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By

Joseph Beaden

Abstract

A shorter historiographical essay, examining the ways 'space' might be employed as an analytical category for the study of the nineteenth century. Japan, Germany, and Russia are often seen as latecomers to the modern world (if they arrived at all), and as a consequence are labelled passive recipients of an essentially Atlantic modernity. 'Eurasia' as a spatial category has been discarded, as our understanding of space focuses overwhelmingly on connectivity and exchange over conflict and consciousness. This essay argues that, in the realms of economic self-strengthening and the construction of national identities, these polities represent a common 'Eurasian' modernity, distinct from Western and colonial forms. The argument roots itself in the novel concept of 'cognitive space': space defined not by connectivity, but by coincidences of cognition stemming from common circumstance.

About the author

Joseph Beaden works primarily on the history of nationhood and identity, with a particular focus on modern Korea and Japan. As a self-described global historian, he is always keen to explore comparative, big-picture history, and the possibilities of new cross-disciplinary methodologies.

In *The Transformation of the World*, Jürgen Osterhammel makes two claims that frame the position of the 'Eurasia' as connective space and analytical category. Commenting on the geographical spaces of the nineteenth century, he states: "The Eurasian age (…) began with Genghis Khan and ended sometime before 1800. For the nineteenth century, "Eurasia" is not a spatial category of prime importance".[1]

Reproducing this quote may seem decadent, but it serves to illustrate the position of Eurasia in current narratives of global history. Both Osterhammel and his contemporary, John Darwin, relegate the space between Central Europe and Korea to the status of seedy back-alley in comparison to the congested oceanic thoroughfares of the Atlantic and Pacific. Partitioned by empires, no longer containing that strength which through the Khans shook earth and heaven, 'Eurasia' became another European frontier. Links between its great states became primarily oceanic, underwritten by European sea-power and characterised by unequal treaties and Western European economic gravity.

The marginalisation of Eurasia is based on Osterhammel's conception of space as entirely physical, material, and active. Of the five kinds suggested by Osterhammel, spaces imprint themselves onto the populations within them by way of physical environment or connectivity.[2] Yet space cannot think for itself—it is made real only through human experience. The nineteenth century was a period of what David Harvey calls 'time-space compression', during which space became less significant in the lives of many.[3] To attempt to speak of active material spaces, then, increasingly loses significance or defaults to ordering the world as the periphery of a European-centred 'world-system'. This periphery exists mostly economically, and inevitably echoes into the cultural domain. It is defined by its subordinate status in relation to the centre. The advance of technology similarly rendered physical distance less significant in this ordering as imperial power increasingly penetrated even the most remote spaces.[4]

This does not make space less useful as an analytical concept, but suggests that new approaches are needed to avoid a purely economic, Eurocentric interpretation. To this end, this essay suggests *spaces of cognition* as an additional category of spatial analysis. These are spaces that, by the lived experiences of those within them and their relations to the world around them, and despite connectivity or lack of it, produce 'co-incidences' of similar worldview, ideology, and action. It is the contention of this essay that Eurasia continues to exist meaningfully in the nineteenth century as a cognitive space.

When analysing cognition, we are lucky to have one concept that dominates the study of thought, both everyday and intellectual, during the nineteenth century—*modernity*. What features defined this Eurasian modernity? To a degree, these were features common to all forms. Pericles Lewis notes three primary features of modernity in the English-speaking context: crisis of representation, crisis of liberalism, and crisis of reason.[5] The English-speaking world, with Britain at its hegemonic helm, experienced these as instances of moderated creation. The crisis of representation tackled life within industrial modernity, rewriting Britain's self-confidence as much as its anxiety. The crisis of liberalism saw the

franchise gradually extended—notably to women in 1918. The crisis of reason saw the world redefined in rationalist, Darwinian terms—'survival of the fittest' devoured any teleology. As the planet's apex predator, however, Britain had less to fear than others.

The opposite of moderated creation was uncontrolled destruction. This was most obvious in instances of 'colonial modernity', where the crises of modernity were twinned inexorably with the crushing experience of colonialism.[6] This analytical concept stemmed from a need to articulate informal European empire in East Asia, but has found applications in the study of Japanese colonialism in Korea, particularly by Gi-Wok Shin and Michael Robinson.[7] Nayoung Aimee Kwon takes this concept further, tackling the crisis of representation in Korean literature—a crisis made more acute by the need for representation to conform to imperial interests.[8] Across East Asia, modernity became tied to the immanent, often hostile 'West'. Colonial modernity saw all three crises become more acute in their psychological and social impact. Deprived of political agency, however, this condition did not enduringly impact the behaviour of states until later processes of decolonisation.

Modernity exists in myriadic different forms. Western modernity and colonial modernity are far from the only possibilities. Still, they serve to conveniently situate the subject of this paper. Eurasian modernity, then, sits between these two conditions. Its qualia include the mixed suspicion, adoration, and disavowal of the 'West' shared with colonised peoples, mixed with the cautious optimism of a rapidly industrialising state. Still possessing sovereignty, the crises of modernity manifested as political and strategic anxieties, often producing uncontrolled suspicion, conflict, and violence between Eurasian powers.

This essay traces these two strands to make the case for Eurasian modernity. Japan, Germany, and Russia experienced Eurasian modernity in different ways, reminiscent of their unique cultural, political, and historical circumstances. The life of the average citizen would have differed radically in each polity, but here lies the central argument of this paper: space is not determined solely by what it can *make*, but by what it can *make its inhabitants think*. In each case this paper tackles the crisis of representation as articulated by the ideological 'nation building' of intellectuals, and then the manifestation of this work at the international, strategic level. It argues that the writing of modernity onto space through international interaction, conflict, and strategic 'self-strengthening' recreated, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a meaningful Eurasian space.

Beginning with Germany, this paper addresses nation-building, economic hyper-modernity, and the subversion of liberal nationalism during unification. Its strategic participation in Eurasian space will be addressed via Germany's colonial experience in eastern Europe, and its political similarities to Russia. It will then move to Japan and discuss its successful industrialisation and entrance into Eurasian power politics through its defeat of Russia in 1905. Finally this essay will address Russia, its strategic competition with both Germany and Japan, and its attempts to find alternatives to Western modernity

through its conditional adoption of citizenship and nationality as political concepts. The pursuit by intellectuals of a 'Eurasian' identity beyond the national echoed efforts in Germany and Japan to construct distinct domestic nationalisms.

Like any good circus, this essay has a number of elephants in its room. The first is the overlap between 'Eurasia' as meaningful spatial category, and Eurasia as Russian ideological project, to be addressed in the section on Russia. Secondly, though central to any treatment of Eurasia, due to the failure of the Hundred Days' Reforms and its lack of sovereign agency during this period, China (like Korea) has reluctantly been treated as falling within the space of colonial modernity during this period, rather than Eurasia. Finally, the trio of states selected for this study may raise eyebrows. Eurasian modernity may be applied to a range of contexts in the nineteenth century and beyond: polities from Austria-Hungary to Qajar Persia experienced similar symptoms, and might be profitably analysed in the same way. Germany, Japan, and Russia were selected in this case to highlight the trilateral lattice of anxieties that bound the three states together.

Germany

In highlighting the distinctiveness of Germany's encounter with nationhood and modernity, this essay does not seek to reinvigorate the *Sonderweg*. This thesis, fallen out of fashion since the 1990s, characterises a broad sweep of scholarship that found the origins of the Nazi cataclysm in the *Kaiserreich*.[9] These works constructed narratives in which Germany deviated from the Western norm: its authoritarian government and the artificiality of its nationalism—both rendering Germany's nineteenth century nothing more than the skeleton of more monstrous futures.[10] Naturally we cannot see modernity as a linear movement toward a Western standard. We can, however, highlight aspects of the German experience that evidence commonality with Russia and Japan—an epidermis of nationalist hypermodernity concealing the ancient and tortured sinew of a multi-ethnic Eurasian empire. The aspirations of its liberals and conservatives were bent up together, feathering into myriad different ways of being 'modern' and 'German'.[11] In essence, the reaction of Germans to their rising status in a world of established hierarchies, the pursuit of alternative modernities to guide them, and the commonalities of this experience with others across Eurasia provide the basis for this comparison.

Germany, Geoff Eley argues, differed from the West in its excess of modernity. By the twentieth century the Atlantic world looked to Germany as the standard of success, through the productivity of its factories and the genius of its technology.[12] Joachim Radkau's argument that hypermodernity ushered in an 'age of nervousness', defined by economic, social, and existential anxieties, reflects this. In this paradigm Kaiser Wilhelm II became the symbol of a hypermodern Germany—reckless and paranoid, yet wielding vast economic and military might.[13] Wilhelm sat at the intersection of the 'encirclement' anxieties of Bismarck, and the crushing personal pressure of the urban capitalist routine. Germany's economic and political success was predicated on continued economic expansion, and the

navigation of an increasingly hostile diplomatic status quo.[14] As in Japan, demands for democracy ran up against an economic and militaristic paranoia in which both peace-time production and wartime violence became integral to a national project centred on preserving German modernity.[15]

One example of this consciousness was the *Werkbund*, a society of artists, architects, and designers intimately involved with artistic movements such as the Bauhaus school. Founded in 1907, it was promoted by writer Joseph August Lux as a way to concentrate German artistic ingenuity into the project of national self-strengthening.[16] Art, he argued, took on a moral imperative under modernity—to strengthen the 'cultural power' of German society, particularly by promoting bourgeois domesticity as the zenith of modern civilised life.[17] The links drawn between German production and national strength echoed the militaristic machismo of the discourse on 'German work' analysed by Sebastian Conrad. Driven by the increasingly central status of 'work' in regimented modern life, German society embraced the idea that German production was qualitatively different and superior—that work was essential to the strength of the nation.[18] This was not a view unique to Germany, yet it was backed by the force of real economic strength, and found far broader popular support than top-down modernisation efforts in Japan and Russia. 'German work' was reinforced by foreign reaction to it. In Britain, German competition was perceived as a genuine threat to British hegemony, a condition shared by Russia in central Asia.[19] This Darwinist paranoia is the first sign of a cognitive partition between Eurasian and Oceanic worlds: to imagine your neighbours as red in tooth and claw makes it easier to imagine them as other.

Economic nationalism coupled with practises of violent colonialism in eastern Europe, in cooperation and competition with Russia. Philip Ther argues that Germany, despite a majority German population, was shaped by its experience in Poland into building a multi-ethnic empire in the model of Russia or Austria. The reality of German empire was constructed in Central Europe, long before its brief flash of ambition in Africa and Asia.[20] Naturally this must be qualified. Germany was far less dependent on multi-ethnic cooperation than either Russia or Austria. Nevertheless, this colonial experience transcended the historical circumstances of Wilhelmine Germany, finding its origins in the strategic priorities of the pre-unification Prussian state, and its conclusion in the genocidal violence of the 1940s.[21] Despite its efforts to compete with the West in the arena of hypermodernity, Germany could not escape the logic of the space it occupied. Facing Russification from the east, and the anti-Catholic policies from the West, Poland was crushed within a shared lattice of violent assimilation.[22] The transition from Prussian to German empires was a marginal one, changing little about the political reality of the Prussian state. The new empire inherited its generally eastern-facing strategic outlook, its reluctance to embrace democratic institutions, and its autocratic militarism.[23]

Annemarie Sammartino deepens this perspective, analysing the Kaiserreich from the perspective of Russian historiography and highlighting a number of similarities. Both

Germany and Russia denied nationalisms and identities not supportive of imperial projects. The Prussian monarchy wrapped itself in German nationalist armour to silence and integrate other German identities. The *Kulturkampf*—the political campaign initiated by Bismarck to weaken the ties between German Catholics and the papacy—illustrated the effect of this mindset on southern Germany.[24] Indeed, the Prussian empire failed to fulfil the German nationalist aspirations it claimed to support. Hagen Schulze argued that, in creating a *Kleindeutschland* based around an autocratic Prussian monarchy, Bismarck's conquest had successfully sidelined nationalism in its liberal form.[25] Though he amends this argument to frame unification as a dialectical process by which Bismarck made concessions to liberals, the empire created bore little in common with the liberal visions expressed during 1848. Despite its hypermodernity, Germany's empire was an autocratic one, engaged with Russia in the dance of Eurasian imperial geopolitics. Frustrated in its ambition to challenge the maritime power balance, and thus distanced from the modernity of the Oceanic worlds, it had more in common with its eastern neighbour—the form and conduct of its politics, its complex semipermeable approach to the West—than with Britain or France.

By the 1870s this autocratic nature had met in concert with a shift of nationalism toward the right. Eric Hobsbawm argues that it was an emergent middle class, their fortunes closely tied to an industrialising national economy, that caused this shift. Their insecurities drove their embracement of anti-Semitic and xenophobic ideas, and as leftist movements came often to oppose the nation, the right began to gain a sole monopoly on nationalist rhetoric.[26] In Germany this saw what John Breuilly calls the 'national idea' being invoked to support greater centralisation within the new federal empire. This led national liberals to take up common cause with the autocratic monarchy—an illiberal position that led naturally to illiberal outcomes. The similarities between the German and Russian empires is what may have prompted John Darwin to group together the three powers of the *Dreikaiserbund* (Germany, Austria, and Russia) as the stuttering and reactionary shadow of Europe—inheriting only the most violent impulses of European imperialism.[27] This approach is of no more use than A.J.P. Taylor's diagnosis of an autocratic engine driving Germany towards pre-determined genocidal outcomes.[28] Germany was part of a cognitive Eurasian space—not shadowing Europe but responding to it—as well as a product of its own internal strategic logic. Its hypermodernity, its economic and militaristic nationalism, and its participation in patterns of multi-ethnic Eurasian empire reflect this. Germany's economics, politics, and imperialism were driven by its attempts to mediate Western modernity, whilst building an empire that could continue to compete in Eurasian power-politics. Spatial reality mediated not just materiality, but cognition.

Japan

Japan's first official encounter with the Prussian state came with the Eulenburg expedition of 1860. This expedition, though insignificant in itself, evidences Prussian interaction with Japan around this time. When attending the funeral of two murdered Russian soldiers, the delegates commented on the overwhelming number of Prussians at the

ceremony—a Prussian chaplain officiating, and a Prussian gunboat offshore.[29] This incident highlights the lived experience of Eurasian cognitive space. The Prussian state, by the presence of its delegates and its navy, sought to strengthen its relationships with Russia and Japan. Such interactions between Westerners in East Asia were not uncommon. The lives of foreign communities in China and Japan often bridged cultural and political boundaries. Still, the political implications of this mutual support in regards to such a diplomatically fraught issue should not be understated.

In the case of Japan, this cooperation continued in more practical ways. The leaders of Kishu domain, seeking to challenge the military advancement of the southern Daimyos, invited Carl Köppen, a Prussian military instructor, to reform their army.[30] Though Kishu domain sided with the Tokugawa, ending up on the wrong side of the Satsuma rebellion and subsequent Meiji restoration, its Prussian-style force was integrated into the new imperial army. Officers trained in Prussian doctrine challenged the dominance of British, Dutch, and French military ideas. By 1885, a second instructor, Klemens von Meckel, was hired to build on this work, supporting the Japanese victory against China in 1894.[31]

Japan's desire to build a modern military, and one based on a mixture of models, was a result of its forcible integration into the global trade economy following the Perry expedition of 1854. Conrad points out that for the new, modernising elite, 'The Reich constitution, which was seen as a 'third way' between absolutism and egalitarian democratisation, was used as a model for the Meiji constitution of 1889'.[32] Germany provided Japan an example for how a late-comer might hold their own in a European-dominated world. Japan thus became part of the Eurasian cognitive space. Comparing two land empires and an island archipelago may seem unusual, however, Japan quickly entered Eurasian power politics through its expansion into Korea and Manchuria. Additionally, as a cognitive space, Eurasia in the nineteenth century was not necessarily defined by its physical geography, but by the worldview imposed by forces within and without.

The first of these forces was the tidal influence of Western modernity. Between Japan's opening in 1854 and the Meiji restoration of 1868, the elites of Japan faced humiliation through unequal economic treaties, and the psychological effect of new strategic and existential anxieties.[33] At first, this manifested as an inexorable attraction toward the West. Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote of 'leaving Asia' to become a Western nation in 1885. For him, Asia was defined by its backwardness and its inability to provide answers to the problems of modernity. As the twentieth century arrived, however, Japanese intellectuals reevaluated their continental neighbours, seeing in Asia a source of strength and community. Okakura Tenshin, writing fifteen years later, saw the communitarianism of Confucian society as a counter to the individualistic materialism of Europe. For historians Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian, this was Japan's 'revolt against the west'.[34] Japan was not alone in this enterprise. Intellectuals across Asia sought ways to understand their culture under the shadow of European colonialism. In these discussions, viewing itself as an Asian liberator, Japan took centre stage.[35] The aesthetic and communitarian values that

came to define this revolt were broadly grouped under the heading 'national body' or *kokutai*. The construction of this national body was not a coherent project, but a diffuse one. As Carol Gluck points out, the writers of ideology were spread throughout society—the 'fitful and inconsistent' project of a diverse elite.[36]

Within all these projects, however, we find an anxiety reflective of the German case. One Japanese writer commented on the adoption of days off on Sundays: 'Even if we cause the people to run day and night, we shall not overtake the West in less than a few decades. If such is the case, how much longer will it take if they waste a day each week?'.[37] This parallels the spread of 'nervousness' in the model of Radkau. The construction of the political nation was linked directly to the strengthening of its economy. The outcome was an anxiety that penetrated all arenas of economic life, transforming even the most mundane of activities into a scrambling battle for national survival.

The 'return to Asia', and the growing confidence to challenge Western norms, did not exist in a vacuum. The Russo-Japanese War was the first major military victory for an Asian power over a European one. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea—overturning a lattice of power shared with China and Russia.[38] Seiji Lippit identifies this confidence with 'Taisho cosmopolitanism', born of a new generation's seeming familiarity with an increasingly globalised world.[39] Where Harootunian sees a genuine opening to the world—a flowering beyond the siege mentality—Lippit sees the reinforcement of the illusion of the West. Its status as other is entrenched as its reality is transformed into a fantastical illusion.[40] As Japan came to grips with its own crisis of representation, its disavowal of, yet magnetic pull toward, the West reproduced itself as a permanent feature of Japanese modernity. Intellectually, Japan had been drawn into the Eurasian cognitive space.

This spatial move also took place at the strategic level. The annexation of Korea drew Japan intractably into a strategic logic of expansion—first Korea to better defend Japan, then Manchuria to better defend Korea. Korea had been secured with the defeat of Russia, an event that, Rotem Kowner argues, inaugurated Japan's entrance into Eurasian power politics.[41] In Germany, Wilhelm II became increasingly agitated at the idea of a 'yellow peril', commissioning a telling painting depicting Germania as the defender of Europe against Japanese expansion. Though functionally an attempt to draw the US into closer cooperation with Germany, the painting illustrated Wilhelm's personal anxieties.[42] Japan's victory was thus both confirmation and question. It affirmed the German belief that a kind of Darwinian aggression was central to strategic success, whilst prompting them to reassess the balance of power in Europe. Russia was now compromised by humiliating defeat, and increasingly clashed with Germany. Both ideologically and strategically, Japan was now an Eurasian nation.

Russia

Russia differs markedly from the first two victims of our comparison. The Russian empire did not experience hypermodernity, a unifying nationalist movement, or expend

undue effort ideologically uniting its subjects. Its experience of the Eurasian cognitive space was defined by relative passivity on the part of the Tsarist regime, and the strongest rejection of Western modernity on the part of non-state intellectuals.

Yanni Kotsonis treats Russian modernity in a way by now familiar—to remove it from the list of 'incomplete' modernities, to examine what was achieved in Russia's nineteenth century, and the relationship of the West to these changes.[43] A broad trend identified by Kotsonis and other authors is the gradual extension of citizenship and nationhood within the empire. The term *narodnost* had gradually matured into a general term for ethnicity or nation. Charles Steinwedel argues that in the 1880s and 1890s, this new concept was increasingly used to differentiate between peoples. Where previously religion and 'estate' had dominated imperial views of subject peoples, as opponents of the state began to spring from increasingly varied religious and economic backgrounds, ethnicity began to be employed as a more flexible category.[44] This was accompanied, under the reign of Alexander III, with the increasing association of the empire with Russian ethnicity.

This gradual shift, though not the economic hypermodernity of Japan and Germany, did inaugurate new kinds of citizenship and subsequent political rights, and with them the arrival of Eurasian modernity. Alexander Morrison argues that *narodnost* became the foundation for a Western-inspired, if vague, form of citizenship. Imperial subjects, particularly in Asia, gained access to local government through these forms, no longer bound by military rule.[45] Kotsonis sees these intellectual shifts as evidence that Russia shared a framework of modernity with the West.[46] The distance between Russian and Western concepts of citizenship and nationality, however, undermines this. Russian concepts of citizenship, however inspired by the West, served to reinforce Russia's own, illiberal modernity.

The idea of Russia as an overland extension of European imperialism goes hand-in-hand with the rejection of Eurasia as meaningful space. When we recognise Russia as the eastern frontier of colonial expansion, it becomes easier to reject any claims to the distinctiveness of a 'Eurasian civilisation'. As a concept, 'Eurasia' has recently returned to prominence through Russian intellectuals seeking to push a nationalist agenda centred on Russian exceptionalism.[47] John Darwin is quick to point out that, despite its ideological claims, Russia is as much a European empire as Britain or France. He presents Russian expansion as following the same patterns, driven by the same economic, cultural and security incentives.[48] We should not let our resistance to contemporary ideological projects twist our understanding, however. Though viewing Russia as the eastern arm of Europe elucidates much, it also silences those Russian intellectuals and statesmen that did view themselves as distinct from Europe.

In many cases, it was intellectuals outside of the Tsarist state, and opposed to it, who imagined Eurasia. Marlene Laruelle begins her history of Russian Eurasianism with these exiles—intellectuals who, having failed in the attempted revolution of 1905, sought new forms of personal and national identity.[49] Though this Eurasian movement would only truly

mature in the 1920s, it was not bound to the Russian state in the manner of its twenty-first century echoes. Matthew Schmidt is quick to point out that early Eurasianism was not necessarily coherent or politically engaged enough to become imperial ideology.[50] In some ways it thus resembles the cosmopolitan nationalisms of Germany and Japan—sidelined by the state, and subsumed when convenient.

The Eurasianists were also not the only group imagining transnational alternatives to Western modernity. Anarchism, an intellectual movement that grew to maturity in Russia, actively and violently opposed Western capitalism. Steven Marks sees anarchism as Russia's first true intellectual export. It was Russian thinkers who developed anarchism into a true programme of revolutionary action.[51] Anarchism was also essentially transnational—Russian thinkers travelled to support the revolutionary cause in Spain, Italy, and notably, Japan. Sho Konishi documents the emergence of this transnational 'anarchist modernity', developed by intellectuals in transit between the two countries. Notable among these thinkers was Lev Mechnikov, who saw the roots of Japan's modernisation in the ability of its workers to adopt technology and production techniques independent of state guidance.[52] Japan's restoration was an Asian revolution, and a middle path for Russia to follow. This conclusion obviously echoed the Japanese view of Germany's industrialisation—a middle ground preserving both culture and independence, whilst strengthening the nation. The exiles of 1905 built intellectual networks across Eurasian space, reaching both east and west. Though not supported by the state, they contributed as much to the creation of Eurasian cognitive space as state diplomacy.

Strategically, Russia formed the bridge between Germany and Japan—the military backbone of the Eurasian space. Alex Marshall's history of the Russian general staff highlights the sense of paranoia this created, with constant debates between Asian and European frontiers.[53] This was encirclement anxiety in the manner of Germany and Japan, and in turn informed the anxieties of both nations. Russia's eventual defeat by Japan led to a broad withdrawal from Asia, but for the majority of the period, Russia participated in strategic contests with both, helping to push the boundaries of cognitive space into reality. Though it shared strategic concerns, the Tsarist regime was unable to mobilise society toward military ends to the same degree as Germany and Japan—evidenced by its defeat in 1917.

Conclusion

Eurasia, as a spatial category, was made not by cooperation, connectivity, or geography, but by the shared mindsets of those within it. This paper has attempted to present space not just as a physical category, but as a set of circumstances and resulting anxieties that inform the decisions of historical actors. This was a process of interaction, but also of co-incidence. Eurasian modernity, the condition between Western hegemony and colonial subjugation, was an experience created by the intellectual and economic pressures of industrialisation, and strategic pressures of competing in a continuous geographic space surrounded by maritime empires. In Germany and Japan, this manifested as radical anti-

Western nationalism, facilitated by the social and strategic opportunities of rapid industrialisation. Even in Russia, where industrialisation was slower, strategic competition drove attempts to articulate unique forms of identity and modernity. Eurasia was no longer the trade highway of the early modern period, but for the nineteenth century it remains a useful spatial category by which to analyse the empires within it.

Moving forward, this re-conceptualisation of space presents possibilities for further inquiry. Several additional concepts might be introduced to strengthen the link between the intellectual and physical worlds. Duncan Bell's concept of 'mythscape' provides the ground on which forms of identity might be related more explicitly to 'cognitive space'.[54] The mathematical concept of 'state-space' might allow a more comprehensive mapping of historical forms of identity, and how those identities impinge on the more material aspects of history. When the divisions between concepts, times, and places are blurred—as in the Eurasian cases presented in this paper—a more holistic, more global history might be constructed.

Notes

[1] Jürgen Osterhammel and Patrick Camiller, T*he Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 104.

[2] Osterhammel and Camiller, T*he Transformation of the World*, 94.

[3] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Wiley, 1990), 10.

[4] Stephen Halsey, "Sovereignty, Self-strengthening, and Steamships in Late Imperial China," *Journal of Asian History* 48, no.1 (2014): 84, https://doi.org/10.13173/jasiahist.48.1.0081.

[5] Pericles Lewis, *The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

[6] Tani Barlow, "Debates over colonial modernity in east Asia and another alternative," *Cultural Studies* 26, no. 5 (2012): 618, https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2012.711006.

[7] Gi-Wok Shin and Michael Edson Robinson, *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 5.

[8] Nayoung Aimee Kwon, *Intimate Empire: Collaboration and Colonial Modernity in Korea and Japan* (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 14.

[9] Matthew Jefferies, *Contesting the German Empire, 1871-1918* (Oxford: Wiley, 2008), 48.

[10] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History* (London: Butler and Tanner, 1962) is a good example drawing a causal narrative directly from the eighteenth century to the rise of Hitler.

[11] John Breuilly, *The State of Germany: The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation-state* (London: Longman, 1992), 13.

[12] Geoff Eley, Jennifer Jenkins, and Tracie Matysik, *German Modernities from Wilhelm to Weimar: A Contest of Futures* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 66.

[13] Jefferies, *Contesting the German Empire*, 181.

[14] Shigeki Sato, *The Politics of Nationhood in Germany and Japan* (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1998), 4.

[15] Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.

[16] Eley, *German Modernities*, 65.

[17] Jennifer Jenkins, "Introduction: Domesticity, Design and the Shaping of the Social," *German History* 25, no. 4 (2007): 465, https://doi.org/10.1177/0266355407082760.

[18] Sebastian Conrad and Sorcha O'Hagan, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74.

[19] Conrad and O'Hagan, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, 44.

[20] Jefferies, C*ontesting the German Empire*, 171.

[21] Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, *Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914-1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 229.

[22] Conrad and O'Hagan, *Globalisation and the Nation*, 387.

[23] Annemarie Sammartino, "Alternative Modernities: Imperial Germany through the Lens of Russia," in Eley, *German Modernities*, 86.

[24] Sammartino, 89.

[25] Hagen Schulze and Sarah Hanbury Tenison, *The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-1867* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,1991), 101.

[26] Breuilly, *The State of Germany*, 13.

[27] John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 227.

[28] Taylor, *The Course of German History*.

[29] Sebastian Dobson, "Photography and the Prussian Expedition to Japan, 1860-61," *History of Photography* 33, no. 2 (2009): 124, https://doi.org/10.1080/03087290902767893.

[30] Xavier Bara, "The Kishū Army and the Setting of the Prussian Model in Feudal Japan, 1860–1871," *War in History* 19, no. 2 (2012): 152, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098427.

[31] Bara, "The Kishū Army and the Setting of the Prussian Model in Feudal Japan, 1860–1871", 171.

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