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SCOPE AND PURPOSE
In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, Global Histories: a Student Journal aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

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Dear reader,

There is a constellation of texts we vaguely can call 'academic history writing' composed of a seemingly never-ending stream of books, anthologies, research articles, book reviews, essays, conference reports. Some belligerent and impeccable, some compliant or tedious — they move back and forth addressing and referring to each other. They refute, support, or criticize previous works; they also propose and imagine new ways to formulate questions about the past. Discussions flow through different fields, subdisciplines, languages and institutions. The aim of this publication has been, since its inception, to engage in these discussions from the authorial and editorial perspective of students. The field we are interested in is not any kind of history — we want to think and write from, about, or against, the approach known as global history.

This issue carries on with such a task. However, after eight editions under the sun perhaps it is now the moment to sit down, contemplate and reflect on our field of study. This issue is that moment. This pause is not to elaborate on the definition of global history, but rather to think on why we would want to write (global) history, and what for? As always, there is no single answer. What we do know, however, is that the answer is not to emulate an omniscient eye that surveys all epochs and lands; neither to reify the economic connections and power relations of contemporary globality. History writing evidently belongs to its author's own time and space, its execution is never detached from its surroundings. It comes from a political stance; it is a political stand. Taking that into account, one answer could be to use the historian's eye to reflect on closer — one might even say present! — events. In other words, to know the aim or sense, we first have to think about the position from which we write it.

Reader, we have no clear answers. However, we would like to present to you two new sections that intend to reflect on these issues. The 'Methodologies' section orbits the question of how we conceptualize and 'practice' global history. Which tools and perspectives do we use, perhaps without even acknowledging them? What are their scopes or limitations? What are other possible frames or approaches

can we use? Goh Ngee Chae Joshua, Billy Sawyers and Lisa Poggel's contributions tackle these questions. Goh's essay proposes 'Mythic Kinships' as a way to study cross-cultural interactions in Antiquity, beyond what is acknowledged as 'factual' processes. Billy Sawyers explores the uses of cosmopolitanism in global history, arguing for a reconsideration of the concept in the post-2008 world. Lisa Poggel reflects on why modernization theory remains a common place in history writing, even after several decades of analysis and criticism.

The 'Public History' section, edited by Ben Miller, focuses on the uses of historical tools and discourses in contemporary discussions. Do we mean to use our knowledge in contemporary public debates? Which past is portrayed to the public? Who is this public? Virgil Taylor and Carla Panico's essays deal directly with these issues. Taylor's work analyzes online queer public history, while Panico's traces the discursive strategies used to portray migrants as a negative 'other' in contemporary Italy.

The intention of this issue was to come up with different ways to answer the questions above. The Public History and Methodologies sections are two avenues to address them directly. However, these are questions that are always addressed, albeit in a less explicit way, by history writing itself. In this volume we have research articles by Marvin Martin, Fatima Aizaz, Wang Jialu, and Hans Magne Jaatun. Their inquiries are not disconnected from our own concerns. Wang's research focuses on the power structures that favored the creation of art history as a discipline in China at the dawn of the 20th century. Martin's article follows the journey of five Aboriginal activists to the "Congress of African People" in Atlanta in 1970. Through the thorough analysis of newspapers, Aizaz traces 'Pan-Islam' discourses formed under and against colonial rule. Jaatun's article analyses the relationship between religion, international humanitarianism and colonialism using the case of the Near East Relief during the interwar years.

As in previous issues, this issue has a Review section. Sandra Alsén, Lisa Phongsavath, Yeo Huijin Martina, Paul Sprute, Peder Østebo, and Sébastien Tremblay have reviewed

recently published history books, while Max Vogel and Paul Sprute give us an account of the 'Africa and the Cold War' Conference, which they attended this past March in Addis Ababa.

It is true that academic and non-academic discussions of history, and those in-between, are constituted mostly by texts, as they do not require the simultaneous presence of people to unfold. However, they only have meaning and sense when there is a reader to engage with them. All texts are made for a reader, so we hope you enjoy this issue!

Best regards,

The Global Histories editorial team

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Australian Indigenous Activism and the Global Influence of the US Black Power Movement: the US Trip of Five Aboriginal Activists in 1970

by:
MARVIN MARTIN

ABSTRACT

Historians have conventionally stressed the uniqueness and domestic context of the Australian Black Power movement by situating this movement within the longer history of Aboriginal resistance and have only recently investigated its global dimensions. Although these domestic aspects are of great significance, the aim of this article is to focus on an important, understudied global aspect by examining the transnational encounter of five Aboriginal activists with the US Black Power movement in the international Black Power conference, "Congress of African People", in Atlanta in 1970. Investigating the role that this US trip played for the five activists, this article argues that despite their often-negative conclusions about the usefulness of this trip, their encounter with the US Black Power movement helped them find new answers to the long-term Aboriginal rights struggle. After the US trip, some of the Aboriginal activists implemented and adapted tactics and philosophies of the US Black Power movement for their struggle, the most important being new perspectives on black pride and self-determination. This article therefore argues that the national explanation of the Australian Black Power movement must be complemented by its transnational dimension. The second aim of this article is to address the marginalisation of Indigenous peoples within the field of Global History. Global History has favoured the study of mobile and transnational European elites over Indigenous peoples who have typically been assumed as local and static. This case study of the transnational encounters of five Aboriginal activists however challenges this notion and demonstrates that Global History approaches can also be used to give voice to Indigenous peoples.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Marvin Martin is currently writing his master's thesis for his completion of the master's programme Global History at the Freie Universität Berlin and the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Before studying Global History, he received a Bachelor's degree in History and Political Science from the Freie Universität Berlin. An exchange year at the University of Melbourne in 2017-2018 sparked his research interest in Australian Indigenous history. In his master's thesis, he therefore examines the role that Indigenous peoples and knowledge played in European explorations in Australia.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a shift occurred within the Australian Indigenous activist movement.[1] From the 1950s until the mid-1960s, Aboriginal activists together with white supporters campaigned for equal citizenship rights in an attempt to integrate Aboriginal people into the Australian nation. This campaign was led by the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) and culminated in an overwhelming "yes" to the 1967 referendum that amended the Australian constitution. The amendments were mostly symbolic. Aboriginval people were for the first time counted in the official census and the federal Commonwealth government – as opposed to the states and territories only – was granted the right to pass legislation on Aboriginal issues. Many Aboriginal activists nonetheless hoped that the successful referendum would be accompanied by reforms that would improve the lives of Indigenous people. Similar to the situation in the USA after the passing of the Civil Rights Bill in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965, this optimism was followed by frustration about the lack of concrete changes.[2] By the late 1960s, a younger and more radical generation of Indigenous activists grew impatient with the relatively moderate approach of the FCAATSI. Instead of framing their campaign in terms of equal citizenship rights, the new generation of Indigenous activists emphasised Aboriginal identity and self-determination.[3] This new emphasis was highly influenced by the US Black Power movement, which emerged at this time.[4] Aboriginal activists were acquainted with the ideas and actions of the US Black Power movement through newspapers and the television and they read the texts of Black Power representatives such as Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, or Malcom X.[5] The visit of the Caribbean Black Power activist Roosevelt Brown in August 1970 is often seen as the moment when Black Power (both symbolically and literally) arrived in Australia.[6] Brown's visit to Australia lasted only three days, but it left a lasting impression on the radical and young activists.[7] More concretely, this visit prompted Brown to invite five Aboriginal activists to the international Black Power conference, "Congress of African People", in Atlanta, USA, in September 1970. An Aboriginal participant of this conference, Bruce

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1 Russell McGregor, "Another Nation: Aboriginal Activism in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s," *Australian Historical Studies* 40, no. 3 (2009): 343.
2 Kathy Lothian, "Seizing the Time: Australian Aborigines and the Influence of the Black Panther Party, 1969-1972," *Journal of Black Studies*, no. 4 (2005), 182; Angelique Stastny and Raymond Orr, "The influence of the US Black Panthers on indigenous activism in Australia and New Zealand from 1969 onwards," *Australian Aboriginal Studies*, no. 2 (2014), 64.
3 McGregor, "Another Nation," 343-46.
4 Lothian, "Seizing the Time," 181-85.
5 Lothian, 183-184.
6 Lothian, 185; Alyssa L. Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly': Aboriginal Black Power and the Rise of the Australian Black Panther Party, 1967-1972* (PhD Thesis, The Unversity of Melbourne, 2013), 132.
7 Jennifer Clark, *Aborigines & Activism: Race, Aborigines & the Coming of the Sixties to Australia* (Crawley, W.A.: University of Western Australia Press, 2008), 210-11.

McGuinness, highlighted the usefulness of his trip:

> The mere fact that myself and other Aborigines were able to study firsthand the Black American situation on THE BLACK AMERICAN battleground so to speak was in itself an experience, so beneficial that words cannot describe it.[8]

This article will analyse this trip of five Australian Indigenous activists to the USA in 1970, but first it is important to outline the broader historiography of Australian Indigenous activism in the 1960s and 1970s.

Despite the significance that McGuinness ascribed to his encounter with the US Black Power movement, the importance of this movement for Australian Indigenous activists does not feature very largely within the Australian historiography of "the long 1960s".[9] Most historians have conventionally analysed the Australian Black Power movement within a national framework and have therefore neglected the broader transnational connections that Australian Indigenous activists sought with other movements. The historian Alyssa L. Trometter concludes in her analysis of the scholarship on the Australian Black Power movement that "[s]cholars have typically stressed the uniqueness of Aboriginal Black Power but have failed to address the often surprising relationships that were forged beyond Australia's borders."[10] Historians who have looked at the various Australian activists movements of the 1960s more broadly also similarly believe that scholars have not sufficiently addressed the global engagements of local activists.[11]

Australia has furthermore generally been neglected within the wider "global 1960s" historiography that investigates transnational connections between social movements of the 1960s throughout the world. Today there are many studies of the radical 1960s that examine connections between the USA and West European countries, the "West" and the "East", or, more occasionally, the "First World" and the "Third World". Australia is however almost always omitted.[12] On top of the neglect of the transnational dimension, the Australian Black Power movement is generally understudied within the Australian historiography. In

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8 Bruce McGuinness, "Report by Bruce B. McGuinness Director Administrative Officer A.A.L.," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.: Report on trip by Five Aborigines to Congress of African People and United Nations*, (Melbourne: ABSCHOL, 1971), 26.
9 For the concept of "the long 1960s" see Simon Hall, "Framing the American 1960s: A historiographical review," *European Journal of American Culture* 31, no. 1 (2012): 14-17. Henceforth, I will abbreviate "the long 1960s" to "the 1960s".
10 Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 2.
11 Jon Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s: Global radicals* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 13; Clark, *Aborigines & Activism*, 5.
12 Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*, 12.

2001, the 1960s Australian Indigenous activist and historian Gary Foley criticised that "historians have trivialized, marginalized and dismissed the achievements and historical influence of the so-called Australian Black Power Movement."[13] Australian historians have indeed often downplayed the significance of the Australian Black Power movement, by viewing this activism as a continuation of previous forms of resistance. Heather Goodall for example stresses that the radical Indigenous activism of the 1960s should be seen within the longer history of the Aboriginal struggle for land rights.[14] Historian Richard Broome in turn thinks that, "for a handful of Aboriginal activists," Black Power provided "a new way of thinking about the world [...] However, to understand the dominant forces that influenced most Aboriginal people to seek change, we must look to Indigenous aspirations [...]." Black Power was according to him rather a "catalyst for change" or "a spark to ignite" pre-existing long-term Indigenous aspirations for autonomy.[15]

Some historians have however recently challenged this marginalisation of the Australian Black Power movement and the conventional national history writing which neglects the transnational context underpinning this movement, arguing that Aboriginal activists turned to Black Power after they had been disappointed with the reformist approach of the 1950s and 1960s.[16] The historians Jon Piccini and Tracey Banivanua Mar have in particular counteracted the previous scholarship by stressing that travelling and the mobility of Australian Indigenous activists played an important role in changing Australian Indigenous activism.[17] Both historians can be ascribed to the emerging studies of Indigenous transnational mobility which highlight the mobility of Indigenous people and thereby challenge the stereotypical notion that Europeans were global and mobile, whereas Indigenous people were local and static.[18]

This article contributes to both, this emerging Indigenous mobility studies and recent transnational studies of the Australian Black Power movement, by focusing on the specific case of the US trip by the five Aboriginal activists mentioned above. The aim of this article is not to refute the significance of the domestic aspects of the Australian Black Power movement, but to complement and complicate the national history writing by focusing on this important,

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13 Gary Foley, *Black Power in Redfern 1968-1972* (BA Honours Thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2001), http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_1.html [last access November 26, 2018].
14 Heather Goodall, *Invasion to embassy: Land in Aboriginal politics in New South Wales, 1770-1972* (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin in association with Black Books, 1996), 335-36.
15 Richard Broome, "The 1969 Aboriginal Takeover of the Victorian Aborigines Advancement League - Indigenous and Black Power Inspirations," *Agora* 51, no. 3 (2016): 22.
16 Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*, 152-54.
17 Piccini, 4; Tracey Banivanua Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous globalisation and the ends of empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 185.
18 Zoë Laidlaw and Alan Lester, *Indigenous communities and settler colonialism: Land holding, loss and survival in an interconnected world* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 7, 9; Jane Carey and Jane Lydon, "Indigenous Networks: Historical Trajectories and Contemporary Connections," in *Indigenous networks: Mobility, connections and exchange*, ed. Jane Carey and Jane Lydon (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1; on Indigenous mobilities studies see also Rachel Standfield, ed., *Indigenous Mobilities: Across and Beyond the Antipodes* (Acton, ACT: ANU Press, 2018)

neglected global aspect of this movement. As historians have conventionally overlooked transnational aspects of this movement, this article will ask the questions: what role did the US Black Power movement play for the five Aboriginal activists of the US trip? Was the US Black Power movement merely a "catalyst for change" or was Black Power central for them?

The US trip is generally understudied and mostly merely mentioned in passing as part of Aboriginal activists' growing interest in the US Black Power movement,[19] but Piccini is one of the few scholars who has analysed this trip in detail.[20] In his analysis, however he rather underappreciates the significance of the US Black Power movement for the five Aboriginal activists, as he stresses how difficult it was for them to implement US Black Power ideas and tactics in Australia. Using mainly a report written by the Indigenous participants of the US trip, but also newspaper articles, oral history interviews and biographies, I will argue in contrast to Piccini that the role which the US Black Power movement played for these activists should not be underestimated. The analysis of the US trip reveals that the movement was an important aspect for the five Aboriginal activists, not because all of them wholeheartedly embraced Black Power, but because the direct encounter with the US Black Power movement sharpened their positions concerning the Aboriginal rights struggle, as they were forced to either endorse or to oppose the methods used by the US Black Power movement. Despite their often-negative conclusions about the usefulness of this trip, I argue that their encounter with the US Black Power movement helped them to find new answers to the long-term Aboriginal rights struggle and the Australian issues of dispossession and colonisation. This case study therefore indicates that the transnational aspect of the US Black Power movement played an important role for at least some of the 1960s Australian Indigenous activists.

The second and more general aim of this article is to address the neglect of Indigenous peoples within the field of Global History. Despite its aspiration to include non-European perspectives, Global History studies have mostly overlooked Indigenous people.[21] Studies of transnational networks have in particular privileged the study of mobile metropolitan and colonial European elites and have thus given little attention to Indigenous peoples who are typically considered to be less connected.[22] The scholar Karen Fox moreover observes that Global History has the potential to "perpetuate the marginalisation of Indigenous voices and stories that took place for so long", as Indigenous histories tend to focus on the local, whereas transnational histories seek to go beyond the analytical framework of the nation-state.[23] Global History's common focus on

19 Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*, 160.
20 Piccini, 159-168; another detailed analysis is provided in Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 138-147.
21 Carey and Lydon, "Indigenous Networks," 7.
22 Carey and Lyndon, 6-7.
23 Karen Fox, "Globalising Indigeneity? Writing Indigenous Histories in a Transnational World," *History Compass* 10, no. 6 (2012): 426.

mobile and transnational actors could therefore be seen as being detrimental to giving voice to Indigenous peoples in history.

This article's analysis of five Aboriginal activists travelling to the USA however challenges the notion that Global history studies unavoidably must favour the study of European elites over supposedly less mobile Indigenous peoples. It contests this by showcasing along with other studies of Indigenous transnational mobility that Australian Indigenous peoples did not stay put and were not isolated from the wider world. This trip shows on the contrary that Aboriginal peoples actively sought transnational connections in the 1960s by travelling to and meeting with other activists. Similar histories of what scholar Ravi de Costa calls "indigenous transnationalism" have shown that the mobility and transnationalism of the five Aboriginal activists were not exceptional.[24] These activists in fact followed a longer history of Indigenous people from throughout the world who used travel as a means to assert their sovereignty.[25]

That such transnational Indigenous histories existed implies that Global Histories and Indigenous histories do not need to be mutually exclusive and detrimental to Indigenous voices in history. This article argues that Global History approaches can be used to give voice to Indigenous peoples when historians reject the notion of static Indigenous peoples and instead foreground transnational connections between different marginalised peoples.[26] It demonstrates this by using Françoise Lionnet's and Shu-mei Shih's concept of "minor transnationalism". With this concept Lionnet and Shih advocate for transnational studies that evade the typical global/local binary of Global History approaches. In addition to studying the relationship between the global and the local, the dominant and the resistant, or above and below, both believe that scholars should also focus on "minor-to-minor networks that circumvent the major altogether".[27] The encounter of five Aboriginal activists with Black Power activists from throughout the world in 1970 is such a "minor transnationalism" between different marginalised groups. By showcasing the minor-to-minor transnationalism between the US Black Power and the Aboriginal Black Power movements in the 1960s, I aim to show that approaches of Global History can also help to reinforce Indigenous voices in history if global historians go beyond an approach that favours the study of European elites. Done differently, Global History can in fact broaden the knowledge about people who were supposedly immobile and left out of the processes of globalisation or have been assumed to be at the

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24 Ravi de Costa, *A Higher Authority: Indigenous Transnationalism and Australia* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006), 1.
25 Other examples of such histories of Indigenous transnationalism are Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*; Coll-Peter Thrush, *Indigenous London* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); Fiona Paisley, *The Lone Protestor: A M Fernando in Australia and Europe* (Canberra, A.C.T.: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2012); Ravi de Costa, *A Higher Authority*.
26 With this, I do not want to suggest that examining mobile and transnational actors is the only way to do Global History. It is also possible to examine transnational connections of relatively immobile actors but examining transnational actors has become a common approach within the field of Global History.
27 de Costa, 8.

receiving end of it.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: ASSIMILATION POLICY AND STATE SURVEILLANCE

To undertake a trip to a Black Power conference in the USA and to assert Aboriginality was a radical act on behalf of the five Aboriginal activists at a time when Australian Indigenous people were subjected to the assimilation policy of the Australian government. State and federal governmental representatives officially formulated this assimilation policy in a conference in 1937 and subsequently they constantly redefined what the assimilation policy constituted in conferences in 1951, 1961 and 1965. The principal aim of absorbing the Indigenous population into the white population and forcing Indigenous people to live like Europeans remained however unchanged.[28] The 1961 "Native Welfare Conference" for example stated that "all Aborigines and part-Aborigines are expected eventually to attain the same manner of living as other Australians [...], observing the same customs and influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties as other Australians."[29] Governmental officials therefore saw the rise of a Black Power movement in Australia asserting Aboriginality as a threat and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization monitored members of the Black Power movement accordingly. Staff of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization for example took pictures of Brown, leaving Australia at the Essendon airport in Melbourne. When the Aboriginal activists headed for the USA in 1970, the director-general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization also requested the US Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor the movements and words of the delegation.[30]

THE LEARNING EXPERIENCES OF THE FIVE ABORIGINAL ACTIVISTS

Despite the assimilation policy and state surveillance, the five Indigenous activists Bruce McGuinness, Bob Maza, Patsy Kruger (who later changed her name to Patsy Corowa and will subsequently referred to as such), Jack Davis,

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28 Richard Broome, *Aboriginal Australians: Black responses to white dominance, 1788-2001*, 3rd ed. (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 165, 175-7.
29 Richard Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 177.
30 Banivanua Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific*, 192, 194-195.

and Solomon Bellear were willing to risk the one-month-long trip to the USA in September 1970. Although most of these activists were based in the Australian state of Victoria, taken together, they came from a variety of regions and institutions ranging from the Victorian Aborigines Advancement League, to the National Tribal Council, the West Australian Council for Aboriginal Advancement, and the University of Sydney. However, they were all part of the younger and more radical generation interested in the US Black Power movement.[31] The US trip did not only comprise of speeches and workshops at the Black Power conference in Atlanta with estimated 2500 registered participants. During the trip, the Aboriginal activists also visited Harlem and Long Island in New York where they met different leaders and organisations associated with the Black Power movement. Amongst others, they had discussions with Native American groups, the leader of the Nation of Islam Louis Farrakhan, Queen Mother Moore of the Universal Association of Ethiopian Women, the civil rights activists Jesse Jackson, and they listened to performances of well-known artists such as Ray Charles, Nina Simone and Stevie Wonder.[32] In New York City, the Aboriginal activists also submitted two petitions to the United Nations, calling for "the relief from the genocide which is being practiced upon our people" and the "elimination of all racial discrimination."[33] The Australian Indigenous delegates therefore met a broad range of representatives of the US Black Power movement and used the trip to exchange experiences with them.

This section investigates how the five Indigenous activists learned from these exchanges and tried to draw lessons from the situation of African American people for their political struggle in Australia. This was after all the expressed hope of the activists. One month prior to departure, McGuinness, the principal organiser of the trip,[34] outlined the purpose of their visit: "[w]e will be studying particularly conditions and race relations at Atlanta University, which has the largest number of negro students."[35] Referring to the self-help programmes of the Black Power movement, he stated that "[i]t will be our aim to try to introduce these ideas into Australia."[36] Shortly after arriving in the USA, Maza repeated this hope in a *New York Times* article.[37] The goal of the conference was, according to McGuinness, not only to put pressure on the Australian government, but also to become economically independent.[38]

The report of the Indigenous delegation reveals that the Australian Indigenous activists did indeed learn from their experiences abroad when they

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31 Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*, 161. The only exception in terms of age was Jack Davis who was 53 years old at the time of the US trip.
32 Jack Davis, "5 on U.S.A. Field Trip," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 4-5.
33 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 19-23.
34 Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 138-140, 143.
35 "Aborigines to study in the U.S.A.," *Northcote Leader*, August 2, 1970, available from http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/1960s/aalbp/rb33.html [last access November 26, 2018].
36 "Aborigines to study in the U.S.A."
37 "World Unity of Blacks Sought at Parley," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1970, 11.
38 "'Third World' Seeks Unity at Conference," *The New York Times*, September 6, 1970, 40.

eventually went to the USA. The US trip served as a corrective to the image which Aboriginal activists had of the situation in the USA prior to their first-hand experiences. In his report, McGuinness depicts the image which Indigenous activists had before travelling to the USA:

> There was a certain fear in each of the Koorie[39] delegates when embarking on this trip. We, like all Australians, had been subjected to the news reports of Race riots, killing, burning, looting, plane crashes, assassinations and sabotage in the U.S., so that the question foremost in each of our minds was, 'will, we ever come home'?[40]

These unrealistic expectations show that the young Aboriginal activists only had a partial understanding of the US situation in the 1970s.

This partial understanding is understandable, given that none of the Aboriginal activists had ever been overseas.[41] In addition to their lack of direct experience of the USA, the Aboriginal delegates' partial understanding of the situation in the USA can more importantly be explained by the way Australian mainstream newspaper depicted the US Black Power movement. The historian Alyssa L. Trometter has analysed Australian newspapers depictions of the US Black Power movement in detail for the first time and she argues that the readers of the mainstream Australian newspapers "were often given an imperfect and rather partial knowledge of the American Black Power movement and Black Panther Party [...]."[42] Particularly "violent and bloody images of American civil rights movement became well known in Australia," while other aspects such as the community programmes of the Black Panther Party or the justifications behind the Party's actions were mostly not mentioned.[43] In 1967, the Melbourne based *The Age* for example reported that there was "a wave of violence" and "roaming bands upturned cars, smashed windows and hurled petrol bombs" throughout the USA.[44] The Australian press coverage therefore heavily shaped the perception of the US Black Power Movement in Australia.

In accordance with this analysis of Trometter, McGuinness admitted himself that he "had been conditioned for [sic] from the Australian Press and

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39 Aboriginal people from Victoria and the south of New South Wales refer to themselves as "Koorie" or "Koori" in order to differentiate themselves from Aboriginal people from other parts of Australia. For this definition see "About," The Koorie Heritage Trust, accessed November 26, 2018, http://koorieheritagetrust.com.au/about-us/.
40 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.,* 6.
41 Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*, 163.
42 Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 93.
43 Trotmetter, 93.
44 "Negro Rioters Loot, Burn in Ghetto Area," *The Age*, 30 June, 1967, 2, cited in: Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 101.

previous overseas visitors" and he reported that he had read that almost every Black American was armed. When he arrived in the USA, he found out that this was "a gross exaggeration" and in the report he voiced his "surprise when the first thing that I noticed was a Black man arm in arm with a white girl."[45] The direct experiences of the Aboriginal delegates contradicted the Australian media representation of the US Black Power movement. Instead of the reliance on Australian media reports, the US trip therefore gave Aboriginal activists the opportunity to revise their misconceptions of racial relations in the USA.

McGuinness in fact actively explored these racial relations in the USA. His report shows that he was a keen and at times anxious observer who was constantly looking out for signs of racism. The delegates first arrived in San Francisco where they had to change flights and had to go through customs. They feared that their boomerangs would not go through and they "deliberated for some time" whether they should approach white or black customs officers. The decision was eventually taken from them as an airline steward pushed McGuinness to a white customs officer. It took him only two minutes to go through the custom, while a black customs officer questioned the other Aboriginal delegate Davis "at length on his tablets and their uses." McGuinness simply remarks that these are "[n]ot very important points, but nevertheless worth mentioning."[46] His description of the delegation's arrival in the USA however demonstrates that McGuinness paid very close attention to cross-racial interactions.

His report is indeed full of descriptions of mundane interactions between white people and people of colour that he thought were very much worthy of mention. When arriving at his hotel in Atlanta, McGuinness witnessed a white porter picking up a tip from the ground after his host, Roosevelt Brown, had dropped it. McGuinness did not believe that Brown intentionally dropped it, "but you should have seen that guy on his hands and knees picking up the nickles [sic] and dimes while us poor lowly coloured folk stood around watching."[47] For McGuinness, this reversal of the common racial hierarchy was apparently unimaginable in Australia. McGuinness also flirted with white women in order to examine how widespread discrimination was in the USA. He took a walk through the city and "made passes at White girls receiving some very favourable results."[48] However, when he did so alongside the comparatively darker-skinned Indigenous activist, Bellear, he "received nothing but cold stares."[49] He "experimented further", asking a barmaid of his hotel for a date. She accepted initially, "but when she found out who and what I was, she suddenly

45 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 8.
46 McGuinness, "Report," 6.
47 McGuinness, "Report," 7.
48 McGuinness, "Report," 7.
49 McGuinness, "Report," 7.

remembered a previous engagement."[50] The purpose of this flirting was to test what constituted socially acceptable behaviour for black or Indigenous people regarding white people in the USA. McGuinness thus consciously used the US trip to explore the differences in racial discrimination between Australia and the USA.

These experiences more generally helped Indigenous activists to better comprehend their situation in Australia, since they could now compare the situation of African Americans in the USA with that of Indigenous people in Australia. As Corowa reflects in her report, only after the US trip was it possible for her to "stand back and look *objectively* at what is happening to Australians."[51] The US trip gave her a reference point for evaluating Australia's position within the global issue of racism. Concerning the trip's usefulness, McGuinness similarly concluded: "[t]he Education I received re: race relations cannot be obtained from text books."[52] As McGuinness' unrealistic expectations of the US trip have shown, media reports about the US Black Power movement were not sufficient. Only through first-hand-experience of the US Black Power movement could he, through comparison, truly understand the situation of Aboriginal people. The retrospective reflections of Jack Davis additionally stressed how the US trip changed his previous beliefs: "[a] fleeting trip could not produce soundly based scholarly conclusions, but it did produce some deep impressions and challenging opinions which influenced and directed my activities after I returned to Australia."[53] Altogether, these quotes show that the US trip gave the Indigenous activists the possibility to reflect on their own situation in Australia by comparing it with the US American one. The engagement with the US Black Power movement was in conclusion an important learning process for the young Indigenous activists.

THE USEFULNESS OF ENCOUNTERING THE US BLACK POWER MOVEMENT

But when comparing the USA and Australia, many of the Aboriginal delegates believed that the USA was an unsuitable example to follow. They concluded that the contemporary situation of racial relations in the USA would become the future Australian situation if no actions were taken. McGuinness

50 McGuinness, "Report," 7.
51 Patsy Kruger, "A Year in the Revolutionary Education," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 31, emphasis added.
52 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S,* 23.
53 Keith Chesson, *Jack Davis: A life-story* (Melbourne: Dent, 1988), 149. Keith Chesson states that he has merged his own written passages with the transcripts taken from recorded conversations with Jack Davis. This quotation might therefore not be a literal representation of what Davis said. As Chesson admits himself, his book is neither a true oral history, nor a true biography. For this see Chesson, *Jack Davis*, 3.

phrased this view particularly eloquently, stating that "Australia in the future will be a mirror of America today"[54] and that the current situation in the USA was "a projection of the Australian situation in years to come."[55] Bob Maza also thought that Australia would follow the same trajectory as the USA if nothing was done. In a later interview with the Indigenous activist Kevin Gilbert, Maza recounts that "[t]he black situation in the USA made me realize that if our black movement here in Australia is going to be left in the hands of whatever ego-trippers there are around, [...] then we are going to head the same way that the black Americans did."[56] Experiencing the poverty of African American welfare recipients in Harlem firsthand gave Davis similarly the impression that "this was a process already begun in Australia amongst the Aborigines."[57] The USA therefore served as a negative example of what Indigenous Australians should avoid.

In accordance with this assessment of the USA, many Aboriginal activists later drew negative conclusions about the usefulness of participating in the Congress of African People. Corowa expressed her disappointment that many other Black participants of the Congress "didn't KNOW there were black people in Australia."[58] After returning to Australia, McGuinness also criticised the lack of interest during the conference in Aboriginal peoples: "[t]he Congress of African Peoples was about as much use to Australian Aboriginals as me having a hole in the head. [...] There was virtually no awareness of our particular problems at all."[59] Davis later retells how a workshop about self-defence in which he took part during the Congress rather alienated him: "[a] peace-loving man, I watched the demonstration without any real attempt to absorb the techniques or acquire the skills."[60] He consequently did not return to the next session and reports that, after his return to Australia, he didn't become "personally involved" in the Australian Black Power movement as he preferred "other, non-violent initiatives."[61] Most of the Indigenous delegates thus concluded that representatives of the US Black Power movement were not interested in the struggle of Aboriginal people and that the situation in the USA was not comparable with Australia.[62]

This article however contends that the US experiences helped sharpen the convictions of the Aboriginal delegation even as a negative example. The

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54 McGuinness, "On Reflection in Brief!," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 27.
55 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 23.
56 Kevin Gilbert, *Because a white man'll never do it* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973), 115.
57 Chesson, *Jack Davis*, 151.
58 *The Herald*, June 5, 1971, collected in Barry Christophers Papers, MS 7992, Box 3, NLA, quoted in Clark, *Aborigines & Activism*, 216.
59 "Native Rights Plea Ignored," *The Australian*, October 3, 1970, 5. Not to be confused with the wrong newspaper quoted by Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 144 and the wrong date quoted by Rhonda Y. Williams, *Concrete demands: The search for Black power in the 20th century* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 232, endnote 93.
60 Chesson, *Jack Davis*, 147.
61 Chesson, 152.
62 The report of the US trip therefore suggest that the Aboriginal activists were often frustrated by the lack of interest in and knowledge about the Aboriginal struggle in Australia, but this should not rule out the possibility that Aboriginal activists could have influenced their US counterparts as well.

Aboriginal activists acknowledged that the USA was too different to simply imitate the methods of the US Black Power movement, but as seen above they nonetheless drew lessons from their experiences in the USA. McGuinness in fact hoped that the delegates' knowledge obtained during the US trip would "short circuit the expensiveness of trial and error, by illustrating to the prementioned [Aboriginal organisations, Aboriginal people and governments] the inadvisability of procrastination [...]."[63] And he added:

> [i]f previous American Governments had done their job, had they of [sic] tackled the Black situation in the US in a more mature manner, then their racial problems could be well on the way to solution. We have to learn by other peoples [sic] mistakes, isn't that what progress is all about?[64]

The Aboriginal delegates therefore perceived the USA as a dystopian future of Australia which made immediate changes in Australia imperative. Encountering the US Black Power movement gave them the opportunity to learn from past mistakes in the USA even when they considered the USA to be an inapt example to follow for their own struggle in Australia.

THE ABORIGINAL ACTIVISTS' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDEAS AND TACTICS OF THE US BLACK POWER MOVEMENT

Because of the Aboriginal activists' negative comments about the usefulness of participating in the Congress of African People, the historian Piccini stresses in his analysis of the US trip the "limits of transnational politics" rather than the benefits.[65] He believes that the US trip showed the "real challenges and difficulties" of implementing ideas and tactics of the US Black Power movement in Australia.[66] Although it is true that the activists contested the usefulness of some aspects of the US trip, I argue that he undervalues the subsequent influence of the encounter with the US Black Power movement on Indigenous activism in Australia.

There are for instance some concrete examples of how some Australian

63 McGuinness, "On Reflection in Brief!," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 27.
64 McGuinness, "On Reflection," 27.
65 Piccini, *Transnational protest, Australia and the 1960s*, 151.
66 Piccini, 160.

Indigenous activists implemented the tactics used by the US Black Power movement. Bob Maza for instance visited the National Black Theater in Harlem and met its founder, Barbara Ann Teer, during his stay in New York City. This encounter with Teer inspired him to help create the "National Black Theatre" of the same name in the suburb Redfern of Sydney two years later.[67]

The US Black Panther community survival programmes that McGuinness alluded to before visiting the USA furthermore inspired Australian Indigenous activists to set up similar programmes in Australia. The 1970s marked the time when Aboriginal communities set up Aboriginal controlled organisations in major cities throughout Australia to provide housing, legal and health services. The Aboriginal Legal Service of New South Wales was established in the suburb of Redfern in Sydney in October 1970 and was soon followed by similar organisations in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland.[68] Kathy Lothian compellingly makes the argument that the numerous Aboriginal organisations that were formed in the 1970s maybe did not share the name of the US Black Panther Party or necessarily adopted the programmes of it systematically. They however "embodied the spirit of these programmes."[69] The historian Trometter also believes that the idea of Aboriginal community control was "[p]erhaps one of the greatest developments to arise out of the Black Power era in Victoria."[70] She thinks that the medical training programmes of Aboriginal controlled organisations like the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service established in 1973 embodied the US Black Panther Party's principle of self-determination.[71] McGuinness experienced the breakfast programmes of the US Black Panther Party first-hand in Harlem and praised the Party's work as "the essence to the Black Movement."[72] He noted that the militancy of the Black Panther Party is well known, as "[t]he Australian Press never lets us forget it, but there is one aspect of their activities which is never publicised, 'their breakfast programme'. In Harlem alone, they supply 500 free breakfasts to Black School kids."[73] After experiencing these programmes in the USA, McGuinness was involved in setting up Aboriginal-controlled health services in Australia. He was a founding member of the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service and also helped to establish the National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organisation which was established in 1976 and represented Aboriginal health services from throughout Australia.[74] While these Aboriginal-controlled self-help programmes were not mere copies of their US counterparts, McGuinness' report reveals that the US trip contributed

67 Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 146.
68 Lothian, "Seizing the Time," 193.
69 Lothian, 197.
70 Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 147.
71 Trometter, 148.
72 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 14.
73 McGuinness, "Report," 14.
74 "A History of the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service," Victorian Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation Inc., 11, 32, 44, https://www.vaccho.org.au/assets/01-RESOURCES/TOPIC-AREA/CORPORATE/A-HISTORY-OF-THE-VICTORIAN-ABORIGINAL-HEALTH-SERVICE.pdf [last access April 26, 2019].

to a growing awareness and knowledge about the US programmes and thus facilitated the establishment of similar programmes in Australia. The establishment of Aboriginal controlled community programmes was therefore one aspect that resulted out of Aboriginal activists' seeking of transnational connections with the US Black Power movement.

Arguably the biggest role that the US Black Power movement played for the Aboriginal delegates was however the idea of self-determination and of proudly identifying as being black or Aboriginal. Particularly the report of Corowa, who was the incoming president of the Aborigines Advancement League in Melbourne, highlights the importance of identity. Her report is full of examples that show how her encounter with the ideas of Black Power enabled her to connect with the people and home of her ancestors. Corowa's grandfather, John Corowa, came from the Pacific Island Tanna of what is today Vanuatu and he was traded at the age of ten to work as an indentured labourer in Queensland. He was therefore part of the Australian South Sea Islander community which descended from Pacific South Sea Islanders who were often forcefully taken to Queensland in the nineteenth century in the course of Queensland's indenture labour trade.[75] Patsy Corowa's encounter with the US Black Power movement and her participation in the Australian Indigenous activism of the 1960s made it possible for Corowa to identify with and feel part of the Tanna Indigenous community of her grandfather. After the US trip, she did not immediately return to Australia and took a detour to Tanna to visit the homeplace of her ancestors for the first time.[76] She recounted that she planned on going to Tanna once before, but that she ended up working in the secretary of the Aborigines Advancement League instead. Looking back at this time of her life, she believed that her experience of working with Australian Indigenous activists of this League was a necessary step for appreciating her own Indigenous background:[77]

> I realize now that that time would have been premature for me to return. I had too many changes to go through before I could go home and see through the eyes of a Tanna child, and appreciate what was happening to Tanna and my Brothers and sisters there and in other parts of the New Hebrides [today Vanuatu].[78]

"Until a short time ago," she indeed disregarded "traditional life styles of peoples, other than Europeans as primitive and inferior" and she was "striving,

75 Banivanua Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific*, 196.
76 Kruger, "A Year," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 32.
77 Kruger, "A Year," 35.
78 Kruger, "A Year," 35.

because it was the 'civilized' thing to do, to become European orientated."[79] These quotes indicate that her dealing with the Black Power movement in the Aborigines Advancement League prompted Corowa to reconsider her perception of Indigenous people and her own Indigenous identity. The Aborigines Advancement League, of which Corowa was part of, in fact discussed ideas of the Black Power movement prior to the US trip. Inspired by the idea of self-determination of the Black Power movement, the League passed a motion in September 1969 requiring all non-Aboriginal officeholders to resign and to fill the appointments with Aboriginal people. This motion was shortly afterwards replaced by a more moderate motion that required only the majority of officeholders to be Aboriginal.[80] The basic principle of self-determination that Aboriginal people should take their affairs into their own hands was nonetheless preserved and the whole debate reveals how Aboriginal activists took up the ideas of Black Power and considered their applicability for Australia.

The US trip of 1970 was in addition to her experience of the Aborigines Advancement League influential for Corowa's reconsideration of what it means to be Indigenous and black. Adopting the language of the Black Power movement, Corowa stated that it was only *after* this trip that "I recognised my duty, as a relevant sister in the struggle for liberation of black people wherever they are and whoever they are."[81] The direct encounter of the US Black Power movement enabled Corowa therefore to identify with her Indigenous ancestors who she previously would have dismissed as "primitive" and different. The ideology of the US Black Power movement empowered her to adopt a different perspective in which she could claim that "the moment I was in the New Hebrides was so emotionally fantastic. I felt that I was HOME."[82] The US Black Power ideology therefore helped Corowa to re-connect with the land of her grandfather.

Identity was also an important aspect of McGuinness' experience of the Congress of African People. The Black Power ideology propagated at the Congress allowed McGuinness to identify as being black and Aboriginal. To do so was not always straightforward for McGuinness because he often felt uneasy about the relatively lighter colour of his skin. During his childhood, his colour of skin played already a role as his siblings "with whiter skin called him 'nigger'."[83] Before the Congress, McGuinness was rather concerned with the opposite, his relative whiteness. When Brown visited Australia, McGuinness asked Brown whether "part-Aboriginals [would] be accepted into these Black Power Conferences," to which Brown gave him a positive answer.[84] This quote shows

79 Kruger, "A Year," 35.
80 Clark, *Aborigines & Activism*, 218-219.
81 Kruger, "A Year," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 31.
82 Kruger, "A Year," 31.
83 Reko Rennie-Gwaybilla, "The Dr. Bruce Mac Interview," available from http://www.kooriweb.org/bbm/reko.html, cited in: Trometter, 'The Fire in the Belly', 144 [the URL no longer functions].
84 Bruce McGuinness, "Exclusive Interview," *The Koorier* 1, no. 10 (November 1969): 5, cited in: Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 144.

what impact state colonial definitions of Aboriginality could have on Aboriginal people. As the 1961 Native Welfare Conference's definition of assimilation policy quoted earlier indicates, Australian settler-colonial officials were constantly preoccupied with racially categorising Aboriginal people into "full bloods", "half bloods", or "octoroons" in order to determine whether Indigenous people were eligible for welfare benefits. The most extreme example occurred in Western Australia where officials determined that some people were 1/128 Aboriginal.[85] Black Power gave McGuinness however a way of rejecting such colonial categories of Aboriginality.

Reiterating his doubts before the Congress, McGuinness reported that "[i]nitially, I felt out of place because of the fairness of my skin. However, the Brothers and Sisters soon showed me that I was like them and in the Black Bag, 'I was accepted'."[86] Particularly the visit to Harlem gave him a feeling of belonging. He described Harlem as a place "[w]here part Blacks are regarded as 'all Black'. Where there is no 'I'm Whiter than you' or 'I'm Blacker than you'. Where equality is reality."[87] In this quote McGuinness evidently referred to the quarrels around the colour of his skin which had plagued him since his childhood. And to be sure, in a later interview just before his death in 2003, he claimed that he was "hurt" and "left out of things and not being encouraged to take part in workshops [of the Congress of African People] because [he] was a bit fair skinned and straight haired."[88] These contradictory remarks perhaps show his ambivalent feelings towards the Congress. However, at least for a brief time, he seemed to have been inspired by the promises of the Black Power movement. To claim that so-called "half bloods" were just as Aboriginal or black was indeed a radical act which undermined Australia's assimilation policy and the attempt of the Australian government to divide Aboriginal people into different categories. As the historian Banivanua Mar put it, "[i]dentifying as Indigenous, like mobility, was becoming its own act of liberation."[89] She therefore considered this question of identity next to the means of travelling as one of the crucial aspects of the global Indigenous decolonisation movement.

The idea of self-determination and the rejection of imposed settler-colonial definitions of Aboriginality was of course nothing new and predates the emergence of the Black Power movement in the USA.[90] "Overseas influences" in the words of the historian Broom however "provided a new language, that of Black Power, and a newfound pride in their traditional culture. It gave a new way to frame their thinking about the world [and] a connectedness to other

85 Broome, *Aboriginal Australians*, 164-165.
86 McGuinness, "Report," in *Aborigines Visit the U.S.*, 8.
87 McGuiness, "Report," 15.
88 Rennie-Gwaybilla, "The Dr. Bruce Mac Interview," cited in: Trometter, *'The Fire in the Belly'*, 144-145.
89 Banivanua Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific*, 109.
90 Indigenous organisations and movements throughout the Pacific region, including Australia, defied caste and blood quanta discourses of settler-colonialists in the 1920s and 1930s. For this see Mar, *Decolonisation*, 103-113.

oppressed peoples [...]."[91] Despite these remarks, Broom overall believes that Aboriginal people sought change in the 1960s because of the "long-term and local Indigenous aspirations for community control" rather than the influence of Black Power.[92] It is certainly true that the Australian Indigenous activism of the 1960s was embedded in a longer history of resistance and protest. The situation of Aboriginal people and their history of invasion and dispossession was also different to the situation and history of African American people, as some of the expressions of disappointments of the five Aboriginal activists testify. But the analysis of the US trip demonstrates that it is important to not just consider and explain the radical Indigenous activism of the 1960s within a national framework and to stress the uniqueness of this activism, but to take transnational aspects of it into account as well. At least for the five Aboriginal delegates, the transnational encounter of the ideas and the people of the US Black Power movement was an important part in finding their own answers to the long-term struggle for Aboriginal rights. They drew positive and more often negative conclusions about the usefulness of the US trip. But regardless of whether the conclusions were positive or negative, the direct engagement with the US Black Power movement consolidated their beliefs and thus helped them to find an approach more appropriate to Australia. McGuinness, Maza, Corowa, Davis and Bellear all in their own way learned from their overseas experiences in the USA.

REINFORCING INDIGENOUS VOICES IN GLOBAL HISTORY

This article analysed these five Aboriginal peoples' transnational encounter with the US Black Power movement in order to make a second and broader argument that Global History approaches do not necessarily have to neglect Indigenous agency by privileging the study of mobile European elites or colonial agents. As mentioned above, Indigenous peoples do not generally speaking feature largely within Global History studies and when they do, they are mostly portrayed as victims of colonisers.[93] In order to not continue to marginalise Indigenous peoples, Global history must be done differently. This case study demonstrates that it is possible to write global histories which avoid this marginalisation by foregrounding the actions of the five Aboriginal activists. Far apart from being merely victims of the Australian governmental assimilation policy and of state surveillance, the five Australian Indigenous activists evaded

91 Broome, "The 1969 Aboriginal Takeover," 22.
92 Broome, "The 1969," 22.
93 Carey and Lydon, "Indigenous Networks," 1-2.

state control and met with other marginalised people from throughout the world to learn about new ways of addressing settler colonialism in Australia. The main actors of this transnational case study were not the government officials who monitored the delegates, but the Indigenous activists who were determining the course of action.

The existence of this transnational Indigenous history demonstrates that Global History approaches do not necessarily have to marginalise Indigenous peoples, but that they can be used to gain new insights into the histories of non-European peoples. European colonial agents were not the only ones who formed transnational networks. Marginalised peoples such as Indigenous peoples also crossed border and took advantage of new means of travelling. The five Aboriginal activists were not static but formed their own "minor transnationalism" or what Banivanua Mar called "counter-imperial and subaltern networks".[94] Global historians can therefore write histories that are beneficial for Indigenous peoples, but in order to achieve this, they need to put Indigenous peoples at the centre of their studies and must reject the assumption that Indigenous peoples were immobile and static.

CONCLUSION

This article analysed the specific case of five Aboriginal activists' encounters with the US-Black Power movement in 1970 in order to assess what role the US Black Power movement played for these activists. I demonstrated that the US trip served as a corrective for previously held beliefs about race relations in the USA. The trip gave the five Aboriginal participants the possibility to gain first-hand experiences of racial discrimination in the USA that differed from the depictions in the Australian media. It also enabled them to compare their situation in Australia with the situation of African American people in the USA. The lessons they drew from this comparison were often negative. I have however argued against the historian Piccini who, as a consequence of these negative assessments, jumps to the conclusion that the US trip shows the "limits of transnational politics". Even when the five activists assessed the usefulness of the US trip negatively and did not see the USA as a suitable example to follow, I argue that their encounter with the US Black Power movement sharpened their own positions concerning the Aboriginal rights struggle as they had to decide whether the tactics and philosophies were applicable to Australia. Some of them in fact implemented and adapted some tactics and philosophies of the US Black

94 Tracey Banivanua Mar, "Shadowing Imperial Networks: Indigenous Mobility and Australia's Pacific Past," *Australian Historical Studies* 46, no. 3 (2015), 340; see also Banivanua Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific*, 9-10.

Power movement to the Australian context, such as the National Black Theatre and the idea of self-determination and black pride. The latter idea enabled Corowa to reconnect with the people and home of her grandfather and allowed McGuinness to defy settler-colonial definitions of Aboriginality.

A closer look at the US trip of 1970 therefore reveals that national explanations of the Australian Black Power movement must be complemented by the transnational dimension of it. As Clark points out, "Australia's experience [of the global radical 1960s] must by definition be unique and cannot simply be extrapolated from what happened elsewhere." Our understanding of this experience will however "remain chronologically and culturally skewed" if we do not take transnational aspects such as the Indigenous movement's "direct links to events and developments overseas" into account.[95] The analysis of the US trip in 1970 showed that these direct links played an important role for at least the five Aboriginal activists. For them, this encounter was in fact a crucial learning process to develop their own answers to the Australian long-term issues of dispossession and colonisation, as it gave them a way of finding their voices vis-à-vis the older generation of Indigenous activists who campaigned for equal citizenship rights in the 1950s and 1960s. Our understanding of the Australian Black Power movement therefore indeed remains incomplete if historians consider this movement merely as an extension of earlier forms of Aboriginal resistance and the transnational connections only as a "catalyst for change", as Broome puts it. The Australian Black Power movement must also be considered on its own, transnational terms.

The second aim of this article was to argue against the notion that Global History approaches inevitably privilege the study of mobile Europeans over supposedly less mobile Indigenous peoples. This article has shown that the five Aboriginal activists were on the contrary highly mobile and transnational actors as they crossed borders, took advantage of new means of travelling and formed their own transnational networks which circumvented governmental policies and surveillance. Instead of focusing on European governmental officials, this article foregrounded transnational connections between marginalised groups. The existence of these transnational connections implies that Global History studies do not necessarily have to marginalise Indigenous peoples. Global History can in fact reinforce the voices of Indigenous people – but only if it is done differently.

95 Clark, *Aborigines & Activism*, 11-12.

Rethinking Pan-Islam under Colonial Rule in British India: Urdu Press 1911-14

by:
FATIMA AIZAZ

ABSTRACT

The study of pan-Islam in the context of British India is largely restricted to the Khilāfat Movement. It overlooks, or peripherally mentions, the process of the creation of a pan-Islamic discourse prior to the Khilāfat Movement, aided by technological advancements across the Muslim world from the late eighteenth century onwards. The onset of the printing press had a significant impact on the creation of this discourse since it informed the spread of Islam across a vast geographical area about the happenings in other Muslim-dominated lands. This paper explores the pan-Islamic discourse in the Urdu press between the years 1911 and 1914 and pays specific attention to three newspapers – Al-Hilāl, Hamdard, and Zamīndār. This discourse redefined the classical definition of pan-Islam, by incorporating into its fold the lived realities of colonial rule. Hence, its aim was twofold – fighting for the cause of the Ottoman Empire, and empowering Indian Muslims. In this sense, it was strongly grounded in the Indian context, while also constantly conversing with the broader political context of the Muslim world in the early twentieth century. I thus argue that this discourse relied upon a rather abstract idea of a Muslim millat, rather than on the existing, and much more concrete idea of ittihād.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

All non-English common nouns have been italicized and transliterated according to the standard IJMES transliteration system for Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Arabic and Persian proper nouns for people, and books have also been transliterated, as in Abul Kalām Āzād. In the case of Arabic and Persian proper nouns for places, the standard spelling has been maintained, for example, Aligarh. However, proper nouns for places have been transliterated when they were part of a book title, as in *Kānpūr kā Dardnāk Naẕārah*. In order to maintain the phonetics, Arabic words used in Persian or Urdu script have been transliterated using the IJMES system for Persian transliteration, as in *qabża*. Spellings in titles of books have been retained, except when the books were in Urdu, in which case the titles were transliterated, as in *Maulānā Ẓafar ʻAlī Khān: Aḥvāl va Āsār*. Since the IJMES transliteration system does not contain transliteration method for Urdu, the Library of Congress system of transliteration was used to transliterate only those Urdu letters which are absent from Arabic and Persian, namely ٹ, ڈ, ڑ, ژ and ے.

INTRODUCTION

The classical conception of pan-Islam was rooted in the territorial contiguity of Muslim lands.[1] The idea that all Muslim majority lands, the Balkans-to-Bengal complex[2] as Shahab Ahmed refers to it, should be amalgamated into a unified geographical unit, ruled and governed by the Muslims themselves, lies at the heart of the pan-Islamic ideology in the nineteenth century. This identity gained further ground with technological advancements in the Islamicate world in the nineteenth century, such as the advent of the printing press, the laying of the underwater telegraph cable, and the construction of the Ḥijāz Railway Project. Due to these advancements, news traveled across the Islamicate[3] world at a much faster pace, keeping Islam's spread across the world informed of the happenings in other Muslim inhabited lands.

Spread by colonial elites in the Islamicate world, the idea of nationalism also gained influence. Consequently, around the turn of the twentieth century,

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1 Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal Of Modern History* 41, no. 1 (1969): 18.
2 The temporal-geographical area extending from Balkans through Anatolia, Iran, and Central Asia, down and across Afghanistan and North India to the Bay of Bengal. See Shahab Ahmed, *What is Islam?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 32.
3 The phrase Islamicate world refers to the geographical area stretching from modern-day Turkey to South Asia in the West.

we see a shift arising in the way pan-Islam was envisioned by certain Muslim thinkers. While some attempted to reconcile these apparently contradictory ideologies, others attempted to discredit any potential relationship between the two ideologies. As a result, a new hybrid form of pan-Islam emerged, which relied on the abstract idea of *ukhūwwat* (brotherhood) rather than on a much more concrete idea of *ittiḥād e Islām* (Islamic unity), and this hybrid form was informed by anti-colonial rhetoric.

The enmeshing of anti-colonialism with a feeling of solidarity with Muslims across the world presents a complicated phenomenon – one that evades any rigid definition of pan-Islam. This rhetoric presupposed a distinction between *ḥaqq* (Truth) and *bāṭil* (Falsehood), whereby the colonial west represented the latter; simultaneously, the narrative of the crusades was also evoked when reporting about wars between Ottomans and the Christian West. In this sense, religious sentiment was used to advance an anti-colonial narrative. Moreover, changes in responses to colonial rule can also be observed. These changes can be interpreted as responses to the particular events going on at the time, such as the Italian invasion of Tripoli, the Balkan Wars, and the Kanpur Mosque incident.

Through a textual analysis of three newspapers – *Al-Hilāl*, *Hamdard*, and *Zamīndār* – this essay explores the role of Urdu newspapers in constructing such a discourse on pan-Islam. I argue that the editors of these newspapers carved out a discourse that reshaped the definition of pan-Islam in the context of colonial India. It encompassed the realities and consequences of colonial rule. It thus morphed into a more dynamic, and fluid definition that surpassed the rigid idea of pan-Islam in the classical period. These editors were thus relying on an abstract idea of *ukhūwwat* (brotherhood), rather than on a much more concrete idea of *ittihād e Islāmī* (Islamic unity). This conception of pan-Islam allowed them to take into account the conditions of the Indian Muslims,[4] and take steps to alleviate their oppressed state. Hence, it also helped in carving out a political identity for these Muslims.

Al-Hilāl was published in Calcutta between the years 1912 and 1914. It was edited by Maulānā Abul Kalām Āzād, a prominent and regular name in Muslim politics at the time. The weekly newspaper contained not just news, but also opinion pieces and regular series, such as the series on Islamic history, and the series on *Nadwat ul 'Ulamā*.[5] In this sense, it served more like a magazine or a periodical than a conventional newspaper. Maulānā Muḥammad 'Alī Jauhar

4 The category Indian Muslims is far from being a monolith. Other than religion, it has varying layers of caste, class, ethnicity, and race. However, the limited scope of the research and the availability of documents hindered the unpacking of this term. Due to the reach of the newspapers to mainly the provinces of Punjab and UP, I have considered the category of Indian Muslims to be synonymous with North Indian Muslims.

5 *Nadwat ul 'Ulamā* was an association of religious scholars founded in 1894 in Kanpur. The main aim of this association was to bring about educational reforms. For this purpose, a *Dār ul 'Ulūm* (educational institute) was founded at Lucknow in 1898.

began publishing *Hamdard* in 1913. This was the Urdu counterpart of *The Comrade*, which was begun in 1911 in Delhi. This was done in order to reach a larger audience since *The Comrade* could only be read by a small section of the Muslim population – the English literate elite. The newspaper was a two-page daily that started as a newsletter about the Balkan Wars. However, in just a year's time, it had been expanded to four pages and had begun to include opinion pieces along with the news. *Zamīndār* was published from Lahore from 1911 onwards, with Maulānā Ẓafar 'Alī Khān at its helm. This was also a daily, spanning five pages in length.

The first section of this paper explores the existing scholarly understandings of pan-Islam and then attempts to problematize these definitions by elaborating on the difference between *ittiḥād* (unity) and *millat* (brotherhood). The second section attempts to historicize pan-Islam in the Indian context through analyzing the impact of technological advancements, particularly the printing press on religious identity in South Asia. The third section attempts to locate the pan-Islamic discourse in early twentieth-century North India through analyzing the differences in the editors' responses to colonial rule. The fourth and final section analyzes how a particular incident became the site around which centered this discourse of *millat*. This incident played a pivotal role in carving the pan-Islamic discourse in the three newspapers. It became the site around which centered not just Indian Muslim agitation against colonial oppression, but also their attachment and support for the rest of the Muslim world. The theme of land was crucial in establishing this symbol.

ITTIḤĀD, MILLAT AND PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS OF PAN-ISLAM

Jacob Landau argues in his book, *Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, that the pan-Islamic ideology and movements have had one or all of the following premises for the achievement of unity and union within the Islamic world: the need for a strong central authority to lead the Islamic world, rallying of the entire Muslim world to the cause, obedience of Muslims everywhere to the leader, total solidarity for the cause, readiness for common action and, the establishment of a state.[6] However, such definitions tend to limit the scope of pan-Islam to simply a transnational project dissociated from the social and political context of local territories. There is a need to redefine and rethink the idea of pan-Islam, particularly in the twentieth century. With the

6 Jacob Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 5.

advent of colonialism, and subsequently nation-states, the realization of a political unity became merely an aspiration and an ideal state. With numerous localized problems, it did not make sense for Indian Muslims to rally for the cause of a foreign power. In the following pages, I problematize this rigid definition of pan-Islam and argued for a reconsideration of its implications.

The discourse generated in pre-WWI British India reflects that while attempting to connect with Muslims outside India, Muslim thinkers were also addressing problems at home. The local, colonial context and the aim of empowering Indian Muslims were as important as building a connection with the wider Islamicate world. Hence, they built a network which surpassed borders and simultaneously was rooted in its Indian context. Due to limitations of research, I have focused more on the latter part of this argument and zoom in on the years between 1911 and 1914 due to two reasons: the Urdu press experienced a surge during this period, and these years set the foundation for the forthcoming Khilāfat Movement. This paper will thus be focusing on exploring and analyzing this network within North India[7] and Bengal, the two Muslim majority areas in British India where the three newspaper sources were published.[8] The region of North India is particularly important because it had always served as the seat of power, and consequently was the hub of the Muslim intellectual elite. The centers of knowledge production such as the Deoband seminary, *Nadwat ul 'Ulamā*, and Aligarh Muslim University were situated here. This meant that scholars from across the Islamic world visited this place because of its status as a political and intellectual center of India.

I argue that, in doing so, these Indian Muslims were relying on an idea of *millat* rather than *ittiḥād*. Some terms which have been widely used by thinkers in the Muslim world, and commonly translated as pan-Islam, are *al waḥda al Islāmīyyah, Ittiḥād e Islāmī* and *Ittiḥād al-Muslimīn*. The important words in these terms are *waḥda* and *ittiḥād*, both of which are derived from the same Arabic root, *waḥada*, meaning unity.[9] It remained and still remains an open question whether this unity is social or political. Despite these debates, it remains a much more concrete term than *millat* or *ukhūwwat*. The former denotes a community of any religion, while the latter refers to a sentiment of brotherhood.[10] Due to its vague nature, the term *millat* allows for a more inclusive approach. While allowing

7 This term broadly refers to the United Provinces and Punjab.
8 Focusing on two areas does not discount the fact that Indian Muslims present in Istanbul, London, Bombay, Delhi, Lucknow, and Calcutta, among other cities, had set up local organizations which rallied for the cause of the Ottoman Empire, but also attempted to represent and alleviate the problems of the Indian Muslims. Probably the most prominent people in this regard were Sayyid Amir Ali, an Indian lawyer settled in Britain; Mushir Ḥusain Kidwa'i, a London-based newspaper editor who also financed the Anglo-Ottoman Society; and Khwāja Kamāluddīn, an Ahmedi Muslim who set up the Woking Muslim Mission in Woking, London. See Khizar Humayun Ansari, "Making Transnational Connections: Muslim Networks in Early 20th Century Britain," in *Islam in Inter-War Europe* (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), 31-63.
9 *Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: 3rd Edition* (New York: Spoken Language Services, 1976), 1054.
10 *Feroz ul Lughāt: 27th Edition* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 2011), 650.

greater coherence to the discourse of a transnational community of Muslims – the *Ummah* – it is not distanced from the local context. On the contrary, the implication of unity and oneness in the term *ittiḥād* lends ambiguity to the political motives at play.

The discussion on merely the meaning of the term pan-Islam is laden with numerous interpretations. The Ottoman Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II (1842-1918; r. 1876-1909) is usually credited with spearheading the pan-Islamic project.[11] Contrary to his ancestors, he inherited a much weaker empire which was simultaneously experiencing internal turmoil and invasions from European powers. While the Ottomans were in combat with the Russians on the eastern side of the border, the French were planning their conquest of Tunisia. The British had already occupied Egypt in 1882. Meanwhile, the empire was still reeling from the internal strife that had engulfed parts of the empire during the 1850s and 1860s, the most notably the civil war in modern-day Lebanon. The eastern part of the empire had also erupted in a rebellion which was crushed by violent means, resulting in events like the atrocities in Armenia and Macedonia. Hence, the empire was in a fragile state when 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ascended to the throne. It was only natural that he sought to gain legitimacy from his subjects and from the rest of the Muslim world and to somehow establish his power and secure his empire from disintegration. Landau and Browne argue that one way to do this was to further the idea of Islamic unity, with the Ottoman Sultan as the figurehead of the Muslim world.[12] Once it was established upon the European powers that the Sultan wielded influence over all Muslims – even those living within the European colonies – the Sultan could limit the threat of invasions.

It can be argued that pan-Islam was nothing more than a political tool for 'Abd al-Ḥamīd to ensure the sustenance of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The fact that pan-Islam as an ideology gained popularity only in non-Ottoman territories serves to illustrate the political and realist motives behind the propagation of this ideology.[13] 'Abd al-Ḥamīd used pan-Islam to further his pan-Ottoman objectives.[14] By securing loyalty from his subjects in the name of Islam, he tried to establish Ottoman supremacy again. Loyalty to the Ottoman sultan became synonymous with loyalty to the religion of Islam. Hence, he attempted to assume the title of *Khalīfah*, replacing the age-old title of Sultan, which was used by his ancestors. This change in title was a clear attempt at gaining legitimacy from the wider Muslim world.

It can further be argued that Hamidian pan-Islamism also had realist underpinnings. The Ottoman treasury was almost empty, and it was becoming increasingly expensive to maintain such a large empire, let alone invest heavily

11 Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 10.
12 Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam,* 23.
13 Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 69.
14 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "'Abd al-Ḥamīd'," *Princeton Encyclopedia*, 10.

in the army to ensure the protection of the empire's borders.[15] With consecutive wars and internal turmoil, the increased burden had been placed on the Ottoman army. The most immediate answer to this financial problem was to seek help from within and without the empire. Since the Sultan had a policy of detachment from the Great Powers,[16] it seemed most plausible to reach out to Ottoman sympathizers in and outside the empire. Consequently, donations poured in from not just within the empire, but also from other parts of the Muslim world. As early as the Russo-Turkish War, Indian Muslims were donating large sums of money to the Ottoman Empire; over one million Indian rupees were collected by different organizations in India.[17]

With Istanbul as the center, vigorous pan-Islamic propaganda began, strongly supported by the printing press.[18] The boom in the number of printing presses, during the reign of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, reflects the importance of the printing press in the dissemination of this ideology. Intellectuals – most notably Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī – aided 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's aims. They contributed regularly to the numerous periodicals and churned out pan-Islamic content in large numbers. This was further aided by the developments in communications and technology. Despite restricted funds, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd invested heavily in infrastructure. As a consequence, telegraph lines were laid connecting the provinces to the Ottoman center, numerous printing presses were set up, and the Ḥijāz Railway Project begun. Nevertheless, a number of periodicals and pamphlets were published from Istanbul and distributed across the empire.[19] They were evenly distributed among the pilgrims visiting Mecca for Hajj. Through this, it was ensured that the message reached all quarters of the Muslim world. It must be noted, however, that this was the need of the hour. The Ottoman Empire, which had posed a threat to the British and French empires for three centuries, was now struggling to maintain its territorial integrity. At such a moment, it seemed only pertinent that the Sultan attempted to find common ground among Muslims from diverse cultures and countries.

Having said this, the definitions of the term have been restrictive in nature, and have excluded local colonial contexts. There is a need to reconsider pan-Islam in the twentieth century, in which the empowerment of local Muslims was a pivotal aspect, thus also carving out an identity for them. On the whole, its aims can be categorized into two broad categories – fighting for the cause of the Ottoman Empire, and empowering and liberating the Muslims of India and the rest of the world.

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15 Şükrü Hanioğlu, "'Abd al-Ḥamīd'," 10.
16 The term Great Powers was used to refer to the seven major powers of the world at the time. These included the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy.
17 Michael Christopher Low, "Empire and the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance, 1865–1908", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 02 (2008): 279.
18 Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 68.
19 Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 68.

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS, THE ONSET OF PRINT AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

By the end of the nineteenth century, Ottoman power was visibly declining, and the British and French were making inroads into the once stronghold of the Ottomans. The Europeans brought with them Enlightenment ideals and a coherent communications network. Michael Feener argues in his article, *New Networks and New Knowledge*, that the technological advancements of the nineteenth century allowed for the development of transnational connections and a more rapid exchange of ideas.[20] The development of the mass-producing printing press, steamship, railroads and the underwater telegraph cable in India, connected the region to other parts of the world, most notably the Ottoman Empire. Though the printing press had existed in Ottoman territories prior to the nineteenth century, they were owned by Jews and Christians.[21] It was only around 1850 that there was a boom in the number of Muslim owned printing presses in the Ottoman Empire.[22] This rapid increase meant that books, newspapers, and magazines were being produced in large quantities.

This was complemented by the development of an underwater telegraph cable connecting Britain with its Eastern colonies. Consequently, the traveling time of news from one end of the empire to the other was significantly reduced. This facilitated more rapid dissemination of the news from one end to the other. Hence, Muslims in India became more connected with the rest of the world and the Islamic world because they knew of the events occurring in these places.

Finally, the development of steamship and railroads significantly reduced the traveling time and made travel easier. The Ḥijāz Railway Project in the late-nineteenth century particularly connected Muslims from different geographical regions. The extension of these means of transportation to Muslim territories meant that Muslims were increasingly traveling to other parts of the world and interacting with other people. Moreover, with the steamship and the Ḥijāz Railway, traveling to Ottoman territories and to the Holy Cities became much easier for Muslims.

Consequently, there was a flow and exchange of ideas and people across the Muslim world. This flow was extremely important because it aided the creation of a transnational network of Muslim scholars and intellectuals across borders. This network visibly transcended territorial borders. As a result, there was not just a movement of people, but also of knowledge, and–more

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20 Michael Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, Communications and the Refiguration of the Muslim Community in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries," in *The New Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 6*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 41.
21 Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge," 44.
22 Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge," 45.

specifically–of the printed word. The colonial masters, hence, formed a crucial bridge between Muslims in different territories. Universities and educational institutes in the European and the Ottoman territories played an integral part in the flow of ideas. With colonization, increasing numbers of people from India were traveling to Britain to study in universities like Cambridge and Oxford, where they interacted with people from diverse regions. Similarly, Muslims from across the Islamic world traveled to centers of Islamic learning, most notably Egypt, Baghdad, and Qom. The editors of the newspapers under analysis were also alumni of these institutes. While 'Alī was educated at Oxford, Āzād was a graduate of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. This phenomenon was particularly true for Āzād since he was born and raised in Mecca and frequently traveled to other areas in the Islamic world. It can thus be argued that these technological developments imported by the British allowed for a more rapid and easy movement of ideas and people through the development of advanced communication technologies. This resulted in an exchange of ideas, people, texts – all of which can be grouped into the category of knowledge.

In the Islamic world, there had always been knowledge networks, but they were based more on oral transmission than written.[23] The printing press resulted in mass production of the written word. This, coupled with the laying of the underwater telegraph cable, gave birth to a rapid rise in newspapers, which were printed in large quantities and transported to other parts of the world. Thus, newspapers and magazines published in the Ottoman Empire and Britain were sent to India, and vice versa.

Francis Robinson, in his essay *Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print*, discusses the way print impacted religious change in the subcontinent. He argues that North India, in particular, the United Provinces (UP), became the site of the print revolution.[24] By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 69 Urdu newspapers in UP with a circulation of more than 23,000.[25] The number of newspapers had almost doubled within the first decade of the century with circulation numbers reaching more than 75,000.[26] These figures serve to augment Robinson's argument that the mass printing of Urdu newspapers and periodicals resulted in transforming the ways Muslims conceptualized themselves. This is partly because they were now more aware of happenings in other parts of the Islamic world, particularly the Ottoman Empire. This news was disseminated through numerous newspapers and periodicals published during this period.

The news of the Crimean War, the Balkan Wars, the Italian invasion of

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23 Francis Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print," *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 01 (1993): 234-235.
24 Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change," 233.
25 Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 78.
26 Robinson, *Separatism among...*, 78.

Libya, and other important events in the Ottoman history, reached India within a day. This was a marked rise in the pace at which news traveled previously. Moreover, the postal system also allowed the circulation of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals beyond borders. All this resulted in new imaginings of being Muslim. Robinson argues that one of these changes was a "broadening Islamic vision to embrace a large part of the Muslim community in the world at large."[27] 1857 had marked a disjuncture in the way Muslims thought of themselves. In the absence of the Mughal[28] emperor, who was the symbol of Muslim grandeur, there was a need to trace legitimacy from another source which symbolized Muslim power. In the early part of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire emerged as the site in which rested Muslim power. This was more so because it had been losing its territories to the more powerful European empires. Italy conquered Libya in 1911, the French conquered Morocco in the same year, Eastern Europe was lost in the Balkan Wars of 1911-1914 and, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia had already been conquered by the British and French respectively in the 1880s. Hence, there was an increased disillusionment with the European colonial powers and the feeling that the West was "encroach[ing]" upon Muslim lands, was a shared one.[29] As a result, there was a rise in the pan-Islamic sentiment which is evident by the boom of newspapers, periodicals, magazines, and societies producing pan-Islamic content.

Hence, I take Robinson's argument forward by situating it in the specific socio-political and historical context of early-twentieth-century India. He only briefly touches upon the subject of print facilitating the spread of pan-Islamic ideas. Through a textual analysis of three of the most popular Urdu newspapers, this is evaluated in greater detail and depth in this paper. The next section attempts to locate the development of this hybrid pan-Islam in the three newspapers identified above. The following analysis of these newspapers explores how each of the three editors opposed colonial rule in a different manner, yet ensured that they relied on happenings across the Muslim world and connected the plight of Muslims across the world with the plight of Muslims in India. In this sense, they were also attempting to rouse the Indian Muslims to speak up against the injustice of colonial rule.

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27 Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change," 243.
28, The Mughal Empire was founded by Ẓahīr al-Dīn Bābur in 1526, with the victory of the Battle of Panipat. Bābur was a matrilineal descendant of the Mongol Chingiz Khān. At its height, the empire encompassed most of the areas that come under the modern-day states of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The Empire continued to exist until 1857, after which the British colonial rule took over the whole Indian subcontinent. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 366-367; Taymiya R. Zaman, "Mughals (1526-1857)," *Princeton Encyclopedia*.
29 Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change," 243.

DIFFERENT RESPONSES TO COLONIAL RULE

There are differences among the editors' perceptions of colonial rule. While *Zamīndār* and *Hamdard* gradually began expressing anti-colonial sentiments, *Al-Hilāl* was vehemently anti-colonial from the beginning. A contributing factor to this may be the editors' backgrounds; Ẓafar and 'Alī were Aligarh students, while Āzād was a revolutionary who had engaged in revolutionary activity in Calcutta.[30] Despite their differences, each of them indulged in some anti-colonial rhetoric which gained in strength. As the Ottoman Empire experienced more invasions and subsequent loss of territories to European colonial powers, the anti-British sentiment in India increased. The British, in particular, were blamed for two actions – inaction at the fate being meted out to Turkey, and oppressive attitude against Indian Muslims. While the former was channeled through reporting of the Italian invasion of Tripoli, the Balkan Wars and the Russian invasion of Mashhad, the latter was channeled through the reporting on Kanpur Mosque incident.

The Aligarh background seems to inform the narrative of both Ẓafar and 'Alī. Ẓafar particularly seems to have a more lenient stance towards the British. The title page of *Zamīndār* (Figure 1) is representative of this thought. Underneath an image of the British crown is a verse calling for faithfulness towards the British government.[31] Even while criticizing British policies and actions, his tone remains imploring compared to Āzād's excoriating tone. On the occasion of the Russian attack on Mashhad in Iran, Ẓafar literally beseeched the government to take action against the Russian atrocities.[32] He pleaded to his *meherbān* (merciful) and *inṣāf pasand* (just) government to consider the feelings of its Muslim subjects and intervene on their behalf.[33]

Though the choice of words, on the surface, seems to be sycophantic, resentment towards the British and the colonizers, can be sensed. By comparing the Russian attack on Mashhad to the Karbalā incident,[34] Ẓafar was clearly establishing that the Russians were *bāṭil* (Falsehood), while Muslims were *ḥaqq*

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30 Rajat Ray, "Revolutionaries, Pan-Islamists, and Bolsheviks: Maulānā Abul Kalam Azad and the Political Underworld in Calcutta, 1905-1925," 105. In Mushirul Hasan ed. *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1985).

31 *Tum khair khwāh daulat e bartāniah raho*
Samjheṇ janāb qaiṣar e hind apnā jāṇ niṯār
Remain a well-wisher of the British Empire
The monarch must think of you as loyal

32 See *Zamīndār*, 12 July 1912.

33 *Zamīndār*, 12 July 1912

34 The Battle of Karbala (680 A.D) was fought between Hussayn (grandson of Prophet Muhammad), and Mu'awiya (caliph of the time). In Islamic tradition, the battle is remembered for the sacrifice of Hussayn and his followers for the Truth. This battle has become the symbol of the opposition between *ḥaqq* (Truth) and *bāṭil* (Falsehood). It is further seen as the prototype of resistance to oppression and political injustice. See Phil Dorrol, "Holy Places", *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 221-222; Rainer Brunner, "Karbala," *Princeton Encyclopedia*, 293.

(Truth).[35] Moreover, this was not just a war of territory, but also of ideology and morality. The use of the word *inṣāf pasand* (just) suggests that there was some violation of *inṣāf* (justice). It was only because they felt that the British would not live up to their promise of upholding justice, that they emphasized their demands through the invocation of the word *inṣāf pasand*.

The idea of the British as the maintainers of peace in the world is represented in a cartoon strip published in *Zamīndār* (Figure 2). With the caption "*uṭh aye Bartānvī shér amn ke qā'im karāné ko*" (Rise, O British lion, to install peace), the cartoon portrays a lion fast asleep. In the background is a depiction of the war between Italy and Turkey. While the Muslim World is blowing a trumpet in the lion's ears, the Muslim League is tugging at its tail. Despite this, the lion refuses to wake up. The text below the image translates as follows:

> Muslim World: O lion! Why are you dozing off? Get up!
> Stop this bloodshed! Install peace!
> British (to itself): They think that I am dozing off, but I am just ignoring. Some blow the trumpet, some tug at my tail, but I will not open my eyes until the time is suitable. That suitable time is very near.

The image and the text below reflect the feelings of resentment toward the British. While portraying them as maintainers of peace in the world, and in effect implying them as rulers of the world, this image also suggests that the British are deliberately letting the conflict of Italy and Turkey continue. The text below the image explicitly states that the British lion is not "dozing"; instead, it is deliberately turning its eyes away from the conflict until it deems the time is suitable for intervention. It is suggested that the involvement of another Christian power in this conflict is hampering the British to intervene on behalf of the Muslims.

As opposed to Āzād, who was critical of the Muslim League, Ẓafar seems to be in favor of it. In the cartoon, the Muslim League is representative of Indian Muslims. As opposed to Āzād's critical tone, Ẓafar's tone hints of disappointment. The repeated publishing of the verse calling for loyalty, and the mention of British as maintainers of peace, reflect that he expected the British to meet the Muslim demands. This could be because along with being an Aligarh alumnus, Ẓafar was also a founding member of the Muslim League. The objectives of both organizations were to forward feelings of loyalty toward their rulers – the British.

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35 The distinction between *ḥaqq* (Truth) and *bāṭil* (Falsehood) holds a central position in Islamic discourse. The debate on the connotations of the two words has assumed an important position in Islamic political theory. One of these connotations is that *ḥaqq* is Islam, while *bāṭil* is any other religion. Another implication of *bāṭil* is injustice while raising voice against that is considered *ḥaqq*.

However, at the British's repeated failure of living up to these expectations, he seemed to be disappointed. Consequently, by 1921, the newspaper had completely abandoned any pro-British expressions it previously had.

Muḥammad 'Alī adopted a slightly different tone in *Hamdard*. Compared to Ẓafar, 'Alī was diplomatic and tried to reason out his request. Since Muslims constituted a significant proportion of the population in the British Empire, any British action that hurt the sentiments of these Muslims, was bound to have a detrimental impact on the security situation in India.[36] Hence, it was only reasonable for the British to consider Indian Muslim sentiments while conducting diplomatic relations with both the Ottoman Empire and other empires containing Muslim subjects.[37] In this sense, 'Alī was also navigating in a pan-Islamic narrative. However, he also understood that simply considering Muslim sentiments was not possible in diplomatic relations which are much more complex. He did not expect, nor demand, the British government to maintain cordial relations with other governments even if they were detrimental to the British crown.[38] Rather, he only demanded the British to lend an ear to the concerns raised by Indian Muslims as they had listened to the concerns of the people in Britain. 'Alī was, therefore, trying to negotiate some degree of political standing for the Muslims. As long as the British remained the protectors of Muslims, it was a moral and legal duty of Indian Muslims to remain faithful to the British crown.[39]

Āzād, on the contrary, openly criticized the British government and its policies, both in India and abroad. During the Balkan Wars and the Italian invasion of Tripoli, *Al-Hilāl* consistently maintained a critical tone for the British because of their inaction towards the situation. The revolutionary climate in Calcutta may have contributed significantly to Āzād's bold and unfazed expression of discontent with colonial rule and its policies. He criticized the Aligarh school because of their inactive approach towards these issues. Though a proponent of the Aligarh University and the Muslim University for which 'Alī was collecting funds at the time, he felt that a much more active approach was needed when dealing with British policies. By themselves, social acts–such as setting up a university–could not fulfill the task of securing rights for Muslims and securing Ottoman claims over the lands threatened by colonial advances.[40] More active acts, such as "agitation",[41] were needed if the British were to be opposed. For Āzād, the protests against the demolition of a portion of the Kanpur Mosque epitomized the protest tradition in India, and set a precedent for future protests and dissent.[42]

Even among these editors, there were differences in responses to

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36 See *Hamdard*, 14 March 1913.
37 See *Hamdard*, 14 March 1913.
38 *Hamdard*, 14 March 1913.
39 *Hamdard*, 14 March 1913.
40 Speech delivered at a session of *Ittihād e Islāmī* in Calcutta, on 24 October 1914. Comp. *Khuṭbāt e Azad* (Lahore: Zahid Bashir Printers, no date), 27-29.
41 See *Al-Hilāl*, 5 November 1913.
42 See *Al-Hilāl*, 5 November 1913.

colonial rule. While Ẓafar had a pleading attitude towards the British, 'Alī was significantly more diplomatic. Āzād was the most outspoken in his criticism. These differences were reflected in the newspapers they published. These differences can be attributed to the backgrounds of these authors – while Ẓafar and 'Alī had traces of their Aligarh training, Āzād demonstrated his experience with revolutionaries and secret societies in Calcutta. Nevertheless, all three of them engaged in some degree of opposition to British policies and actions. Their response to the demolition of a portion of a mosque in Kanpur reflects the different way(s) in which each editor engaged in opposition to British colonial rule, and simultaneously also attempted to fight for the cause of the Muslims. For these editors, this incident manifested British injustice. By virtue of this, the Kanpur Mosque incident became the thread that connected Muslims across the world because all of them appeared to be experiencing injustice at the hands of European colonial powers. The next section explores and analyzes this incident in greater depth.

KANPUR MOSQUE INCIDENT

The Kanpur Mosque incident became an important event around which Indian Muslim agitation was centered in the years immediately preceding the First World War. The newspapers under question also capitalized on this event and sketched their anti-colonial stance in relation to the Kanpur Mosque incident. This also served to sharpen the distinction between *ḥaqq* (Truth) and *bāṭil* (Falsehood) in the context of India, whereby the British were explicitly declared *bāṭil*, against whom *jihād* (Holy War) became incumbent.

The incident began with the demolition of a portion of a mosque situated in Machli Bazar in Kanpur. Specifically, the courtyard of the mosque was demolished in order to widen the adjacent road. It must be noted, however, that previous plans for the realignment of the road, dating back to 1908, had also included the demolition of two temples in the area. Moreover, the *mutawallīs*[43] of the mosque had appeared before the Land Acquisition officer, where formal documentation made the acquisition of the courtyard legal. The demolition was not carried out immediately but announced later in 1912 by Sir James Meston, the Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces (UP). Following this announcement, numerous Muslim scholars issued *fatwas* declaring the courtyard to be a part of

43 Manager or custodian of *waqf* property (charitable endowment). The *mutawallī* is chosen by the founder of the *waqf* and is responsible for the administration of *waqf* property in the best interest of beneficiaries. The *mutawalli*'s first duty is the preservation of property, then maximization of revenues for beneficiaries. See The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Accessed online at http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1666)

the mosque, and hence a sacred and inviolable space.[44]

The British government, nevertheless, continued with the plan. It was argued that the courtyard contained the ablution space of the mosque, and was therefore not a part of the mosque proper. Hence, the removal was justified. Following the demolition, protests were organized in the city. On August 3, 1913, a mass protest took place in the city's ʿīdgāh,[45] after which the protestors marched towards the mosque and began to rebuild the desecrated portion. In order to disperse the group, the police opened fire, resulting in the death of 20-30 people.[46] However, the government was criticized for understating the casualties. Āzād, in particular, was very critical of the government and argued that it was impossible that so few casualties occurred when the police had fired rounds of ammunition consecutively for ten minutes.[47]

As they reported on these events, the newspapers constructed an anti-colonial narrative centered on the Kanpur Mosque Incident. Āzād called for *jihād* (Holy War), while ʻAlī engaged in active politics through representing Kanpur Muslims in front of the British government in London. Ẓafar criticized the British in a harsh tone. The Muslim League also passed resolutions condemning the act but requested that the editors assist in restoring calm among the Muslims.[48] This may be the reason why ʻAlī refrained from publishing anything in the newspaper until July when it was made clear to him that the mosque would be demolished. The three newspapers led the agitation and were considered trouble mongers by the British.[49] Consequently, all three of them were forced to forfeit their securities and cease publication. After orders for Ẓafar's imprisonment were released, he fled to London.[50]

LAND

The reference to land is pervasive in the narrative developed around the Kanpur Mosque incident. Āzād persistently used the word *zamīn* (land) when discussing the conflict. He describes the conflict as a case of forceful capture of

44 Spencer Lavan, "The Kanpur Mosque Incident of 1913: The North Indian Muslim Press and Its Reaction to Community Crisis," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 42, no. 2 (1974): 274.
45 A congregation place to perform biannual Eid prayers.
46 Sir James Meston to the Private Secretary of the Viceroy, 3 August 1913. Cf. Lavan, "Kanpur Mosque Incident," 263.
47 Abul Kalam Azad, *Kānpūr kā Dardnāk Nazārah* in Abul Kalam Azad, *Mażāmīn e Azad* (Lahore: Book Talk, 2008), 50.
48 Minutes of the meeting of Punjab Muslim League Executive Committee held on 8 October 1913. Published in the *Civil and Military Gazette*. Cf. Lavan, "Kanpur Mosque Incident", 277.
49 Lavan, "The Kanpur Mosque Incident," 275.
50 Nazir Husain Zaidi, *Maulānā Ẓafar ʻAlī Khān: Aḥvāl va Āṯār* (Lahore: Majlis e Taraqqi e Adab, 1986), 105.

the land which belonged to Muslims.[51] The British had forcefully seized (*qabża*) the land that was the property (*milkīyat*) of the Muslims. The choice of these words is particularly noteworthy. The simultaneous use of both words has legal ramifications since there is a connotation of ownership and property. While the violation of this property becomes a crime at the hands of the British government, it also reflects that this mosque was seen as Muslim property much like the Ottoman Empire was seen as Muslim property.

In this instance, the Kanpur Mosque became a metaphor for Muslim land. It became the space that represented Muslim land in British India, and the demolition of a portion of that space came to represent the encroachment on Muslim land at the hands of the colonial powers. Āzād uses the words *zamīn* (land) and *takht* (throne) for both the Muslim empires and for the mosque.[52] While the mosque represents the *takht* of God's power, the Muslim lands represent the *takht* of government. Hence, in this instance, the mosque came to represent the spiritual power of the Muslims, and the Ottoman lands came to represent the temporal power of the Muslims. Both needed to be protected from foreign invasions. However, as Āzād argues, failing to protect spiritual power was a graver concern than failing to protect temporal power.[53] A similar narrative was also evident in the reporting of the Italian invasion of Tripoli. The association of the words *ḍākū* (robber) and *qābiż* (occupier) with Italy, again signified the violation of land that was considered Muslim property.

This incident and the response towards it presents a highly interesting phenomenon. It is indicative of the disjuncture from classical pan-Islam, and its mutation into a more hybrid pan-Islam, whereby a local incident of injustice at the hands of colonial power was used to connect Muslims elsewhere suffering the same dilemma. It was thus a means to vie for some political agency for Muslims in India while staying rooted to the cause of Muslims across the world–particularly those in colonial territories. The newspapers used this incident to rally and organize anti-colonial protests, but they also used the mosque as a site that represented Muslim land and, indirectly, power. Moreover, they used the incident to connect themselves to Muslims in other parts of the world, particularly those experiencing foreign intervention. In a heart-rending article written in the aftermath of the Kanpur Mosque incident, Āzād wrote that the earth was 'thirsty' for Muslim blood, which was shed on the lands of Tripoli, Mashhad, and the Balkans. Now that India had also witnessed this bloodshed, Indian Muslims and those Muslims were–at least on an emotional plane–connected.[54] Now that they had experienced similar oppression at the hands of colonial power, they could better empathize with their Muslim brethren.

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51 See *Al-Hilāl,* 5 November 1913.
52 See *Al-Hilāl*, 5 November 1913.
53 *Al-Hilāl*, 5 November 1913.
54 Azad, *Kānpūr kā Dardnāk Nazārah,* 49.

CONCLUSION

The advent of the printing press in the Islamicate world played a significant role in the creation of a pan-Islamic identity. Its arrival in the Indian subcontinent allowed Indian Muslims easier access to news of incidents and events in other parts of the Islamicate world. The very printing press that aided the creation of a transnational identity also made possible its localization. In the Indian context, incidents in the larger Muslim world were not only used to connect Indian Muslims to other Muslims on an emotional level, but also to fight for the political agency for Indian Muslims. In this sense, this pan-Islamic narrative was strongly rooted in the Indian social and political context, while simultaneously borrowing from events in the wider Muslim world.

This meant a constant negotiation with the colonial rulers in India, the response to whom changed over time. From beseeching to reasoning to outright opposition, the response to colonial rule varied over time. The Kanpur Mosque incident proved to be a watershed moment because it made loyalists, like Ẓafar, criticize the government in harsh words. It was also significant because it assisted in the shaping of the political identity and discourse of Muslims. Through agitation against–and negotiation with–the British authorities, Muslims vented out their opinion on the issue.

In doing so, they redefined the notion of pan-Islam. The aim was to empower and emancipate Muslims around the world, and through the content produced in their newspapers, ʻAlī, Ẓafar, and Āzād were doing exactly this – empowering Muslims to speak against the injustice against their worship place. This violation connected Indian Muslims to the Muslims in other regions, simply by virtue of being a violation of Muslim property and sacred space. Moreover, the British reaction to the protest, and the subsequent killing of unarmed Muslims, firmly established the connection between Muslims of the world – all of them were facing oppression and violation of land at the hands of colonial powers. This violation was not just a legal crime, but also threatened their identity. The strong opposition to such acts suggested that the loss of land was tantamount to a loss of their religious identity – that of belonging to the faith of Islam – which was a significant element of these editors' identity, and the kind of identity they aspired to build among their Muslim readers.

APPENDIX



Figure 1: Title page of Zamindar till 1912. The verse calling for faithfulness towards British is at the bottom right, marked in red.

Figure 2: This image depicts a dozing lion, above which is written Bartanwi Sher (British Lion). A turbaned Muslim, depicting the Muslim world, is blowing a trumpet in the lion's ears, while an Indian Muslim depicting Muslim League, is tugging at the lion's tail. Despite this, the lion refuses to wake up. (Source: Zamīndār, 01 December, 1911)

From Religious Relief to Development Aid: The Near East Relief and the Emergence of International Humanitarianism, 1915-1930

by:
HANS MAGNE JAATUN

ABSTRACT

The emergence of a sustained scholarly interest in the origins of humanitarian organisations is a relatively new phenomenon, which has – in part – led to an overly positivistic and uncritical understanding of humanitarianism, in both its current and past iterations. This article is an examination of one of the earliest, and perhaps most influential humanitarian organisations of its time: the Near East Relief – and details the organisation's transformation from a coalition of religiously selective relief committees into a secular, permanent, and development-focused humanitarian institution. Through exploring the setting, birth, and early history of the NER, it is possible to create an image of the general development of international humanitarianism in the interwar years. Factors such as field experience, donor pressure, internal organisational disputes, paternalistic attitudes, a growing academic presence within the NER, and the influence and changing character of religious doctrine and thought, all combine to form a more nuanced image of the origins and evolution of modern humanitarianism.

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As Michael Barnett states in the opening words of his book on modern humanitarianism, *Empire of Humanity*, "[all] communities get their history wrong, and the humanitarian community is no exception".[1] For many years, the history of NGOs in general and humanitarian organisations in particular represented a woefully understudied area within the field of history. The narratives surrounding the emergence of early humanitarian organisations had been left mostly to the whims of biographers or to members of the organisations in question, whose bias often prevented a thorough and critical historical analysis. As a result, these foundational stories were often subject to retroactive romanticism, teleological arguments and "great man" thinking. In response to this, and influenced by larger academic and public debates surrounding globalisation, aid regimes and civil society, historians have recently started engaging more thoroughly with the origins of NGO "precursors", alongside the sets of ideas they were founded upon or influenced by. Historians such as John F. Hutchinson and Harald Fischer-Tiné are good representatives of this trend through their work on the origins of the Red Cross and the Salvation Army respectively.[2] Barnett offers perhaps the most ambitious study from this perspective, attempting to sketch out a full historical trajectory of humanitarianism, wherein the interwar years are described as a transitional point between what he terms the "Age of Imperial Humanitarianism" and the "Age of Neo-Humanitarianism". During the interwar years, Barnett argues, "[t]here were signs that need, not identity, was the increasingly important criterion for deciding who received attention; that a secularized humanity was replacing a religiously based compassion; that institutionalization was repvlacing improvisation; that public governance of relief was replacing private morality; and that internationally coordinated responses were replacing nationally driven action."[3]

While his choices of periodisation are a matter of some debate, there remains little doubt that both the theories and institutions surrounding international humanitarianism were undergoing profound changes during the First World War and interwar years. The early humanitarian organisation Near East Relief (NER) represents a useful unit of study for analysing and understanding said changes. One of the first 'true' humanitarian organisations, the NER emerged out of American missionary circles in the war-torn Ottoman Empire in 1915, and would in the span of 15 years transform itself from a temporary coalition of committees engaged in religiously selective emergency relief into a permanent humanitarian organisation championing a "full round of life for all" through technical programmes of comprehensive rural and social development.[4] In 1930, in order to

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1 Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity* (Ithaca, 2011), 1.
2 John F. Hutchinson, "Rethinking the Origins of the Red Cross," *Bulletin for the History of Medicine*, 63, no. 4 (1989): 557-578; Harald Fischer-Tiné, "Global Civil Society and the Forces of Empire. The Salvation Army, British Imperialism and the "Pre-History" of NGOs (Ca. 1880-1920)," in *Competing Visions of World Order. Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s* (London, 2007), 29-67.
3 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity,* 82-83.
4 Michael Limberg, ""A Full Round of Life for All": Transforming Near East Relief into The Near East

communicate these changes to world, the NER reincorporated itself as the Near East *Foundation* (NEF), officially confirming the organisational changes that had been developing internally over the preceding years.

This essay is an attempt to showcase what caused the transition of NER into NEF through an analysis of its origins, internal developments and field experience. In doing so, I use the NER as a lens through which we can observe the general development of international humanitarianism in the interwar years. Far from being the story of an organisation moving inevitably towards a greater stage of liberty and humanity, this essay will show that NER's transition was the result of a complex set of factors, including internal organisational strife, donor pressure, wider trends in international humanitarianism, continuing influences from its missionary origins and, perhaps most importantly, experiences made 'on the ground' by NER operatives and associates. The sources I have used, especially works by Watenpaugh, Limberg, Rodogno and to some degree Kieser, can be positioned within the same scholarly movement as Barnett, Hutchinson, and Fischer-Tiné, owing to their shared objectives of complicating and critically re-examining the early histories of international humanitarianism. For better insight into the organisation's internal affairs, I have also consulted a series of research reports based on recent material gathered from the NER/Rockefeller Archives. For the sake of readability, the pre-NEF iterations of the NER (ACASR, ACRNE) will all be referred to as NER throughout the essay, as they were the NER's direct organisational forebears.v

The NER emerged from a long-standing American interest in the MENA region. In the Near East specifically, American philanthropism had left its mark as early as the beginning of the 19th century, when a mix of philhellenes and religiously motivated individuals provided rebellious Greeks with supplies and volunteers to assist them in their struggle against the "intolerable despotism" of Turco-Muslim rule.[5] Perhaps more importantly for the later emergence of the NER, the Near East had also received significant attention from American missionaries, arriving in limited numbers as early as 1819 and picking up steam from the mid-19th century onwards.[6] Initially concerned with the millenarian and "somewhat utopian and romantic aspect of Israel's restoration", the realities of the holy land soon caused a shift both in target audience and in doctrine.[7] The original target group, the Jews, proved unreceptive to the efforts of the missionaries while the region's majority Muslim population were, according to an early American missionary to Palestine, shielded "almost impenetrably from the influence of Christianity"

Foundation," (Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online, 2013) <http://rockarch.org/publications/resrep/limberg.pdf> [Accessed 23 May 2018], 1.

5 Edward Mead Earle, "American Interest in the Greek Cause, 1821-1827," *The American Historical Review* 33, no. 1 (1927): 52-53.

6 Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millenialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Philadelphia, 2012), 38.

7 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 34.

on account of their faith and political circumstance.[8] Instead, the Americans decided to focus their efforts on the region's Oriental Christians, in particular the Armenians, who soon found themselves subject to western attempts at spiritual and cultural reform with the goal of achieving a "revival of Christianity in the East".[9] While evangelisation was the original goal of these missionaries, they soon found themselves engaged in a wide variety of work, resulting in the establishment of schools, hospitals and other developmental institutions intending to "uplift" the region's Christians spiritually and culturally so that they would, in time, become more receptive to the evangelical gospel. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the proselytising aspects of the American missionaries and educators would be toned down even further, complimented by "experiments and new conceptual fermentation" centred around the idea that the best way to preserve and reinvigorate Christianity in the East would come through a general improvement of conditions for *all* residents in the area, through the creation and support of a liberal, American-influenced and Ottomanist civil society.[10] While this more holistic approach would prove optimistic – ultimately the *Osmanlilik* identity implemented by the new Ottoman regime proved authoritarian, centralist and often hostile to non-Muslim elements – it still serves to indicate that the idea of a comprehensive societal transformation in the Near East predated the establishment of the region's dedicated humanitarian organisations.[11] These ideas were already present in the Near East missionary and educational communities that would later form the backbone of NER.

The NER's interwar transition from relief to societal transformation can be traced back to a series of humanitarian crises in 1915. In response to the devastation brought about by an artificial famine in the Greater Syria region and to mounting reports of atrocities committed against the Ottoman Empire's Armenian populations, 1915 would see multiple relief committees set up by American educators and missionaries stationed in close proximity to affected regions and communities.[12] These efforts were soon centralised into the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR), which in 1919 would be incorporated into the NER. The organisation combined massive public fundraising campaigns and religious fundraising networks in the US with local contacts and knowledge in the Near East to create what Davido Rodogno calls "an American humanitarian actor as relevant as the American Red Cross or the American Relief Administration" [13]. As funding increased and aid networks expanded, the suffering of non-Armenian communities became increasingly

8 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 18.
9 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 44-47.
10 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 73.
11 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 63-98.
12 Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Oakland, 2015), 97.
13 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 2; Davide Rodogno, "Beyond Relief: A Sketch of the Near East Relief's Humanitarian Operations, 1918-1929," *Monde(s)* 6, no. 2 (2014): 45.

apparent to NER fieldworkers. In response, the organisation would slowly extend their aid to Muslim, Jewish and Alevi populations as well.[14] In many ways this represented a watershed moment in the history of international humanitarianism, as previous relief efforts had been dominated by religious and ethnic exclusivity. In addition, NER operatives started responding to developing needs on the ground by assuming care for displaced orphans – another unintended development dictated by need rather than top-down demands. This would in turn become a cornerstone of NER operations, with hundreds of orphanages in operation from the Russian Caucasus to the cities of Greater Syria.[15] After the armistice of Mudros in 1918, the NER would take American missionary and evangelical work with the Armenian population to its furthest conclusion, when it became involved in large scale resettlement and repatriation programmes of Armenians into entente-controlled areas of southern Anatolia (primarily Cilicia), in an effort to carve out a new Armenian state constructed on "modern liberal nationalist, Wilsonian lines."[16] What had started as a limited intervention to alleviate the suffering of Christians in the Near East had over the course of the war developed into a vast enterprise with direct responsibility for tens of thousands of refugees and orphans, engaged in ambitious programmes to demographically, politically and socially reshape the landscape of the Near East.

The magnitude of the famine, the massacres and the displacements "forced the relief committee to transcend the levels of organization that had characterised all earlier efforts to solicit relief funds outside the circle of givers to the missionary boards."[17] As the NER's financial power increased, so did the scope of its aid and the complexity of its organisational structure. Professionalisation and bureaucratisation occurred not only because of changing ideological drives in NER leadership, but also as a logical response to the organisation's expanding assets and the increasingly complicated and prolonged nature of the disasters it involved itself with. In addition, many of the NER's operatives in the Near East were slowly falling victim to what Hugo Slim terms "ethics creep": as their moral obligations towards the objects of their aid thickened over time, solving *immediate* problems was no longer seen as sufficient.[18] This manifested itself on a personal level, evidenced by the many friendships forged between aid workers and locals over the course of NER activities in the area, and to a lesser degree on an organisational level,

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14 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 30-57, 91-124.
15 Shaloma Gauthier and Davide Rodongo, "The Near East Relief's Caucasus Branch Operation (1919-1920)" (Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online, 2011), <http://rockarch.org/publications/resrep/gauthier-rodogno.pdf> [Accessed 26 May 2018].
16 Keith David Watenpaugh, "The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927," *The American Historical Review* 115, no. 5 (2010): 1318.
17 Yehonathan Brodski, "The Near East Foundation Records at the Rockefeller Archive Center" (Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online, 2012) <http://rockarch.org/publications/resrep/brodski.pdf> [Accessed 27 May 2018] 7-8.
18 Hugo Slim and Miriam Bradley, "Principled Humanitarian Action and Ethical Tensions in Multi-Mandate Organizations," *World Vision* (2013), 3.

evidenced by the NER's flexibility in adapting to on-the-ground demands (from non-Christians and orphans).[19] Many members started calling for more comprehensive programmes aimed at solving the root causes of their suffering, no doubt influenced by trending discussions on the role and nature of humanitarianism, but based primarily on personal experiences and the developing sense of a deeper and wider responsibility for the region's suffering. After the First World War, the continuation of violence in the Russian Civil War, the French termination of Hashemite rule in Syria, the Turkish War of Independence and in subsequent Greco-Turkish population transfers eliminated the prospects of an immediate withdrawal for the NER, as it became increasingly clear that a full retreat would result in "disastrous consequences" for refugees and orphans in NER care.[20] For the first two post-war years, the NER stayed in the region primarily because wartime conditions persisted. By the mid-1920s "[t]he acute phase of need – the humanitarian emergency – had passed" and socio-political developments in the Near East dictated a corresponding change in the activities of humanitarian organisations present there.[21] The Christian communities of Anatolia had all but vanished following genocide, expulsion and population transfers, the colonial powers of France and Great Britain had divided the Levant and Mesopotamia between themselves, while increasing Soviet hostility towards Western aid organisations made work in the Caucasus difficult. The NER had since its inception been structured principally around the relief of immediate suffering resulting from uneven inter-religious conflict, but now it found itself situated in a region with a whole new set of different issues to solve.[22] Many of the projects that the NER had to adapt to during the conflict were either vanishing or required different solutions to what had been previously been attempted. Refugees were slowly becoming settled and orphans, who since the conclusion of hostilities had been the NER's primary object of attention, were reaching the age of maturity, which released them from the direct responsibilities of the NER. The much larger issue of the what to do with the Armenian diaspora also required new answers as the expulsion of French and British troops from Southern Anatolia eliminated any prospects of repatriation and nation-building. Coinciding with these developments was also the issue of funding. Private fundraising appeals increasingly failed to bring in as much money as before, be it due to the elimination of the traditional "call to alms" surrounding oppressed Christians and orphans, or simply donor fatigue.[23]

These developments spurred a series of debates within the ranks of the NER on the organisation's future that would eventually result in the reincorporation of the relief-based NER as the development-focused NEF.

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19 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones,* 91-123.
20 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 5.
21 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones,* 184.
22 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 183-184.
23 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 184.

However, as I alluded to above, this development was far from certain when it was discussed at the time. Powerful voices within the NER's board were declaring that the mission had been accomplished and called for a Near Eastern withdrawal, with local authorities or permanent religious associations taking over responsibilities.[24] Others imagined a limited continued engagement centred on the declining numbers of refugees and any orphans who still needed assistance.[25] Finally, there developed a growing number of voices arguing for an increased and permanent commitment to the Near East. These long-term discussions initially revolved around the future of the thousands of orphans in NER care, exemplified by this 1920 statement by the then director Charles V. Vickrey:

> It may be doubted if any American organization has ever had an opportunity equal to ours in shaping the future of the Near East. The 100,000 children now under our care, wisely guided will become the leaders in a New Era in the Old World. They will be the trained agriculturalists, the mechanics, merchants, manufacturers, bankers, educators, lawyers, doctors, governors and national leaders of the New Near East.[26]

Though its aims were grandiose, under this model the responsibilities and presence of the NER would effectively cease after the successful upbringing and education of the orphans. In the following years, the increasing number of academic experts serving and collaborating with the NER would slowly push for a much broader engagement. In the initial years of the First World War as the NER grew in size and complexity, it had experienced a growing influx of non-missionary and non-evangelical personnel. Over the course of the next decade these men and women would gradually enter into positions of influence and leadership within the organisation. Influenced by developing academic theories surrounding development studies and international humanitarianism, these people perceived the NER not only as an instrument to do 'good' in the world based on their own understandings of the word, but also as an arena in which they would be able to work and experiment with the practical implementation of said theories.[27] The early sociologist Thomas Jesse Jones brought with him educational experience, and started lobbying for more comprehensive

24 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 4.
25 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 9.
26 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 7.
27 Limberg, '"A Full Round of Life for All," 7-11; Sjaak Braster, Frank Simon and Ian Grosvenor, *History of Popular Education* (London, 2014), 179-182; Rodogno, "Beyond Relief," 47-51.

programmes of rural education and development based on prior experience working with what he termed "backwards peoples" such as African Americans.[28] Men such as Paul Monroe, who was previously engaged with the establishment of modern school systems for the Iraqi and Jordanian governments, further tipped the internal NER balance of power towards long term development, particularly aimed towards the Near East's rural sectors.[29]

While early leadership figures such as Cleveland H. Dodge and James Barton "came to relief work in the Near East largely out of a sense of religious and national duty to the region's Christian populations", interwar successors like Barclay Acheson, and Dodge's son, Cleveland E. Dodge, increasingly became occupied with "science-based" ideas of transformative development and the extension of the NER's work to non-Christian populations as well.[30] In Cleveland Jr.'s case (who took over his father's chair on the NER board after his death), this reasoning seems to have been based primarily on his background in US philanthropic circles, while Acheson, who had climbed the ranks of the NER from his position as a field worker, was often drawing on what he perceived to be factual "needs" building on his personal experience in the field.[31] The factions advocating a more comprehensive engagement in the Near East were aided significantly in their efforts by external pressure emanating from NER donors such as the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), which throughout the existence of the NER remained one of its greatest contributors. The RF had exerted this form of pressure before: in 1915, having made $20,000 available to the NER's forerunners, the Committee on American Atrocities, it announced that future aid would be given *only* on the condition that the various American aid organisations operating in the region at the time were merged into one entity: the American Committee for Armenian and Assyrian Relief (later the NER).[32] When the debate about the future of the NER was raging internally in the mid-1920s, the RF once again made use of this position and alongside the Commonwealth Fund it raised demands for a higher level of professionalisation within the NER, mainly through a focus on long-term technical missions.[33] As previously mentioned, unlike other late-war relief organisations such as the American Relief Association (ARA), the NER was a private organisation that still relied primarily on funding from parishioners, households and philanthropists as well as institutional donors, making it susceptible not only to changing donation trends, but also to the influence and agendas of powerful donor blocks. In many ways, the actions of the RF resembled those of the League of Nations, who made the adoption of certain organisational structures a prerequisite for cooperation between the League and

28 Thomas J. Jones, *Essentials of Civilization* (New York, 1929); Rodogno, "Beyond Relief," 57-58.
29 Braster, Simon and Grosvenor, *History of Popular Education,* 179-181.
30 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 3-4.
31 Rodogno, "Beyond Relief," 50-51; Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 12.
32 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones,* 186.
33 Rodogno, "Beyond Relief," 49.

independent organisations during the interwar years.[34] In this way, the NER was also partly the result of top-down ambitions towards a secular and professional humanitarianism, making the evolution of the NER not exclusively the product of internal decisions, but also of external and deliberate pressures.

The missionary origins and character of the NER also had an important part to play in deliberations on the NER's future. "[A] vision for guiding the future of the Near East had always been implicit in NER's aid to Christian minorities", evidenced by recurring talk of the Armenian population as a "vanguard" for a "New Near East" that was to be revived spiritually, culturally and technologically by the powers of Protestantism and the West.[35] These very same ambitions had been present within American evangelical circles as far back as the mid-1800s.[36] When the NER emerged out of these circles during the humanitarian crises of 1915, they carried over a significant amount of evangelical ideological and religious heritage that would remain a defining feature of the NER until long after the organisation officially shifted its objectives and methods in the 1930s. When the idea of creating a Christian Armenian nation state collapsed in the political situation that followed the Cilician retreat[37], many NER decision-makers went back to the same thinking that ABCFM [what is this?] members and institutions like the Syrian Protestant College had experimented with following the revolution of 1908 – towards creating a liberal, American-influenced region that through an "uplifting" of the entire populace in cultural, technological, and political terms would ensure the prosperity and survival of the Near East's Oriental Christian communities.[38] In this way, the continued Christian selectiveness the NER rarely conflicted with the new ideas and theories introduced by growing numbers of "ideological humanitarians" entering the ranks of the organisation. Instead, the missionary origins of the NER seemed to have worked as a force pushing the organisation not only towards maintaining its presence in the region even after the time of emergency had passed, but also towards the adoption of more holistic and transformative approaches when dealing with the issues of *who* to help and *how*. In other words, having a Christian 'character' was not necessarily a force pushing against long-term technical development and a non-discriminatory aid regime (although it was to some degree for people like Vickrey); instead, for

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34 Kerstin Martens, "Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 9-14.

35 The "New Near East" was also the title of the NER's self-published magazine during the interwar years: Near East Relief Historical Society, "Spreading the Word: The New Near East Magazine," *Near East Relief Historical Society*, 2015 <https://neareastmuseum.com/2015/12/18/spreading-the-woar-east-magazine/> [Accessed 25 May 2018]; Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 7; Watenpaugh, ""Are There Any Children for Sale?": Genocide and the Transfer of Armenian Children (1915–1922)," *Journal of Human Rights* 12, no. 3 (2013): 293.

36 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 63-79.

37 Following a series of bloody battles, Turkish revolutionaries would succeed in routing Franco-Armenian troops from the province of Cilicia, resulting in the expulsion or massacre of the majority of the area's civilian Armenian population. In 1922, with the last hopes of establishing an Armenian nation state in southern Turkey gone, the NER were once again forced to return to working with the Armenians as a minority population within a primarily Muslim land.

38 Kieser, *Nearest East*, 63-79.

many of the organisation's leadership figures (like Acheson), it would be one of the main forces pushing *for* it.

A more cynical reading of the NER's activities and its pivot from relief to development programmes often involves criticism directed at the organisation's missionary character, notions of American superiority and desires to spread American influence abroad – as well as the NER's widespread use of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim rhetoric at home.[39] While certainly present to some degree, these aspects of the NER's work did not seem to have been particularly important factors in internal decisions regarding the nature and role of the organisation.[40] In a 2016 interview, Watenpaugh warns listeners against adopting what he terms a "modernist smirk" when examining the early histories of organisations such as the NER, stating that humanitarianism is inherently selective, and that the early prioritisation of Oriental Christian communities should not necessarily be viewed as evidence of hatred towards the Ottoman Empire's Muslim subjects, nor as a form of cultural imperialism.[41] The fact that NER relief efforts were expanded to non-Christian communities as soon as on-the-ground situations demanded it should indicate a disparity between the more hostile and divisive fundraising rhetoric applied in the USA and the actions and beliefs of the organisation's own members working in the Near East and on the NER's executive board. In this way, the expansion of NER programmes to cover all of the region's communities, and not merely the Christian population, should be viewed not only as a product of changes in leadership and doctrine, but also as the natural evolution of an extended humanitarian presence in the Near East. While Christian communities long remained the exclusive or later the primary focus of the NER, they also served as a gateway towards expanding humanitarian efforts in the remaining strata of the Near East, as soon as these strata became "familiarised" to the humanitarian community.

However, this is not to absolve the NER of all wrongdoings, or to wash away many of the organisation's more problematic characteristics, chief amongst them the issue of paternalism. For while paternalistic attitudes still permeate humanitarian organisations today, and in some sense must be considered inevitable, the case was far more overt and severe in the early 20th century. The acknowledgement that peoples outside one's own 'tribal' group merited aid and assistance was radical enough for the time, but to actually go the extra step and involve their suffering in decision-making processes surrounding their own aid was never even seriously suggested. In the case of the NER, roughly speaking, the missionaries were to serve as moral and religious teachers, and the experts

39 Jaffa Panken, ""Lest They Perish": The Armenian Genocide and the Making of Modern Humanitarian Media in the U.S., 1915-1925" (PhD Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2014).
40 Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 183-205.
41 Watenpaugh, "The Middle East in the Making of Modern Humanitarianism," interview by Chris Gratien, *Ottoman History Podcast*, 2016 <http://humanityjournal.org/blog/the-middle-east-in-the-making-of-modern-humanitarianism/> [Accessed 24 May 2018].

as technical and political ones. The peoples they concerned themselves with were to play the role of the grateful pupil-recipient and nothing more. While, as Barnett states, "any act of intervention, no matter how well intended, is also an act of control", the level of control that the NER exerted over the people they cared for can be considered disproportionate.[42] Over the course of the 1910s and 1920s, members of the NER managed to develop a great degree of sympathy and compassion for the members of the various confessions and ethnicities they encountered, but compassion does not equate respect, and it remained implicit in the NER's message of 'uplift', that local traditions and norms in contrast with the organisation's own were to be gradually phased out in favour of (western) 'civilisation'.

While members of the NER's board still disagreed on what the organisation's future would look like, a 1924 meeting in Constantinople saw them all agree that a reassessment of "what they knew of local societies" was in order, so that their work could be reformulated to meet current needs.[43] These talks laid the foundations for a regional survey, approved in 1925 and completed in 1927, where information was collected on "transportation networks, imports and exports, agriculture, tax policies, health and sanitation, education, demographic change, women's rights, and religious/racial divides in each country's social matric".[44] While health, education, and to some degree also women's rights, had by this point become a long-time focus for American missionaries in the region, the inclusion of economic and agricultural fields as units of analysis in the survey clearly indicated the growing influence of philanthropic and academic experts within the NER. This can be seen in the fact that the task of writing the report based on the survey results was given to "Dr. Frank A. Ross, a statistics expert at Columbia University, C. Luther Fry of the Rockefeller-funded Institute of Social and Religious Research, and Elbridge Sibley, a sociology graduate student, also at Columbia University"[45] – all of whom were academics with no prior connection to the NER. The results of the survey would solidify the various ideas and methods that had evolved within the NER into factions centred on key leadership figures. One of the most influential factions to emerge out of the following discussions was centred on Vickrey's ambitions for the region's remaining orphans – a more limited engagement similar to what the organisation had been occupied with in the preceding years, based primarily around aiding the region's Christian minorities.[46] Another, broader coalition that formed around Acheson was centred around the advice and growing influence of philanthropic experts and "holistic" missionaries in the NER, arguing for comprehensive societal change in the

42 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity,* 12.
43 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 10.
44 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 11.
45 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 10.
46 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 11.

entire region, with special attention paid to rural reconstruction.[47] In a series of meetings and conferences leading up to 1929, Vickrey's faction would be slowly pushed out by Acheson's, the former leaving the NER in order to start a separate organisation more in line with his own thinking (The Golden Rule Foundation).[48] Vickrey losing out to Acheson in this time period was far from predetermined, and seems to have been partially the result of Acheson's superior political skill.[49] Following these developments, Acheson would consolidate power and initiate the technical steps required for the replacement of the Near East Relief with the Near East Foundation. While this process would take many additional years to fully complete, its outcome had already been decided in the post-survey debates, when the NER's official shift from relief to technical societal transformation was irreversibly confirmed.

Bridging traditional American missionary work and values with the tools of modern humanitarianism, the NER's transformation from relief to development was the result of a complex interaction between American evangelicalism, modern humanitarianism and organisational and operational experiences. The organisation's missionary origins laid the groundwork for the NER's stated objectives and character and, perhaps more surprisingly, also served as a significant impetus for development in the direction of holistic and religiously inclusive development programmes. The growing number of academics and humanitarian experts that entered into the organisation as it expanded in size and complexity would not only be instrumental in securing the final board majority in favour of a comprehensive and prolonged commitment to the Near East, but would also be one of the main sources of a push for societal "uplift" and for translating this desire into actual policies, primarily through a focus on rural reconstruction. The NER's prolonged engagement in the region gave them a sense of responsibility for the local populations, both Christian and non-Christian, that would prove difficult to shake off in the post-war years, driving the NER operatives and its leaders towards increasingly more comprehensive solutions for aiding the region's suffering. Complementing these developments was external monetary pressure for professionalization coming from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Commonwealth Fund, which would prove important in steering the direction of the NER in the organisation's formative and transformative years. By the time the NER officially started questioning its future in the interwar years, the odds were already heavily stacked in favour of a shift from emergency relief to transformative development.

Returning to Michael Barnett, it should be clear why the NER is a good example of the changes that international humanitarianism underwent in the

47 Limberg, "A Full Round of Life for All," 11-12.
48 Near East Relief Historical Society, "Charles V. Vickrey and the Golden Rule", 2015, *Near East Relief Historical Society*. <https://neareastmuseum.com/2015/10/30/charles-v-vickrey-and-the-golden-rule/> [Accessed 9 Feb 2019].
49 Limberg. "A Full Round of Life for All," 11-14; Rodogno, "Beyond Relief," 57-59.

interwar years. While the transition to a need-based, secularised, and permanent humanitarian regime was far from complete, the first major steps in these directions were taken when traditional religious relief efforts interacted with a developing expert-driven academic humanitarianism in the context of one of the world history's greatest humanitarian disasters. But while this case study in many ways confirm some of Barnett's key arguments about the historic trajectory of international humanitarianism, there are significant discrepancies as well. If *Empire of Humanity*'s greatest strength is its scope and reach, its greatest weakness is its limited length. Like any ambitious survey, Barnett's work covers ground unevenly, which leads to the unfortunate omission of organisations, events, and processes that might further nuance an already complicated narrative. While the NER, in the worst case, can be considered a loose fit to the framework of humanitarianism offered by Barnett, certain aspects that proved instrumental to its development are never discussed at length in his work. The role of religious doctrine and thought, and not just symbolism or language, is never adequately dealt with, despite its undeniable importance in the development of humanitarianism in the first quarter of the 20th century. Had the NER been included as a specific unit of analysis in Barnett's work, a further exploration of the changing religious norms and practices and their influence on what we today consider 'secular' humanitarianism would be required, although this is a topic important enough to merit several dedicated monographs. The NER was an amalgamation of secular and religious practises, motivations, and means, that, when granted the opportunity to, never shied away from using colonial or semi-colonial methods and structures to achieve their aims. Driven by a sense of compassion and altruism and informed by experience, but burdened by a strong and unapologetic Western paternalism, the NER was symptomatic of the state of the then-emerging international humanitarian community. The result of clear historical breaks and continuities, the NER serves as an important intermediary organisation positioned between the religiously selective relief committees of the early 20th century and the permanent secular development institutions of today.

The Construction of Chinese Art History as a Modern Discipline in the Early Twentieth Century

by:
WANG JIALU

ABSTRACT

This paper challenges the dichotomies of modernity and tradition, West and East, global and local, by shedding light on the construction of Chinese art history as a modern discipline in the twentieth century. Through uncovering the conditions and power structures that made such construction possible, I argue that the "transfer" from a Western and Japanese art history template to Chinese art historical writing is not a unidirectional process. Rather, it must be embedded in broader cultural and political contexts which shaped the values and discourses of said period. The paper intends to use a transcultural approach to art histories, by considering the entanglements and transfers between cultures.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the concept of "modernity" emerged in Europe, the Western world has made use of it to establish a dichotomy between tradition and modernity, and to interpret history as a developmental process, as the lineal transit from one to another. In this narrative, the West achieved "modernity" before other regions. Following Western imperialist expansion, the idea of pursuing modernization was widespread among non-Western countries, which caused a variety of processes—unique to each region—that dealt with this conceptual novelty. Although contemporary to the West, the non-Western civilizations are often regarded as "antique", or "primitive" by art historians and collectors in the context of Modernism. In the delineation of a "developmental history of art", the evolutionary classification schemes are used to characterize the cultures of the world from the "savage" to the "civilized".[1] The concept of "primitive" was coined in the context of Modernism to manifest the advantage of modernity.
The works of Modernist artists and writers are inspired by the ever-changing present, the modern world. They deliberately reject the past traditions and views of art. This break with the past means that modern artists and art writers need to invent signs, media, compositions, and forms that are adequate to express the fast pace of the modern world.[2] Curator Marco Scotini uses trains as a metaphor for the development of cultures: While the train of Western civilization is keeping up its high speed, the trains of other civilizations are running in their own speed, too. When they come across each other, from the view of the Western train, seemingly other trains are moving backwards, whilst this is only because they are heading to different directions.[3] Western modernism is described by John Clark as a closed system, which is unable to accommodate other modernist discourses beyond the West.[4] Taking the historical writing as a case, the spread of modernist historiography to Asia, Africa, and Latin America is usually seen as the effect of a cultural import forced by the colonial powers.[5] In this essay, I will shed light on the construction of Chinese art history as a modern discipline in the early twentieth century. Through uncovering what the conditions and power structures are that made the construction possible, I will argue that the "transfer" from a Western and Japanese art history template to a Chinese art historical writing is not a one-way shifting process. Rather, it must be embedded in broader cultural and political

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1 Monica Juneja, "Alternative, Peripheral or Cosmopolitan? Modernism as a Global Process", in *Global Art History - Transkulturelle Verortungen von Kunst und Kunstwissenschaft,* ed. Julia Allerstorfer and Monika Leisch-Kiesl (Bielefeld, 2017), 79-107.
2 Anne D'Alleva, *Methods & Theories of Art History* (London: Laurence King, 2012), 142-43.
3 Marco Scotini's exhibition, "Too Early, Too Late: Middle East and Modernity," accessed 31 July 2018, https://www.naba.it/en/too-early-too-late-middle-east-and-modernity-0
4 Partha Mitter, "Interventions: Decentering Modernism: Art History and Avant-Garde Art from the Periphery," *The Art Bulletin* 90, no. 4 (2008): 531-48, doi:10.1080/00043079.2008.10786408.
5 Sebastian Conrad, "'Nothing is the Way It Should Be'. Global Transformations of the Time Regime in the Nineteenth Century," *Modern Intellectual History* 15, no.3 (November 2017): 1–28.

contexts.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

"Problematization" will be employed in this essay as a methodological tool. It is one of the most important methodological contributions of Michel Foucault[6]. Instead of viewing history of morality as a linear development, which assumes that words keep their meanings and ideas retain their logic in a single direction, Foucault suggests a genealogical method that does not seek one answer to an issue, but examines how certain knowledge is "questioned, analyzed, classified and regulated" at "specific times and under specific circumstances".[7] It captures "how and why certain things (behavior, phenomena, processes) become a problem" and how they are shaped as something for thought.[8]

Art history is a discipline that came into being under certain historical and political settings, respectively and differently in the West and East. How did the field come into being? Why has it been developing following a Western structure even though Chinese art has its own history dated back to thousands of years ago? Is the process more of a cultural transfer, or there are competitions and struggles within the formulation of the discipline? Does it function as an apparatus of national building under specific conditions? In order to answer these questions, it is unhelpful to see the development of the discipline as a "natural" process. Rather, it "becomes", and "emerges", as an object for thought in practice. Studying it as a problem makes it possible to consider the power relations involved through examining how values are "thought" in certain ways.

THE EMERGENCE OF ART HISTORY AS A MODERN DISCIPLINE IN MODERN CHINA

2.1 ART HISTORY: MODERNISM AND THE SHAPE OF TIME

"How did a field like the history of art come into being?" Margaret Iversen and Stephen Melville pose the question in their book *Writing Art History*.[9]

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6 Robert Castel, "'Problematization' as a Mode of Reading History," in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault,* ed. Jan Goldstein (Blackwell Publishers, 1994): 237-252.
7 Roger Deacon, "Theory as practice: Foucault's Concept of Problematization," *Telos* 2000, no.118 (Winter 2000): 127-142.
8 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Sherry Simon (New York: Cornell University Press, 1980), 139-164.
9 Margaret Iversen and Stephen W. Melville, *Writing Art History: Disciplinary Departures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010)

Nowadays, if one looks at the art history curriculum in institutions such as universities, the answer would seem quite obvious: there is art, it is widely spread, and art history is the study of art with attention to its social and historical specificity (thus it is classified based on period and geographical location). However, if we look at the curriculum more closely, the shape of it becomes blurry. Some of the primary terms seem to have a rather loose relation with the presumed scheme. "Baroque", for example, seems to have named a chunk of time. Nevertheless, as argued by Iversen and Melville, that is all it does. Although the term was intended to function as a style name to some extent, the relationship between a style and a historical period is still obscure. Moving forward from the Baroque, it is suggested by Iversen and Melville that matters are becoming only more and more obscure as the shape of art history tends to bend towards particular names such as "Realism" or "Impressionism", many of which were coined in relation to "Modernism".

Within terms such as "Baroque", "Realism", "Impressionism", and "Modernism", further difficulties can be seen: the medieval object makers studied by art history neither saw themselves as artists, nor described the objects they made as art; and students of Asian art constantly find that the objects and practices they study are falsified by the categories of the distinctively Western art-historical thought.[10] Discussions of such issues rapidly become muddy: many historians of Asian art do exactly the same kind of interpretive work as their Western colleagues do, whereas they feel that some articulations fundamentally different from that used by historians of Western art are in need. Seemingly this is an argument about the term "art", while on another level, as Iversen and Melville argue, this is also an argument about "history" as a Western way of give meaning. The systematic study of artistic objects is no more than five hundred years old, beginning with the description of art works of Italian Renaissance.[11] In art history, modernism is usually considered to begin in France in the 1850s, when artists such as Gustave Courbet (1819-1877) and Édouard Manet (1832-1883) gained popularity.[12] Along with modernism, the idea of avant-garde came into play, creating and seeking the new, attacking the old and established institutions of culture and art. Meanwhile, modernism became a particular way of narrating the history of art. For a long time, the geography of modernism in the mainstream writing of art history has been following a Paris-Berlin-Vienna axis, and was subsequently extended to New York following the migration of artists, scholars, critics, gallery owners and art lovers caused by WWII. When outposts such as Seoul, Shanghai, São Paulo, or Mexico City appear in the list of art historical writings, they are likely to be read as diffusion from the Western centers to

10 Iversen and Melville, *Writing*, 1-14.
11 George Kubler, *The Shape of Time Remarks on the History of Things* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008)
12 D'Alleva, *Methods*, 142-50.

remote peripheries.[13] Global art history has been preoccupied with a Eurocentric stance towards modernism and often overlooked modernist phenomena in other places. While one may find oneself applying a certain view of the practice of art history, such view offers no particular reason why it is the best in terms of shaping the discipline. From a transcultural perspective, one could argue that modernist movements unfolded very differently in Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America than in Europe or the United States. They did not just happen in Europe, nor did they happen there first and then travel to other parts of the world. It is insufficient to assume that the non-Western nation-states and civilizations simply submitted to a Western modernity or regard their formulations of national identity and particularity merely as reactions to the Western modernity.[14] There were modernist practices, which are both distinct from as well as in dialogue with the Western modernism. It is unhelpful to see the process of globalization and localization as framed in terms of dichotomies; rather, they are inextricably bounded together.

2.2 WESTERN AND JAPANESE INFLUENCE ON CHINESE MODERN ART AND ART EDUCATION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

Before the 19th century, Western art had little influence on Chinese painting. The Chinese tradition, as represented by, for example, the late-nineteenth-century masters Wu Ch'ang-shih (吴昌硕) and Jen Po-nien (任伯年), seemed to have been continuing the calm, slow progress throughout the time and never been affected by outside factors.[15] Even today there are artists whose art is still totally unaffected by the Western style. Traditional Chinese painting is a self-satisfying mode of expression which cannot be significantly enriched through infusing Western techniques.[16] In the nineteenth century, as China suffered from humiliations from the European powers (e.g. the first and second Opium War, the first Sino-Japanese War, Siege of the International Legations, etc.), it was forced to adopt more elements from the West. The imbalanced power structure urged changes. Nevertheless, the leaders of China since the twentieth century insisted that science and technology from the West should only be the "shell", while Mencius and Confucius should remain the "core" of Chinese culture. Westernization in China was a slow process, and until 1911, with the establishment of the Republic, art was scarcely influenced at all. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Western-style art was largely confined to the Treaty

13 Juneja, "Alternative," 79-107.
14 Mike Featherstone, "Localism, Globalism and Cultural Identity," in *Global. Local. Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, ed. Wimal Dissanayake and Rob Wilson (Duke University Press, 1996), 46-77. https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822381990-003
15 Michael Sullivan, *The Meeting of Eastern and Western Art; from Sixteenth Century to the Present Day* (New York: Graphic Society, 1973), 165-171.
16 Michael Sullivan, *The Meeting of,* 165-171.

Ports. Unlike its Meiji counterparts, China tended to be anti-Western in terms of cultural matters. Western technologies such as machine-guns and railways were one thing, paintings were quite another. In several epochs, China has strictly delineated its own terms.[17] Buddhism and Buddhist art, for example, were slowly digested and made as part of its own art culture in its own majestic way.[18] Mao Tse-tung's (泽东) words, "Make foreign things serve China", as still frequently quoted in China today, sums up her way of dealing with foreign cultures.
At the turn of the twentieth Century, reform was in the air. In China's pursuit of modernization, Japan played an important role from the end of the nineteenth century.[19] After the Sino-Japanese War (1895), Chinese scholars and students flocked to Japan to learn Western paintings. It is estimated that over three hundred Chinese artists went to Japan in the first half of the twentieth century.[20] Japan's success in modernization encouraged the Chinese intellectuals to learn from them in treating visual art as a crucial part of modern knowledge. Numerous Japanese art publications were translated into Chinese language. From 1920s to 1930s, over half of the publications of translated literature on art history in China are from Japanese works. Nevertheless, little of the content concerned Japanese art. Every one of the books either introduced histories of Western art, or discussed Western art theories. At that time, Japan and Japanese art were not the ultimate goal of Chinese scholars. Rather, for them Japan was more similar to a bridge that linked China with the West.[21]

Changes can also be seen on the institutional level. During the twentieth century, art courses and art history studies based on Japanese experience began to occupy the educational curricula in China. Following the establishment of a modern education system since 1902, there was an urgent need for curricula and textbooks. The early Western art accepted by China was determined only by functional needs. Namely, the drafting requirements of architecture, engineering, and empirical science. The government-operated school of Western learning, the Tongwenguan (同文馆) in Shanghai, which began in the mid-1860s, published the translated "how to" books on Western painting as early as the 1870s.[22] Ink painter Pan Tianshou (潘天寿 1886-1971) viewed art education from a different perspective[23]. In 1936, he published a paper on the development of Western art in China, where he acknowledged that the young people of China had a desire

17 Sullivan, 165-171.
18 Sullivan, 165-171.
19 Guo Hui, "*Writing Chinese Art History in Early Twentieth-Century China"* (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2010)
20 Liu Xiaolu. *Shijie meishu zhong de Zhongguo yu Riben meishu* [Chinese and Japanese Art in World Art]世界美术中的中国与日本美术 (Nanning: Guangxi meishu chubanshe, 2001), 246.
21 Guo, "*Writing,*" 15-28.
22 Julia F. Andrews and Shen Kuiyi, "The Japanese Impact on the Republican Art World: The Construction of Chinese Art History as a Modern Field," *Twentieth-Century China* 32, no. 1 (2006): 4-35. doi:10.1179/tcc.2006.32.1.4.
23 Pan Tianshou, "Yuwai huihua liuru zhongtu kao lüe [Brief investigation into foreign paintings in China] 域外绘画流入中土考略," in Zhongguo huihua shi [A history of Chinese painting] 中国绘画史 (Shanghai: Daxue congshu, 1936; Shanghai: Shanghai renmin meishu chuban she, 1983), 295

to seek and learn Western art, a desire that was more essential to art itself, than merely responding to functional requirements. In the same paper, Pan also acknowledged the accomplishments of Western art education in modern school systems, as well as in the Japanese models. However, he realized that there was no record of accomplishment in his own field, namely, Chinese ink painting. The earliest institution for studying Western art in China was the Nanjing Liangjiang Superior Normal Academy (南京两江优级师范学堂), which was established in 1902. According to Pan, its curriculum was very much similar to that at Tokyo Higher Normal School (东京高等师范学校). Despite the destruction of some well-equipped school facilities in the 1911 revolution, around fifty to sixty graduates developed art teaching career all over China. Western-style painting imported from Japan was promoted by these teachers throughout this new art education system. A functional view of Western-style art was widely spread as part of China's modern curriculum. Nevertheless, by the last years of Qing Dynasty, the Western art practice was only viewed as an ahistorical skill. There was little need in understanding its history.[24]

According to Andrews and Shen, Chinese painting during this period fell into a limbo state. It was officially ignored because in this modern educational system, which came from Japan and essentially the West, it did not have a category. Probably more strongly than other "pre-modern" cultures, China had a long history of art criticism which distinguished high and low culture. Ink painting and calligraphy were seen as the highest form of visual art during the pre-modern period. Literati painting (文人画) was positioned at the pinnacle. Sculpture and architecture, which were valued in the West, were never considered as artistic genius in China and occupied little space in early Chinese art historical writings. Therefore, the ignorance of Chinese painting in modern education system was a denial of the most fundamental part its artistic tradition. It was not until 1911, when Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培) came back from his studies of philosophy in Leipzig University that a higher purpose for art was identified in "modern" Chinese society. In 1912, he gave a speech about what he called "aesthetic education" (美育), in which he separated art from utilitarianism and provided a philosophical bases for art training. To quote Maycing Kao: "Cai's conception [was] that art and its appreciation would contribute to the formation of a new perception of reality – a perception that he considered key to the transformation of Chinese society... In Cai's thinking, love of beauty could help to eliminate greed and prejudice, the obstacles to harmony in the material world...art should ultimately replace religion as the spiritual cultivation of the individual and the unifying principle of society."[25] Soon after, museums and exhibitions were established, and art curriculum were introduced to higher learning institutions. Art was then regarded no longer as only

24 Andrews and Shen, "The Japanese Impact," 4-35.
25 Maycing Kao, "Reforms in Education and the Beginning of the Western-Style Painting Movement in China," in *A Century in Crisis: Modernity and Tradition in the Art of Twentieth Century China*, ed. Julia F. Andrews and Shen Kuiyi (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1998), 146-161.

a tool, but a crucial humanistic activity, which should have a history and needed a canon.[26] Through these intellectual operations results of the interactions with the West, a Chinese notion of "Chinese art" emerged, and what followed was its consolidation in the early twentieth century.

2.3 CANONIZATION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINESE ART HISTORY

Faced with instable political, economic and social conditions during the early twentieth century, Chinese scholars of art attempted to find new canons to affirm their cultural authority. The hierarchy of categories in Chinese art is one issue to be thought about. Before the twentieth century, there was no single word in classical Chinese conforming to the Western concept of fine arts. Although certain amount of theoretical and biographical writings about calligraphy and ink painting survived from the fourth to the nineteenth century, few historical monographs say much about other forms of artistic production. In pre-modern China, architecture, sculpture, bronze, and decorative arts were regarded differently from painting and calligraphy.[27] Painting and calligraphy were seen as proof of a scholar's personal cultivation and high social status. On the contrary, other forms of art, such as bronze and ceramics, were out of their concern. From the late nineteenth century, Chinese art started to embrace a new notion and different categories of art in tune with the Western concept. For example, Jiang Danshu (姜丹书), Teng Gu (滕固), and Li Puyuan (李朴园) first followed the Western analysis by making architecture as the supreme topic of discussion, demoting painting as the second, and omitting any mention of calligraphy. It was explained by Jiang that architecture led the development of art, while sculpture and painting were subordinate to it. Zhu Jieqin (朱杰勤) was less radical and included calligraphy in his art historical writings, putting calligraphy between painting and sculpture. Whereas Zheng Wuchang (郑午昌) used a new order: sculpture, architecture, painting, calligraphy, and ceramics. These scholar's choices reveal their efforts in showing the significance of Chinese art in accordance with Western artistic values. Chinese art was positioned in parallel with Western art, which was an attempt to demonstrate the comparability of Chinese art to Western art. Nevertheless, there were also compromises. For example, as Western studies devoted most attention to bronze, lacquer, ceramics, and decorative arts since the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese scholars also dedicated to these art forms as a consequence.[28]

The temporal structure given to Chinese art history also has played a crucial role in the canonization of the discipline. A temporal structure, or shape

26 Andrews and Shen, "The Japanese Impact," 4-35.
27 Guo Hui, "Canonization in early twentieth century Chinese Art History," *Journal of Art historiography*, no.10 (June 2014), 1-16.
28 Guo, "Canonization", 1-16.

of time, defines what is the canon of a discipline in a certain period of history and marks its differences to another period. Writing art history in China during the early twentieth century was closely in relation to a new consciousness of time, which also influenced the process of defining a new canon of national culture. The temporal frameworks emerged in this period offered a new logic and structure for the canons of Chinese art.[29] While some authors still employed the imperial reigns dating system, the Western calendar was also increasingly used. Painter Fu Baoshi (傅抱石, 1904-1965), for example, used both Chinese and Western calendar in the table of content to indicate the date of era in his *Chronological Table of Chinese Art* (《中国美术年报》)[30]. Such temporal arrangement inscribed the modern system of time onto the traditional one. It indicates a new linear perception of time, which was also a founding construction of Chinese modernity.[31] Prior to this, the writing of history was periodized only according to imperial regimes. Other art history authors, such as Li Puyuan (李朴园), provided only the Western dates. He adopted a unified calendrical dating system tracing art history, establishing its beginning and its end. This suggested a new coherence in Chinese art history, where the relations between different dates are presented without the cultural impact that dynastic nomenclature inevitably has.[32]

Unlike dynastic history, art history challenges the power of chronological time based on political regimes.[33] In this new temporal disposition, art objects had their own sequence of time in relation to each other, which was different from the dynastic time. In Pan Tianshou's (潘天寿) book in 1926, however, he pointed out that it was difficult to find the material needed for a sequential and comprehensive history. Then he listed three sources: *Peiwenzhai shuhuapu* (Peiwenzhai Caligraphy and Painting Book, 佩文斋书画谱), Nakamura Fusetsu (中村不折 1868-1943) and Oga Seiun's (小鹿青雲) *Shina kaigashi* (History of Chinese Painting, 支那绘画史), and *Meishu congshu* Book of Art, 美术丛书).[34] Pan Tianshou not only consulted the Japanese sources, but his work was also a direct translation of Nakamura Fusetsu and Oga Seiun's book in 1913 (See Figure 1). There were discussions about the reason why Pan Tianshou used this book's system of periodization to develop his work on Chinese painting history. Its prestige, convenience, and coherence were surely important, but the most essential reason was that this historical framework served Pan Tianshou's generation's reformist purpose during the Republican period of China. The history of painting was divided into the ancient period (上世史) from pre-Han to

29 Guo, "Canonization", 1-16.
30 Guo, 1-16.
31 Leo Ou-fan Lee, "Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945, " in *The American Historical Review* 105, no.4 (October 2000): 1274-1275.
32 Guo, "Canonization", 1-16.
33 Siegfried Kracauer, *History: The Last Things before the Last* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 143-145.
34 Pan, 中国绘画史 (A history of Chinese Painting) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926), preface, 2-3.

the Sui dynasty, the medieval period (中世史) from Tang to Yuan, and the Early Modern Period (近世史) from Ming to Qing. Pan Tianshou completely followed this system of periodization from Nakamura-Oga's book, using their terms to label the historical periods. This book offered the Chinese a solution to the problem of how to value China's art in the past, while still condemn the late Qing decline.[35] For Nakamura, the art of Song and Ming was highly praised, while the orthodoxy of literati paintings after Dong Qichang (董其昌, 1555-1636) were condemned. He claimed that the civil service examination system caused a reduction of creativity, as scholars all sought to develop their work into a conventionalized *baguwen* (八股文) format. Therefore, he regarded the late Ming and Qing dynasties as a decline. The viewpoint of a Qing decline fit well the ideological stance of most artistic scholars in the world during that period, while the highlight of the Japanese authors and the Chinese translators were quite different.[36]

Among Japanese thinkers, the theory of China's decline was widespread. However, for Chinese writers, the same words could imply different meanings. On the one hand, the recognition of China's great past made possible the sense of a cultural pride, which was a powerful claim against the humiliations that China underwent during the previous decades. The decline itself, on the other hand, was for Chinese readers a call to arms, rather than submission. As Andrews and Shen argue, this call was a crucial part of the culturally nationalist project of creating an art history that could express the greatness of Chinese people both as individuals and a collectivity. With an aim of overthrowing the legacy of Qing dynasty during the Republican China, Chinese art history ended it with a confidence in the future of Chinese art.[37] If Japan borrowed, and then absorbed, Western art's historical formulation, then China borrowed the Japanese version of the occidental structures and absorbed it. Chinese art history as a modern discipline thus came into being in no more than a decade during the 1920s on the basis of Japanese organizational frameworks. Nevertheless, after the Japanese occupation to Manchuria in 1931, it became unfashionable to mention the Japanese contributions to Chinese art history.[38] They have been thus largely forgotten. The Chinese did not wish to encourage a harmonious cultural exchange between China and Japan during the early Republican era, since this could be considered as ideological weapons which justify the Japanese aggression.

35 Andrews and Shen, "The Japanese Impact," 4-35.
36 Andrews and Shen, "The Japanese Impact," 4-35.
37 Julia F. Andrews and Kuiyi Shen, "The Traditionalist Response to Modernity: The Chinese Painting Society of Shanghai," in *Visual Culture in Shanghai, 1850s-1930s,* ed. Jason C. Kuo, (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2007).
38 Andrews and Shen, "The Japanese Impact," 4-35.

Pan Tianshou (潘天壽)
***Zhongguo huihuashi* (中國繪畫史 1926)**

Part I: Early History (上世史)
Ch. 1 Ancient Painting
Ch. 2 Han Painting
Ch. 3 Painting of the Wei-Jin and Six Dynasties Periods
1. General Introduction to Wei-Jin and Six Dynasties Culture
2. Painting of Wei and Jin
3. The Northern and Southern Dynasties
Ch. 4 Sui Dynasty Painting

Part II. Painting of the Medieval Period (中世史)
Ch. 1 Tang Painting
1. General Introduction to Tang Culture
2. Early Tang Painting
3. Late Tang Painting
4. Tang Dynasty Painting Theory
Ch. 2 Five Dynasties Painting
1. Painting of Southern Tang
2. Painting of Early and late Shu
3. Landscape and Miscellaneous Painting of the Five Dynasties period
2. Painting of Early and late Shu
3. Landscape and Miscellaneous Painting of the Five Dynasties period
Ch. 3 Song Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Song Culture
2. Song Painting Academy
3. Song Painting
a. Landscape Painting
b. Buddhist and Daoist Figure Painting
c. Bird and Flower Painting
d. Ink Plum Blossom and Bamboo and Miscellaneous Painting
4. Song Painting Theory

Ch. 4 Yuan Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Yuan Culture
2. Yuan Painting

Part III: Early Modern Painting (近世史)
Ch. 1 Ming Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Ming Culture
2. Ming Painting Academy
3. The Evolution of Ming landscape
a. Zhe School
b. Court Painting
c. Wu School Painting
4. Ming Dynasty Buddhist and Daoist and Genre Painting
5. Ming Bird-and-Flower Painting and Miscellaneous Painting
Ch. 2 Qing Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Qing Culture
2. The Evolution of Landscape Painting
3. The Evolution of Figure Painting
4. Bird-and-Flower and Miscellaneous Painting

Nakamura Fusetsu (中村不折) and Oga Seiun (小鹿青雲)
***Shina kaigashi* (支那繪畫史 1913)**

Part I: Early History (上世史)
Ch. 1 Pre-Han Painting
Ch. 2 Han Painting
Ch. 3 Six Dynasties Painting
1. General Introduction to Six Dynasties Culture
2. The Wei-Jin Period
3. The Period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties
4. The Sui Dynasty
Part II: Painting of the Medieval Period (中世史)
Ch. 1 Tang Painting
1. General Introduction to Tang Culture
2. Early Tang Painting
3. Later Tang Painting
4. Tang Dynasty Painting Criticism
Ch. 2 Five Dynasties Painting

Ch. 3 Song Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Song Culture
2. Song Painting Academy
3. The Development of Painting Style in the Song Period
a. Development of Landscape Painting
b. Evolution of Buddhist and Daoist Figure Painting
c. Development of Bird and Flower and Miscellaneous Painting
d. Painting Criticism of the Song Period
Ch. 4 Yuan Painting
1. General Introduction to Yuan Culture
2. The Evolution of Yuan Painting

Part III: Early Modern Painting (近世史)
Ch. 1 Ming Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Ming Culture
2. Ming Painting Academy
3. Landscape Painting
a. Zhe School
b. Court Painting
c. Wu School Painting
4. The Evolution of Buddhist, Daoist, and Genre Painting
5. Bird-and-Flower Painting and Miscellaneous Painting
Ch. 2 Qing Dynasty Painting
1. General Introduction to Qing Culture
2. Landscape Painting
3. Figure Painting
4. Bird-and-Flower and Monochrome Ink Painting

Figure 1: Pan Tianshou's 1926 *Zhongguo Huihuashi* & Nakamura Fusetsu and Oga Seiun's 1913 *Shina kaigashi*. A side-by-side comparison.[39]

39 Andrews and Shen, "The Japanese Impact," 20.

Joachim Kurtz called the wave of historical interest during the 1920s China the "twin obsessions with antiquity and modernity".[40] On the one hand, archaeological findings encouraged the nation to rely on its prosperous past. On the other hand, Republican China's failure stimulated painful doubts on its ability to adapt to the modern age.[41] In the early twentieth century, China needed a rapid modernization. Nevertheless, it is arbitrary to argue that the transformation towards a modern era was a one-way cultural transfer. Within the transformation, there are adaptions, selections, compromises, negotiations, assimilations, and conversations. The "truths" in the art history discipline in China are not to be taken for granted, but rather we should consider that they were shaped after what was valued at the time, pursuing certain purposes during a specific time. It is the ethical and political structures that allow and constitute them to be thought about in particular ways. Ultimately, the Chinese found their need to develop their own, and sometimes nationalistic, discourse. This transcultural interchange was an essential part of the emergence and construction of the discipline of Chinese art history.

CONCLUSION: IS ART HISTORY GLOBAL?

About Chinese painting, James Elkins has observed: "It seems to me that no matter how seriously you take Chinese painting, no matter how long a time you spend studying it, if you are within art history, as it is generally construed you can never take Chinese painting as seriously as you take Western art." Further on he added: "In order to see [Chinese art] as central…you have to give up large parts of the discipline of art history."[42] This indicates that the usual plots of the "history of art" do not adequately accommodate non-Western cultures and traditions. As Monica Juneja suggests, it is an urgent task to examine the genealogy of narrating worldliness in art history, as it directs our attention to the epistemic foundations, which continue to shape our current scholarly practice.[43] It is thus necessary to rethink these epistemic moorings as well as the values they transport.

In conclusion, this essay has employed the method of "problematization", which examines how certain knowledge is regulated under specific circumstances, to study the construction of Chinese art history as a modern discipline in the early twentieth century. China did borrow a Western art history

40 Joachim Kurtz, "Chinese Dreams of Middle Ages," in *The Medieval History Journal* 21, no.1 (2018): 13, Sage Publications, Doi: 10.1177/0971945817753874
41 Joachim Kurtz, "Chinese Dreams, 1-24.
42 James Elkins, in Interview with Tamara Bissell, *Umění* 46 (1998), 151.
43 Juneja, "Alternative," 79-107.

formulation from Japan for her own art historical writings. This global reach, however, was not the effect of a cultural transfer alone. Rather, it must be understood as historical actors responding to a series of discursive changes. If we talk about a global art history in its singular form, as modernism tends to do, it signals towards an inclusive feature and inevitably overlooks certain cultures when they do not fit the logic of an overall structure. It is thus necessary to find a way to underline the relationships between cultures that encompass both disparities and contradictions, and negotiate among multiple subjectivities of actors involved.[44] Rather than understanding Chinese art history as an addition to an existed canon of Western art history, a transcultural understanding of globality, which takes into account the entanglement between cultures and defines cultures within the context of nation-building, is suggested in this paper. In comparison with one global art history, art histories in their plural forms could be defined upon the relationships where they are implicated. This would further mean to approach time and space not as linear and homogenous, but through the logic of contingent historical practices.

44 Juneja, "Alternative," 79-107.

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Public h

What does it mean to do public history? Do we mean using the methods of our discipline in and with publics? Which publics? Do we mean emphasizing the use of our knowledge in contemporary debates of contemporary issues? Do we mean involving publics in the past? Again: which publics? And which pasts? What might a global public history be, and how are all of us, as humans, participants in the understanding, creation, and adaptation of global pasts?

C

istory

The two articles presented in this, the debut of this journal's public history section, offer two provocative answers to these questions. Virgil Taylor's essay on a new form of Extremely Online queer public history invites thought about how publics (and political subjects?) form around the creative reinterpretation and reclamation of historical events, while Carla Panico's discussion of abyssal thinking in the contemporary politics Italian migration demonstrates how historical discourses of exclusion can evolve, flex, and grow in response to social conditions.

Introduction by: **BEN MILLER**

Some Thoughts About Doing Queer Public History Online

by:
VIRGIL BENJAMIN
GOODMAN TAYLOR

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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The death of George H. W. Bush in at the beginning of December 2018 now seems a distant political moment, a small coincidence in the march of time. But as the world responded to his passing on or about World AIDS Day, some patterns and networks of responses to this coincidence suggested an answer to the question: What might be a queer public history online? This paper will attempt this answer by focusing on how queer publics mediated this historic occasion,[1] focusing on how social media networks active and nurture these publics. I will begin with Avram Finkelstein's personal Facebook page. Finkelstein was an active member of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power and the agit-prop group Gran Fury, whose bold public-facing graphics continue to define the popular memory of the activist response to HIV/AIDS in New York City. He has recently published a major contribution to the field of AIDS history, *After Silence: A History of AIDS through Its Images*.[2] I noticed a pattern that Saturday, a recurring post on Finkelstein's page featured, at the top, a ghostly but high-contrast image of an angry-looking President Bush under the words SERIAL KILLER; at the bottom, a litany of Bush's failures to address HIV/AIDS during his presidency. The poster (Figure 1) was created by Finkelstein and Vincent Gagliostro for the 21 May 1990 ACT UP action at the National Institutes of Health.[3] This and other images of ACT UP's anti-Bush actions circulated quite well throughout the day. The language of those images reverberated, soon circulating as a headline in OUT Magazine, an American LGBTQ publication.[4]

In a conversation about these posts on his page, Finkelstein saw possibility in the gathering of like-minded people on Facebook. "People squat on my page…[and] consider my history theirs and use it as a way of gauging their own feelings about a moment."[5] His is a critical approach towards Facebook, not as a neutral space of sociality but as a space where control and ownership "of our image commons in a digital age' is at stake."[6] Privatization and alienation abound in social media—it is not a public space because, for Finkelstein, "public spaces are by nature interrogative" and on Facebook, the self-mediation is "declarative rather than interrogative", and "in order for [public spaces] to function, they need to be, they should be [interrogative]."[7] Finkelstein's pointed towards possibilities of social media which emphasize 'meaning making' and 'consciousness raising' throughout in our conversation, the latter a political practice with deep roots in the U. S. left and of particular importance to Finkelstein.

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1 Michel Foucault, "Friendship as a Way of Life," in *Foucault Live: Interviews, 1961-1984*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. John Johnston, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series (New York, NY: Semiotexte(e), 1989), 207.
2 Avram Finkelstein, *After Silence: A History of AIDS through Its Images* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018).
3 Avram Finkelstein, Personal Communication, video call, December 20, 2018.
4 Phillip Picardi, "'George Bush, Serial Killer': ACT UP's Fight Against the President," *OUT Magazine*, December 1, 2018, https://www.out.com/out-exclusives/2018/12/01/george-bush-serial-killer-act-ups-fight-against-president.
5 Finkelstein, Personal Communication.
6 Finkelstein, Personal Communication.
7 Finkelstein, Personal Communication.

As news of Bush's death spread via breaking news alerts and posts, I first caught wind of his passing early in the morning in London. I remember thinking that the former President hadn't actually died. There is the true order of events, that Bush's death on 30 November did not align with the annual marking of World AIDS Day on the first of December, but there is also the very real feeling (based on Bush's late-evening death and the peak of commemoration taking place the next day) that it did—an agreed upon fact which guided the many conversations and tweets which this paper will take as its subject. If history will not agree with us, what are we to make of this feeling of history's potential coincidences, the rhyming of time and space? for our spectacles and our sensations of outrage? I first read the news in a joke, a clever Ariana Grande reference the day after her much-anticipated music video dropped. [8] It was a tweet of an unflattering picture of Henry Kissinger (figure 2) captioned with "George H. W. Bush: *dies*//me: thank u, next.[9]" It took a few more hours for me to understand that he had actually died.

I can recall this sort of feeling when other monumental figures of the American right-wing passed away, notably when Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was found suddenly dead—there was a queer and communal joy that rang out over texts and online: "Dead Scalia Twitter is lit.[10]" Online and off my friends react to these events with humour and glee. More than just a good laugh, it is a means of reinforcing a shared understanding of the history attached to a given figure, a history that we tell differently than those in power.

The titular *queer* in this essay might best be located here. Not affixed to particular sexual practices or identities gender identities but instead attached to the forms of relations to which those social conditions attune us. Queer is the enactment of a sensation of difference, and a desire to see the world contain the possibilities that that sensation inaugurates. As Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner note in their essay "Sex in Public," "queer worlds do not have the power to represent a taken-for-granted social existence."[11] We must craft this public, and the relations contained within will always already be novel. It is in this way that the cumulative effect of these small actions taken online, habitual responses to networks we participate in, might be a public history made across a shared infrastructure of queer repose because they already intend to alter those dominant infrastructures which hold us uncomfortably to narratives which would have us erased.

Here is a good place to look a bit more historically, to return to the media from those early days in December. But first, to draw further back, let's remind ourselves that these queer public networks did not and do not arise merely in

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8 Ariana Grande, "thank u, next," November 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gl1aHhXnN1k.
9 Volcelot Revolver (@costaggini), "George H. W. Bush: *dies* Me: Thank u, next Pic.Twitter.Com/QhpVt3fUcl," Tweet (blog), December 1, 2018, https://twitter.com/costaggini/status/1068744267160375298.
10 Brandy Jensen @BrandyLJensen, "Dead Scalia Twitter Is Lit," Tweet (blog), February 13, 2016, https://twitter.com/BrandyLJensen/status/698645791850758145.
11 Michael Warner and Lauren Berlant, "Sex in Public," in *Publics and Counterpublics* (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2002), 314, note 22.

response to Bush's death. On 11 March 2016, Zed Books tweeted Donald Moffett's "He Kills Me" (1987)[12] poster (Figure 3a) after Hillary Clinton grossly misstated Nancy Reagan's commitment to HIV/AIDS on the occasion of Reagan's funeral.[13] Then-candidate Clinton commented on MSNBC:

> It may be hard for your viewers to remember how difficult it was for people to talk about HIV/AIDS back in the 1980s, and because of both President and Mrs. Reagan, in particular Mrs. Reagan, we started a national conversation when before nobody would talk about it, nobody wanted to do anything about it, and, you know, that too is something that I really appreciate with her very effective, low-key advocacy, but it penetrated the public conscious and people began to say "Hey we've got to do something about this too."[14]

Clinton posits herself as both as knowing more about the history of HIV/AIDS and by saying "we," insinuates herself as a central figure in the AIDS crisis, displacing community activists with an alliance of herself and the notably uncaring Nancy Reagan.[15] I replied to Zed Book's tweet of Moffett's original poster—a diptych of an orange and black target pattern paired with a formal portrait of President Reagan created for the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) to protest Reagan's late and insufficient response to AIDS—with new images: replacing Reagan in Moffett's composition with similar formal portraits of Clinton and Mrs. Reagan (Figure 3b) overlaid with the text "SHE KILLS ME.[16]"

As Clinton misrepresented the past, we were able to recollect it and reengage with the tools of 1987 in 2016. That same aesthetic gesture still had weight. Sharing my new Nancy Reagan poster on Facebook, Ted Kerr wrote "Her Nostalgia Is Killing People,[17]" calling back to Vincent Chevalier and Ian Bradley-Perrin 2013 contribution to poster/VIRUS, *Your Nostalgia Is Killing Me!* (Figure 4), wherein nostalgia is configured as "the unpinning of our past from the

12 International Center of Photography, "He Kills Me," International Center of Photography, March 3, 2016, https://www.icp.org/browse/archive/objects/he-kills-me.
13 Zed Books (@ZedBooks), "#ANationalConversation @HillaryClinton pic.twitter.com/VtYWA3li4k," Tweet, (blog), March 11, 2016, https://twitter.com/ZedBooks/status/708389966729125888.
14 MSNBC (@MSNBC), "Hillary Clinton: The Reagans, Particularly Nancy, Helped Start 'a National Conversation' about HIV and AIDS.Http://Nbcnews.to/1RcyBSw," Tweet (blog), March 11, 2016, https://twitter.com/MSNBC/status/708363242737766401.
15 Michael Specter, "Hillary Clinton, Nancy Reagan, and AIDS," *New Yorker*, March 12, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/hillary-clinton-nancy-reagan-and-aids.
16 Virgil B/G Taylor (@fag_tips), "They All Kill Me @ZedBooks @HillaryClintonpic.Twitter.Com/SgOVdQLqtc," Tweet (blog), March 11, 2016, https://twitter.com/fag_tips/status/708412193906302976.
17 Theodore (Ted) Kerr, "Theodore Kerr - Her Nostalgia Is Killing People...," Facebook, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/theodore.kerr.1/posts/10153314066236300.

circumstances from which the fights were born.[18]" The work being done here, online, is the repinning our present to its pasts, against the tides that would leave us unattached, and affirming that "the history [is] real and tethered to a time and place and reason such that the output is responding to today and is ready for tomorrow.[19]"

The immediate coverage of Bush's demise was glowing. A video posted alongside his *New York Times* obituary calls him the nation's "uncle[20]" and the obituary itself does not once mention HIV/AIDS.[21] Broadly, it seems the mass media was inclined to rosily recall Bush and to not mention his legacy on HIV/AIDS (not to mention his other legacies of violence as a President and CIA director). The obituaries were indeed quite warm: *The Economist* folksily gave their obituary the headline "Doing his darnedest.[22]" Widely, his death was framed the loss of a certain kind of public figure—the loss of respectability and "hard-hearted[23]" WASP patricians. Like Clinton's twisted recollection of the Reagans, nostalgia for imaginary good service overshadows the past and its troubles. Ross Douthat's paean[24] to these lost (elected) aristocrats was quickly parodied.[25] This attitude of reverence was widespread and well-enforced, involving the whole country with few expenses spared: the United States Postal Service suspended deliveries[26] and a special funeral train crossed Texas towards his grave, the first since Eisenhower.[27]

Some mass media eventually came to less hagiographic conclusions on Bush's legacy. *Democracy Now!* ran nine headlines in the week following his death detailing Bush's "war crimes," "racism," "his many victims" and more.[28] *The Intercept's* podcast called him a war criminal, with host Jeremy Scahill saying that the President "spent the overwhelming majority of his life making the world a worse place, a more dangerous place," and described the days following his death as "a grotesque canonization of one of [the United States] imperial saints… every media outlet in this country, every politician, Democrat and Republican, is

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18 Vincent Chevalier and Ian Bradley-Perrin, "Your Nostalgia Is Killing Me!," poster/VIRUS, 2013, http://postervirus.tumblr.com/post/67569099579/your-nostalgia-is-killing-me-vincent-chevalier.
19 Chevalier and Bradley-Perrin, "Your Nostalgia Is Killing Me!"
20 Peter Baker, Robin Stein, and David Bott, *George H.W. Bush: A Life of Public Service* (The New York Times, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/video/obituaries/100000005865853/president-george-h-w-bush-obituary.html.
21 Adam Nagourney, "George Bush, Who Steered Nation in Tumultuous Times, Is Dead at 94," *The New York Times*, December 5, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/us/politics/george-hw-bush-dies.html.
22 The Economist, "Obituary: George H.W. Bush Died on November 30th," *The Economist*, December 8, 2018, https://www.economist.com/obituary/2018/12/08/obituary-george-hw-bush-died-on-november-30th.
23 Franklin Foer, "The Last WASP President," *The Atlantic*, December 2, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/george-hw-bush-last-wasp-president/577156/.
24 Ross Douthat, "Opinion | Why We Miss the WASPs," *The New York Times*, December 5, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/opinion/george-bush-wasps.html.
25 Consumerjism (@kamilumin), "pic.twitter.com/8sWljb4kTI," Tweet (blog), December 5, 2018, https://twitter.com/kamilumin/status/1070314836901462017.
26 United States Postal Service, "National Day of Mourning | USPS," December 2018, https://www.usps.com/national-day-of-mourning/welcome.htm.
27 Will Weissert and David J. Phillip, "Bush's Presidential Funeral Train First in Nearly 50 Years," AP NEWS, December 7, 2018, https://apnews.com/fd4a3d8b2a9e4b8199637174ecc4ef26.
28 Democracy Now!, "Show Archive: December 2018," Democracy Now!, accessed January 3, 2019, https://www.democracynow.org/shows/2018/12.

engaged in collective eulogy based on lies.[29]" WNYC's *On The Media* asked, in their broadcast one week after Bush's death, what would it mean give an honest account of his legacy. The host, Brooke Gladstone, concluded that we cannot give over questions of legacy to eulogy. Presidents are "not a subject for public eulogizing like a film star. He, so far he, no longer belongs to his family or friends." Quoting her guest Anne Helen Petersen, of Buzzfeed, Gladstone admonishes her listeners that the President "by dint of the power he wields belongs to us all.[30]" The funeral of a President, in this frame, is a moment to take personally the history and legacy of the nation.

On social media folks rushed to correct the record. Lena Solow tweeted: "mourning the thousands who died of AIDS while Reagan/Bush laughed, cut AIDS research, barred HIV+ people from entering country. never sugarcoat[sic] a president's legacy after death, but especially not on World AIDS Day."[31] This initial tweet did quite well on the social network, at the time of writing garnering 19,132 retweets and 60,001 likes.[32] Witnessing this sudden and substantial gathering around her post, Solow reached out to her friends, including the writer, to research replies to her post that would not only back up her claims, but add to her reader's understanding: imploring in one reply "don't forget your history - civility didn't make the WH [White House] focus on AIDS, sustained militant direct action did.[33]"

In her essay 'The Commons: Infrastructures for Troubling Times" the queer theorist and historian Lauren Berlant defines

> "'structure' … as that which organizes transformation and 'infrastructure' as that which binds us to the world in movement and keeps the world practically bound to itself; and I am proposing that one task for makers of critical social form is to offer not just judgment about positions and practices in the world, but terms of transition that alter the harder and softer, tighter and looser infrastructures of sociality itself. [34]

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29 Intercepted, "Intercepted Podcast: George H.W. Bush (1924-2018), American War Criminal," *The Intercept* (blog), December 5, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/12/05/george-h-w-bush-1924-2018-american-war-criminal/.
30 Brooke Gladstone, "Remembering the President Completely | On the Media," *WNYC Studios*, December 7, 2018, https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/remembering-president-completely.
31 Lena Solow, "Mourning the Thousands Who Died of AIDS While Reagan/Bush Laughed, Cut AIDS Research, Barred HIV+ People from Entering Country. Never Sugarcoat a President's Legacy after Death, but Especially Not on World AIDS Day," Tweet, *@lenaruthsolow* (blog), December 1, 2018, https://twitter.com/lenaruthsolow/status/1068876734139953152.
32 Lena Solow, "Mourning the Thousands Who Died…"
33 Lena Solow (@lenaruthsolow), "And Speaking of the Past, Don't Forget Your History - Civility Didn't Make the WH Focus on AIDS, Sustained Militant Direct Action Didhttps://Newint.Org/Columns/Mark-Engler/2017/07/01/Act-up …," Tweet (blog), December 1, 2018, https://twitter.com/lenaruthsolow/status/1068943419152769025.
34 Lauren Berlant, "The Commons: Infrastructures for Troubling Times*," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 34, no. 3 (June 2016): 394, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775816645989.

The re-mediated history, the means and methods of sharing on Twitter and Facebook and the direct messages which cut across these platforms, are kinds of *structure*: sharing to counter the mainstream narrative can be transformative. But it is humour, glee, the queer reconfiguring that is the *infrastructure*—"that which binds us to the world in movement and keeps the world practically bound to itself." These modes, my focus, are what we hold onto as we travel, what keeps us returning, the very base from which we make meaning, what enables us to recognize and hear each other through the noise of a room or a Twitter timeline. Berlant's call to action can be read as a call for the "consciousness raising" that Finkelstein staked out as his goal for his Facebook presence. This task cuts to the responsibility of these queer actors online (and, as always, off).

In a reading at The Poetry Project in New York City, Sophia Hussain presented a new unpublished essay poem entitled "Time"[35] (Appendix A) which regards with rage the deaths of both Bush and his wife Barbara Bush in 2018—eight months apart—with a critique which echoes and shapes this essay.[36] Hussain breaks into laughter while reading the line "When Barbara Bush died, the Women's March tweeted: "Rest in peace and power Barbara Bush.[[37]]"[38]" Hussain's laugh begs the question: How could an organization that claims to be "grassroots," "inclusive" and "resistance"[39] venerate a public figure whose record is at odds with their own? Hussain ad-libs through a wide smile "They haven't taken it down." These deaths are critical moments of political revelation. The audience at the Poetry Project laughs with Hussain. When Professor Claire Potter tweeted sympathetically about George W. Bush's personal loss, students at her university responded by posting screenshots of her tweet on campus: "Twitter-shaming…gone post-digital![40]" Shaming, sure, but also an expression of a desire to have one's own version of the story publicly told. When we let well-tarnished public records be polished, we are witnessing our own erasure from history. This is more than mere shaming or mere laughter. Hussain frames these laughs and tweets as "the glee of refusal, and how good that feels[41]" or, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick famously asks us: "What makes pleasure and amelioration so "mere"?[42]"

Understanding the means of mediation are essential to any history,

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35 Sophia Hussain, "Time" (Poem, December 3, 2018).
36 The Poetry Project, "Sophia Hussain & Dave Morse," The Poetry Project, 2018, https://www.poetryproject.org/events/sophia-hussain-dave-morse/.
37 Women's March (@womensmarch), "Rest in Peace and Power, Barbara Bush.Pic.Twitter.Com/Gl8elYd8A6," Tweet (blog), April 18, 2018, https://twitter.com/womensmarch/status/986418934852280320?lang=en.
38 Justin Lane Briggs, *Sophia Hussain, Poetry Project 12.03.18 Pt 1* (The Poetry Project, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aHcLzc8rqc.
39 Women's March, "Unity Principles," Women's March, 2018, https://www.womensmarch.com/principles/.
40 Claire Potter (@TenuredRadical), "And in Case You Are Inerested, @TomSugrue, Apparently the Twitter-Shaming Has Actually Gone Post-Digital! These, Apparently, Are Posted around @TheNewSchool. It's so Odd That Expressing Sympathy for Someone Whose Parents Died Has Produced Such Hysteriapic.Twitter.Com/U4Soolp4V1," Tweet (blog), December 6, 2018, https://twitter.com/TenuredRadical/status/1070701116126564352.
41 Hussain, "Time."
42 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity*, Series Q (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 144.

particularly for the history of the oppressed, who we might best understand as taking up these means not by choice but out of necessity. We must attend to moments of exclusion from mediation.[43] We must also listen closely to the ways in which we are seen or heard. Writing in 1990, Ray Navarro and Cat Saalfield reflect that, "for a new Person With AIDS (PWA), his lover, and their friend, the phone becomes a veritable lifeline connecting us with each other and with our cultures, those which have affirmed us, prepared us, sustained us, moved us from being "innocent" to being armed."[44]

The AIDS crisis gave new meanings to the world around us. In *Equipped*, another co-authored work from 1990 with Zoe Leonard, Navarro and Leonard reimagine the artifacts of Navarro's illness, shortly before he passed away—his wheelchair, walker and cane—as sexy libidinal prostheses (Figure 5).[45] If in Navarro's work we see AIDS as an occasion for the transformation of these devices, perhaps we can also engage with the remediation of the internet as something more than it is, even as it remediates us. As noted by Dan Udy, "HIV infection became re-configured as a chronic but manageable illness just as Internet access entered a period of rapid expansion with the coincidental deployment of the first effective protease inhibitors and the first mass-market web browser, Netscape Navigator in 1995." [46]

As in any year, 2018 was marked by the loss of notable public figures. Although 'astonishing' numbers of readers turned to the New York Times' obituary pages that year,[47] it is difficult to say if any year is more or less about the death of the famous. But these notable, newsworthy deaths—the surprising and coincidental ones in particular—are a productive ground for contending with history and our relationship to it. Although I've selected just a few key examples, these deaths and coincidences are illuminated not by a few loud critics but, to quote George H.W. Bush, by 'a thousand points of light.[48]' Each of us join in a chorus—a loud cacophony of assonance and dissonance, resounding and clamouring together, and it is this echoic quality that offers one a sense of scale, as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun suggests: '"Repetition becomes a way to measure scale in an almost inconceivably vast communications network.[49]" In her book *Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media,* Chun makes strides against

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43 Theodore (Ted) Kerr, "AIDS 1969: HIV, History, and Race," *Drain Magazine* 13, no. 2 (2016), http://drainmag.com/aids-1969-hiv-history-and-race/.
44 Ray Navarro and Catherine Saalfield, "Shocking Pink Praxis: Race and Gender on the ACT UP Frontlines," in *Inside/out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories*, ed. Diana Fuss (New York: Routledge, 1991).
45 Ray Navarro and Zoe Leonard, "Equipped," icaboston.org, 2018, https://www.icaboston.org/art/ray-navarro-zoe-leonard/equipped.
46 Udy, "Going Viral: Remediating AIDS in the YouTube Decade," 24.
47 William McDonald, "Deaths Seized the Attention of Millions in 2018, Sometimes Surprisingly," *The New York Times*, December 27, 2018, sec. Obituaries, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/obituaries/deaths-in-2018.html.
48 George H.W. Bush, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans | The American Presidency Project," August 18, 1988, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-new.
49 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, "The Enduring Ephemeral, or the Future Is a Memory," *Critical Inquiry* 35, no. 1 (September 2008): 148–71, https://doi.org/10.1086/595632.

framing new media as *new* and presents a model of digital media as a field of habituation and crisis.[50] We might imagine these historic coincidences as crises—moments of exception that reveal our habits. The crisis is when the mask is pulled off, the revelation of our assumptions of norms, allowing us to see the gaps we mistook for solid ground. These moments of crisis are made critical through the shock of seeing glowing recollections of figures we might better describe with words like "genocidal."[51] They become crises as new media has habituated our relationship to mass media, and on these occasions those media rub against our ways of using these (new) media. Chun's work and attention to network theory is particularly suggestive for public history. Chun writes that: "Networks are both science fiction and the historical present. They describe future projections as though they really existed; they relay past events as if they were unfolding in the present.[52]" Here Chun is mapping digital networks as a mode of interacting with time. In that *time* is always at play or in question on the network—we might understand that those of us who find ourselves well-mediated, well-reflected in networked communities, as always already doing a sort of public history.

Queerness is the inappropriate pose which pervades these online activities: "I hate to dance on his grave, but...well, here I am, cutting a rug." [53] We laugh, we thunder in our shared outrage, we form new bonds in our sense of history. We might extend Elizabeth Freeman's erotohistoriography from the erotic and into the gleeful and rageful: "the "inappropriate" response of eros in the face of sorrow as a trace of past forms of pleasure located in specific historical moments."[54] It is worth noting that in the contemporary queer's interaction with platforms like Twitter (and until recently Tumblr[55]) the content discussed here is often interrupted with erotic and pornographic material, the boundary between the two is fungible. In my own work I have found intermingling the erotic with the "gleeful or rageful" feelings that intersperse it to be productive. Freeman's theoretical framework also attends to the *feeling* of history. The digital is as tactile as it is imagined. The glass slab of the smartphone should be seen as a locus of intimacy that, as Evan Calder Williams puts it, we 'touch, rub, tap, worry, flick, and stroke...at least once an hour, almost every hour.[56]' While the feelings expressed above are not strictly erotic, the manner of expression onto these tightly held object certainly is adjacent to *eros*; we may not be fucking[57] but we are feeling history with every thwack of thumb to glass.

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50 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016), 2.
51 Hussain, "Time."
52 Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same*, 50.
53 margarine of error, "@BrandyLJensen I Hate to Dance on His Grave, but...Well, Here I Am, Cutting a Rug."
54 Elizabeth Freeman, "Time Binds, or, Erotohistoriography," *Social Text* 23, no. 3-4 (84-85) (2005): 65.
55 BBC News, "Tumblr to Ban All Pornographic Content," December 3, 2018, sec. Technology, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46434711.
56 Evan Calder Williams, *Shard Cinema* (London: Repeater Books, an imprint of Watkins Media Ltd, 2017), 38.
57 T謝 (@t1ffany4scale), "This Onscreen Keyboard Likes a Good Spanking from My Thumbs," Tweet (blog), March 8, 2017, https://twitter.com/t1ffany4scale/status/839349262550990848.

The work done online is not merely to witness the absence of representation, rather it is the communal, habitual, remediation of each other towards the ends of witnessing itself. Negative feelings recall Heather Love's notion that queerness' 'disposition toward the past—embracing loss, risking abjection—[is evoked]...with the phrase "feeling backward."[58]' Carolyn Dinshaw's offer of 'a queer historical awareness of multiplicity' might also account for the queerness of this history-making at hand.[59] The past is always present is always past in queerness. Epidemics inspire historical thinking: how long will it endure, how quickly will it spread, when did it begin? HIV/AIDS is no exception and has long been entangled with history. The AIDS crisis is, as suggested, an historic occasion. It is an occasion that troubles the instance of *occasion*, extending instead across decades, defining the past and occurring actively today. And more than a mere opportunity to reimagine society, it is a call to arms, an ongoing demand for survival.

* * *

During our conversation Finkelstein told me about a spell he cast with members his affinity group, Anonymous Queers. A 30-day candle burning spell—stretching from the 1991 Kennebunkport action to a planned march on Washington, D.C. At the end of the spell, Finkelstein threw the remainders of the candle wax over the White House fence, a prefiguration of the 1992 Ashes Action, and mailed the rest to the White House to get the wax inside. Finkelstein

> started this huge fight at this occult store called Magical Child, because I was asking the person who worked there if he wanted to change someone's mind, should it be a green candle or a white candle? The entire store got involved in this conversation, but it turned into a very heated argument as to whether or not trying to change someone's mind was black magic. Then I was like, "Well, if it's for the greater good and more lives will be [saved]"[60]

58 Heather Love, *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History*, First Harvard University Press paperback edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England: Harvard University Press, 2009), 30.
59 Carolyn Dinshaw, "Temporalities," in *Middle English*, ed. Paul Strohm, Repr, Oxford Twenty-First Century Approaches to Literature (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), 122.
60 Finkelstein, Personal Communication.

I might propose that, at their best, the gestures which structure the tweets and posts discussed here are like spells, controversial and potential black magics. Language used with its most potent purpose, to not only offer but make new social forms: an ever-expanding field of inappropriate responses meant, at the very least, to figure the normative affections for Presidents past absurd (Figure 7).[61] These are spells for the "greater good" and, while not saving lives with the urgency of ACT UP in 1991, are cast with the intention to make real alterations to the "infrastructures of sociality itself." And who knows, some spells might actually work: "I should say we never really claimed credit for George Bush vomiting on the prime minister of Japan, but it happened very shortly after the end of the candle spell."[62]

APPENDIX A (UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL)

TIME

BY SOPHIA HUSSAIN

George H.W. Bush is dead and I'm thinking about all the time he got — 8 more months even than Barbara.

I would try, in this essay, to limit my quoting of twitter — but it is where the best minds of my generation have assembled. Where every few months, the video of Muntadhar al- Zaidi throwing a shoe at George W. Bush resources for our shared enjoyment. If a ball will not drop or a clocktower will not rejoice at this, we'll loop the video over and over.

When Barbara Bush died, the Women's March tweeted: "Rest in peace and power Barbara Bush"

The queer Arab American writer Randa Jarrar tweeted, "Barbara Bush was a generous and smart and amazing racist who, along with her husband, raised a war criminal" — and got death threats. The clip we posted of her reading at the Asian American Writers' Workshop, where I work, quickly got scanned and copied to inflame the far right. We took it down to prevent this escalation.

The president of Fresno state, where Jarrar has tenure, tepidly defended

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61 pe moskowitz (@_pem_pem), "pic.twitter.com/Xno8bdAKjx," Tweet (blog), December 3, 2018, https://twitter.com/_pem_pem/status/1069700995830173696.
62 Finkelstein, Personal Communication.

her, claiming that Jarrar had spoken as a "private citizen" but her words were "obviously contrary to the core values of our University." In some cases, it was an issue of free speech, and in other occasions, not quite; "beyond free speech. This was disrespectful." No critic of American empire, and an Arab woman no less, gets to be a private citizen, and so many "citizens" don't really get to be citizens.

What I am trying to say is that civility is only aspirational in the sense that many would like to hide war crimes, and state violence. Let us be uncivil.

"A professor with tenure does not have blanket protection to say and do what they wish," he said. "We are all held accountable for our actions."

The University lowered their flag to half mast, and Jarrar went on leave for a semester. And on Sunday I woke up to read things about George HW Bush like "He was the best one-term president"
And I'm wondering how we are counting — both the hours and the bodies

"best one-term president"

Killed the most people in one term? The least? With stunning efficiency? The Gulf War was famously only "100 hours."

"I feel tension in the stomach and in the neck … but I also feel a certain calmness when we talk about these matters," Bush said of the 1991 Gulf War.

The far right and progressives and civility extremists, latched on to Jarrar's "amazing racist,"

I'd like to think they were so angry to discover the glee of refusal, and how good that feels
and its potential for contagion

It turns out it is easy to tell the truth — it just makes people mad but Jarrar had more to say.

In another tweet, the professor wrote: "I'm happy the witch is dead. can't wait for the rest of her family to fall to their demise the way 1.5 million iraqis have. byyyeeeeeee."

Other ways we could count:

8 women groped

$1.5 billion increase in spending on the drug war
The number of loved ones' ashes flung on the White House lawn on October 11, 1992. It was 12 years into the AIDS epidemic, read: 12 years of genocidal policy, that ACT UP organized the action to throw ashes on the White House lawn.

Recalling the calmness that George HW Bush remarked upon the Gulf War;

George Bush believes that
the White House gates shield him,
from you, your loss, and his responsibility for the AIDS crisis. Now it is time to bring AIDS home to George Bush.

I am writing because I am angry that George HW got to live as long as he did. My rage is simple. And I am angry because the world makes me envious of time and how it becomes hoarded — a luxury. I want to be alive but I hold longevity in contempt, because our enemies appear to control our bodies and also time.

We cannot recover the bodies but we can say "amazing racist" and mean it. And what will we call this uncertain time we have.

From 1987-1989 Felix Gonzales Torres worked on a series called "Untitled (Perfect Lovers)." Perfect Lovers. Two standard issue, batter operated wall clocks next two each other, in sync, telling the same time. Commercial, mechanical, wedded to standard time — yet why are they touching? Gonzalez-Torres made the work created this work shortly

after his partner was diagnosed with AIDS. He wrote a short piece, with a drawing of the two clocks in blue ink on top of the page.

"Lovers, 1988

Don't be afraid of the clocks, they are our time, time has been generous to us. We imprinted time with the sweet taste of victory. We conquered fate by meeting at a certain TIME in a certain space. We are a product of the time, therefore we give back credit where it is due: time.

We are synchronized, now and forever. I love you."



Figure 1: Avram Finkelstein, (1991)
Reproduced from Avram Finkelstein, 'Avram Finkelstein', *Facebook*, 2018 <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10216594333423503&set=a.1078897445373&type=3&theater> [accessed 29 December 2018]

Figure 2: *© 2017, Molly Riley-Pool / Getty*. Reproduced from Volcelot Revolver, 'George H. W. Bush: *dies* Me: Thank u, next Pic.Twitter. Com/QhpVt3fUcl', *@costaggini*, 2018 <https://twitter.com/costaggini/status/1068744267160375298> [accessed 26 December 2018]



Figure 3a (above): Donald Moffett, *He Kills Me* (1987). Reproduced from Zed Books, '#ANationalConversation @HillaryClinton pic.twitter.com/VtYWA3li4k', *@ZedBooks*, 2016 <https://twitter.com/ZedBooks/status/708389966729125888> [accessed 26 December 2018]

Figure 3b (below): Virgil B/G Taylor, *She Kills Me (Nancy) after Donald Moffett* (2016). Reproduced from Taylor, Virgil B/G, 'They All Kill Me @ZedBooks @HillaryClintonpic.Twitter.Com/SgOVdQLqtc', *@fag_tips*, 2016 <https://twitter.com/fag_tips/status/708412193906302976> [accessed 26 December 2018]



Figure 4 (above): Vincent Chevalier and Ian Bradley-Perrin, *Your Nostalgia is Killing Me!* (2013). Reproduced from Chevalier, Vincent, and Ian Bradley-Perrin, 'Your Nostalgia Is Killing Me!', *Poster/VIRUS*, 2013 <http://postervirus.tumblr.com/post/67569099579/your-nostalgia-is-killing-me-vincent-chevalier> [accessed 26 December 2018]

Figure 5 (below): Ray Navarro and Zoe Leonard, *Equipped* (1990). Reproduced from Navarro, Ray, and Zoe Leonard, 'Equipped', *Icaboston.Org*, 2018 <https://www.icaboston.org/art/ray-navarro-zoe-leonard/equipped> [accessed 26 December 2018]

Figure 6: Virgil B/G Taylor, *Masturbation from Utopia_11.gif* (2016). Reproduced from Taylor, Virgil B/G, 'Utopia_11.Gif', *Fag Tips*, 2016 <http://www.fag.tips/giftopia/> [accessed 29 December 2018]

Figure 7: Reproduced from moskowitz, pe, 'pic.twitter.com/Xno8bdAKjx', *@_pem_pem*, 2018 <https://twitter.com/_pem_pem/status/1069700995830173696> [accessed 26 December 2018]

Reproducing borders, reproducing *Abyssal lines*: Representation and governance of the "migrations' emergency" in contemporary Italy

by:
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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In this article, I read the representation and management of the "migration crisis" in contemporary Italy from a genealogical point of view. I will trace the roots of a socio-political paradigm articulated by the triangulation of three elements: migrations, states of exception and neo-colonialism. I argue that contemporary Italy, located at the center of the Mediterranean and therefore crossed by enormous migratory flows, is a privileged place to investigate how the migration question functions, in European societies, to demarcate what, according to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, I will define as multiple *abyssal lines*[1]. As a consequence, I illustrate how the representation of contemporary migratory phenomena can be analyzed inside the paradigm of "abyssal thinking", which I consider the dominant and hegemonic epistemology in contemporary Europe. What I intend to investigate is, then, a mechanism of colonial power—and therefore of exclusion, exploitation and the production of absence—exercised within a global North. My analysis does not aim to attribute the definition of "abyssal thinking" to Eurocentric thinking from an ontological point of view; but instead to answer the following question: in its historical development, how does Western thinking deal with otherized ways of thinking in an *abyssal way*? This abyssal way of relating to otherness consists in the establishment of a "system of visible and invisible distinctions" and implies the concept of "*abyssal line*": The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two realms, the realm of "this side of the line" and the realm of "the other side of the line"[2]. Abyssal thinking is characterized by the impossibility of the coexistence of the two sides of the abyssal line: the division is such that "the other side of the line" vanishes as reality becomes non-existent, and is indeed produced as "non- existent", or, "not existing in any relevant or comprehensible way of being"; the non-existent is radically excluded, at least, from the same conception of what is the "other" itself: in this sense, it is an otherness that deals with *absence* and not with *dialectics*[3].

In particular, I believe that this system of representation and management is based on the two categories of knowledge and law—identified by Boaventura de Sousa Santos as the maximum representation of Western abyssal thought. These two aspects together describe a double *abyssal cartography* foundational to Eurocentrism, in which the *abyssal line* is the boundary of separation of the human (or of what is considered acceptable to be recognized as human) and of the sub-human (what cannot be understood as existing).

Abyssal knowledge consists of a series of representations that operate mainly through the invisibility of etherized forms of knowledge (indigenous, popular, plebeian, peasant), defining and reifying those forms as structurally

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1 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of. Knowledges," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 30, no. 1 (2007): 45-89

2 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Beyond Abyssal Thinking," 45-46.

3 De Sousa Santos, 45-46.

untrue or excluding from the realm of true and false. On the other side of the abyssal line from Western epistemology, there is no real knowledge; there are beliefs, opinions, subjective intuitions, which at most can become objects or materials for the scientific investigation conducted from the global North. In this specific epistemological cartography, the subjects who are "on the other side of the abyssal line" do not meet the epistemological conditions for self-representation.

Abyssal law provides that "the legal" and "the illegal" are the only two relevant forms of existence before the law; for this reason, the distinction between the two is set as a universal distinction. This central dichotomy leaves out an entire social territory in which this dichotomy would be unthinkable as an organizational principle: namely, the territory of the *lawless*, the a-legal, the non-legal, and even the legal or illegal according to non- officially recognized system of law. Thus, the invisible abyssal line that separates the realm of law from the realm of non-law grounds the visible dichotomy between legal and illegal.

The two categories, in everyday social and political practice, certainly intersect and partially overlap; but I believe they offer a method of explaining how this specific case of abyssal thought—which has as its most evident and superficial aspect the production and spread of a racist sentiment —is based on the constant use of knowledge and law as instruments of exclusion, invisibilization and domination.

The line I analyze in particular is the one drawn on the Italian national state, and specifically I would like to demonstrate how the concept of "clandestinity"—structured among the instruments of Western knowledge and law—produces some fundamental characters of contemporary Italian society. First, "clandestinity" produces a sentiment of insecurity, quite extended among "white" Italian people[4], which justifies the application of extraordinary law instruments in order to regulate the criminality supposedly spread by immigrants. Second, the power to label people as clandestine is structurally needed to create a vulnerable labor force. This is most visible in the agrarian sector and other precarious and unregulated forms of employment.

In the next pages, I will analyze the aspects of this scheme one at a time. In the first part, I will analyze a specific *epistemological cartography* around the multiplication and strengthening of borders. In the second part, I will consider some legal instruments that determine the production of a "state of emergency" based on the representation of the "migratory crisis" as an exceptional and transitory phenomenon to be governed by every possible means. The aim is to show how the two categories work in order to produce a new nationalistic feeling

4 About the arbitrarity of social and historical construction of Italians' whiteness, see Gaia Giuliani (ed.) *Il colore della nazione (The colour of the nation)* (Florence-Milan: Le Monnier-Mondadori Education, 2015) and Gaia Giuliani, *Race, Nation and Gender in Modern Italy. Intersectional Representations in Visual Culture* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2019).

that includes Southern Italian people , who used to be the internal "excluded"; and to stigmatize immigrants as the common external . I argue that this process is fundamental to explain the rise of new right-wing extremism which is now taking a hegemonic part in the Italian political landscape.

What I will deal with in this text is the way in which the migratory question is used within Europe, in particular in the current Italian political situation, to strengthen relations of domination and regimes of whiteness. I will not deal with the subjective experience of migration or the epistemological and political experience of the race from the point of view of those who live it, suffer it, or organize itself to fight against. Understanding that this task is not up to us is an exercise of relativizing white and Eurocentric knowledge, an exercise that it is important to start practicing.

MODERN KNOWLEDGE: BREAKING THE "PACT OF MORAL STABILITY"

Gaia Giuliani, referring to the representation of race in the Italian context, defines the "new moral stability pact"[5] as:

> A politically correct semantic context in which, although the structural sources of discrimination are not called into question, the sexist and racist offenses first ascribable to the center-right are sent back to the Lega Nord alone and to the other extreme right-wing formations.

The Lega Nord is a political party born in the late 80s with secessionist convictions, which claimed the autonomy of Northern Italy—self-defined as "Padania". From the beginning, the style of communication of the Lega Nord was characterized by an aggressive and explicitly racist discourse, built on the affirmation of an anthropological supremacy of the inhabitants of Northern Italy, whose origins were traced back to noble Nordic populations, such as The Celts,

5 The context of this text is characterized by a specific event in Italian history: in 2013, within a center-left government led by the Democratic Party, a "Ministry of Integration", run by a black woman named Cécile Kyenge, was established. This event was placed in a climate of radical rupture with the previous political and social regime, dominated by central-right governments who became famous for their explicit sexist and racist positions. Gaia Giuliani, "La zona d'ombra. Genere, agency e bianchezza nell'Italia contemporanea," in Valeria Deplano, Lorenzo Mari, Gabriele Proglio (eds.) *Subalternità italiane. Percorsi di ricerca tra storia e letteratura* (Roma: Aracne, 2014), 223-246.

and in detriment of the people of the South, defined negatively as "terroni"[6]. Growing beyond being a localist movement, the increasing success of the Lega Nord in the Italian national context has led to a progressive mutation of the political objectives of the same, which has refurbished from the aggressive anti-southern discourse into a nationalist one, explicitly inspired by the French *Front National*. This change was confirmed in 2014 with the foundation of the movement *Noi con Salvini,* -which explicitly appealed to the regions of Southern Italy, including them in a nationalist project instead of continuing to exclude them.

My hypothesis is that this specific moment and the events that took place were a turning point in the policies of representation and management of the racial issue in Italy, as a moment of redefinition of the abyssal lines in which the boundary of the exclusion relocated, from the internal Southern Question, to the outside of the national state. This event has produced a radical change in the construction of Italian political discourse. A new nationalism was constructed from the representation of an "other" who was outside but, at the same time, extraordinarily *close:* that was the creation of the xenophobic fear of the migrant invasion.

What I want to underline is that starting from this turning point, a fundamental caesura has been produced in what Giuliani defines as the "pact of moral stability. This system was invoked by making racism a showy and grotesque exception: it was supposed to be practiced only by members of the Northern League, who shamelessly produced sexist and racist insults[7]. In essence, this paradigm produced a normalization of institutional racism, which regularly exists even during the left-wing governments.[8] The racist structure of Italian society—the racialization of the labor market, the policies of rejections at the borders, the differentiated access to welfare—was not in any way questioned, but rather invisibilized.

Starting from 2014, this paradigm stopped being the dominant one, while a different one was activated: one that ruled racism as a phenomenon no longer of a minority, and justified by the "emergency paradigm" produced by the supposed "migrant emergency". This paradigm of power is strictly inscribed in a dynamic of knowledge production, through multiple levels of visible/ invisible relationships. The first distinction, which in my opinion underlies the rest of them, is the one between the hypervisibilization of migrants, through

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6 The world "terroni" means "the same color of the earth"; southern Italian people were usually assimilated, by geographical position and anthropological attitude, to Northen African people.
7 i.e. The ones against the newly-minister Kyenge.
8 The italian main leftist party is the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico), who leaded, at the time, a govenment of coalition whith center-moderated parties. The entire tradition of institutional progressive parties never had a serious problematization of institutional racism which is a structing part of national-State identity, since the colonial experience in Africa. See Gaia Giuliani, Cristina Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell'identità razziale degli italiani* (Firenze-Milano: Le Monnier/ Mondadori Education, 2013) and Cristina Lombardi-Diop, Cristina Romeo (eds), *L'italia postcoloniale (*Firenze:Le Monnier, 2004)

an enormous production of knowledge about them; and the invisibilization of the same migrants, or the cancellation of their own knowledge. Migrants are the *subaltern who cannot speak*[9]*;* at the same time, talking about migrants is a constant and inflated practice in the public spaces for politics and society. The hypervisibilization —based, in reality, on the invisibilization—is articulated in other secondary divisions. The discursive regime that has appeared progressively in recent years and has become a real system of governance starting from 2014 has no source in a real increase of migration flows: over the last ten years, immigration fell by 43%, from 527 thousand in 2007 to 301 thousand in 2016.

Does the "migration crisis" really exist? Or is it produced within an invisibilization/hypervisibilization regime, established through the media? This would be functional to the establishment of a *state of exception*, intended to strengthen a national order that restricts democratic spaces. This condition of social and political "emergency" is produced, according to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, by the instrumental representation of the *return of the colonial*, where "the colonial is here a metaphor for those who perceive their life experiences as the other side of the line and rebel against it."[10]. Three colonial contemporary figures, the terrorist, the undocumented migrant worker and the refugee, appeared in the landscape of Metropolitan society when legal and epistemological tools, traditionally based in the appropriation/violence dichotomy typical of colonialism, were used to repress and regulate these three figures of modernity.

As a result, and even without a formal suspension of such rights and guarantees, we are witnessing the emergence of a new state form, the "state of exception", with the guise of safeguarding or even expanding them. The use of abyssal knowledge in order to produce a "state of exception" - in the way I tried to describe - is articulated through the specific application of the form of *modern law*, which is produced, above all, by the definition and separation of the three "emblematic characters of the colonial contemporaneity"[11], of which so far I have deliberately spoken using the unique category of "migrants". In the next part I will try to explain the reasons for this differentiation.

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9 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Can the subaltern speak?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)
10 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Beyond Abyssal Thinking," 45-89.
11 "the terrorist, the undocumented migrant worker and the refugee"; De Sousa Santos, "Beyond Abyssal Thinking," 55.

MODERN LAW: THE PRODUCTION OF CLANDESTINE SUBJECTS

The device of knowledge associated with migration in contemporary Italy produces a condition of exception, starting from the hypervisibilization of images of "illegal" arrival in the media. This produces an induced climate of perceived insecurity. I would like to analyze how this production of discourse asserts itself by the use of juridical instruments of Western thought, in order to sanction the state of emergency that corresponds to an authoritarian turn, and to a restriction of the spaces of democracy. I will proceed by analyzing the following points: first, the historical production of the status of *clandestinity* in Italian law; second, the connections that the latter has with the creation of different legal status—refugee, economic migrant—according to European regulations on migration; and third, the double use of illegal immigration, on the one hand for the criminalization of migrants, on the other for the purpose of their employment in the labor market. Italian law on migration is structured on the basis of two fundamental stages. The first is the establishment in 1998 of the Turco-Napolitano law. This legal provision is based on the idea of favoring the regulation of migration and "discouraging" illegal immigration. This implies that "regular" immigrants are included in a progressive process of achieving rights, while those identified as illegal immigrants are subject to a provision for immediate expulsion from the State[12]. This text was modified and then abolished in 2002, when it was collected and expanded in the new law on immigration, the Bossi-Fini law[13]. This law is characterized by three fundamental innovative points: the establishment of the crime of clandestinity, punished with up to four years of imprisonment; the binding of the possibility of accessing a residence permit—and therefore the exit from the clandestinity itself—to the possession of a regular employment contract; the State's accompanying of expelled migrants to the border, combined with the use of navy ships to counter landings in the Mediterranean; and the establishment of *Centri di identificazione* (CIE) for the detention of political asylum seekers awaiting a response on their procedure.

The characteristics of the law I have listed so far help us to develop a reflection on the abyssal functioning of immigration law: firstly, what this law

12 For the first time in the history of Italian law, this law provides for the establishment of *Centri di permanenza temporanea* (CPT), or detention centers in which illegal migrants are detained indefinitely while waiting for repatriation: this precedent corresponds to a first, very important connection between the status of clandestinity and the institution, in fact, of a system of incarceration for subjects who are recognized as illegal immigrants.

13 The signatories that give the name to this law are, respectively, the historic leader and founder of the Lega Nord Umberto Bossi, at the time minister of reforms of the Berlusconi government, and Gianfranco Fini, leading member of the Nationalist right-wing party Alleanza Nazionale, vice president of the Council of Ministers.

establishes is the preliminary identification of migrants as illegal immigrants, a condition which, in fact, occurs even before the assessment of any access to the right to asylum or the possible achievement of working conditions to request regularization. Since the clandestine itself is already committing a crime and because it can already be imprisoned for this crime itself, the fundamental consequence is the production of the migrant as a criminal subject[14]. This process has produced, in the public discourse on migration, the indissoluble equivalence between migrant and criminal. Since the clandestine is, par excellence, the subject that juridically does not exist, he or she is outside the same paradigm of law. This is accompanied by the constant hypervisibilization in the media of the crimes committed, or hypothetically committed, by migrants. The migrants are then permanently represented as thieves, delinquents, a dangerous class, starting from the statute itself to "not to be visible", to be defined by but at the same time outside the paradigm of the law.

This leads to a second point on which I would like to dwell: the way in which the status of clandestinity produces a legal *partage* that identifies two opposing figures: the one of the refugee and the one of the economic migrant. If in the first part of the text I have deliberately used the single category of "migrants", it is precisely because of the need to reject this dichotomy, which marks an abyssal foundational line of modern European law on migration. The possibility of accessing or not to political asylum is established on the basis of the definition, in the categories of European law, of migration itself as a voluntary or obligatory act: in the second case, the compulsory departure from your country - and therefore the arrival in Europe - is established on the basis of "humanitarian" parameters. In Italy, you may be entitled to asylum in case of escape from a war zone from a country where you are at risk of the death penalty, where you are prosecuted for reason of religion, politics or of sexual identity and sexual orientation.

The parameter that establishes the voluntary nature of the act of migration is the way in which, in the categories of European law, it does or does not belong to the sphere of human rights: migrants are recognized as "victims" when in their country there are wars recognized by Europe; when Europe defines the regimes-in-power as totalitarian; when Europe considers local laws and penalties as persecutions. Refugees are represented, in fact, as those who deserve "our" piety, a protected category that, in exchange for this status of partial inclusion within the legal paradigm, must necessarily accept to be docile and domesticated, grateful and willing to accept any condition that is imposed on them. This mechanism of inclusion/exclusion produces refugees as "good migrants", as opposed to clandestine ones, which therefore can be even more criminalized. This pitiful and self-righteous representation of welcomed refugees

14 Sandro Mezzadra, *Diritto di fuga* (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2002)

in Italy was central in the construction of a "humanitarian racism" present in the Italian institutional left: the pathetic description of the sufferings of refugees—who deserve to be accepted—and the celebration a colonial and paternalistic reception system.

This representation, falsely opposed to the obvious racism of the rights, is part of that "pact of moral stability" which has being broken with the complete hegemonic affirmation of the racist discourse of the right. This moral and Eurocentric representation of anti-racism, in which refugees must be included because they deserve the solidarity of whites, is a form of abyssal thinking much harder to expose: a false internal opposition inside the same abyssal categories created by Eurocentrism and the lack of a radical anti-racist discourse in several political and activist context are both elements which strengthen a racist political-discursive regime.

The Bossi-Fini law, as we have already mentioned, established the *Centri di identificazione* (CIE[15]) to replace the already existing *Centri di permanenza temporanea* (CPT). These are the places where migrants awaiting the asylum application are held, in dire humanitarian conditions, as the facilities tend to be overcrowded, unorganized, lacking personnel and services. If refugees are the object— under the discursive conditions of humanitarian racism described above—of a hypervisibilization, asylum seekers are constituted as invisibilized subjects. The reception centers are places where, by legal status, inmates cannot go out or have contact with the outside, and those outside, except for authorized personnel, cannot enter.

As the last point of this analysis, I would like to discuss the way in which the abyssal distinction between refugees and economic migrants works, always through the ambivalent node of clandestinity, within the relationship between migration and work. My first observation is that the arbitrary reproduction of a differential legal status is strictly functional to a specific use of racialized labor-power in capitalist economies[16]. This mechanism has specific consequences in the case of the Italian labor market. First of all, the arbitrary division between economic migrants and refugees is exactly the division between migrants who

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15 The CIE have been repeatedly called the "lager of modernity" for the living conditions and the invisibilization to which the people are subjected; a campaign of national activism has been active for some years, called "LasciateCIEntrare" (Let us enter), which try to create conditions for the entry of external observers within the CIEs, to monitor internal conditions.

16 Without entering into a philosophical discussion on the subject, I consider the same separation between refugees and economic migrants as a simple regulatory tool developed entirely within Eurocentric thinking to better govern and exploit migrations. I limit myself to use Mezzadra and Nielsen interpretation, that no migration—in the sense of a social and not individual phenomenon, as the "migratory crisis" in Europe—should be considered an entirely voluntary event. How can we place—if not for governmental purposes—a unanimous border between social, political, economic and environmental reasons that determine a migratory phenomenon?; See Sandro Mezzadra and Briett Nielsen, *Borders as a Method, or the Multiplication of Labor* (London: Duke University Press, 2013).

are directly—"legitimately" —inserted into a process of exploitation of labor power and those that fall indirectly into it. If the recognition of the refugee status implies access to an international protection that guarantees minimum rights, this must take place at the price of a constant demonstration of gratitude and submission. In the Minniti-Orlando decree, a decisive translation of this status of subordination takes place: the establishment of "voluntary work programs for refugees" permits the employment of refugees in unpaid public work. Tasks belonging to state services—such as street cleaning or the care of parks and public gardens—are carried out by refugees for free "in exchange" for the hospitality offered by the European community in the Italian state. On the other hand, however, the same definition of "economic migrants" implies voluntary migration with the aim of improving economic conditions. In this sense, Italian law establishes—starting from the aforementioned Bossi-Fini law—a direct correspondence between access to a residence permit and a stable working condition proven by an employment contract.

Yet, as already demonstrated by various researches, there are entire productive sectors of the Italian market that are only structurally possible thanks to the employment of clandestine migrant labor force. On the one hand there is the care work, almost completely attributed to women migrated from Eastern Europe, which were explicitly subject to the regulation of the Bossi- Fini law; on the other hand, the work in capitalist agriculture, which remains one of the largest export sectors of the Italian economy[17].

In Italian capitalist agriculture the incidence of registered migrant workers is 35%; but in this percentage there is only a very minor part of non-white workers: it is visibly unreal, because the majority of workers in each of the huge industrial plantations scattered in Southern Italy are African people. Francesco Caruso[18] has defined these places as "suburban districts of clandestinity": places on the margins of the law, areas on the shadow of the law that however, are not exceptions. On the contrary, these are areas of shadow envisaged and constitutive of the same legal system that guarantees the reproduction of Italian capitalism, which could not exist today without the presence of migrations—without the possibility of creating different juridical statutes and different forms of exploitation. In this case too, the relationship between visibility and invisibility regimes is constitutive of the national legal system.

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17 See Gennaro Avallone, *Sfruttamento e resistenze: migrazioni e agricoltura in Europa, Italia, Piana del Sele*. (Verona: Ombre corte, 2017) and Gennaro Avallone, Yan Molinero, "Producing Cheap Food and Labour: Migrations and Agriculture in the Capitalistic World- Ecology," *Social Change Review* 14, no. 2 (2016): 121-148.

18 Francesco Caruso, *La politica dei subalterni. Organizzazione e lotte del bracciantato migrante nel Sud Italia* (Roma: DeriveApprodi, 2013).

CONCLUSION

On the morning of February 3rd, 2018, in Macerata—a small city in central-northern Italy—a 28-year-old man, a militant in neo-fascist organizations and already a candidate for political elections in the Lega Nord party, crossed the city in an armed car and shot migrants he saw on the street. He hurt 11 people, 3 severely. Then, he got out of his car draped in an Italian flag and made a Mussolini salute. He justified the action as a form of "revenge" for the death, a few days before, of an Italian girl who may have been killed by a migrant. The neo-fascist right publicly celebrated this man as a hero and offered to pay court costs for his trial. All the members of the then-government—who were part of the Democratic Party—expressed themselves on the matter talking about the "problem of uncontrolled immigration".

The two most important organizations of the neo-fascist right have organized public events in Macerata and in other cities in Northern Italy. The anti-fascist demonstration, which was immediately called for February 10th, was first explicitly forbidden by the Minister of the Interior Marco Minniti. Afterwards it was allowed. Only one month later 4 during the last Italian national election, the Lega Nord gained about the 17% of vote, being for the first time the second most popular party. Making an alliance with the *Movimento 5 Stelle*, the populist party which won the most votes, the Lega Nord joined the government, occupying many of the most important positions of power, such as the Ministry of Interior, led by Lega Nord leader Matteo Salvini. The principal focus of the current government is the fight against migration, through measures like forbidding the landing of NGO boats on Italian ports and cancelling humanitarian protection for immigrants[19].

These events, still ongoing, seem to sum up very well the functioning of the speech-building devices I described in the previous pages. The construction of the discourse on migration as a contemporary form of affirmation and confirmation of an abyssal thought of colonial formation is not only a specific part of the organization of exploitation and repression. It does not concern only those subjects that are "racialized"—and therefore visibilized/invisibilized—within

19 This last provision will affect at least about 40.000 foreign people who used to live in Italy as regular strangers—for humanitarian reasons—and who will be transformed, by law, into clandestine individuals, losing the right to be hosted in public accommodations.

these binary divisions. It is also the mechanism of contemporary capitalist power in a specific place in the global North, where the socio-political emancipation/regulation paradigm is structured on the basis of that appropriation/violence one, in a manner that becomes increasingly visible. Within this structure, the space of construction of the metropolitan society, which assumes to be the guarantee space for the white and dominant subjects, breaks down into a reproduction of internal borders and new abyssal lines, which affect and completely oppress the society. The pressure of the appropriation/violence upon the regulation/emancipation logic produce, through the presence of the state of exception, the condition of the so-called social fascism[20], both into the global South and the global North.

The construction of the discussion on migration that I tried to retrace is, in fact, the construction of the conditions of affirmation of social fascism: a nation that continues to show itself as formally democratic—because the two regimes are not in polar opposition—but that is socially fascist, where the spaces of radical democracy gradually shrink.

20 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Beyond Abyssal Thinking," 45-89 and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Introducing the Epistemologies of the South" in *Decolonising the University: The Challenge of Deep Cognitive Justice* (Lisboa: Almedina, 2017.

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Origines Gentium: Mythic Kinships as an Archive of Cross-Cultural Interactions in the Ancient Global History

by:
GOH NGEE
CHAE JOSHUA

ABSTRACT

There is a perceptible gap between present-day historians and those of classical antiquity in their understanding of inter-cultural connections. While ancient historians tended to conceptualize inter-cultural connections in terms of common descent, present-day historians focus mainly on concrete materialist processes such as trade networks and 'actual' moments of diplomatic contact.

While the current neglect of mythic kinships is arguably justifiable given their largely fictitious nature, this paper argues that these sources are still very much relevant to the study of ancient global history as an 'archive' of cross-cultural interactions. Being discourses created to ideologically justify existing relationships within other societies and cultures, myths of ethnic origins constitute an important form of ancient diplomacy. This makes it extremely important for us to consider myths of ethnic origins as a mode of ancient cross-cultural interaction when writing a global history of the ancient world.

In order to demonstrate how exactly myths of ethnic origins might be read as an 'archive' of ancient cross-cultural interactions, this paper will engage in a brief philological study of some of the various mythic kinships that mediated relations between the Indic and Hellenistic worlds after Alexander the Great invaded India in 326 BC. Reading the myths told by each side as discursive strategies with a diplomatic imperative, I not only hope to emphasize the role played by myths of ethnic origins in Indo-Greek relations but also to develop a cohesive framework for a more complete and nuanced understanding of ancient cross-cultural interactions.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Joshua is an undergraduate history major at the National University of Singapore who specializes in global antiquity with a particular focus on ancient Chinese and Mediterranean societies. As of now, his research agenda is defined by two distinct trajectories. On one hand, he is interested in the history of pre-modern global interconnections. On the other hand, he is also interested in deepening his understanding of the relationship between history and literature by reading ancient historiography comparatively.

INTRODUCTION

In his review of Michael Scott's ambitious "global history of antiquity", Salvatore Tufano insightfully observes a perceptible gap in the way inter-cultural connections have been understood by present-day historians and historians from classical antiquity. On the one hand, historians in ancient China, Greece and Rome conceptualized "connections among cultures" by projecting their kinships, along with other peoples, into a distant (and often mythic) past.[1] On the other hand, historians "in our time" pay greater attention to the tangible aspects of "the interactions between classical civilizations and Near and Far Eastern cultures". In some cases, this entails "the specific study of networks of trade and discernible moments of contact (such as during the Persian Wars, or in cities like Palmyra)".[2] For the most part, however, the lack of actual contact means that connections between classical civilizations have to be artificially created through comparative studies.[3]

Ironically, Tufano himself does not seem particularly perturbed by this observation. Treating the ancient concept of inter-cultural connectivity merely as a foil to the modern one, Tufano goes on to praise Scott's work for both his masterful integration of "the comparative analysis of contemporaneous political revolutions" along with "the actual entanglements" among the various ancient 'worlds'.[4] Mythic kinships do not have any place in his so-called "global perspective in the study of ancient history".

Arguably, Tufano's perfunctory treatment of the mythic kinships contained within myths of ethnic origins is reasonable.[5] After all, claims of kinship with other foreign peoples should never be taken too literarily as direct evidence of "actual entanglements" among ancient societies.[6] Notwithstanding, their

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1 Salvatore Tufano, "Review of Ancient Worlds: A Global History of Antiquity by Michael Scott", *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* (February, 2018) no. 37. < http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2018/2018-02-37.html>

2 Salvatore Tufano, "Review of Ancient Worlds". See for example the various works studying the Silk Road. For some recent examples, see Xinru Liu, *The Silk Road in World History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Valerie Hansen, *The Silk Road: A New History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Christopher I. Beckwith, *Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

3 Salvatore Tufano, "Review of Ancient Worlds". For some recent examples of comparative works on Han dynasty China and Augustan Rome, see Fritz-Heiner Mutschler & Achim Mittag, eds, *Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared*, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also Walter Scheidel, ed, *Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For some comparative studies on 5th century Greece and Han dynasty China, see Siep Stuurman, "Herodotus and Sima Qian: History and the Anthropological Turn in Ancient Greece and Han China," *Journal of World History* 19:1 (2008): 1-40. See also Hyun Jin Kim, *Ethnicity and Foreigners in Ancient Greece and China*, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 2009). For a more general comparative study between Ancient Greece and China, see Steven Shankman & Stephen W. Durrant, *The Siren and the Sage: Knowledge and Wisdom in Ancient Greece and China*, (London: Cassell, 2000).

4 Salvatore Tufano," Review of Ancient Worlds."

5 In this paper, the terms "myth of ethnic origin" and "mythic kinship" will hereby be used interchangeably to denote myths which establish fictive kinship ties with foreign peoples through the telling of the origins of the said peoples.

6 Take for example, Martin Bernal's controversial argument that Greece was once colonized by Phoenician

undeniably fictitious nature does not make them any less useful to the study of ancient global history. Though clearly unreliable as genealogical records, myths of ethnic origins are still very much an indispensable 'archive' of ancient cross-cultural interactions.[7] Being the verybasis of ancient diplomacy, mythic kinships have commonly been invoked to justify everything from alliances to declarations of war.[8] The Athenians, for instance, justified their claim to the island of Salamis by creating fabricated genealogies which connected the people of the island to other Attic cults.[9] Such discursive usages of mythic kinships meant that their textual histories could easily be mapped onto existing periodizations of cross-cultural interactions. According to Hall, due to the "occasional survival" of earlier elements which "coexist albeit uncomfortably" with later elements of the same myth, "contradictions" or "fracture points" can often be found within myths of ethnic origins. These "fracture points" help delineate "specific stages" within the discursive construction of mythic kinships which were in turn conditioned by the state of inter-ethnic relations during that specific time period.[10]

As of now, few have attempted to write a global history through the lens provided by mythic kinships. While many scholars have studied myths of ethnic origins in societies both within and outside the Mediterranean world, they have generally restricted themselves to the confines of isolated civilizational silos.[11] The only notable concerted attempt to break this trend was Mu-Chou Pu's recent study on attitudes towards foreigners in ancient China, Egypt and Mesopotamia. Even then, his work focuses more upon making comparison rather than identifying connections between these civilizations. Granted, the sheer

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settlers based upon the tradition that the Greek city of Thebes was founded by Camdus the Phoenician. Hall exposes the naivety of such a reading by pointing out that there is "a world of difference between saying that the Greeks were the descendants of Egyptians and Phoenicians and that the Greeks thought that they were descended from Egyptians and Phoenicians". See Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 19. See also Edith Hall, Bernal's "Ancient Model," in Mary R. Lefkowitz and Guy Maclean Rogers, *Black Athena Revisited*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 344-347.

7 Here, my usage of the term "archive" specifically invokes Foucault's concept of the 'archive' as "the accumulated existence of discourse". That is to say, I am not interested in the content contained within myths of ethnic origins but rather how these texts "functioned in relation to their original situation". See Michael Foucault, *Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966-84)*, (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 25.

8 See especially Christopher P. Jones, *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999).

9 See Rosalind Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.

10 See Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, 40-51. See also Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, 42.

11 For examples of scholarship covering myths of ethnic origins within the Mediterranean, see Erich S. Gruen,. *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). See also Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*. For examples of scholarship covering myths of ethnic origins outside the Mediterranean: See Romila Thapar, "Indian Views of Europe: Representations of the Yavanas in Early Indian History," in Romila Thapar, *Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 536-555. See also Wang Mingke, *Huaxia Bianyuan: Lishi jiyi yu zuqun renting*, (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 1997). See also Stella Xu, *Reconstructing Korean History*, 15-43. Nicola Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 297-304.

geographic and temporal distance between ancient China and these two near-Eastern civilizations makes the existence of any form of cross-cultural connection highly unlikely.[12] Nevertheless, as I will later argue, myths of ethnic origins can in fact be taken as evidence of connections between civilizations, if they are taken as a form of cross-cultural interaction rather than just any representation of the 'Other'. Such an approach would make myths of ethnic origins an extremely important source in the study of ancient global history.

In order to further illustrate the workings of this 'archive', my essay will briefly consider the role mythic kinships played in mediating relations between the Indic and the Hellenistic worlds after Alexander the Great's invasion of India in 326 BC. By situating myths of ethnic origins told by each side within the larger context of Indo-Greek relations, I hope to emphasize the function of these myths as discursive strategies with a diplomatic imperative. This allows us not only to appreciate the importance of myths of ethnic origins in mediating Indo-Greek relations, but also the dynamic character of cross-cultural interactions in general. Such an approach to myths of ethnic origins would be of great relevance to the study of global antiquity. Being a cohesive framework for integrating these highly problematic, albeit important, sources into global historical narratives, this approach develops a much more complete and nuanced understanding of ancient cross-cultural interactions.

WHEN EAST MEETS WEST: MYTHIC GENEALOGIES IN THE HELLENISTIC *OEKUMENE* AND MAURYAN EMPIRE

Writing in the first century BC, the Hellenistic historian Diodorus Siculus presents two different accounts on the origins of the Indians in his voluminous universal history *Bibliotheca historica*. In his first account, Diodorus connects the Indians to the mythic Greek past by claiming that the Dionysius once invaded India with "a notable army" before he was apotheosized. After having settled upon the hill-country of northern India, Dionysius reigned over the region for 52 years and blessed the Indians with the various benefits of Greek civilization. This included everything from cities and law-courts to wine-making. According to this first account on his death Dionysius's sons reigned over India until they made way for "a democratic form of government" many generations later.[13]

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12 See Mu-chou Poo, *Enemies of Civilization: Attitudes toward Foreigners in Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005).

13 Diodorus, *Bibliotheca historica*, 2.38. See translation in Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History*, Volume II: Books 2.35-4.58. Translated by C. H. Oldfather. Loeb Classical Library 303. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 12-13

In his second account Diodorus writes of the Indian belief that Heracles was "born among them". Displaying the same strength as the figure in Greek myth, he did India a great service by clearing "both land and sea of their wild beasts" and founding great cities. At the same time, he married several wives and begot many children whom he appointed as rulers over India. As in the case of Dionysius's children, the kings of the Heraclean bloodline likewise ruled for many generations until the emergence of 'democracy' in India.[14]

At first glance, the apparently fictitious nature of these two accounts seems to suggest that they were nothing more than a fantasy dreamt up by Diodorus from the comfort of his writing table. While these myths of ethnic origins tell us much about Diodorus's intellectual priorities, they appear to have relatively little to do with any actual contact with the Indians. On one level, Diodorus's focus upon connecting the stories of the Indians to that of the Greeks reflected his cosmopolitan tendencies. In common with many other writers of universal history, Diodorus aspired to marshal all men into the "one and the same orderly body" of "human society as a whole" (πάντας ἀνθρώπος).[15] On another level, Diodorus's decision to include these two mythic accounts in his universal history had much to do with his project to ideologically justify the deification of Julius Caesar, a Roman politician he admired greatly. Being mortals who were later deified as gods for having brought the benefits of civilization to all mankind, the figures of Dionysius and Heracles both serve as convenient metaphors for the Hellenistic ruler cult.[16] By framing the exploits of Caesar in contemporary times within the context of these earlier "cultural heroes", Diodorus invites the reader to draw parallels between the two.[17]

Nonetheless, these two myths of ethnic origins were in fact the product of decades of cross-cultural interactions between the Hellenistic and Indic worlds. Indeed, most scholars generally agree that Diodorus lifted his information about India entirely from the *Indica*, an ethnography written by Megasthenes who was the Indo-Greek Seleucid Empire's envoy to the Mauryan Empire. Though the exact dating of this work is uncertain, Kosmin has convincingly argued that the *Indica* was written sometime after Megasthenes was appointed as an envoy representing King Seleucus in the court of Chandragupta in 304/5 BC.[18]

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14 Diodorus, *Bibliotheca historica*, 2.39. Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History*, 16-19.
15 Diodorus, *Bibliotheca historica*, 1.1-3. See translation in Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History, Volume I: Books 1-2.34.* Translated by C. H. Oldfather. Loeb Classical Library 279. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 5-7.
16 The so-called "Hellenistic ruler cult" was a political ideology commonly adopted by rulers that legitimized monarchial rule on the basis of the monarch's worship as a living god. Commonly adopted by rulers in the Hellenistic East, this ideology proved to be popular among successive Roman leaders like Julius Caesar and later Augustus. See Helmut Koester, *History, Culture and Religion of the Hellenistic Age*, 2nd ed, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1995), 34-40.
17 See Charles E. Muntz, *Diodorus Siculus and the World of the Late Roman Republic*, (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2017), 133-189. See also Iris Sulimani, *Diodorus and the Pagan Mission: Historiography and Culture-heroes in the First Pentad of the Bibliotheke*, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011), 229-335.
18 See Paul J. Kosman, *The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 261.

Based upon this reading, Kosmin interprets Megasthenes's ethnography of India as work shaped by Seleucid imperial priorities. For example, Megasthenes's unusually disproportionate focus on the city founding activities of both Dionysius and Heracles reflects the importance of city building to the Seleucid imperial project. At the same time, they also legitimized the territorial retreat of the Seleucid Empire after it signed a peace treaty with the Indians in 304/5 BC. Just as the lack of cities made prehistoric India an easy target for Dionysius's mythic army, the ever-increasing presence of cities indicates an acknowledgement that Mauryan India was now unconquerable.[19]

Other scholars focus upon interpreting these two mythic accounts as an act of *interpretatio graeca* on the part of Megasthenes. To them, the Greek gods Dionysius and Heracles were the means through which Megasthenes made sense of the unfamiliar religious systems he encountered during his travels.[20] Lassen, for instance, argues that Megasthenes identified the Indian supreme god Krishna as Heracles.[21] Similarly, Goukowsky believes that the Greeks identified the Indian god Shiva as Dionysius.[22]

Dahlquist, however, points out that Megasthenes was not the first Greek to frame Indian gods as Heracles and Dionysius. This identification was already made during the course of Alexander the Great's Indian campaign in 326-323 BC.[23] Writing elsewhere in the *Bibliotheca*, Diodorus tells us that one of the first peoples that Alexander met during his Indian campaign were the Sibians. In a clear example of astute ancient diplomacy, the Sibians immediately made peace with Alexander by claiming that they were descendants of the soldiers who came with Heracles to unsuccessfully lay siege to the rock of Aornus. Undoubtedly aided by the various "magnificent gifts" heaped upon Alexander, according to Diodorus this claim of common ancestry convinced Alexander to let spare the Sibians as he marched against the next tribes.[24] While one can never know whether that such an event actually occurred, it is possible that instances of Indian cities surrendering were imaginatively reinterpreted by chroniclers travelling alongside Alexander to burnish his name. After all, the Macedonian royal house, to which Alexander himself belonged to, also claimed descent from Heracles himself.[25]

Clearly, the myths of ethnic origins told by the Greeks about the Indians cannot be divorced from the history of cross-cultural interactions between the

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19 Paul J. Kosman, *The Land of the Elephant Kings*, 44-46.
20 For more on the practice of identifying foreign gods as Greek ones, see Robert Parker, *Greek Gods Abroad: Names, Natures, and Transformations*, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).
21 Christain Lassen, Indische Alterthumskunde. II. (Bonn: H.B Koenig, 1852), 1107. Cited in Allan Dahlquist, *Megasthenes and Indian Religion: A Study in Motive and Types*, (Uppsala: Montilal Banarsidass, 1962), 9-10.
22 Paul Goukowsky, *Alexandre et Dionysos*, Essai sur les origins du mythe d' Alexandre, vol.2, (Nancy: Annales de l'Est publiees par l' Universite de Nancy, 1981), 27-28. Cited in Robert Parker, *Greek Gods Abroad*, 185.
23 Allan Dahlquist, *Megasthenes and Indian Religion*, 29-30.
24 Diodorus, *Biblioteke* 17.99.2. Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History*, Volume VIII: Books 16.66-17. Translated by C. Bradford Welles. Loeb Classical Library 422. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 396-397.
25 See Christopher P. Jones, *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*, 7.

two peoples. As I have demonstrated in the preceding philological study, there are unmistakable parallels between the textual history of these myths and the general development of Indo-Greek relations. This makes the mythic accounts in Diodorus's *Bibliotheca historica* an extremely valuable source in the study of global antiquity. While such accounts tell us very little about the history of the Indians themselves, their discursive nature as royally sanctioned 'propaganda' implicitly reveals the changing concerns and priorities of the Greeks during their interactions with the Indic world.

In the same way, the myths of ethnic origins told by the Indians about the Greeks were also influenced by the historical development of their cross-cultural interactions. However, they differ from those of the Greeks by being mainly concerned with defining ethnic boundaries between the Indians and the Greeks. For the Indians, the Hellenistic Greeks (referred to as *Yavanas*) belonged to the wider social category of *Mleccha*, a term for non-Sanskrit speaking foreigners. This invariably implied the permanent exclusion of the Greeks from the four castes (*varna*) of Indian society.[26]

It is thus unsurprising that the Sanskrit epic poem *Mahabharata* emphasizes the impure status of the *Yavanas*. In an episode accounting for the origins of the various *Mleccha* peoples, the Mahabharata states that the *Yavanas* were initially born of urine from the all-powerful Cow of Plenty. Created specifically to defend the Cow of Plenty from being seized by the army of a powerful king named Visvamitra, the Yavanas constituted one of the "manifold hosts of barbarians" produced from the cow's various bodily excretions (dung included).[27] By associating the origins of the *Yavanas* with urine, such a narrative etiologically explains their unclean, and by extension, lowly status in Indian society. At the same time, the Mahabharata's characterization of the *Yavanas* as a barbarian army arguably originated with the encounter with Alexander the Great's invading army in 326-323 BC. The antagonistic nature of such a contact could hardly have endeared the Greeks to the Indians. Diodorus, for instance, notes that Alexander the Great showed absolutely no mercy to Agalasseisi who foolhardily attempted to resist him during his Indian campaign.[28]

In spite of this, increasing cross cultural interactions between the Hellenic and Indic worlds seems to have gradually softened the initial Indian hostility towards the *Yavana*. With the establishment of Hellenic kingdoms in West Asia in the aftermath of Alexander's death, ambassadors like Megasthenes started visiting the Mauryan court more frequently. At the same time, territorial exchanges with the Seleucid Empire as part of the so-called "Treaty of the Indus" left

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26 Romila Thapar, "Indian Views of Europe: Representations of the Yavanas in Early Indian History," in Romila Thapar, *Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 537-539.
27 Mahabharata 1: 165:30. Translation from J.A.B Van Buiten,trans,ed, *Mahabharata I: The Book of the Beginning*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973),333.
28 Diodorus, *Biblioteke* 17.99.3. Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History*, Volume VIII: Books 16.66-17.

Mauryan emperors in charge of large Greek and Aramaic populations.[29] In order to deal with these changes, the Yavanas had to be fitted into the caste hierarchy by ascribing to them an Indian origin.[30] Unfortunately, as much as the Indians would have liked to draw closer to the Greeks, their contemptible status as impure *Mleccha* continued to haunt them. This tension was once again reflected through the *Mahabharata* which listed the *Yavana* (Greeks) as one of the many descendants of *Turvasu* who was in turn the son of *Yayati*, a famous king from the legendary Lunar dynasty.[31] While such a noble lineage seems to have placed the Greeks within the exalted *Ksatriya* caste of warriors and rulers, the very fact that *Turvasu* was their ancestor made the Greek's exact status within the caste hierarchy highly ambiguous. Having insolently refused his father's request to borrow his youth, *Turvasu* was cursed by King *Yayati* to "rule over people" who were essentially *Mlecchas*, "whose customs and laws are corrupt and whose walks of life run counter to decency". More tellingly, *Turvasu* was cursed with a lineage which would ultimately go extinct, suggesting that the *Yavana* did not really partake of his *Ksatriya* caste status.[32]

CONCLUSION

To conclude, this essay has briefly demonstrated how myths of ethnic origins might be read as an 'archive' of ancient cross-cultural interactions. Even as the content of such accounts is likely fictional in nature, myths of ethnic origins can still be read as discursive artifacts left behind by actual contact between cultures. By situating the textual histories of these narratives within the historical development of Indo-Greek relations, myths of ethnic origins can be readily integrated into the study of global antiquity as both a mode and window into ancient cross-cultural interactions. This enriches the overall field of ancient global history in several ways.

Firstly, myths of ethnic origins broaden our concept of "cross-cultural interactions" beyond that of concrete materialist processes like trade and migration.[33] Even as they still made treaties, alliances and wars with each other, mythic kinships were the main vehicle through which people in antiquity understood and justified such relationships. Consequently, by analyzing myths of ethnic origins as a mode of cross-cultural interaction on its own, rather than

29 Romila Thapar, "Indian Views of Europe", 540.
30 Romila Thapar, "Indian Views of Europe", 542-543.
31 Mahabharata 1: 80: 25. Translation from J.A.B Van Buiten, trans, ed, *Mahabharata I*, 194.
32 Mahabharata 1: 79: 10. Translation from J.A.B Van Buiten, trans, ed, *Mahabharata I*, 192.
33 See Patrick Manning's argument for the need for historians to "allow the meaning of "cross-cultural interaction" to extend to a range of issues beyond mass migration, imperial rise and fall, and commerce". See Patrick Manning, "The Problem of Interactions in World History," The American Historical Review 101:3 (1996): 780.

an unreliable literary document of the past, we would be able to obtain a much more complete picture of how people in antiquity related to one another. Such a phenomenon was unique to neither the Greeks nor Indians. The Han-dynasty historian Sima Qian, for instance, claimed that the ancestor of the nomadic Xiongnu antagonists were from the Xia dynasty, one of China's earliest ruling houses.[34] Though a seemingly improbable scenario, Xu points out that Sima Qian's curious attempt to give the Xiongnu an illustrious Chinese ancestor could be profitably interpreted as a justification for Chinese imperial expansion. By suggesting that the Xiongnu were once Chinese, Sima Qian implies that these unruly 'barbarians' were ultimately civilizable and by extension a natural part of the Chinese cultural and political order.[35]

Secondly, myths of ethnic origins offer a privileged window into the dynamics of "global integration" in the ancient world. The Hellenistic and Indic worlds were, in a sense, two distinct civilizations with almost nothing in common. Not only did the Greeks and Indians have their own separate cultural identities, the ethnocentric nature of their worldviews meant that each side perceived the 'other' as 'barbarians' far removed from the realm of civilization. For the Indians, the world was divided into the ritually pure lands of the Sanskrit speaking *Aryas* and the impure lands of the non-Sanskrit speaking *Mleccha,* including the Greeks. For the Greeks, India was generally considered to be nothing more than an exotic land in the distant Orient. Yet, when Alexander the Great's Indian campaign in 326-323 BC brought the two peoples into an uncomfortable proximity with each other, Indo-Greek relations did not devolve into Huntington's proverbial "clash of civilizations".[36] In fact, the boundaries between the two started to become less rigid and impermeable. For instance, myths of ethnic origins told by the Indians which started to ascribe an Indian ancestry to these once contemptible *Mleccha* as Indo-Greek relations warmed and intensified. While events like the landmark "Treaty of the Indus" in 304/305 BC already indicate the thawing of diplomatic relations between the Indo-Greek Seleucid Empire and the Mauryan Empire, it is only through myths of ethnic origins like those told in the *Mahabharata* that we are able to find evidence of shifts in civilizational attitudes towards the Greek 'other'. The ability to analyze "global integration" on the level of mentalities is especially important for the study of global antiquity given the scarcity of extant sources available. By adding another dimension to the study of ancient global connections, we would go beyond ascertaining the mere fact of their existence to assessing their quality and impact. This would in turn allow scholars of ancient global history to effectively situate their work within the wider

34 Sima Qian, *Shiji*, 110.1. See translation in Sima Qian, *The Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II*, Burton Watson, trans, revised edition, (New York & Hong Kong: Columbia University Press, 1961), 130.
35 See the argument made by Stella Xu, *Reconstructing Korean History: The Formation of Korean-ness in the Shadow of History*, (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 36-37.
36 Here, I use Huntington's concept of "clash of civilizations" as shorthand for a permanent state for primordial antagonism between conflicting civilizational units. See Samuel Philip Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72: 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.

process of "global integration".[37]

In an article discussing the state of scholarship on "contact and exchange in the ancient world", Mair bemoans the presence of "a strong intellectual bias" towards the notion of ancient civilizations existing in complete isolation from each other. Even as there was a "plethora of detailed data" attesting to the existence of "contact and exchange among early peoples", current scholarship had become so specialized and nationalistic that such evidence was ignored. In the rare event that scholars decided to go beyond their narrow geographic and temporal specialization, they usually ended up retreating to the safety of the comparative rather than risk disrepute by discussing cultural parallels and connections.[38] Though the field of global antiquity has certain made much progress in the decade after Mair wrote this essay[39], the initial scholarly neglect of mythic kinships as a valid mode of cross-cultural interaction suggests that the project to dismantle this "strong intellectual" bias is still very much on-going.

37 See Sebastian Conrad's argument for the need to go beyond "a focus on connections" to an analysis of the quality and impact of connections". See Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 90-91.
38 Victor H. Mair, "Kinesis Versus Stasis, Interaction Versus Independent Invention" in Victor H. Mair, ed, *Contact and Exchange in the Ancient World*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 3-7.
39 See for example, Michael Scott, *Ancient Worlds: An Epic History of East and West*, (New York: Random House, 2016). See also Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 1-44.

Cosmopolitanism, neoliberalism and global history

by:
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Despite the common imperative of many global historians to do away with teleologies and grand narratives, the global history project has developed a singular and linear progressivism of its own. The ambition to explain global integration between and beyond the nation-state has so far meant privileging movement, exchange and border-crossing at the expense of the sedentary and the locally-embedded. From Ibn Battuta to Zheng He, unprecedented attention is afforded to those who embody openness and mobility against the grain of traditional history, chiming with contemporary liberal and multicultural values. Chronicles of the transnational — of networks, flows and constellations — are saturated with an economistic interpretation of human existence in conjunction with a projection of present-day cosmopolitan ethics onto the past. The uncritical assumption that "connectedness is part of the human condition" posits a kind of cosmopolitan essence that somehow transcends historical change.[1]

The necessity of a meta-narrative of cosmopolitan integration on a planetary scale, designed to "meet the needs of our globalising world" was indeed a founding statement of LSE's Patrick O'Brien when he introduced us to the Journal of Global History back in 2006.[2] Whilst it may be too much to suggest that O'Brien personally inaugurated the proselytising impulse of global history to explain and celebrate humanity's fundamental interdependence and interconnectivity, the cosmopolitan meta-narrative he puts forward can be traced in the key assumptions and methods employed by many globally-minded historians.

Confronting the limits of this vision has become almost automatic for the historian residing in a world of resurgent nativism and alter-globalisation. But this critique must go further than Jeremy Adelman's prescription to "reckon with disintegration as well as integration", which merely complicates reigning teleological narratives when what is needed is a reconstruction from the bottom up.[3] Historicising the ebb and flow of the global cosmopolis helps us explain moments of disintegration, but we are left with the question of whether the global cosmopolitan ideal truly lives up to its universal promise. Why is the cosmopolite, the homo globus, first and foremost an individual? Why is their freedom measured in connectivity, to other individuals but also to capital? Why are their actions so often rendered in the bland, managerial language of transfers, consumption and entrepreneurship? And, most crucially, why do we

1 John Darwin, "Globe and Empire" in Maxine Berg, ed., Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the 21st Century (Oxford, 2013), 198.
2 Patrick O'Brien, "Historical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history", Journal of Global History, 1, no. 1 (2006), 3-39.
3 Jeremy Adelman, "Is Global History Still Possible, or Has It Had its Moment?", Aeon (2017), https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment (accessed 12/04/2019).

get the increasing feeling that such formulations are losing explanatory power in the present? Without understanding the politics and hierarchies inscribed in the cosmopolitan vision, we are blind to its co-option by a specific ideological programme, that of neoliberalism.

To reforge our cosmopolitan ideals we must first come to terms with a tacit agreement between neoliberal ideology and the societies that have for more than three decades consented to its hegemony. As described by the cultural theorist Jeremy Gilbert, the bargain struck by neoliberalism — particularly the 'Third Way' tradition carried by Tony Blair, Bill Clinton and Gerhard Schröder — enabled the simultaneous liberation of society and economy with privatised individualism as its organising principle.[4] The idealised subject of this project is the cosmopolite, an individual whose existence is configured by freedom and opportunity, unbounded by oppression, discrimination or market regulation. This too is the idealised subject of global history.

> [H]istorians who have committed (albeit as conscripts or collaborators) to this cosmopolitan enterprise … find themselves at an intellectual frontier unbounded by geographies, hemispheres and continents, let alone national borders and parish boundaries.[5]

Back in 2006 when he introduced the Journal of Global History, Patrick O'Brien was remarkably explicit about the terms of this neoliberal compromise. The promise is clear enough: history could finally be liberated from methodological nationalism as long as it played ball with neoliberal cosmopolitanism, a grand narrative which O'Brien describes as universal. Indeed, by celebrating the collaboration of historians with this "enterprise" (which, for the Journal of Global History, began with a large Leverhulme grant in 2003) he indicates acquiescence towards the academic integrity that could be lost in the process. Elsewhere, Sebastian Conrad speaks of global history's "catering" to an audience of middle-class, capital-wielding global citizens.[6] Catering has indeed been a fruitful activity for history departments that seize upon the magnetism of the global, drawing wider interest from students and scholars but also from politicians and grant-giving foundations. This has led scholars like Rebecca Karl to claim with some justice that the neoliberal compromise is the "back

4 Jeremy Gilbert, "The Crisis of Cosmopolitanism", Stuart Hall Foundation (2017), http://stuarthallfoundation.org/library/the-crisis-of-cosmopolitanism/ (accessed 12/04/2019).
5 O'Brien, "Historical traditions", 4.
6 Sebastian Conrad, What is Global History? (Princeton, 2016), 209.

door" through which global history is "smuggling normative capitalist modernisation into the centre of the narrative."[7]

Is this what we desired, what we still desire of global history? That, in return decentring and decolonising historical writing we must also subscribe to a teleology of progress towards a globalised world of capitalist individualism? This is of course also a world of openness, multiculturalism and intersectional liberation — a world we want and thus a world we must validate historically. But under neoliberalism the cosmopolitan template is cast in an individualised mould that is already crumbling under the burden of our collective needs and interests. By empowering the private and mobile individual, cosmopolitanism disempowers those who can't move, those who rely on public institutions, and those who lack the means to benefit from the economic freedoms we have continually been promised. Fully subsumed by the global, the local can no longer hold it accountable, and if it tries it risks the charge of backwardness and parochialism. Far from being post-Other, this cosmopolitanism has created new Others.

Comparable to the collection of movements and organisations — like the World Social Forum and the Occupy movement — that have been termed alter-global, what we must pursue is not an outright dismissal of global history but a fundamental change in its direction of travel. We must work to restore the local as a material historical reality, a site of working-class solidarity and cross-community interaction that can productively and democratically incorporate global change. At the same time, we must differentiate this critique of neoliberalism from the reactionary rhetoric of the far-right, whose hollow idea of the local is defined in specific opposition to multiculturalism and migration, often flirting with dangerous antisemitic tropes of 'rootless cosmopolitans' and 'cultural Marxists'. Alter-globalisation movements tend to seek mediation and collaboration between the local and global, rather than the vengeance of the former against the latter. Within our discipline, we certainly can appreciate the worthwhile outcomes of marshalling local histories against the hegemony of master narratives, particularly as a countervailing force to globalisation's homogenising tendencies. But an egalitarian and democratic history needs to work on both scales, towards a broader understanding of their dialectical relationship.

As Kerwin Lee Klein has made artfully clear, both iterations of 'history' entail a kind of universal vision, making claims as they do to an authoritative understanding of the past based on the best scales and apertures available. Time and again, he says, "we anxiously affirm our

7 Rebecca Karl, "What is World History? A Critique of Pure Ideology" in Tina Mai Chen (ed.), The Material of World History (London, 2015), 19.

clean break with the evils of narrative mastery", renewing a dichotomy of the great and small — the Hegelian historied and unhistoried — that helps "burden our new tales with the bad, old metaphysics we claim to have escaped."[8] Perhaps a truly novel metaphysics would recognise the multi-scalar nature of the universal and its multiplicity of interpretations and reifications — cosmopolitanism being one among many. What we must pay attention to is the politics of how universal narratives are configured, shifting our gaze to join our ordering of history umbilically with the power relations of the present.

And what we find, probing into the universalising tendencies of neoliberal cosmopolitanism, is disempowerment as a widespread political reality. The radical alterations experienced by so many communities in the wake of capital-led globalisation appear to those left behind as a gross manifestation of invisible market forces and abstract liberal values. For those alienated and Othered by neoliberal cosmopolitanism, animosity towards the global proceeds directly from its utterly unaccountable presence in their lives. This sentiment is only sharpened as the Other faces material and moral exclusion from supposedly cosmopolitan society. A decade of political fallout and resurgent nativism has exposed the false universalisms of the neoliberal project, and now urges us to reconsider the cosmopolitan assumptions that still hold hegemony in the global political mainstream.

"It would be a mistake", as Gilbert claims however, "to throw out the cosmopolitan baby with the neoliberal bathwater", leaving us with the critical task of restoring democracy and collectivism to the cosmopolitan project.[9] What does this mean for the global historian? It means, in a broad sense, disentangling the neoliberal compromise tacitly made during global history's formation in the early 21st century. We must strip the wolf of the sheep's clothing by differentiating democratic and inclusive cosmopolitanism from the parochial and atomised vision projected by neoliberal narratives under the cover of universality. This may sound like an abstract task of the political imagination but that is far from the case: collective cosmopolitanism is a historical reality that has enriched and empowered the lives of ordinary citizens and continues to do so even in the face of neoliberal globalisation. There is a critical role to be played here by the writing of global histories which cherish, to follow Stuart Hall, a cosmopolitanism based "in locatedness, in position, attachment." Part of the Windrush generation of African-Caribbean migration to the UK, Hall's life was deeply configured by cosmopolitanism and he remained until

8 Kerwin Lee Klein, "In Search of Narrative Mastery: Postmodernism and the People without History", History and Theory, 34, No. 4 (1995), 276-277.
9 Jeremy Gilbert, "The Crisis of Cosmopolitanism".

his recent death one of its most influential and optimistic advocates. He knew the danger of a cosmopolitan ethics that veers too close to market abstractions and that claims ”we can only really calculate what individuals are like when we free them from all their attachments: no religion, no culture, nothing.”[10] For Hall, as for Gilbert, actually-existing cosmopolitanism is where connectedness and interdependence equate to democracy and collectivity, straddling the global and the local even within the ageing paradigms of methodological nationalism.

Looking to the futures of global history, we must be unashamed in our pursuit of a new universalism, one which appreciates the inevitable hybridity of multi- and inter-cultural societies and the horizons of liberation that can only be reached collectively and democratically on a global scale. The aim is not to construct a universal narrative that transcends history — none can — but rather to take seriously the power that cosmopolitanism and other universal histories can hold in the present.

10 Stuart Hall in conversation with Pnina Werbner, Film Interviews with Leading Thinkers (Cambridge, 2006), https://www.sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1119965 (accessed 12/04/2019); David Morley and Bill Schwarz, “Stuart Hall Obituary”, The Guardian (2014), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/10/stuart-hall (accessed 12/04/2019)

Why has modernization theory not been overcome? The ontology of capital in revisionist and traditional Marxist critiques of modernization theory

by:
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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In a recent article for *History and Theory,* Barış Mücen has argued that efforts to overcome modernization theory in critical historical scholarship have not been successful because they have failed to question the ontological principles underlying it. Modernization theory is a model of social progress, which is based on the assumption that all societies evolve from a stage of "pre-modernism" or "tradition" to a stage of "modernity." In this model, non-Western societies are seen to be in a process of catching up with the West. After the height of its popularity in the 1950s and 1960s and numerous critiques in the 1970s and 1980s, this model was thought to be overcome, until its comeback in the early 1990s proved otherwise. Mücen argues that even though critics of modernization theory have rightly outlined its Eurocentric, elitist bias and the teleological and essentialist thrust of its argument, they have not challenged the core principle of modernization theory: the "ontology of capital," in which "being" is characterized with a form of capital and the particularity of a social entity is visible only by showing the degree of the effectivity of the capital it holds. Mücen draws upon Pierre Bourdieu's theory of capital to describe how an object of analysis is constructed through this ontology. Simply put, the ontology of capital defines social entities "by measuring their distance and difference from one another based on their respective possession of particular properties," or capital[1], and then objectifies these relations as hierarchies (f. e. of race, class and gender). These "objectified forms of hierarchies, reflected in the unequal distribution of capital turn into the given facts that determine the way the categories, such as class, gender, race, and nations, are used in research."[2] This ontology, then, "does not necessarily require essentialism"[3] as categories such as "West/non-West" or "modern/traditional" are "empirically constructed as a specific composition of capital that is constituted through the relations (of struggle over capital) that are conditioned by such distributions of capital."[4] Hence, Mücen argues that critical historical scholarship cannot overcome modernization theory simply by avoiding essentialism; it also has to challenge the ontology establishing its analytical categories.

Mücen's criticism is directed at historian of Ottoman history Bernard Lewis, but he also criticizes traditional Marxists for their failure to recognize this capitalist ontology. Following Moishe Postone's reading of Marx[5] he tries to show that this ontology relies on the traditional "distribution model" of capital in Marxist scholarship. According to Postone, traditional Marxism locates the central contradiction of capitalism between the *mode of production* and the *mode of*

1 Barış Mücen, "The Ontology of Capital: On the Shared Methodological Limits of Modernization Theory and Its Critics," *History and Theory* 57 (2018): 175.
2 Mücen, "The Ontology of Capital," 180.
3 Mücen, 181.
4 Mücen, 186.
5 Moishe Postone, *Zeit, Arbeit und gesellschaftliche Herrschaft. Eine neue Interpretation der kritischen Theorie von Marx*, (Freiburg: ça ira-Verlag, 2003).

distribution and only the mode of distribution is seen as historically variable.[6] Traditional Marxists therefore understand class struggle as a struggle over the mode of distribution and as the main agent of social change. Alternatives to capitalism derived from this understanding of capitalism focus on the abolition of the mode of distribution in which surplus is generated for the private use of capitalists, leaving the capitalist mode of production, productive proletarian labour, intact. By "traditional Marxism," then, Postone does not mean a specific historical school of Marxism, but rather all Marxists who share this ontology. Mücen follows Postone in this understanding of traditional Marxism.

In this essay I will employ Mücen's analysis of the "ontology of capital" to show why Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu's[7] model of "Uneven and Combined Development" (UCD) can neither sufficiently criticize modernization theory nor its revisionist variant by Kenneth Pomeranz[8]. While Mücen has focused on a work supportive of modernization theory to outline the basic premises of its ontology, I will treat two works critical of modernization theory: a revisionist variant by Pomeranz and a traditional Marxist critique by Anievas and Nisancioglu. I will show that both works construct difference, the hierarchy between the "West" and the "Rest," as their object of analysis based on their shared ontology of capital.

Pomeranz claims that up until about 1750 "Europe could have been China" because its industrial output, consumption levels and demographic did not greatly differ in comparison to parts of China. According to Pomeranz, Europe rose above Asia in terms of economic output because of the fortunate location of coal on its mainland, and because it could exploit its overseas colonies to relieve pressure on the colonial centre by producing timber, cotton and foodstuffs in a much less "labour-" and "land-intensive" way. Anievas and Nisancioglu object that this claim is impossible to sustain empirically, and that Europe did differ from other parts of the world before 1750—however, not because it was *more* developed but because it was *less* developed than many other parts of the world. They claim that European "backwardness" was a privilege: because European feudal lords were so backward when the Roman Empire collapsed, they could import the technological, military and ideological components of their "apparatus of feudal domination" from abroad. In the feudal mode of production aristocrats relied on the extraction of surpluses from the enserfed peasantry. New technology enabled them to successfully wage war and expand their land and thereby the amount of peasants available for surplus extraction. This process of

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6 Moishe Postone, "Rethinking *Capital* in Light of the *Grundrisse*," in *Karl Marx's Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later*, ed. Marcello Musto (London: Routledge, 2008), 120-145.
7 Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, "How Did the West Usurp the Rest? Origins of the Great Divergence over the *Longue Durée*," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 59 (2017): 34–67.
8 Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) and Kennet Pomeranz, "Political Economy and Ecology on the Eve of Industrialization: Europe, China and the Global Conjuncture," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (April 2002): 425–446.

"geopolitical accumulation" led to the formation of centralised states and their violent overseas expansion.

On the first glance Pomeranz' and Anievas/Nisancioglu's arguments seem to oppose each other. The former sees the acquisition of colonies as a "lucky discovery" and only their exploitation appears as a direct consequence of capitalism. The latter interprets the forceful colonial expansion of Europe as a logical consequence of a uniquely European feudal tradition of "geopolitical accumulation."

However, neither Pomeranz nor Anievas and Nisancioglu challenge the basic "ontology of capital" of modernization theory. They share two central premises. First, both analyses include only those actors who are differentiated on the basis of the distribution of capital between them. In Anievas and Nisancioglu's case central actors are f.e. feudal aristocrats and revolting peasants or colonial empires and impoverished colonized states, who are in direct competition over resources and capital. Pomeranz places actors who can be statistically defined by their capital in the centre of analysis, f.e. citizens as consumers or Chinese women as workers. There is no direct argument of (class) struggle in Pomeranz' account, but the level of consumption of Chinese workers is only relevant for Pomeranz in relation/comparison to European levels of consumption: their relationship is defined by the difference in capital distribution. Second, in both accounts, capitalism appears as an inevitable and coherent development from different points in time onwards: in Pomeranz' account the ascent of Europe is "decided" in the 1750s. In Anievas and Nisancioglu's account European hegemony is founded much earlier, in medieval feudalism. The capitalist mode of production seems inevitable in both arguments because they both follow a linear logic of technological modernization: in Pomeranz' account the production of "land-intensive" goods on plantations in the colonial periphery by means of slave labour funds indirectly the development of the coal-fuelled metallurgy industry, which is a precondition for the construction of railways and steamships, which then reduce industrial production costs by reducing transportation costs and by speeding up production chains. Anievas and Nisancioglu share this understanding of technological progress. The acquisition of new technologies provided the feudal lords and later the colonial enterprises and factory owners with the possibility to increase their surpluses. As I have already outlined above, the capitalist mode of production in its feudal and colonial stages relied on the acquisition of land through war, and advanced technology was a condition for military success. The only major difference to Pomeranz is that Anievas and Nisancioglu locate the development of military and other technologies outside Europe.

The consequence of this shared "ontology of capital" is twofold. First, this logic objectifies the categories of China and Europe. That is, the initial decision to characterize them by the difference in the capital that they hold becomes self-evident and "objective," because the outcome of their historical struggle, the

establishment of a hierarchy, proves their difference. The second consequence is that capitalism seems logical and coherent, while alternatives are erased from the analysis or they appear as utopian wishes in the far future. Alternatives and real contingencies are completely absent from Pomeranz' analysis. In his analysis, the mode of production and its logic of surplus generation and economic growth appear to be the same in Europe as in China. The reason for their different historical outcomes lies in their unequal access to resources and land. This universal logic of production objectifies the hierarchical relation between Europe and China and even justifies it. In contrast to Pomeranz, Anievas and Nisancioglu problematize the exploitation of the populations of colonized states by rich and powerful colonial states. But their alternative is obvious and clichéd: the oppressed and colonized workers need to stand up against their oppressors and reclaim the surplus they generate. This alternative is, essentially, a revolution of the *mode of distribution*: The capitalist class can be eliminated but the principles of their labour, the *mode of production*, will stay intact. The utopia of UCD is thus that of traditional revolutionary Marxism: the realization of proletarian labour without its exploitation.

In my opinion, a historical analysis of capitalism is of little use if it explains the present as a logical outcome of transhistorical laws of political economy. This kind of analysis uses history as an illustration of a theory, but not as its foundation. It revolves around the question of why historical inequalities evolved, but it does not find a truly critical answer, because the nature of this inequality is not questioned. What we need, then, is a critical historical scholarship that analyses the historical particularities of labour in capitalism. This kind of scholarship needs to reject the "distribution model" of traditional Marxism in order to successfully challenge modernization theory. If it does so, it may contribute much to our understanding of capitalist societies, their contradictions, weak points and, ultimately, the alternatives that can replace them.

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Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism –
by Quinn Slobodian, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Hardcover $35.00, Pp. 400, ISBN 9780674979529

Reviewed by:
PEDER ØSTEBØ

In a recent essay in *Dissent Magazine*, historian Daniel Rodgers argues that few concepts have increased more in use in the last twenty thatn "neoliberalism." Rarely spoken of during its alleged watershed moment following the collapse of the cold war ideological schism, the term is, according to Rodgers, "the linguistic omnivore of our times, a neologism that threatens to swallow up all the other words around it."[1] The observation is hard to disagree with; neoliberalism has been invoked to describe everything from Blairite Labour or Emmanuel Macron's vision of the French "start-up nation" to Reaganism, and associated with such different scholars as Anthony Giddens and Milton Friedman, or such different political actors as Hillary Clinton and Augusto Pinochet. Furthermore, neoliberalism is conceptualized to fit the frame of almost all academic disciplines; what was earlier defined as an economic policy doctrine is now read and seen as a wide-reaching intellectual-cultural regime that penetrates every social field and sphere.

This exponential increase in usage and the ever-widening perceived scope of neoliberalism leave scholars with a difficult problem. While the claim that we live under a neoliberal global regime, or in the neoliberal era, is frequently invoked, the watering down of the concept itself makes it difficult to address the meaning of what that may imply. A thin description, in which neoliberalism is merely equated with a predilection for markets and market logic, makes for a flexible concept, but it also represents a concept that has been de-historized and de-contextualized. For historians, a natural starting point for addressing this problem is a critical examination of its origins: where and how was neoliberalism born, and how did the circumstances of its birth shape its trajectory? This, embedding neoliberalism in intellectual history, is the project of historian Quinn Slobodian, currently at Wellesley College, in *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, which has revived the historical debate on what is said to be the ideology shaping our world since the book's publication last year.

Two theses are at the core of Slobodian's work. The first is of one of neoliberalism's genealogy, and the second of neoliberalism as a political ideology with a global agenda. In recent intellectual history, the European origins of neoliberalism have been highlighted by such scholars as Daniel Steadman Jones, uprooting a US-centered narrative in which the ideological tendency is primarily centered around the Economics Department at the University of Chicago in the mid-1970s.[2] In current debates, the birthplace of neoliberalism is usually thought to be either Paris, where the term neoliberalism was coined in the Walter Lippman Colloquium in 1938, or Geneva, where key intellectuals later seen as the godfathers of neoliberalism coalesced around institutions like the

1 Daniel Rodgers, "The Uses and Abuses of "Neoliberalism," in *Dissent Magazine* 65 no. 1 (Winter 2018): 78-87, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/uses-and-abuses-neoliberalism-debate.
2 Daniel Stedman Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) in the 1930s and 40s. Slobodian casts the latter city and institution as the neoliberal hotbed, and invokes the term "the Geneva School" to describe the visions of among other Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke, Gottfried Haberler and Friedrich Hayek, whose scholarly lives centered around Geneva's multiple headquarters of international institutions, in addition to the mentioned institute. Although many of them found new homes, often in the Anglophone world, the Geneva School, through institutions like the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Studies Conference and, later, the Mont Pèlerin Society, came to persist as a social-intellectual circle from which a neoliberal vision was promoted.

Slobodian's innovation is not the emphasis on Geneva as the intellectual center of neoliberalism as such. Rather, the author casts Geneva as an institutional node, and the epicenter of an array of networks. For him, the Geneva School's vision is one shaped by a Central European imperial and post-imperial experience, as many of its proponents spent their formative years in the decaying Austro-Hungarian Empire, and witnessed the former imperial capital becoming "Red Vienna," the site of strikes and violent social confrontations. As Hayek and Mises, Vienna residents and protagonists in Slobodian's narrative, saw this world of nations, in which a burgeoning political sphere of popular struggles dominated, begin to replace the world of empire, they cast their mission as global-political, not national-economic. By invoking the schism introduced by Carl Schmitt of a world of *imperium* and a world of *dominium*, Slobodian argues that the post-imperial experience framed the imaginary of the neoliberals, leading them to search for an order in which the global market could thrive uninterrupted by the perceived calamities of national politics. The *imperium*, in this case, represents the world of boundedness, one of people and national politics, while the *dominium* is the world of capital and property, global in nature, according to the Geneva School. The neoliberal project became, then, a globalist endeavor to "solve the riddle of the post-imperial order" by establishing an "institutional order that safeguarded capital and protected its right to move throughout the world" (p. 9). In other worlds, to protect proprietary *dominium* from popular *imperium*.

In the book's seven chapters, Slobodian masterfully lays out the ideational trajectories of the Geneva School. Recognizing the political nature of the group's project, Slobodian highlights the need not only to present a case for the utility of a global neoliberal project but also rather to emphasize its moral superiority. In chapters 1 and 2 (respectively entitled "A World of Walls" and "A World of Numbers") Slobodian describes the Vienna- and later Geneva-based scholars' work to not only present a counter-narrative to social-democratic visions and Keynesian macroeconomic ideas, but to create an ideational world of symbols, tropes, and language to encompass their arguments. Two examples stand out as particularly enlightening. The first is the work within the International Chamber of Commerce and the League of Nations to portray tariff barriers and unionized labor demands as walls, a powerful trope frequently invoked in the

present. The second is the gradual turn *away* from economic modelling, and towards a conceptualization of a global economy as something "unknowable," out of reach for human comprehension. These tendencies evolved into a vision in which planning is futile and legalistic frameworks appear as the only valid tool of regulation, an idea that would be aggressively promoted in the aftermath of World War II.

Originally, then, a "critique of national sovereignty" (p. 117), the neoliberal project took on a more comprehensive agenda in the construction of the post-war order. In chapter 3 and 4 ("A World of Federations" and "A World of Rights") the struggle over new international institutions and the vision of individual rights are the central components, as the main mission of the neoliberals was to promote a legalistic regime favoring capital and discouraging economic nationalism. Slobodian again shows the historical importance of the Habsburg imperial experience; the Habsburg Empire was argued to be a potential model of how nations could coexist within a single "economic space" (p. 106). Although the Geneva School failed in gaining momentum for a federal framework, the effort to contain global "politization" of new international institutions won the day. The successful campaign against an International Trade Organization and the promotion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are the most important components in the story. The latter would eventually evolve as a vehicle to separate economic and political spheres, through the institutionalization of global market policies in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Additionally, the language of the neoliberals transformed to fit a new paradigm, namely that of rights as the protection of property from the state, central in their later work to promote international investment regulation.

The 1960s posed multiple challenges to the promotion of the neoliberal doctrine on a global scale, some of which led important members of the Geneva School to part ways. In chapter 5, "A World of Races," Slobodian explores the neoliberals' thinking on decolonization and races, where especially Röpke stands out as an unapologetic white supremacist (p. 151). South Africa became a hot topic in neoliberal circles. Many within neoliberals were in principle opponents of Apartheid. Nevertheless, far more effort was put into demonstrating the ills of sanctioning the regime than of the regime itself. The boycott campaign pushed forward by countries in the Global South "transgressed the borders separating the world of property and the world of states," a divide that had been the basis of the world order envisioned by the Geneva School from the beginning. The chapter unfortunately reads more like a detour than an integral part of Slobodian's narrative, and many questions are left unanswered. For instance, how do conceptions of race inform neoliberals' staunch resistance against the New International Economic Order (NIEO), their aversion towards the United Nations as a tool of governance, and their critique of modernization theory? Although Slobodian's discussion on the ideational framework of the neoliberals is generally highly engaging, neoliberalism as an ideology embedded in European

imperial heritage in which racial hierarchies were pivotal remains somewhat underexplored.

Nevertheless, the subsequent chapter largely dealing with the NIEO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (chapter 7, "A World of Signals") as a fundamental challenge to the neoliberal idea of global market supremacy is highly informative. Along with the discussion of the diverging opinions of Geneva School intellectuals on the European integration and the European Economic Community (EEC) (chapter 6, "A World of Constitutions"), they serve to connect pre-war discussions and the post-war struggles on the main topic in the era of decolonization: national sovereignty and the north-south divide. While many neoliberals opposed the EEC initially, claiming that preferential treatment and outward protectionism impeded the effort of opening markets through the GATT, a new generation, primarily inspired by Hayek, eventually came to see the EEC framework as stepping stone for the institutionalization of global governance. With the decline of the NIEO movement in the early 1980s, the strengthened legalism and the "multilevel governance" of the EEC eventually became the model for the GATT's successor, the WTO, which Slobodian sees as the "last episode of the twentieth century neoliberal search for an institutional fix in a world they saw as always threatened by spasms of democracy and the destructive belief that global rules could be remade to bend toward social justice" (p. 257–8).

By expanding the narrative beyond US-centered tales and exploring the connections between past imperial perceptions and both modern and present-day institutions, *Globalists* offers to the reader a comprehensive and coherent counternarrative to standard portrayals of neoliberalism and its origins. Quinn Slobodian not only argues the case of the globalist nature convincingly. He also manages, albeit not explicitly and perhaps not even intentionally, to cast present discussions on neoliberalism and global affairs in a new light. Alluding to the influence of the Geneva School on US conservatives, Slobodian's narrative may be read as an interpretation of the origins of two forceful visions of globalization. One usually referred to as neoliberal, favoring a world order in which nation-states fade away and remain only as cultural spheres while global markets prevail. The other, perhaps closer to the original vision of the Geneva School, a vision favoring a world of two worlds; one in which capital may move freely, and one in which the nation-state serves a container of human agency and prevents a global effort for equality, democracy, and the promotion of human rights - both political, as well as social and economic. *Globalists* is therefore not only a highly important work of modern and contemporary intellectual history. It is also an essential read for those wanting to understand the roots of our current moment, in which clashes of different notions of rights often define political struggle.

"Aus dem Volkskörper entfernt". Homosexuelle Männer im Nationalsozialismus –

by Alexander Zinn, Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2018. 39,95€, Pp. 695p, ISBN: 978-3-593-50863-4

Reviewed by:

SÉBASTIEN TREMBLAY

Although he has already written on the subject in numerous publications, Alexander Zinn, journalist and *Diplomsoziologe*, has finally published his pivotal work on the life of homosexual men under National Socialism. Based on his 2016 doctoral dissertation in Erfurt, this voluminous empirical study of non-heteronormative everyday life between the German Imperial period and the long post-war era presents ground-breaking archival work and a much-needed focus on local aspects of homosexual life. By focussing on the *Alltagsgeschichte* of small towns and the countryside, Zinn adds nuance to some of the better-known theses about the persecution of homosexual men before, after, and especially during the Nazis' rise to power. In doing so, he offers a well-elaborated study on the infamous §175 in both its original Prussian form and after the radicalisation of 1935. At the center of his vast archival endeavour, Zinn succeeds in shedding light on the everyday realities of non-heteronormative men in the 1930s and on the top-down measures (*Sanktionsmaßnahmen*) established by the National Socialist regime to hunt, persecute, and in many cases, murder homosexual men. In order to do so, he concentrates his efforts on a chronological exposé of homophobic Nazi ideology, strategies, and action plans, as well as on a spatial comparison between the Reich as an entity, a regional examination of Thüringen, and a local focus on the area around the town of Altenburg. According to Zinn, these spatial considerations were taken concurrently with the archival corpus available for historical research, as well as the regional particularities. Indeed, Thüringen and the county of Altenburg, devoid of big metropolitan centres, constitute spaces where urban proletarian and agricultural homosexual life coexisted. These regions are also the setting for the life of Rudolf Brazda, one of the main protagonists of Zinn's story, who was born in Thüringen and was persecuted most heavily at the hands of the Nazis in Buchenwald and near Altenburg.[1] As Zinn has previously published Brazda's story, it is unsurprising that he made the young man his focus throughout the book. Through multiple extensive empirical renditions of Brazda's fate and cohabiting stories across his regional points of interest, Zinn intends to correct previous gaps in historiography. He aims to demonstrate how previous works on the persecution of non-heteronormative individuals ignore important data, contradicting pre-supposed ideas of the complete acceptance of the regime's homophobic ideology by the broader population. He also examines the possibility of homosexual life away from the all-encompassing urban oppressive gaze of the Gestapo. Moreover, Zinn goes in extensive detail about the necessity of a paradigm shift. According to Zinn, historians have focussed for far too long on the possible motivations of the Nazi's attack on homosexuality as a strategic and rhetorical device without pointing out

1 For a semi-autobiographical portrait of Brazda, one of the last surviving homosexual survivors of the Nazis' atrocities: Schwab, Jean-Luc /Brazda, Rudolf: Itinéraire d'un Triangle rose. Témoignage du dernier survivant déporté pour homosexualité, (2013) Paris: J'ai Lu. (Translated into German, Italian, Spanish and Romanian). For Zinn on Brazda: Zinn, Alexander: „Das Glück kam immer zu mir": Rudolf Brazda - Das Überleben eines Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich. FaM: Campus, 2011.

the ideological fundaments of the persecution. To his credit, it is by concentrating his gaze on key ideological moments of Nazis' virilism that Zinn shines at his best. Embodied in figures like Himmler, Röhm or pre-*Machtübernahme* characters like Blüher, the ideological basis of these persecutions unveiled an orchestrated terror machine that is exposed brilliantly and at great length throughout the seven chapters of his dissertation. The unfortunate doctoral tone of Zinn's monograph will be dealt with at the end of this review. Indeed, most of Zinn's highs and lows connect to the original medium of the material at hand. In other words, Readers are confronted with a grand overarching empirical project, a monotonal statistical tone, a flawed, incomplete and dated theoretical background paired with a somewhat debutant misunderstanding of the fine line separating a social history book project and the desire to prove one's academic qualifications. Excelling at finding archival material to present, Zinn nevertheless brushes over recent scholarship and presents a sketchy understanding of queer historiography. However, first let us give credit where it is due: this is truly an impressive piece in terms of archival research.

EMPIRICAL MERITS

After an imposing journey across almost the whole Federal Republic, Zinn brings to life a remarkable corpus of both biographical stories, legal conjunctures and new archival material. If the first chapter following the introduction offers a relatively tame overview of the German Empire's dealings with homosexuality, Zinn's third chapter about everyday male homosexual life in distinctive milieus (agricultural, proletarian, bourgeois and elite) is an empirical tour de force. Unfortunately, the redundant information offered by Zinn's wall-to-wall presentation of homosexual life and the excessive scale of the demonstration (i.e. a chapter of almost 150 pages) hints more at a grocery list of empirical findings and at a dissertation draft, rather than a final published work. This is notwithstanding the constant emphasis on outmoded and out-of-date theoretical and sociological concepts such as "stigma-management" (more on this below). In chapter four, Zinn almost redeems himself with a more concise overview of the persecution at the level of the Reich. He consequently complements or corrects some of the better-known historiography, namely the works of Rüdiger Lautmann and Burkhard Jellonnek. Chapter five and six shift the emphasis onto the regional and the local levels, concluding the triangular spatial inquiry advanced by Zinn. Yet again drowning his readership in listed archival material, Zinn also follows some strange additional tangents unrelated to his original research questions and somehow loses the reader along the way. Nonetheless, this is where the book takes all its sense, as his convincing demonstration fills multiple gaps in the pre-

existing historiography of the time period. Zinn offers nuanced and multifaceted angles and perspectives that have rarely been put at the forefront of research on this topic. Finally, he provides a last chapter on the aftermaths of 1945 until the liberalization of §175. In doing so, he looks at the memory of the atrocities and eventual discussions on reparation well into the 21st century. Still, slapped to the end of such an imposing volume, the discussion feels forced, rushed and put forward to connect the project to contemporary discussions deserving of their own contribution and lacking a connection to the primary effort. Giving us closure to Brazda's life story, it nonetheless opens the discussion for readers unfamiliar with German republican history before and after the *Wende*.

THEORETICAL INADEQUACY

It is in his theoretical approach that Zinn's book really shows its flaws. Conservative, insistent, and brushing over more than 40 years of gay, lesbian and queer studies, he spends pages following what seem to be historiographical vendettas. Along the way, he uses intellectual shortcuts to dismiss a whole corpus of social science that could have been beneficial to his analysis. For instance, his shot fired at Claudia Schoppmann's work on lesbian persecution is enough to raise the eyebrows of anyone interested in systematic and structural genocide studies and the history of sexuality. In 2018, it is surprising to consider a lack of direct concerted persecution as a proof of its absence. For a historian spending so much time on detailing his methodology while dealing with perpetrator sources and reading against the grain, Zinn ignores his own advice when it comes to the persecution of other forms of non-heteronormative sexualities. This is, of course, after years of literature examining the violence and persecutions of so-called "asocial" women. But this example is only the tip of a much more problematic iceberg. Anchored in dated theories from the 1970s and 1980s, Zinn's work obstinately ignores decades of literature on the topic. The works of people like Dagmar Herzog, on the creation of the queer self, on the constructivist aspects of queer, and on the cultural phenomenology of the queer subject are completely ignored by, if not unknown to, the author, as are works on queer shame, "queer spectrability" and queer longing. Indeed, Zinn spends some pages in his introduction on what he calls the "purist constructivist" approach. Yet, in a time where canonical journals like GLQ offer their readers epistemological discussions and self-reflections on early queer studies by Cohen and Halperin, the simple mention of Butler and Foucault as strawmen appears more like an embarrassing lack of knowledge. A brief overview of the literature list at the end of the book also exposes the German-centric aspect of the secondary literature. This becomes painfully apparent when Zinn mentions as "novelty" things that

have already been dealt with in other languages. This criticism is not intended to reinforce the status of English as an imposed lingua franca in academia, but the lack of awareness of seminal theoretical work in this day and age is difficult to take seriously. This would maybe be less problematic if Zinn did not insist on the "ahistorical" aspect of queer theory and write an unconvincing dismissal of identity-based framings in order to brings back old ones from the 1970s. In this regard, the book reflects more the apparent swansong of an outdated vision of LGBTQ history (i.e. gay history), if not a generational gap. This is unfortunate, as the empirical data amassed by Zinn is proof in itself that he has extensive knowledge about his material. Regrettably, good historical praxis isn't worth much if not paired with a solid theoretical background. That being said, the book would have benefited from further revision between the dissertation and the monograph. Its doctoral aspect is still too static and dry, and it would have been helpful to bring modification to what is essentially a manuscript rather than a book.

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Reviewed by:

LISA PHONGSAVATH
& YEO HUIJUN MARTINA

In 1969, Raffles Professor of History at the University of Singapore, K.G. Tregonning, proclaimed that modern Singapore began in the year 1819. Referring to Stamford Raffles' establishment of a British settlement in what was deemed a largely uninhabited island along the Melaka Strait, he states:

> 'Nothing that occurred on the island prior to this has particular relevance to an understanding of the contemporary scene; it is of antiquarian interest only'.[1]

About a decade later, Tregonning's successor as Raffles Professor, Wong Lin Ken, further bemoaned the lack of knowledge on Singapore's earlier trading history, claiming that, 'no historian has yet adequately explained why Singapore failed to be a major trading centre before the 19th century'.[2]

Tregonning and Wong's claims capture the essence of Singapore's popular national narrative, which credits both the island's foundation and its economic significance to its British colonial inheritance. 2019 marks 200 years since the arrival of Stamford Raffles and British settlement. At the same time that the nation prepares to celebrate the bicentennial of its official founding, Kwa Chong Guan and Peter Borschberg's edited volume, *Studying Singapore before 1800*, presents an alternative response to the origins of modern Singapore. Rather than a 200-year time frame of history beginning at 1819, the editors suggest that a longer 700-year framework might be more appropriate when considering the island's past.

The volume is a rich collection of pre-existing research on Singapore before the 19th century, ambitiously brought together for the first time. Its extensive 18 chapters consist of journal articles and book chapters originally published between 1921 and 2006, with the majority of work already over 50 years old. The age of the articles shines light on how scholarship on Singapore's early history has been relegated to the margins of the national-colonial framework. Rather than a gap in literature, as Wong Lin Ken assumed, it becomes apparent that this kind of research was being conducted all along, waiting to be brought to the surface again by a new historical agenda. Looking to the global transformations of the island and its surrounding waterways before British intervention, the book's combined chapters aim to establish Singapore's global identity using a deeper past, underscoring that the island's historical position 'should not be as insignificant as some people used to consider' (p. 52).

The chapters cover an overwhelming scope – from periods of antiquity all

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1 K.G. Tregonning, 'The Historical Background', in *Modern Singapore*, ed. Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1969), p. 14.
2 Wong, L.K., 'A View of Our Past', in *Singapore in Pictures, 1819–1945*, ed. Lee Yik and C.C. Chang (Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Poh and Ministry of Culture, 1981), p. 15.

the way to the 18th century, and with topics ranging from toponymy and geography to political organisation and naval conflict. The source base of the volume's 16 authors are similarly impressive – utilising Malay, Arabic, Chinese, Dutch, Portuguese, Javanese, Tamil, French and British records – often in combination and comparison with one another. Among other classical texts, particular attention is accorded to the Malay Annals (*Sejarah Melayu*), the 17th-century chronicles of the Melaka royal court. Where historians have dismissed the Malay Annals for its incorporation of folklore, the volume's authors have made significant efforts to treat the text as a genuine historical source, closely and critically examining its rich contents and corroborating its validity with other records, including maps, poems, epigraphy, travellers accounts and archaeological evidence. Pieter Gerritsz Rouffaer's article (Chapter 5), translated from Dutch to English for the first time, is particularly dedicated to the analysis of the Malay Annals, examining in great detail the text itself, the historical context under which it was written, and the sources used to construct its narrative.

Although each of the chapters share a driving concern for Singapore before 1800, their histories do not necessarily follow the same paths, nor are their arguments completely in agreement with the other chapters. This can be seen, for example, in the question of how far back Singapore's history can be stretched. The answers the chapters' authors present span from the 2nd to 13th centuries C.E. But by presenting a variety of research, covering a wide range of time periods, themes and disciplinary backgrounds, Kwa Chong Guan and Peter Borschberg's volume establishes a rich basis of secondary scholarship from which new research on pre-1800 Singapore can spring up, encouraging readers to make up their own mind about what this history entails.

Chapters 1 to 7 are earlier articles from the 1920s to the 1970s which touch on the historical geography of Singapore and its vicinity, mainly through the comparison of toponyms found in classical texts, travellers' accounts and contemporary geography. The authors seek to pinpoint specific geographical locations and time periods pertaining to important recorded episodes in and around Singapore island. Their focus on historical geography reflects the larger historiographical preoccupation with using Singapore's strategic geographical location to explain its economic success. Where the succeeding chapters focus exclusively on the early-modern era and onwards, this first section covers the earliest periods in Singapore's history. What can be evinced in these chapters and the evidence they use, especially travellers' maps and accounts, is the extent to which the pre-colonial history of the island was deeply embedded in not only the local contexts of neighbouring regions, but also wider, global transformations, such as long-distance travel and the navigational technologies that enabled them.

Chapters 8 and 9 are later research papers, from 2004 and 1992 respectively, indicative of more recent historiographical trends. In Timothy Barnard's contribution on the role of Singapore in Malay histories (Chapter 8), his focus on collective memory can be seen as part of the cultural turn in historical studies

and an increasing concern with memory. Similarly, the emphasis on ethnicity in Muhammad Yusoff Hashim's study on the role of the Seri Bija Diraja within the Melaka court (Chapter 9) reflects an escalating interest in ethnically-based identity politics within Malaysia and Southeast Asia from the late 1980s onwards.

Chapters 10, 11 and 17 contribute significant insights into the key actors of the region's early-modern societies, concentrating on the social, economic and political structures within which they functioned. The activities of sea nomads like the Orang Laut, living autonomously on Singapore's islands and around its waterways, as well as the roles of Melaka's rulers, noblemen, and political liaisons (the *Shahbandars*), are discussed in detail, imparting a rich imaginary of the personalities of pre-1800 Singapore. Chapters 13 and 15 describe accounts of European naval conflicts in the region based on early-modern Portuguese and Dutch records. They highlight the significant relationships that existed between early-modern Johor, Singapore and Europe, as well as the broader European interest in the region before British colonisation. Chapters 14 and 16 focus on the theme of navigation, looking at various waterways and nautical passages around Singapore using a combination of historical texts and navigational records, like maps and nautical charts, with geographical studies. Geologist Victor Obdeijn's paper on the Melaka Strait trade route (Chapter 16), first published in Dutch in 1946, is a stand-out piece that combines studies of geomorphology with an in-depth examination of travel records. With both scientific and historical scrutiny, he claims that trade in Singapore and wider Melaka would not have been able to thrive until ca. 1350, when the Strait of Singapore, a waterway which did not formerly exist, came to be navigable. Chapters 12 and 18 are contributions by editor Kwa Chong Guan that are closely aligned with the central premises of the volume. Chapter 12 is a long-durée history of the trade routes along the south Melaka Strait, underlining the centrality of this trade to Singapore's long-term historical legacy beginning in the 7th century C.E. Jumping to the nineteenth-century, Chapter 18 considers a different vantage point to 1819 in Singapore's history. Attention is given not to Raffles nor the British colonial administration, but more to the part of Johor statesmen, Tengku Husain and his Temenggong, in signing Raffles' treaties and, in effect, inaugurating the modern Singapore we know today.

When taken as a whole, this huge breadth of information can be overwhelming and complicated to follow. The chapters are loosely ordered by chronology, but often jump between different topics and time frames unpredictably. Not sorted by publication date, it is also difficult to trace the historiography and the state of each chapter's research when making one's way through the book. Outdated elements in older articles follow and contradict chapters published more recently, oftentimes leaving the reader with a confused and undefined take-away from each contribution. Combined with the heavy use of specific toponyms and the overwhelming mentions of actors, places and events – often interchanging between different literary traditions, the content is challenging to read without prior familiarisation with the context.

The book's agenda to prove Singapore's early significance can be seen as a rather ambitious national project. Its aims to further designate this significance as the 'clear beginning' to Singapore's contemporary realisation as an 'aspiring global city' (p.23) establish high expectations, assuming that the island's early history *should* prove to be noteworthy. Despite the editors' push towards rewriting the history of Singapore, not much action in the volume actually takes place on the island itself. The narratives presented are much more focused on what happened in and around the island's shores and waterways, and their implications in wider regional and global transformations, especially with regard to trade, conflict and exploration. Indeed, given the centrality of archaeology in corroborating the existence of complex trade and societies in 14th-century Singapura island and the editors' emphasis of this in the introduction, it is surprising that not one chapter is specifically focused on archaeology and these findings. The volume's emphasis on movement and mobile societies, such as that of the Orang Laut, grounds its history less on Singapore's soil and within its current national boundaries, but more as part of an extended regional history. Timothy Barnard's argument, in Chapter 8, towards implicating Singapore in a wider Malay legacy appears as a more convincing conceptualisation of the island's global past, better corresponding with what the book's chapters actually achieve. A further disconnection between the editors' aims and the volume's content is the centrality of the 200- vs. 700-year framework of Singapore's history made in the introduction (p.21). This poses a limited scope to the various narratives offered in the chapters, which extend the historical framework to a much longer period, beginning in some cases more than 1700 years ago.

Due to the significant age of most of the articles, the content of research in *Studying Singapore Before 1800* does at times feel outdated. All of the 16 authors are male, and especially those who wrote the older chapters, such as Richard Winstedt and Carl Alexander Gibson-Hill, belonged to a privileged political class of administrators, lawyers and executives of colonial and national institutions. Reviewing the content of their chapters, many of the histories presented are traditional, masculine narratives based on politics and power, comprising of themes of discovery, mapping, political structure and conflict. Where the editors seem keen to remove the 'Great Man' trajectory of Stamford Raffles in Singapore's popular history (p. 4), they turn a blind eye to how their new history might also be grounded on the worlds of other high-ranking men. However, these limitations come with the choice to showcase older articles, and can point to the very difficulty of conducting this kind of research in the first place. Indeed, the decision to create a volume using only older material sheds light on the very short supply of new research that exists on pre-1800 Singapore. In the country as well as elsewhere, researching and writing Singapore's history is not a very popular endeavour. It is also difficult to accomplish new work when primary sources are so limited and no new resources are being found. Still, the book could have benefited from having a conclusion that rounds off the findings of the existing research and indicates possible new

directions and approaches for the study of Singapore's early global past.

Despite their internal flaws, the authors should still be commended on their impressive and varied use of source material in uncovering this 'hidden' history. What is apparent in each chapter is a deep engagement with the sources, reading both against-the-grain and along-the-grain in a critical, comparative and contextualised manner. The authors' serious treatment of the Malay Annals, however not always agreeing with the veracity of the entire text, also makes an important case for how historians should not dismiss historical accounts written in non-Western tradition as completely fictitious, invalid or irrelevant. A few authors even looked deeper into the very myths and symbols that originally gave these sources their bad reputation. In Chapter 10, Leonard Y. Andaya justifies taking seriously the myth of the Johor sultan's supernatural powers as this was what the nomadic Orang Laut accepted as true. This spiritual faith in the ruler was the backbone to their fierce loyalty and willingness to provide naval support to the Johor Kingdom during the 17th century. As Kwa Chong Guan suggests, this 'spiritual prowess or daulat of the sultan' was 'at the apex of society' in Melaka (p. 192). In Chapter 4, Paul Wheatley explains the significance of the recurring symbol of the crown and its loss in the writings of the Malay Annals and other Sumatran texts. Some time in the history of Srivijaya, he explains, 'the lack of a crown had to be explained away, possibly by a usurper legitimizing his reign'. The physical 'crown was considered essential for a valid coronation' in Malay history (p. 70). These examples demonstrate the necessity of examining the spiritual and symbolic content of local texts; they were what contemporaries genuinely believed and were central to their social and political relationships. Considering the scarcity of source material and the limited new research available on these periods of history, more of such studies looking deeper into local classical sources, and especially their myths and symbols, could be a potentially productive direction, enabling a profounder view into the belief systems of people at the time and how they interpreted these narratives.

Kwa Chong Guan and Peter Borschberg's ambitious source collection, *Studying Singapore before 1800*, is a clear move away from the 200-year-old fascination with Raffles and British colonisation in the history of Singapore. Presenting an extensive selection of research on the island's pre-colonial past, the editors piece together a new collective memory of Singapore's regional and global origins. Despite its dense content and inconsistencies, the edited volume is a welcome addition to historical scholarship on Singapore, breaking away from the limits of the dominant colonial framework and bringing forward a much more vibrant picture of the island's global past. Our hope is that more work will emerge from this, which not only engages Singapore's pre-colonial history with a focused inquiry into the local sources or with the question of 200-, 700- or 1700-year time frames, but also new research that can bring fresh approaches to this once-forgotten past.

Remaking the Modern World 1900-2015: Global Connections and Comparisons –
by C.A. Bayly, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018.
Paperback $49.95, Pp. 424, ISBN: 978-1405187169

Reviewed by:
PAUL SPRUTE

Following his magisterial *The Birth of the Modern World*, the study of the 19th century which has been so influential in re-focusing historiographical perspectives towards global interlinkages, Christopher Bayly leaves us the complementary *Remaking the Modern World*. Published in 2018, three years after the author's sudden death, the preface points out that Bayly had left an "unfinished, though in effect complete" manuscript, which the editor prepared for publication in an "exceptionally demanding production process" (p.xi) with the help of several colleagues who were close to the author. Any reader of this book will be left wondering how Bayly would have revised this work himself and fleshed out certain parts of it. Yet, there should be no doubt that all readers also benefit greatly from the editor's decision to finalize and publish this manuscript despite not having the possibility to further develop it in dialogue with the author. With *Remaking*, the reader gains an insight into Bayly's perspectives on the genealogies of today's world. The late author draws compelling conclusions on its emergence in his reflection on the *Global Connections and Comparisons,* which he has offered to historians around the world as a stimulus for their work. At the same time, Bayly has suggested a perspective that focuses on the relations between individuals, their actions and identities, and greater global processes. Christopher Clark points out in his introduction to this volume that Bayly "saw a piece of agency, a spark of resilience and hope, in everyone who entered his field of vision" (p.xiv). Taken together, this book suggests to me a study of history that does not shy away from following historical processes up to their preliminary conclusions in the present. It also seeks to identify greater changes and links them with a closer focus on the local or individual without simply subordinating the complexities in these smaller units of analysis to grander narratives. The fact that this book is again convincing and illuminative in this quest surely is a testament to Bayly's excellence as a historian, as well as it may be an inspiration to any student of history.

As a companion volume to *The Birth of the Modern World*, Bayly takes a similar approach in organizing *Remaking* by including a number of narrative chapters that enclose the more conceptually focused ones. After the first part of this volume chronologically revises the long twentieth century, eight thematic chapters analyze different changes that Bayly understands as central to the era. The volume is concluded by another broader chapter recapitulating as well as synthesizing historical processes "Between Two Centuries" leading up to 2015, and a short conclusion. The thematic chapters are roughly divided between two foci: The first is the question how the human experience was shaped by the expansion of knowledge on a social, but also more personal level. A chapter on religion serves as the point of transition to the more politically oriented chapters on 'Killing' and 'Crime,' 'Internationalism and Transnationalism,' the 'Shadow of Empire,' and the 'Pressure of People.' Still, it is evident throughout those later thematic chapters, that Bayly sustains his focus on the broad question how people reacted to and interacted with the influences of fundamental historical

changes on their lived experiences.

Despite its neat fundamental organization, its clear concerns and focus, *Remaking* is quite imbalanced. This is the most (and somewhat banally) obvious in the length of the chapters varying from 7 to 25 pages. More importantly, however, these imbalances extend to the contents of the book. Bayly was a historian of South Asia and the British Empire by training and this volume strongly reflects his specialization. While the book reflects the author's concern to incorporate events and processes from around the world, his analysis is at its liveliest when presenting cases from his area of expertise. One example is the attention that Bayly dedicates to the British settler colonies in their own right. Such preferences should not be understood as deficiencies, however, but can instead inspire the reader to draw their own "global connections and comparisons"—whether in support or contestation of Bayly's positions. Given the unfortunate circumstances of this volume's publication, it is also quite certain that Bayly would have added more color to certain parts of his picture, reconsidered some accentuation and maybe even changed specific proportions. All this would not have changed the clearly visible overall image, however.

I was nonetheless left wondering about potential omissions in *Remaking* compared to alternative approaches exploring the fundamental historical changes from which our present has emerged. Notably, Bayly barely mentions the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America as a decisive rupture in the second half of the 20th century. The central importance of this swift change and its consequences for the history and the eventual end of the cold war, but also for current international politics, recently underlined by Odd Arne Westad,[1] would surely have warranted some attention. Yet, I found Bayly's fundamental take on the international conflicts after the Second World War quite illuminating, as he situates the 'Global Cold War' convincingly in longer histories of internationalism and the demise of European empires. Here, as elsewhere, I found the background of Bayly's perspective in the analysis of long-term changes over centuries very beneficial.

Considering the strength of *Remaking* in its rootedness in Bayly's clear argument of our world converging—notwithstanding, but still accounting for local specificities or heightened antagonisms, it works best as a companion volume to his earlier works. In fact, it is illuminating to read certain chapters from both books, such as the ones on religion, alongside each other, as the respective chapter in *The Birth* exemplified this book's contribution so well and reflects a core theme of Bayly's overall work. *Remaking* provokes the reader to think about historical changes at the greatest scale available to the historian (who does not buy into either 'deep' or 'big history'). In that context, I found it quite amusing, but entirely appropriate to see Bayly unexpectedly reflect on the place of contemporary

1 Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (London: Allen Lane, 2017), 395–422.

phenomena like K-pop within the greater scheme of things. I hope that this attention and the name drop in *Remaking* is appreciated by *Gangnam Style*'s Psy, whose music Bayly presents as an expression of the rise of youth culture around the world which sets itself apart from the moral values of older generations. Not only, but also due to such turns, Bayly's sober prose, and the clarity as well as poignancy in his conceptual discussions, this book is a great read.

Nevertheless (and hopefully not narrow-mindedly), I would like to note that it is beyond my understanding how certain egregious errors—entirely dispensable hurdles for the reader to stumble upon—were overlooked in editing. The gravity of these errors varies: Often, they are actually negligible, for example when a later position of an individual is predated (p.254) or a historical event is postdated by exactly a decade (p.255).[2] Yet, if awkward copyediting leaves the impression that George W. Bush and Tony Blair decided to intervene in Rwanda to stop the genocide of 1994—when no international power did—instead of invading Iraq almost a decade later (p.256), this inadvertently changes historical facts and is annoying at least. Once these errors become part of the argument by, for example, highlighting the relevance that Hutu and Tutsi were groups "of similar size" (p.256)—when they were not—and all these errors occur over two pages, the editorial process has to be questioned. While I fully acknowledge the difficulty of handling a manuscript for posthumous publication, these and many more errors and cases of awkward editing suggest that even more care should have been taken. Such neglects seem all the more regrettable as they could have been easily corrected without doing injustice to the original manuscript.

Apart from these awkward flaws, the abrupted writing process seems to have affected this work on a more fundamental level. *Remaking* includes specific characterizations, as well as certain "connections and comparisons" that fail to convince because they are overly eclectic, seem imprecise, or lack important detail and nuances. Several examples can be found in the chapter on *The Pressure of People* (e.g. p.291), including an unconvincing generalized reference to Nazist *Lebensraum* ideology (p.295), while the discussion of environmental pressures fails to mention the challenges of climate change. It is safe to assume that Christopher Bayly would have revised his manuscript in such a way that many of these issues had been resolved. Yet, at the same time these issues mirror easy criticisms against approaches of global history and represent actual challenges to writing global histories. This is why it is so unfortunate that this book could not fully reflect the author's excellence as a global historian in successfully handling such concerns.

Overall, the great value of this last of Christopher Bayly's books is nonetheless beyond question: *Remaking the Modern World* is truly thought provoking and speaks to many different discussions, be it on the approach

2 The first example refers to Ariel Sharon's position during the 1982 Lebanon War, the second to the year of Partice Lumumba's assassination.

of global history—for example the entanglement of different layers of history writing—or the problems and possibilities of presentist history writing. The work also shows in exemplary fashion how historians can help us understand changes in individual perceptions, impressions, and the human experience itself. In his preface, the author graciously acknowledges that "[w]riting world history … can only be a flawed activity. But I argue that it adds value to other forms of historical writing and to public debate more generally" (p.xx). In this sense, *Remaking* serves as an excellent springboard for students of history to actively engage with the opportunities that the author has left us to contribute our own multitude of voices to the field.

The Price of Aid:
The Economic Cold War in India –
by David C. Engerman, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. 512. ISBN: 9780674659599

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The Development Century:
A Global History –
by Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018

Reviewed by:
SANDRA ALSÉN

In the epilogue of *The Development Century: A Global History*, Jeremy Adelman reflects on the ubiquity of development projects in recent history and notes that "what is remarkable is that so many people and institutions remained committed to their ideas of development" (p. 327). This resilience, he argues, stems from the fact that development emerged in response to global integration and "as long as global integration … frames interdependent relationships between societies," we can expect the lure of development to endure (p.336). Development plays an equally important role in *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India*, but for very different reasons. In David Engerman's account, development is presented as a phenomenon linked to a very specific moment in history. International development assistance, he argues, became an aspect of postwar international relations only when ideas about economic development took on new meanings at the intersection between decolonization and the outbreak of the Cold War. In this context, the Indian government became absorbed by 'development politics' – "the competition for external aid and its entanglement with domestic politics" (p.3). Within two decades, however, the international context had changed and India was left, economically and politically destabilized, to pay the "price of aid".

Engerman portrays this tragedy of the economic Cold War in India in three parts. The first part serves as background and describes how the United States and the Soviet Union 'discovered' India after independence, sparking debates about the potential of extending economic aid to newly independent nations. Simultaneously, Indian politicians were discussing economic policy and national development, debates which Engerman traces back to debates among Indian nationalists that preceded independence.

The second part, titled "The Heyday of the Economic Cold War, 1955-1966", forms the core of Engerman's argument and describes how "development politics" structured domestic debates as well as relations between India and the two superpowers. Cold War competition spurred the United States and the Soviet Union to outdo each other in the field of development, a dynamic that Indian officials exploited, by playing the two superpowers off against one another, to obtain more generous assistance. The competition did not, however, preclude India from accepting assistance from both the East and the West at the same time. Over time, a division of labor of sorts developed between the two blocs, whereby Indian officials seeking to develop the public sector and heavy industry turned to the Soviet Union while officials involved in promoting agriculture and freer markets sought aid from the United States.

These different visions of development coexisted within the Indian government and led to increasingly sharp political divisions as officials used the Cold War to further their own domestic agendas. The final part of the book explores how, in the late 1960s, these divisions deepened as both superpowers withdrew from development projects and India entered the 1970s facing both political instability and economic stagnation. The global project of development,

Engerman concludes, was intended to enhance state power, but the "practice of development assistance threatened the stability of nation-states" (7).
The Price of Aid successfully sheds light on the paradoxical relationship between development aid and state sovereignty because Engerman focuses on networks of actors working within and between governments rather than the state itself. Rather than taking the state for granted as the prima facie actor in international relations, Engerman disentangles and examines the internal workings of states and the transnational networks enabling cooperation between them. This perspective makes it clear that development was not a phenomenon exported by the USA but a language spoken on both sides of the Cold War divide as well as in the places where Cold War bipolarity was explicitly rejected: ideas about development were constructed through interactions between Indian, Soviet and American government officials. This insight emerges from extensive archival research in all three countries which allows Engerman to alternate between the international dimension of Cold War competition and biography-like portraits of individual government officials, without any loss of clarity or attention to detail.
While this impressive feat is to some extent made possible by the Cold War lens through which *The Price of Aid* views the history of development in India, this reader cannot help but wonder what other actors and insights might have emerged from a perspective less colored by the Cold War narrative. For instance, the time frame of the book follows the chronology of the Cold War, but a more organic chronology could have shed light on continuities and connections with development efforts that both preceded and succeeded the heyday of Cold War developmentalism.
The editors of *The Development Century*, Stephen Macekura and Erez Manela, call for precisely such a shift in perspectives. The fifteen contributions that follow take up this challenge and demonstrate how the history of development is both entangled with and independent from the Cold War. As such, they agree with Engerman's assertion that development was not invented and exported by the United States. The volume's chapters cover different scales – from the national and international to the local and transnational – and show that, for actors around the world, "development was not seen as something to be *done* to them" (p.282) but was, rather, perceived as an integral part of their own political agendas. Hence, the volume also captures the malleability of the development concept and how it has been incorporated into radically divergent ideologies and political projects including, for instance, both imperialism and anti-imperial nationalism.
In terms of chronology, Amanda Kay McVety's chapter tracing the origins of international development assistance back to Enlightenment philosophy, Julia Irwin's study of US engagement with development practices in the interwar years and Christy Thornton's chapter on the Mexican interwar origins of development, make a convincing case for histories of development stretching further back than President Truman's 1949 "Point Four" speech. Development, as Macekura and Manela remind us, "has long been the rage in the global arena" (p.2).

Similarly, interventions by Paul Adler and Timothy Nunan, describing the emergence of a transnational network of activists engaging critically with development projects over the last three decades of the twentieth century, and a century of international development projects and humanitarianism in Afghanistan, respectively, show that development remained important long after the 1970s, the point at which Engerman's study and many other development histories end. Both contributions suggest ways to study the emergence of activist networks and NGOs as both proponents and the fiercest critics of development. Integrating these actors into development histories will not only contribute to our understanding of what Jeremy Adelman calls the resilience of development, but also poses interesting questions about the history of nation-states, territoriality and globalization.

Moreover, several of the contributions in *The Development Century* expand our understanding of development by inserting its history of development into research on a wide array of topics beyond that of the Cold War. For instance, Thomas Robertson's study of World War II-era inventions that cleared the way for development projects in tropical areas weaves together development with the history of technology and, most interestingly, environmental history. Erez Manela's excellent chapter, moreover, frames development within the history of disease control and the emergence of international institutions as development actors. Perhaps the best example of this is Priya Lal's chapter which, looking at Tanzania and Zambia in the years following independence, argues for the need to examine postcolonial national development projects "according to their own internal logic" (p.175). Doing so reveals a distinctly Southeastern African, hybrid approach to national development resulting from a fusion of African socialism and the ideas attached to the development aid that Zambia and Tanzania accepted from abroad. Lal also introduces the concept of "developmental labor" which includes both the sort of work in the welfare sector that is traditionally associated with national development projects – health care and education, for example – but also reproductive labor which has often been overlooked in the scholarship. Since this latter category was dominated by women, and all developmental workers were simultaneously both the subjects and the objects of development, gender was a key dimension of postcolonial development politics. Lal's efforts to "write gender into the mainstream narrative of development history" (p.178) not only enhances her own analysis but also points to one of the many dimensions of the history of development that remain unexplored.

If David Engerman's *The Price of Aid* is an interesting read on account of its ability to synthesize transnational interactions and complex political and international debates into a clear narrative of 'development politics,' *The Development Century* is compelling because, in many ways, it does the precise opposite. Collectively, the sixteen chapters "reveal development not as a universal concept" but rather, in the words of the editors, "as a contingent, messy, and often-contested process of explaining the past and imagining the future" (p.10).

One challenge for future historians of development will be to integrate the diversity of perspectives and actors found in *The Development Century* with the attention to detail that characterizes *The Price of Aid*. In the meantime these books, especially when read together, provide both a good introduction to the global history of development and ample inspiration for future contributions to the field.

Africa and the Global Cold War –
Conference at the University of Mekelle, March 2019

Reviewed by:

PAUL SPRUTE
& MAXIMILIAN VOGEL

Whether it is Addis Abeba's Tiglachin Monument to the Dergue rule in Ethiopia and the joint struggle of Cuban and Ethiopian soldiers or the only public statue of Karl Marx in Africa (Figure 1),[1] it is hard to avoid stumbling over marks of the Cold War in Ethiopia's capital. While the rapid growth of the economy and population, as well as a dizzying construction boom might have changed the outlook of the capital city and the country over the last decades, these spaces remind us that the "Global Cold War" had one of its main theatres in this region. If one looks underneath recently sealed asphalt roads and turns away from the ongoing construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, but instead looks at the so-called "China Road" of the 1970s, or explores the history of the Yugoslav-built hydrological power plant at the Blue Nile Falls, it becomes clear how much of the current Ethiopian infrastructure is connected to the Cold War as well, indeed holding a multitude of intriguing stories.[2]

Moreover, Ethiopia's current political system has been firmly rooted in the outcome of the Cold War. The ruling coalition of regional parties, led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), has come to power by waging an ultimately successful guerrilla war against the Dergue, finally ousting Mengistu's government in 1991—coinciding with the collapse of his sponsors in the Soviet Union. Beyond Addis, monuments are dedicated to this struggle in the capitals of Ethiopia's federal states. While these stelae in Amhara's capital Bahir Dar or Tigray's Mekelle commemorate the emergence of today's system of rule, the basic political set-up of Ethiopia's "ethnic federalism" has recently been shaken.[3] With the coming into power of the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the unquestioned dominance of the TPLF now seems to belong to the past. At the same time, the prime minister has been able to cut through one of the most strongly and firmly tied Gordian knots that the interlinked forces of (anti-) imperialism and the dynamics of the Cold War have left: the bitter confrontation between the former comrades in arms of the Tigray and the Eritrean People's Liberation Fronts. Notwithstanding the recent détente between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Horn of Africa remains a hotbed of political upheaval and geopolitical rivalry to be linked to the entangled dynamics of colonialism and the Cold War. Djibouti's role as a safe haven for six different international navies, the lasting fragmentation of Somalia, but also the devastating war in Yemen and the recent fall of the regime in Sudan make us painfully aware of this fact.[4]
To put it shortly, there hardly seems to be a place from where it would be more crucial to explore the history of the Global Cold War than Ethiopia, at the center

1 Meskerem Assegued, Demeke Brehane, and Denis Pesut, *Public Monuments of Addis Ababa*, *1930–2014* (Addis Abeba: Goethe-Institut, 2014), 36–41.
2 For contemporary impressions and some of these stories of Cold War encounters, for example refer to this travelogue of a Soviet engineer in Ethiopia: Georgi Galperin, Äthiopische Reise (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1972).
3 Mahmood Mamdani, "The Trouble with Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism," *The New York Times*, January 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/opinion/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-reforms-ethnic-conflict-ethnic-federalism.html.
4 Gérard Prunier, "Éthiopie-Érythree, Fin des Hostilités," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, November 2018, https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2018/11/PRUNIER/59209.

of the Horn of Africa. This thought must have been close to the organizers of the workshop series "Africa and the Global Cold War." The two organizing parties, the Universities of Mekelle and Erfurt, had initiated their cooperation in 2014 with a focus on the cartographic history of the Abyssinian Empire based on the extensive Perthes collections housed in Gotha. This initial project triggered further cooperation in the field of international history.[5] In July 2018, a first workshop on "Africa and the Global Cold War" was held at the University of Erfurt.[6] Already focusing on the Horn of Africa, this exchange between scholars from Ethiopia and Germany turned out to be so productive that a second conference was organized in Mekelle on March 25 and 26, 2019. The stated goal of this workshop, convened by Aychegrew Hadera and Christian Methfessel, was to extend the opportunities for Ethiopian scholars to discuss their contributions. Moreover, the workshop sought to strengthen interdisciplinary approaches by including international relations. This change also meant that the workshop gave ample room for the discussion of the contemporary situation in the Horn of Africa. Throughout the conference, a number of core themes and topics emerged that were picked up in different presentations and panels. One central concern was the relationship of the Cold War and colonialism. While some participants suggested to understand the Cold War on the African continent as a form of colonization, others focused on the nuances that a close study of Ethiopia—as the only African country that was never colonized—can make visible.
In regards to methodological approaches, there was strong agreement that collaborative research bridging different locales and scales would hold insights for the study of interlinkages and interdependencies in the Global Cold War. While no exemplary contributions were made by individual conference presentations, the overall conference discussion reflected this spirit quite well. Furthermore, the general emphasis of discussions lay in retracing the intricate power dynamics shaping the Cold War in the region and its geopolitical dynamics until today as straightforward international history rather than on post-colonial or deconstructivist approaches.

Thematically, different emphases emerged throughout the panels, binding the conference discussion together. First of all, a number of presentations gave much needed broader historical context. Michael Pesek explored African perspectives on the Cold War by analyzing the alliances that African states knit after independence. Abraha Woldu focused more closely on Ethiopia's shifting positions against the background of the Cold War and decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. Woldu highlighted how the Ethiopian Empire ultimately became

5 For general information on the Perthes collection, please see: "The Gotha Perthes Collection," Universität Erfurt, accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.uni-erfurt.de/en/the-gotha-perthes-collection/; For an overview of the cooperation between the Universities of Mekelle and Erfurt, please see: "Research Cooperation with Mekelle University (Ethiopia)," Universität Erfurt, accessed April 19, 2019, https://www.uni-erfurt.de/index.php?id=52752&L=1.
6 For a conference report, please see: Philipp Metzler, "Africa and the Global Cold War," H-Soz-Kult, January 22, 2019, https://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-8061.

a sponsor of the Non-Aligned Movement and host of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) having opened its political alliances with the Bandung conference. Both presentations were complemented nicely by Tewodros Hailemariam's contribution discussing the influence and changing focus of Marxist theory in Africa during the Global Cold War as a means to challenge dominant epistemic and political orders.

Other presentations dealt more closely with the international history of diplomacy in the Horn. Paul Skäbe explored the strategy of Jimmy Carter's administration in the Somali-Ethiopian confrontation which escalated in the Ogaden War. Skäbe highlighted the influence of the former station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency and journalist Paul Henze in shaping understandings of the political moment. Christian Methfessel analyzed the United Kingdom's role in the Ogaden War and the indirect influences that African states exercised in this geopolitical crisis as the British diplomats accounted for possible African responses to British action. Highlighting the obstacles to a concerted response by other African states or the United Nations Security Council, Methfessel's presentation related directly to Thomas Spielbüchler's earlier contribution on the failed conflict management mechanism of the OAU. Spielbüchler located the causes of its failure in the structuring impact of the Cold War and the preoccupation of African states on their recently gained national sovereignty. Again, taking a closer look at the repercussions of long-lasting conflict in Ethiopia on the social and political development in specific locales, Dessalegn Bizuneh examined the effects of the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and Cold War rivalry in the town of Metama at the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. Aychegrew Hadera explored the course of "development interventions" by international actors in the Kobo-Alamata Valley in Southern Tigray since the 1960s. Both presentations assessed the opportunities of local actors in relation to external influences in time of armed conflicts.

A key focus of the conference was the rise of a new global humanitarian discourse and activism in 1970s and 1980s in the context of the devastating famines in Ethiopia. Florian Wagner showed, for example, how arguments of humanitarian repatriation and resettlement were deployed in a functionalist and situationist manner by the TPLF in Northern Ethiopia who moved refugees back to their war-torn homelands in Tigray. Wagner compared their strategy to the 'mission' of Jewish activists in the United States of America to 'save' the Ethiopian Beta Israel by airlifting them to the Jewish state. Iris Schröder examined the 1980s as a turning point in international responses to humanitarian crises, such as the Ethiopian famine, fuelled by the activism of international non-governmental organizations. Schröder highlighted the impact of Western media coverage, notably a report by the British Broadcasting Corporation in raising global attention. This focus was further pursued by Franziska Rantzsch's discussion of East German media depictions of the Ethiopian famine, exploring the role of public opinion between Cold War rhetorics and the humanitarian turn of the 1980s

in a socialist state.

In fact, the relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Africa—the influences of their formative interests, ideas, and institutions—were another key concern of the conference. Ned Richardson-Little took up a popular focus of recent scholarship by discussing the entanglements between Africa and East Germany in human rights and international law. Richardson-Little showed how the emphasis of the GDR shifted from the promotion of self-determination in tune with African states to the protection of Europe from the Third World. Our, Maximilian's and Paul's joint presentation, suggested a more integrated understanding of East German 'International Solidarity' as the key concept of the GDR's relations with the decolonizing world. Paul continued the reflection on the possible meanings of 'solidarity' in his presentation on the little politicized understanding that young East Germans assumed for their deployment as solidarity workers in African states. Maximilian's presentation showcased another group of actors, the organizations of African students in the GDR as part of transnational networks. Criss-crossing the Iron Curtain to an unexpected degree these students enjoyed their liberties due to the desire of the East German leadership to sway post-colonial African elites in their favor.

Lastly, more presentations dealt with the question how our times were made from Third World interventions. Meressa Tsehaye focused on the connected cases of Eritrea and Ethiopia, paying special attention to dynamics of "mutual interventionist" nation building, while Gerezihe Haftu emphasized the implications of the Cold War for the current militarization in the Horn of Africa. Scrutinizing the possibility of a new Cold War, Solomon Abraha attested the end of liberal internationalism seeing it replaced by the influence of new global powers, religious or ethnic sectarianism, and the dominance of strongmen. In the final discussion of the conference, the predominance of quite conventional approaches to political history was noted. Participants called for the cultural dimensions of politics to be integrated more comprehensively in future discussions. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the relations between the state and civil society was a persistent theme of the conference that would warrant more systematic inspection. Other participants called for economic perspectives to be integrated more thoroughly in order to adequately understand the factors shaping the trajectory of the Cold War in the Horn. It was also noted how many contributions to the conference showcased the multiplicity of factors influencing seemingly small issues and re-connecting them to broader developments. Many participants pointed to quite concrete inspirations to be taken from this conference's discussion for their own work. Examples included the opportunities to focus on specific groups of actors, such as student organizations or the socialist Asian-African People's Solidarity Organization. Others suggested to emphasize the persisting importance of the "global colour line"[7] or to consider

7 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the*

institutionalized alternatives, such as the New International Economic Order, as well as the importance of Chinese alliances after the Sino-Soviet split.
Overall, it was a great experience to have participated in this conference.[8] All contributions were discussed in a cordial and cooperative spirit. We benefited greatly from the reflections of more seasoned scholars on our work and the conference's topic in general. Furthermore, it was enriching to learn from Ethiopian scholars and discuss their approaches to studying the Global Cold War and its continuing ramifications in the region. We were most impressed by presentations that closely focused on the entangled histories of specific locales within the wider political context and would have welcomed an even greater number of such approaches on the topic. In our view, it is vital to understand how specific local events had repercussions way beyond their immediate impact. Yet, it has to be acknowledged as well that the presentations of wider perspective were just as important to set the coordinates for the overall discussion.
This conference should be appreciated as an exemplary and quite successful attempt to facilitate dialogue between historians from Germany and Ethiopia. In that respect, we were especially glad to learn in how far the processes of the Global Cold War continue to inform the Ethiopian colleagues' perspectives on recent developments in the region. Still, we would have hoped for even more opportunities on the conference's margins to get to know the Ethiopian researchers and to further discuss their work in a more informal setting. Although we acknowledge the difficulties and sometimes unintended effects of splitting questions of organization between different cooperating partners, it is regrettable that the conference turned out to be such a male affair, with only two female presenters present.

Gladly, there are many plans to continue the cooperation between both sides. In our opinion, it would for example be useful to further integrate political science perspectives to account for demands to explain the current dramatic changes in the region without neglecting the contributions that historians make to the understanding of their trajectory. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to discuss aspects of the Cold War's memorization more explicitly.
Overall, this conference confirmed us in our view that the Horn of Africa's role in the Global Cold War warrants much more attention in scholarship. Such research could explore the role of development concepts in their socialist or capitalist forms, but also of an emerging global public with humanitarian and human rights concerns as meaningful changes in a region's geopolitics. The Ethiopian case also highlights the many contradictions or counter-intuitive dynamics within the Global Cold War, underlining how myopic standard accounts are that simplistically assume a world neatly divided between Soviet and American ideology. After all,

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International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8 Our participation was kindly supported by the Freie Universität Berlin's Ernst-Reuter-Gesellschaft through a travel stipend.

the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia were both pro-Soviet and somewhat socialist while they were fiercely fighting each other in the Ogaden War—both seeking Soviet assistance. At the same time, the TPLF emerged in Northern Ethiopia as armed and decidedly left-wing opposition against the Dergue government in Addis, seeking its support in Albanian socialism,[9] as well as the works of Lenin or Marx. Led by Meles Zenawi, the TPLF would take control of the Ethiopian government in 1991, nowadays confusingly denouncing the rule of the Dergue as the "Red Terror" of "Fascists."[10] This being merely a glimpse into the perplexing history of this world region during and after the Cold War, we came to our own perspective on the personality cult around the late Meles Zenawi that has gripped Tigray. Seeing the black-and-white image of the young Meles in decidedly Guevaresque style all around Mekelle (Figure 2), we thought that the Cold War struggle in which he played such a prominent role would indeed deserve to be lifted out of its relative obscurity. In its interlinkages to central processes around the world, it should receive some of the continuing attention for the iconic Cuban struggle. For us, the conference in Mekelle served as an excellent starting point in this quest.

9 Surprisingly, these Albanian relations are not picked up in: Elidor Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao: Albania and the Socialist World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017).
10 This is done in the "Red Terror" Martyrs' Memorial Museum in Addis Ababa.

Figure 1: Caption: The Karl Marx Statue in Addis Ababa. Photo: Maximilian Zinke.

Figure 2: Meles' Image at the TPLF Victory Monument in Mekelle. Photo: Maximilian Zinke.

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