work aiming to compare methodically these empires, and this paper will try to fill that vacuum.

The similarities between the events in both empires' occupied territories and colonies, and their respective struggles for independence are clear, particularly regarding two aspects: the figure of the leaders of these new proto-states and their difficulties to consolidate. The former is the case of Simón Bolivar and Yiannis Kapodistrias, both of whom faced difficulties in conducting military operations on the challenging terrain that comprise the Colombian and Greek territories, and struggled with quasi-simultaneous processes of formation of new independent states. Further, both leader's states were born out of empires that had controlled the territories for almost four centuries, which—in the nineteenth century—started to play a preponderant role in the international concert, and whose Metropolis were in decline.

Yet, these similarities are not completely symmetrical, and there are some substantial differences between the events that suggest different developments in the construction of the future Colombian and Greek states respectively. The main differences are the geopolitical location of the former two, as well as the historical burden that both regions carried, which shaped the development and intensity of their respective war experiences. The position of the primitive Greek state and the rebels who constituted it was clearly much more jeopardized than that of its revolutionary counterparts in New Granada.[6] The imperial authority of Sultan Mahmud II, against whom they had to rise, was neither thousands of kilometers and an ocean away, nor absent, as was the case of Ferdinand VII with the American territories. In the same way, given its strategic position within the European continent and the support or direct intervention it received from the European powers during the Greek revolution, future Greece can hardly be compared with the new Colombia.

Another fundamental difference is the cultural factor, which can be divided into several aspects, the main two being religious and linguistic differences. By the

6 Petros Pisanias e.a., *The Greek Revolution of 1821: a European Event* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2011), 257-258.

beginning of the nineteenth century, the Spanish colonial system had achieved considerable homogeneity in the implementation of language, beliefs and customs on the American continent. Despite the ethnic and linguistic diversity, further increased through the forced migration of African enslaved people, added to the European and indigenous population, the American colonial society was tried to be homogenized around Catholicism and Spanish language. However, both faith and speech were enriched by many centuries of syncretism and resistance from the subjects of the empire that disagreed with the uniform social parameters imposed by the metropolis. The indigenous and black populations of America gave their contribution to the Spanish traditions and impositions in religious or secular ceremonies, and those combinations still live throughout the material and immaterial culture of the continent. Nevertheless, attempts for linguistic and religious homogeneity were an inherent part of life to the leaders of the revolution, and therefore they did not seek or attempt to replace it.

This development is very distinct from that of the Ottoman Empire, which from its genesis and by the very nature of the peoples who inhabited the conquered territories for centuries before the arrival of the Turks, led to the configuration by the first Ottoman sultans' *millet* system[7*], in which the people subjected to the Sultan were protected in their authority, and could also upkeep their traditional language and religion. This course of action allowed the Sublime Gate to govern a vast multiethnic and multi-religious territory for centuries. The Greek revolution, conceived by its leaders and elites through the new concept of nationalism derived from the French revolution, sought to break this system at all costs. Their goal was to group the entire Grecophone and Orthodox-Christian population of the Ottoman Empire in a new, independent Greek state.

THE REVOLUTIONS, THE TRANSFER OF REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS AND THE *HISTOIRE CROISÉE*

The Greek and Colombian cases show numerous similarities that can either be discarded as coincidences or recognized as being derived from the same process, but in different contexts. As such, *histoire croisée* offers an alternative to theoretically grasp the different dimensions and interrelations which the two case studies represent.[8] These two examples are relevant for their position within the age of revolutions on a regional scale, and despite the geographical distance, their historical development is strikingly similar.

7 The term *millet* refers to "nation" in the Turkish language.

8 M. Werner and B. Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire croisée and the Challenge of reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45 (2006): 30-50.

This historiographical approach could be useful to understand the similarities, differences and contact points between these two cases. The correspondences were present at various levels. At the end of the 18th century, the colonial subjects of the Spanish and Ottoman empires in other geographical spaces began to visit regions beyond the imperial borders. The ideas of freedom and rebellion started to arrive either through wealthy Creoles like Bolívar or Miranda; through agents of a foreign empire like Kapodistrias or Ipsilantis; or through societies such as the Neogranadian masonic lodges or *Filiki Eteria*.[9] Transmitting those ideas to the fighters, including veterans and volunteers from Europe, *klepthes* in Greece[10] or *lanceros* in Colombia,[11] the respective colonial and occupied peoples transformed the liberal, rebellious ideas into actual independence.

The process of transmission, assimilation, and implementation of revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment in regions thousands of kilometers away from the point at which these ideas emerged was a long and complex process that can be classified following the direction of the communication exchanges made between the center (the Metropolis) and the periphery (the occupied/colonial territories).[12] Evidently, and for reasons of pure domination, the clearest examples of transference are given from the center to the periphery and were carried out both by colonial authorities and institutions, as well as by individuals or collective groups, which had a broad political or scientific character that was often trans-imperial. An example of that in this specific case is Lord Byron, one of these trans-imperial agents that personally shared his sympathies with both revolutions and was in contact with prominent protagonists of the Colombian and Greek independence.[13]

During the beginning of the eighteenth century, the transfer of ideas in the modern Greek experience followed a pattern from center to periphery. In the quest for an integral education and the revitalization of the ideals of classical antiquity, the custom of making a trip to the Mediterranean to see the vestiges of the Greek civilizations was consolidated into traditional practice for the educated upper classes around the continent. In Rome, this sort of undertaking received the name *Grand tour*.[14] These journeys of

9 David Brewer, *The Flame of Freedom. The Greek War of Independence 1821-1833* (London: John Murray, 2001), 238.

10 Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels and Their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions* (Witney: Peter Lang, 2010).

11 Eduardo Pérez, *La guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva Granada y Venezuela 1810-1830* (Tunja: Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia - Academia Boyacense de Historia, 2005).

12 Paschalis Kitromilides, *Enlightenent and Revolution. The making of Modern Greece* (London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 15

13 Ernest J., Lovell, ed., *His Very Self and Voice, Collected Conversations of Lord Byron* (New York: MacMillan. 1954), 369

14 Lisa Colletta, ed., *The Legacy of the Grand Tour: New Essays on Travel, Literature, and*

young intellectuals who marveled at ruins and romanticized those who at that time inhabited the Italic and Balkan peninsulas played a double role. First, they laid the foundations for an ideological and intellectual apparatus based on the erudite interpretation of classical antiquity from Western Europe especially during the eighteenth century, called Neohellenic Enlightenment or «Διαφωτισμός».[15] In second place, they helped to shape public opinion of the European powers in favor of the national and independence movements. This was especially the case during the Greek war of independence, forging a whole social movement of volunteers from Europe and America, seeking the freedom of the "cradle of civilization" from the Ottoman yoke. The embodiment of this philhellenism movement was Lord Byron, who personally met personalities like Francisco de Miranda or Kapodistrias and would be the mutual acquaintance between the protagonists of the Greek and Colombian revolution.[16] Making him an important part of the bridge that connects both independence processes.

It is easy to elucidate the intellectual transfers from Europe to its periphery through the exchanges of ideas and journeys of intellectuals. However, it is important to keep in mind that, particularly in this period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the experiences and historical developments which emerged in that Western periphery would be tremendously influential. For example, according to Benedict Anderson, the very concept of nationalism[17] emerged in the New World and not in Europe.[18] In any case, it was not the same to be a local "enlightened" and to undertake a trip from Spanish America or from Ottoman Greece to Paris, London or Rome, then to do it in the opposite direction. It was also not the same to embark on official expeditions, commissioned and sponsored by the central state towards the imperial territories than to do it from the periphery with the resources and defects that the same colonial system regarding social mobility imposed.

Simón Bolívar is one example of how ideas were transferred from the periphery to the center. Bolívar traveled in his youth to Rome and in an enlightened ecstasy proclaimed an oath to fight for the freedom of Hispanic America on Monte

Culture (London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2015), X.

15 Anna Tabaki, *Neo-hellenic Enlightenment. An introduction,* Academia.edu. Accessed April 5, 2019. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/2025102/Neo-hellenic_Enlightenment._An_introduction

16 Jeremy Black, *War in Europe: 1450 to the present* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 161; David Howarth, *The Greek Adventure: Lord Byron and Other Eccentrics in the War of Independence* (London: Collins, 1976).

17 Charles Esdaile, *Las guerras de Napoleón: una historia internacional, 1803-1815* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2009), 11-13.

18 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991) xiii; Anthony McFarlane, "Identity, Enlightenment and Political Dissent in Late Colonial Spanish America," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 8 (1998): 309-335.

Sacro on August 15, 1803.[19] Yet, the undoubtedly most important example is that of Francisco de Miranda, one of the most interesting men of his time, without being of the highest social class, his skills and charisma led him to fight for Spain, alongside George Washington, and then to become a general of the French Revolution who ended up writing his name on the *Arc de Triomphe*. In addition to a large journey through London and St. Petersburg, he was perhaps the first South American to visit the Ottoman Empire.[20] His visit to Attica marked him deeply, even to the point of buying a house in Athens, motivated by the feeling that the search for the freedom of the Greeks was his own.

FUTURE STEPS OF ANALYSIS, COMPARISON AND DIFFERENTIATION

So far it has been evident that despite the distance and the different peculiarities of the independence of Colombia and Greece, the initial question about the possibility of a comparative analysis between both revolutions, and about the prospects of building that bridge between different spaces from the analysis of the Napoleonic post-war period, could be answered affirmatively. That possibility exists, essentially because of the contemporaneity, nature and development of both processes. In any case and bearing in mind that this is an introductory work to an almost unexplored historiographical branch, the comparative possibilities do not end here. For example, both countries, despite acknowledging that the most important historical event in their configuration as a nation is the war of independence, also have sometimes monolithic conception of these bellicose events in their historiography and national historical consciousness. On the other hand, it is crucial to turn the tide of the current historiographical analysis of Empires towards the study of the Spanish and Ottoman entities, their encounters, clashes and resemblances through the Modern Age.[21]

Another possibility of comparison could be the racial and ethnic composition of the troops. In that sense, the Colombian case generated certain particularities when it came to the creation of royalist or patriotic armies. This aspect is also present during the Greek revolution, where the ethnic melting pot of the Balkans, began to stir with the nationalisms that emerged during this period. Secondly, the use of a common past, specifically that of classical antiquity under the filter of the ideas of neoclassicism, should be considered

19 John Lynch, *Simon Bolivar, A life* (London: Yale University Press), 26.

20 Miguel Castillo Didier, *Grecia y Francisco de Miranda* (Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Bizantinos y Neohelénicos "Fotios Malleros" Universidad de Chile, 2002), 317.

21 Hilda Sabato, *Republics of the New World: The Revolutionary Political Experiment in Nineteenth-Century Latin America*. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

as a topic of future research. Without going deeply into this aspect, it would be very interesting to investigate and analyze how close the Greeks of the first half of the nineteenth century were to their millenary ancestors, or whether, on the contrary, they gave priority to Byzantium and to Christian orthodoxy. Despite the geographical distance that would imply a closer ideological affinity between Nariño and Caldas[22] and Aristotle and Demosthenes, than that of the latter with Makriyiannis or Ipsilandis.[23] The formulation of these possibilities, the imagination of new ways to break the schemes and established periods must be an action and reflection of the historical discipline, which has always fulfilled a function with the present and the needs that are generated from it. A key part of the historical analysis, and especially in what concerns to global history is to look for other perspectives to analyze an event that may be distant in space but close in time. This kind of approach can act as a looking glass for understanding the social conglomerate in a certain way, whether it be inserted in the Colombian, Greek, Latin American or Balkan context.

In summary, this comparison could be possible for the striking similarities of this independence processes. That were contemporary, driven by the same kind of ideas and fought in a relatively similar way. Even so, the aims and outcomes of both independences were not the same, and their impact in the regional geopolitics were different. Nevertheless, this comparative exercise contributes to global history while opening the possibility of studying less-known revolutions of this historical period in their own terms, trying to clear up the omnipresent mist of Eurocentrism and shifting the focus to other valuable spaces of analysis. The methodological approach chosen in this essay seeks to shed light on how global processes as the Enlightenment and the Age of Revolutions spread and manifest in seemingly disparate environments like Colombia and Greece. With the current trend of the discipline to enhance and challenge the spatial boundaries of analysis, the history and comparison of these two spaces that sound alien to the main narratives of the early nineteenth century could take more relevance.[24] The Greek and Colombian experiences of independence would draw important examples for later global developments of nation-state building in Europe and America. Comparing them and build an

22 Del Molino García, Ricardo "La Antigüedad Clásica en la Nueva Granada teatro revolucionario e iconografía republicana," in *International Conference "Imagines", The reception of Antiquity in performing and visual Arts* (Logroño: Universidad de La Rioja, 2007): 69-82; Margriet Haagsma, Pim den Boer, and Eric Moormann. *The Impact of Classical Greece on European and National Identities: Proceedings of an International Colloquium, Held at the Netherlands Institute at Atenas, 2-4 October 2000* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 2003).

23 Yiannis Makriyiannis, *Memorias de la Revolución griega de 1821* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2012), 28.

24 Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 115.

historiographical bridge between the regions will contribute to a broader perspective, one that would push the limits of global history, while shifting, overlapping and entangling the scales, themes, and spaces of historical analysis.[25]

25 Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, 137.

Re-

4

views

How to Hide an Empire:
A Short History
of the Greater United States

by Daniel Immerwahr,
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019.
Pp. 516. ISBN: 9781784703912

reviewed by

JOSEPH BIGGERSTAFF

In early 1945 "*the* strategic blunder of the Philippine campaign" unfolded as U.S. forces surrounded Manila and prevented the Japanese from retreating out of the city. Then, to save "American lives," the U.S command decided to relentlessly bomb both military and civilian targets until the Japanese surrendered. When the dust settled a few months later, Manila had been nearly completely destroyed and 100,000 of its residents had perished. "Because the loss of a single American life to save a building was unthinkable," the U.S command later admitted, "we really went to town." Oscar Villadolid remembers the during following "Liberation" by U.S troops he was approached by a GI and asked "How'd ya learn American?" Villadolid answered that English had been compulsory in schools since the United States colonized the Philippines half a century earlier. "Take a moment to let that sink in," writes Daniel Immerwahr, "This was a soldier who had taken a long journey across the Pacific. He'd been briefed on his mission, shown maps, told where to go and whom to shoot. Yet at no point had it dawned on him that he was preparing to save a U.S. colony and that the people he would encounter there were, just like him, U.S. nationals" (p. 212). This is one episode from the Northwestern University historian's latest book, *How to Hide an Empire: A Short History of the Greater United States*, 400 pages of informed prose that upends enduring misconceptions about the United States--seen as *the* prototypical nation-state—and empire. Written for non-academic audiences, the work has its drawbacks, but the approach to painting the big picture of U.S history from the perspective of its territories, colonies, and other "points" is impressive.

On a research trip to Manila Immerwahr was struck by a contrast between the imprint U.S. colonization has left on the Philippines and the lack of knowledge most people from the continental United States—Immerwahr calls them "mainlanders"—have about the former colony. U.S. history textbooks portray "territorial empire" as merely "an episode" (p.14) and while historians have interrogated U.S imperialism, "When it comes time to zoom out and tell the story of the country as a whole, the territories tend to fall away" (p. 15). Yes, many U.S-Americans think the United States imperialistic, but few know much about its territories, colonies, let alone about the inhabitants and their histories. To understand this chasm, Immerwahr points to the "logo map" of the United States. Erasures in broad narratives of the United States reflect omissions on its logo map, a "strategically cropped family photo" (p. 13) that leaves out colonies, territories, and overseas military bases. Immerwahr's response to this preterition "is not archival, bringing to light some never-before-seen document," but rather "perspectival, seeing a familiar history differently" (p.16). *How to Hide an Empire* surveys U.S. history from the perspective of

the "Greater United States"— the territories, islands, colonies, and military bases left off the logo map.

The first chapters underscore how a continental empire, and settler mythology, emerged alongside the fledgling nation-state. Immerwahr stresses that very early on, the United States was an "amalgam of states and territories." The concept of territory was adopted so that the federal government could oversee westward expansion. Ironically, the newly ratified constitution did not address one of the country's most pressing problems; the ceaseless stream of settlers pouring over the nation's westward borders. Here Immerwahr argues that George Washington in particular was ambivalent, even reticent, to violate treaty agreements with Native polities in order to placate squatters and speculators like Daniel Boone. As the logo map took shape—a process that was underwritten by massive dispossessions, treaty violations, and an imperial war against Mexico— Boone gained legendary status as honorary founding father. It is remarkable that in two brief chapters Immerwahr is able to illustrate the dynamics of settler colonialism.
The third chapter, "Everything you wanted to know about guano but were afraid to ask" shifts to a less well-known story of guano islands. The annexation of tiny islands altered the United States which had only three years earlier, with the Gadsden Purchase of 1854, assumed the shape of the logo map. This chapter feels like a detour, but it foreshadows the second half of the book, "The Pointillist Empire," in which small points on the map, including some guano islands, resurface as crucial nodes following the Second World War.

Moreover, annexing these islands provided a legal precedent for the later acquisitions of 1898, which figures prominently in this chronicle. For Immerwahr The Spanish-American-Philippine War of 1898 figures is a watershed moment because until this point the United States had "rarely incorporated large nonwhite populations" (p. 77) "Taking land and flooding it with settlers" was different from "conquering subject populations and ruling them" (p.79). Rather than interrogating how this shift came about, Immerwahr juxtaposes two contemporaneous and exclusionary supreme court rulings, *Plessy v. Fergusson* (1896) and the Insular Cases. The latter, a culmination of debates over the legality of new overseas acquisitions, barred constitutional rights to new colonized subjects. And whereas Plessy v. Fergusson was overturned with B*rown v. Board of Education* in 1954, the Insular Cases remain on the books. But here is a missed opportunity to tease out the dynamic between internal and external colonialism. In the Philippines, for example, land disputes between Filipino landholders and U.S owned corporate speculators were resolved by drawing on precedents from the mid-west. These rulings then were applied in the American West in the following decades. So legal

structures of settler "expansion" and extra-continental imperialism "constituted one another."[1] Similarly, the following chapters in the first half of the book demonstrates how colonies were treated like island-sized laboratories: Horrifying plans like the sterilization of Puerto Rican women to control population were tried out with few consequences. Yet, to readers unfamiliar with US History these cases may appear episodic because the author does not more forcefully delineate how exclusion at home and exclusion are mutually constitutive.[2] Accomplishing this on top of what the book already achieves, however, may be a high wire act.

In 1945, if you looked up and saw a U.S. flag, "you were more likely colonized or living in occupied territory" (p. 226). So why did the United States give up its territories? Part two of the book answers this question. Yes, anti-colonial movements were an important factor, but new "empire killing technologies" like synthetics, standardization, logistics, and the English language made it cost-effective for the United States to decolonize. Immerwahr writes that "together with innovations in chemistry and industrial engineering, the U.S. mastery of logistics would diminish the value of colonies and inaugurate a new pattern of global power, based less on claiming large swaths of land and more on controlling small points" (p. 216). Part two of the book explores what Immerwahr calls the "pointillist empire," a planetary network of military bases held together by these empire killing technologies.

Drawn to U.S. history after taking classes with Eric Foner while an undergraduate at Columbia, Immerwahr acquired a second B.A. at King's College in London where he was mentored by the late global historian Christopher Bayly. This training in global history, particularly Christopher Bayly's tutelage, shows in *How to Hide an Empire*. Like Bayly, Immerwahr is adept at seamlessly navigating a vast geographical expanse. Readers will undoubtedly learn more about the Greater United States and finish reading with a desire to learn more. Immerwahr's book has also raised much needed debates about applying a global approach to a nation-state. The modern historical profession deeply entangled with the emergence of the nation-state, which raises special considerations about the applicability of doing global or transnational history to address what are problematic national narratives. In his 2013 presidential address to the American Historical Association, William Cronon discussed the importance of story-telling and the danger of "professional boredom": a "tendency of professionals, when talking mainly to each other, to adopt vocabularies and ways of speaking

1 Rebecca Tinio McKenna, Rebecca "Irogot Squatters and Indian Wards: Toward an Intra-Imperial History of Land Dispossession," Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 18, no. 1 (March 2019): 221239.

2 Maggie Blackhawk, "Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law," *Harvard Law Review*, 132 no. 7 (May 2019).

that have the effect of excluding outsiders who do not belong to that profession."[3] He added that it is the job of historians to persuade the public of the importance and fascination of the past, with its many "subtleties and contradictions." Without a doubt, Daniel Immerwahr has answered this call. *How to Hide an Empire* is full of hard-to-believe episodes that fascinate and confound its readers. Yet, *How to Hide an Empire* raises grave concerns about Cronon's call for historians to tell engage our readers.

3 William Cronon, "Storytelling," *The American Historical Review,* 118 no. 1 (February 2013): 1-19.

Beggar Thy Neighbour: A History of Usury and Debt

by Charles R. Geisst, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, PA, 2013. Paperback, UK, £24.99, pp 388, ISBN: 978-0-8122-4462-5

reviewed by
DAVID BELL

The unwitting reader, perhaps hoping for the critique of the injustices of capitalism that the title of *Beggar Thy Neighbour* suggests, may perhaps be disappointed to learn that this is not what Charles R. Geisst, at the time of publication a professor of Finance at Manhattan College, is about. What he does provide is a history of usury and debt in the longue durée with, aside from chapter 7 "Islam Interest and Microlending", a clear focus upon the history of western finance, in particular the United States of America and Britain. Geisst is the author of several other well received works on the history of finance such as *Loan Sharks: The Birth of Predatory Lending* (2017) and *Wall Street: A History* (1997, 2004, 2012, 2018). His career has also spanned the world of high finance as a capital markets analyst and investment banker. *Beggar Thy Neighbour* thus benefits from the high degree of experience in the actual workings of modern capital markets that Geisst has accumulated.

Beggar Thy Neighbour begins with Marcus Junius Brutus, a "young provincial Roman administrator," chided by Cicero for "lending money in Cyprus at four times the maximum rate stipulated by Roman law."[1] This rather sets the tone for Geisst's vision of the history of modern financial markets, namely beginning with the Roman Empire and its laws and progressing through a series of continuous stages toward the present day. Geisst also joins a long tradition of taking the figure of Brutus, better known for his assassination of Julius Caesar in the Roman senate, as a figure of huge symbolic and historical importance. Of course, many in the United States, being consciously modelled in its genesis on the Roman Republic, prized Brutus for his role in toppling the tyrant Caesar. John Wilkes Booth famously claimed to have shouted "Sic semper tyrannis! (Ever thus to tyrants!) The South is avenged" upon his assignation of Abraham Lincoln, joining a tradition endemic to American discourse of deploying the history of Rome as rhetorical ammunition. That is not to say that Geisst doesn't provide a relatively convincing argument for this choice of starting point, however it can feel a little tiresome for the reader looking for a history of the phenomenon of usury which does not resort immediately to the stale narrative of, as it were, from ancient Rome to the White House.

Geisst then proceeds with 8 chapters—roughly chronological and beginning with biblical references—which trace the history of usury and debt over 3000 years. Through this the point is made that the abuse of debt and usury, though consistently identifiable in monetary societies, are perversions to, rather than central to, the 'natural law.' Geisst writes that notions of fairness and equality have "transcended ancient, medieval, and modern societies."[2] In some ways Geisst's is a universalised

1 1.

2 7.

conceptualisation of the history of the world. This is undermined by his overwhelming focus on Britain and the USA as well as his chapter on Islam, which I will come to later. It might well be pointed out that, in devoting only the first two chapters to the period before the Protestant Reformation Geisst undermines any conclusions he might wish to draw about the similarities between ancient societies. Evidently his area of expertise and where he excels is the modern history of finance, it might therefore have been worthwhile to begin *Beggar Thy Neighbour* later rather than attempt such a wide scope. As it is Geisst's argument seems vulnerable to criticism by specialists, particularly of ancient and medieval history, although this is true of virtually any work with a comparable timeframe. As it is, Geisst's chapters do provide interesting vignettes from earlier history, in particular his exploration of the origins of Roman law pertaining to usury, even if the ancient and medieval periods go by surprisingly quickly. It should be pointed out that this will be especially true for the very casual browser who picked up *Beggar Thy Neighbour* based on the 16th century painting used as the cover piece.

Geisst writes that with the Protestant Reformation "practicality finally began to win the usury debate and capitalism emerged from the shadows of church dogma."[3] If Roman law was, to Geisst, central to the modern definition and understanding of usury, centuries of Christian dominance by the Catholic church only curtailed its development. Again, here the accusation could be levelled that this is a typical narrative of American history. 'Progress' in this case the unfettered explosion of capitalism could only be made possible by Protestantism, exploration and growth. Even as he argues for Protestant exceptionalism Geisst gives examples of developments to lending and usury under Catholic rulers, for example the "tontine" of Lorenzo Tonti in Louis XIV's France.[4] Discussion of the interconnectedness of financial thinkers in this period seems lacking, although Geisst frequently discusses the movement of British and American thinkers he stops short of acknowledging the huge movement of financial expertise between the Protestant and Catholic worlds, divisions he might assess more critically had he done so.

On 'exploration' and growth Geisst gives a troubling narrative of European expansion driven by Malthusian concerns over resource scarcity and population growth.[5] While Geisst is happy to argue that the needs of expansion were central to the development of financial systems, he pays little attention to the human costs of expansion at the expense of native populations and to a great extent on the backs of slave labour. Of course, it could be argued

3 97.

4 99.

5 98.

that this is not the aim or remit of the book, however even a short history of western expansion, foregrounding a more specific discussion of financial methods, which excludes the human cost of this period should surely be problematised in the 21st century. Given that the title *Beggar Thy Neighbour*, a term coined by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, alludes to the practice of economic policies which benefit one country at the expense of another, the gaps in this history of colonisation and exploitation seem all the more remarkable. The exclusion of slavery and conquest, aside from inter European wars, as primary factors in Geisst's work, in a similar fashion to the centrality of Brutus, strengthen the argument that *Beggar Thy Neighbour* provides a white-washed history of modern financial systems. This also highlights a criticism that can be levelled at Geisst throughout that he focuses overly on financial methods and theoretical publications, rather than, as it were, on the 'nitty gritty' of lived experience.

In Chapter 4 "The Great Experiment" Geisst follows developments in Britain and the United States as usury laws were gradually repealed, as well as through frequent market crashes almost from the outset of this experimentation. Here too the main thrust of Geisst's argument is that morality gradually lost its supremacy in determining the legal controls over usury in favour of economic reasoning. This chapter provides interesting insight into a highly experimental period, corresponding to the 19th century, in which Britain and the United States effectively dipped their toes into processes which would become crucial to the history of the modern world. Here there is a sense that Geisst has entered a period in which he is far more comfortable, and the arguments become less generalised and more specific and based in close use of source material. Geisst provides engaging descriptions of individual actors and their personalities. One criticism that could be levelled is that most of the chapter is limited to the Anglophone world and it does feel a little as though the picture narrows at a time when world economics were more, rather than less, crucial to developments in Britain and the USA.

In chapter 7 Geisst throws something of a curve ball, writing about the history of usury and debt in Islam. Unfortunately, here again specialists will very likely be frustrated. For example, Geisst writes that by the 2000s "in the developing world, and in the Islamic world in particular, not much had changed for centuries."[6] Consciously or unconsciously Geisst deploys a number of problematic notions about "the Islamic world." For one thing he suggests a monolithic unity and separation from 'the rest' of the world. He also alludes to the argument that Islamic societies are 'stagnant' or 'behind' in terms of modernisation. Finally, he suggests a disconnectedness of the 'Islamic'

6 272.

world from the shaping and effects of Western finance which ignores centuries of peaceful and violent interconnectedness. Take for example the heavy involvement of Western finance in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century. The Ottoman sultans borrowed heavily on world financial markets while simultaneously claiming the spiritual leadership of Sunni Islam. Geisst mentions the Ottomans only to state that their experience of borrowing on world financial markets "was new."[7] In fact Geisst seems to view western finance as having been placed upon the Islamic world with virtually no influence in the other direction. To make the claim that the 'Islamic World' had not changed for centuries *in the 2000s* seems ludicrous and flies in the face of a vast body of research in different fields. This chapter is demonstrative of the *Beggar Thy Neighbour*'s greatest flaw, that the scope is unnecessarily and damagingly wide. Instead, a chapter dealing explicitly and more critically with Islamic finance in the 20th and 21st centuries, particularly at this late stage in the book might have been much more productive. The early history of Islamic finance might and probably should have been incorporated into the early chapters on the same phenomena in Christian and Jewish societies. As it is Geisst turns what could have been a productive inclusion into a chapter which supports outmoded arguments about the regressive effect of Islam and the false separation and backwardness of the Islamic world in global economic history.

Overall *Beggar Thy Neighbour* predominantly presents a history of the emergence of modern financial methods. Geisst demonstrates an impressive knowledge of modern finance as well as a very history of earlier periods which is enjoyable to casual reader. However, the grand scope of the work, as well as its insistence on the basic fairness of natural law, as opposed to the abuse of usury and debt, leads to some frustrating shortcomings. Specialists of various periods will surely be frustrated by the lack of detail and attention given to various, particularly earlier and non-western, subjects. The chapter on Islam is demonstrative of this as what could, and should, have been a profitable addition to multiple chapters, serves to perpetuate harmful notions such as the monolithic, unchanging, and regressive nature of Islam and the Islamic world. *Beggar Thy Neighbour* is at its most comfortable discussing the ins and outs of modern financial methods and in the colourful lives of, mainly white male, financial movers and shakers. It seems a shame to recommend that an author reduce their scope according to their expertise, but *Beggar Thy Neighbour* certainly demonstrates why this is sometimes not such a bad idea.

7 274.

Maoism: A Global History

by Julia Lovell, London: The Bodley Head, 2019.
Paperback, UK, £14.00, Pp. 606,
ISBN: 978-1847922502

reviewed by

CHRISTIAN JACOBS

While China's current influence in the World is heavily discussed, the early People's Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Zedong has often been depicted as isolationist. However, several scholars have recently pointed to the various attempts by Chinese communists to shape the World order and to influence other countries' domestic politics at the time. Julia Lovell's new book adds to this research analyzing the multiple ways in which Maoist ideas and language traveled the world from the 1920s until today. Lovell sheds light on both sides of this history, the efforts to spread ideas and to support like-minded governments and groups, and the different adaptations and usages of Maoist language and thinking in a variety of local contexts.

Lovell starts the book with a conceptual look at the term "Maoism". While using the term analytically as an umbrella word for all the ideas and practices attributed to Mao Zedong, she stresses the diversity and often changing and contradictory nature of what people understood as "Maoist". However, the author names several distinct characteristics: Violence as a political instrument, peasants as a key favorable social group, the primacy of practice in each specific situation, brutal rectification campaigns, emphasis on the importance of anti-imperialism and feminism, rebellion as a leitmotif and contradiction as a model of thinking. In the following case studies, she illustrates how these aspects recur in different places and at different times.

In the next three chapters, the author looks at the development of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its role within the global political system from the late 1920s until Mao's death in 1976. The book describes in detail the importance of the first international propaganda success in 1936 when American journalist Edgar Snow visited Yan'an, where the communist army was in hiding after the "long march". Mao, who had recently become the *de facto* leader of the CCP, devoted a lot of time for private interviews with the young journalist and made sure that he and his comrades would be described favorably. In the next year, Snow wrote a book about his trip to Yan'an. *Red Star over China* depicted the young communist guerilla fighters as idealistic patriots and egalitarian democrats. The book became a surprise bestseller in Britain and the United States and made Snow an authority on Chinese politics. Later, it was translated in various languages and became a source of inspiration for many activists, from Chinese patriotic youths in the civil war to Soviet female partisans in the Second World War, to anti-imperialist revolutionaries like Nelson Mandela in the Global South.

Following the triumph of the CCP in 1949 after a long civil war, China became an important player in the Global Cold War. The US government feared that the PRC would ignite communist revolutions throughout Asia. These concerns were warranted as many communist movements,--in Malaysia

and Korea set high hopes in the newly founded Chinese state. And the new government established political training sites in Beijing, where Mao's teaching was taught to anti-imperial activists from all over Asia. Moreover, North Korea and North Vietnam received massive material aid and military support for their wars. However, Western governments overestimated the coordination between the communist movements in Asia and overlooked the importance of existing tensions. As the most significant conflict in the communist camp between the Soviet Union and the PRC escalated in the late 1950s, the Chinese government's foreign propaganda radicalized. From the 1960s on, China portrayed the Soviet Union as a traitor to the communist cause and depicted itself as the leading power for a soon-to-come world revolution. To push for a global insurgency, China drastically increased foreign aid and--in addition to technical and military experts--sent millions of copies of printed publications abroad.

The followings seven chapters analyze the effects of these efforts in specific contexts. These case studies are generally very well-balanced explanations of the successes or failures of this endeavor and illustrate how local agents adopted Maoist ideas and codes to specific contexts with different results. For instance, In Nepal, a Maoist guerrilla movement wrested eighty percent of the country's territory and negotiated a peace process in 2006 resulting in the election of a former guerrillero as prime minister. Lovell points out that various factors, like the fractured communist movement, the combination of bourgeoning education rates, political, social, and economic frustrations and, finally, a China-friendly government that tolerated Chinese influence, created a very receptive environment for the Chinese foreign propaganda during the Cultural Revolution. But later, the brutal state response against Maoist insurgencies led to a polarization in the countryside. Additionally, the weak, dysfunctional Nepali state offered the Maoist guerrilla movement the possibility to take control of large rural areas. Using single personal examples, the author can explain how discriminated social groups, like women and Dalit, were especially attracted to the Maoist movement, being one of the rare political groups which voiced their concerns and offered them a role in society. At the same time, she shows how the Nepali Maoist movement systematically used violence and coercion against the local people to gain support and to implement their political and military strategy, for example by using brutal forms of forced labor to build the so-called Martyr's road, a ninety one-kilometer route in west Nepal.

Even though Lovell's multi-dimensional explanations are mostly convincing, the individual case studies do not do justice to every single aspect and sometimes simplify terms or chronologies. Looking at the European Maoists,

for example, the author calls the communist group Vive la révolution "the more liberal wing of French Maoism" (p. 300) and argues that European Maoists discovered the authoritarian side of Mao only after 1968. Yet, Vive la révolution radically opposed liberalism and many French Maoist groups active before 1968 were indeed authoritarian, deciding sometimes on the jobs and potential marriages of their members. Furthermore, Lovell argues that these groups showed little inclination to subject China to the same criticism applied to their societies. While definitely true for some groups, many French Maoist groups engaged in heated discussions with the Chinese government, for example in regard to the May 1968 movement in Paris, the incoherent collection of quotes in the Mao-Bible or China's position in the Indo-Pakistani War leading in some cases to a definitive break between these groups and the CCP. (Cf. Christophe Bourseiller, Les Maoïstes. La Folle Histoire des gardes rouges français, (Paris: Plon, 1996), pp. 111f., 272f..) However, in light of the book's broad approach, such occasional simplifications should rather be considered a starting point for further discussions than a general point of criticism.

A real strength of the book is its ability to look at many contemporary developments out of a rarely invoked historical perspective. In her analysis of Maoist ideas in Zimbabwe, Lovell points out that some influential Maoist ideas such as the systematical use of violence and mass mobilization, partly explain the political and economic horror of Robert Mugabe's dictatorship. Furthermore, the strong connection not only Mugabe but, also his successor Emmerson Mnangagwa, have to China-the latter being trained in China in the 1960s-puts a long historical connection in a new light.

The legacy of Maoism is also discussed in the last chapter looking back at China. The chapter called "Mao-ish China" sheds light on the revival of Mao in the last decade. Lovell exhibits how Maoist thinking prevailed after the reform era in the 1980s and why many aspects of it have been revived today. She argues that the current Chinese government invokes Mao's historical prestige to underpin a new nationalistic narrative and renormalizes Maoist tools like self-criticism sessions, mass rallies, and the personality cult, to tighten political control.

To sum up, the book helps to understand the historical relations of the CCP in the world and their present repercussions. In times, in which the Chinese government again aspires to export its worldview outside of China, it helps to understand the historical roots of this aspiration.

The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America

by Greg Grandin, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2019. 30,00$, 384 pp, ISBN: 9781250179821

reviewed by

JOSEPH BIGGERSTAFF & PEDER ØSTEBO

For many, especially for those observing the launch of Donald J. Trump's campaign from afar, the president's campaign launch in June 2015 seemed like a bizarre, almost humorous, distraction from the usual pre-election jabber that occupy foreign affairs desks all over the world when a US election is nearing. A few days after the multi-millionaire descended from the echelons of Trump Tower to declare his candidacy, Norway's daily Aftenposten ran a story with the headline "Why these US elections will be funnier."[1] The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany's paper on record, was equally dismissive, albeit in a more sober and eloquent fashion: "His candidacy is a scandal and a show, a pub brawl taking the shape of a political operation. But it will be an irrelevant one."[2] The apparent bizarreness of a Trump candidacy was slowly but steadily, as the national conventions and, eventually, the presidential election the following year neared, unmasked as a likely scenario. That appeared to be a sideshow, soon replaced the heirs apparent of centrist political currents as the main act.

The assumption that both elections and the political system of the United System is fundamentally centipedal, deeply rooted in political analysis as self-evident, appear today a myth. But according to historian Greg Grandin, it is not the only myth that has fallen victim to recent political developments. In his book *The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America*, Grandin takes on what is perhaps the most common and repeated tropes of US exceptionalism, namely the idea that an ever-expanding "frontier" has not only fueled US economic development but also transformed the American ideology from liberal republicanism to an individualist democracy. The revolutionary effect of the frontier, ironically, famously serves as a "safety valve" for revolutionary movements. Today, however, the trope of the revolutionary influence of the boundlessness of the United States of America is, according to Grandin, not only a myth, but a myth in decay. The slow but immensely impactful ideational transformation from a being a country on the frontier to being a bordered country has reached its pinnacle with the rise of Trumpism. Borrowing a line from Canadian poet Anne Carson, Grandin sees the myth dying the perilous life after unfolding, through a critical juncture, a profound crisis of political existentialism.

Grandin, who recently returned to Yale University from where he received his Ph.D. in 1999,

1 Lars Glomnes and Øystein K. Langberg, "Derfor blir USA-valget morsommere," *Aftenposten* June 17, 2015, visited October 8, 2019. URL: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/kw6X/Derfor-blir-USA-valget-morsommere-av-Donald-Trump

2 Markus Günther, "Das Geheimnis des Trumpismus," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 4, 2015, visited October 8, 2019. URL: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/amerika/das-geheimnis-von-donald-trumps-erfolg-13730711-p4.html

is no stranger to tackling the political acuteness of the contemporary moment from an historical point of view. In Empire's Workshop (2007), he provided a narrative that bridged the gap the intellectual-political current that shaped US interventionism in Latin America in the 1980s and the global "War on Terror". *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle (2010),* published in the immediate aftermath of the global economic crisis, served as a lens for investigating expansionist capitalism akin strangely akin to that of the pre-crash era. Finally, anticipating renewed debate on slavery and racial justice as a fulcrum of US political discourse, *Empire of Necessity* (2014) explores the interdependency of slavery and the birth of US nationhood, and the paradox that the age of American revolutions brought with an ever-increasing reliance on slave labor in the newly founded liberal republic.

Grandin's combination of rich and informed prose and a willingness to forcefully argue against dominant narrative in conventional accounts of US history is ever-present in *The End of the Myth*. Throughout the book, his main object, the concept of "the frontier" is juxtaposed with the actual frontier as a place. Whereas Frederick Jackson Turner posited in his famous 1893 "Frontier Thesis" that a democratic impulse was replenished through the process of (sometimes violent) westward settlement, Grandin—inverting the thesis—argue that "overseas" military domination in both South East Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean "acted as a prism, refracting the color line abroad back home" (p. 139). More recently, yet equally unsettling, are the vigilante death squads of trauma-afflicted returning veterans from recent oil wars who comb the southern border. According to Grandin, the dynamics of this refraction can, as foreign wars can be traced back to the first clashes between settlers and the Indigenous Peoples of what was to become the United States, the main point of the books three first chapters.

Grandin, who in the first half of the book dedicate much space to the intellectual (counter-) history of the intellectual underpinnings of glorified expansionism and contrasts to it the brutal violence with which the expansion was executed, notes that Turner's skewed thesis was not a result of neglect but rather an ideological construct. Turner was a centrist who sought to steer thinking away from the racial determinism of his time, such as the "Germ Theory", which attributed the spread of democracy to Anglo-Saxon migration. And while Frederick Jackson Turner lamented the end of the frontier as marking a decline in American dynamism, Grandin writes that in the twentieth century "the idea of the frontier continued to advance, even as the border stayed put" (p. 149). During the New Deal, the ethos of limitless growth and expansion underwent a critical evaluation. Reformers proposed a "new social ethics" of limits and restraint. FDR's

secretary of labor, Frances Perkins, in her work *People at Work*, "drew out the gendered underpinnings of the Frontier Thesis, arguing that wealth was created by the "free labor" provided by household production (free in the sense of not being paid for.) The uncompensated toil of women and children resulted in a "pure gain in national wealth."

The "freedom" of the frontiersman is, then, the freedom to dominate. It depended less on having a gate of escape across an endless frontier than on being able to control the labor of his family. Perkins argued for a new "awakened conscience," based, at the very least, on adequate compensation, dignified working conditions, and limitations placed on child labor, which were the goals of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.' (p. 175). But while the reformist program that democrats and republicans alike coalesced might have changed configurations at home, the myth prevailed as the US took on a more global role. Thus, political alignments and the meaning of government in twentieth century are perhaps reconfigured, but the flexible concept of the "frontier" was merely readapted, and the notion of freedom as expansion and domination never truly challenged. This process, fundamental to the New Deal, is through Grandin's eyes a "socialization of frontier thesis" that expanded capitalism abroad while extending "political liberalism at home" (p. 180). The freedom to dominate, echoing Grandin's previous works, was, as the economic and political hegemony of the United States prevailed, its global *modus operandi*.

Concurrent to the elaboration of freedom as expansion in the rudimentary political economy of Benjamin Franklin, the moral philosophy (of freedom as movement) of Thomas Jefferson, and finally the political theory of James Madison, the frontier becomes a space of increasingly racialized violence—a blood meridian. In the Seven Years War, settlers learned to "kill their victims pitilessly" and "act if they themselves were at native to the land as Indians (16)." In a replay of events twenty years earlier following the Royal Proclamation of 1763, after the Treaty of Paris (1783) settlers continued to stream into western territories and engage in guerilla warfare with Indigenous peoples. Any interference by the federal government, which was finding new ways to dispossess native land through mechanisms of debt, was an impediment to movement and thus an assault on individual freedom. But as Grandin illustrates so clearly throughout the book, expansion is the root cause of what he sees as the country's problem. The US construction of freedom, in Grandin's narrative, becomes the narrative that drive a triangle of expansionism, violence and domination. It is not possible, the author argues, "to extricate 'individual rights'—to possess and to bear arms, and to call on the power of the state to protect those rights—from the bloody history that gave rise to those rights, from

the entitlements settlers and slavers won from people of color as they moved across the land (p. 220)." First personified in Andrew Jackson, this ethos has remained strong in American politics, notably among stalwart supporters of Donald Trump.

After having been guided through a powerful retelling of how the frontier and a unique understanding of freedom persisted, only to gradually see it become an "ideological relic of a now-exhausted universalism," Grandin turns to the present. In a very concise, and somewhat dramatic fashion, he proposes that Donald Trump's ascendance implies that the notion of freedom of expansion is unmasked by the end of the frontier myth. In Grandin's view, this has consequences, as the dominating political consensus that have maintained both tropes are unlikely to return. Seeing the rise of democratic socialism as a legitimate political current (arguably, for the first time in the country's history), the crossroads proposed to the reader is one of only two paths, namely those of socialism, "or at least social democracy" and barbarism, understood as continued belief in the freedom to dominate (p. 275). Although underexplored, Grandin, as many other on the democratic left, provides a narrative leading up to a contemporary moment in which a return the center is nothing but hapless nostalgia.

The reader is, then, left with a compelling narrative elaborating on the diagnosis, but a prescription that only begins to suggest a cure. An inherent challenge within Grandin's narrative is that it is mediated, with some notable examples, through traditional protagonists of US history. The rise of Trumpism is nevertheless the result of popular resentment, and, especially in the latter half of the book, popular interpretations of the national myth are rarely addressed. This spurs fundamental questions on how national myths are taken up, and possibly transformed. What is, for instance, the place of Americans, simultaneously the bearers of the decaying frontier myth and the segment which, now and in 2016, favor the force that ended the myth, in a possible transcendence of national myths of domination?

Two additional fundamental challenges of Grandin's narrative may be found in its interpretation of counter-narratives and its construction as a uniquely US phenomenon. Apart from Perkins, the notable critic of the frontier myth in the 20th century is Martin Luther King, who Grandin casts as the strongest counterforce to the dominating narrative the last time the global frontier myth was in disarray, as a consequence of the slowly progressing national trauma of the War in Vietnam. Beyond King, stories of resistance are largely absent. Finally, while Grandin's narrative is compelling, it never addresses the rise of Trumpism as part of a phenomenon that expands far wider than the US, namely the rise of the contemporary authoritarian right. Although the consensus on free trade is elaborated upon through a

deep-dive into the consequences of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the global rise of exclusionist triumphalism and xenophobia as pillars of political projects are certainly not unique to the US.

Despite the imbalances between the different narratives that the book attempts to unite, *The End of the Myth* succeeds in its prime objective, namely in sketching out the deeply entrenched pattern of intellectual thought on US history that leads up to the current moment. As with his previous works, Grandin places himself in the center of political conjunctures, with a book meant to bridge the gap between radical historical approaches and current debates on the US left.

Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State

by Radhika Mongia, Durham: Duke University Press, 2018. 25,95$, 248 pp

reviewed by

LOUISE THATCHER

Radhika Mongia's *Indian Migration and Empire* is an important contribution to the growing body of work historicising what "seems an unremarkable fact" (p. 1)—that in the present, states hold a monopoly over the international movement of people.[1] Much of what we take for granted is actually very new; the global order of passports, visas and the inherent right of a nation-state to control entry at the border is not timeless, but arose only at the start of the last century. Mongia examines the question of how this happened via histories of different forms of state regulation of colonial Indian migration. She traces the shift in the ideologies and systems of the British Empire from the 1830s, when regulation of the movement of indentured workers was conceivable of only as a limited exception to the general principle of free movement, to the 1910s, when the right to control immigration was synonymous with national sovereignty.

Much work in migration studies and history is still bound by methodological nationalism and by what Mongia calls "methodological statism" (p. 5). This book is an important and useful critique of both of these presumptions. Further, Mongia's post-colonial perspective challenges existing scholarship in which the modern nation-state takes shape in Euro-America and spreads outwards over time; she proposes instead "a world produced through processes of relationality and coproduction" (p.147). This perspective on global entanglements should make this work of interest more generally to global historians.

Like the late Adam McKeown's *Melancholy Order* (with which, as Mongia notes, her study "shares important resonances" [p. 156]), this book argues that the history of the emergence of the modern border regime is also a history of the development of the modern state.[2] Both writers argue that nation-states did not first form and then enact control over immigration but rather that the process of asserting the right to exclude particular immigrants was part of the development of modern sovereignty. Where Mongia differs from McKeown is in her attention to the specifically colonial history of these simultaneous formations. She thus presents a reevaluation of the relationship between colonial and metropolitan state formation: they are far more intertwined, she argues, than has been thought.

As the book's subtitle suggests, this is a Foucauldian genealogy, seeking to illuminate how systems emerged in their present form through "chance occurrences,

1 For example, Adam M. McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); John C. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport : Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Alison Bashford, 'Immigration Restriction: Rethinking Period and Place from Settler Colonies to Postcolonial Nations', *Journal of Global History* 9, no. 01 (March 2014): 26–48, https://doi.org/10.1017/S174002281300048X.

2 McKeown, *Melancholy Order*.

peculiar configurations, contingent forces" (p. 13). She traces how a legal regime and a thick bureaucracy predicated on ideals of rationality and the rule of law emerged via ambiguity, arbitrariness and a muddle of conflicting rules. Mongia's argument for the role of contingency and peculiarity in history is echoed in the book's structure. It does not give a continuous linear history, but instead a presents a series of snapshots of particular moments that together illustrate her argument. The official archive of Indian migration is vast and unwieldy; Mongia skillfully brings together sources from India, Mauritius, South Africa and England.

The first half of the book deals with how controls were first developed over the movement of indentured Indian workers. This was justified as an exception to normally understood principles of free movement via appeals to the 'exceptional' nature of colonised subjects, who were considered incapable of guaranteeing their own freedom. (After the abolition of slavery, this 'freedom' was supposedly to be guaranteed via the contract.) Central to her analysis is Partha Chatterjee's concept of 'the rule of colonial differences' in which the "peculiar situation of the colonies" (p. 11) could be called on to justify diversions from a liberal ideology that was, outside of and despite these exceptions, still held to be universal.[3] Ad hoc restrictions developed and then came to be standardised, leading to a web of disciplinary regulations presented in great detail in Chapter Two. This "thoroughly modern bureaucratic formation" (p. 84) was not a template imported from Europe, but emerged through complex transactions between different sites across the globe, such as immigration bureaucracies, jails and military institutions.

The inclusion of these chapters take up Mongia's argument against relying on state categories in our historical analysis, including the classification of migration as either 'free' or 'unfree'. If only 'free' migration is thought of as part of migration history, this can lead to thinking about state control of migration only in terms of restriction, and ignoring the historic role states have played in promoting and managing migration.

The last two sections are about the rise of 'nationality' as a defining factor of the management of mobility. Chapter Three is about debates around the Indian 'Marriage Question' in South Africa. Indian women's right to travel to South Africa was connected to the status of their husband. From the early 1910s South African authorities, seeking to discourage Indian migration, prevented a number of women from coming as wives on the grounds that their marriages were polygamous: or on the grounds that even monogamous Muslim or

3 Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Hindu marriages had the potential to be polygamous, and thus were not valid marriages. This chapter is about the arguments of South African officials and also about the key role that this question, and the emotions mobilised around it about national female honour, played in the development of Mahatma Gandhi's satyagraha movement. Mongia's analysis traces how gender and sexuality are connected both to feelings of national identity, and to the procedures of identification that police the limits of nationality.

The final chapter deals with the introduction of passports in Canada in the early twentieth century: another mechanism used to restrict Indian immigration within a context that required some semblance of equality among British subjects. This was necessary partly because of attachments to an ideology of liberal universalism, but mostly because of pressure from Indian nationalists and other agitators for equality. Nationality "served as an alibi for race" (p. 111) and explicit racism against Indians (sometimes) disappeared behind arguments about the right of a nation to control immigration, making the passport "a document that has effectively naturalized the rule of colonial difference" (p.139).

In analysing how it is that states came to control human mobility Mongia also addresses the "differential access to mobility" available to different categories of people. More specifically, she examines how this differentiation enforces the "global colour line"—even under liberal regimes which disavow explicitly race-based discrimination.[4] This is a book about mechanisms that states developed in specific contexts in order to be racist without naming race. Mongia argues strongly that this ongoing concern with not *appearing* racist shows the flaw in any narrative that sees racism as simply 'the spirit of the times', or as simply diminishing over time. Rather, she argues, "the racist state developed in cognizance of its racism" (p. 129).

In her conclusion, Mongia brings this into the present. She mentions the radical analysis of activist groups such as No One Is Illegal that challenges the fundamental logic of the modern state, and thus the unjust divisions produced between those classified as 'citizens' and those classified as 'migrants.' However, she is somewhat dismissive of the work they do in practice, arguing that their critique is blunted because activists are forced to negotiate with the state in which they find themselves. I would suggest that this underestimates the capacities of activists. Work by activist and scholar Harsha Walia, among others, shows that activists can be aware of and able to negotiate these contradictions,

4 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); The concept of the colour line is taken from work by W. E. B. Du Bois originally published in 1903:: W. E. B. Du Bois, *Souls of Black Folk* (Routledge, 2015).

maintaining a sharp and systemic critique while mobilising against particular state structures in solidarity with individuals in struggle.[5]

Many historians feel a responsibility to the present (and the future). For historians of migration this weight—the question of how to be useful, and the question of how the present related to the past— can seem especially urgent. De-naturalising the current regime of borders is a contribution to the struggle against its racist violence. In her attention to the particularity of the past, Mongia goes further, providing tools for a critique of the present that can make it more possible for us to articulate "futures that are not merely versions of, or smoothly continuous with, the past" (p. 14). In its argument against a teleological view of history this book is also an argument for a different future, a future that has not yet been determined.

5 Harsha Walia, *Undoing Border Imperialism* (Oakland: AK Press, 2013).

Unwieldy Archives: The Past, Narratives, & History

University of Toronto, May 2019

The 15th Annual Graduate History Symposium

(1373/1500)

reviewed by

MARY WALLE

INTRODUCTION

"Unwieldy Archives: The Past, Narratives, and History" took up Anne Stoler's call—or more aptly put, challenge—for scholars to move from "archive-as-source to archive-as-subject."[1] Nineteen graduate students, primarily from North America, gathered to present and discuss their work in May 2019 at Toronto University. Over the course of two days, presenters in a wide variety of ways took up questions of the "unwieldy archive" including: How do we deal with the power and politics of archives? How do we work around—and through—the many silences of the archives we work with? How do archives themselves shape our historical narratives? Presenters, along with faculty discussants, a faculty roundtable, and visiting high school students came together over the course of two days to present, discuss, and reflect on the relationships between the archives they/we use and the histories they/we write.

PANELS & CONFERENCE KEYNOTE

The opening panel took up questions of archives in relationship to the production of history. The papers—presented by Virginia Grimaldi of York University, Perri Pyle of University of Maryland, College Park, and myself —set the tone for a theoretically and methodologically engaged conference. Professor Cindy Ewing from the University of Toronto commented that although historians are generally known for being a "allergic" to theoretical engagement—each of the first papers demonstrated deep theoretical engagement spanning from Foucault to University of Toronto's own Eve Tuck. Violence and silence—central themes of the conference—were discussed in the first panel and taken up further during a "Scholar's Roundtable," co-hosted by the Toronto School District. The panel invited scholars from University of Toronto to reflect on their teaching and research engaging with the violence and silences of archives. Moderated by Lindsay Sidders from University of Toronto, Melanie Newton (University of Toronto), Luis van Isschot (University of Toronto), and Alexandra Logue (University of Toronto) shared reflections from their research and teaching experiences. Their scholarship and teaching challenges the myth that as we have become more "modern" we have become less violent. Pushing the boundaries of what is considered violence, and what violence is sanctioned (i.e. often state and colonial violence), their discussion put front and center their role as teachers and the importance of responsibly navigating historical and present day violences they encounter in the classroom.

Further panels returned

1 Ann Laura Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance," *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 87-109.

to these themes in different temporalities and geographies from the 'pre-modern' to working with internet archives of the 1990-2000s. Moreover, they expanded on questions of counter-archives and questioning what is an archive? The conference brought together a variety of disciplines and graduate students at various places in their research. Each panel of graduate students was commented on by a faculty "discussant" who was responsible for commenting on the work as a whole and then presenting initial questions for consideration. While most faculty took the opportunity to keep the attention focused on the graduate students work, offering critical but supportive feedback and questions to begin the discussion period, a few faculty unfortunately took the opportunity to re-center themselves, taking up far too much of the allotted discussion time for their own thoughts and stifling the conversation rather than invigorating it.

Though the presenters were primarily historians, a variety of other disciplines were represented in the presentations and discussions including: literary studies and archival studies. Perri Pyle a presenter completing her M.A. in History & Archival Studies, remarked how refreshing it was to be amongst historians "thinking archivally." As a history-archivist in training she exists in the often too wide divide between "archivists" and "historians." Rather than the intersection that she sees it as, she's experienced her M.A. as operating in a grey zone between two disciplines—that in her view and for those at this conference—ought to be in closer communication and collaboration.

Finally, the Keynote address—"Thinking Archivally"—by Kirsten Weld (Harvard University) took the participants both a step back to assess a so-called "archival turn" in the social sciences and humanities, in order to ask: has this actually changed the way that historians go about their/our work? Reflecting back to her own experience writing her dissertation which became her first monograph *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala*, she recalled the intense push back that her adviser gave her when she wanted to analyze the archives themselves rather than merely culling them for 'virgin knowledge.' Though the doors for historians to analyze "archives as subject" and not just use them as sources have been opened, the "hangovers" of the modern historical discipline's nineteenth century origins most often still keep historians, according to Weld, "archivally bound."

(CRITICAL) PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

At the onset of the conference, the opening of the Scholar Roundtable, and more than one paper—presenters and moderators began with a thoughtful Land Acknowledgements. Questions of archives cannot be disentangled

from questions of colonialism and in the North American context, settler-colonialism. It was fitting then for the coordinating team to begin with a thoughtful Land Acknowledgement, which is "a formal statement that recognizes the unique and enduring relationship that exists between Indigenous Peoples and their traditional territories."[2] Though Land Acknowledgements have gained traction in academic settings, one must be conscientious of their performativity without substance.[3] As Eve Tuck and KW Yang argue, Land Acknowledgements can often become "moves to innocence, which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity."[4] The Land Acknowledgement at the beginning of the public "Scholars Roundtable" in particular stressed that the acknowledgement itself was not an end but rather and necessarily a part of ongoing work and relationship building. However, no further space was given specifically toward these discussions and given the conference topic, that would have been important work that could have been highlighted.

As a conference itself dealing with questions of historical methods, the coordinating chairs did an exemplary job in pushing the boundaries of the common critique of academics: inaccessibility. There are many ways that inaccessibility manifests within academic institutions and knowledge production, as well as between academics and "the public." There was ample time for engagement between graduate students, faculty, and most notably the public. As previously discussed, the Scholars Roundtable made space for the public to engage with a lively panel of academics all working on issues of silence and violence in their work and teaching. More specifically, high school students were invited to join the conversation and notably the moderator asked first for the questions from high school students, centering their perspective in a place that rarely takes them seriously. In addition, an afternoon workshop on the relationship between so-called academic and public historians opened up space for questions about employment possibilities, an ever present topic for graduate students.

Coming from a Global History approach, the strong skew of North American institutional representation was disappointing. However, as a fellow graduate student conference organizer, I can appreciate the challenges of creating an accessible conference. The barriers for a graduate conference to recruit and make their conferences

2 "Know the Land Terrirtories Campaign," LSPIRG Creating Agents of Social Change, October 29, 2019. http://www.lspirg.org/knowtheland

3 Some academic institutions now have begun publishing Land Acknowledgement Guides. See for example two North American examples: "Land Acknowledgement," Indigenous University of Toronto, October 29, 2019. https://indigenous.utoronto.ca/about/land-acknowledgement/; "Guide to Indigenous Land Acknowledgement and Territorial Acknowledgements for Cultural Institutions," October 29, 2019. http://landacknowledgements.org/.

4 Eve Tuck and Yang K. Wayne, "Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1-40.

accessible across geographies are numerous; namely, providing financial support and visa application advising. Lacking both of these, the turn out of Canadians, U.S. citizens, and E.U. citizens was to be expected. Nonetheless, this was a missed opportunity because the questions of "unwieldy" archives cross borders. However, the research papers presented covered a wide geographic scope while taking up questions of archive, history, and power in a variety of ways.

CONCLUSION

In the Scholar's Roundtable, Melanie Newton commented that "the study of the past is not in relationship to documents. It's in relationship to people." The papers presented, as well as the personal dialogues that transpired, brought this issue to the foreground. In doing so the conference overall highlighted the political nature of historical research and writing, not just the politics of the past, but rather the politics of the present. The archives we/they work with are not neutral. They have been carefully constructed, whether by one white woman in the 1950s in the United States or a colonizing regime. Thus, historians too—this conference asserts—must be methodologically, theoretically, and ethically responsible and accountable in the histories we/they write, which rely on them.

Fifth Global Histories Student Conference

Freie Universität Berlin – Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, May 31st-June 2nd 2019

reviewed by

MARÍLIA ARANTES SILVA MOREIRA

The "Global Histories Student Conference" is in itself a masterclass of global history-making. In its fifth version, the student organising team from the M.A. Global History from the Freie Universität and Humboldt-University zu Berlin has again handpicked interesting presentations. The panels followed a dynamic programme, where participants of different origins could exchange their efforts in contributing to this innovative historical approach.

As there now seems to be a worldwide consensus on the establishment of Global History as a historical perspective, this was a proper moment for converging methodological self-analysis with the participants' aims for self-enrichment. Being amongst students allowed sincere commentaries; everyone seemed interested in hearing the feedback. Questions raised on-site supplemented the points of discussion that the organising team suggested to panellists in advance. Most students shared their interests and accommodated the different views well. Beyond our differences, it was a place for spotting our common achievements and concerns about the use of a global perspective.

Although one could have expected to see more professors circulating around the conference, the opening keynote by Lisa Hellman was enough to inspire the next days to come. In her presentation, Hellman painted a universe of possibilities enabled through the perspective of global history. It was impressive to see how a well-thought combination of transnational sources, interpreted from creative analytical paths, could generate the study of local and intercultural circulations of knowledge and communication, as she does in her current investigations. Hellman demonstrated diverse strategies for global historians to pursue, remarkably observing the use of micro-histories to expound macro contexts which permits tackling multiple motivations. As Hellman noted, now that global history has achieved more visibility, there is more of it to contest.

This field addresses well what Reinhart Koselleck deems a "history in the plural". That is, it is not about establishing one analytical model, but rather developing a plurality of theories and methods with which historians can illuminate specific themes and problems.[1] The conference's arrangement of panels included multiple themes to be explored. On presentation days, simultaneous panels left attendees with hard decisions to make on which to join. Yet, any choices made would have led to creative ways to look at problems. The panels also incorporated different historical periods to debate.

Panel four, "Markets and Ownerships," illustrates this encompassing rich mix. For example, exploring the British East India

1 See: Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crises: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society,* (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1998). Also, Niklas Olsen, *History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).

Company's possession and trading of native slaves in Southwest India, Vinil Paul revealed a history of that particular period of British imperial activity which, from a broadened perspective, differed from the slave trade in West and East Africa by other empires that expanded South Atlantic routes in the same period. Then, Daniel Villamarin presented a very contemporary analysis of the transnational regulation of shipping containers through contracts and global trade standards. Notably, the points of conversion between those papers were their global focus on the circulation of goods. Although Paul analysed a problem dated two centuries earlier, both illustrated the forces at work of regulation rules following similar logistics of time-efficiency and a production-oriented mindset.

Other papers in same panel likewise focused on circulations, but based on capital. Diana Gluck demonstrated the role of investments to contemporary war logistics in Yemen. And Jiajia Liu revealed ancient role models for the Shanghai Stock Exchange, a Chinese financial institution which is considered among the most innovative. Ultimately, the panel generated interesting debates on global interactions, leaning mostly towards the economic, but also including cultural interactions as well as considerations of geography. Importantly, the panellists shed light on interactions happening independently from the European centre.

Studies centred on intensifying global interactions seem to be the road most travelled by global historians. It is well known that this methodology envisages overcoming national boundaries, narrow views and binary standpoints. Still, much is to be done in order to "change the terrain on which historians think," as proposed by Sebastian Conrad in his book *What is Global History?* As Conrad noted, histories of global interactions are key. Interactions have some regular and sustained patterns of exchange at their core, and are thus able to shape societies in profound ways. "There have always been cross-border exchanges, their operation and impact depended on the degree of systemic integration on a global scale."[2] During the conference, a preponderance of interaction-based studies was an observable trend.

Looking at intensified circulations in modern transoceanic history, panel six, "Ports and Oceans in Global Perspectives" approached maritime entanglements. Here, the panellists discussed the role of the Jolly Roger Jacobites in instilling piracy activities in the early eighteenth century and investigated the global competition for the South Atlantic amid the Revolutionary Wars of 1792-1802. They attempted to rethink Guam as an archipelagic constellation, and presented an environmental history of Greenpeace's shift into global action against predator whaling in the 1960s.

2 Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?,* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2016), 10-11.

Most presentations in the Berlin Student Conference recognised the contribution of post-colonial theory in elaborating broadened historical narratives. This was particularly debated in the third panel, "Transnational Activisms," which encompassed the study of interactions and networks functioning outside of mainstream centres. Also, historians coming from underrepresented locations demonstrated awareness to the "methodological Eurocentrism" so criticised by global historians. Within this analytical framework, the ten panels revealed an interdisciplinary epistemology in assembling vital themes, such as migrations, property, othering, imagination, visual construction, and agency, and also entwining fields such as environmental history and encouraging unusual sources to their work.

Very interesting experiments could be seen in panels related to colonial themes. For example, the first panel, entitled "Colonialism and Anticolonialism: Practices and Identities," contemplated the spaces "in-between." In another panel, "The Visual as Document," it was stimulating to see psychogeography—a "vintage" concept carved by Guy Debord in 1955— combined with a global historical perspective to drive an esthetical reading of Poznan's cultural context. Also interesting was the use of postcards as a focal source of post-colonial analyses of narrative and image construction in colonial Germany, and the use of photography as a common medium for interrelating the Crimean and American Civil wars. Lastly, the paper, "The Construction of Chinese Art History as a Modern Discipline in the Early Twentieth Century," displayed a negotiated identity that broadened the sense of cultural belonging.

The format of the conference allowed discussions on various historical periods in the same panel. While all periods (except for medieval) were accommodated, most papers focused on the 19th and 20th centuries. Perhaps this reflects how global interactions were intensified in the transition to the 19th century and the de-colonial processes of the 20th century. Imperial-based themes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could, however, possibly resist being overcome by the national biases of history-making as this construct had, in these periods, not yet been established. Even if earlier sources might seem at first glance as antithetical to "global" structures, it is possible to frame them within the power relations involved in global interactions different to those of the late modern or contemporary periods.

Overall, during the conference, discovering what we have in common was challenging, even when there was a vaguely similar approach, a consistent tool used in all papers. Yet, the real gain of diversity was to have an exchange on the practical challenges of the field. As such, linguistic barriers appeared to be a common concern,

requiring multiple knowledges for reading our sources. That, in turn, brings translation to the centre of attention. Language matters so widely that the "global turn" and "linguistic turn" go along together well, shedding light to plural narratives. Acknowledging how plurality and language matters leads to the critical use of primary sources. In our tasks of providing complexity to mainstream narratives, a transnational selection of archival resources becomes crucial.
The global requires numerous, geographically-spread sources.
A methodology that enables broadening boundaries ends up broadening our fieldwork. Still, global thinking is rewarding since it allows us to consider plural conclusions.

To conclude, I make a final remark on Berlin as an object of study itself. A walking day around the city remains as my final picture of the conference. It was a fieldwork exercise on widening the academic environment. First, in a more "traditional" historical tour around the Mitte district, and second, a guided tour around the neighbourhood of Wedding, led by the *Berlin Postkolonial* activist group, who explained the grassroot reasons for the movement's aims of reviewing local street names to respect the hardships of the colonial past in Africa. Those entanglements become clear in this city which stands as a centre of global circulations, connections and interactions, manifested in the most extreme ends. The Student Conference makes Berlin one of the most encouraging places to think and rethink eurocentrism, providing perspectives and tools to reach beyond it. In its fifth edition, the Global Histories Conference reassured its pioneering skill in rethinking "methodological eurocentrism" while promoting state-of-the-art debates and addressing theory in practice.

Communicating Community: Anarchism and Its Boundaries

Florence, Italy, 8th of July 2019
European University Institute

reviewed by

OSCAR BROUGHTON

Set in the rolling Tuscan hills that surround Florence, the European University Institute (EUI) has in recent years become an unlikely, yet common, setting for scholars interested in anarchism. Following in this new tradition the "Communicating Community: Anarchism and Its Boundaries" workshop held at the EUI on the 8th of July 2019 was a natural development and was supported by the collaboration of the Global Intellectual History graduate school in Berlin and the EUI.

This workshop brought together researchers based at the EUI and from abroad for a one-day workshop, which saw the presentation of various historical approaches towards anarchism. Central to this workshop was the theme of "communication" which designated the different ways that ideas and practices relating to anarchism, ranging from philosophical traditions to practices of translation and mass propaganda efforts, have been expressed. This theme allowed for discussions relating to the use of 'anarchism' as a term either actively embraced or deliberately avoided by historical actors; and spilled into conversations about how different contexts determined the meaning of this label and its potential to identify and exclude adversaries or appeal to particular audiences. Across four panels discussion circulated through these themes and touched upon a variety of social, political, intellectual and cultural approaches to the history of anarchism. This allowed for differing and overlapping perspectives to emerge as anarchism was discussed in relation to varying political strategies, the conceptual boundaries and linkages to other forms of socialism and syndicalism, and differences in meanings which have appeared across the longue durée of anarchist histories.

In the first panel which dealt with contested figures within the broader canon of anarchism John-Erik Hansson (Université de Cergy-Pontoise) examined the place of William Godwin within the genealogy of anarchist thought and recurrent debates which have occurred around Godwin's ideas. This was followed by Tommaso Giordani (Tallinn University) who examined the often ambiguous position of Georges Sorel in relation to anarchism and argued for a vigorous reappraisal of Sorel's consistent anti-statism.

This panel was subsequently followed by another which dealt with transnational anarchist campaigns. Oscar Broughton (Freie Universität Berlin/ Humboldt Universität Berlin) began this panel with an examination of the National Guilds League during the fading era of transnational anarcho-syndicalism in the early twentieth century and addressed the role of print media and translation in this history. Constance Bantman (University of Surrey) continued many of these themes with a discussion of the importance of Jean Grave and his role within transpolitical anarchist networks which drew particular attention to the significance

of various forms of political campaigning.

Following these discussions, the next panel focussed on anarchism set against the backdrop of early globalisation. This featured Robert Kramm (University of Hong Kong) who presented the case of early twentieth-century anarchist-communism in Japan and its distinctive development from other forms of anarchism in Japan during this period. This was followed by Pascale Siegrist (EUI) who presented the case of anarchist geographer Lev Mechnikov whose knowledge of ten languages and time spent in Japan informed his fusion of anarchist philosophy with scientific thinking.

The final panel focused on new perspectives on the most well known historical case of mass anarchism in Spain. Opening the panel Arturo Zoffmann Rodríguez (EUI) examined the changing significance and historical memory of the 1917 Russian Revolutions for Spanish anarchists during the 1920s and 1930s. This presentation was followed by Danny Evans (Liverpool Hope University) who discussed the changing meaning of Bolshevism within the CNT during the 1930s. Jessica Thorne (Royal Holloway, University of London) concluded this panel with her analysis of anarchist prisoners who were held captive under Franco's regime between 1950 and 1975 and explored their connection to the emerging New Left and the Anarchist Black Cross.

A concluding discussion reflected upon how questions of diffusionism and Eurocentrism were still relevant issues that needed to be addressed in history writing about anarchism, however there was also a clear sense that major efforts have been made to address these issues particularly since Lucian van der Walt and Steven Hirsch's calls to provincialise anarchism in 2010.[1] New pathways in research also came into clear focus such as the need for more analysis of overlooked actors who performed vital supportive roles for communication networks and often assisted major anarchist figures. Furthermore the importance of looking beyond the container of the nation-state, which has now become a mainstay since the "global turn," was also reevaluated in relation to the question of mobility. Suggestions to move beyond the fetishism of mobility towards a focus on the non-mobile and how this can still be understood in relation to transnational and transimperial contexts were also discussed. Additionally there was also clear consensus that there is currently a golden age in terms of research into anarchism which has driven research forward significantly in the last twenty years. This trend does not seem to be declining as this workshop proved and as more research than ever before refocuses anarchism in new and expansive ways.

1 L. van der Walt and S.J. Hirsch, *Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870-1940* (Brill, 2010), xlvi.

ISSN: 2366-780X